### TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919–2006 Facts and Analyses with Documents

#### Edited by Baskın Oran

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#### Preface

#### A New Kind of Book

The authors of this book are academics who studied Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy through Events), the main book used in Turkish universities in this field since the end of 1960s.

The surest sign of the success of a book is when the people who have used it cease to be satisfied with it at some point. This also applies to a person, an institution, or a system. Having grown up with this textbook, we have assimilated it to such an extent that we rarely refer to it in this book. Because we now consider it to have become inadequate, we have written the present work.

Why inadequate? Above all, because, in effect, it ended in 1971. The rest was very brief, consisting almost exclusively of headings. Overall, the authors determined what subjects would be dealt with, whereas it should have been the other way around. The book had no editor, so it did not have internal consistency. It lacked a unified style, and its language had become archaic. Because it was a product of the Cold War years, it was difficult for the authors to diverge from commonly held views, which gave the book an "official history" flavor. To cite an example, the Sadabad Pact signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan was described as being directed against Italy.

Bearing in mind that the readership in Turkey for foreign policy books is relatively restricted, the authors felt that the present book, the result of the labors of fourteen specialists working together over three and a half years, should be broader in scope than a specialized university textbook. That is why it was written with an eye to appeal even to high school graduates interested in the subject.

#### Approach, Form, and Content

The present book has been conceived and realized with this novel approach in mind. First, each contribution has been based on a carefully worked-out plan and repeatedly reviewed by the editor. In this manner, all the contributions conform to the same standard. Special care has been taken to make the text readable. Explanatory notes have been provided in boxes for those concepts and terms that may not be familiar to the average reader.

Second, the authors have been selected according to the subject. That is to say, instead of having a particular author write about a certain period, each subject has been entrusted to an expert.

The third distinguishing feature is that the book may be read vertically in chronological order or horizontally according to themes. In other words, the reader can follow Turkey's policies vis-à-vis all countries over a certain period (say, 1919 to 1923) or can study Turkey's policies in relation to a specific country in different periods from 1919 to 2006. In this manner, we have eliminated the shortcomings of the exclusively chronological approach, where the reader cannot follow the relations with a specific country without interruptions, and the shortcomings of the thematic approach, where relations with specific countries cannot be seen in relation to the full historical background of the period.

Fourth, the different periods represent all parts of the theoretical approach outlined in the introduction and not disjointed bilateral relations. Care has been taken to integrate the periods to bring out the continuity of foreign policy.

Fifth, we have taken steps at the beginning of the discussion of each period to provide the reader with a view of the period in its differing aspects and also as a whole. We have included tables that contain the names of the principal actors in foreign policy (head of state, head of government, minister of foreign affairs, secretary-general/permanent undersecretary of the ministry) and the dates of their tenures. The chapter "Appraisal of the Period" first analyzes "The International Environment and Dynamics" as well as "The Domestic Environment and Dynamics" before discussing the foreign policy produced by these factors and examining bilateral relations. Our intention is to provide not snapshots but a reel of film. At the same

time, detailed tables containing data on Turkey's foreign economic relations and macroeconomic performance are also included, because foreign policy cannot be studied without reference to economic developments.

Finally, in addition to its novel approach, this book also offers the reader new findings on Turkey's foreign relations. An example is the section dealing with payments relating to Mosul petroleum.

What must be emphasized about this book's approach is the great effort that has been made to attain maximum objectivity. In providing and interpreting data and information, we have consistently adopted a neutral position. Facts appearing to favor Turkey have not been exaggerated; nor have facts reflecting negatively on Turkey been suppressed. The information has been reflected accurately without embellishment.

From the point of view of language, the Turkish names for Aegean islands are accompanied by the Greek names in parentheses. When interpreting a provision of a treaty, we generally provide the original text rather than summarizing the provision. We did not want the reader to accept our interpretation without seeing the original text. We have avoided using expressions like "we," "our country," "our nation," and "our foreign policy," preferring to use "Turkey," "Turkish foreign policy," and "Turkey's interest."

In regard to substance, we have tried to maintain objectivity by making sure that each country's system and views are reflected before taking up its bilateral relations with Turkey, because interpretations without understanding the other side or knowing its motives could easily lead to error. Thus we have made an effort to explain the internal politics and external relations and viewpoints of countries such as the U.S., the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Greece with which Turkey has maintained intensive relations.

The reason for this approach is not only to achieve objectivity but also to enable those who pursue Turkey's interests to do this more effectively by seeing the viewpoint of the other side. If young people today are taught to believe that "in such and such a case we were right and country X was wrong" with no explanation of what the other side's arguments were, then they can commit serious errors when they reach positions of responsibility, for the facts might be very different from what they were taught. The conduct of foreign policy leaves no room for error, because the stakes are extremely high.

Another characteristic of this book is its interdisciplinary approach. All important concepts and technical terms are explained in a concise form in separate boxes to enable those who are not familiar with Turkish foreign policy to follow the text without referring to other sources. During the courses on diplomatic history that I gave as guest professor at the Department of International Relations of a not-so-newly established university in 1995 and 1996, I discovered that my students did not have an adequate knowledge of general history, Turkish foreign policy, international law, political science, economics, current international affairs, or philosophy. Therefore I was forced to provide background information in parentheses to enable my students to overcome their limitations. This method worked very well, and the information contained in boxes in this book serves the same purpose.

In addition, we have included illustrations and maps to facilitate the use of this book and render it more effective, thus making the use of an atlas unnecessary. We have tried to liven up the text by including political cartoons and photographs.

The order in which we present Turkey's bilateral relations is designed to facilitate the reader's understanding of the subject. Historical events to which reference is frequently made (like Montreux, Mosul, and Hatay) are explained more extensively and in greater detail. Unless otherwise stated, documents and treaty texts are drawn from İsmail Soysal's book, which is the most comprehensive source on the subject. For the texts relating to Mudros, Sèvres, and Lausanne, unless otherwise indicated, we have relied on the research of Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay.

### Spelling, Explanatory Notes, and Acknowledgments

Having placed explanatory information in the boxes, we indicate sources in parentheses in the text when the material is attributable to a single study or in the case of a dissenting opinion or an important piece of information or interpretation. When dealing with Turkish proper names after 1934, we use surnames, which became compulsory for Turkish citizens at that time (for example, Atatürk). For periods before 1934, we employ the name in use at that time (for example, Mustafa Kemal); at the first mention of the name, we indicate the future surname in square brackets (for example, Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk]).


This is a long book. Despite all our efforts, errors may have crept into its pages. We would appreciate the reader's assistance in identifying these errors and letting us know by sending an e-mail message to us at oran@politics.ank ara.edu.tr. We will gladly acknowledge your correspondence and make sure the necessary rectifications are made in future editions.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance provided to us. The authors would like to thank the following friends and scholars: Hüsnü Abbas, Mustafa Akkaya, Sina Akşin, Ayşenur Alpaslan, Ali Arsın, Mustafa Kemal Basa, Sertaç Başeren, Abdülrezak Bilgin, Hakan Bingün, Ali Rıza Cihan, Nezih Danyal, Gökhan Erdem, Aydemir Erman, Haluk Gerger, Bülent Gökay, Mustafa İsen, Orhan Koloğlu, Hasan Köni, Deniz Kuru, Bilsay Kuruç, Gün Kut, Faruk Loğoğlu, Ünal Maraşlı, Bülent Meriç, Necil Nedimoğlu, Tan Oral, Nimet Özbek, İnan Özyıldız, Yücel Sayman, İstemihan Talay, İlhan Tekeli, Eser Torun, Nihat Tuna, and Nuri Yeşilyurt. Special gratitude is of course due to Mustafa Akşin, who translated the book; to Ünal Ünsal, who reviewed the text; and to our copyeditor, Kathy Burford Lewis, who checked everything.

As editor, I would like to note that it is a rare event for so many scholars to work together for years to produce a book with unity and consistency. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my colleagues who read and contributed to my portion of the text and who responded positively to all my requests during our three and a half years of collaboration.

As this book was being written and especially in the final stages, my wife, Feyhan, stayed up with me until dawn and with her ever-bright disposition never allowed me to get a true inkling of how much she had been neglected. To her, I offer a terse "thank you" full of love.

BASKIN ORAN



# Introduction

Turkish Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice

From Empire to Nation-State: Similarities and Differences in Foreign Policy

The many similarities and differences between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic are also reflected in their foreign policies.

The foreign policies of these two states exhibit striking similarities, because they share the same geography and population, with one being the successor of the other.

Both have based their existence on two basic tenets: to be aware of the balance of power and use it for survival and to steer clear of wars involving others unless directly threatened.

The early phases of the Ottoman Empire were characterized by the drive to conquer ever more territory. Once this expansion was checked in the seventeenth century, however, its foreign policy, like that of its predecessor the Byzantine Empire, was compelled to take the course of relying on the prevailing balance of power. Yet in the final phase the Ottoman Empire got involved in the inferno of World War I, when it could very well have kept out. This decision by Enver Paşa is the only such example and brought the empire to its end.

Although the similarities in the foreign policies of the two states are numerous, the differences arising from the contrasting philosophies of the two states are also considerable.

The Ottoman Empire was based on the principle of immutability. It wanted to preserve a multinational, multireligious, multisectarian empire within its existing borders and its heterogeneous population despite the advent of the age of nationalism, without making any changes in its basic political, economic, and ideological structure.

The founding of the Turkish Republic, in contrast, is based on the principle of change. It strove to ensure its survival on a smaller territory, with a fairly homogeneous population. It is also attempting to restructure itself fundamentally, according to the model of a Western contemporary civilization. It is aware that its predecessor fell because it failed to adapt to changing conditions.

This book traces the reflection of this change process in the country's foreign policy. It also describes how the Turkish Republic's failings in conforming to "contemporary civilization" led to difficulties in its foreign relations.

We can now look into the factors influencing foreign policy after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

### The Overall Framework of Turkish Foreign Policy

#### Basic Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign Policy

We can study the elements affecting Turkish foreign policy under the following headings. These elements can be positive or negative, giving this foreign policy a complex character.

#### A. The Cultural Dimension

Turkey has numerous ties and links to various cultures. These can be classified as Central Asian, Middle Eastern-Islamic, and Western.

#### Central Asian

The origin of the Turks of Asia Minor is Central Asia. The traces of this are still visible. About 97% of Turkey's territory lies in Asia. Its society bears the traces of feudal and nomadic cultures. The prevalence of kebabs (grilled meat) and pita bread in the popular cuisine attests that nomadic people do not grow vegetables and must confine their diets to meat and cereals. In domestic politics the tendency is to eliminate an adversary rather than to seek a compromise to attain a win-win situation. It cannot be said that politicians are of a high caliber. There is a tendency to rely on strong leaders rather than on sound institutions. When a military coup occurs, it is able to gather popular support because the people are more used to authority than to democracy, whether in the family or in public life.

Another Central Asian trait is that people often stoically accept oppression and difficulty but, at the same time, may be easily roused and may show disproportionate reactions. This can also carry into foreign relations. A rational negotiator can be taken by surprise to encounter a violent reaction after long and patient negotiations. This trait can also occasionally lead to the breakdown of negotiations and bargaining sessions, with one side walking out or "going into a sulk."

Democracy in Turkey is relatively new and without

deep roots. Capital punishment was abolished only in 2003 and after fierce resistance. The concept of human rights is novel and fuzzy. Especially when proposed from outside, it can trigger a reaction reaching a kind of xenophobia.

#### Middle Eastern-Islamic

The full extent of the Middle East has never been properly defined, and the concept remains blurry. It is not surprising to hear people exclaim: "This is Turkey, you can expect anything, anytime."

The common denominator of Middle Eastern countries is Islam, and Turkey's population is 98% Muslim. This religious factor becomes clearly discernible when Muslim Bosnians or Chechens are persecuted abroad. At the same time, Russia is perceived as a traditional enemy of Islam, which resulted in popular sentiment against communism before the demise of the USSR, which in turn created support for the U.S. Turkey is a stranger to Islamic principles, however; the state functions according to secular principles.

The second distinguishing feature of the Middle East is the prevalence of Arabism in this region. Turkey is foreign to this factor, which excludes it from the Middle East.

#### Western

Although only 3% of Turkey's territory lies in Europe, Western influence in the country is strong. Turkey is the country in the Middle East that is closest to the West in every respect and the most Westernized. Turkey and Israel are the only democracies in the region.

Furthermore, Turkey is the most radical if not the only Muslim state in the world that pursues a policy of laicism/laicization (Box Intro-1). Among the capitalist countries, Turkey carried out the most radical and most successful revolution from above. In this manner Turkey

#### Box Intro-1. Laicism-Secularism

These two words are often considered synonymous. This is incorrect. Laicism is attributable to the state, whereas secularism is attributable to society. The former is a state policy, whereas the latter characterizes society.

Religion is the cohesive ideology of feudal (agrarian) societies. For this reason, in societies still bearing feudal traces the relationship between state and religion is quite different than in those societies where such traces have been eliminated.

Turkey is an excellent example of the first category. Members of the Westernized elite, in conformity with the constitutional principle of laicism, find themselves in a constant struggle to ensure that the country is run along rational, laical principles and not religious principles as embodied in the Sharia. This is the policy of laicism of the "revolution from above." The reverse situation is the one that prevails in Sharia-run countries like Saudi Arabia. In addition, in "gray" countries like Egypt, unlike Turkey, no policy of laicism or laicization can be implemented.

In countries of the second category the state does not need to pursue policies of laicization, because all vestiges of feudalism that might defend the principles of running the state along religious principles have long since been eliminated by the bourgeois revolutions. These societies have been secularized. Britain and France (since 1905) are examples of this (France followed laicization policies between 1789 and 1905 and ended up by secularizing its society).

The U.S. is a special case, because it never passed through a feudal phase. Thanks to European immigration, it went directly from the tribal stage to commercial capitalism. That is why the U.S. has always remained strictly aloof from all religious faiths. By the first amendment of its Constitution, the federal government can neither interfere with nor provide any backing for any particular religious faith. In a multiethnic society with many religions, the

federal government must operate on this basis of neutrality. When people and institutions with religiously inclined ideologies in Turkey allude to the "American model of laicism" they have in mind the noninterference of the U.S. government in religious affairs.

It is also necessary to deal with the laicism-democracy dilemma in this context.

As the case of France cited above suggests, the goal of a laicization policy is to bring about a secular society. In this process it is to be expected that the principle of democracy will suffer, because the majority with a feudal mindset will want to support those who use religion for political ends. If we insist on complying with democratic rectitude, we must resign ourselves to achieving the secularization of society at the slow pace of the society's internal dynamics. Such a slow pace would have negative effects on basic human rights and, in particular, women's rights.

Conversely, a laicization policy pursued without restraint can turn into a form of repression in the hands of the elite. That is why laical policies should have the primary objective of preventing the interference of religion in state affairs, while keeping the state from getting involved with the religious preferences and worship of the individual.

To summarize, a secular society is essential for democracy. Consequently, laical policies designed to bring this about are good for democracy. But if these policies are not implemented with sensitivity they can violate democratic principles. The best way of preventing this is to soften the laicism policy and strive to achieve a broad social consensus to the extent that the religious establishment stops aspiring to political power and becomes integrated within the country's political system. Only then can the American form of laicism be achieved in Turkey.

(B. ORAN

deliberately detached its superstructure from Ottoman history, language, and culture (that is, from Central Asia and the Middle East), and its ruling elite became Westernized. In fact, the Westernization of the elite started about a century earlier (after 1839) than for the elite of developing countries with a colonial history (Box Intro-2).

As a result, this cultural dimension of Turkey is in direct contradiction with its other two cultural dimensions. A second consequence is that Turkey is not considered Western by the West. Third, most Turks suffer from an identity problem, having to choose between the Eastern/Middle Eastern culture and Western culture. Fourth, the differentiation between the elite and the masses is not negligible.

Nevertheless, members of the elite, who determine the direction of both domestic and especially foreign policy, are definitely Westernized. This ensures that Western values will prevail in the structure of the state over the medium and long term. That is why it is natural that Turkey should constantly seek to align itself with the West and with Western institutions.

#### B. The Historical Dimension

The Turkish Republic is the state that brought the Ottoman Empire to an end. Nevertheless, it acquired from this great empire many of its features.

The Ottoman Empire was a European state, even if it was referred to as the "sick man of Europe." The great majority of the Ottoman viziers, well until the empire's expansion stopped at the end of the seventeenth century, originated as Islamicized Christian boys from the Rumeli/European provinces of the empire. Especially in the period after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, grand viziers of Anatolian/Turkish origin were rare; seven out of nine grand viziers of Suleiman the Magnificent were of Christian origin (Mantran, vol. 1, p. 228). The Ottoman Empire was an essential element of the European balance of power in the nineteenth century. Ottoman diplomacy skillfully used this situation to prolong the life of the empire by about one hundred years.

The same can be said for other states located in this region, including the Byzantine Empire and the Republic of Turkey. By exercising skill in its diplomacy, Turkey is able

#### Box Intro-2. Revolution from Above

This concept refers to revolutions or revolutionary changes taking place not from below as a result of natural socioeconomic evolution and pressures but from above as a consequence of elites' taking over the apparatus of the state and imposing their revolutionary will on the masses.

In other words, if revolutionary changes cannot take place naturally from below because of the static nature of society, then an elite group claiming to "represent the popular will" takes charge of society and, without regard for the "unenlightened views and attitudes of the masses," imposes its "revolutionary will" by force through the instrumentality of the law

The most successful example of this is the Kemalist revolution from above carried out in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the Kemalist reforms of the superstructure have even led to changes in the infrastructure—that is, the economic foundation. To illustrate this, whereas the Ottomans allowed daughters to inherit one share against a son's inheritance of two shares, the Civil Code of 1926 introduced equality of the sexes, As a result, the ownership of property in Turkey today reflects this new situation.

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to play a more important role in world affairs than would otherwise be possible. After 1453 the Ottoman Empire considered itself the successor of the Byzantine Empire. It should be recalled that the sultans also bore the title "Sultan of Rome" (Sultan-1 İklim-i Rum). Both of these empires took advantage of the status quo through the pursuit of balanced policies that allowed them to survive for many years in a weakened condition. This characteristic of maintaining the status quo and using the balance of power is also a prominent feature of Turkey's foreign policies.

Furthermore, the roots of laicism in Turkey should be sought not in the West but rather in the Ottoman and Byzantine periods. Even if the Ottoman Empire was apparently run according to Sharia laws, the sultan's edicts regulating mundane affairs in fact had definite precedence. Not only did the Turks have a long pre-Islamic past, but after the conquest of Constantinople it was no longer possible to regulate the complex day-to-day life of a realm of imperial scale on the basis of Islamic legislation designed for Arab tribes living in the seventh century.

In any case, it should be recalled that religion in the Ottoman Empire was always under the domination of the state. Even though the conformity of the sultan's edicts with Sharia law was determined by a decision of the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Şeyhülislam), this head of the religious establishment was appointed by the sultan as a public servant and could therefore be dismissed and even put to death by strangling (because the blood of a Muslim

scholar was not supposed to be spilled). This practice was inherited from the Byzantine Empire. Whereas two Greek Orthodox patriarchs are known to have been executed in Ottoman times, historians have lost count of the number of patriarchs put to death by the Byzantine emperors.

For all these reasons, Turkish diplomacy is a natural extension of Ottoman diplomacy. The new Republican regime never went through the growing pains of the newly established states of our times. It resisted the great powers at Lausanne and successfully concluded the negotiations. When we survey the periods from 1919 to 1923 and 1923 to 1939, it is easy to discern a determination and pride in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy that harks back to the imperial period. In fact, this imperial pride triggered the War of Liberation: the occupation of İzmir in 1919 by a "former subject nation" was an affront that could not remain unanswered.

Turkey has always had an ambivalent attitude toward the Ottomans. On the one hand, it rejected everything Ottoman, including the alphabet, and declared the last sultan a traitor. On the other hand, it was always ready to accept the continuity between the two entities. When accused of being responsible for the misdeeds of the Ottomans, it never tried to evade this responsibility. Turkey did not resort to the plausible defense that charges of being responsible for the psychological scars left by past Ottoman incursions in Europe or accusations of Armenian Genocide could not be leveled against it. The Republic has refused the Ottoman regime, not its state.

The significant difference between Turkey and its predecessor was that the aim of Ottoman diplomacy was to ensure the survival of a multinational and multireligious/ sectarian state, while Turkish diplomacy was designed to serve the needs of a nation-state.

#### C. The Strategic Dimension

This question has three aspects: the geographical factor (Turkey's geostrategic location, its neighbors, the Turkish Straits), the regional security rings, and the global power axes.

#### Turkey's Geography

This factor has had profound effects, both positive and negative, on Turkish foreign policy.

#### Geostrategic Location

The territory of the Republic of Turkey is located at a very strategic spot adjacent to the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East. It is also situated between the industrialized West and its main sources of energy in the Middle East and the Caspian. This location gives Turkey an importance and advantages beyond its actual dimensions.

Against this, the country is situated on historic and even present-day migration routes, which account for the Turks having settled here in the past. This engenders feelings of insecurity, which explain why Turkish foreign policy is constantly preoccupied with security issues.

#### Neighbors

The direct relationship between the number and nature of a country's neighbors and its security is well known. The more neighbors a country has, the greater the likelihood of its being invaded or threatened or being compelled to fight on several fronts.

In this sensitive geostrategic region, Turkey has always bordered on a good number of neighbors. It had eight of them before World War II: Greece, Bulgaria, the USSR, Iran, Iraq, France through Syria, Britain through Cyprus, and Italy through the Dodecanese Islands. After the war, the number was reduced to six: Greece, Bulgaria, the USSR, Iran, Iraq, and Syria and then, as of 1960, Cyprus. At the end of the Cold War, this figure went up to eight again: Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan through Nakhechevan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This figure can be raised to twelve by including overseas neighbors: Ukraine, Ruisia, Romania, and Cyprus.

The nature of these neighbors does not provide Turkey with much reassurance either. It has historical feuds and conflicts of interest with most of them. True, the USSR, its strongest neighbor and the one that gave it the most trouble in the past, is no more. This country's successor, the Russian Federation, does not have a common border with Turkey; but given its enduring influence in the Caucasus, it continues to be a neighbor. In fact, one of the most threatening aspects of the demand for independence by Kurdish nationalists is that, if successful, it would deprive Turkey of "strategic depth" as an important security element vis-à-vis Russia in eastern Anatolia.

These security concerns have led Turkey to seek alliances.

#### The Turkish Straits

Turkey's possession of the Straits raises its importance from a regional to a global level. Despite the development of nuclear weapons, the Straits have enormous strategic importance, which gives Turkey the possibility to influence global developments. This also creates problems for Turkey by exposing it to the effects of global developments.

Furthermore, the defense of the region of the Straits poses many problems. In addition to being exposed to attacks by sea and air, Turkey does not possess strategic depth in its European territories. This explains why the powerful 1st Army is deployed in this region (Aydın, p. 58).

#### Turkey's Regional Security Rings and Its Dilemmas

Bearing in mind Turkey's general geostrategic location and its neighbors, the country must find integrated solutions for its security concerns when formulating its foreign policy. The existence of five regional security rings covering Turkey makes this a necessity. These rings are interlocked. The balances of forces in each of them are mutually linked. In addition, these rings have no natural border or obstacles between them. Any geographical limits that might be drawn would be totally artificial. Turkey must act as a pivot to maintain the balance of forces among these rings and ensure their compatibility. Finally, each of these five rings poses dilemmas for Turkey, as explained below (Sander).

#### The European Perspective

This perspective is influenced by the global system, which is dominated by relations between the superpowers. Here Turkey's recurring dilemma is to play an active part in the Western alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—without threatening the big northern neighbor, whether it be the USSR or Russia. A more recent dilemma is how to accede to the European Union (EU) without allowing interference in Turkey's internal affairs.

#### The Balkan Perspective

Being the gateway to Europe, the Balkan region is important for Turkey. As we shall see later, this is the reason why Turkish foreign policy was so deeply preoccupied with the Bosnian issue. This gateway must somehow remain open at all times, making it imperative for Turkey to be constantly engaged in this region. The objective is to ensure that either the Greek route or the Bulgarian route always remains accessible. Turkey cannot afford to be on bad terms with both Greece and Bulgaria at the same time, as was the case from 1984 to 1990.

#### The Mediterranean Perspective

Here the dominant issue is relations with Greece. Turkey must protect its vital interests against Greece, which encircles it to the west, and Cyprus to the south. The Aegean islands could block the western ports of Istanbul and Izmir while Cyprus completed the pincer movement on the southern ports. It is this threat of being surrounded in the Aegean that has driven Turkey to declare that the Greek attempts to extend the territorial waters beyond the present six miles in the Aegean would be considered a casus belli. In doing this, it must make sure that it does not turn an ally (Greece) into an adversary that can block its links to Europe. In such a case, the damage to the interests of Turkey (whose relations are mostly with countries to its west) would far exceed the damage to Greece's interests if its routes to the east were blocked. It should also be recalled that this thorny issue with Greece has always elicited negative reactions from the U.S. This situation has become even more serious with Greece's entry into the European Union.

#### The Middle East Perspective

In this oil-rich region influenced by the global system and by international rivalries, Turkey's dilemma is how to capitalize on its ability to be active while not getting drawn into the complex web of regional disputes and conflicts.

In addition, the Middle East is also important for Turkey in relation to the Kurdish question. Turkey has conducted military operations in northern Iraq since 1983. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs document entitled "Priority Measures in Connection with Our Iraqi Policy" that was circulated to key government agencies in May 2001 was leaked to the press. This internal document stated that "the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq should be considered grounds for our intervention" (Cumhuriyet, 13 May 2001). This is documentary evidence that such interventions have become established state policy.

#### The Caucasus Perspective

This is a region where Russian influence is still dominant. For Turkey it is important because of the oil and gas pipelines that go through this area. Here the dilemma is to reduce Russia's influence by supporting friendly and strong regimes in the region and to secure the construction of energy routes over Turkish territory, but to do this without angering Russia.

Russia is an important balancing factor, however, against the now unchecked power of the U.S.

#### Turkey's Location and Global Power Axes

It has always been stressed that Anatolia is a bridge. This assertion is true not only in geographical terms but in two other, more important aspects (Sander).

As a result of the Cold War, the world was divided

along strategic, political, ideological, and economic lines into two camps; the resulting vertical axis ran across Turkey. Turkey found itself to the west of this axis and participated in the Truman Doctrine, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and other Western projects and organizations.

A second and more important axis is the one that started appearing in the late 1980s. This horizontal axis divides the world into North and South along economic lines and also crosses Turkey. Turkey is striving to remain to the north of this axis, as demonstrated by its efforts to join the European Union.

Turkey did not have much difficulty in coming to a decision with respect to the first axis. For a number of reasons, above all security, it opted for the West. In the case of the second axis, however, the diplomatic decisions were harder to make. Turkish delegations at the United Nations often face difficulties when voting, owing to their need to reconcile their membership in southern organizations like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with their membership in the OECD or their candidate status with the European Union.

## D. The Domestic Dimension The General and Historical Aspects

The ethnic and religious makeup of Anatolia had a profound impact on the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire by driving the Ottomans ever westward.

This westward drive had several causes. The exploitation and chaotic conditions stemming from the corrupt feudal structure of the Byzantine Empire led its inhabitants to look upon the much fairer prefeudal system of the Ottomans as their salvation. This greatly facilitated the Ottoman advance in Byzantine and Balkan territories (the factor of the infrastructure). The Islamic practice that led to declaring the West darül-harb (meaning theater of war or lands that should be conquered for Islam) facilitated the implementation of a conquest-oriented economy (the factor of the superstructure). Finally, the mountainous and unproductive terrain of eastern Anatolia in contrast with the fertile plains of western Anatolia also pushed the Ottomans toward the West (the factor of the environment).

Aside from these factors, the ethnic/religious/class composition of Anatolia and the problems it created pushed the Ottomans constantly westward and brought them into closer contact with Western civilization. When the Turks first arrived in Anatolia from Central Asia as a limited number of tent dwellers, they ran into two other

important autochthonous peoples besides the Armenians: the "Rum" (Greeks/Byzantines) and the Kurds. The Kurds fought with the Turks against the Greeks at the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071. Because they lived in the mountains, these Kurds remained semiautonomous until the time of the centralization drive undertaken during the reign of Mahmut II. In other words, because they were populated by Sunni Muslims and because of their semiautonomous state, the Kurdish regions were not regarded as suitable for conquest. As a result the Ottomans always had a tendency to drive westward.

A further reason for this westward drive was the Turkmen (Turcoman) tribes. The few eastern campaigns undertaken by the Ottomans all took place before the big westward drives, in order to pacify their chief rival, Iran, and thereby ensure the rear. The determining factor behind this is not military, ethnic, religious, or ideological but has to do with the class structure in Anatolia. At this time, there was a constant stream of Turkmen migrants from Central Asia. These migrants were a major source of concern for the Ottomans, who came increasingly under Byzantine influence after the conquest of Constantinople and adopted a sedentary way of life. The migrants were overrunning farmlands, clashing with the local populace, and refusing to submit to any discipline. Derogatory expressions like "dumb Turks" used by the settled Ottomans to disown the migratory Turkmens are signs of a class conflict that was perceived at the time as being a sectarian conflict. In contrast to the Sunni beliefs of the Ottomans that enjoin respect for authority, the Alevi creed of the Turkmens reflected the free and independent spirit of their migratory society, still very much under the influence of shamanism.

Thus the Ottomans pursued the dual objective of trying to prevent any links between these Alevi Turkmens and Shah İsmail of Iran (who was an Alevi at the time) and settling these Turkmen tribes in the frontier regions of the newly conquered Balkan territories to relieve population pressures (see Box 1-26 in Section 1).

Another factor is the existence of a large non-Muslim population in Anatolia. When the empire entered its stagnation phase, the West used this population as a pretext to apply pressure on the Ottoman state. This compelled the Ottomans to pay more attention to the West, to diplomacy, and to the balance of power.

#### The Specific Present-Day Aspect

The Republic of Turkey has inherited the most important component of the Ottoman Empire's ethnic mix: the Kurds. The Kurds revolted just sixteen months after the establishment of the Republic and intermittently kept their revolt going until 1938. All of the treaties concluded with countries to the east and south of Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s (including, in particular, the Sadabad Pact) were intended to keep the Kurds under tight control.

Subsequently Kurdish nationalism initiated a very serious armed insurgency in the 1980s, which left a deep imprint in Turkey's foreign policy. First, it compelled Turkey to be a defender of the status quo in its relations with all countries, opposing the autonomy and certainly the independence of all separatist groups, whether Chechens or Kosovans. Second, the measures to suppress the very serious armed rebellion of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the southeast of the country resulted in severe violations of human rights. This became a major stumbling block in Turkey's quest to become part of Europe and delayed its transition to modernity.

#### The Ideological Aspect

Finally, the "development model" in Turkey has been one of the factors influencing foreign policy. This aspect is dealt with in greater detail below. Two important points should be noted here, however.

First, the development model will influence the selection of a country's allies. A country subscribing to the capitalist model will find it difficult to enter into strong and lasting alliances with a socialist country.

Second, the development model is important because it has a major influence on a country's development effort. Obviously, the influence of a developed country in international affairs will not be the same as that of an underdeveloped country. The degree of success of a country's development model and of capital accumulation will have a direct bearing on the weight of its foreign policy.

Baskin Oran

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- II. THE MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
- A. Turkey as a Strategic Medium Power (SMP): Military-Strategic and Economic Dimensions

The Concept of a "Medium Power"

Two questions need to be asked when starting the examination of Turkish foreign policy.

Within the international system, in what category does the Republic of Turkey belong from the perspectives of its general situation and its foreign policy?

This question has no clear answer: because of Turkey's sensitive location, its foreign policy encompasses many problems, faces numerous threats, must enter into differing alliances, and must cater to conflicting interests. In order to examine this question, however, it is necessary to identify some fixed patterns and parameters within a complex picture.

In terms of dimensions, it is customary to classify states as major or minor.

It is relatively easy to describe the category of state that was known as a major power before World War II and subsequently came to be known as a superpower. Such a state can effectively influence the regional and global balance of power because of its population, geographical size, economy, resources, military power, and so forth. It is also easy to describe minor powers, because they are the opposite. They are easily affected by regional and global events but have little influence over them.

Not all states fit into these two categories, however. A third, intermediate category can be described as a medium power. Provided they hold a geostrategic position, such states can influence the international system only marginally but can have an impact on regional developments and especially smaller neighbors, resist pressures coming from major powers, bargain with them, and, by taking advantage of circumstances, even influence their actions. Examples are Israel, Iran, Turkey, and to a certain extent Egypt.

Such SMPs can also be described as regional powers. Their ability to influence events does not allow them to resist major powers successfully or to engage in armed conflicts with them. SMPs under threat from a major power can either resort to the balance of power by playing one major power against another or seek protection within an alliance. This choice is not always easy. The balance of power can shift. Or, after joining an alliance, the SMP can find itself reduced to being a satellite of the major power of that alliance. Sometimes it is not within an SMP's abil-

ity to exercise these choices because of the nature of the international system at that particular time or because of the circumstances of that SMP within the international system (Hale, p. 2). In a rigid bipolar system an SMP is very likely to be forced to adhere to one of the two camps, especially if its geostrategic location is considered critical by their leaders. Raymond Aron has explained in *Peace and War* that in such circumstances it is impossible to pursue policies that are independent of the two camps. This is known as the Aron paradigm (Aydın, pp. 93–94).

#### The Elements of an SMP:

The Economic and Military-Strategic Dimensions
The elements of an SMP can be classified under two headings: economic and military-strategic.

An SMP must have a certain economic size and strength. The economy is already important per se; it is also the basis of military power, which is necessary for defense and to make a country's voice heard in international circles. An economy is never completely trouble free. If it is chronically in trouble, however, then a country will have to compensate by emphasizing the military and geostrategic dimension in order to preserve its strategic medium-power status.

It has to be noted that the ability of this power to resort to military action is not unrestricted. If an SMP attempts to acquire land in a sensitive geostrategic region against the wishes or interests of the influential or hegemonic power in that region, it can create serious problems for itself. Having annexed Hatay in 1939 with the consent of the regional power (France), Turkey faces no serious problem there today. Because it invaded Cyprus without the consent of the hegemonic power (the U.S.), however, and continues to maintain forces there to this day, Turkey has had to face unending problems. Although it can count on a much higher degree of U.S. approval, Israel faces similar problems as it keeps building new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories (Box Intro-3).

If the SMP finds itself far from the main international axes of power, however, it can avoid suffering sanctions. This can be illustrated by Turkey's annexation of an Iranian territory called the Little Ararat in 1930 (see "Relations with Iran" in Section 2).

Turkey belongs in the medium power category when considered in the light of its economic indicators. It is larger in surface than any of its neighbors except Iran. Its population also exceeds that of its neighbors. Turkey is self-sufficient in basic food production. Its endowment in natural resources is in large measure adequate, except for hydrocarbons. With a nominal gross national

#### Box Intro-3. Hegemonic Power

Since the fifteenth century certain states have acquired power in the international arena, gained the ability to influence international developments, earned a larger share in international trade, and thereby placed themselves in a dominant position in international affairs. An important precondition for this was the possession of the largest merchant fleet and the strongest navy. From a historical perspective, Portugal in the fifteenth century, Spain in the sixteenth century, France in the seventeenth century, and Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the hegemonic powers. The U.S. became a major power after defeating Spain in 1898 and transformed itself into a hegemonic power after becoming actively involved in world affairs following World War II. As a result of technological progress since that time, the U.S. has maintained its status as the global hegemon:

In the past a challenger has always contested the position of the hegemonic power. At that point a major war between the hegemonic power and the challenger occurs, resulting in a fundamental transformation of the international system. This happened when Germany challenged Britain's hegemony, but the war exhausted both contestants, making way for the U.S. to gain hegemony.

Hegemonic powers have stood for free trade and tried to force other countries to lower their customs barriers. Britain in

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the nineteenth century launched the open door policy. Today the U.S. is the driving force behind the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO), while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are in large measure under U.S. control.

A hegemonic power has a strong currency that is internationally utilized, possesses bases and allies throughout the world, and intervenes in regional crises to demonstrate its leadership, Since 1945 the possession of nuclear weapons has been added to the attributes of a hegemonic power.

To maintain its position the hegemonic state cannot rely solely on raw power. It must earn the approval of a significant number of countries and persuade them to follow its leadership. The hegemonic power must also legitimize its status by spreading its way of life, culture, and values and gaining new converts.

Today the U.S. has the power, the ability, and the will to influence all developments in the world and continues to remain the hegemonic power. But history tells us that no hegemonic power can maintain its position indefinitely, because such powers exhaust themselves in the effort to maintain their hegemonic edifice, thus leading to the appearance of challengers.

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product (GNP) of \$655.9 billion in 2007, it ranks 17th in the world. Russia apart, it has the 7th largest economy in Europe (World Development Indicators —WDI—The World Bank, 2009, p. 210). Leaving aside the 9% decline in GNP during the 2001 crisis, the Turkish economy has grown from 6 to 9.9% per annum since 2002 (see Table 8-2 in Section 8). This importance is borne out by its inclusion among the G-20 (the twenty most developed economies). Although not completely self-sufficient in armaments, it also has a respectable defense industry.

The military dimension is crucial for a world power to become a hegemonic power. Similarly, a medium power must rely on the military component to become a regional power or even to maintain itself as an SMP. Clearly the military dimension becomes more relevant if the country is located in an important geostrategic region.

An important geostrategic location has benefits but also drawbacks. If the country is strong, this kind of location will contribute substantially to its status as an SMP. If the country is weak, the location can deprive it of its security, prevent it from keeping its defense expenditures at a low level, and thereby damage its economy. It can force the country to seek alliances and also threaten its existence by encouraging those with designs on the region. In other words, strategic importance could get the SMP in trouble (see "The Question of the Relationship of Security, Economy, and Foreign Policy in a Developing Medium Power" below).

But even these drawbacks of a special geostrategic location can help a country to be regarded as an SMP. Its geostrategic location might be considered so critical by the major powers that the country would have to be taken into account because of its weakness as much as its strength. The Ottoman Empire was a classic example of this situation throughout the nineteenth century. All of Europe, especially Britain and Russia, was preoccupied with the so-called Eastern Question, which involved coping with the problems that would result from a sudden collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Chase and Hill).

Turkey, the successor of the Ottoman Empire, is such a pivotal state for the U.S. Turkey has to be heeded because of its weaknesses, deriving from its many unresolved problems. This situation could lead to serious instability in the region and threaten the interests of the hegemon, the U.S., and its ally Israel.

Turkey is also important because of its strength. Compared to the Ottoman Empire, it is more compact and easier to govern, with a much more homogeneous population. Turkish foreign policy displays features such as the ability to influence the regional policies of the major powers and, when necessary, confront these powers. This characteristic was very much in evidence before and during World War II, when Turkey's military strength was relatively limited. During the Cold War, both camps valued it from a strategic point of view. For a variety of reasons, Turkey was able to maintain this position of importance

#### Box Intro-4. National Interest

The concept of national interest appeared after 1789 with the development of the modern state.

This concept assumes that the nation as a whole has common interests. Although the reference is to the nation, the concept is attributable to the independent state within which the nation is organized. It is the state that represents and pursues the national interest. In reality this concept has existed since the coming into being of the state and even of its precursors such as tribes. But at that time it had a different name. For example, in the period when sovereignty in the state belonged not to the nation but to the monarch, it was known as raison d'état (reason of state), where the sovereign's interests were declared to be those of the state. In even earlier times, when sovereignty was attributable not to an individual but to a metaphysical being (God, spirits, and so forth), the national interest was expressed in other terms. Whatever the term, the reference is to the collective interests of society.

This interpretation of the concept of national interest has

led to criticisms from both liberal and Marxist quarters. According to the liberal view based on the individual, the nation and the nation-state are losing influence with advancing globalization and thus the concept of national interest must share a similar fate. In pluralistic societies it cannot be maintained that there is a common national interest (Frankel, p. 21). In fact, it is impossible to use this concept in the context of the European Union. The Marxist view based on class, however, claims that the national interest attributable to the state actually reflects the interests of the dominant class in society. Consequently, there cannot be a single national interest but only class interests, and the interest of the oppressor class cannot be similar to the interest of the oppressor class cannot be similar to the interest of the oppressor class cannot be rational interest is a fiction that the dominant class uses to present its interest as being identical with the collective interest of all segments of society.

(B. ORAN)

after the Cold War ended. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the natural raison d'être of NATO came to an end. Even in this period, almost all of the political flash points confronting NATO were within Turkey's vicinity. Given the military-strategic dimension, Turkey emerges as an SMP despite its economic difficulties.

#### B. The Security Factor of Foreign Policy

What does the pursuit of foreign policy entail for a country, especially if it is an SMP? What is the purpose of foreign policy?

These superficially easy-sounding questions are difficult to answer in a clear way. What comes immediately to mind is the obvious reply: "To further the national interest beyond a country's borders." This in turn leads to a very complicated question: "What is the national interest?" (Box Intro-4).

Nevertheless, it can be said that the foremost objective of foreign policy is to secure the broadest measure of national security against outsiders and thereby ensure the country's survival. Parallel to this, domestic policy will be based on the need to serve the public interest (Frankel, p. 38). Naturally, we must understand security as being defined by those who make national and independent decisions; this precludes the full security that could be obtained through union with a hegemon.

National security has three components that should be conceived as three overlapping circles: military, economic, and political-social. These circles are the foundation of the national strength that underpins foreign policy. If one of these circles is wanting, the system of national security will be damaged. Finally, these three circles must be placed within a fourth larger circle: the international system. In this scheme, the three circles of national security and the encompassing international system are constantly interacting and affecting one another. The foreign policy formulated by a government and implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be based on keeping the three circles sound and healthy (the internal dynamics) while making sure that the international system is favorable (the external dynamics), keeping in mind that the internal and external dynamics will affect one another.

We can now examine this proposition as it applies to Turkey.

#### The Domestic Setting of Turkish Foreign Policy The Military Circle

The first circle is the military dimension, based primarily on weapons and personnel but also including factors such as morale, esprit de corps, command and control, and degree of preparedness. The weapons and the personnel are ultimately dependent on the economic strength and educational level of the country. It will be recalled that during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 the Egyptian aircraft were destroyed on the ground without even getting a chance to take off.

In addition to the fighting spirit and ability of the Turkish soldier, it is generally acknowledged that the competence of technical military personnel is quite high. Turkey is able to procure only about one-fifth of its weapons systems from national sources, however, and is dependent on foreign sources, primarily the U.S. Given the speed

with which weapons become technologically obsolete, this situation should be regarded as normal and unlikely to change over the medium term. The Turkish defense industries are either not at a high technological level, as in the case of the Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKE), or dependent on foreign inputs, as in the case of the aerospace industry (the F-16 project; see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Sections 6 and 7). Although Turkey is acquiring tanker aircraft for aerial refueling and Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) early warning aircraft and even contemplating the acquisition of aircraft carriers to strengthen its defenses, all of this depends on the willingness of the superpower that will supply such equipment.

In addition to this lack of self-sufficiency in armaments, the Turkish economy is becoming increasingly dependent on outsiders. When this is considered against the background of the regional difficulties discussed above ("The Strategic Dimension" in "Basic Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign Policy" above), the difficulties that have to be confronted become more apparent.

This military component (circle) is the one that Turkey relies on most. At times it displays its military power much beyond the capacity of its foreign policy, as it did when it threatened military action against Syria to secure Abdullah Öcalan's expulsion from that country in October 1998. When seen from a broader perspective, however, it must be noted that the military power backing foreign policy remains limited.

#### The Economic Circle

Turkey is among the so-called "emerging market econmies." Although 22 percent of its active male population was engaged in agriculture between 2003 and 2006 (against 25 percent for Brazil and 3 percent for the U.S.), even in this sector the country is gradually becoming import dependent. Imports now include commodities such as lentils, chickpeas, corn, beans, wheat, cotton, tobacco, sunflower seeds, and rice (Cumhuriyet, 29 May 2001, p. 9).

Turkey's economy has been chronically plagued with problems since the mid-1950s, with income distribution becoming more unbalanced and the country becoming more import dependent. In addition, since the 1980s the economy has relied increasingly on external and internal borrowing. The foreign debt, which was under \$1 billion in 1960, grew to \$15.7 billion in 1980 and \$49 billion in 1990. When economic indicators, including the rate of inflation, were all moving in the right direction in 2000, prior to the economic crisis of February 2001, the foreign debt burden had reached \$114.5 billion. Over the last ten

years there has also been a huge increase in the internal debt. Between 1991 and 2000 this debt increased by a factor of 796 in Turkish lira terms. Even when converted into dollars, the internal debt increased by a factor of 5.3 over the same period. In June 2001 Turkey's interest payments amounted to 111.08% of its total tax revenue, which means that the state's total tax income could not cover its interest payments. No amount of statistics could highlight the starkness of the economic situation better than this fact (see "The Domestic Environment and Dynamics" in "Appraisal of the Period" in Section 7).

In this situation, whether we describe it as "not being fully developed" or describe it in technical terms as "not having upgraded from peripheral country status to semiperipheral," Turkey's persistent economic problems make it difficult for it to qualify as a genuine SMP. For a country to be considered a durable SMP, it must reach a level of development that allows it to upgrade itself from a peripheral to semiperipheral country (Box Intro-5). The economic dimension is examined in greater detail below. In these circumstances, it can be said that we are dealing with a foreign policy that is not grounded on a sound economy.

#### The Political-Social Circle

A country with an untroubled political and social order has a sound basis for developing an effective foreign policy. Turkey has a serious drawback due to the fragility of its political and social structure. The internal structure of its political parties is not all that democratic; it is difficult to change party leaders, making it hard to introduce new faces among the political leadership. Even when circumstances have changed fundamentally, the tendency is to stick to old remedies. This is because Turkey does not confront its problems (some of which date from the nineteenth century) with modern methods, that is, by engaging in rational debate to produce alternative solutions. The prevailing tendency is to put off dealing with problems. The resulting accumulation of difficulties creates an insurmountable barrier: fear of change, leading to anxieties in foreign relations and a weakening of national cohesion.

As a result, starting in the 1970s, Turkey has had to face various internal social conflicts. The struggle against the terrorism of Kurdish nationalism beginning in the mid-1980s came on top of this. Then came the friction brought about by political Islam, which triggered the debate about whether the source of power in the state is the nation itself or God. Finally, there is the rivalry between the military and the civilians. All of this is taking place in

#### Box Intro-5. The Concepts of the Center, the Periphery, and the Semiperiphery

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The concepts of the center and the periphery denote both the level of development of countries and their place in the global division of labor. The periphery must play the economic role that is assigned to it by the center. It is also subservient to the center in a number of noneconomic spheres.

The center has many ways of controlling the periphery to prevent this state of affairs from changing. New technology is always developed in the center. The periphery does not engage in research. In addition, there is ideological control. All news originates from a limited number of news agencies located in the center. Just as the "discotheque culture" is automatically imported along with the import of blue jeans, the import of industrial products entails the import of the corresponding ideology. Finally, the international financial system and its methods of providing credit also help in maintaining the status quo. Loans extended to the periphery are designed to provide markets for the products of the center. Together with the loan, the recipient is forced to accept liberalism under the guise of "structural reform." Because the periphery can only repay the interest on loans with its limited exports, its indebtedness never ends. Furthermore, although it is not resorted to very often, the possibility of direct intervention is always present. Typical examples are the coups engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S. in Iran against Mohammad Mosaddeq and in Chile against Salvador Allende.

Nevertheless, it is possible to break out of the periphery and attain the level of the semiperiphery, whereby a country reaches a higher level of development without becoming as developed as the center. There are two ways of achieving this.

In the first case, a country can take advantage of a favorable international conjuncture and adopt a statist/protectionist model and detach itself temporarily from the international division of labor, secure a certain level of development, and then open up to the world on the basis of export-led growth. Japan and South Korea are modern examples of this, and Turkey's model of statism also had this objective.

In the second case, certain center countries select a country in the periphery to be their regional partner and serve as a distributor of their products. They engage in intensive cooperation in selected fields. For this they will designate either a country with a high economic potential (a "pivotal state") or a country with strategic importance, preferably both. Israel is a typical example. In the early 1960s the EEC may have regarded Turkey in this light. This type of semiperiphery status is analogous to the status of a medium power that is in close alliance with major powers.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Keyder, pp. 80–133)

the center of the most unsettled regions of the globe: the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The lack of internal cohesion and unity deprives Turkish foreign policy of a solid foundation.

#### The International and Regional System in Which Turkish Foreign Policy Operates

Since the end of the sixteenth century Turkey has found itself in an international system where the West is paramount. Although this predominance was fractured at times (Britain/France versus Germany) or contested (the West versus the USSR) and occasionally Turkey was able to profit from this, in the final analysis the West was unrivaled. Even the USSR, when it was most powerful, had to conduct its international trade according to the rules of capitalism. After the disintegration of the socialist bloc in the 1990s, the international system has become even more monolithic. The same can be said about the regional system.

These two external dynamics that prevent Turkey from deviating from its path are reinforced by two internal factors. First, the security circles alluded to earlier weaken the hand of those who manage foreign policy. Second, members of Turkey's elite have a Western-oriented approach, which makes it difficult for them to consider non-Western foreign policy alternatives.

In these circumstances Turkey is not able to deviate much from the general direction set by the West. Since 1990 the path it has had to follow has become even narrower. With the ending of the East-West conflict and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Turkey's usefulness to NATO has come to an end. True, the U.S. still needs Turkey to maintain its hegemony in the Balkans/Caucasus/Middle East triangle and continues to take an interest. But the EU, although still having strategic interests in the region, has less need for Turkey for its defense and in any case seems to rely on the customs union, which binds Turkey economically to Europe.

As a result, since 1990 Turkey has been compelled to tread the path of the U.S. in its policies, whereas before it was treading the path of the West in general. This is becoming more obvious as the EU spurns Turkey, especially because of its human rights record. At one time Turkey profited from tensions and crises to underline its usefulness to the West and thereby maintain its status as an SMP. Now Turkey needs the U.S. to pursue this course. It will be noted that Turkey's foreign policy successes since 1990 have all been in areas where its interests have coincided with those of the U.S.: Bosnia, energy pipelines, the capture of Öcalan, humanitarian-assistance undertakings, and operations in northern Iraq.

The question to ask is: "Must Turkey, in these constricting circumstances, always conform to U.S. wishes?"

The answer is no. A nation-state, especially if it is an SMP, by definition has enough autonomy in matters pertaining to foreign policy and to security in particular—provided it is prepared to pay the price. In other words, from time to time and where it deems necessary to safeguard its vital interests, Turkey can follow courses that may be in conflict with those of its Western allies. In the medium term this can only be possible if the country regains its economic freedom of action. This autonomy is not a given for a country that has to persuade the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to come to its aid to repay its foreign debts.

Therefore it is necessary to examine Turkey's foreign policy in a political economy context.

#### c. The Political Economy of Foreign Policy

The political economy of foreign policy involves the economic criteria (distribution of income, savings, etc.) that determine a country's political processes. These processes lead to capital accumulation by the public/private sector for the purpose of economic growth/development and the rational allocation of capital. The social dimension of development is the availability of qualified human resources in sufficient numbers to manage the process.

Selecting the model for capital accumulation is not a matter of simple preference. In this selection, the internal dynamics of a country (the class structure) and even more the external dynamics (the degree of integration in the international division of labor) play a part. In other words, the model for capital accumulation is an important factor of foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, it determines external alliances, and the success or lack of success in a country's development efforts has a direct bearing on the strength of its foreign policy.

There are two basic models of capital accumulation: the protectionist and the liberal model. The first model aims to achieve development by shielding a country's economy from the influence of the international economic system (international capitalism) and takes two forms. In capitalist countries it involves industrialization through import substitution (IIS), while in socialist countries it involves the socialist form of accumulation. The second model tries to connect the country to the international economic system and seeks development through this integration.

In the final phases of the Ottoman Empire an enforced integration with the outside world took place. In the first years of the Republic (1923–29) there was little digression from this course. The country's class structure led to this course of action, as reflected by the deliberations of the İzmir Economy Congress of 1923, the policies

designed to create a Muslim business class inherited by the elite from the Union and Progress Party, and the international obstacles (the trade convention signed at the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1923 prevented the raising of customs tariffs for five years). It became possible to switch to a more independent development model after the economic crisis of 1929, when foreign conditions allowed, indeed imposed, a change in policy. This import substitution model did not include certain features of the model applied from 1960 to 1980 (such as increasing the purchasing power of labor through collective bargaining, trade unions, etc.). But it nevertheless reflected the typical features of those formative years of the Republic from 1923 to 1945.

#### 1. Industrialization through Import Substitution (IIS)

"IIS" is the economists' term for the strategy of developing domestic industry by protecting it from imports.

This model is not confined to the Turkish Republic. Throughout the nineteenth century and up to 1945 the U.S. pursued such policies. The same is true for Prussia and then for Germany in response to its political/military needs. Japan also began to apply this model in the latter part of the nineteenth century. IIS has been employed by countries trying to attain the takeoff stage of economic development.

Although Turkey severed its political ties with the past in 1923, in the economic sphere the break occurred in 1930, when Turkey switched to the import-substitution model. The other "oppressed nations" would resort to these policies after World War II.

A country usually resorts to IIS as the result of an international or local crisis or an acute foreign exchange shortage or as a reaction to the process of being turned into a semicolony. The main thrust of IIS is to limit or ban imports and thereby promote domestic production. In this model, requirements are not met through imports even if it would make more sense to do so. Instead needs are met through local production even if the price is higher or the quality lower or the technology obsolete.

The strategy is to start with consumer goods, move up to intermediate goods, and end up by producing capital goods for the domestic market. This does not entail cutting off all links with the outside world, however. Some intermediate and other goods will always need to be imported. Furthermore, if the strategy proves successful, the country can shift to an export-led model.

This type of accumulation is the result of a state's relative external autonomy and also helps to reinforce this relative autonomy. This model was adopted by Turkey from

#### Box Intro-6. The Relative Internal and External Autonomy of the State

The concept of the relative autonomy of the state was developed primarily by N. Poulantzas. Unlike the "vulgar Marxist" view that perceives the superstructure as being absolutely dependent on the infrastructure, this concept is based on the assumption that, with time, there is a divergence between the economic level of the state and the political/ideological level. When the political level is relatively autonomous of the economy, the state will become more autonomous in its decision-making.

Relative autonomy has an internal and an external dimension. The relative internal autonomy of the state occurs when it is relatively autonomous of the social classes in the country, which means the state is not compelled to take action to satisfy their short-term interests. Naturally, the state will be influenced by the long-term interests of classes. But at the same time the state must try to balance the interests of classes and thus preserve unity. The introduction of the right to strike is designed to preserve this balance even if it is against the interests of the ruling class. For relative internal autonomy to prevail, there must be a situation where the

class structure in the country is not fully developed (impotence of classes) or a situation where neither of the ruling classes, consisting of feudal landlords and industrialists, is able to assert superiority (equilibrium). Atatürk's Turkey is an example of underdeveloped class structure, while South Korea illustrates the case of equilibrium between classes.

In the case of relative external autonomy, a state is able to preserve this autonomy vis-à-vis the international system and other states. In normal circumstances no medium power can be so strong that it can insulate itself completely from foreign pressures. For this to happen, the international system and its principal major powers must have become ineffective owing to other pre-occupations, or a balance of power between states/blocs must prevail. In other words, relative external autonomy is the outcome of external dynamics.

(B. ORAN)

1929 to 1945 and from 1960 to 1980. Even in the years from 1945 to 1960 it was not discarded. Combined with the nature of international relations of the period, this helped Turkey to enjoy relative autonomy in its foreign relations from 1929 to 1980 (Box Intro-6).

These periods differ in important ways, however, as will be seen when they are examined later. From 1919 to 1945 no superpower on the international scene was imposing its own version of "Pax." The Turkey of Atatürk's time took advantage of this unusual situation, when there was no attempt to interfere in its domestic affairs, its economic policies, or its diplomacy. But the Cold War rendered the period from 1960 to 1980 quite different. Turkey enjoyed relative autonomy at this juncture, even though it was in the Pax Americana camp, because the world was divided into two Pax camps at the time.

The aftermath of the IIS period from 1929 to 1945 was markedly different from the aftermath of the period from 1960 to 1980 in the field of foreign relations. In both instances foreign policy lost its relative autonomy and had to operate within a more confined framework. But the two periods differed in the manner in which they ended.

The first period came to an end in 1939 with the outbreak of World War II, when the main objective of foreign policy was to stay out of the war and avoid foreign occupation. All resources were mobilized for defense, so development plans had to be shelved. The failure of the import substitution program was due to external dynamics.

The end of the second period (and the relative autonomy that it conferred) is rooted in the debt trap and the payments crisis, so its causes are internal. Import substitution was resorted to because of the shortage of for-

eign exchange. As the country developed, the demand for imported products increased without a corresponding increase in exports, owing to the inability to produce export-quality products. To bridge the resulting gap in payments and maintain development programs, there was just one solution: more foreign aid and loans. Turkey failed to make the transition from import substitution to export-led growth, with dire results. Countries like Japan and South Korea had managed this transition smoothly and were to serve as models for others.

The periods 1923–39, 1939–45, and 1960–80 were the three eras when IIS policies were implemented. In this book we examine them as "Relative Autonomy" periods 1, 2, and 3.

#### Integration in the International Economy

This is the "normal" model that fits the international capitalist system and is applied when there is no crisis or when the IIS phase has been successfully completed. Both internal and external dynamics lead to this phase.

1. The external dynamic: the only prevailing international economic system is capitalism. This was so even when there was a powerful socialist bloc of countries. Both political systems existed within one universal economic system.

This international system compels countries that have not completed their economic development to integrate with the international system in a number of ways.

First, through globalization capitalism is constantly expanding its market and forcing other countries to join the system (Box Intro-7).

Second, in this single market the logic of the rule of comparative advantage (that is, the ability of certain countries to provide certain goods and services more cheaply and thereby to specialize in these fields) forces countries into specialization. Moreover, the actor making decisions about comparative advantage is no longer the nation-state. It is international speculative capital, which after 1990 acquired an enormous scale and high mobility. This capital flows into whichever country appears advantageous at the time and flows out when these advantages disappear. States are powerless to deal with this phenomenon.

Third, in this global market no country can be selfsufficient either in the production of goods and the provision of services or in the production of technology.

Fourth, thanks to the communications revolution (broadcasting via satellites, TV, the Internet, etc.), the system is able to carry out an intensive ideological conditioning, inducing the masses to adopt the capitalist pattern of consumption.

In the case of medium powers with remarkable geostrategic importance like Turkey, the system will exert even greater pressure.

2. The internal dynamic: one of the basic concepts of the Third World approach that was influential in Turkey during the late 1960s and the 1970s was the "national bourgeoisie." The dominant ideology of the Left was to work for a "national democratic revolution." It was national because it was against imperialism and democratic because it was aimed at freeing the peasant majority from the oppression of the sheikhs, feudal landlords, and superstition while at the same time liberating toilers in the cities. This process included a place for a national bourgeoisie. Through import substitution policies, a national bourgeoisie would develop that would defend the national economy against the interests of the international bourgeoisie. Subsequently there would be a transition to the socialist revolution stage. The basic assumption here was that the national bourgeoisie would oppose the international bourgeoisie.

Today, however, we know that the domestic bourgeoisie also has only a single rule: maximization of profits. This can be achieved either through import substitution or through integration, depending on the circumstances. During a crisis, import substitution occurs; when the crisis has been overcome, integration is preferred (Keyder, p. 102). For this reason, and contrary to the notions of the Third World approach, there is no distinction between a national bourgeoisie and a *comprador* bourgeoisie (the local collaborators or agents of foreign capital). The bour-

### Box Intro-7. The Three Waves of Western Expansion

Globalization can be defined as the global expansion of the West with its infrastructure (capitalism) and its superstructure (all that pertains to Western culture, especially rationalism, democracy, human rights, etc.). The driving force behind this is not the deliberate expansionist policies of certain countries but the fundamental objective of capital: maximization of profits. For this to happen, markets (and also finance, etc.) have to be expanded.

The West has expanded in three waves, Roughly speaking, the first wave occurred in the 1490s, driven by mercantilism and leading to colonialism. The second wave occurred after the 1870s, driven by the results of the industrial revolution, which led to imperialism. The third wave occurred in three stages: the birth of multinational corporations in the 1970s, the advent of the communications revolution in the 1980s, and the disintegration of the USSR in the 1990s, which left the West without ideological rivals. This third wave is called globalization.

It will be noted that the common denominator of these waves is the expansion of markets. The waves occurred at times when the size of the market became inadequate, resulting in a pressing need to secure their expansion. Western Europe in the 1490s, Europe in the 1890s, and the Western world in the 1990s became inadequate for global capital, and the market (as well as production, finance, etc.) started to expand to encompass the whole world.

The third wave is a continuation of the second. In the intervening period, there was a hiatus arising from the coming into being of the USSR, which, once it was eliminated, allowed the process to resume its course. The difference between these waves is mainly twofold. First, the third globalization excludes military occupation (that is why the U.S. of George W. Bush has been the only imperialist power in the world). Second, international speculative capital has now acquired a mobility that does not allow, at least for the time being, any type of regulation (see also Box 7-1 in Section 7).

(B. ORAN)

geoisie will decide and act in a way that will maximize profits. As a result of developments after 1990, the decision to maximize profits is no longer up to the national bourgeoisie. It is now international capital that makes the decisions. Since the crisis of February 2001, the national bourgeoisie has complained bitterly that it has been forced into selling its businesses (see "Appraisal of the Period" in Section 7).

This model of capital accumulation is of course very sensitive to external events, because it is in large measure dependent on the functioning of the international capitalist system. Therefore it runs counter to the state's relative autonomy. In this situation the state's sovereignty and its ability to make independent decisions are much more limited.

This limitation, combined with the powerful influence of the international system, has led to a weakening of Turkey's foreign policy autonomy and increased foreign influences during those periods when the integration with the international economy model was being implemented (1945 to 1960, 1980 to 1990, and 1990 to the present). The first two periods are dealt with under the heading "Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc," part 1 and part 2, and the third under the title "Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization."

#### The Question of the Transition from the IIS Model to the Integration Model

Turkey has had a peculiarly negative experience in its development efforts. Although it has tried both import substitution and integration, it has failed to attain a level of economic development befitting an SMP—that is, it has not been quite able to upgrade itself to the semiperiphery yet. During these periods Turkey has gone through authoritarian and democratic phases. Yet numerous countries have managed this transition through both protectionism and the liberal capital accumulation model. Examples of the former are the USSR, China, and Malaysia, while Spain, Portugal, and Greece are examples of the latter.

A country cannot insulate itself from the world economy forever. At some point it must carry out the transition to integration. But those that have managed this have deliberately carried out their integration after achieving takeoff through import substitution. The USSR developed very well under the protectionist model but failed to make the necessary transition, which resulted in its disintegration. Turkey failed because it did not have an economic policy that was national in its essence. It should have passed to the integration phase with deliberation and proper planning. This it was not able to do. As a result it was dragged into integration in the 1980s head first, with no planning or programming and under the pressure of the international system. If Turkey had been more decisive and better prepared, it could have achieved a certain level of development-and independence-even in the unipolar Western capitalist world that emerged after the disappearance of the socialist bloc.

The conclusion is that autonomy in foreign policy is dependent on the phase at which the transition from import substitution to integration is effected (early vs. mature; prepared vs. unprepared; after becoming a nation vs. before) and on the methods employed (deliberate vs. involuntary; gradual vs. in one stroke).

#### The Question of the Relationship of Security, Economy, and Foreign Policy in a Developing Medium Power

There is a close relationship between a country's security and its economy with respect to their influence on and even their ability to determine its foreign policy. Let us examine this proposition.

1. We have already seen that when the efforts to achieve a healthy economy fail, it becomes more difficult to ensure security, that the primary element of a country's national strength is its economy, and that a weak economy results in weakened security.

Another important observation is the following. If a country gets in the habit of making up for scarce domestic resources by resorting to external resources (in other words, to foreign borrowing), its foreign policy autonomy can be seriously undermined. The Ottomans started experiencing this situation as far back as 1860, which led to the problem of the Ottoman Public Debt (Düyun-1 Umumiye) and the Sèvres Peace Treaty.

To cite the example of modern Turkey, the cumulative deficit in its balance of trade from 1950 to 1980 is \$7,968,000,000 in 1950 dollars (Akat, pp. 62–65). If we deduct from this sum the remittances of Turkish workers abroad, amounting to \$4,561,000,000, again in constant 1950 dollars, we obtain the figure of \$3,407,000,000, representing the net injection of foreign resources into the Turkish economy. In this thirty-year period Turkey covered this deficit, amounting to 42%, exclusively with foreign aid or borrowing (Gerger, p. 199). This does not include the substantial military assistance that was also received. If this is also included, the degree of dependence on external sources becomes even more striking (Akat, p. 64, footnote 16).

This situation has had two very negative effects. Turkey never felt the need to launch an export drive, because it got used to relying on the unearned foreign exchange obtained from external aid and loans. Loans must eventually be repaid, so this excessive dependence on foreign borrowing had negative effects on the country's ability to conduct an autonomous foreign policy after 1980. It was necessary to borrow increasing amounts in order to service the foreign debts.

In such a situation it is difficult to obtain additional foreign loans without paying a political price. New loans can be made conditional on the introduction of specific legislation or repealing of some laws. It may become more difficult to procure weapons and military equipment, or they may be delivered with limitations on their use. Thus the economic and military-strategic components of

security would be affected, making it harder to pursue an autonomous foreign policy.

2. When the economy starts performing badly, this also affects a country's security. Major powers always on the lookout for forward bases and installations in different regions will find it easier to pressure such countries to grant these types of facilities, especially if the country is located in a sensitive geostrategic location (e.g., the Adnan Menderes period). They might also press it to maintain a larger army than it actually needs.

Among the most important features of an SMP is the maintenance of a large military establishment, which can easily lead neighbors to perceive a military threat and force them into heavy rearmament programs. This can spiral into a serious burden, as in the case of the Turkish-Greek arms race.

The maintenance of a military establishment larger than warranted by possible regional threats and a constant preoccupation with security concerns, however, can have harmful effects on the development of democracy in a country. For example, the growing influence of the military on politics might well jeopardize the democratic process.

Sometimes the perception of a foreign threat is deliberately reinforced by inventing "internal foes" or by exaggerating their capabilities if they actually exist. This can lead a country to waste its positive energy in a struggle against these imaginary internal foes and distract its attention from real problems. It can damage a country's unity and release harmful centrifugal forces. The conceptual chaos unleashed by such a situation can result in serious paranoia. In fact, when Turkey was in the process of joining the Western Bloc in the 1940s and 1950s, the Communist threat was deliberately exaggerated even though the Communists in the country numbered only a few thousand. After the riots of 6–7 September 1955 (see Box 4-13 in Section 4), Communists were the first to be arrested. In the 1990s those who advocated that the Kurdish question could only be solved by expanding individual freedoms were declared internal collaborators of the PKK terror.

- 3. An economically weak strategic medium state could well try to stand on its strategic importance only. This is a dangerous situation, especially if this country tries to emphasize its geostrategic importance by artificial means when this importance is weakened by external dynamics such as international developments or changes in weapons technology. In this situation this country could even reach the point where it specifically tries to create a security crisis. Turkey experienced this in 1957 when Prime Minister Menderes threatened Syria.
  - 4. An even more serious threat exists if the economy

remains chronically sick. In such a case, a medium power can resort to becoming a kind of "mercenary" in crises created by the hegemonic power if it believes that this might extract more foreign aid/credits. It could send its soldiers to die for others. During the Gulf crisis of 1990 Turkey under Turgut Özal was getting ready to intervene in Iraq and was concocting scenarios for reconquering Mosul.

To summarize, it is not easy to claim that the security components that underpin Turkey's foreign policy are adequate to the task of allowing an effective foreign policy to be conducted.

Despite these shortcomings and faults, however, Turkish foreign policy has been much more successful than might be expected and much less open to outside influence. This can be explained by international developments favoring Turkey's relative autonomy and also by the ability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to minimize the effects of negative internal factors on foreign relations (see "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs" in "The Implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy" below).

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## III. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

It is not easy to reduce the foreign policy of a country extending over a period of eighty years to a few principles or to attribute a consistent permanent pattern to it. Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy can be said to rest on two firm pillars: maintenance of the status quo and a Western orientation.

#### A. Maintenance of the Status Quo

In a sensitive region where the balance is always precarious, this policy, inherited from predecessor states, had two implications for Turkey.

#### 1. Preserving Existing Frontiers

For Turkey, defense of the status quo meant to be satisfied with existing frontiers, to preserve them without changes, and to refrain from pursuing irredentism (the policy of annexing adjacent territories where co-nationals live) in lands containing Turkish minorities.

This policy is enunciated in a speech made by M. Kemal in 1921 and also in his reply to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's congratulatory message sent on 29 October 1933 (the tenth anniversary of the Republic), containing the maxim "Peace at home and peace in the world." This became the guiding principle of the defenders of the status quo.

On 1 December 1921 M. Kemal delivered a speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) while the War of Liberation was still being fought:

Gentlemen, we are not pursuing grandiose illusions. We did this in the past and attracted the odium of the world on this nation. We did not pursue Pan-Islamism. We may have said: "We are doing it" or "are going to do it"; and our adversaries said: "Let us get rid of them to stop them from doing it." We did not engage in Pan-Turkism. We said: "We will do it, we are doing it"; and they said: "Let us get rid of them!" Instead of gaining new enemies by talking about dreams we did not or could not carry out, we must know our limitations and, as a nation, seek only the right to live and be independent. Only for these goals do we sacrifice our lives. (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I, p. 201)

The maxim "Peace at home and peace in the world" was enunciated when the new order was already established and signified the following: once the domestic order on a Western model consisting of statism in the economic sphere, a single party in the ideological sphere, and a single nation in the political sphere (after the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion) has been established, there should be no alterations regarding this domestic order. Now that our independence is secured, however, we have no demands abroad. We are satisfied to live within our borders and have no wish to interfere in matters beyond our fron-

tiers. As long as no claims are made on our frontiers, we shall live in peace with everyone.

This stance in favor of the status quo has several causes.

First, after the War of Liberation Turkey was too weak to be concerned with any foreign issue other than a direct threat to itself. This was a period of construction and consolidation of the state and the regime. It was a time to repair the ravages of war, carry out Westernizing reforms, and suppress the Kurdish rebellion. There was also the question of the removal of certain persons from the ranks of the leadership.

Second, at all stages the Soviet reality had to be taken into account. This country had the largest concentration of Turkish ethnic minorities. Under the treaty signed in 1921, the Soviets undertook not to foster communism in Turkey, while Turkey promised not to incite Pan-Turanism in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was the political and economic window to the world, both during the War of Liberation and afterward.

Third, the new Turkey was established as the successor of the empire that had come to grief as a consequence of the Pan-Turkist policies of the leaders of the Union and Progress movement. Turkey stayed clear of irredentism, vis-à-vis not only the Soviets but other countries as well. Its leaders knew that upsetting the existing balance for the sake of irredentist policies would damage Turkish interests. The new Turkey was persuaded that its borders as traced at Lausanne corresponded in very large measure to the borders aspired to under the National Pact (see "Revisionism and the Status Quo in the National Pact" in Section 1) and wanted nothing more than that Turkish minorities in neighboring countries should be able to live in peace and happiness.

Fourth, M. Kemal's personal influence also came into play. Unlike Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, the Turkish leader knew where to stop. This explains how Kemalism attained its objectives and endured while the Nazis and Fascists were destroyed. Kemal's objective was not conquest but the strengthening of the nation-state.

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy also got involved in situations that ran counter to the Versailles order or undertook interventions beyond the frontiers.

First, the War of Liberation was a full-fledged act of revisionism (a policy aimed at changing the peace treaties that concluded World War I; see the discussion of the period 1919 to 1923 in Section 1). Furthermore, it was the first revisionist move that resorted to arms.

Second, after the end of the War of Liberation and the signing of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne came two more revisionist episodes. The Lausanne Convention of the Straits was changed at Montreux in 1936. In 1939 Hatay was annexed, and the Lausanne borders were changed.

Third, a number of transboundary interventions also occurred. From 1950 to 1953 a military contingent was sent to Korea. In 1974 Turkey made a military intervention in northern Cyprus. In the 1980s and 1990s military operations were conducted in northern Iraq. Turkey also joined the interventions in Somalia in 1993, Bosnia in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001.

If we analyze Turkey's policies in favor of the status quo in the light of these examples, we can draw the following conclusions.

First, the Nationalist Movement interpreted revisionism restrictively even in the course of the War of Liberation. As soon as the war ended and the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed, policies defending the status quo were launched. These policies are still in effect.

Second, the actions at Montreux and Hatay were carried out in conformity with international law and without resorting to arms. This is the opposite of what the revisionist states of the period were doing. Montreux removed the limitations on sovereignty over the Straits as a result of the consensus reached at the international conference. The annexation of Hatay was the result of cooperation and agreements with France and the League of Nations. In these examples we can detect the influence of the policies inherited from the Ottomans (who sought to base their actions on legality to minimize adverse foreign reactions) as well as the care that M. Kemal took in the same respect.

Hatay is the only instance of territorial expansion. Although it is an example of both revisionism and irredentism, it remains an isolated case and not the manifestation of a policy of irredentism (see the discussion in Section 2, 1923 to 1939).

Third, the intervention in Cyprus was in compliance with article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, although the protracted presence of Turkish troops on the island eventually harmed the status quo policy. As for hot-pursuit operations in northern Iraq, until 1988 these were carried out in accordance with the bilateral agreement concluded with Iraq. Subsequent operations were conducted with the implicit consent of Iraq and the overt consent of the U.S. The Korea, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo operations took place within the framework of international organization operations designed to maintain the Western status quo.

Despite the view that the policy of defending the status quo had been dropped after the radical transformation of the international system in the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy has continued on its traditional path of maintaining the status quo.

#### 2. Preserving Existing Balances

The second aspect of Turkey's status quo-oriented policies is the reinforcement and preservation of balances within the established order. This had two distinct manifestations. First, despite the Western orientation of its policies, Turkey always tried to establish a kind of balance between the West and its adversaries as a consequence of its geostrategic location. Second, for the same reason, Turkey has sought to ensure a balance with the different components of the West.

The first sort of balance was not easy to achieve, because the West was able to establish its dominance in the international sphere, leading to a unipolar world after the victory of the West in the Cold War. Nevertheless, Turkey has tried to diversify its options by taking advantage of the existing balance. In the period from 1923 to 1939 and from 1960 to 1980 Turkey took advantage of the USSR as an element of balance.

Turkey also took advantage of the second sort of balance by using the different Western European countries in the periods 1919–23, 1923–39, and 1939–45. With the entry of the U.S. on the world scene, this balancing act could have been between the U.S. and Western Europe, but that was not to be. In the aftermath of World War II Western Europe was very weak; and in the period from 1960 to 1980 Turkey was unable to come to a final decision regarding the European Economic Community (EEC). In the period after 1980 the hostile European reaction to the military regime of 12 September 1980 resulted in Turkey being practically excluded from Europe.

Three conclusions can be drawn from Turkey's policies of maintaining the status quo.

First, since the established order has always been under Western domination, the pro-West and pro-status quo policies are merely different faces of the same coin.

Second, when some sort of balance could be preserved, it was easier to follow a pro-status quo course. When Turkey leaned exclusively on the U.S., as in the Menderes era (Baghdad Pact) or Özal era (the scenarios of the Gulf War), deviations from the pro-status quo course occurred. When it became possible to preserve a balance (as was the case in 1923—39, 1939—45, and 1960—80), it was easier to maintain the status quo.

Third, Turkey's relative autonomy increased in these periods of balance. This relative autonomy was restricted in the Menderes, Özal, and post-1990 periods, while it was greater in 1923–39, 1939–45, and 1960–80.

#### B. Westernism

#### The Meaning and Roots of Westernism

Western civilization has an infrastructure based on capitalism and a superstructure based on rationality rather than on faith. In other words, the West is not a geographical term.

This concept has undergone changes since Turkey was established in 1923. Its infrastructure changed from a system that excluded the labor unions to the welfare state of today. Its superstructure had lost its solid liberal character between the two world wars when it was challenged by the Hitler order extolling a single leader, a single party, and a single ideology. Today it is a democratic order emphasizing human and minority rights. The West that has developed over time contains two strains that are completely opposed to one another. Turkey has usually been influenced by the dominant Western strain of the time, M. Kemal's main concept of the West, however, was the Anglo-Saxon version, and this determined Turkey's course.

Why the West? There must be good reasons for a Middle Eastern country with only a tiny fraction of its territory located in Europe to be so fervently pro-Western.

- 1. The historical dimension: as we have already seen, Anatolia's geographical, religious, and other features drove the Turks westward even before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Islam's gaza (holy war) tradition of spreading the faith was used to reinforce this tendency.
- 2. The ideological dimension: Union and Progress (UP), the political movement that made the strongest impression on Turkey's recent history, was both nationalist and Western. The Republic was established by the members of this movement, who maintained their policies of Westernization under the new regime (Box Intro-8).
- 3. The social dimension: Turkey's class structure and its development model have pulled it westward, as we have already seen.
- 4. The cultural dimension: the cultural influence of the West is very strong in Turkey. Both the state and the people want to be identified not as Eastern but as Western.
- 5. Turkey has pursued status quo-preserving strategies from the days of the Ottomans, as indicated earlier. As an SMP it has always been careful to maintain the status quo. For Turkey, the status quo and Westernism are synonymous.
- 6. Turkey is basically an underdeveloped country. Kemalism, as it developed in the 1930s, is the first example—perhaps the prototype—of the nationalism of underdeveloped countries that emerged in the 1950s. In

### Box Intro-8. The Westernizing Reforms of Union and Progress

Aside from the declaration of the Republic, all of the seeds of the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s were sown by Union and Progress. The UP leadership was Turkist and wanted to put "Muslim merchants" in the place of the non-Muslim minorities. The Law for the Promotion of Industry provided free land for factory building, customs exemptions, and tax relief to "national merchants." Under the Republic, a law with a similar title and content was passed in 1927. UP established the Itibar-i Milli Bank, while the Republic founded the is Bankasi in 1924. Policies for protecting and promoting national industries were launched by UP. The Republic was to do this after 1929. UP set aside a special week during which only locally produced goods. would be bought. In 1914 the capitulations were abolished. To keep the working class under strict control, UP enacted the law on "The Stoppage of Work," which banned unions and strikes. The Republic kept this law in force until 1937 and legalized the strikes only after 1961.

As regards superstructure, the UP leadership declared Turkish to be the official language in 1908 and considered reforming the alphabet but failed to implement this because of the war. In 1916 all tribunals were placed under the Ministry of Justice and all primary schools controlled by religious foundations under the Ministry of Education. UP established employment agencies for women, and matrimonial matters were removed from the competence of religious courts and placed under the competence of civil courts. A man was no longer able to enter into a polygamous marriage without the wife's consent. After 1916 an annual painting exhibition was held, and paintings were purchased to decorate the walls of public offices. The Quran was translated into Turkish.

It was during the Republic that these reforms were carried out wholesale and in a systematic manner, completely transforming the superstructure.

> (B. ORAN) (Source: Avcioglu)

these countries nationalism and Westernism are synonymous (Box Intro-9).

All of these reasons are important. But Turkish Westernism is the result of a revolution from above. Until recently the country was still not free from semifeudal practices. In this context, to understand Westernism in Turkey we must understand the elite: the intellectuals.

## The Rudder and Engine of Westernism: The Intellectuals

The term aydm (usually used in the plural form aydınlar: the enlightened, meaning intellectuals) applies only in underdeveloped countries. There is no corresponding term in developed countries. The words "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" do not correspond exactly to aydınlar, which is derived from the Age of Enlightenment that the West went through in the seventeenth and eighteenth

### Box Intro-9. Nationalism and Westernization in Underdeveloped Countries

Both in the prototype that appeared in Turkey in its Kemalist version and in the version that appeared about twenty-five years later among all the colonial and semicolonial countries, nationalism in underdeveloped countries has three main objectives: (1) gain independence, (2) become modern, (3) develop a positive identity.

The second objective can also be described as Westernization. The intelligentsia put into practice the values acquired from the West and tried to transform their country into a Western model. The political dimension of this remodeling is establishment of an independent state, the social dimension is nation building, and the economic dimension is industrialization through state capitalism, given the absence of private capital.

The third objective derives directly from the second. The first objective implies throwing the West out through the front door, but the second implies letting it back in through the rear door. This creates a feeling of frustration, which is compounded by the fact that these underdeveloped countries consist mostly of peoples with darker skins that make them particularly sensitive to the condescending racial attitudes of the West. This leads directly to the third objective of trying to solve the identity problem.

To summarize, nationalism in underdeveloped countries is both anti-Western and an admirer of the West, trying to install the West in its local environment. In fact, all the nationalisms that followed the original Western European nationalism of 1789 are reactions to Western European nationalism that nevertheless adopted it as their model.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Oran 1997)

centuries. Aydınlar refers to people who have assimilated the values of the Enlightenment and made these values applicable to their day-to-day lives. This is why there can be no such thing as "Islamic intellectuals" (İslamci aydınlar); this would be a contradiction in terms.

Probably the best available definition for the term aydın is a person who is "the product of modernization before this modernization reached his country" (Kautsky, p. 46). This is achieved by individuals belonging to the educated segment of the petty bourgeoisie who manage to get an education either in the West or in a Westernstyle educational institution in their own country (Box Intro-10). As a result, these intellectuals assimilate the values of the West, which are quite alien to the values of their underdeveloped society. In this manner they are able to observe their society from the perspective of the outsider.

As long as their society remains at its current level, the *aydınlar* cannot put their Western knowledge to good use or reshape their society, or even find employment suit-

### Box Intro-10. The Social Roots and Basic Characteristics of the *Aydınlar*

The intellectuals (aydınlar) do not constitute a class but are a segment or a stratum of the educated wing of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie can be divided into two parts. (1) The aydınlar are products of Western education and uncompromising Westernists who make a living thanks to their education and are usually employed in the bureaucracy. (2) Small traders make a living as traders and service providers even if they are educated. The influence of the West has a negative effect on small traders, unlike the aydınlar, because it forces them to change or go out of business. The Western superstructure (women's rights, etc.) is allen to them. Consequently, this segment is very conservative and anti-Western.

The aydınlar can be classified as both interclass and supraclass. The first category makes them insecure and gives rise to the accusation of being "spineless" because they aspire to join an upper class. The second category renders them relatively autonomous of the country's class structure. This allows them to pursue a pro-independence foreign policy and a domestic policy based on rational principles.

As products of the West, these intellectuals base themselves on the Western model, which is capitalism, and try to adapt it to their country's structure. In the second half of the 1970s, however, we encounter a second generation of intellectuals who were influenced by the Soviet and Chinese models and who wanted to modernize upon a Marxist infrastructure. This group failed to make headway following the ascendancy of globalization in the 1980s.

> (B. ORAN) (Source: Oran 1999)

able to their skills. This is why they seek to change their country of birth according to Western models. When they come across resistance from the internal dynamics, they strive to reach their goal through revolution from above on the basis of their administrative skills acquired from the West.

#### The Aydınlar in Turkey, the West, and Foreign Policy

The *aydınlar* in Turkey are markedly different from the intellectuals of the other underdeveloped countries. The reasons for this difference and its repercussions on relations with the West can be summarized as follows.

- 1. The historical perspective: the Ottoman realm did not experience imperialist occupation, so its inhabitants had no reason to hate the West. Because there never was a colonial administration that suppressed these intellectuals, they did not become alienated from the West.
- 2. The structural perspective: even the Turkey of the 1920s was at a more advanced level in terms of the mode of production and the class structure than many countries

were thirty years later. It was also closer to the West. For this reason, its dominant classes did not reject the West from the very outset.

- 3. The ethnic perspective: Turkey is a country with territory in Europe and with a white population. That is why the kind of anti-Westernism that is fed by the color bar does not exist in Turkey.
- 4. The chronological perspective: the Soviet revolution was still in its early stages during the formative stage of the Republic, and the Western development model was the only valid model. Furthermore, the "leftist intellectuals" (who may be called the second generation of the intellectuals) were not yet on the scene or were unable to influence the Republican cadres.

For these reasons, Turkey's Westernization process was easier, less complicated, and more radical than the Westernization process in other developing countries. Not only was Turkey's structure less alien to the West, but its intellectuals had received a Western education; far from being anti-Western, they greatly admired the West. On this basis they were prepared to copy the West systematically in both the infrastructure and the superstructure. This led to a foreign policy in which an alternative to the West would be unthinkable.

To understand Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy, we should also bear in mind the background of Kemal Atatürk. To begin with, Atatürk was a graduate of the War College (Harbiye), the Ottoman institution that was most under the influence of the West. He was also a complete realist: this trait ensured that he would avoid conflicts with the Western major powers and seek accommodations with them. He was determined to adopt the Western superstructure as well as the infrastructure. We shall revert to this theme in the appraisal of the period from 1923 to 1939.

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## The Implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy

### I. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### A. The Relative Autonomy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry's Difficult Task

Invariably the precondition for a successful foreign policy is for the country to rest on a sound foundation. The reason for the great influence of the U.S. in the international arena is the strong foundation of the country—military, political, and especially economic—rather than the skill-fulness of its diplomacy.

As we have already seen, this does not apply to Turkey. Many of the country's chronic problems go back to the beginning of the twentieth century and sometimes even earlier (the Kurdish question, the Armenian question, disputes with Greece, differences with the Arab countries, etc.) and are not susceptible to solutions by modern methods because of Turkey's Asian and Middle Eastern dimensions. The attempt to solve these questions in isolation renders them even more complicated in the long run.

As a medium power, Turkey was able to take advantage of its geostrategic location during the Cold War to further its economic development. With the end of the Cold War this possibility was in large measure lost. U.S. aid to Turkey, which began in 1947, came to an end in 1998; the IMF is little concerned with geostrategy (although the situation is now somewhat different in the post-9/11 world).

In addition, succeeding governments have not been able to deal successfully with the economic consequences of globalization. This rigidifies their stand vis-à-vis the outside world in political questions, making it harder to implement an appropriate foreign policy. That should not be understood to mean that the usual attempt is being made to distract the public from internal questions by directing its attention abroad. Turkey's various political/

ideological groups (Kurdish nationalists, Islamists, etc.) are developed enough to avoid falling into this trap. What is referred to here is the attempt to use certain steps that relate to foreign policy (such as resistance to the abolition of the death penalty, recognition of ethnic identity, and acceptance of nonviolent freedom of expression) as a cover for economic submissiveness. This renders the task of Turkish diplomacy very difficult.

In practice, however, these negative factors are not fully reflected in Turkey's foreign relations, despite the revolution that has taken place in communications. One reason for this is Turkey's lingering geopolitical importance. But another reason is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which, compared to other institutions, has been relatively less affected by the country's upheavals and limitations. This institution has had its share of criticism. Certain quarters have berated it for not publicizing Turkey adequately or for not putting across Turkish causes convincingly. This criticism is unwarranted. Turkey's domestic problems resulting directly from an internal structure that is badly in need of reform are reflected abroad in a manner that plays down their negative aspects. The ministry is able to accomplish this difficult task thanks to its relative insulation from the country's turbulent politics.

To understand Turkey's foreign policy, it is necessary to examine this relative autonomy of the ministry. But let us look at the statistics first.

### The Ministry's Personnel and Budget

The ministry's personnel consists of professional staff, popularly referred to as diplomats, and support staff.

According to the 2001 data, 1,040,101 civil servants work in Turkey's ministries. This figure does not include those working in the president's office, the Grand National Assembly, the Ministry of Defense, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the gendarmerie, the

public economic enterprises, and provincial and local administrations.

The total number of personnel in the MFA is 2,675. Foreign policy is implemented by professional staff (career diplomats), numbering 880 in 2001. Of these professionals, 21% are women. Roughly 45% are stationed at headquarters in Ankara, with the remaining 55% serving at 157 posts in 93 countries. Service at headquarters is a minimum of two years, followed by foreign postings, which (with a few exceptions) cannot exceed five years.

The budget of the ministry represents 0.3 to 0.4% of the national budget. In comparison, the budget of the Administration for Religious Affairs is 1.5 times larger. The share of the State Department in the U.S. federal budget is over 4%.

After 1990 posts were established in newly independent countries, but the number of professional staff did not increase correspondingly. Especially in periods of erosion in the value of the Turkish currency, the MFA has to carry out its tasks with huge budgetary and personnel constraints.

The relative autonomy that allows the MFA to operate effectively is derived from powerful sources. We shall examine these in two categories: sources from outside the ministry and within the ministry itself.

### Outside Sources Feeding the MFA's Autonomy

These sources can be subdivided into those related to the nature of the diplomatic profession and those related to the special features of Turkey.

### The Nature of the Diplomatic Profession

First, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Finance constitute the principal ministries in all countries.

Second, the MFA and the Ministry of Defense are concerned with foreign countries and come to be closely associated with the national interest.

Third, diplomacy is a very special field and requires special skills that other civil servants need not have. Knowing foreign languages, being at home in labyrinthine international practices, and being able to keep pace with the ever-changing international environment are just some of these special requirements.

As a result, the MFA is least affected by political patronage and pressures for special favors. This allows it to remain free from voters' demands and political impropriety. Furthermore, the margin for error in foreign relations is very narrow. An error in domestic politics can be readily

redressed, but a provision inserted in a treaty as a result of oversight can bring about untold difficulties to a country for many years, directly affecting its national interest.

### The Special Features of Turkey

First, the West has a special place in Turkey, and the MFA has been a prime vehicle for transmitting the values of the West to the country since Ottoman times. The earliest contacts with the West were through the military. Long before its forerunner the Reis-ül Küttaplık was transformed into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1835, delegations were being sent to the West and were bringing the West to the attention of the country through their dispatches. During the Directoire period in France (1795–99), Morah Esseyit Ali Efendi studied how the French MFA operated and reported his findings to Istanbul. This practice is still kept up, with embassies submitting periodic reports to headquarters.

A second feature is that the prime minister is usually familiar only with the domestic scene. Even when familiar with the international scene, the prime minister cannot keep up with the pace of change or the intricacies of international economics. By the nature of Turkish politics, prime ministers tend to originate from provincial small towns. The MFA is the institution that is supposed to keep abreast of international developments. Politicians can lose their positions after an election, but professional diplomats stay at their jobs for roughly forty years before they retire.

The third feature is that Turkish politicians and civil servants do not as a rule have foreign language skills; nor are they familiar with international procedures. This places a special burden on the MFA. When politicians and civil servants travel abroad and find themselves on unfamiliar ground, they must rely on diplomats. Even the personnel of other ministries posted in foreign countries rarely know foreign languages and procedures well enough to conduct their business directly with their foreign counterparts.

A fourth feature is the case of politicians who make wrong moves that harm Turkey, requiring the intervention of diplomats to repair the damage. This usually occurs when the MFA is excluded either deliberately or by oversight. In any situation that has international implications, the rule is that politicians should consult the MFA to make sure that they do not run counter to the country's current position with regard to that subject. When this rule is not heeded, the country can be placed in a difficult or embarrassing situation. When a minister gives a speech supporting an independent Kosovo in order to

curry favor with the Albanian lobby in Turkey or out of sympathy for the Muslim community in the Balkans, it is the MFA that has to make sure that foreigners do not link this support for separatism with Turkey's problems in the southeastern part of the country.

From having to do this often, the MFA has gained considerable expertise in this field. A typical example of this is when the ministry issues a press release stating that the minister in question was expressing his or her private views, that in democracies such things do happen, and that the government's official position is that the issue in question should be resolved within the framework of the UN Security Council resolution. If the minister has received the representative of the "Chechen Republic" in the presence of TV cameras without consulting the MFA, the ministry tries to prevent the broadcasting of the event. As a courtesy, most channels will comply with such a request. The next step would be to invite the Russian ambassador to the ministry and inform the ambassador that the minister in question has made a statement that is open to misinterpretation, that the matter should not be needlessly blown up or seen in a negative light, and that the Russian Federation is well aware of Turkey's policy. In more serious cases, the matter is allowed to cool off in an effort to have the episode forgotten. If it is difficult to forget (as in the case of T. Özal's actions during the Gulf War), then the ministry tries to minimize the damage.

One of the situations that would be difficult to redress is when the government has joined, in one way or another, an international organization that follows a line contrary to Turkey's general orientation. It is conceivable that a prime minister might establish a link with an organization of doubtful value that might also be following an anti-Western line. The MFA would follow instructions and carry out the requirements of membership. Once the prime minister is out of office, the staff would minimize links with the organization even though they would have to attend meetings to demonstrate the state's continuity of purpose. Summit meetings, however, would be attended by a minister of state. At a second stage, the organization's joint projects would be delayed or suspended. Of course, all these efforts naturally drain the limited resources of the ministry.

The MFA must also cope with situations caused by politicians who fail to take the international repercussions of their actions into account. When Öcalan showed up in Rome and sought political asylum in late 1998, the police failed to prevent an angry crowd from tearing down the sign of the Italian embassy in Ankara. When the French parliament passed a law on the Armenian question in 2001 that was perceived as being anti-Turkish, French firms

were prevented from bidding for projects in Turkey. This did not help Turkish ministers who went to Paris or Rome some months later to secure loans or attract investments.

# 2. Factors within the Ministry That Contribute to Relative Autonomy

### The Quality of Personnel

The quality of the personnel of the MFA is far above the average level of civil servants in Turkey, for a number of reasons.

To qualify for employment in the ministry, candidates must pass a rigorous competitive exam (Box Intro11). They cannot transfer from other ministries. In the past, difficulties arose in obtaining the authorization of the Ministry of Finance for the necessary number of positions. Now it is difficult to fill all the positions available because an insufficient number of candidates with the right qualifications apply. This is because public sector employment is not as desirable as it used to be, the ministry's salaries have lost their attractiveness, diplomats serving abroad face the threat of assassination, and the possibility of finding employment in foreign countries has increased.

The examining board consists of at least five ambassadors. Other ministers plenipotentiary and ambassadors may choose to join the board. The exam is meticulous and fair, because senior diplomats try to maintain the MFA's high standards. They know that the quality of their subordinates will reflect on the quality of their own work.

That is why favoritism in the exam is extremely rare. Even the son of a president of the Republic is known to have failed the exam in his first attempt.

This is also true for the candidates taking the exam for administrative personnel, but the same cannot be said about the personnel not included in these two basic categories. Promotions are difficult but fair. Those succeeding in the entrance exam are admitted to the ministry on probation for two years. The first year is a period of in-service training. After this comes one year as attaché, three years as third secretary, and three years as second secretary; if the incumbent has a personal record of at least seventysix points out of one hundred, he or she can then take an exam to be promoted to first secretary. Those who fail this exam three times are downgraded to the category of administrative staff. Each failure lowers the position of the incumbent in the hierarchy. Up to this point the incumbent has been ranked according to the entrance exam grade. After this, the promotion exam for first secretary will determine ranking up to the level of senior counselor. If the diplomat becomes minister plenipotentiary, he or she is a candidate to become ambassador. Thirty-five to forty members of the staff are in this category.

## Box Intro-11. The Entrance Exam for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The exam consists of two parts, written and oral. The passing grade is seventy. The written part consists of four different tests: a composition in English, French, or German, a composition in Turkish; a translation from Turkish to a foreign language; and a translation from a foreign language to Turkish. Those taking the exam in German must obtain a grade of at least fifty in one of the other two languages. Those taking the exam in two languages will gain an advantage. Turkish composition is given particular attention. The Turkish text that is to be translated is complicated and difficult. Each test is graded separately, and a passing grade is required for all four tests. The total of the grades determines the level of the candidate.

Successful applicants are then invited to take the oral exam, which can last from thirty minutes to one hour. The candidate must answer questions on diplomatic history, international politics, Turkish foreign policy, constitutional law, international law, civil law, private international law, international law, international economics, the Turkish economy, finance, and general culture. The questions are selected by drawing lots. In this exam-cum-interview, candidates are judged according to their knowledge and general comportment as well as the order and manner in which they deal with the particular subjects.

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Rising in the hierarchy depends exclusively on the diplomat's place in the seniority list. This list determines promotions and assignments. No other ministry has this type of ranking, derived from the Vienna Convention. Naturally, diplomats cannot get promotions as fast as in other ministries.

Diplomats remain attached to their jobs and work with devotion despite the difficulties and threats to personal security experienced in foreign assignments, because of the equitable system that prevails in the MFA. They know that if they are hard-working and successful the system will ensure their regular promotion. Although certain ambassadors may somehow have attained the position without really deserving it, the staff of the ministry knows that every deserving diplomat attains the rank of ambassador. All ambassadors are selected from among the staff of the MFA, the last noncareer ambassador with a military background having retired in the early 1980s.

The knowledge that diligence and effective performance will be duly rewarded encourages keen competition among career diplomats. Although foreign assignments might not always reflect the ranking in the entrance exam, the urge to get desirable postings and qualify to join the ranks of the thirty-five to forty diplomats who are considered ambassadorial material sharpens the competition and improves the performance of the staff.

There is a strict hierarchy and discipline in the MFA. In this respect it ranks immediately after the armed forces.

An individual who becomes a career diplomat immediately begins to conform to a model. Diplomats must always be properly attired and well behaved and must observe the rules of protocol and etiquette. They must address their superiors deferentially and seek permission to leave when the workday is over. They must remain at a party until their superior leaves. Their private life, drinking and gambling habits, ability to live within their income, and personal relations will all affect their careers and determine whether they get promoted and especially whether they become ambassadors. Although this strict discipline and hierarchy can wear diplomats down, it is important in preserving the quality of personnel. The hierarchy may be strict, but the diplomats know that it will be fair. Young diplomats are aware that in the future their subordinates will serve them with the same dedication with which they serve their superiors. They have no doubt that working overtime will always improve their prospects of promotion.

Thanks to this discipline, the decline in the quality of civil servants observed since 1980 has had a minimum impact on the MFA.

Unlike their counterparts in other government agencies, diplomats never withhold information or documents from their colleagues. Any information or document in any department is automatically transmitted to other related departments in the ministry and to other related organizations. In this manner proper coordination is achieved both within the MFA and among government agencies. At the same time, diplomats are provided with all the available information related to their field of competence so that they can have a full picture of any situation. This is achieved through the following mechanisms and procedures.

Telegrams: telegrams arriving from missions abroad are distributed to related departments. To cite an example, if the ambassador in Sofia has made a demarche on the subject of the Council of Europe to the Bulgarian MFA, the dispatch is addressed to Turkey's representation to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and to the departments of the ministry dealing with the Council of Europe and Bulgaria. If the demarche relates to some action of the Council on Cyprus, the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia and the Cyprus department in the MFA will also receive copies of the dispatch. If the Bulgarian official has referred to something the Russian ambassador said, the dispatch will also go to the embassy in Moscow and to the ministry's Russian department. All plain and coded messages other than technical ones (for example, acknowledging receipt of a parcel) are also received by the MFA's senior staff, the president's office, the prime minister's office, and

(depending on the subject) the chief of the General Staff and the National Intelligence Organization. Requests for visas are transmitted to the Ministry of Interior.

Service notes: service notes are reports drafted by diplomats on all demarches made by them or to them at headquarters. These service notes are transmitted to the senior staff of the MFA, the offices of the president and prime minister, and also the deputy prime ministers when there is a coalition government. In any event, diplomats in the position of cabinet chief or advisor in these offices maintain a close liaison between these offices and the MFA. The distribution of confidential material is more restricted, but all interested offices and departments will get their copies.

The MFA also employs circular service notes in its communications. For example, when an important event like Vladimir Putin taking over the Russian presidency takes place, the MFA's appraisal is communicated to all departments in the ministry and missions abroad through this device.

This communication system not only operates according to strict rules but is based on the deep-rooted traditions of the MFA. This reinforces the integrity of the MFA, rooted in its role as a historic institution with staff members who have been the products, until very recently, of a limited number of elite schools, and with well-defined traditions, discipline, and hierarchy.

The decision-making process in the MFA, which can be described as "democratic centralism," secures the effective functioning of the institution and contributes to the development of a motivated staff. In this system decisions are initiated at the level of section chief; the proposal works its way up to the top echelons, where the final decision is made and then executed at a lower level. This allows the personnel to get proper training, to develop loyalty to the ministry, and to identify with the duty being performed.

### The MFA's Bureaucratic Character

Despite the distinctiveness of its personnel, the MFA makes a great effort to be a smoothly operating part of the general state bureaucracy. This contributes to its relative autonomy. Let us see how this is accomplished.

First, the ministry strives to maintain continuity within the state and relies on its traditions to do this. The ministers of foreign affairs and the permanent undersecretaries are not subject to capricious change.

The frequency of change among ministers is less than among governments, and this helps provide a certain continuity in the state's foreign policy. In the 975 months that elapsed from the establishment of the Grand Na-

tional Assembly in April 1920 to July 2001, there have been sixty-three different governments but only thirty-seven ministers of foreign affairs. The average span of governments was 15.4 months, while the ministers lasted for 26.3 months. This means that the period in office of the minister was 71% longer than that of the government. (In fact, this proportion would be higher if it were not for the frequent change of ministers after 1990. During this period there have been eleven governments and thirteen ministers.)

Because foreign relations is a difficult and specialized field, the actual person at the helm of the MFA is usually not the minister, who is a politician, but the undersecretary, who is a professional. In Atatürk's period the undersecretary had a special place in the state hierarchy. To this day the undersecretary's official car carries a red registration plate, similar to that of a minister. The 12 September coup administration (following the military takeover) and T. Özal wanted to put an end to this practice but were probably thwarted by the knowledge that the original decree establishing the practice bore Atatürk's signature. By Decree No. 4334 of 1 March 1981, however, the second highest ranking person's title of secretary-general was changed to undersecretary, as in the case of other ministrates.

During the years of the Republic the undersecretary of the MFA has always been a diplomat who had risen in the ranks. This practice is observed only in the ministries of the Interior, Defense, and Finance. In other ministries the undersecretary comes and goes with the minister. With the exception of the Ministry of Defense, only in the MFA is it known beforehand who the next undersecretary will be. If we look at the statistics from the establishment of the TGNA to July 2001, there have been thirty-one undersecretaries, with an average span in office of 31.4 months. Their time in office is longer than that of ministers by over 19% and longer than that of governments by 104%.

Second, the MFA stays clear of domestic politics and its day-to-day functioning. This keeps it out of the political fray and contributes to its relative autonomy.

The ministry tries to insulate itself and the government from the influence of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy. This is relatively easy, given that foreign policy is a field far removed from clientelist relations. When dealing with questions such as Cyprus, Azerbaijan, or Bosnia, public opinion obviously cannot be completely ignored. Willy-nilly, the MFA has to take account of public sentiment in such cases. Furthermore, it has become harder to ignore public opinion, because since 1990 influential lobbies have sprung up in Turkey.

When the lobby's activities are parallel to Turkey's

interests, there is usually no problem. A typical example of this is Greenpeace's efforts to keep dangerous cargoes out of the Turkish Straits. Other examples are the Turkish lobbies in foreign countries, like the Turkish lobby in the U.S. that tries to block anti-Turkish legislation in Congress. In some cases, however, the lobbies have used abusive language against Armenian, Cypriot, Kurdish, or Greek associations and followed Pan-Turkic policies based on racism. This is highly embarrassing to the MFA, which tries to distance itself from their activities or to steer them toward more rational courses.

The lobbies that cause the MFA the greatest difficulties are the ones located in Turkey. First of all, these lobbies try to get Turkey aligned with their ethnic kin (Albanians, Abkhazians, Georgians, Chechens, Circassians, Azerbaijanis, etc.). Second, they also try to put Turkey into a frame of mind where decisions are based not on right and wrong but on irrational and dangerous distinctions such as active/passive, friend/foe, and even Muslim/infidel. Third, they raise unfeasible and irrational expectations among the Turkish public by advocating the bombing of Serbs in Bosnia or Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, leading to severe disappointments. Such lobbies get their members of parliament to apply pressure on the MFA. When the MFA referred to armed Chechen hijackers of the ferryboat Avrasya as terrorists in 1996, the ministry's telephones were deluged with protest calls.

The MFA has to deal in different ways with these lobbies that attempt to derail Turkey's traditional sober policy of staying out of foreign conflicts. When the Abhaz lobby presses the ministry in connection with humanitarian aid to Georgia, the pressure can be deflected by sending additional humanitarian aid to Georgia with the request that it be distributed to the Abhaz people. But if the pressure is considered a threat to Turkish interests, then the MFA will resist. If the pressure is to bomb Bosnia, the ministry will work in close consultation with the General Staff to prevent such an extreme course. When the Albanian lobby agitates for the independence of Kosovo or the dismemberment of Macedonia, it is blocked from advocating a course that could constitute a bad precedent for Turkey in its efforts to maintain its territorial integrity. The MFA persuades the Chechen lobby that good sense dictates that Turkey must not damage its good relations with Russia.

Third, the MFA's guiding principle is "service to the government, loyalty to the state." Although its loyalty is fundamentally to the state, the ministry scrupulously executes the policies of the current government regardless of any qualms that its personnel may have. The MFA has its personnel in the office of the president and the prime

minister to provide liaison and serve as advisors. The ministry also has experts to brief professional bodies, universities, ministries, associations, and other groups on subjects coming within its field of competence. It provides notes to institutions and individuals on particular subjects, furnishing background information and explaining the ministry's views on the subject.

This practice, which was inherited from the Ottomans but also corresponds to the practice of all modern MFAs, constitutes a major asset to the state. When the War of Liberation ended with the victory of Ankara, the ministry continued to provide its professional services with the same loyalty to the new regime.

The employees of the MFA are usually more tight-lipped than the personnel of other ministries. It is not unusual for senior Turkish officials to speak or leak to the press when they cannot persuade politicians to follow a sensible course. This rarely occurs in the MFA. Because the ministry's loyalty is above suspicion, governments need not attempt to "gain supremacy" in the ministry. It is an established fact that the MFA will carry out its duties without questioning. This ensures that the MFA is free from sniping and able to get on with its duties with relative autonomy.

In this context the MFA avoids taking an openly contrary position on taboo "national" issues such as anticommunism during the Cold War, Armenia later on, and Cyprus (we shall revert to this question later). In fact, on issues where public opinion is tough and unyielding and its own freedom of maneuver is consequently very restricted, the MFA can be said not to have a "foreign policy." In such cases, it merely carries out the policies dictated by the prevailing chauvinistic atmosphere and avoids attracting unwanted criticism.

The practice of careful execution of government policies by the MFA has limits, however. One is when the MFA is kept out of foreign policy decisions. Naturally, this is a matter of survival for the ministry, and it is perfectly understandable that it should react. Such an instance (not as an isolated incident but as a matter of deliberate policy) occurred only once. T. Özal had the notion that the Mülkiye (Faculty of Political Science of the University of Ankara) approach, which stands for upholding the public interest, traditions, legality, and hierarchy, was preventing important initiatives. Özal started taking fundamental steps in the field of foreign affairs (such as the unilateral lifting of visa requirements for Greek nationals, preparations for the 30 January 1988 Davos meeting, and making important contacts not through ambassadors but through businessmen and journalists close to himself) without even informing the MFA. He also prevented the keeping

of records at crucial meetings. The MFA's reaction was to continue to carry out its duties faithfully, while taking subtle steps to ensure that Özal's actions contrary to Turkey's traditional policies of rationally upholding the status quo and his personal gaffes and political mistakes became public knowledge.

The second limit is even more important: deviation from the fundamental pillar of Turkish foreign policy, Westernism. This limit was breached twice, causing internal grumbling in the first case and open opposition in the second. The first case was when Gündüz Ökçün as minister tried to add a pro-Third World strand to Turkr ish foreign policy from 1977 to 1979. The second case was when the Necmettin Erbakan government (the coalition between the Welfare and True Path parties, lasting from 8 July 1996 to 30 June 1997) tried to bring relations with Muslim countries to the foreground, especially with its D-8 project. In this instance, opposition did not involve refraining from performing duties. Instead Erbakan's blunders and shortcomings while visiting Libya, Iran, and similar countries were discreetly leaked to the press. It is widely believed that the MFA acted in close coordination with the General Staff in this case (see Box 7-59 in Section 7).

### The Rational Aspect of the Ministry's Bureaucracy

This aspect of the ministry's bureaucracy may appear to conflict with the "typical" aspect described in the previous section but in fact does not. The two aspects complement one another and enhance the MFA's importance and thereby reinforce its relative autonomy. In certain circumstances, policies must show flexibility to avoid failure, and the ministry's task is to prevent failure by adjusting policies to changing circumstances.

First, although the MFA implements the foreign policy of the government without questioning it, it certainly questions and debates all issues internally, including taboo subjects. It does this through brainstorming sessions where discussion papers are circulated and considered. The aim is to be prepared for policy changes when the need for such changes arises (we shall return to this question from a different perspective at the end of this section). Sometimes it even prepares the ground for such changes. In July 2000 the media reported that the MFA was taking initiatives to establish diplomatic contacts, though not diplomatic relations, with Armenia, while trying at the same time to persuade Azerbaijan to accept this.

Second (and perhaps more importantly), while carrying out without question policies that may appear necessary from a domestic vantage point but may be harmful

to the state in the external context, the MFA personnel will also caution politicians about possible dangers.

This is done in two basic ways. First, the negative aspects of harmful policies are explained to politicians in very discreet language and in a roundabout way. This is done with a rational solution proposal that does not give the impression that a veering away from traditional state policies has occurred. For example, instead of proposing that Öcalan's death sentence should not be carried out in order to prevent great damage to Turkey's international image, the ministry conveys the message that it is inappropriate for Turkey to remain (along with Russia) the sole country in the Council of Europe not to have signed the Sixth Additional Protocol (relating to the abolition of the death penalty) of the Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Basic Freedoms.

Perhaps the most typical example of this type of warning is the information release put out by the ministry on 25 September 1992, containing this paragraph written in diplomatic language on the post of high commissioner on national minorities newly established by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): "the new mechanism might well be used against Turkey or any other member of the CSCE. As long as Turkey is making progress in the fields of democracy and human rights, there will be no grounds for feeling disturbed over the development of CSCE mechanisms" (see Box 5-1 in Section 5).

The second way for the ministry to issue warnings is an integral part of its functions: the transmission of information on external events to the domestic scene. When the subject is sensitive this is done with proper emphasis so that it is not overlooked. The important thing is to transmit the foreign reaction with appropriate emphasis but without including the MFA's views. An example of this is the decision in 1982, following the coup of 12 September, to hold a ceremony marking the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Constitutional Court. On that occasion the embassy in Bern was instructed to issue invitations to the Swiss Federal Tribunal to participate at the ceremony. The primary duty of the MFA was to warn the administration that the holding of a ceremony by the members of the Constitutional Court in a country where the Constitution had been abolished through a military coup would be perceived negatively in Europe. The warnings were not heeded, and the invitations were issued. The federal judges not only refused to attend the ceremony but also arranged a press conference at which they appeared in their judicial robes, contributing to the spread of a negative image for Turkey. The embassy's task was to transmit this information in full detail to Ankara and vividly convey the reigning negative atmosphere. This warned Ankara to be on guard against similar events and ensured that the MFA would be taken more seriously by the state machinery in the future.

In analogous situations the MFA has given sensible warnings to various government agencies and in particular to the General Directorate of Foundations in connection with decisions relating to minorities in Turkey. In carrying out its duty to propose correct policies to the state, the MFA helps Turkey to preserve its reputation abroad and demonstrates that it is advisable to keep the ministry in the decision-making process in domestic issues with foreign implications. For example, any restrictions on non-Muslim pious foundations in Turkey applied in contravention of the Lausanne Treaty bring about an immediate reaction against Turkish foundations in Western Thrace. This brings home the message to politicians that the warnings of the MFA on such issues should be heeded. It should be noted, however, that the MFA's warnings are only partially effective and do not always prevent the same errors from being repeated.

The passage of time has invariably demonstrated the soundness of the MFA's warnings. In the case of the Lice incident of 1993, the MFA indicated in 1997 that it would be wiser to reach a friendly settlement with the local inhabitants whose houses were destroyed by gunfire, because the compensation that would be awarded by the European Court of Human Rights would be higher (see "The Issue of Human Rights" in Section 7). Events proved the MFA to be right. Such cases contribute to the strengthening of the credibility, the prestige, and the relative autonomy of the MFA within the state structure.

### The Closeness of the MFA to the Military

The MFA's relative autonomy is also enhanced by its similarity to the military, which holds first rank in the field of relative autonomy. Some of the attributes that give the military its relative autonomy are also the attributes of the MFA. Furthermore, there is a general impression that the MFA and the military are working closely together.

First, these institutions are based on two of the windows that opened to the West even in Ottoman times: the War College (Harbiye) and the College for Civil Servants (Mülkiye), the third window being the Medical School (Tibbiye). The graduates of these three colleges are convinced that there is no satisfactory alternative to the West.

Second, the MFA and the military also resemble one another in form. Their members wear uniforms: one military, the other civilian. It is inconceivable that a diplomat would show up at work without a jacket and tie. The same similarity exists in regard to respect for superiors, strict discipline, observance of protocol, and hierarchy.

The third resemblance is in their operating methods. Both hold innumerable internal meetings to reach their conclusions. They even go through simulation exercises where some of their members are asked to play the part of the opposition in order to get a better idea of the position of the other side. Once a decision is reached, they execute orders faithfully and without questioning.

Fourth, the MFA and the military share the same values. Their fundamental duty is to be concerned with foreigners. That is why they have a keen sense of awareness for their land, national defense, patriotism, the public interest, and the national interest. Members of the military feel close to the MFA because they entertain no doubts about its patriotism.

Fifth, their approach to crises is similar. In matters dealing with foreign affairs both institutions act with extreme caution. Many examples of this can be cited, going back to the early days of the regime. There was much opposition in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to the Treaty of Lausanne after its signature, and it took the combined efforts of the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, and TGNA president Marshal Mustafa Kemal to stem this opposition. When the Germans offered the Aegean islands to Turkey through informal channels near the end of World War II, the opposition (the leaders of the future Democratic Party to come to power in 1950) wanted to capitalize on this by turning the issue into a "national cause." They were checked by a coalition of diplomats and soldiers. Another instance of preventing foreign adventures occurred during the Gulf War of 1991.

It is also well known that the MFA has had to use the National Security Council to "persuade" prominent politicians who strayed too far from Turkey's traditional foreign policy by espousing the causes of ethnic lobbies for electoral gains. When diplomats and soldiers act in unison, their combined voice carries weight not just in Turkey but also in highly developed countries, including the U.S. This ability to influence the outcome reinforces the closeness of diplomats and the military, which also gains strength from the collaboration between diplomats and military attachés in Turkey's foreign missions.

### Esprit de Corps

A strong feeling of professional solidarity within the community of diplomats, deriving from a number of sources, contributes to the relative autonomy of the MFA.

The first thing to bear in mind is that diplomats constitute a very small segment of the civil service. Because of this, the MFA has a weak hand in the negotiations for salary increases or budgetary appropriations. Everyone can agree on the need to renew hospitals or tanks; but, in a country where the currency is constantly being devalued, it is not easy to persuade people to set aside foreign currency to repair an embassy building. When diplomats travel abroad to attend a meeting, their per diem will barely cover their hotel expenses, so they end up staying in the homes of their colleagues. Diplomats serving in missions abroad constitute a very small group. Even those who do not get along will not criticize one another to outsiders.

Second, the MFA does not elicit much sympathy from the general public. The prevailing view is that diplomats are "a bunch of effete snobs." This negative perception is compounded by the condescending and patronizing attitude of many of these professionals. The ministry always attracts unfair criticism without due regard for the general situation of the country and the constraints that have to be overcome. Because so much of the MFA's work is confidential, it is not always possible for diplomats to defend their actions or boast about their successes. In any case, they do not make public statements.

Third, the esprit de corps among diplomats draws strength from their common social class and therefore common culture. The vast majority of diplomats come from the educated petty bourgeoisie. According to a brochure put out by the MFA, the parents of personnel admitted to the ministry were from the following backgrounds: bankers 4%, lawyers 6%, physicians and pharmacists 6%, architects and engineers 7%, self-employed 13%, diplomats 15%, retired civil servants 19%, civil servants 25%, others 5%.

Finally, the consciousness of being a member of a "select" group also strengthens the existing esprit de corps.

### B. Shortcomings and Weaknesses of the Ministry

As in the case of the MFA's strengths, we shall examine its weaknesses in two parts: external and internal.

### The MFA's External Shortcomings and Weaknesses

### **Material Constraints**

The many problems that the ministry has to contend with and its organizational shortcomings are in large measure derived from the fact that it operates with a very restricted budget. Although the salaries of diplomats when serving at home are slightly above the general civil service level, they are completely inadequate when considered in the light of diplomats' protocol obligations. In these circumstances the diplomats are eagerly awaiting their foreign assignments, which reduces their effectiveness. As files change hands every two years, continuity suffers. Sometimes important departments are faced with a complete change of personnel. We could almost say that it is the deputy directors general who preserve continuity at headquarters, because they serve for a period of three to three and a half years.

Continuity is also lacking in missions abroad. To economize on salaries, a replacement is sent abroad only when the diplomat has returned to headquarters. To have an orderly transfer of files, however, it is necessary for the departing diplomat and his or her successor to work together for at least two weeks, which the state will not allow in order to save half a salary.

### Erosion of Responsibility

Ever since the 1960s, when the question of joining the EEC came under the responsibility of the State Planning Organization, the MFA's areas of responsibility have been trimmed. This tendency accelerated after 1980 when T. Özal, as part of his project to diminish the influence of the Mülkiye tradition in the bureaucracy, recast the personnel and the functions of the three principal ministries: the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. All government agencies are in a race to appropriate the functions of the MFA, with serious consequences for implementing a well-coordinated foreign policy. For example, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade corresponds directly with the Belgian Embassy in Ankara. It has been reported in the press that the Ministry of Health rejected the relief assistance of certain countries after the Marmara earthquake of 1999. In June 2000 the members of an Armenian delegation who were attending a meeting of the municipality of Kars were deported upon the orders of the local governor. The chief prosecutor of the State Security Tribunal applied directly to the representative office of the European Commission, seeking information about an investigation he was conducting.

According to international practice and for the sake of achieving proper coordination, it should have been necessary for these agencies to seek the advice of the MFA, with all correspondence with foreign entities being conducted through the MFA. As a matter of fact, article 1 of Law No. 1173, dated 17 May 1969 and entitled "Law on the Implementation and Coordination of International Relations,"

stipulates that the contacts and negotiations between the Republic of Turkey and foreign states, their missions, and representatives will be conducted by the MFA in consultation with the related ministry.

### 2. The MFA's Internal Shortcomings and Weaknesses

The external negative factors aggravate those that derive from the MFA's own organizational structure.

### "Memory"

Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, who served as minister of foreign affairs three times for a period of eight years, once remarked that the MFA has no memory. This is a very serious shortcoming and has a number of causes.

To begin with, the archives might just as well not exist because they are not properly classified and are in a dispersed state. Documents less than five years old are kept in the departments by persons who are not experts in filing and maintaining archives. After five years files are transferred to a temporary location in the basement of the main building and eventually transferred to the newly established state archives building in the Yenimahalle district of Ankara. Archives of the Ottoman period are kept in the Prime Ministry's archives, located in Istanbul. Still other documents are kept in embassies.

Because fax messages are not transcribed to regular paper, they fade over time and become useless. The MFA's computer network did not adopt the Windows operating system until July 2001. As a result, retrieving any bit of information—even if it is related only to the recent past such as the 1980s—takes time unless the person with the information is at hand. The library, which is not particularly extensive, was moved recently from the annex building to one located closer to the main building. Being housed in several dispersed buildings is in itself a serious handicap for the MFA.

### Policy Planning

The MFA does not conduct policy planning activity that fits the description and meets the requirements of the age. Reading the incoming dispatches and carrying out day-to-day duties leave no time for medium- and long-term policy planning.

Until 1995 there were two kinds of coordination meetings. The first is the compulsory and traditional weekly meeting, with the participation of the undersecretary, the deputy undersecretaries, the staff of the Policy Planning General Directorate, and, depending on the agenda, specific general directors and their deputies. The second

kind of meeting takes the form of a brainstorming session, with the participation of the section chief where the preparation of the paper to be discussed was initiated. The head of the academy (the in-service training unit) and the staffs of the policy planning and information departments also participate. At these meetings all participants freely express their views without regard to the hierarchy. This second type of meeting is now rarely held.

Both kinds of meetings take up the pressing questions of the day. As a rule, no attempt is made to consider foreign policy alternatives in a systematic way, because the current issues are usually very urgent and time is always scarce. Participants are eager to return to their desks to read embassy dispatches and carry out the appropriate action.

As already noted, the MFA has a tendency to avoid tackling taboo subjects. This is probably one of the reasons why policy formulation is inadequate. Even when policy formulation is carried out, there is a tendency to avoid formulating alternative policies. This is a blot in the MFA's record.

### Alternative Policy Proposals

In addition to these limitations of the coordination meetings, the ministry makes no obvious institutional effort to elaborate alternative policies that take into account new developments and conditions. True, occasional small steps are taken in this direction. The policies vis-à-vis Armenia are being seriously discussed and questioned. But these are still diffident steps. In an environment where it is impossible to engage in policy planning, the ministry should encourage and even organize the elaboration of alternative policies and strategies by experts, even if only behind closed doors. This job could be undertaken by an affiliated body of the ministry, the Strategic Research Center (SAM in its Turkish acronym). But its present budget, personnel, and structure prevent it from filling the existing void. In any case it is difficult for a research center that depends on the MFA to produce independent views. The MFA should seek the assistance of qualified institutions and individuals for this purpose, given that its diplomats do not seem to be eager to "put their careers into jeopardy" (which can be translated as being assigned to a "hardship" post abroad) by proposing alternative solutions to taboo subjects.

### The Question of Specialization

The MFA urgently requires two categories of specialists: (1) people who can look at medium- and long-term issues comprehensively and provide appropriate advice; and (2) people with expertise on particular subjects and regions. The MFA is not organized in a way to provide solutions to these problems, however.

It is not unusual for a diplomat to work at the Greek desk and become familiar with its work and then be assigned to the embassy in Amman and end up at the U.S. desk upon returning to headquarters. As a result, diplomats cannot concentrate on a specific subject. The first six months at headquarters are spent on familiarization with the job and the last six months are spent getting ready for a foreign assignment, so effective work can only be carried out for about a year. The same conditions apply to foreign assignments. In fact, during the first assignment (lasting five years) the diplomat has to serve at two different posts, including spending two to three years in a "hardship" post.

In these circumstances ministry employees can only claim full familiarity with the files they are currently dealing with. They will know about related information not in the file only if they have taken a personal interest in the matter. For example, a diplomat might know about the as yet unpublished U.S. plans for Kosovo or Nagorno Karabakh, but, having just returned from Indonesia, might not know when the MFA had contacts with Kosovar or Armenian officials. This is the main reason why the ministry is said to "have no memory."

Then there is the question of misallocation of human resources. As noted earlier, members of the administrative staff of the MFA are hired on the basis of a serious and fair entrance exam, and some of them are as qualified as the career diplomats. Instead of entrusting certain categories of consular work to the administrative staff, however, the MFA will assign diplomats to these jobs, aggravating the shortage of specialists.

These problems are rooted in the argument (going back to Ottoman times) as to whether foreign service officers should be generalists or specialists. Of course, these issues are not confined to Turkey.

Both schools of thought have strong and weak sides. If diplomats' expertise in a specific subject is carried to extreme lengths, they will end up being ignorant of other subjects and afflicted with professional distortion, becoming completely identified with their subject and incapable of gauging its relative importance. This will make it difficult to decide where to place their subject within the general framework of events and achieve proper coordination. This approach would also require a much larger MFA. The ministry already has a shortage of career diplomats because of the need to maintain standards. If a Middle East expert becomes unemployable in NATO affairs, the shortage of personnel will get worse. There is also

the question of "desirable" versus "hardship" posts. All the assignments of officers who specialize in EU affairs will be in desirable posts, with Central Asia specialists ending up in hardship posts. That is why in some cases diplomats will not admit speaking Arabic, to avoid being regarded as specialists.

If the emphasis is placed on generalists, then jobs requiring specialization will not get done properly, at a time when the trend everywhere is increased specialization. This will not be good for the MFA and may have dire consequences in the long run.

At present neither of these schools prevails in its pure form in any country. The general approach is eclectic. Turkey has adopted the generalist approach, with specialization being the exception, so it must find a way to compensate for the system's weaknesses. One way to achieve this would be to secure very close cooperation between the MFA and academic specialists.

Except for a few isolated instances, this approach was first adopted by minister Gündüz Ökçün in the late 1970s. But at that time the ministry did not know how to use experts; nor did the experts in the universities know how to work with the ministry. The impression was quickly created that the MFA was somehow inadequate; moreover, the minister himself was an "outsider," having come from academia. That led to concern in the ministry. This first attempt revealed that the MFA was not yet ready to seek outside help: the generalists did not relish working with specialists. After this experience the MFA did commission some academics to prepare projects in the 1990s, but this practice never became institutionalized.

This suspicion about outside expertise was not completely unwarranted. The chief legal counselors of the MFA, who were naturally drawn from international law chairs, usually ended up being assigned to one of the missions as ambassador. This created considerable resentment among ministry personnel, who saw it as an encroachment on their preserve. The concern is that recruitment of other experts in a similar fashion will result in a diminution of the relatively restricted number of ambassadorial posts. A specialist on Central Asia whose children reached university age could conceivably start agitating for a posting in London. In fact, even filing clerks get assigned to administrative posts in foreign missions as a result of chronic shortage of personnel, and it is difficult to block this practice. The expert is not a professional diplomat, however, and therefore not subject to the strict discipline and hierarchical structure that applies to the career diplomat.

The MFA is always wary of getting drawn into domes-

tic politics by recruited experts. This can happen because the expert has links with a political party or at least certain political/ideological leanings. The parties that did not share these ideologies would then try to foist "their own professors" on the ministry.

Another reason for keeping experts out is the nature of the work of the MFA, much of which is classified.

Finally, there are the administrative difficulties. Experts who are employed must be placed on the ministry's payroll. It would be difficult to attract top experts with the modest salaries available.

These are the principal reasons for not hiring experts. Nonetheless, the opposing view has more validity. It would be relatively simple to prevent experts from seeking foreign assignments, especially those outside their field of specialization, by inserting a provision in Law No. 4009 ("The Structure and Functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs") that would exclude experts from foreign assignments. In fact the post of chieflegal counselor of the ministry is now being assigned to a diplomat, to prevent an outsider from being awarded an ambassadorial post. In addition, the place of the experts in the hierarchy could be properly and clearly defined. These persons would have no representational function; they would not be assigned to foreign missions and would only serve as an expert advisor to a professional diplomat. In recent years some career diplomats have given their relationship with advisors and experts a quasi-institutional character and thereby rendered valuable services to the ministry. At the same time, the MFA has increasingly resorted to the services of young specialists, one example being the hiring of specialists in water issues.

Many experts in Turkey have no political affiliation. As a matter of fact, most true experts fall in this category. The links between politics and those fields requiring specialization are scant. In any case, all individuals have political leanings. It would be wrong to claim that diplomats have no political/ideological preferences (especially since 1980). Some of them have entered into politics.

Another point to bear in mind is that it would be wrong to assume that advisors or experts who are hired would leak restricted information to the press or reveal confidential information to outsiders.

The MFA's main difficulty is not in securing new posts (cadres) but in filling vacant posts with qualified personnel. Therefore, obtaining posts for advisors and experts would pose few problems. It would be wrong to claim that these people cannot be attracted due to lack of material rewards, because expert academicians would probably want only part-time employment. Their main concern would

be to gain access to specialized books, contact prominent foreign specialists, participate in international conferences, and keep abreast of the latest developments. The level of their salaries would be of secondary importance, because the chance to take part in international conferences from time to time would be reward enough. Those who want more would not be hired.

To conclude, it can be said that the members of the MFA's professional staff are performing brilliantly, given the conditions prevailing in Turkey. But because of the way the ministry is structured and its large volume of work, they do not have adequate expert information about an increasing number of subjects and are unable to make up for this deficiency through their own efforts. In these circumstances the MFA must hire advisors and specialists who can become the "collective memory" of the specific department without regard to whether they seem to threaten the diplomatic staff. In other words, the ministry must change the manner in which diplomats carry out their duties and the system through which they get foreign postings. If it refuses to make these changes, we must conclude that those who claim that the generalists do not want specialists around because they fear the competition are justified.

In these circumstances it will be difficult for the MFA to maintain either its record of successes or its relative autonomy in a world where international affairs are getting increasingly complex and specialized.

Baskin Oran

# II. THE FORMULATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY A. The Historical Dimension

As in most countries, foreign policy is executed in Turkey by the MFA. In addition, this ministry prepares alternative policies for submission to decision-makers, evaluates current policies, and makes the necessary adjustments.

Other individuals and institutions also get involved in the elaboration stage of decisions, however, and influence the process in a number of ways, depending on the period and the circumstances.

The process of formulation of Turkish foreign policy has gone through a number of changes during the periods following the establishment of the Republic. These changes came about as a result of the changes in Turkey's internal structure as well as the changes in the international system. Among the factors influencing the process are the leadership, the changing weight of bureaucratic

institutions, the press and public opinion, economic and other pressure groups, and the changing role of the military.

We can study the process through different periods. In doing this, two things need to be kept in mind. First, each period in Turkey's political history has witnessed the rise of specific institutions and agents. The predominance of certain institutions and agents should not lead to the conclusion that other agents have been driven out of the process.

Second, once a factor makes itself felt in the decision-making process, its relative weight can increase or decrease, depending on the period and the circumstances, but it will not disappear. For example, factors such as public opinion, the press, the military, and the business community that became influential in the 1960s have continued to exert their influence to this day, both in unison and individually.

In this process the MFA has maintained its central position in identifying options and charting alternative courses as well as implementing decisions and following up. Though it has kept a low profile, it has continued to be the main formulator of foreign policy. Even politicians who have tried to exclude it have depended on its support.

After this introductory explanation, we can examine the decision-making process in the following periods.

- 1. The period when the leader was the determining factor (1919 to 1950).
- 2. The period when the MFA became increasingly influential (1950 to 1960).
- 3. The period when public opinion, the opposition parties, and the intellectuals (*aydınlar*: the enlightened) became influential (1960 to 1980).
  - 4. The 12 September period (1980 to 1983).
- 5. The period when the business community came to the forefront (1983 to 1991).
- 6. The period when the military gained influence (the 1990s).

## 1. Leaders as Determining Factors (1919–1950)

The National Struggle and the period of M. Kemal: both during the National Struggle and after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, M. Kemal's views carried great weight in internal politics and in the formulation of foreign policy. On many occasions his views were the determining factor. When it came to determining the general orientation of Turkish foreign policy, Atatürk had the last word.

In the period of the National Struggle M. Kemal had

the authority to determine foreign policy, first as chairman of the Representative Delegation (Heyet-i Temsiliye) then as the speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) after it was convened in 1920 and as head of government. He was also an effective leader with a strong personality. In this period M. Kemal centralized the decision-making process in order to cope with the extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, he sought legitimacy for his foreign-policy initiatives by keeping the TGNA informed of developments. M. Kemal was not only the decision-maker during that era. He also got involved in the execution of foreign policy, as in the case when he personally carried out the negotiations with France that led to the 21 October 1921 agreement.

M. Kemal's special place in the determination of foreign—and also domestic—policy lasted into the Republican period. Atatürk respected the views of experts, however, and reached his decisions after careful examination of the MFA's reports and detailed discussions with officials and diplomats. He even consulted foreign diplomats in Ankara on specific subjects (Aras, p. 59). Certain important diplomatic notes were submitted to his approval.

During this period another important actor in the field of foreign policy was Ismet Paşa [İnönü]. When it was decided that he should go to the Lausanne Conference, he was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Ismet Paşa differed from his two predecessors in that he was a successful field commander and a close friend of M. Kemal. After that he was to become prime minister, with some breaks, until Atatürk's death.

Dr. Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] became minister of foreign affairs in 1925 and remained in this position until 1938, making him the longest-serving minister in the Republic's history. In foreign policy, however, Atatürk was the decision-maker, while Aras was the executor of policy.

The İnönü period: after Atatürk's death, he was succeeded by İnönü. International tension reached a peak during this time, culminating in war in September 1939. In the İnönü period the previous model of one leader making most decisions on foreign and domestic policy continued to hold sway (Erkin, p. 191), in large measure because there was a war going on, İnönü had a military background, and he took a close interest in foreign policy. The MFA correspondence that was considered important was regularly submitted to the president. The biggest change in the foreign policy establishment was the replacement of the foreign minister T. Rüştü Aras by Şükrü Saracoğlu for the following reasons.

First, as a leader in the Atatürk tradition, İnönü wanted to hold the reins of foreign policy in a time of war. This

might have been difficult with a minister who had held the post for thirteen years and was a member of Atatürk's immediate entourage. Furthermore, in certain instances (for example, at the conference on Mediterranean security held at Nyon, Switzerland, in 1937) Atatürk and İnönü disagreed. At such times, Atatürk used Aras to carry out his policies. Second, T. R. Aras was also disqualified because during Atatürk's long illness he formed part of the Şükrü Kaya clique, which shielded Atatürk and kept İnönü at bay. Third, it has been claimed that Aras, the man who gave precedence to relations with the USSR, was replaced by an Anglophile, Şükrü Saracoğlu. Nevertheless, unlike the prime ministers of the Ottoman period, no one in the decision-making machinery during this period could be labeled as being under the influence of a foreign power.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: this ministry officially came into being on 2 May 1920 with the establishment of the Ankara government on that day. The first minister of foreign affairs of the Ankara government was Bekir Sami. Although he died before the legislation requiring all citizens to adopt surnames came into force, he is often referred to as Bekir Sami Kunduh because he was the son of Musa Kunduh Paşa. Bekir Sami resigned in 1921 after the London Conference and was succeeded by Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk] (Girgin, p. 117). Neither of these ministers carried much weight in the decision-making machinery because they were frequently absent on lengthy trips abroad and because of the preponderance of M. Kemal as the leader.

At this time, the Turkish diplomatic establishment was in its early formative stage and was in the process of absorbing the venerable and deeply rooted Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the early years of the Republic one-third of ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary were transplants from the Ottoman ministry (Şimşir, p. 24). With these transplants, the ministry acquired the diplomatic savvy of the Ottomans. In the years when the empire was crumbling the Ottoman government had become adept at playing the major powers against one another. It was governing highly strategic regions of the globe populated by different ethnic and national groups. These traits went all the way back to Byzantine times. During the national struggle M. Kemal also took advantage of rifts among the major Western powers while securing the diplomatic and military support of the Soviets. This diplomatic tradition was kept up in the interwar years when the Turkish economy was extremely weak as well as during World War II. Although Turkey came increasingly within the orbit of the West and of the U.S. in the foreign policy sphere during the late 1940s, the MFA maintained

this diplomatic tradition because of the imperatives of its sensitive strategic situation.

The military: during the Atatürk and İnönü eras the military's role in the formulation of foreign policy was confined to technical fields because Atatürk wanted to keep the army out of politics, and İnönü maintained this approach. As early as 1923 a law was enacted that required officers to resign if they wanted to become parliamentary candidates. Those officers who were already deputies had to relinquish their commands. Under the 1924 Constitution the chief of the general stafflost his seat in the cabinet (Hale, pp. 72-73). The justification for keeping the army out of politics was the bitter lesson of the late Ottoman period, when the officer corps was divided between rival political camps. Furthermore, neither of the two leaders wanted competition from the army. Both leaders kept the army on a tight leash through Fevzi Çakmak, who remained chief of the general staff until his retirement in 1944. Çakmak was a moderate with no political ambitions and was therefore able to work harmoniously with both leaders while keeping the army out of politics. He was even invited to join meetings of the cabinet. In 1944 a new chief of the general staff was appointed and was made accountable to the prime minister. This situation lasted until 1949, when the chief of the general staff became accountable to the minister of defense.

Apart from the general staff, a war committee was established in 1922, answerable directly to the TGNA. The members of this committee were the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, finance, and health under the chairmanship of the speaker of the TGNA. A supreme defense council was established in 1933, consisting of the prime minister and the chief of the General Staff, with the president of the Republic presiding over its meetings. In 1949, after World War II, the supreme council of national defense was established, under the presidency of the prime minister. The armed forces were represented on this body only by the chief of the general staff, with civilians constituting a majority on the council.

## 2. The Growing Influence of the MFA (1950–1960)

The single leader model was maintained in the era of the Democratic Party, but with one big difference from previous eras in the formulation of foreign policy: the influence of the MFA was in the ascendancy.

The Menderes period (1950 to 1960) can be divided into two parts in regard to decision-making: Fuat Köprülü was the minister until 1957, when Fatin Rüştü Zorlu took over.

Köprülü, the first minister of foreign affairs of the Menderes government, was a well-known historian and politician, but he was not so well versed in the field of foreign affairs. That is why both Menderes and Köprülü felt the need to rely on the experienced staff of the ministry. In fact Menderes got the MFA to move into the building that housed the office of the prime minister, where it remained until 1987. Menderes was in direct contact not only with Köprülü and Zorlu but also with leading diplomats such as Muharrem Nuri Birgi, Melih Esenbel, and Zeki Kuneralp.

Menderes was prime minister during a period when the Cold War was at its peak and took an active interest in decisions regarding the Korean War, NATO membership, and the creation of the Baghdad Pact. The early 1950s was an era of relative stability in domestic politics, so he was able to devote more time to foreign affairs.

In the second half of his tenure Menderes lost interest in foreign affairs because of the increased tension with the opposition in domestic politics. In addition, the new minister of foreign affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was a career diplomat and was asserting his influence in the conduct of foreign policy. Zorlu worked with diplomats like Semih Günver and Hasan Esat Işık, who were considered close to him. This helped reinforce the traditional role of the ministry.

Zorlu and Menderes were related to one another through marriage but were not particularly close. Zorlu was a brilliant diplomat, however, and as such had a special place in the formulation of foreign policy. He was able to take new initiatives because he enjoyed the confidence of Menderes. For example, Zorlu played an important part in reaching the Cyprus agreements of 1959–60, while the prime minister deferred to his minister. Menderes left the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy to his minister, getting involved only in the overall direction of foreign policy. This allowed the formulation and conduct of foreign policy to proceed smoothly.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: during this period the structure of the ministry underwent a change. Foreign economic relations and foreign aid issues previously had been the responsibility of the ministries of Finance and Trade. Zorlu brought these issues under the field of responsibility of the MFA. A general secretariat had been established in 1948 to deal with foreign aid and economic relations. Diplomats like Hasan Esat Işık, Oğuz Gökmen, and Semih Günver were assigned to the general secretariat, which had privileged status within the MFA. This general secretariat also assumed an important role in relations with the U.S. and in the elaboration of policy options

(Günver, pp. 104-5). A special department was set up to deal with NATO affairs, with a permanent representative assigned to the headquarters of the organization.

The military: during this period the army's role in foreign policy matters as well as in domestic politics was quite minor. True, the army's participation in the decision-making process had been enhanced by NATO and Baghdad Pact membership, but it still did not carry much weight in the determination of foreign policy. The Menderes administration had a tendency to remain distant from the military and to underestimate its importance. The appointment of a retired colonel as minister of defense is an example of this attitude. The decision to send a military contingent to Korea was likewise made without consulting the general staff about the nature and size of the unit to be sent (Yavuzalp, 1991, pp. 81–82). In fact, Menderes is known to have remarked, "I could run the army with just reserve officers."

Public opinion and the press: although there was a relaxation in the official attitude toward the press compared to previous periods, it was still not possible to speak of a free press or the free discussion of foreign policy issues. The press did report on issues like the Korean War and the events of 6–7 September 1955, but these subjects were taken up in the traditional way, within the bounds set by the government. The opposition—the Republican People's Party—was only able to influence public opinion to a limited degree, because it found itself under heavy government pressure.

### 3. The Rise of Public Opinion (1960–1980)

The process that began on 27 May 1960 was a watershed not only in Turkey's domestic politics but also in the field of foreign policy and its elaboration.

Those who carried out this first military coup in the Republic's history wanted to project a reassuring image. They did this by selecting as minister of foreign affairs Selim Sarper, a diplomat with good links to the West. The National Unity Committee (MBK in its Turkish acronym), however, which ran the country during this period, also controlled foreign policy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: while a drastic purge was conducted in the civil service by the new government, the MFA was excluded from this operation in the early stages. By a law enacted on 11 July 1960, however, the responsibility for coordinating foreign aid was returned to the ministries of Trade and Finance. The competence of the MFA would henceforth be confined to political and economic subjects relating to the execution of foreign policy (Firat, pp. 50–51). In this manner the cadres who

were close to Zorlu would lose their former preeminence within the MFA.

Although its responsibilities in the area of economic questions had been trimmed, the MFA was pressing for new initiatives in foreign policy, both for economic reasons and because of Cyprus. These preparations proceeded under Feridun Cemal Erkin, also a career diplomat, who succeeded Selim Sarper. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil became minister in 1965, which led to a more comprehensive and balanced foreign policy. The disappointment caused by President Lyndon Johnson's letter (see "Johnson's Letter" in Section 5) and the pressure of public opinion were instrumental in the adoption of a multidirectional foreign policy.

Public opinion and the press: during the Atatürk and İnönü eras foreign policy was generally the responsibility of the leader. In the Menderes period the MFA's influence grew, but foreign policy remained the preserve of the leader and an exclusive group from the ministry. The relative freedom introduced by the 1961 Constitution allowed other factors to influence foreign policy, if only indirectly.

It now became possible for the press and the public to discuss and to criticize the government's foreign policy line. This allowed at least some sectors of the public to become aware of differing viewpoints in the realm of foreign policy and to take a growing interest in the subject. Previously it had been very difficult for ideas not approved by the government to be reflected in the press (Sezer, pp. 104–5).

Until that time foreign policy had been considered a national issue, and questioning it was regarded as somehow disloyal. This was called a bipartisan foreign policy, a term borrowed from the U.S., where it had been coined after World War II. According to this understanding, differences between parties would be confined to domestic politics. Foreign policy had to be national and enjoy the support of all parties. This approach was designed to prevent questioning of the established order and shield the government from criticism.

While foreign policy issues were being freely discussed in the press and among the intellectuals in the permissive atmosphere of the 1960s, the opposition was now able to bring dissenting viewpoints to parliament and to the public at large. The basic orientation of Turkish foreign policy was being questioned in the magazines Forum and Yön, and alternatives were being proposed. The Turkish Labor Party, established in 1961, was able to win fifteen parliamentary seats in the 1965 election. This party wanted a return to the foreign policies of the Atatürk era and advocated a Third World posture for Turkey.

The Labor Party's critical approach to foreign policy and its anti-NATO, anti-U.S. stance became more pronounced after Johnson's letter of June 1964. This meant that the nonpartisan approach to foreign policy started coming to an end during the 1960s. From then on, the foreign policy line of governments would be subjected to the increasingly critical scrutiny of parties, the press, and public opinion. This had a double-barreled effect on the foreign policy of the government. While the government's freedom of maneuver was being restricted in domestic politics, its hand was now strengthened in the field of diplomacy. For example, governments now felt the need to explain to the public why foreign bases in the country were necessary. At the same time, they could use the public-opinion factor to place these installations on a legal foundation, as was done at the negotiations with the U.S. in 1969. From that time on, all governments—apart from coup administrations—had to formulate and implement foreign policy under these conditions. The growing influence of public opinion on foreign policy also led governments to use foreign policy to influence public opinion and to exploit foreign policy successes for political advantage.

The military: while new factors were beginning to influence the elaboration of foreign policy with the advent of the 1961 Constitution, the military was able to strengthen its position within the political system through the National Security Council (MGK in its Turkish acronym), which became a constitutional organ. In addition, the general staff was made directly subordinate to the prime minister instead of to the minister of defense. Through the establishment of the MGK, the military was able to participate more directly and more effectively in the formulation of foreign policy.

The text of article 111 of the Constitution reads: "The MGK informs the Council of Ministers of its basic position to facilitate decisions relating to national security and their coordination." In the amendment following the military intervention of 12 March 1971, the word "informs" is replaced by "recommends," thus enhancing the MGK's power. Nevertheless, the military confined itself to playing an advisory role in the period from 1960 to 1980.

The leadership: the government of Süleyman Demirel, which came to power in 1965, formulated its foreign policy within these institutional limitations. Demirel was an engineer who had risen to the position of directorgeneral of the state hydraulic works before entering politics. He was well versed in domestic and economic affairs, but his interest in foreign policy was limited. He left this field to İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, who served for nine years

as minister (the longest tenure after that of Aras). A retired governor and seasoned politician, Çağlayangil relied to a large extent on the MFA's staff in formulating foreign policy.

Unlike Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, who came to power in 1973, was directly interested in foreign affairs and was ready to take initiatives in this field. Ecevit followed international developments and the foreign press and participated in the work of the MFA by amending the position papers the ministry prepared for meetings and negotiations. He appointed Professor Turan Güneş in his first term and Professor Gündüz Ökçün in his second term as foreign ministers. Both were from the Faculty of Political Science and were familiar with foreign affairs. But they were not from the MFA; nor were they politicians. This allowed Ecevit to wield more influence, because the ministers were not in full control of the ministry's bureaucracy and did not have a political constituency. Ultimately Ecevit's way of operating was to create problems that resulted in the resignation of Güneş.

In his brief first term Ecevit's most important political action was the decision to undertake the Cyprus operation. Before the decision to intervene, meetings were held in the National Security Council, the General Staff, and the MFA to determine if Turkey had the legal right to intervene and to review the likely implications of intervention. The decision was made to call for a meeting of the TGNA to consider the issue. Ecevit briefed the leaders of political parties about developments. He sought the views of the MFA and the General Staff on technical questions, and a Cyprus Coordination Committee was set up.

In this period the influence of public opinion on foreign policy became fully evident. With the establishment of the National Security Council as an institution, the military's participation in the foreign policy process increased. During this time the MFA became more effectual in the formulation of foreign policy under Çağlayangil as well as under ministers Osman Olcay, Haluk Bayülken, and Melih Esenbel, who all started as career diplomats.

In the 1960-80 period foreign policy became multidirectional. At the same time, the influence of public opinion, the political parties, and the military in the decision-making process increased. The diversity in the political system and in foreign policy found its reflection in the process of elaborating foreign policy.

### 4. The 12 September Period (1980–1983)

In the period following the coup of 27 May 1960 Turkish foreign policy broke loose, to a certain degree, from U.S. influence and started on a multidirectional course. The opposite took place after the coup of 12 September 1980:

U.S. influence became preponderant. Turkish foreign policy, which had veered under Cold War conditions, returned to its regular course.

The leaders of the 12 September coup followed the example of the 27 May coup and placed a career diplomat at the top of the ministry in the person of llter Türkmen. But the real decision-maker was Gen. Kenan Evren himself. The most concrete example of this is when Evren gave immediate approval to the plan of U.S. general Bernard William Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), which enabled Greece to return to NATO's military wing (see "The Rogers Plan and Greece's Return to the Military Structure of NATO" in Section 6).

The function of influencing, criticizing, and pressuring the foreign policy process that had been exercised (starting in the 1960s) by public opinion, the press, the intelligentsia, and the opposition parties came to an end with the repressive measures adopted by the coup makers.

The 12 September administration increased the number and the power of the military members of the National Security Council, which had been established following the 27 May 1960 coup. In this way it sought to expand the role of the military in the decision-making process. The most noteworthy legal arrangement was the provision whereby decisions on matters relating to national security adopted by the National Security Council would be "taken into consideration on a priority basis" by the government. In addition, before transferring power to the new government, the military increased the powers of the National Security Council, which were regulated by article 118 of the 1982 Constitution. It passed a law on 9 November 1983 (Law No. 2495, entitled "National Security Council and General Secretariat of the National Security Council") by which the General Secretariat, in addition to its other duties, would "monitor and control" the implementation of the decisions of the council.

As the free market economy gained ascendancy because of the economic measures taken after 1983 and Özal's policies, however, the influence of the military in foreign policy did not follow the course intended by these constitutional and legislative arrangements. On the contrary, the influence of the military receded. This trend would be reversed in the 1990s.

## 5. The Rise of the Business World (1983–1991)

During this period the business world took its place among the factors influencing foreign policy, alongside public opinion, the press, and the military. In addition, during Turgut Özal's tenure as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and as president from 1989 to 1993, the influence of the leader became important once again. But the most noteworthy event was the increased power of the business world, as Turkey became integrated with the international capitalist economy. In a way Özal was the projection of the business world in the seat of political power.

Leadership: Özal's leadership had certain distinguishing features. Unlike Atatürk and İnönü, Özal was supported in large measure by external factors: the U.S. and international financial circles. As a result, Özal took up a role as the voice of business circles in political life and had no qualms about admitting it.

Özal's period saw the most radical changes in the elaboration of Turkish foreign policy. These changes can be summarized as follows:

- The decision-making process became personalized, especially after the mid-1980s.
- The traditional institutions that took part in policy formulation (such as the MFA, the military, and the TGNA) were excluded.
- Advisors and journalists with no official status or responsibility were engaged in the decision-making and diplomatic processes alongside the traditional actors.
- The direct involvement of business circles in the political process also influenced the process of foreign policy formulation, with some business leaders acting as diplomats.

Before going into the changes wrought by Özal in the process of elaborating foreign policy, we must examine his approach to Turkey's political system. Özal had a pragmatic view of things. His objective was to integrate Turkey into the international capitalist system. This basic objective determined his foreign policy and his methods. Özal perceived the bureaucracy as an obstacle to this process—hence his attempts to weaken it and to render it ineffectual or to short-circuit it. To this end he attracted young executives from the U.S. who were unfamiliar with the Turkish system but were well connected with the Özal family and placed them at the head of important public institutions. The press alluded to these younger-generation executives as "princes."

Özal looked upon foreign policy from the same perspective. He held the view that Turkey's chronic foreign policy problems could be solved with economic measures. He believed that the bureaucracy was, as a rule, conservative, clumsy, and incapable of taking initiatives. The Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye) school, which dominated the MFA, was perpetuating the cautious Inönü tradition; far from making new decisions, it was not even up to finding solutions to age-old questions weighing on Turkey's foreign relations (Barlas, pp. 116, 117, 127).

When Özal assumed the presidency in 1989, he freed himself from reelection considerations, which allowed him greater latitude in foreign policy. The most striking manifestation of this came during the Gulf War of 1990–91. Özal took the initiative and started determining Turkey's stand in direct telephone contact with U.S. president George H. W. Bush. This was described to the public as "telephone diplomacy." Özal, who was not politically accountable under the Constitution, was taking initiatives on highly important and sensitive questions, without the knowledge or participation of competent institutions. He was exercising remote control over the prime minister's office and was having ministers sign blank decrees, which he was to use when necessary.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: in the matter of foreign policy elaboration, Özal's attitude toward the ministry led to a reduction in its field of competence. In certain situations the MFA was bypassed. Shortly after coming to power, the Motherland Party government promulgated a decree creating the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade. Legislation was adopted whereby this new agency would be responsible for international economic and financial affairs. Özal was following a course similar to that of the Menderes government in its economic policies and was adopting the same pro-U.S. stand. Unlike the Menderes government, however, which worked through the MFA, he chose to exclude the ministry. Instead he employed diplomats who were close to him as advisors. In this way institutional relationships were replaced by personal relationships. In this period the minister was Vahit Halefoğlu, a career diplomat who had attained this position upon Evren's request. In the second Motherland Party government set up in 1987, Özal was to bring to this position a novice in the person of Mesut Yılmaz, who would be succeeded by Professor Ali Bozer (a lawyer) and then by Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin and Safa Giray (both engineers). These ministers served for only brief terms, which allowed Özal to hold the reins in the field of foreign policy.

In the matter of unilaterally lifting the visa requirement for Greek nationals and the project for supplying water to the Middle East through the "peace pipeline," Özal failed to consult the MFA or kept it out of the decision-making process. Furthermore, he employed journalists close to him as go-betweens in important issues like the Kurdish question. All of these risky practices were unprecedented in Turkish foreign policy.

Evren, the leader of the 12 September 1980 coup, became president in 1982 through the referendum adopting the Constitution. Until his term came to an end in 1989, Evren took no initiatives other than having Halefoğlu

appointed as minister. In the early years of his government Özal was careful about his relations with Evren. With time, he became more unconcerned and independent.

The business world: the driving force behind Özal's practices was the business circles, whose ambition was to integrate Turkey into the international economic system. These circles perceived the bureaucracy as an impediment to their development and did their best to neutralize it. At this time of transition, when statism was abandoned, privatization was being launched, and the need to diminish the role of the state was being stressed, the state and the bureaucracy had to be curbed somehow. Özal wanted to introduce economic and commercial factors as elements of his foreign policy. He intended to use this approach as a key to solving problems. For this it was necessary to create an infrastructure capable of importing and exporting large amounts of goods and services.

Thanks to the economic measures adopted beginning in early 1980, the strengthened bourgeoisie now played a direct role in politics through more than twenty cabinet members with business backgrounds and through Özal himself. Business leaders were taking a direct interest in foreign developments now that the economy had opened up to the world. They were receiving briefings from the MFA and (as in the case of Şarık Tara) were participating in the Davos process with the ministry's support. From now on, business leaders would be taking part in official trips abroad, a usual international practice. One of the first such trips was taken by Özal to Cyprus in 1984 in the company of a large group of businessmen.

With the encouragement of the MFA, the business community went about institutionalizing these developments and in 1986 established the Foreign Economic Relations Council (DEIK in its Turkish acronym). DEIK was to help develop worldwide links for Turkish business and contribute to the integration of the Turkish economy into the global economy. This was the second organization established by business, the first being the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), established in 1965 to regulate relations with the European Union, to publicize the EU in Turkey, and to lobby the government.

The military: during this period the Turkish Armed Forces felt serious concern about Özal's perception of the differences with Greece, his attempts to solve the question of Cyprus through unilateral concessions, and his approach to the Kurdish question. Özal was seeking to reduce the influence of the military as well as the bureaucracy in the political system and the conduct of foreign policy. In 1987 he intervened in the selection of the chief of the General Staff, which hitherto had been regarded as

an internal affair of the military, and secured the appointment of Necip Torumtay instead of Necdet Öztorun.

Ozal's struggle with the civilian and military bureaucracy did not always succeed, however. Among the failures we can cite his attempt to bring the National Intelligence Organization (MIT, a body traditionally led by a soldier) under civilian control by appointing Hiram Abas; his attempt to withdraw troops from North Cyprus; his attempt to solve the question of Cyprus through the businessman Asil Nadir rather than Rauf Denktas; and his wish to open a second front during the Gulf War (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 7).

The military actually had no objections to Turkey's integration into the international capitalist system or the capitalist model of development. The 12 September coup had already prepared the ground for this. As business gained the ascendancy, however, it tried to enhance its influence on domestic and foreign policy and found itself in disagreement with the military on certain issues.

Despite all the legal arrangements made by the military administration of 12 September, the military found itself being pushed into the background in the face of the foreign policy initiatives of Özal and business. In this period the military's main concern was to thwart Özal's attempts to alter Turkey's traditional foreign policy rather than to be an active actor.

The press and public opinion: with the coming to power of a civilian administration in 1983, the press, public opinion, and the opposition parties started to regain their former influence in the field of foreign policy. The 1982 Constitution was admittedly more restrictive than the 1961 Constitution in the area of rights and freedoms. It was forbidden to challenge the official acts of the 12 September period or the leaders of the coup legally. But those who criticized the government no longer faced prosecution or feared official pressure.

With time, the establishment of other political parties and the restoration of the rights of banned politicians with the referendum of 1987 made possible wider criticism and discussion of the foreign policy of the Özal administration.

### The Increased Weight of the Military (1991 to the EU Harmonization Packages)

The structure of the international system underwent great changes in the 1990s. During this period important developments took place in Turkey's periphery and in its domestic scene. All of this rendered the political agenda highly changeable and brought into play new factors influencing foreign policy while altering the importance and role of existing factors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: following the 1991 election, the Motherland Party (which had been in power since 1983) was replaced by the True Path-Social Democratic People's Party coalition led by Demirel and İnönü. Hikmet Çetin served as minister of foreign affairs for over three years in this government and distinguished himself with his active foreign policy. The MFA started recovering its former standing. In this period the ministry went through an internal reorganization, reflecting the changes in the international scene. Toward the end of the 1990s, however, the governments and the foreign ministers started changing in quick succession. In an eighteenmonth period in 1997-98, four ministers served for an average of four and a half months each. This was extremely debilitating for a sensitive ministry that had to cope with great changes in the international scene.

To this must be added the special conditions arising from internal developments that were being guided by narrow interests. In these uncertain circumstances, another institution started taking charge of the country's destiny and the formulation of foreign policy—the military.

The military: both internal and external developments led to the growing role of the military in the field of foreign policy. The internal developments were the following.

- 1. As the institution that had a primary role in setting up the state, the military already had a much greater role in Turkey's political and social structure than in other countries. Furthermore, Turkey's political and social culture enabled the military to exercise great influence on the political process even in periods when coup administrations were not in power.
- 2. The instability in the political system, the general lack of confidence in the political parties and the political process, the prevailing corruption, and the Susurluk Accident (see Box 7-6 in Section 7) all conspired to help the armed forces to earn the respect of the public, who perceived the military as untainted by scandal.
- 3. The "low intensity war" that broke out in the 1980s in the southeastern region of Turkey and gained in intensity during the 1990s was another factor. The brunt of the struggle against the PKK separatists was being borne by the military, which adopted a more aggressive strategy after 1993. The conflict in southeastern Turkey, which started in 1984, constituted a question of survival. This brought about a growing fear of dismemberment of the country and—parallel to this—increased the dependence

on the military. The capture of the PKK's number-two man after an operation conducted in 1998 by the military (without informing the government) and the subsequent disintegration of the PKK movement (following the pressure on Syria to expel Abdullah Öcalan, which led to his capture) greatly enhanced the prestige of the military.

- 4. The main development that increased the army's importance and led to its greater involvement in the foreign policy process resulted from the policy of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (see Box 6-3 in Section 6) pursued by the regime of 12 September. This policy led to the rise of political Islam in the mid-1980s, which gained further momentum in the 1990s. In this environment the armed forces (which remained the sole institution that had not been infiltrated by the Islamists and which was now completely free of the 12 September malaise) took the lead in the struggle against the rise of political Islam, also referred to as "reaction" in Turkey. This struggle reached its climax during the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition, which came to power in 1996. The sectors of the population that defended the secular Republic supported the armed forces, thereby enhancing their prestige and legitimacy. In this way the 28 February process, which was seen by some as a "postmodern coup" resulting in the collapse of the Welfare-True Path coalition, was generally accepted without too much questioning (Box Intro-12).
- 5. Another factor that took the army's role in foreign policy beyond providing technical advice was the increase in the number of arms procurement projects, starting in the late 1980s and continuing at a faster pace in the 1990s. Some of these contracts had significant political aspects.

External developments can be outlined as follows.

- 1. Turkey's security concerns increased as a consequence of conflicts and instability in regions like the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. This called for a large military establishment and increased the influence of the army in matters relating to security. Turkey was aspiring to become a "regional leader" in this part of the globe and relied chiefly on its military strength for this. During this period both the politicians and the military would claim that Turkey was a "generator of strategy" in its region.
- 2. Some regional developments were also helping the army to reinforce its place and importance in the field of foreign affairs. The establishment of the Training Center of the Partnership for Peace (where military personnel from thirty-two countries were receiving training), the participation in UN operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Palestine (Hebron), and NATO operations all led the army to take a closer interest in this type of

### Box Intro-12. The 28 February Process

The U.S.-sponsored "Green Belt" (see "Human Rights, the 'Green Belt,' and the Carter Doctrine" and "The U.S., Islam, and the Policy of the Green Belt" in Section 6) policy and the parallel stance of the 12 September regime with its Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the 1980s led directly to a strengthening of the Islamic movement in Turkey. By the late 1990s it was directly affecting the state. The uneven distribution of income became more acute in the 1990s. This was compounded by mass migrations from the southeast to large cities, with all the attendant problems. To this must be added the general disenchantment with socialism. As a result, the Welfare Party, which had a popular vote of around 10% in the 1980s, received 19% of the votes in the election of December 1995 and became the largest party in the parliament. With the support of the True Path Party, it was now able to form a coalition government, with Welfare as the senior partner.

In the period when Necmettin Erbakan was the prime minister and the True Path leader Tansu Çiller was minister of foreign affairs, certain Internal and external events compromised the secular character of the regime. Erbakan was selecting countries like Libya, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia for his visits. Domestically, the antisecular practices of some Welfare Party-controlled municipalities were creating reactions. In particular, the Jerusalem event organized by the municipality of Sincan, with the presence of the Iranian ambassador and prominent display of portraits of the Lebanese leaders of Hezboliah, drew much criticism. That event led some tanks returning from an exercise to drive down the main street of the town. This was a warning sent to the government and to Islamic circles, which the military referred as a "wheel alignment."

At the regular meeting of the National Security Council (MGK) held on 28 February 1997, the military wing demanded that the decisions regarding the raising of compulsory education to eight

years be implemented immediately. Erbakan felt himself compelled to sign the MGK decision but was taking no steps to implement the decision. The establishment of the "Western Working Group" by the general staff, the holding of briefing sessions on reactionary activities to which members of the press, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy were invited, and the public statements by the military criticizing the government led to heightened political tension and the expectation of an imminent coup. The reactions were not confined to the military and the opposition parties. A number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also took a stand against the government by supporting the 28 February decisions.

These pressures, and the desire of Ciller to become prime minister, led Erbakan to relinquish his position in her favor. When Erbakan had vacated his position, the president called on Mesut Yılmaz to form the new government on the grounds that the Constitution made no provision for the transfer of the position of prime minister. In this way, for the first time in Turkey's history, the army secured the fall of the government without resorting to force or delivering a memorandum. Following this, the constitutional court closed the Welfare Party in January 1998 and banned its leaders from all political activity. A court passed a prison sentence on Erbakan for a speech he had made, but this sentence was not carried out because of the amnesty law enacted in the early part of 2000. Eight years of primary education became compulsory, resulting in the abolition of the junior high school level of education (from the sixth to the eighth grade); As a consequence, the cleric and preacher high schools (public schools held responsible for religious reaction) had their junior high school level abolished. Youngsters who used to go to these schools at the age of twelve or thirteen would now start at the age of sixteen.

(i. Uzgel)

regional issue and get involved in the decision-making process.

These developments also directly affected the process of elaborating foreign policy. The army's active role in Turkish foreign policy, especially in the areas relating to security, became discernible. Throughout the 1990s senior officers started making statements about foreign relations, criticizing neighboring countries, and engaging in crossborder operations, sometimes apparently without clearance from the political authority. Senior commanders were making statements directly criticizing, accusing, and occasionally threatening Greece in connection with the Aegean, all neighbors with the exception of Bulgaria and Georgia in connection with the PKK, Iran in connection with religious reactionary movements, the EU in connection with human rights, Germany in connection with arms sales, and the U.S. in connection with the Armenian issue. Headlines started appearing in the press referring to the "army's Cyprus policy" (Milliyet, 30 October 1997; Hürriyet, 4 November 1997).

During the Welfare—True Path coalition it became clear that the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel was being driven by the armed forces and particularly by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Gen. Çevik Bir. In the forming of policies relating to Greece, Cyprus, and the Kurdish question the influence of the army was also decisive. The process of extricating Abdullah Öcalan got underway when the commander of the land forces, Atilla Ateş, made a statement containing a stern warning to Syria, followed by the threat to use force.

In addition to these examples, the General Staff established a structure that replicated the various departments of the MFA. The General Staff started by setting up a Greece-Cyprus department, followed by a department dealing with human rights and others. In addition to the Western Working Group that dealt with "reactionary" activities, the General Staff had an eastern working group dealing with the Kurdish issue, a confidence working group dealing with Cyprus, and a Barbaros working group that dealt with the S-300 missile crisis (Bölügiray, pp. 150–

51). When Turkey became a candidate to join the EU at the Helsinki Summit, a European Union working group was established. Although the Ministry of Finance had a unit to monitor the flows of illicit funds (a matter that became very topical during the 1990s), the General Staff went ahead and established the Economic and Financial Monitoring Center (EMIM in its Turkish acronym). The military also undertook a leading role in some research centers established by civilian organizations. One such center is the National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies (SAEMK) set up within the structure of the Council for Higher Education (YÖK).

The armed forces also took part in the preparation of two important documents bearing on foreign policy. The first was the National Military Strategic Concept (MASK) paper, in which the General Staff determines the institutional, operational, and logistic requirements of the Turkish armed forces. This paper also sets out the potential threats to the country and, based on this, defines the concept of national security. It was revised in 1992, and separatism was identified as the major threat. In 1997 religious reactionary movements were added to the threat list.

The second document was the National Security Policy Paper (MGSB). This paper was prepared by the general secretariat of the MGK and was based on the MASK. The paper dates back to 1963, and the MFA and MİT were consulted at the preparatory stage. It is revised every year in December and redrafted every five years in the light of prevailing conditions and submitted to the cabinet for approval. Once it is approved, no law, regulation, or international agreement can run counter to its provisions. In November 1997 this document was leaked to the press. The greatest threats to the nation, according to the document, were reaction and separatism, followed by the alliance between the mafia and hit men belonging to the Nationalist Action Party (who are referred to as ülkücü in Turkish). In the eventuality of an armed conflict, the document warns of collaboration between Greece and Syria. It also mentions the need to develop relations with the Central Asian republics.

The center for crisis management, set up in January 1997, is nominally under the prime minister's control. It is designed to ensure coordination in crisis situations, both domestic and external. This center is located in the building of the general secretariat of the MGK. It can be assumed that in practice the center is under the MGK's control.

Thus, in addition to its basic function, the military

has assumed the functions of decision-maker and executor with respect to a good number of other subjects.

Public opinion and the press: the advances in the field of communications registered in the 1990s and the huge increase in the number of television channels have made it possible for the public to be instantly informed about foreign developments. The public is now able to follow more closely both foreign policy and its appraisal by pundits. During this period both the press and public opinion (especially in Islamic circles) started exercising pressure on behalf of peoples with Turkish and/or Islamic roots who became victims of oppression in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Starting in the late 1980s, popular demonstrations were organized and declarations were read in front of foreign embassies in connection with developments in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Bosnia, China (the Sinkiang region), and Chechnya as well as Öcalan's sojourn in Italy.

The business world: having come to the fore in the 1980s, the business world appeared to be pushed into the background in this period. But it continued to press on with its "low-profile" efforts to exert its influence on the domestic and foreign policies of the country. Alongside the army, it was the chief source of alternative policies in the fields of domestic and foreign affairs.

Big business is organized under the umbrella of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD). Located in İstanbul, TÜSİAD is perceived as a club of the elite. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) represents primarily the medium-sized businesses. Both organizations issued statements and prepared reports on issues such as education and democracy in Turkey, the Kurdish question, and current foreign policy developments. Through these means business made known its views and proposals on these subjects.

As in the case of senior officials who make public statements on foreign policy, business leaders were also propounding their views on sensitive issues regardless of the possible reactions from particular segments of the public. Some examples of this are Sakip Sabanci's statement that the "Basque model" should be examined in the context of finding a solution to the Kurdish question (Milliyet, 9 October 1995) and Rahmi Koç's view that the "Cyprus operation had cost Turkey dearly" (Hürriyet, 21 March 1997) and that, in the Özal tradition, "we must prevail in the struggle with Greece through expanded trade" (Uzgel 2004, p. 342). TÜSİAD issued a report in January 1997, one month before the 28 February decision of the MGK. This report, entitled "Turkey's Perspectives

### Box Intro-13. The Rise of the Commercial State and International Relations

in the Middle Ages there were two models of the state: states like the Ottoman Empire fighting for terrestrial expansion and the "commercial state" model exemplified by the Italian city-states, especially Venice.

The commercial states may be said to constitute a subsystem in the international order and are prototypes of the present-day major capitalist states. Some of the clues to the behavior of these modern states can be traced back to the medieval city-states.

The wealth of the oligarchy of the northern Italian city-states was derived mainly from shipping. They had total control of the state and looked upon defense matters and territorial conquest from a commercial, cost/benefit point of view.

These states had come together to reduce their defense costs to a minimum. They made sure that the territories that they conquered would be strategically located from the point of view of commercial traffic. Also, they carried out their conquests with the help of foreign mercenaries. The arms and consumer goods that they produced were then marketed to these mercenaries, which helped recoup their military expenses.

For this model to function effectively, the Italian city-states had to ensure the existence of the proper conditions: (1) being continuously aware of the objectives of their adversaries seeking territorial expansion in order to foresee their future actions and reduce defense expenditures; (2) being well informed about the regional markets as well as the actions of the countries of the region; and (3) monopolizing the information required to conduct trade with distant markets. To secure these conditions, they established a wide-ranging network of permanent and well-developed diplomatic missions at a time when diplomacy was resorted to only temporarily and was accorded a very low priority. It is for this reason that the first permanent diplomatic mission in Istanbul belonged to Venice. These city-states demonstrated during the Middle Ages, when value was created from the soil, that one could become prosperous and therefore powerful without possessing vast ter-

ritories. They were instrumental in the transformation that took place after the sixteenth century in Europe, whereby the notion of "power" was gradually replaced by the notion of "affluence."

The semi-Keynesian model developed with the Marshall Plan by the U.S. in the early stages of the Cold War resembled the model of the city-states. The U.S. provided military assistance to its allies to ensure that they would fight for it (or at least with it) and then sold them the weapons and the goods that it produced so as to reap twice the value of the original assistance. Against this, the USSR, acting without commercial considerations, provided its military assistance in the form of grants, a policy that landed it in difficulties later on.

At present the notion of the commercial state is an important aspect of Anglo-Saxon strategic thinking. It holds the view that countries that trade with one another will sheath their swords and abandon military rivalries, thereby ensuring peace.

Since 1945 both systems have coexisted in the world. In reality, no country can be purely a "power" or a "commercial" state, but one of these characteristics tends to be dominant. In the international system, these types of states complement one another.

After 1990 a change occurred in the criteria for being considered powerful. Many new states came into being, and their possibilities for maintaining their independence were limited. It was held that countries having to trade with one another would establish regional economic groupings that would prevent them from waging war against their partners. The development of international trade would establish the primacy of the commercial state in the international system, thus contributing to world peace. This strategy of the major powers has its adversaries, however, who claim that the reason for creating small countries is to make it easier to dominate.

(H. KÖNI) (Sources: McNeil, part 3; Braudel)

of Democratization," contained radical proposals like the abolition of the MGK and the attachment of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense rather than the prime minister's office. In another report ("Toward a New Strategy of Economic and Commercial Diplomacy in Turkey"), published in 1998, TÜSİAD proposed that a transition be made from a "national security" state to a "commercial" state model (Box Intro-13).

The business leaders did not confine themselves to making proposals. In the 1980s they started setting up Turkish-American, Turkish-Greek, and Turkish-Russian business councils through which they worked to solve problems and develop relations in areas going beyond strictly economic and commercial ties. TÜSİAD established a company in the U.S. to engage in lobbying. Prominent businessmen like Şarık Tara and Rahmi Koç were acting like "diplomats of the business world" and telling the Greek prime minister that they would take initiatives

to secure his invitation to Turkey. TÜSİAD went even further and in 1994 established a Foreign Relations Committee and set up representative offices in Brussels and Washington, D.C.

BALLERAL REPORT AND REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF

This situation was in keeping with international developments. After the Cold War economic competition and the technology race intensified, and the diplomats of important countries started concentrating their efforts on economic and commercial issues. A concept of economic diplomacy was gradually taking shape.

In the 1990s Turkey was confronted with two courses: the first gave priority to national security, as advocated by the military; and the second course, advocated by the business world, gave priority to trade and the economy. The first course was gaining greater weight in Turkey, largely due to the internal issues such as the conflict in the southeast and the rise of political Islam as well as regional conflicts and instability. The perception was that the prob-

lems with the Western countries were due to the Sèvres Peace Treaty (signed after World War I) being made a topical issue once again.

### The Leadership

The instability of the 1990s witnessed the tenure of Tansu Ciller as minister of foreign affairs (who pushed matters relating to the ministry to the background), the very short tenure of Murat Karayalçın as minister, and Necmettin Erbakan's efforts to veer from Turkey's traditional foreign policy. Demirel, as president from 1993 to 2000, appeared more active in foreign affairs than when he himself had been prime minister. He developed a personal friendship with the leaders of the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, above all with Heydar Aliyev. He also had an affinity with the leaders of numerous Balkan, Middle Eastern, and Western countries that he had started in the past and developed during the 1990s. This gave him considerable scope for action in the field of foreign relations. Unlike Özal's foreign policy activities, which showed no regard for the positions of the army or the government or bypassed them, Demirel's activities were generally designed to support the government's policies.

In the 1990s new elements in Turkish foreign policy were the energy and pipeline contracts, which allowed new organizations to get involved in foreign policy, if only within a restricted field. In this context, the Ministry of Energy as well as Botaş (the state's pipeline operating company) and the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) became active players, especially at the stage when pipeline contracts were being awarded and in connection with the transport of Caspian oil and gas. In some instances these organizations even clashed with the MFA over areas of responsibility.

### B. The Legal Background of Turkish Foreign Policy

The process of elaborating Turkish foreign policy is regulated by the Constitution and relevant laws. In the legal dimension of this process a prominent place is accorded to the competent institutions and organs as well as to the arrangements regarding treaty making, treaty ratification, and declaration of war.

Among the principal organs responsible for elaborating foreign policy are the government and the MFA. The president and the TGNA also figure also among the responsible organs.

The government and the MFA: the government is the organ charged in the Constitution (article 112/1)

with elaborating and executing the foreign policy of the country and bearing the legal and political responsibility for all decisions made. In carrying out foreign policy the government acts in accordance with its political tendency and within the framework of the party and government programs. Naturally, the government must conform with the Constitution and the regime in the decisions it makes and the policies it pursues.

In the field of execution, the most important organ is the MFA. This ministry's duties are specified in the following laws: Law No. 1173, dated 5 June 1969, entitled "Implementation and Coordination of International Relations"; Decree No. 206 (with the force of law), dated 8 June 1984, entitled "Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"; and Law No. 4009, dated 24 June 1994, entitled "Law on the Structure and Duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." The MFA's competence and duties are described as follows: in article 2/a, "[e] xecute foreign policy in accordance with the principles set out by the government and conduct the Turkish Republic's relations with foreign countries and international organizations"; in article 2/b, "[c]arry out the preparatory work for the determination of the Turkish Republic's foreign policy, put forward proposals, conduct and coordinate the foreign policy to be determined"; in article 2/d, "conduct negotiations with foreign states and organizations"; in article 2/e, "ensure that the activities of other ministries and organizations are in conformity with foreign policy"; in article 2/f, "secure the conformity of financial, economic, and technical negotiations with foreign policy and, when necessary,...participate in the negotiations"; in article 2/h, "carry out the duties of representation, as the competent authority, at foreign states and international organizations"; and in article 2/i, "monitor developments in foreign states and international organizations and their interaction with one another."

The president of the Republic: the authority of the president in the field of foreign affairs is mostly of a formal kind and relates to ratification of treaties and declaration of war.

Under article 104 of the Constitution, the president has the power to ratify and proclaim treaties. Before the president can exercise this power, the TGNA must pass a law approving the treaty. Among the president's powers are "to send the representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the representatives of foreign states to the Turkish Republic."

Under articles 92 and 104, the president also has the power to decide on the use of the Turkish armed forces.

Article 104, on the president's duties and powers, provides that "the president exercises the powers of commander-in-chief of the Turkish armed forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly," while article 92 provides that "if the country suffers a sudden armed attack when the Turkish Grand National Assembly is on holiday or in recess and it becomes necessary to use armed force immediately, the president can make a decision on the use of the Turkish armed forces."

The TGNA: the role of the TGNA in the elaboration of foreign policy consists in the ratification of treaties, declaration of war and the use of force, the budgetary depates, and the activities of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs.

As noted earlier, the TGNA passes a law approving an international treaty after it has been signed. Under the provisions of article 90/a of the Constitution, however, "[a]greements regulating economic, commercial, or technical relations of a duration of less than one year enter into force upon proclamation, provided they do not impose financial obligations on the state or bring changes to the personal status or the property rights of Turks in foreign countries." The following exceptions are foreseen in article 90/3 of the Constitution: "Implementation agreements based on an international treaty and economic, commercial, technical, or administrative treaties signed on the basis of powers granted by law need not be approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; however, economic and commercial treaties and those relating to the rights of private individuals entered into under this provision cannot come into force before promulgation." Under Law No. 244, the MFA has the duty to prepare the draft of the law on approving a treaty. The draft is adopted by the assembly without amendments (Tanör, pp. 324–26).

Under article 87 of the Constitution, the TGNA has the power, inter alia, to declare war. Article 92 provides that "[w]hen sanctioned by international law, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has the power to declare a state of war, to authorize the sending of Turkish armed forces to foreign countries in circumstances other than when alliances to which Turkey is a party or international courtesy require the sending of armed forces, and to authorize the stationing of foreign armed forces in Turkey."

In addition to the ratification of treaties, the TGNA's activities in the sphere of foreign policy include the government's briefing of the assembly on foreign policy developments and holding general debates from time to time on foreign policy. The main activity in this field consists of the foreign policy debates in the committees on

foreign relations and the budget. The debates in the committee on foreign relations involve examining the texts of treaties, whereas the debates in the budget committee can get very heated, with governments having to defend their foreign policy and replying to criticism through the minister. Since the 1990s the committee on foreign relations has been following developments more closely and demanding more information from the government and the MFA.

İlhan Uzgel

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### **SECTION 1**

1919-1923

The Time of Liberation

Table 1-1. The Administration of the Period 1919-1923

| HEADS OF STATE   | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                            | SECRETARIES-<br>GENERAL OF MFA                                   |
|--|--|--|--|
|  | Ahmet İzzet Paşa [Furgaç]  | Ahmet Nâbi Bey   |  |
|  | Government<br>(14 Oct. 1918–11 Nov. 1918)  | (14 Oct. 1918–11 Nov. 1918)                                |  |
| Sultan Mehmet VI<br>(Vahideddin) (in İstanbul)<br>(3 July 1918–1 Nov. 1922)                  | Ahmet Tevfik Paşa [Okday]  | Mustafa Reşit Paşa<br>(12 Nov. 1918–23 Feb. 1919)          |  |
|  | Government<br>(12 Nov. 1918–3 Mar. 1919)   | Yusuf Franko Paşa<br>(24 Feb. 1919–3 Mar. 1919)            |  |
|  | Damat Mehmet Ferit Paşa<br>Government<br>(4 Mar. 1919–2 Oct. 1919)                                 | Damat Mehmet Ferit Paşa<br>(4 Mar. 1919–2 Oct. 1919)       |  |
|  | Ali Rıza Paşa Government<br>(3 Oct. 1919–7 Mar. 1920)  | Mustafa Reşit Paşa<br>(3 Oct. 1919–8 Feb. 1920)            |  |
|  | Salih Hulusi Paşa Government<br>(8 Mar. 1920–4 Apr. 1920)  | Abdüllatif Safâ Bey<br>(9 Feb. 1920–4 Apr. 1920)           |  |
|  | Damat Mehmet Ferit Paşa<br>Government<br>(5 Apr. 1920–17 Oct. 1920)                                | Damat Mehmet Ferit Paşa<br>(5 Apr. 1920–17 Oct. 1920)      | 1  |
|  | Ahmet Tevfik Paşa [Okday]<br>Government<br>(18 Oct. 1920–4 Nov. 1922)                              | Abdüllatif Safâ Bey<br>(18 Oct. 1920–13 June 1921)         |  |
|  |  | Ahmet İzzet Paşa [Furgaç]<br>(14 June 1921–4 Nov. 1922)    |  |
| TGNA President<br>Mustafa Kemal Paşa<br>[Atatürk] (in Ankara)<br>(24 Apr. 1920–29 Oct. 1923) | Provisional Executive Committee<br>President: M. Kemal Paşa [Atatürk]<br>(25 Apr. 1920–2 May 1920) |  |  |
|  | First Executive Council<br>Prime Minister: M. Kemal Pașa [Atatürk]<br>(3 May 1920–23 Jan. 1921)    | Bekir Sami Bey [Kunduh]<br>(3 May 1920–12 May 1921)        |  |
|  | Second Executive Council<br>Prime Minister: M. Fevzi Paşa [Çakmak]<br>(24 Jan. 1921–18 May 1921)   |  | Suad Bey [Davaz]<br>(30 Apr. 1920–<br>27 Aug. 1923)              |
|  | Third Executive Council<br>Prime Minister: M. Fevzi Paşa [Çakmak]<br>(19 May 1921–9 July 1922)     | Yusuf Kemal Bey [Tengirşenk]<br>(16 May 1921–25 Oct. 1922) |  |
|  | Fourth Executive Council Prime Minister: Hüseyin Rauf Bey [Orbay] (12 July 1922–4 Aug. 1923)       |  |  |
|  | Fifth Executive Council Prime Minister: Ali Fethi Bey [Okyar] (14 Aug. 1923–29 Oct. 1923)          | Mustafa İsmet Paşa [İnönü]<br>(26 Oct. 1922–22 Nov. 1924)  | Tevfik Kamil Bey<br>[Koperler]<br>(3 Sept. 1923–<br>9 Nov. 1925) |

Sources: Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele, vols. 1 and 2 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992); Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Kronolojisi, 1918–38, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali, 1839–1922 (İstanbul: İsis, 1999); Zeki Sarıhan, Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1993).

### Appraisal of the Period

### THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

As we shall see in the section on "The Domestic Environment and Dynamics" below, Anatolia was in terrible shape as the War of Liberation got underway. The Allies, however, who had imposed Sèvres on the Ottomans, were themselves not in such a good position to put further pressure on Anatolia after the cessation of hostilities.

First, Britain, France, and Italy had internal problems. Britain was facing difficulties in India, Egypt, and especially Ireland in the form of independence movements. It also had problems in the Middle East because of independence promises made to Arabs but not kept. (When Dr. Rıza Nur, one of the three representatives of the Ankara government in Lausanne, reminded Britain of Ireland at the Lausanne Conference, the Irish republicans sent him messages of appreciation [Nur, vol. 3, p. 1063].) At the same time, Britain was dealing with labor unrest. Furthermore, David Lloyd George, who gave unreserved backing to Greece, had serious differences with his foreign secretary, George Nathaniel Curzon. Lord Curzon feared that allowing Greece to expand unduly in Anatolia would hinder the restoration of peace, while his defense secretary, Winston Churchill, felt that a friendly Turkey could be useful as a shield against the Bolsheviks (Hale, p. 49). France was preoccupied with the general strike and the actions of both the Catholic and Communist trade unions. Italy was embroiled in the Fascist takeover of the country following the march on Rome of the Black Shirts on 28 October 1922.

Second, the Allies also had serious differences among themselves. Britain's attempt to appropriate the territories that had been promised to France and Italy in 1916 and 1917 alienated both countries. Italy was active in the Adriatic and in Antalya without consulting Britain, while Britain was punishing Italy by allowing Greece to grab İzmir, which had been promised to Italy. Meanwhile France was concerned about Britain's obstruction of French plans to

tie down Germany with punitive terms. It also reacted sharply to Britain's occupation of Mosul and subsequently of Antep in 1918, both of which had been assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot partition plan. In the end both France and Italy were reduced to seeking nothing more than concession agreements and privileges in Anatolia and thus abandoning Britain in its confrontation with Ankara (Box 1-1). In this situation Greece was left to its own devices as it advanced in Anatolia.

Third, an antiwar atmosphere was building in all three countries. The people were tired of war and could see no justification for the Anatolia operation. Marshal Ferdinand Foch declared that it would take twenty-one divisions to subdue the Turks and that such a force was just not available. The soldiers had been told that they had won "the war that was to end all wars" and now looked forward to demobilization (Hale, p. 48).

Fourth, the Treaty of Sèvres took no account of the USSR. After 1920, however, the Bolsheviks had gained control of Russia. The Allies had tried to nip the revolution in the bud through armed intervention, fomenting civil war and imposing an embargo. Now the Bolsheviks were seeking a way to relieve the Allied pressure. When V.I. Lenin prevailed in his debate with M.N. Roy (Box 1-11 below), the theoretical hurdles preventing Soviet aid to Ankara had been cleared.

Another very important event that took place in the international environment was the proclamation of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1919. This document upset the colonialist powers Britain and France, because it sought to prevent secret diplomacy and defended the principles of self-determination and nationality. These principles, and especially point 12, were used by Ankara to justify demands for full independence. When Gen. James Harbord came to Anatolia, he saw point 12 featured on placards that M. Kemal ordered displayed.

Seen from a regional rather than a continental perspective, the most important foreign factor was Britain's

#### Box 1-1. The Road Leading to Concessions

The first debt contracted by the Ottomans was to finance the Crimean War (1854). Because of a lack of discipline in the civil service and the attractiveness of borrowing the funds needed to cover public expenditures, the practice of contracting foreign debts became the financial policy of the state. From 1854 to 1874 fifteen separate loans were obtained. At the end of the period the total debt amounted to over 5,297,000 gold French francs, and the annual interest was approximately 300,000 francs.

To service its foreign debt, the Ottoman government now started borrowing from the Galata bankers. When it became incapable of even repaying the interest on these loans, it issued the Ramadan Decree in October 1875, declaring that only 50% of installments that came due would be paid. In the event, even this undertaking could be met for only three months.

In March 1876 all foreign debt repayments came to an end. This was followed by suspension of repayments of domestic loans. That default signified the bankruptcy of the state, and the Galata bankers were allowed to appropriate the tax income for six important items (stamp duty and taxes levied on spirits, silk, fish, salt, and tobacco) for ten years. In 1876 the Rüsum-i Sitte administration was set up to administer this tax operation.

When repayments of foreign debts were delayed after Rüsum-ı Sitte came into operation, foreign creditors pressed the government to issue the Muharrem Decree in December 1881. This decree set up the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The Galata bankers received bonds and relinquished the receipts of the Rüsum-ı Sitte to the Düyun-ı Umumiye. The Düyun-ı Umumiye set about collecting taxes and started repaying the creditors of the Ottoman Empire. In order to increase the yield of tobacco taxes, which were the easiest to collect, a monopoly known as the Régle Administration was established in 1884 to take over the production of tobacco goods.

In this situation the Ottomans were deprived of funds to carry out public services. The solution was to grant concessions. A private firm was granted a concession to carry out a public service for a given period, usually as a monopoly. The distribution of water or electricity and the operation of tramways and shipping can be cited as examples.

The next step of this Ottoman bankruptcy process was article 232 of the Treaty of Sevres. Today these concessions come in the form of build, operate, transfer (BOT) agreements.

(B. ORAN)



Figure 1-1, 24 September 1919: The courthouse at Erzincan (U.S. National Archives).

determination to prevent any other country from gaining supremacy in the Middle East, a region that was becoming important because of its oil reserves. That is why Britain amended the Sykes-Picot Agreement and incurred the wrath of France. It also conducted its policy toward Ankara with Mosul in mind. In fact one view, not to be taken lightly, is that Britain encouraged Greece to invade Anatolia solely to create a diversion for the Turks. (M. Kemal,

the master tactician, sent a Turkish unit under the command of "Özdemir Bey" [a remarkable Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa member, real name: Ali Şefik el Mısri] to Revanduz in northern Iraq to harass the British. This unit scored an unexpected success by opening the road to Suleymaniyah on 12 August 1922. It took no less than the Royal Air Force to check the progress of this unit.) It should not be seen as an accident that the treaty establishing a mandate signed by Britain with Iraq's King Faisal I on 10 October 1922 coincided with the armistice agreement signed in Mudanya on 11 October 1922 (Picard et al., pp. 29-30).

## II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

When the War of Liberation started in 1919, Turkey had practically no resources to carry out such a struggle. All of its rudimentary industry and most of its trade were concentrated in a few coastal centers then under foreign

occupation. It took twenty-two hours to go by train from Ankara to Eskişehir, a distance covered in three and a half hours by regular train today. The country was not even producing nails, so used nails had to be straightened and reused.

Alongside the dire economic situation, Anatolia was the scene of constant warfare and insurgency. Because Ankara was unable to deal with this, it had to seek the help of friendly guerrillas. Meanwhile the Anatolian peasants were under the negative influence of a fatwa by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (chief religious authority) condemning the War of Liberation. M. Kemal was compelled to seek counter-fatwas from Anatolian muftis, who declared that the struggle was to save the caliph-sultan and Islam.

Above all, the Anatolian peasants were completely exhausted and war weary after having had to fight without interruption since 1911. Furthermore, Anatolia was not an integrated market, so feelings of national solidarity were not able to draw on shared economic interest. (Even a basic commodity like wheat, which should have been coming from Konya, a town in central Anatolia, was being imported from the Crimea.) As a result, even those soldiers who had not deserted would disperse after a skirmish and return to their villages in the belief that the war had been won (Selek, p. 120). The independence tribunals had been set up during the war to combat desertions. The people were more likely to join insurrections than to join the War of Liberation (Selek, p. 65).

As for the notables (rich and influential landowners/ traders in rural cities and towns), their loyalty belonged to their locality rather than to the nation. Associations such as the Redd-i Ilhak, which they had set up with the help of Union and Progress officers, were striving for the liberation of their region or locality. They were unable to think on a national scale or to entertain the national vision of the intelligentsia as represented by M. Kemal. Nor did they have the administrative skills (such as the use of the telegraph) to realize such a vision. As a matter of fact, this was to render the task of the intelligentsia easier and was to provide them with "relative internal autonomy" both during the War of Liberation and subsequently (Box Intro-6 above).

In addition to its political will, two events pushed Ankara into engaging in a struggle for independence in these difficult circumstances: the occupation of İzmir by Greece in May 1919 and the establishment of Armenia in the eastern provinces under the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.

The exports of all Anatolia, not just the western part, were channeled through the port of İzmir. Its closure would be extremely harmful for Turkey. Furthermore, the

occupier was Greece, a "former subject" with a different religion. After the occupation the local Greek population engaged in jubilant demonstrations, which aroused anxiety among the notables. The lack of response by the sultan to the occupation was an eye opener to the public. In these circumstances it became easier for M. Kemal to influence the clerics and the public who followed them. The message was that "the sultan is a prisoner and action must be taken on his behalf." Throughout the War of Liberation, M. Kemal was to refer constantly to liberation and salvation (kurtuluş) but never to restructuring (kuruluş) or the reforms he was contemplating (these two terms are borrowed from Bülent Tanör). M. Kemal achieved victory in the War of Liberation through shrewd coalitions that he entered into with the notables, Islam, Communists, alternative military leaders, Unionists (the Union and Progress Party members), Kurds, Circassians, and others. He was to break with all of these groups when the time came, with the exception of the notables.

The issue of Armenia was even more important in triggering the War of Liberation. First, the establishment of Armenia, next to Russia and with access to the Black Sea, was a source of major concern. Second, the property of the Armenians who had been deported in 1915 (Box 1-2) had been appropriated by the local notables, who did not want to give up this property (article 144 of the Treaty of Sèvres made detailed provisions for the restitution of this property). It should be noted that no problems arose when the British occupied Antep from 17 December 1918 to September 1919, but there was stubborn resistance to the French occupation on 5 November 1919. This resistance, known as the "heroic defense of Antep," was the result of the French using Armenian units in their occupation. Third, many Unionists who were involved in the Armenian deportation had fled İstanbul to join the Anatolian resistance. Fourth and most importantly, the creation of an Armenian state had greatly upset the Kurds. The Kurdish tribal leaders were among the people who had appropriated Armenian properties. There was also bad blood between the two peoples going back to the time of the Hamidiye Regiments of 1890 (Box 7-33 in Section 7).

In addition, the Kurdish elite could see that the benefits envisaged for them in articles 62–64 of the Treaty of Sèvres would be curtailed because of Armenia. The autonomous Kurdistan was described in article 62 as being south of the southern border of Armenia. In other words, in all the provinces of eastern Anatolia (with the exception of Van) the Kurds, who were much more numerous than the Armenians, would live under the administration of Christian Armenians, who had been their vassals

### Box 1-2. The Deportation of the Armenians

In the heat of World War I, in 1915, the Ottoman administration ordered its Armenians to leave their homes to be deported to Syria, then an Ottoman province. The reason cited was the support that they had provided to advancing Russian armies in the northeast.

The situation had deeper roots, actually, The Armenian popylation, once called the "Loyal Nation," had become the "Armenian Question" of the Ottoman Empire at least since the 1878 Berlin Treaty. Living under ever-increasing pressure from the Muslim population in eastern Anatolia from 1860s on (see Box 7-33 in Section 7), the Anatolian Armenians had demanded reforms, but the disintegrating empire was unable to comply. This permitted the Great Powers to exploit the situation to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ottomans, which turned the Armenians into a Trojan Horse in the eyes of the Muslim people and the administration. The question had eventually become the very "Eastern Question" itself: the struggle among European powers and Russia over who would get the best portion of the spoils of the empire. As a rule, the Armenians (actually, non-Muslims) of the empire endured discrimination; but by the 1890s some Western-educated Armenians had organized secret societies and began opposing Ottoman authorities. This included attacking neighboring Muslim communities, partly for self-defense and partly in an effort to simulate the "Bulgarian model": to attract first the reaction of the empire and then the attention of the European powers, which would help to make the community first autonomous and then independent.

Preparations for the deportation were carried out by Union and Progress leaders during the war without informing the government, at a time when the Ottoman parliament was also dissolved on 1 March 1915. Right after the Armenian rebellion in Van (eastern Anatolia, 20 April 1915), and during the Gallipoli crisis in the northwest (the Dardanelles battle of 19 February-18 March to the Gallipoli landing of 25 April-20 December), the Union and Progress government issued the decree of 24 April 1915, ordering the arrest of Armenian leaders in Istanbul and the closing down of their organizations. This was followed on 27 May by a "provisional deportation law" authorizing the army "to deport and resettle the inhabitants of villages and towns who contravene military regulations, engage in espionage, or commit treason."

Deportation, especially in time of war, is hardly exceptional, particularly in a Middle Eastern historical setting. But the fact that the deportation included not only Armenian armed bands but innocent Armenian families from all over and the deplorable manner in which it was carried out by the secret Special Organization (Teşkilat-i Mahsusa) controlled by the party nucleus led by Dr. Bahaettiri Şakir raise important debates centering on three main points: numbers, intent and name, and compensations.

The first point relates to the number of victims. There is general agreement that 1 million Armenians survived the war. The disagreement is over how many Armenians were in Anatolia when World War I broke out. Turkish sources claim that there were 1.3 million, while Armenian sources claim up to 2.5 million; foreign sources cite figures ranging from 1.5 million to 1.8 million. As a result, the Turkish side reaches the sum of 300,000 victims, while the other side claims around 1.5 million. In the ultimatum handed to the Ottoman government prior to the Treaty of Sèvres, the number of Armenian victims in the years 1915–19 is given as 800,000 (see "The Peace Treaty of Sèvres" below). Even in time of war this number was enormous. It is true that between 1.5 million and 2 million Muslims also lost their lives, but these casualties were not the result of the action of their own state.

The second point relates to the thornier question of intent. Was the Ottoman state in particular responsible for the deaths of this very large number of Armenians, and, further, did it intend to exterminate them? One party claims that there was a plan to liquidate the Armenians for reasons of state. The deportation was part of the Union and Progress policy of Turkification: it was ideologically motivated, planned, and methodical. It was carried out

not just in the war zones in the east but throughout Anatolia and even in Thrace and was not confined to men but included women and children. Killings occurred en route and in some places took the form of organized massacres. In any event, travel on foot from Anatolia to Syria was likely to result in death, especially for the elderly and the children.

Those who hold the contrary view recall the crucial role played by the lamentable circumstances of the war and the prevailing social psychology that the empire was coming apart. They claim that the responsibility cannot be ascribed to an already dissolved parliament or to a government that was dragged into the war, without even being informed, by this hypernationalist nucleus within the central committee of Union and Progress. Those who hold this view remind us that the actual implementation of the law greatly changed from region to region and person to person, depending on the effectiveness of the control by this nucleus. They add that Izmir and Istanbul Armenians were exempted and assert that the aim was to relocate those Armenians who had, as the popular expression goes, "stabbed the army in the back" in wartime to a location where they could not harm the war effort, Consequently, it was neither planned nor ideologically motivated. They argue that killings were exceptional, with most fatalities resulting from diseases, and that these unavoidable measures taken in wartime had nothing to do with an intent to exterminate.

This question of Intent became all the more important because of the Armenian diaspora's insistence on calling the whole affair a "genocide." This term was coined by Polish lawyer R. Lemkin in 1943. Genocide was finally penalized by the UN in December 1948, which defined it as requiring "intent." As a matter of fact, article 2 of 1948 UN Convention stipulated that "genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."

Whatever the outcome of these debates, the deportation resulted in an undeniable human tragedy, taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Anatolian Armenians, and its bitter memorles created a vicious circle in the polarized present-day situation. The Turkish state refrained from discussing the issue even within Its own circle and denied its very existence, as If the massacres had taken place not in Ottoman times but in the Republican era. In turn, this greatly upset the Armenian diaspora, who, in an effort to commemorate and revenge their innocent ancestors, underlined this term to pressure/punish Turkey. Genocide also became a "Chosen Trauma" to symbolize Armenian unity as well as serving to foster national consciousness in order to delay or prevent assimilation in their host country. This very term "genocide," nowever, facilitated the denial in Turkey, because it referred to the Nazis, who, unlike the panic situation of the Ottomans, coldbloodedly planned and executed the massacres in an atmosphere totally lacking any threat from the Jews. In short, the two radical and opposed stances fed each other, particularly the hypernationalist circles.

This situation would bring Turkey under Intense International pressure, make the Republic of Armenia economically dependent on Iran and militarily dependent on Russia, and leave the Armenian community of Turkey in a quandary. The host countries where the Armenian diaspora lived were to profit from this situation. Their politicians used the Armenian votes for electoral gains; their business leaders used the issue to pressure Turkey and to obtain contracts in exchange for lobbying against anti-Turkish resolutions in their parliaments.

As to the third point, the diaspora is insistent on what we might call the "2 + 1 Rs": Recognition of the "genocide," Reparations for lost Armenian property, and, for the most radical wing, Restitution of Armenian lands in eastern Anatolia.

for centuries. As Armenia grew larger, it would be at the expense of their autonomous region, which had the potential to become fully independent. This secured firm Kurdish support for the War of Liberation, given that Turks and Kurds had the sultan-caliph as their common denominator. The only major exception is the Koçgiri insurrection of 1921, brought about by the Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti (a Kurdish association in İstanbul). As a matter of fact, the War of Liberation, with its congresses and hostilities with the adversaries, started in the east. Its first military victories and diplomatic successes would be over Armenia (the Gümrü Treaty of 2 December 1920).

### III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

This was an extraordinary period, when a struggle was being conducted for survival. Consequently, there was only one foreign policy objective: ensuring independence.

Nevertheless, the concept of independence was reflected in the foreign policy with great care and realism. An effort was made to minimize friction with the major Western powers and to present the situation as one of resistance to the Greek army's occupation of Turkey. In this we can detect the influence of the basic philosophy of Turkey's Westernized elite as well as the realism and tactical skills of M. Kemal, which resulted in maximum use of international balances in the War of Liberation.

### A. Independence Based on Realism

The first thing to note about the foreign policy of the War of Liberation is that it was a revisionist policy.

This revisionism did not conform to the standards of the period, however. First, the Turkish revisionists knew where and when to stop; the borders they aspired to attain were rational and realistic. That is why the order achieved at Lausanne is the only one that has survived to this day. Second, the revisionism of the Anatolian movement turned to the maintenance of the status quo immediately after Lausanne. This was reflected in general satisfaction with the gains and policies aiming at domestic consolidation. Third, this was not an "anti-system" type of revisionism, a very important feature from the viewpoint of international relations. It did not challenge the political supremacy of the West (like Nazi Germany) or capitalism (like the Soviet Union). This secured it freedom from the opposition of the major powers. The National Pact reflected this different approach. This text underpinning the Republic of Turkey has six articles. Articles 1 and 6 represented revisionism, and the rest reflected the different nature of this revisionism.

Revisionism and the Status Quo in the National Pact

The National Pact (MM in the Turkish acronym) was the first official document revealing the distinguishing features of the revisionism of the Anatolian revolution. This document was adopted and signed at a closed sitting of the nationalist Felah-1 Vatan group of the Ottoman parliament on 28 January 1920 and was adopted on 17 February by the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan; Chamber of Deputies) and released to the press (Turan, pp. 86–89). The MM, also referred to as the National Oath, based the integrity and the independence of the country on the principles set out at the Erzurum and Sivas congresses of 1919:


Article 1: The fate of the territories of the Ottoman state and especially the places with an Arab majority and those occupied by enemy forces at the time of the 30 October 1918 armistice agreement shall be decided by a free vote of the inhabitants of these territories. All of the lands within and outside the 1918 armistice lines, inhabited by people attached to one another on the basis of religion, custom, and aspirations, harboring mutual feelings of respect and sacrifice, and representing the Ottoman-Muslim majority respectful of their racial and social rights and the condition of their districts, represent a whole that can under no pretext be separated from one another in practice or in law.

Article 2: When the inhabitants of the three districts [Kars, Ardahan, Batum] that chose to return to the fatherland by popular vote achieve their freedom, we can accept that, if necessary, they resort to the vote once again.

Article 3: The legal status of Western Thrace, which is to be settled at the Turkish peace treaty, shall be decided by the free vote of its inhabitants.

Article 4: The security of the seat of the Islamic Caliphate and the Sultanate and the capital of the Ottoman government, Istanbul, as well as the Sea of Marmara shall be free from any threat. With this proviso, the unanimous decision of all states, including ours, to ensure access to world trade and transit through the Straits will be considered valid.

Article 5: We shall respect and guarantee the rights of minorities based on the principles contained in the treaties concluded between the Allies and their adversaries, on condition that the



Muslim minorities in neighboring countries will enjoy the same rights.

Article 6: To achieve our national and economic development, and to manage our affairs in a contemporary and orderly way, we must enjoy, like all states, unfettered independence and freedom as the basis of our present and future existence. Consequently, we are against all limitations that would hinder our political, judiciary, and financial development. The conditions for the repayment of our debts shall not violate these principles.

(Actually, the National Pact consists of seven articles after the preamble. Article 7 was the "Punitory Pact," which was approved for the purpose of punishing those involved in war crimes. The article called for "an investigation of those members of the cabinet and their associates who, starting from the crises that led to the Great War up to the convening of parliament, were responsible for entering the war and, by their actions in directing the war effort and their general conduct of domestic and foreign policy, brought harm to the state and the nation." This article, also known as the "separate article," was subsequently allowed to lapse because it dealt with an internal issue [Turan, p. 86], while MM's main thrust was directed abroad, and also because it was considered ill-advised to allude to the issue of the Armenian deportation at a time when the question of creating a "Greater Armenia" was being mooted.)

It will be seen that articles 1 and 6 dealt with the country's independence and territorial integrity. That

was the foundation of the MM, and it was thoroughly revisionist. In the 1960s certain commentators claimed that the War of Liberation was not launched against the occupiers but rather against the minorities and that it was a strictly Turkish-Greek war. At the Sivas Congress, however, M. Kemal amended the third resolution of the Erzurum Congress, which stated: "All occupations and interventions will be interpreted as an attempt to establish a Greek and an Armenian state," revealing his intention to oppose all occupiers. The comprehensive nature of the War of Liberation also became

apparent when the name of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces established at Erzurum was changed to the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli (signifying European Turkey) at Sivas.

M. Kemal gave a very restrictive interpretation of the first article of the MM, however, signifying his intention to pull back the frontiers rather than to push them outward. As we have seen, article 1 used the phrase "within and outside of the 1918 armistice lines." M. Kemal discarded the "and outside of" portion. After a certain date all MM texts read "within the armistice line" (Tunçay, p. 12). M. Kemal went even further in interpreting the armistice line: "Is there such a line? No. When we met at the Erzurum Congress, we felt such a line should exist, thinking of the fatherland. At that time, we said, the line we control will be our border" (TBMM, p. 354). This restrictive interpretation was due to M. Kemal's concern about being accused in the future of failing to attain the MM's objectives. It was also a reflection of his uncompromising realism.

The other articles of the MM demonstrate the will to abide by the basic principles of the international system. In articles 2 and 3 the then-fashionable method of holding a plebiscite is accepted, even though there were Turkish majorities in those districts. In article 4 freedom of navigation in the Straits is upheld, which was an important issue for international capitalism. Finally, article 5 includes a pledge to respect minority rights. In fact, by accepting "the principles contained in the treaties concluded between the Allies and their adversaries," article 5 accepts the standard for defining a minority: racial, linguistic, and religious. This article was to cause considerable difficulty

for the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference in its efforts to confine the concept of a minority exclusively to non-Muslims.

#### B. Westernism Based on Balance

In conformity with the traditional Ottoman line, Turkey's War of Liberation, though waged against the West, did not lead to a split with the West. The goal of Westernization was manifest among the intellectuals (aydınlar) even as the war was being waged against the West. Turkey continuously sought contacts with the West while the war with Greece was raging on. Not even the West beyond the Atlantic was neglected. A cable was sent from Sivas to the U.S. inviting it to send in a delegation. The message went to all the West, and in particular to Britain, that the new Turkey would shun communism and remain in the capitalist camp. This was done at the İzmir Economy Congress in February and March 1923, at a time when the Lausanne Conference was deadlocked. This message was received with huge satisfaction in the West, where the trauma of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was still fresh and the fear of its spread pervasive.

The Westernism of the War of Liberation was used with great tactical skill and in full awareness of the prevailing balances. M. Kemal accomplished this in two basic ways: using the West against the West and the Soviets against the West.

#### The West versus the West

M. Kemal took maximum advantage of the rivalries within the Western camp and played one Western country against another. When France's Syrian commissioner Georges Picot called in Ankara on his way to Paris on 5-6 December 1920, M. Kemal informed him that he was willing "to accept a French economic mandate encompassing all of Anatolia." Meanwhile Gen. James Harbord's delegation, which had been sent to Anatolia by U.S. president Wilson in the fall of 1919 to explore the question of an Armenian mandate, reported after a meeting that M. Kemal "expressed a preference for an American mandate" and that, "if possible, he was ready to accept American aid" (Helmreich, pp. 139 and 151). In similar fashion Ankara representative Bekir Sami had distributed economic concessions at the London Conference in March 1921. M. Kemal himself proposed to Henri Franklin-Bouillon when they met in Ankara in October 1921 that France be granted 99-year concessions to extract chromium, iron, and silver. In addition, the well-known Chester concession was granted to an American company while the Lausanne negotiations were going on (Box 1-3).

### Box 1-3. The Chester Project

Retired U.S. admiral Colby M. Chester sought a railroad concession in 1911 for a main line linking Sivas and Van and extending to the port of Yumurtalik, with branch lines to Mosul and Kirkuk. This request was rejected by the Ottoman parliament. Colby's son renewed the request as the Lausanne Conference got underway, and an agreement was signed. Under its terms, all investments in the form of railroads, bridges, and ports would become the property of the Turkish government in ninety-nine years, but in the interim all mines within twenty kilometers of the railroad on both sides would be exploited exclusively by the concession holder. In addition, the company would be given the right to build and operate other railroads.

Although the TGNA approved this concession on 9 April 1922, it was never implemented. The company's main focus was on the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk, and at Lausanne it became clear that these districts would be detached from Turkey. On 18 December 1923 the TGNA rescinded the concession.

> (B. ORAN) (Source: Erhan, pp. 377–83; Ana Britannica, 1987, vol. 5, p. 571)

In the 1960s some commentators came to the conclusion that "the War of Liberation was not anti-imperialist," based on the granting of concessions. In reality, however, all of these concessions remained on paper and were designed to split France and Italy from Britain and the U.S. from all three, to prevent the formation of a united Western front. As a matter of fact, the Italians evacuated Antalya in July 1921, and the French left Cilicia on 20 October 1921, leaving the British alone in Anatolia. This was a tremendous relief for Ankara.

#### The Soviets versus the West

The Anatolia movement also used the Soviets as a balancing factor to counter the Western occupation.

The arms and financial assistance coming from the Soviets constituted an important material resource underpinning the War of Liberation. As the first state to recognize the National Pact, the Soviet Union gave Ankara a big diplomatic boost. But the greatest benefit of Soviet friendship during the war was that it kept the West from pushing Turkey too hard out of fear of the spread of communism.

Although each side needed the other, it was not easy to establish this relationship. Ankara was wary of Moscow for historical and ideological reasons. Moscow knew that tight relations with Ankara would delay the normalization of its own relations with the West. It was well aware that M. Kemal's movement had nothing to do with socialism and that phrases that he frequently uttered such as

"imperialism will destroy us," "capitalism will devour us," and "the downtrodden nations will one day obliterate the oppressors" were pure rhetoric. Moscow was hoping that M. Kemal could be bypassed and that it would become influential in Anatolia through the Turkish Communist Party.

The Soviets only signed the March 1921 treaty with Ankara after they had succeeded in reaching a trade agreement with Britain and after coming to the conclusion that Kemal's movement would be able to cope with leftist elements in Anatolia and also with Greece. As a matter of fact, this treaty was signed after Mustafa Suphi (the Communist leader) and his friends were murdered in January 1921, after Ethem the Circassian was beaten (Box 1-15 below), and after the first Battle of İnönü had been fought and won (Hale, pp. 50–51).

The Turkish policy during the War of Liberation can be summarized as saying "no to communism, yes to the Soviets." Through this policy the West was both checked and reassured. The London Conference was convened on 21 February. The delegation of the TGNA reached Moscow on 17 February and signed the treaty with the Soviets on 16 March. On 14 April Britain notified Greece of its neutrality in the war and subsequently banned the sale of weapons to the Greeks.

Baskin Oran

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# The Armistice of Mudros

Signed on 30 October 1918, the Armistice of Mudros signaled the end of the war for the Ottoman Empire.

No conditions were set for the negotiation of a peace treaty, so the document signified the unconditional surrender of the Ottoman Empire. The British commander in the Aegean, S. A. G. Calthorpe, had received orders to conduct the negotiation of the armistice document without reference to his French counterpart, Admiral Jean Amet. Consequently, the negotiations at Mudros were an exclusively British-Ottoman affair. In the final document the British made changes from what had been envisaged earlier. For example, Cilicia (Mersin, Adana, and areas farther to the east that were in the French sphere of influence) was originally supposed to have been evacuated by the Ottomans right away, but it was now accepted that some forces would be kept there to ensure law and order. Similarly, the Allies were originally supposed to have had the right immediately to occupy all important strategic locations, whereas the signed document provided for such occupation only when "a situation arose that would pose a danger to the security of the Allies" (Helmreich, pp. 1-2). Mudros represented the first clash of interests among the Allies.

The armistice document consisted of twenty-five articles covering the following subjects.

1. Subjects dealing with the surrender of the army and evacuation: "Aside from the units required to control the borders and maintain law and order," the army would immediately be demobilized (article 5). "All warships in Turkish waters or in waters under Turkish control" would be surrendered (article 6). All troops in the Hijaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq would surrender (article 16) along with the officers in Tripoli and Bengazi (article 17), and all the equipment, weapons, and munitions of the demobilized army would be disposed of according to the orders issued (article 20).

The withdrawal of troops from "northwestern Iran," "a part of trans-Caucasus" (article 11), and "Cilicia, aside

from the forces needed to maintain law and order" (article 16), was also foreseen.

2. Facilities to be accorded to the Allies: the Allies would have free access to all Turkish ports (article 8) and all repair facilities therein (article 9). "[A] part from those serving the communications of the Turkish government, all wireless telegraph and cable stations" would come under Allied control (article 12). "After local requirements have been satisfied, the procurement from Turkish sources of coal, petroleum products, and vessels shall be facilitated" and their export banned (article 14). In addition, "Allied control officers will take charge of all railroads" (article 15).

3. Diplomatic subjects: the Ottoman Empire was to sever "all relations with the Central Powers" (article 23). The treaty called for "the unconditional surrender to the Allies in İstanbul of all prisoners of war as well as all detained or imprisoned Armenians" (article 4) and "the eviction, within one month, of all German and Austrian soldiers, sailors, and civilians from Turkish territory" (article 19), with "Turkish prisoners to be held at the disposal of the Allied powers" (article 22).

4. Places to be occupied by the Allies: the fortifications of the Straits (article 1); the railroad tunnels in the Taurus Mountains (article 10); Batumi and Baku (article 15); and all the ports in Tripoli and Bengazi (article 18).

5. Places liable to be occupied: this was the core of the armistice document. The other articles contained provisions that would appear in any armistice agreement. But the real intention of the Allies became manifest in two articles.

Article 24: "If disturbances occur in the six Armenian provinces ['Vilayat-1 Sitte' in the Ottoman Turkish text, meaning the six provinces in the east], the Allies reserve the right to occupy any portion of these provinces."

The notorious article 7 extended this right to all of the Ottoman territories: "the occupation of any strategic points in the event of a situation arising that threatens the security of the Allies."

Thus Mudros went beyond the terms of an armistice and became a document that enabled the Allies to occupy any locality in which they chose to trigger incidents. In particular, article 7 rendered all the other provisions meaningless and implied "unconditional surrender."

The preamble of the armistice declared:

The British government, in agreement with its allies, has authorized Admiral Sir Somerset Arthur Gough Calthorpe, British commander-inchief of the Mediterranean region, and the Turkish [Ottoman] Government has authorized the Turkish Minister of the Navy, His Excellency Rauf Bey, the Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reşad Hikmet Bey, and Lieutenant Colonel Sadullah Bey of the Turkish General Staff to decide and to agree on the terms of armistice.

The document then ended with article 25:

All hostilities between the Allies and Turkey [the Ottoman Empire] shall cease as of noon, local time, on Thursday, 31 October 1918.

Done in two copies and signed on 30 October 1918 on board HMS Agamemnon at the Port of Mudros in Limnos.

Signed: Arthur Calthorpe, Signed: Hüseyin Rauf, Reşad Hikmet, Sadullah

#### Post-Mudros, Pre-Sèvres

Although hostilities were meant to cease on 31 October 1918, the Allies failed to comply and did not wait for Sèvres to land troops. Using the rationale of article 7, they occupied various parts of the empire:

1. The three navies arrived in İstanbul on 13 November 1918 and established themselves there.

- 2. The British occupied Mosul on 15 November 1918, fifteen days after the armistice.
- 3. In the spring of 1919 the Italians occupied Antalya and Kuşadası while France occupied Adana, Urfa, Maraş, Antakya, and İskenderun (Alexandretta). To collect weapons and control the transportation system, Britain sent troops to İzmit, Eskişehir, and Samsun; France to Zonguldak; and Italy to Konya.
- 4. On 15 May 1919 Greece occupied İzmir, encouraged by the U.S., Britain, and France.
- 5. Finally, on 16 March 1920 Britain, France, and Italy formally occupied İstanbul and secured the dissolution of the parliament two days later through pressure on the sultan, whereupon some deputies caught by the Allies were exiled to Malta.

The main reason for the occupation was the rise of local liberation associations in places likely to be occupied, starting in November 1918 (Turan 1991, pp. 124-34). These associations were getting ready to fight against the occupiers with armed groups known as National Forces (Kuva-yı Milliye). The congresses of Erzurum (23 July-7 August 1919) and Sivas (4-12 September 1919) had been convened under M. Kemal's leadership. The minister of the navy in the Ali Rıza Paşa government, Salih Paşa, had contacts with Ankara (the Amasya meeting of 20-22 October 1919). The parliament convened in İstanbul on 12 January 1920 and adopted the National Pact (28 January 1920), based on the principles enunciated at the Sivas Congress. The eviction of the French from Antep, Urfa, and Maraş (8-11 February 1920) helped boost national morale. The occupation of İstanbul, though temporary, was meant to balance this situation (Turan 1992, p. 98).

The occupation of İzmir, following the occupation of İstanbul, would have an action-reaction effect and hasten the split between Greece and Italy while adding momentum to Turkey's struggle for liberation.

Baskin Oran

# The Peace Treaty of Sèvres

The Allies signed their first peace treaty with their main adversary, Germany, at Versailles (near Paris), on 28 June 1919. The last peace treaty was to be signed with the Ottoman Empire about thirteen and a half months later, again near Paris: Sèvres.

### I. THE ROAD LEADING FROM THE SHIFT IN THE TRADE ROUTES TO SÈVRES

The Treaty of Sèvres marks the lowest point of the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, an empire that held Europe in its sway from the early fifteenth to the late sixteenth century did not reach its nadir in one stroke. Two mutually reinforcing processes were at work, relating to internal and external dynamics.

#### A. The Rise of Europe

The feudal structure that developed as of the ninth century in Europe led to constant strife among the aristocratic dominant class (the feudal lords) and to the exploitation and pauperization of the peasants.

During this period the main factor of productionland—was owned by the feudal lords, with the church owning the biggest share. The peasants were allowed to hold only enough of the yield to keep them alive, with the rest going to the feudal lord. It was not just the land and its yield that belonged to the lords. The peasants who lived on the land and produced the crops were also considered the private property of the feudal lord. This notion of private property was so powerful that peasant women had to spend the first night of their marriage with the lord in certain periods and regions. At that time, the Ottoman Empire, with its inns, caravansaries, and soup kitchens, provided the common folk with a proper and orderly life relatively free of exploitation at a time when Europe's peasants endured penury, exploitation, and incessant wars.

This exploitation also accelerated the accumulation of capital, however. The bourgeoisie developing in the burghs allowed the feudal society to evolve into trade capitalism. With time, the bourgeoisie reached an agreement with one of the feudal lords, acknowledged him as king, and thereby eliminated the influence of the other feudal lords as well as the church and enabled the country to unite around its king. In this way, absolute monarchy with a uniform legal system replaced the "manor." Law and order was easier to maintain in this united and relatively large land, so it became easier to engage in large-scale trading.

After this the European bourgeoisie opened up to the world. Intracontinental trade was too confining, and international trade was becoming difficult in the East as the Ottoman Empire gained in strength. The eastern trade had been important for Europe from the time of feudalism (the Middle Ages) because spices, which kept food from spoiling, were obtained in the East. In these circumstances navigation made great strides. At the end of the fifteenth century members of the bourgeoisie equipped their ships and set sail. Their ships discovered America (Christopher Columbus, 1492) while searching for India; Vasco da Gama found the eastern passage in 1497. At this point the Mediterranean had been transformed into an internal sea, confined to serving regional trade.

The economic doctrine of the age was mercantilism. In Spain and Portugal (where the bourgeoisie was weak) the pioneers of mercantilism were the kings, while in Britain, the Netherlands, and France it was the trading bourgeoisie that led mercantilism. As a consequence, Europeans colonized the Americas and the Far East and diverted their resources to Europe.

Within this process, Europe put an end to wars of religion with the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648. By the eighteenth century the industrial revolution had begun, leading in turn to imperialism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

#### B. The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

While these developments (external dynamics) were taking place, the Ottoman Empire had reached the limits of its expansion; as the distance from Istanbul to the borders increased, problems of supply set in. The Ottoman expansion was bound to be effectively checked as Europe developed and as absolute monarchies emerged, based on national states (not yet nation-states) with a rational political and economic basis, and as expansion got underway in colonial empires, providing new resources that helped underpin the production of more advanced weapons.

The Ottoman Empire was based on the need to conquer new territories continuously. Both the sultan's share and the treasury's income expanded as new lands were incorporated into the empire, while the proceeds from individual plunder allowed the people (especially the janissaries) to live in prosperity. The Ottoman Empire was a typical "territorial state" (see Box Intro-13 in the Introduction).

As we have already seen, however, it was necessary to keep on expanding in Europe to relieve the internal pressure of the Turkmen/Alevi tribes. The Turkmen tribes of the Bektashi sect (Alevis of big towns) were being settled in the Balkans. When the expansion of the empire came to a halt, this resettling was no longer possible, leading to increased tension between the nomadic and settled populations.

In this period the unrest in Anatolia grew beyond İstanbul's ability to keep it under control. This came about because the public ownership of land, known as the timar system (prefeudal or "Asian mode of production"), was gradually giving way to private ownership and beginning to resemble European feudalism, which meant that it was losing its basic logic. That led to exploitation of the populace, which in turn led to unrest. As the exploitation of the Anatolian peasants, mainly Alevi Turkmens, increased, they started getting closer to Shah İsmail of Iran, who was still an Alevi at that time (he later became a Shiite). This naturally endangered the security of the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim I probably undertook the expedition to Egypt and acquired the religious title of caliph in order to neutralize the efforts of Shah İsmail, who was trying to acquire a spiritual advantage by identifying himself with the revered "Lost Twelfth Imam" of the Shia.

When the external dynamics were superimposed on these internal developments, the Ottomans went into decline in two distinct areas.

First, European mercantilism melted down the golden objects of the great Inca and Aztec civilizations

and put the currency thus obtained into circulation. This led to inflation in the Ottoman Empire, because it was not possible to increase the production of the raw materials now in greater demand by Europeans. That led to a scarcity of these commodities. The Ottomans tried to deal with the problem by banning the export of commodities in short supply. The result was increased smuggling and the loss of export taxes, at a time when the capitulations were also preventing the imposition of taxes.

Second, the shifting of world trade routes deprived the empire of income derived from the transit trade. True, the Ottomans sought to dig a canal through Suez and sought to capture the eastern trade route by dispatching the navy. But it was already too late to change matters. To compensate for the shortfall in income, a renewed effort was made to increase the capitulations (Box 1-4) and to base them on agreements, although to no avail. On the contrary, the capitulations did more harm than good to the Ottomans in the long run. The Ottoman economy was not designed to evolve into capitalism; if people succeeded in accumulating some capital, the sultan would have them eliminated on some pretext and confiscate their property. There was no room for potential rivals or contenders. Because of this fear of rivals, after Halil Paşa of Candar, the Turkmens were replaced by the recruitment of the devsirme (Islamicized Christian boys), who had no tribal affiliation. When the capitulations were added to this situation, it became impossible for the Ottomans, who were only starting to own their land, to make the jump to actual capitalism. Furthermore, Europe had entered the stage of imperialism. It was impossible by then for the Ottomans to develop autonomously in a world where cities like Manchester and Leeds were able to produce better-quality textiles more cheaply.

In short, while the West went from feudalism to capitalism to imperialism, the Ottomans went from the prefeudal *timar* system to the feudal system but were never able to evolve to capitalism.

Parallel to the social, economic, military, and political decline of the Ottomans, a growing exploitation fed the nationalistic currents in the western and eastern regions of the empire after 1789. The first stirrings were in the western regions, which were closest to Europe and to capitalism and therefore most open to nationalism. The eastern regions were to follow later. By the time the Unionists dragged the country into World War I and sealed the fate of the empire, the state had ceased to exist outside Anatolia.

To summarize, the situation at the time of Sèvres was as follows:

#### Box 1-4. The Capitulations

Capitulations are the economic, judicial, administrative, and other rights and privileges granted unilaterally or through agreements to foreign nationals by the Ottomans. The word is derived from the Latin word caput, meaning head, and signifies bowing the head or entering into a surrender agreement. Some examples are the right to set up associations in Ottoman cities, the judicial right granted to foreign consulates to settle legal disputes between foreign nationals, freedom to travel and engage in transportation and trade activities in Ottoman territories, the right to operate shipping in Ottoman waters, and so forth.

The origin of the capitulations was the wish of foreigners to enjoy the same rights and guarantees in the host country that they had in their own country. The Ottoman legal system was based on Sharia law, which also helps to explain the reason for the capitulations.

The first capitulations were granted by the Byzantines, the Selçuks, and the Arab countries on the Mediterranean rim. In this first phase the purpose was to attract trade.

The second phase started in the sixteenth century, with the discovery of the sea route to India. With time, these capitulations became an instrument of the European mercantilist policy. In 1740 they became a permanent fixture with the signing of an interstate trade accord between Mahmut I and Louis XV. At this time the Ottoman Empire was still a self-sufficient economic entity.

The third phase started With the "unequal exchange." The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century was to change everything, resulting in a qualitative difference between Western

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Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The 1838 trade agreement that opened up Ottoman territories as a single market to European products was also a capitulation agreement. Export bans and state monopolies were ended. British traders acquired the same rights as local traders. The Ottomans began to sell cotton or wool instead of yarn and yarn instead of cloth (Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6, p. 1793).

The privileges of foreigners were gradually extended to non-Muslim Ottomans. The growing Ottoman debt combined with the capitulations resulted in the submission of the state to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-i Umumiye in Turkish), the granting of concessions to foreign companies (Box 1-1), and article 232 of the Treaty of Sèvres, establishing the Financial Commission.

Although a promise to abolish the capitulations had been made in 1856 following the Crimean War, the admission to the European Concert (the post-Napoleonic European status quo scheme of the victorious monarchies, planned at the Vienna Congress of 1815) did not suffice to eliminate them. They were abolished by Union and Progress in 1914, only to have them reinstated in a more extreme form in the Treaty of Sevres. The capitulations were declared "null and void" in article 7 of the treaty signed with the Soviets on 16 March 1921 during the War of Liberation. They were abolished once and for all in article 28 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

三十二十二十四 被弃的法表现

(B. ORAN)

- 1. The world was under the control of European imperialism.
- Nation-states were coming into being, under the tight control of imperialism. Many of these nationstates were at one time under Ottoman rule and consequently antagonistic to their former rulers.
- In this process the Ottoman Empire saw its salvation in the preservation of the frontiers and administration of a multinational, multireligious semifeudal empire.

The Anatolia movement, however, which came about in these circumstances, saw its salvation in turn in eliminating this empire and replacing it with a thoroughly Western model.

# II. THE STORY OF THE SIGNING OF THE SEVRES TREATY

After the Armistice of Mudros the first contact of Istanbul with the Allies occurred on 17 June 1919, when an Ottoman delegation was allowed to join the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference even though there was as yet no draft of a peace treaty with Turkey. The head of the delegation at the council was the grand vizier (sadrazam/

prime minister) Damat Ferit Paşa, the brother-in-law of Sultan Vahideddin. He made a tough speech in which he appealed for the preservation of the integrity of the empire and then read out a memorandum drafted in the same tone, calling for the restoration of the 1878 frontiers in the west and demanding the territory of Mosul and all the other territories to the Iranian and Russian borders. The Allies were astonished and furious over these demands (Helmreich, pp. 80–81).

After this the Allies held a series of meetings (starting with London on 12 February 1920 and ending with Spa in Belgium on 11 July 1920) in which they set out the terms of the peace treaty and then invited the Ottoman delegation to Sèvres on 10 May 1920.

The delegation was headed by the Speaker of the Senate and former grand vizier Ahmet Tevfik Paşa and included Fahreddin Bey (the minister of education) and Cemil Paşa (the minister of public works).

The terms of the Allies were communicated to the delegation on 11 May 1920 without any previous negotiation. Tevfik Paşa found the terms extremely harsh and declared that they were unacceptable, ending the deliberations. The Greek forces thereupon took the offensive in western Anatolia and occupied Balıkesir, Bursa, and Uşak.

Damat Ferit replaced Tevfik Paşa as head of the delegation. On Friday, 25 June, Ferit Paşa submitted the Ottoman response to the Allies' terms to Alexandre Millerand, president of the peace conference and prime minister of France (this response is summarized below).

When no response was forthcoming, the delegation returned to Istanbul on 14 July. The Allies' response, formulated at the Spa meeting, was in the form of an ultimatum.

Sultan Mehmed VI Vahideddin called a meeting of the Şura-yı Saltanat (Crown Council) at Yıldız palace, with the participation of all the leading dignitaries of the state. This council, presided over by the sultan, decided to accept the peace terms and sign the treaty.

A new delegation was sent to Sèvres, headed by Hadi Paşa (a member of the senate) and consisting of Rıza Tevfik Bey (also from the senate) and Reşad Halis Bey (the Ottoman minister plenipotentiary at Bern). The Peace Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920.

# The Ottoman Government's Counterproposals to the Draft Peace Treaty

The Turkish Republic has always been severely critical of the Ottoman government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for signing the Treaty of Sèvres and viewed this action as tantamount to treason.

The counterproposals of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 25 June 1920 (which originally appeared in the newspapers *Peyam-ı Sabah* and *Vakit* and were transcribed and published in Latin alphabet in 1977 by Seha Meray and Osman Olcay), however, demonstrate that in the difficult circumstances of that day the ministry gave a good account of itself and delivered an honorable reply.

It is well worth examining this reply, because it constitutes a brave episode in Turkey's past and also because it is an excellent analysis and appraisal of Sèvres, which helps in understanding the terms of the treaty.

The 34-page reply has two distinctive features.

First, in style the document displays no sense of abasement, submission, or pleading. On the contrary, the tone is dignified and at times defiant. The Turkish delegation used the same style at Lausanne. This style must have irritated the Allies, because their counterreply was in the form of an ultimatum replete with insults.

Second, in substance the document was truly noteworthy. The authors were obviously thoroughly familiar with the international events and developments of the time. The document was based on sound logic and solidly

embedded in international law. All arguments in the document were supported by references to well-known Western authors, scientists, politicians, legal institutions, and principles. The intention was to produce an irrefutable document. (The same tactic was employed by İsmet Paşa at Lausanne: at the meeting of 12 December 1922 he produced long historical arguments laced with references to numerous Western sources, including Encyclopaedia Britannica [Meray, pp. 187-200].) The analyses in the Ottoman response were sharp, and the examples provided were striking. The document's approach was completely realistic. A clear distinction was made between what the Allies could and could not forgo. That is why there was no insistence on certain points, such as giving up claims to remote territories or the Financial Commission. But on matters like Armenia, Kurdistan, and İzmir the document proposed alternatives that would be least onerous to the Ottomans. Finally, the response contained certain specific arguments that were precursors to the Lausanne negotiations.

# Introduction: The Fundamental Contradiction of Sèvres

In the introductory part of the reply, the fundamental inconsistency of the situation was explained by noting that "in the final analysis, the Ottoman Empire would be almost completely deprived of the elements of its internal and external sovereignty but would still be held responsible for fulfilling the international obligations imposed by the peace treaty."

The document described this situation as being in breach of the principles of right and justice, logically inconsistent, and legally abnormal and went on to say: "In fact, one cannot make provisions for the continued existence of the state and, at the same time, forcibly deprive it of the fundamental legal condition of its existence [its independence]. On the other hand, one cannot impose responsibilities while denying freedom."

A defiant assertion followed: "Either the Allies hold the view that Turkey [in the terminology of Sèvres, the terms 'Ottoman Empire,' 'Turkish Empire,' and 'Turkey' are used interchangeably] should continue its existence, in which case they must treat it as a free and responsible country disposing of the means to carry out its responsibilities; or they want Turkey to disappear, in which case they will carry out the terms of the treaty themselves without expecting that the party whose defense has not been heard will sign the document or cooperate with them in its implementation."

The following sentences reveal subtle irony and a veiled threat:

However, this latter course would definitely negate the lofty statement made by the Allies in the beginning of the draft, where they express the wish to see "war replaced with a deep-rooted and permanent peace." Nobody should imagine that a nation of 12 million people determined to defend its rights and its independence can be quickly eliminated in conditions of peace. To condemn a whole nation to bondage would be in complete disregard of the feelings of countries whose policies are inspired by exalted thoughts and freedom-loving principles.

The introductory part of the reply ended with a reference to the "right of nations to self-determination" and a description of its views on the responsibilities of the state and its "most fundamental rights." According to the reply, the Ottomans had to enjoy two preconditions to be able to meet the obligations that would be imposed by the draft treaty: (1) the right to exist and (2) equality. The document based the Ottomans' right to enjoy these two conditions on well-known Western sources.

#### **Political Provisions**

The reply cited the example of Istanbul to demonstrate how Ottoman sovereignty was being trampled upon. The capital city has eight different sources of authority (an absurd situation that the Allies themselves were perhaps unaware of): (1) the sultan; (2) the Straits Commission; (3) the military administration of the occupation forces; (4) the political commissioners of Britain, France, and Italy; (5) the interallied military committees of inspection and organization; (6) the Financial Commission; (7) the assembly of the Ottoman debt; and (8) the consular courts.

The reply did not fail to mention such oddities. For example, some states would have two votes in the Straits Commission, whereas the riparian power (Turkey) would not even be represented. With its own flag, budget, organization, and legislative and executive organs, this commission would have a sort of international personality but—not being a state—would not have to carry out the duties imposed on states by the covenant of the League of Nations, which would not be in keeping with its spirit. "Turkey's international status would be inferior to the status of the governments established in territories

detached from the Ottoman Empire, because these countries would come under the mandate of a specific power designated by the LoN, and this power would periodically be answerable to the Council of the League for its responsibilities vis-à-vis the mandated territory. Turkey would not even have this possibility."

#### İzmir

The massacres and atrocities committed by the Greek occupiers in İzmir and adjacent territories were bound to embarrass Greece, so the reply gave a prominent place to these events. Long passages were quoted from the reports by the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dated May 1919. There were also quotations from Greek commander Nikos Zafiriou's order of the day dated 16 May 1919 and his declaration of 4 June 1919. It was also explained that those who survived in the Menemen massacre perpetrated by the Greek occupying forces did so thanks to the intervention of British and French officers, who were identified by name and rank. Everything demonstrated that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was closely following events.

The reply also pointed out with convincing examples that the long-term objective of the Greek landing in İzmir (bearing in mind that Greece had also occupied all of Eastern Thrace except İstanbul) was to complete the pincer movement that would threaten İstanbul and the Straits. This was probably done to warn Britain of Greece's intentions.

#### Armenia

The arguments concerning Armenia were also based on international law and logic and supported with numerous quotations and footnotes. The Allies were reminded that if Ottoman interests were disregarded in drawing the as yet untraced southern boundaries of Armenia the result would be an Armenia with Turkish and Kurdish majorities. This argument was backed with statistics. In this way President Wilson's principle of nationalities was invoked, Armenia was threatened, and the Kurds were given a subtle indirect message. If we recall that the main reason for the Kurds' participation in the War of Liberation was the envisaged Armenian state, we must conclude that the message was not lost on them.

#### The Capitulations

Under the heading "Financial Provisions," the reply document contained elements concerning the economic capitulations that would startle many a Turkish reader today.

"The Ottoman government cannot accept the reinstatement of the capitulations, which would create unfair inequalities between the subjects of the state and foreign nationals and would constitute an important obstacle to the efforts to improve the condition of the state treasury." In other words, the reply rejected the economic capitulations.

On the judiciary capitulations, however, it said: "The Ottoman government accepts the establishment of a committee that would be charged with preparing draft judiciary reform legislation to replace the existing capitulations pertaining to judiciary affairs, with the understanding that it would also be represented in this committee. If any points of disagreement emerge between this committee and the Ottoman government, the council of the LoN will be called upon to give a binding opinion."

Thus, unlike its stance concerning economic capitulations, the reply did not call for the abolition of the judiciary capitulations but proposed judiciary reforms instead. From this it can be deduced that the Ottoman leadership understood that so long as the anachronistic legal system was based on Sharia laws, European meddling could not be prevented. The surest way to get rid of capitulations was through legal reforms in which Western legislation would be adopted. This is an important lesson for those in Turkey who opposed (beginning at the end of 2004) legal reforms made for EU membership.

# B. The Counterreply of the Allies: An Ultimatum

Aside from a minor amendment according to which a Turkish member would be allowed to sit on the Straits Commission, the Allies were adamant. The Ottoman Empire was compelled to sign the Peace Treaty of Sèvres as it had been drafted. In those circumstances it had no other choice. The Allied counterproposal document of 16 July 1920 contained these abusive passages (Meray and Olcay, pp. 31–34):

The Great Powers are of the opinion that [by entering the war] Turkey has committed an act of deliberate treachery against the states that have repeatedly given proof of their friendship for more than half a century... By closing the Dardenelles, Turkey has prolonged the war by at least two years and has caused the Allies to suffer millions of casualties and material losses measured in hundreds of billions... Since 1914 the Ottoman government...has massacred eight hundred thousand Armenians and displaced

from their homes two hundred thousand Greeks and two hundred thousand Armenians... When they rearrange the administration of the Straits, the Allies will not refrain from adopting whatever measures may be necessary to prevent any future Turkish government from committing new acts of treachery against civilization.

At the end of the counterreply came the ultimatum:

If the Ottoman government refrains from signing the treaty or, following signature, finds itself powerless to restore its authority in Anatolia and to enforce the terms of the treaty, the Allies, in conformity with the treaty, will review their decision and perhaps find themselves in the position of expelling the Turks from Europe permanently. By this counterreply, the allied Powers notify the Ottoman representative delegation that the Ottoman state has 10 days to indicate its final acceptance of the terms of the treaty and its intention to sign it. This period shall expire on the 27th day of July at midnight.

## The Ottoman Government's Decision to Sign

As indicated earlier, the sultan called a meeting of the Crown Council (Şura-yı Saltanat) on 22 July 1920 to consider the situation. The first order of business was a reading of the minutes of the cabinet's meeting held two days earlier, which described the situation as follows:

Either the treaty will be accepted with all its harsh and dreadful terms or it will be rejected. If accepted, a diminished state within clear frontiers will survive in Anatolia with İstanbul as the capital of the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate of Islam... If the treaty is rejected, the present strife in Anatolia would spread to the Marmara region, the Ottoman sultanate and Ottoman government would be brought to an end, and the Allies would take over the administration of the government. In those regions of Anatolia where insurgencies appear, the Allies would, as in the case of İzmir and Bursa, suppress the insurgency and transform their zone of influence into outright occupation, bringing about the final partition of the state.

The minutes also recorded that the treaty would

have to be approved by the sultan, since the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) could not be convened.

After the reading of the minutes, the grand vizier, Damat Ferit Paşa, took the floor and declared:

Istanbul will be retained and the Ottoman state will survive thanks to the wise comportment of the sultan and the respect and trust toward his person entertained both by Islam and by the civilized world. If it were not so, the Ottoman Empire would run the risk of meeting the same fate as the Austrian Empire, whose existence came to an end. If there are any who would prefer extinction to survival, I will ask them to make known their views verbally or in written form and to sign the minutes. Those who do not take the floor will be considered to have expressed their preference for the survival and continuation of the state rather than its extinction.

Those who spoke after him voiced their understanding of the helplessness of the government and agreed that the extinction of the Ottoman Empire would be tantamount to suicide, which was the gravest of sins. The Ottoman Empire was compared to a tree: "as long as its roots held the ground, it would of course find fresh vitality." It can be said that this was the main logic of the opposition to the National Struggle.

In response to a question about what would happen if the treaty was not implemented in Anatolia, the grand

vizier replied that it was imperative to put down the insurrections with all available means. Otherwise the Greeks would overrun Anatolia, and to allow this to happen would completely shatter the national honor.

Finally, the sultan asked those who approved the signing of the treaty to stand up. The whole council stood up except for major-general Rıza Paşa, who declared that he was abstaining. The meeting of the council had lasted an hour and a half.

We can now proceed to the examination of the articles, of the treaty signed at Sèvres on 10 August 1920.

# III. EXAMINATION OF THE TREATY


The Treaty of Sèvres was signed almost two years after the Armistice of Mudros and over a year after Versailles. The reason for the delay was the disagreement among the Allies. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the West was attempting to solve the great issue of nineteenth-century imperialism, the "Eastern Question." But clashes of interests in the new circumstances were the cause of the delays.

The signing ceremony took place in one of the exhibition halls of the famous porcelain factory at Sèvres. The document bore the title "Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, signed at Sèvres on 10 August 1920." The signatories were enumerated thus: "On the one part...the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan... Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Hejaz, Poland, Romania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Czechoslovakia; and Turkey on the other part."

Like all documents that aim to tie down the weaker party, the Sèvres Treaty is a long text with 433 articles (the Lausanne Treaty has 143 articles). The first part consists of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as in the case of all the treaties ending World War I except Lausanne. In addition, there are twelve other parts. We shall examine the principal ones.

### A. The Frontiers

The Ottoman frontiers were defined in article 27 and the relevant provisions were contained in articles 27 to 35 (see Map 1-2).



Map 1-2. Frontiers of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres

#### The European Frontier

The frontier of the Ottoman territories in Thrace was considerably south of the presentday border, starting from Kıyıköy on the Black Sea coast and reaching the Marmara Sea immediately west of Büyük Çekmece, with even Silivri left out. In other words, the Ottoman territory in Thrace would be confined to just a portion of the European part of the province of Istanbul. Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) were ceded to Greece (article 84), and the Dodecanese Islands were left to Italy (article 122).

Aside from this small Ottoman territory, Thrace was

awarded to Greece all the way to the Marmara Sea, with the proviso that the Marmara coast (starting from a point west of İstanbul and including the Gulf of Saros in the west) would be considered the "Region of the Straits" and placed under the administration of the Commission of the Straits. Similarly, the southern shore of the Marmara Sea (west and north of a line starting on the Black Sea at a point between Şile and Kandıra through İzmit, passing north of Bursa, and all the way to the Aegean Sea and including the Gulf of Edremit in the west) would be under the administration of this commission.


#### The Asian Frontier

Under the treaty, the Anatolian peninsula appeared to remain Ottoman.

The southern border separating Turkey from Syria and Iraq was drawn somewhat north of the present line and reached the Mediterranean Sea at Cape Karataş in eastern Cilicia. Mardin, Urfa, Gaziantep, Osmaniye, and the entire Gulf of İskenderun were left on the Syrian side of the line.

The frontier with Iran remained unaltered. The frontier with Russia would revert to the pre-1918 border, with Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Sarıkamış, and Iğdır once again detached from Turkey (article 3 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 had restored these cities to the Ottomans).


The small islands in the Marmara Sea and the islands within three miles of the Anatolian coastline—except for the islands ceded to Greece and Italy—were left to the Ottomans.



Map 1-3. Regions to Be Detached from the Ottoman Empire after Sèvres

But all this was far from reflecting the final disposition of Anatolia. Only on paper was Anatolia left to the Ottomans. Aside from a large swath of territory being put under the administration of the Commission of the Straits, Ottoman sovereignty in Anatolia was being compromised in three important areas (see Map 1-3).

- 1. Armenia: as we shall see when we examine article 89, the "greater" Armenia that was being contemplated would encompass a large part of eastern and northeastern Anatolia. The southern border of Armenia was to be fixed later by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, while it would probably have access to the Black Sea at Trabzon in the north. That is why the eastern and northeastern frontiers were defined with the addition of the phrase "subject to the provisions of Article 89."
- 2. İzmir and vicinity: as we shall see later, the ownership of this territory was apparently left for the time being to the Ottomans. In fact, however, it had been awarded to Greece, and all the necessary groundwork had been laid to allow it to become Greek de jure in five years. (Actually, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement had designated this territory as an Italian zone of influence. But, as already stated, Britain gave the Greeks preference, because Italy had ignored British and French interests in the Adriatic and the British would rather have an important region like İzmir in the possession of a weaker power.)
- 3. Autonomous Kurdistan: provisions were included that granted the Kurds living in territories east of the Euphrates River local/territorial autonomy, with eventual independence.



Map 1-4. Economic Zones under the Tripartite Pact of 10 August 1920

#### One Treaty, Three Maps

While on the subject of frontiers, reference should be made to popular maps published in Turkey showing the Sèvres territorial dispositions. In addition to the region of the Straits, Italian, French, and British zones of influence are shown in different colors in these maps.

The Italian zone includes (counterclockwise) Silifke, Niğde, Aksaray, Akşehir, Afyon, Balıkesir, Aydın, Muğla, and Antalya. The French zone includes Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Divriği, Sivas, Tokat, Mersin, Adana, and Maraş.

These maps published in Turkey are misleading, because they show the British zone as including the envisaged Armenia, reaching to the Black Sea. In reality, there was no such British zone of influence in Anatolia. As a matter of fact, Armenia was being set up in this territory and would naturally be under British influence. The same can be said about the planned Kurdistan. The Turkish-Iraqi border had not been defined at this point, however; since the British had not yet determined how far north the oil fields extended, it can be assumed that the British zone would extend a little to the north of the present Turkish-Iraqi border, to include areas south of Lake Van.

With the inclusion of the British zone of influence, these maps convey the wrong impression that in Asia the Ottomans would be left with only central Anatolia and the central and western Black Sea regions. This requires some clarification.

The Sèvres Peace Treaty contains no provisions regarding zones of influence. These zones are the subject of a tripartite pact signed at Sèvres on the same day as the

treaty at Britain's behest. Britain wanted this pact because it was trying to repair its relations with France, which felt cheated over Mosul. It had been assigned to France by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 but was now being appropriated by Britain. Similarly, by the St. Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement of 1917, Italy had been promised Izmir, which was now under Greek control (Helmreich, pp. 193ff.; Olcay, pp. 543ff.; see Map 1-4).

According to the tripartite pact, none of the three signatories would seek to compete for investments in the zone allocated to another signatory. Furthermore, all agreed to

support one another in any claim lodged against the Ottoman government. Each signatory would be responsible for the rights of minorities in its zone.

The Anatolian territories that the Ottomans were allowed to retain included the zones of influence from a formal and technical point of view. These zones were not formally ceded to Italy and France; they were, as their name implied, just economic zones of influence.

The existence of such zones, however, precluded the coming into being of a fully independent Ottoman state in these territories. The presence of zones of influence was proof that the Sèvres Treaty was not the final word but was being seen as a transition stage for yet another partition.

#### **B.** Political Clauses

#### 1. İstanbul

The rights and title over Istanbul were to be retained by the Ottoman government under article 36, but the second sentence added this proviso: "Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty, or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious, and linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connection."

This phrase "Turkey hereby agrees to accept," which is tantamount to signing a blank check, is a special feature of Sèvres that we shall see recurring throughout the treaty.

#### 2. The Straits and the Commission

Articles 37 to 61 cover the subject of the Straits. It was provided that navigation of the Straits would "be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag" (article 37).

A Commission of the Straits was to be established "to ensure the freedom of navigation." The authority of the commission would extend "to all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters within three miles of each of these mouths." When necessary, this "authority may be exercised on shore" (article 39).

Voting rights in the commission were not equal. The U.S. (if it was willing to participate), Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia (if it became a member of the LoN) would have two votes each; Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey would each have a single vote (article 40).

The commissioners would enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities (article 41), while the commission would have its own flag, budget, and separate organization and would exercise its powers "in complete independence of the local authority" (article 42). This would make it a state within a state.

In addition, the zone of the Straits would be demilitarized (article 178). The limits of the demilitarized zone were described in article 179.

On paper, sovereignty north of the Marmara Sea belonged to Greece and south of the Marmara to the Ottomans, but the zone could be used for military purposes solely by Britain, France, and Italy (article 178, paragraph 3). This meant that the zone of the Straits, including Istanbul itself, was in fact an Anglo-Franco-Italian zone of occupation.

#### 3. Kurdistan

#### The Three Related Articles

Iraq, including the Kurdish-inhabited areas in the north, was placed under British mandate after World War I. The Kurds living in the territories retained by the Ottomans were given local autonomy under the Sèvres Treaty (articles 62–64), but the phraseology used left the door open to eventual full independence.

Article 62: "A Commission...composed of three members [British, French, and Italian]...within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, will prepare a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern borders of Armenia...and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia."

Article 63 is typical: "The Turkish government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in article 62 within three months from their communication to the said government."

#### Article 64:

If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.

If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers [Britain, France, and Italy] to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting the part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet [under British mandate].

### The Subject of the Independence of Kurdistan

As will be noted, the Kurds within the Ottoman frontiers were being granted local autonomy. Although the southern frontier of this autonomous territory was fixed, the northern frontier was indeterminate. Being the southern frontier of Greater Armenia, it was going to be fixed by the president of the U.S. under the provision of article 89. (As we shall see below, President Wilson would submit his arbitration to the Allies on 22 November 1920, granting Armenia access to the Black Sea.)

It was this unclear situation brought on by article 89 that prompted the Kurds to lend their powerful support to Ankara's liberation struggle, notwithstanding the granting of local autonomy and the added possibility of eventual independence.

Article 64 was noteworthy, because at first sight it could be interpreted as providing broad possibilities for the Ottoman Kurds. But the text was imprecise, and the granting of independence to the Kurds within Ottoman frontiers was contingent on two conditions being met.

First, the Kurds had to address themselves to the LoN and show that a majority wanted independence from the

Ottomans. It was not made clear how this was to be done. The region had no experience with plebiscites in this region. If a plebiscite was to be held, it was unclear who would decide on its results. (When Ankara demanded a plebiscite in northern Iraq during the Mosul negotiations at Lausanne, Lord Curzon remarked that "the Kurds would take a ballot box for a bomb.") There was no doubt that any determination in this respect would be made by Britain.

Second, the council had to consider the Kurdish peoples to be capable of independence and call on the Ottoman government to grant them independence. Article 64 gave no indication as to what the criteria were for reaching such a decision. Bearing in mind that the U.S. had refused to become a member of the LoN and that Britain was in a position of great influence in the council, Britain would be making the decisions here too. Consequently, the fate of the Kurds was in Britain's hands. Whether independence for the Kurds was in Britain's national interest was a crucial question. For a country like Britain that had "no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests" (Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, 1856), it was easy to switch alliances and adopt new positions. As a matter of fact, rather than facing the possibility of an independent Kurdistan coming under the influence of the French installed next door in Syria or seeing the Kurds under its mandate in Iraq uniting with Kurdistan and turning it into a stronger country, the British might well have preferred to see the Ottoman Empire, enfeebled by Sèvres, in charge in this region.

The phrase "no objection will be raised" in the last paragraph of article 64 is difficult to interpret but probably had the following function. For Britain, the real prize was the oil-bearing regions of the south (Mosul) inhabited by Kurds. It was assumed that the northern region (fractured by mountains, canyons, and plateaus) would not contain oil reserves. Furthermore, the topography of the area would make it difficult to keep the Kurdish tribes under effective control. For these reasons Britain changed its mind and decided not to attempt to bring these lands within its mandated territories. If oil was ever discovered in the northern Kurdish regions, Britain could not dominate these areas by having the independent Kurdistan of the north join the British mandate of the south. The British mandate of the south joining the independent Kurdistan of the north was plausible, however. By using the phrase in the last paragraph of article 64, Britain was probably trying to forestall its rival France from a possible objection to such a union.

In fact Lord Curzon himself defended this clause at

the 19 April 1920 sitting of the preparatory conference at San Remo, while Prime Minister Millerand of France expressed his reservations on this issue (Olcay, pp. 465–67). Britain wanted to grant Kurdistan outright independence but was opposed by France, which felt that it had already made too many concessions to Britain over Mosul. So the compromise formula of autonomy was devised, which allowed for this region to remain within the Ottoman Empire (Helmreich, p. 22).

In these circumstances Kurdistan's independence was dependent on its being a British satellite. The Kurds had to be completely subservient to a major power as a precondition for becoming independent. This situation still applies today, with the U.S. having supplanted Britain.

#### 4. İzmir

The subject of İzmir is dealt with in articles 65 to 83. The borders of the region with İzmir at its center started at Kuşadası in the south, running east to include Ödemiş but leaving out Alaşehir and Salihli, then north, passing to the west of Kırkağaç, then turning west to reach the coast south of Ayvalık. In other words, it included all of the province of İzmir and the western third of the province of Manisa (article 66).

Article 68: "[These territories] will be assimilated... to territory detached from Turkey." This clause revealed the ultimate intention of the Allies with regard to this region.

Article 69: "[These territories] remain under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey, however, transfers to the Greek government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty over... the said territory. In witness of such sovereignty the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort in the town of Smyrna. The fort will be designated by the Principal Allied Powers."

Article 71: "The Greek government shall be entitled to maintain in the city of Smyrna and the [adjacent] territory...the military forces required for the maintenance of order and public security."

Article 72: "A local parliament shall be set up with an electoral system calculated to ensure proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic, and religious minorities. Within six months of the coming into force of the present Treaty the Greek Government shall submit to the Council of the League of Nations a scheme for an electoral system complying with the above requirements."

Article 76: "The Greek Government may establish a customs boundary...and may incorporate...the territory...in the Greek customs system."

#### Box 1-5. The Reasons for the Greater Armenia Project

The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 made no provision for a Greater Armenia consisting of territory to be detached from the Ottoman Empire in eastern Anatolia and added to the existing Armenia. This enlarged entity never came into being, because of the successful conclusion of the Turkish War of Liberation (see Map 1-6).

By the Treaty of Sèvres and the subsequent dispensation of Woodrow Wilson, a Greater Armenia was created in the territories that were to be allocated to Russia according to Sykes-Picot.

Contrary to certain claims, the decision to create this Greater Armenia was not the Allied reaction to the Armenian deportations of 1915. If that had been the case, it would have been created under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, when the bitter memory of the deportations was still fresh. In this agreement the big three were concerned only with their own shares. The reason for creating Greater Armenia in 1920 was the Allies' wish to establish a buffer state against the possible spread of the Communist revolution that had taken place in Russia in 1917.

(B. ORAN)

Article 79: "[I]nhabitants of the...territory...shall be treated on exactly the same footing as Greek nationals. Greece shall provide for their diplomatic and consular protection abroad."

Article 83 of the treaty made the following provision for the de jure incorporation of İzmir and its adjacent territory in Greece. "When five years shall have elapsed, the local parliament...may, by a majority of votes, ask the Council of the League of Nations for the definitive incorporation in...Greece of the...territory... In the event of such incorporation...Turkey hereby renounces...in favor of Greece all rights and title over...the territory."

#### 5. Armenia

The subject of Armenia is dealt with in articles 88 to 93.

Article 88 declares that "Turkey...hereby recognizes Armenia as a free and independent State." Article 89 (as previously mentioned) provides that "Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the U.S. of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier." Although the Allies left the decision regarding the fixing of frontiers to President Wilson, they were already giv-

#### Box 1-6. Negative Right-Positive Right

In human rights terminology, "negative rights" refers to the nonintervention of the state. "Positive rights" refers to state intervention necessary for implementation of these rights.

In minority rights terminology, negative rights are given to all, while positive rights are "plus" rights given only to disadvantaged groups in order to put them on an equal footing with the majority. Minority protection treaties contain both.

(B. ORAN)

ing hints to him to make provisions for allowing Armenia access to the Black Sea as well as for the demilitarization of the frontier regions. Article 90 had the usual provision whereby "Turkey...renounces...all rights and title over the territory."

As stated above, President Wilson made his decision regarding the frontiers of the Greater Armenia on 22 November 1920, providing it with access to the Black Sea but considering it unnecessary to call for demilitarization. Thus Armenia would emerge as a creation of the major powers (Box 1-5).

#### c. Protection of Minorities

This question was the subject of a separate "part" (articles 140 to 151) in the Treaty of Sèvres, unlike the Treaty of Lausanne. This demonstrates the importance that the Allies attached to this question.

Article 140 provided that the stipulations contained in articles 141, 145, and 147 were fundamental and could not be altered by any law or regulation.

Article 141 was designed to ensure negative rights to all inhabitants of Turkey (Box 1-6).

Article 142 stipulates that "conversions to Islam...
of persons who were non-Moslems before November 1,
1914," will not be recognized. This provision was designed
to allow Armenians who converted to avoid the deportation order to resume their original religion. Like all the
other provisions related to the return of Armenians, this
provision is absent from the Treaty of Lausanne.

Article 143 relates to a special arrangement between Greece and Turkey regarding the "reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the populations of Turkish and Greek race." As we shall see below, at Lausanne this emigration was made mandatory.

Article 144: "The Turkish Government...undertakes...to facilitate the return to their homes...of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race...forcibly driven from their homes...since January 1, 1914." Their abandoned movable or immovable properties "must be restored to them as soon as possible, in whatever hands it may be found." The "property shall be restored...without compensation... to the present owners." All acts of sale or any acts creating rights over property concluded after January 1, 1914, would be canceled.

These provisions regarding the rights of Armenians who had been deported or forced to flee to return and reclaim their properties rang alarm bells among the notables and especially the Kurdish tribal leaders who now held these properties. This provision is absent from the Treaty of Lausanne.

Article 145: "Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Turkish Government will submit to the Allied Powers a scheme for the organization of an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation of racial minorities." Such a provision is absent from the Lausanne Treaty.

"No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts." This provision was derived from the first postwar treaty for the protection of minorities, which was the Polish Treaty. It was also incorporated in the Lausanne Treaty in article 39/4 and 5 with one difference. Minorities may use their language before the courts only orally. Therefore all written materials in all public offices must be exclusively in the Turkish language.

Under article 146 the Ottoman government undertook to recognize diplomas granted by foreign universities and schools and to allow the holders of these diplomas to exercise their corresponding professions. This provision is absent from the Lausanne Treaty.

Article 147: "Turkish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall...have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, and independently of and without interference by the Turkish authorities, any charitable, religious and social institutions, schools." The same provision exists in the Lausanne Treaty, but the phrase "without interference" is removed and the adjectives "racial, religious or linguistic" are replaced by "non-Muslim."

Article 149 is a provision regarding the recognition of and respect for the ecclesiastic and scholastic autonomy of racial minorities, which is absent from the Lausanne Treaty.

Article 151: "The Principal Allied Powers, in consultation with the Council of the League of Nations, will

decide what measures are necessary to guarantee the execution of the provisions of this Pact. The Turkish Government hereby accepts all decisions which may be taken on this subject." This provision is very significant, because it enables the major powers to interfere easily in the affairs of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman government agrees to leave the execution of this part of the treaty to the discretion of foreign powers. Important changes would be introduced on this subject at Lausanne, and in case of disagreement the International Court of Justice would be the competent organ to decide.

# D. Military Clauses Clauses Relating to the Army According to article 152:

The armed forces at the disposal of Turkey shall only consist of:

1) The Sultan's bodyguard [under article 154, their number was not to exceed 700]; 2) Troops of Gendarmerie, intended to maintain order and security in the interior and to ensure the protection of minorities [under article 156, their number was not to exceed 35,000]; 3) Special elements intended for the reinforcement of the troops of gendarmerie in case of serious trouble, and eventually to ensure the control of the frontiers [under article 157, their number was not to exceed 15,000].

Article 153: "Within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the military forces other than that provided for in Article 152 shall be demobilized and disbanded."

Article 155: "The strength of the forces enumerated in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 152 shall not exceed 50,000 men." With the sultan's bodyguard, the total strength of the land forces would amount to 50,700 men. The armament and munitions that would be at the disposal of these forces were fixed in tables (article 171) and the importation of arms, munitions, and war materials was forbidden (article 175).

## Clauses Relating to the Navy and the Air Force

Under article 181 all of the Ottoman warships were to be surrendered to the Allied powers. Turkey would "retain the right to maintain along her coasts for police and fishery duties a number of vessels which shall not exceed: 7 gun boats, 6 torpedo boats." The weapons that these vessels would be allowed to carry were clearly specified. Article 182 forbade the acquisition of other warships; and article 186 forbade the construction or acquisition of submarines.

Article 191 provided that "Turkish armed forces must not include any military or naval air forces...[or] dirigibles," while article 194 forbade their import or export.

#### E. Financial Clauses

Article 231 declares that the Ottoman state has to make complete reparation for the losses of the Allies but—recognizing that the country's resources were insufficient—waives the payment of reparations. (This humiliating phraseology would be used by Turkey vis-à-vis Greece in the Lausanne Treaty.) The last paragraph provides that "[t]he Allied Powers, desiring to afford some measure of relief and assistance to Turkey, agree with the Turkish Government that a Financial Commission shall be appointed consisting of one representative of...France, the British Empire and Italy, with whom there shall be associated a Turkish Commissioner in a consultative capacity."

The most important provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, especially from today's point of view, are those relating to this Financial Commission. The responsibilities of this commission, which would hold the financial resources of the Ottoman state under its control, are enumerated in the following articles.

Article 232 states:

The budget to be presented annually by the Minister of Finance to the Turkish Parliament shall be submitted, in the first instance, to the Financial Commission, and shall be presented to Parliament in the form approved by the Commission. No modification introduced by Parliament shall be operative without the approval of the Financial Commission.

The Financial Commission shall supervise the execution of the Budget and the financial laws and regulations of Turkey.

A parliament's main function is the approval and supervision of the budget, so the Financial Commission was in a sense replacing the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) by the provisions of this article.

It will be noted that the budget was to go to the commission at the preparatory stage before it was submitted to the parliament. The same situation was restored in the Republic of Turkey some eighty years later, in June 2000. When the budget for 2001 provided for the payment of an

additional sum to civil servants to compensate for inflation, the IMF announced that henceforth it would inspect the budget not at its "draft" stage but at its "preparatory" stage (Milliyet, 6 June 2000).

Article 233: "The Financial Commission shall...undertake...the regulation and improvement of the Turkish currency." This meant that it would be empowered to act as the Central Bank.

Article 234: "The Turkish Government undertakes not to contract any internal and external loan without the consent of the Financial Commission." In this provision the commission was encroaching on the government's responsibilities.

Article 236: "All resources of Turkey, except revenues conceded...to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, shall be placed at the disposal of the Financial Commission." By this provision the Financial Commission took charge of all the state's financial resources, other than the sums set aside to service the debts to foreign creditors. The commission would determine the amount of the annuities of the Ottoman Public Debt (article 244), supervise the collection of revenues related to it, and appoint and dismiss the director-general of the Customs Administration. The schedule of the customs charges could only be changed with the commission's approval (article 246).

Article 239: "No new concessions shall be granted by the Turkish Government either to a Turkish subject or otherwise without the consent of the Financial Commission." In this way the commission was empowered to protect the privileged position of the current concession holders.

Article 247: "The Commission has authority to propose...the substitution for the pledges at present granted to bondholders...of other adequate pledges, or of a charge on the general revenues of Turkey."

Article 264: "[T]he Financial Commission shall also be entitled to authorize the application...to the nationals of the Allied Powers of any prohibitions on import or export."

Article 421: "The Turkish Government will, within 12 months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, abrogate the existing law on antiquities and take the necessary steps to enact a new law of antiquities which will be based on the rules contained in the Annex hereto, and must be submitted to the Financial Commission for approval before being submitted to the Turkish Parliament. The Turkish Government undertakes to ensure the execution of this law on a basis of equality between all nations." In this manner all nations acquired the right to forage the Ottoman territories for antiquities "on a basis of perfect

equality" and to share out the findings in accordance with the rules contained in the Annex.

Provision for the repayment of the Ottoman Public Debt is made in article 241: "States in whose favor territory has been detached from Turkey, either as a result of the Balkan Wars in 1913, or under the present Treaty, shall participate in the annual charge for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt contracted before November 1, 1914." A similar clause was included in the Lausanne Treaty.

#### F. Economic Clauses

#### The Capitulations and Concessions

Article 261 restores the capitulations that had been abrogated by the Union and Progress Party at the beginning of the war. "The capitulatory regime resulting from treaties, conventions or usage shall be re-established in favor of the Allied Powers which directly or indirectly enjoyed the benefit thereof before August 1, 1914, and shall be extended to the Allied Powers which did not enjoy the benefit thereof on that date."

As we have already seen, the Financial Commission was in control of matters relating to customs.

Article 310: "Allied nationals and companies controlled by Allied groups...holding concessions granted before October 29, 1914,...in territory remaining Turkish under the present Treaty" would have their rights and concessions extended, but "all concessions and all agreements subsequent to October 29, 1914, and prejudicial to the rights referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be declared null and void." By this provision all concessions granted prior to the date when the Ottomans joined the war were restored and concessions subsequently granted to the Germans were canceled.

This is a summary of the main provisions of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres. As already noted, Sèvres was never ratified and therefore did not come into force. The competent organ for ratifying the treaty, the Ottoman parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan), had been dissolved on 18 March 1920 upon the occupation of Istanbul. Other than Greece, none of the Allied Powers completed the ratification procedure, because events were moving so fast at the time.

The most noteworthy aspects of the treaty were the recurring formulation "Turkey undertakes hereby" and the provisions regarding the Financial Commission. Two

other aspects of Sèvres should not be overlooked either. The Allies dictated the terms of Sèvres without any regard for the great changes that had occurred during the two years between the Armistice of Mudros and Sèvres, and they also took no notice of the Turkish liberation struggle triggered by the occupation.

In addition, the Treaty of Sèvres, unlike the other treaties ending World War I, bore the appearance of a document designed to force the Ottomans out of Europe. There could be no other explanation for the harsh terms that were being imposed. The intention of the Allies (as emphasized in their counterreply) to "drive the Turks out of Europe forever" could not be completely carried out due to the rivalries among the Allies.

It was the harshness of the terms of Sèvres that made possible the War of Liberation in the difficult circumstances prevailing at the time and prepared the ground for the Treaty of Sèvres to remain a dead letter. This situation provided a vivid example of a thesis and antithesis relationship.

Baskin Oran

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# Relations with Western Europe

# I. RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

### A. Basic Factors Determining Relations

Turkish diplomatic relations with Britain stretch back to the sixteenth century. The first British ambassador to İstanbul was appointed in 1583. But the Ottomans, in line with their usual practice, waited until 1793 to send their first ambassador to London.

The Ottoman Empire started losing ground to the West in the eighteenth century and had to rely for its survival on the major powers within the complicated European balance of power. One of these major powers was Britain. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Ottoman state sought to preserve its existence by relying on Britain.

Britain's policy of preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was based on the fear that its disintegration would allow Russia to expand to the Mediterranean and the Balkans and strengthen Russia. This was the essence of the "Eastern Question." This fear grew after the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi in 1833, concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. When the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877–78 ended in a Russian victory, Britain abandoned its old policy, because it realized that Russia had become so preponderant that its traditional policy could no longer preserve the territorial integrity or indeed the existence of the Ottoman Empire. Since the process of disintegration was now fully underway, Britain would try to apportion the major share and strive to preempt Russia. As a consequence Cyprus and Egypt were detached from the Ottoman state in the first instance. Britain also started getting involved with the Armenians. As a result of this parting of ways the two countries found themselves in opposing alliances and camps during World War I.

After World War I Britain wanted to keep the Middle East under its control, because it was strategically located on the route to India and because petroleum was becoming an important source of energy. Britain was conscious of not being able to do this all by itself, however, and did

not feel it had to do so. According to its master plan, a weak and diminished Ottoman sultan in Istanbul who was dependent on Britain to survive, the presence of Greece in western Anatolia, the Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia, and the Arab sheikhdoms that would be established farther south would all ensure British preeminence and control in the region. In this way a barrier would be set up against Russia. Through the system of mandates, control would be maintained without assuming the responsibilities of direct rule.

#### The British Viewpoint

Britain wanted to control the Middle East, but it was running into difficulties. The first problem was the rivalry with France. The second was the promise of a single Arab Kingdom made to the Arabs when they were being encouraged to rebel against the Ottomans. In 1916 Britain agreed to share its control in this region with France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. There was a second share-out agreement with France at San Remo in 1920. Finally, three factors caused bitter disappointment among the peoples of the region and made British control of the Middle East difficult to secure: (1) the failure to set up a single large Arab Kingdom; (2) the failure to carry out the promises to establish the Armenian and Kurdish states; and (3) the advent of the Balfour Declaration (see Box 1-25 below).

During this period Britain was also struggling with other questions. The first priority was to bring stability to Europe. This required the restoration of the balance that had been upset during the war. France wanted the vanquished Germans to remain weak, whereas Britain was not in favor of France becoming predominant on the continent. Its task was to rein in the French without confronting them.

Britain also faced problems in its far-flung empire, with freedom movements in India and Egypt. While labor unrest was intensifying in Britain, rebellion broke out in Ireland.

In these circumstances, with a government in Istanbul headed by Damat Ferit, who had declared that "his hopes rested, after God, on the British Government" (FO 371/4141, 40280, cited by Akşin 2004, p. 237). The outbreak of the nationalist movement in Anatolia had a profoundly disturbing effect on Britain. Both public opinion and the British leaders were blaming Turkey for having extended the war and made the Bolshevik revolution possible by closing the Straits. To this was added the aggravation of a nationalist movement that refused to recognize Sèvres. At first Britain failed to understand the nature of the Anatolia movement, assuming it to be a pro-Soviet political movement because of its contacts with the Soviets and the red bands that some in Anatolia pinned on their fur caps.

In the period from 1919 to 1923 an "indirect" war was being waged against Britain in Anatolia. Greece was the connecting element in this. Britain tried to use Greece, a country that had not fought the Ottomans during World War I, for its own purposes after the armistice agreement at Mudros by turning it into a tool to carry out its imperialistic aims. In this way Britain intended to replace Italy with Greece in western Anatolia, because Greece would be more compliant. But these plans were doomed to fail. When Greece—a former province of the Ottoman Empire—occupied İzmir, it aroused deep anger and brought on a violent reaction in Anatolia. Britain had unwittingly given an impetus to the Anatolia movement.

Although an armistice was in effect, legally Turkey was in a state of war with Britain. But as the Anatolia movement started to assert itself, Britain felt compelled to deal with this movement.

#### The Turkish Viewpoint

The Islamic factor was one of the factors influencing Turkish–British relations, especially during the National Struggle and all the way up to 1924, when the caliphate was abolished. At first the Anatolia movement claimed that it was striving to protect the sultanate and caliphate, in order to gain the support of the masses. Although M. Kemal was fully aware that Islam had not been able to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, he knew that the caliph-sultan had a special place among the public and therefore felt the need to use the religious factor for internal as well as external considerations.

This factor had a certain place in relations with Britain. After the war Britain claimed to be the largest Muslim country. In fact, a quarter of the population of the British Empire consisted of Muslims (the bulk being Indian Muslims).

Britain feared that an Anatolia movement with a

religious bias might influence the Indian Muslims. Consequently, it wanted to take the caliphate away from the Turks. Meanwhile the Indian Muslims were persuaded that the struggle in Anatolia was being carried out on behalf of Islam, and they established an Indian Caliphate Committee to support the struggle. This committee engaged in fundraising to support the cause and also sent a delegation to London in March 1920 to inform Lloyd George of its support for the sultan-caliph and M. Kemal. Britain felt great concern over these developments, because a movement with Islamic overtones might well trigger anti-British unrest among Muslim subjects. As the Anatolia movement gathered momentum, however, the importance of the Islamic factor steadily diminished and its influence waned. Important milestones in this process were the abolition of the sultanate on 1 November 1922 and the caliphate on 3 March 1924. Religion ceased to be a factor affecting bilateral relations.

Turco-British relations in the years of the National Struggle were also under the influence of the Soviet factor. Whenever there was a rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in the past, Britain had been drawn into it. A rapprochement between Turkey and Britain had the opposite effect and resulted in Russia's distancing itself from the Ottoman Empire/Turkey.

Although the Anatolia movement had no ideological affinity with Bolshevism, both sides felt the need to cooperate for pragmatic reasons. Both Turkey and Russia were under the direct or indirect occupation of the West. For this reason, the Anatolia movement was compelled to make the fullest use of the Soviet factor in its struggle with the West and primarily with Britain. The frequent allusions to the anti-imperialist character of the struggle in M. Kemal's speeches and declarations are an example of this. Another example is the establishment of a Communist Party by M. Kemal's close friends in October 1920.

While engaging in contacts with the Soviets and using anti-imperialist rhetoric, M. Kemal did not fail to convey to the Western countries that the chief beneficiary of a partitioned Turkey would be the new Soviet administration. M. Kemal was striving to demonstrate that a strong Turkey in Thrace and Anatolia was to the advantage of the West. It is interesting to note that, just as the Bolshevik administration saw Turkey as a buffer against the West and was prepared to back Turkey in its confrontation with the West, Ankara was using the same argument to develop relations with the West, both at Lausanne and afterward.

The cooperation between the Anatolia movement and the Soviets was a source of concern for the British. Nevertheless, when the Turkish-Soviet Treaty was signed on 16 March 1921, London too was signing a trade agreement with the Soviets on that day. On that same day an agreement was signed between Bekir Sami Bey and the British authorities for the repatriation of Turkish prisoners in Malta.

As the Anatolia movement gained in strength, the Soviet factor started to wane. In fact, in subsequent years Ankara worried that the Soviet connection might prove to be an obstacle to developing better relations with the West and particularly Britain.

A general factor influencing Turkish-British relations was Turkey's efforts to Westernize. The difficulty was to establish a Western political—social—economic system while carrying out a struggle against Western imperialism. Westernization was also perceived as necessary for ensuring security. The Ottoman state was being pushed out of Europe because it was different from the West. Consequently, to become Western was not only a means to attain "the standard of contemporary civilization" (M. Kemal) but also a means to ensure security vis-à-vis the West.

#### **B.** Main Developments

# 1. The Occupation of Parliament

The heads of state/government of the Entente countries met in London on 10 February 1920 to discuss the Eastern Question and reached the decision to occupy Istanbul. The ostensible reasons were the unrest in Cilicia and the resistance of the Anatolia movement to the Western countries. But the real reason was that this occupation was deemed necessary to enforce the Sèvres Treaty that was being prepared at the time. The decision to occupy Istanbul was also based on the desire in some quarters in the West to eject the Turks from that city. At the London Conference, they also demanded that the Turkish government dismiss M. Kemal.

As a result of all this, the Allied forces, led by the British, occupied Istanbul on 20 March 1920. Following the earlier Greek occupation of İzmir, this event gave a new boost to the Anatolia movement. The communiqué released on this occasion declared that the occupation was temporary and designed to strengthen the authority of the sultan. This led the sultan to view the occupation favorably, but the raid on the parliament and the arrest of deputies by a country that had a high regard for democracy created an outcry among the public. M. Kemal also reacted strongly from Ankara and sent notes of protest to the occupying countries. He went further and issued an anti-British proclamation to the Islamic world and ordered the arrest of some British nationals in Anatolia. Ultimately, however, this event proved beneficial to his

cause because he was opposed to the parliament meeting in İstanbul in any case. This gave him a chance to seize the initiative and convene the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara.

The British removed the government headed by Salih Paşa, who was regarded as a sympathizer of the movement in Anatolia, and replaced him on 5 April 1920 with Damat Ferit Paşa. Although the British started making plans with the Damat Ferit government to crush the Anatolia movement, M. Kemal avoided a total break with Britain. Through his friends and interviews with journalists, he was sending messages to the British. In this way Britain was being kept informed about the nature of the movement in Anatolia and the significance of the National Pact. M. Kemal went further and sent the message that he was ready to abandon the struggle and cease cooperation with the Bolsheviks if an agreement could be reached. But it was difficult to persuade the British, because the messages did not go through official channels and the cooperation with the Bolsheviks went on.

## 2. The London Conference (February 1921)

From 1921 on, Turkish-British relations started to thaw, because of a reaction to Britain's policies within the British government. In addition, the Anatolia movement was gaining momentum. In the regions of İzmit and Gemlik the nationalists were beginning to challenge Britain's presence, which was causing concern in London. Furthermore, the successes on the eastern front resulted in the signing of the Gümrü Treaty in December 1920. This increased the prestige of the Anatolia movement and strengthened Ankara's hand vis-à-vis Britain. Finally, mention must be made of the first Battle of İnönü in January 1921, which constituted a turning point in Turkish-British relations. For the first time the Greek army had been checked. This event marked the failure of the British policy of using the Greeks without itself getting directly involved in the conflict. It was also understood that the Anatolia movement had passed from the phase of localized resistance to the phase of fielding a regular army.

At the end of this phase of indirect war with Britain the Allies met in Paris and decided to convene a conference in London with the participation of the representatives of the TGNA. M. Kemal gave a positive response to Britain's policy of easing relations with Ankara.

The conference was being arranged to make changes in the Sèvres Treaty. The invitation, which included the name of M. Kemal, was conveyed to Ankara through the Istanbul government. M. Kemal refused to accept an invitation that was made through intermediaries. Prime minister Tevfik Paşa sent telegrams to Ankara, proposing the incorporation of Ankara's representatives within the İstanbul government's delegation. M. Kemal also rejected this formula. Consequently, a delegation headed by the minister of foreign affairs, Bekir Sami, left for Rome via Antalya on 1 February 1921. Upon the invitation of the Italian minister of foreign affairs, Count Carlo Sforza, the Ankara delegation proceeded to London.

The London Conference opened on 21 February 1921 with the participation of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Greece. As previously agreed, the İstanbul and Ankara delegations acted in unison, to the frustration of the Western states, which were planning to play the two Turkish delegations against one another. When it was Tevfik Paşa's turn to make a statement, he ceded the floor to Ankara's representative, Bekir Sami. This was significant, because it indicated the strength of the Anatolia movement. But the İstanbul delegation also had an ulterior motive. In the event of a deadlock or the Ankara delegation's being forced to make concessions, the intention was to lay full responsibility on the Ankara government (Selek, p. 171).

During the deliberations the Turkish side called for Western Thrace's return to Turkey, the evacuation of İstanbul by foreign troops, the ending of the occupation of İzmir, and the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. The Allies submitted to the Turkish and Greek sides a package of minor changes to the Treaty of Sèvres, including granting Turkey two votes instead of one at the Commission of the Straits and raising the ceiling on the Gendarmerie. But when the Turkish side rejected these proposals, which were far from satisfying the principles of the National Pact, the conference ended as a failure. As the Turkish delegation was returning home, the Greek army launched a new offensive in Anatolia.

Although no concrete results were achieved at the London Conference, it was nevertheless a success for the Anatolia movement, because Ankara had been acknowledged as an interlocutor and international public opinion had become more familiar with the principles of the National Pact. Furthermore, the differences among the Entente states had come into the open.

While the conference was going on, Bekir Sami signed agreements with Britain, France, and Italy. The drawback of the agreement with Britain was that, although Turkey undertook to release all British prisoners, the Turkish prisoners held in Malta would be released on condition that they had not mistreated Armenian and British prisoners. Moreover, it had been agreed that some of the Turkish prisoners in Malta would be tried outside of Turkey.

Bekir Sami had signed these agreements by exceeding his authority and without specific instructions. This provoked sharp reactions and drew criticism in the Ankara assembly, which resulted in Bekir Sami's resignation on 8 May 1921. He was replaced by Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk], who had successfully conducted the negotiations at Moscow.

An agreement similar to the one signed by Bekir Sami was signed with France, once again, in October 1921. At the time, the government of the TGNA was striving to get the National Pact accepted and was in no position to secure the TGNA's agreement to any concessions. The disagreement with Britain over the prisoners continued for a while. Although both sides tried to use this question for their own purposes, they proceeded with caution. Eventually all prisoners were released on 23 October 1921.

# 3. The Effects of the Turkish-French Agreement on Relations with Britain

As the administration in Ankara consolidated its position, its influence in the West, and especially in Britain, started rising. This was a consequence of the military successes registered at the second Battle of İnönü in April 1921 and the Battle of Sakarya in September 1921, when the Greek army's advance was halted. The diplomatic success achieved in March 1921 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity with the Soviets also contributed to this development. In April 1921 Britain declared its neutrality in the Turco-Greek conflict, with France and Italy following suit one month later.

The military and diplomatic successes of the Anatolia movement were now leading to new proposals for a settlement from the West. The release of the Malta exiles and the signing of the treaty with the Soviets occurred on the same day. As the Anatolia movement scored new successes at the front, it became more receptive to the conciliatory gestures emanating from the West. In these circumstances the importance of the Soviet factor was diminishing. The signing by the Soviets of a trade agreement with Britain on 16 March 1921 also helped in lessening Turkey's importance to the Soviet Union.

The Battle of Sakarya clearly demonstrated the futility of trying to suppress the nationalist awakening in Anatolia through the instrumentality of Greece. For economic reasons and because of popular opposition, the Western countries were in no condition to wage war. That is why they were seeking a peaceful settlement with Turkey without getting directly involved in hostilities. In fact, even before the Battle of Sakarya the British had sought direct contacts with M. Kemal, although these contacts

never materialized owing to interdepartmental disputes in London. But the fact that such contacts were contemplated demonstrates that Britain was beginning to take Ankara seriously. Furthermore, the British began to worry about their situation in Mosul and elsewhere. It should not be forgotten that between 1919 and 1930 the Kurds in northern Iraq revolted on three different occasions under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmut Berzenci, causing great difficulties for Britain.

One of the main political results of the victory at Sakarya was the agreement between the French representative, H. Franklin-Bouillon, and Yusuf Kemal signed on 20 October 1921. At the time, the Frenchman was in Ankara for talks with M. Kemal. During that period France was unhappy over Britain's European policies, which it considered unhelpful; there were serious differences over how to handle Germany. When France perceived that the Anatolia movement was making headway, it hastened to conclude its own deal with Ankara. The resistance that France met in southern Anatolia also contributed to this decision. This Turco-French agreement caught Britain off guard and demonstrated the success of Ankara's policy of playing the two powers against each other.

The British were surprised by the Turco-French agreement, but they were quick to draw the appropriate lessons and softened their stance toward Ankara. When the Italians evacuated the Antalya region in June 1921, the solid Allied front was shattered, and the British found themselves isolated.

#### 4. From the Çanakkale Crisis to Mudanya

The government of the TGNA did not want to sever all ties with Britain, so in February 1922 it sent its foreign minister, Yusuf Kemal, to London and Paris to probe British intentions regarding an eventual settlement. The government wanted to explore the diplomatic option before unleashing full-scale military action against Greece in Anatolia. In London Yusuf Kemal tried but failed to persuade Lord Curzon to agree to the National Pact.

Subsequently the representatives of Britain, France, and Italy met in Paris in March 1922 and proposed a cease-fire and amendments to the Treaty of Sèvres. But Ankara insisted that Anatolia must be evacuated along with a cease-fire. The British did not meet Ankara's expectations, and no agreement was reached. In addition, there was a feeling in Ankara that the proposed cease-fire was a ruse to weaken the army's resolve and divert Ankara from its purpose of launching a clean-up operation.

After this came a standstill in Turco-British relations lasting a full year. During this period the minister of the interior, Fethi Bey [Okyar], made a private trip to Lon-

don and Paris and conveyed conciliatory messages to the British. Although he was received by prime minister Raymond Poincaré in Paris, he failed to get the expected attention in London. He could meet neither Lloyd George nor Lord Curzon. It now became clear that the road to a peaceful settlement was blocked, and the decision was made to launch the general offensive. By that point the army was ready to undertake such a large-scale operation.

The success of the general offensive (26–30 August 1922) dashed the hopes that had been pinned on the Greeks and stirred anxiety among the British. The Greek buffer was no more: the Allied and Turkish armies were now in direct confrontation. With the victory over the Greeks, people in Ankara started debating the merits of pressing on with the advance and removing the occupation forces from Istanbul and then pushing into Western Thrace. The Turkish army that had liberated Izmir turned northward and arrived at Çanakkale, which led to the socalled Chanak crisis with Britain. At the instigation of the British, who feared that the Turkish Army would invade Thrace, the Allies landed some troops on the Asian shore of the Dardanelles. Lloyd George made a statement in which he hinted that Britain would not refrain from getting involved in the war if the Turks were to move into Thrace. The crisis did not lead to war, because the Soviets supported Ankara and the French and the Italians, not willing to confront Ankara, pulled back. Furthermore, British public opinion was not in favor of war. Another important factor was M. Kemal's decision to proceed with prudence in order not to jeopardize the newly won victory. The government of the TGNA agreed to enter into armistice negotiations at Mudanya on condition that the region reaching to the west of Edirne and the Meric River would be evacuated.

On 3 October 1922 İsmet Paşa met the commanders of the Allied Powers at Mudanya to negotiate the armistice. Under its terms, Eastern Thrace would be evacuated, while the Turkish army would agree not to enter Çanakkale, İzmit, and İstanbul before the inauguration of the peace conference. Thus, for the first time since World War I, the Turks entered into an agreement with the Western states on a basis of equality. They were also regaining a foothold in Europe.

One of the political consequences of this development was the resignation of prime minister David Lloyd George, whose Middle East policy had collapsed with the political and military supremacy of the Turks in Anatolia.

Britain's scheme of using Greece to throw the Turks out of Europe and to confine them within a diminished and easily controlled Turkey under the sultan had failed. The Ankara government had managed to assert its presence thanks to the differences among the Allies and the support of the Soviets but above all through victory over the Greek army on the battlefield. Thus ended the period of a de jure state of war with Britain and a de facto war by proxy. From now on, the struggle would be confined to diplomacy.

İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

#### **II. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE**

The salient feature of relations with the French during this period was that France was the first Western state to enter into contacts and reach an agreement with the Ankara government. Unable to achieve its objectives in the territories it occupied in Anatolia as part of the imperialist partition, France decided to reach an understanding with Ankara for reasons that are examined below. This greatly facilitated Ankara's task.

# A. The Bekir Sami-Briand Agreement and Its Rejection

By the terms of the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1918, France and Britain occupied the southern part of Anatolia. When the British evacuated Adana, Mersin, Urfa, and Antep in November 1919, France extended its zone of occupation to include these regions. This caused a bitter reaction against France in Anatolia and led to Mustafa Kemal's protest against this action to the Allies. In response, the French high commissioner in Syria, Georges Picot, came to Sivas in December 1919 to meet with M. Kemal.

At the "unofficial" talks the French offered to return Urfa, Antep, and Adana if France would be granted economic privileges. Although no agreement was reached at these talks, the meetings demonstrated that the Anatolia movement was being taken seriously even at its very early stages.

When armed resistance broke out against the French occupation in January 1920, a French delegation came to Ankara and signed a twenty-day cease-fire on 30 May 1920. By signing this cease-fire agreement, France had recognized the TGNA government as a valid interlocutor. But when French troops landed in Zonguldak (on the western Black Sea shore) on 18 June 1920, relations soured once again. France sought to appease Ankara by claiming that the cease-fire applied only on the southern front. The French had their eye on the Ergani mines (in southeastern Anatolia) and pressed for economic privileges over them in all subsequent negotiations

One factor contributing to the change in French policy was Aristide Briand's assumption of the post of

prime minister in January 1921. As explained earlier, the new French government had persuaded the British to arrange the London Conference in February 1921. After the London Conference, Bekir Sami Bey signed an agreement with Briand on 11 March 1921. Under article A of the agreement, hostilities would cease and prisoners would be exchanged. Article B provided that the "gangs" and the populace would be disarmed, by an agreement between the Turkish and French commanders. Article C dealt with the establishment of a police force under Turkish command with the participation of gendarmes and French officers, to be placed at the disposal of the Turkish government. Article F provided for the protection of ethnic minorities and the securing of their rights under full equality. This article also called for a fair distribution among ethnic groups of posts in the gendarmerie and in municipalities in districts with mixed populations. Article G assured that precedence would be given to Turco-French economic cooperation in the award of concessions in Cilicia and other regions evacuated by French troops. The Ergani mines would be exploited by a French company, and maximum scope would be afforded for French and Ottoman capital to work together. Article I provided for the preservation of French hospitals and schools. Article K stipulated that the portion of the Baghdad railway between Cilician ports and the Syrian border would be transferred to a French company (Kurtuluş Savaşımız, pp. 101–3).

It will be noted that the agreement not only granted economic concessions but also provided for French officers to remain in the region with police powers and for proportional representation of non-Muslims in the gendarmerie and the municipal administrations. In addition to these political concessions, the fighters who resisted the occupations were referred to as "gangs." Because of all this, the criticism of the agreement started even before Bekir Sami Bey returned to Ankara. Like the other agreements signed by him, this one too was rejected by the TGNA. At this critical phase, however, M. Kemal did not want to confront France. The Paris representative of the Ankara government, Nihat Reşat [Belger], issued a statement clarifying that the objections were not to the agreement as such but only to certain provisions and that new proposals would be forthcoming. At this stage Bekir Sami Bey was sent to France and Italy to ensure the continuation of the negotiating process (Tamkoç, p. 157).

Despite the rejection of this agreement, France continued to seek an accord with Ankara for the following reasons. First, the stiff resistance to the French occupation in the south (especially in the districts of Antep and Maraş) as well as the gains made by Ankara after the successes at the second Battle of İnönü and Battle of Sakarya

led the French administration to conclude that it would be difficult to hang onto Anatolia. Second, France was faced with budgetary deficits, which were being made worse by clashes and hostilities in Anatolia. Furthermore, after the carnage of 1914–18 French public opinion was in no mood to accept further casualties in distant Anatolia. Third, France also sought an agreement with Ankara on account of its strained relations with Britain. At that time Britain was holding the Damat Ferit government under tight control, while pursuing its objectives in Anatolia through its Greek proxy. France, however, was directly involved in the conflict in Anatolia and was seeing its resources drained. France's main concern was Germany, and it was anxious to ensure its security against its eastern neighbor. In the prevailing atmosphere the French set up the Friends of France Association to rival the Friends of Britain Association.

Like the Italians, the French concluded that the best course to follow in these circumstances was to reach a deal with Ankara to gain economic concessions and privileges. By seeking a rapprochement rather than confrontation with the Turks, it would be easier for France to counter Britain's growing influence in the Middle East.

#### B. The Turco-French Agreement of 1921

Motivated by these concerns, France dispatched the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, Henri Franklin-Bouillon, to Ankara on 9 June 1921. During his sojourn of two weeks in Ankara and his conversations with M. Kemal, it was possible to explain the objectives of the Anatolia movement and the principles of the National Pact. Franklin-Bouillon wanted to conclude an agreement based on the Sèvres Treaty and the previous agreement with Bekir Sami Bey, while M. Kemal indicated that no agreement could be signed that was not based on the National Pact. After the Battle of Sakarya, France became fully aware of the strength of the nationalist movement. On 20 October 1921 Franklin-Bouillon and Yusuf Kemal signed an agreement that had been negotiated by M. Kemal himself.

The agreement had nine annexes. The first article stated that "the Parties declare that the state of war between them is ended," while the second article provided that each party would withdraw to its side of the demarcated line within two months. Articles 7, 8, and 10 would be significant because of the Hatay question that would emerge subsequently. Article 7 provided that "[a] special regime would be set up in the Iskenderun region. The region's population of Turkish origin shall enjoy every facility for the development of their culture. The Turkish

language will have an official status in the region." Article 8 fixed the Turkish-Syrian frontier, with the line reaching the Gulf of Iskenderun south of Payas, thus leaving the Sanjak of Iskenderun (Alexandrette) to France. This article also determined that the railroad from Çobanbey to Nusaybin would remain within Turkey but provided that both countries would enjoy equal access to this facility. Although Hatay was being left to Syria, a special regime was provided for the region, thus leaving a door open for Turkey. Compared to the frontier drawn at Sèvres, the new line left more territory under Turkish control.

According to article 9, "the grave of Süleyman Şah in the Castle of Caber...would remain Turkish property and Turkey would have the right to maintain guards and hoist its flag there." In accordance with this provision Turkey continues to maintain a platoon of soldiers and hoist its flag at this spot. Article 10 provides that "the government of the TGNA agrees to transfer the concession for the exploitation of the portion of the Baghdad Railroad from Pozanti to Nüsaybin to a French firm to be designated by the French government. Turkey will have the right to use the portion of the railroad within Syrian territory from Meydani Ekbez to Çobanbey for military transport purposes." Turkey took advantage of this provision to move soldiers through Syrian territory during the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925.

The annexed letters (which were later numbered by Ismail Soysal) provided more detail on some of the provisions of the agreement. Annex 1 stipulated that the government of the TGNA "is ready to grant the concession to exploit the iron, chromate, and silver deposits in the Harşit valley for 99 years to a French group that will establish a company in accordance with Turkish legislation. This company shall be set up in partnership with a Turkish company that will own 50% of the shares." It also expressed the hope that "the French government would authorize French capital to establish economic and financial relations with the government of the TGNA."

The second annexed letter states that "Yusuf Kemal Bey declares the need to allow the population of Iskenderun and Antakya to select a special flag that would embody the Turkish flag." The French representative promised to bring this to the attention of his government. The same letter provides that "Turkish nationals, Turkish cargoes, and Turkish-flag vessels shall enjoy full freedom to use the port of Iskenderun."

The third annexed letter drafted by the French representative states: "I consider it useful to indicate that, in the special regime to be applied in the region of İskenderun, those areas with Turkish majorities will be administered

in general by officials of Turkish origin." The sixth letter provides that "French educational, health, and charitable institutions will continue their activities in Turkey without in any way or under any pretext engaging in propaganda or other action harmful to Turkey's interests or in violation of Turkish legislation."

The agreement and annexed letters did not mention the National Pact; nor was it possible to secure French consent to the abolition of the capitulations. Through this agreement the general outline of the Turkish-Syrian frontier was traced. This would be confirmed under article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne and would be demarcated in a detailed way by the agreement with France dated 30 May 1926. The frontier would acquire its final form by the agreement of 23 June 1939. Starting in December 1921, France evacuated the Cilician region and transferred the administration to Ankara.

This agreement came into effect when France signed it on 28 October 1921. It is a very important document from the point of view of the foreign policy of the national struggle.

First, through the agreement reached by Bekir Sami in March 1921 Ankara had received de facto recognition. Now this agreement gave Ankara de jure recognition. This was the first time that a Western government had done so. Through this agreement the split among the Western countries also became fully apparent. The international standing of the government of the TGNA went up. Second, as France evacuated the southern region, it left behind some arms, which helped strengthen the army. Furthermore, a military delegation left for Paris toward the end of October 1921 to negotiate the purchase of arms. Third, the agreement would later have a direct effect on the outcome of the Hatay question. Fourth, after securing its eastern region with the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 16 March 1921, Turkey was now securing its southern region too and gaining the use of the port of Mersin, which was linked by rail to the interior. After this Ankara's troops would be deployed to the main western front to attain superiority over the Greek forces. This agreement was to remain in effect after Lausanne.

#### III. RELATIONS WITH ITALY

Along with Germany, Italy was the last country in Europe to achieve its national unity. In the imperialist scramble of the early twentieth century, Italy had its sight on the Mediterranean basin. The driving philosophy of Italy's imperialist expansion was to regain the control of the sacred heritage of the Roman Empire, and its immediate objective

was in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. At this time Italy was coveting North Africa, the Aegean islands, and especially Antalya and its surrounding region. To attain its objectives Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire and seized Tripolitania and the Dodecanese Islands in 1911. In the following year the Ottomans acquiesced to these land grabs.

After the outbreak of World War I, the Allies signed a secret agreement with Italy in London in 1915 to draw it into the war on their side and promised to give it a share in a partitioned Anatolia. When Britain and France divided the Ottoman territories in the Middle East between themselves, the Italians took exception to this. To appease the Italians, the Allies met at St.-Jean-de-Maurienne in January 1917 and promised Italy İzmir and its hinterland (see Box 1-23 below). When the İzmir region was given to Greece rather than to a major power like Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, however, the Italians were bitterly disappointed. Italy landed troops in Antalya in March 1919 and on the western Anatolian coast the following month, launching its short-lived Anatolian adventure. Still, its approach to the National Struggle was moderate, even going so far as providing it with direct and indirect support.

When Istanbul came under occupation, the Italians, along with the other Allies, had their high commissioner in this city. For a long time this post was held by Count Sforza, who was sympathetic toward Ankara. Even before the National Struggle was launched, Count Sforza had met with M. Kemal in Istanbul on several occasions. Thanks to these contacts, Italy was to understand the nature of the subsequent National Struggle. This give and take also enabled M. Kemal to be apprised of the intentions of the Allies. These contacts were facilitated by the existence of the Turco-Italian Friendship Society established in March 1920. Italy's Turkish policy developed under the influence of these factors and brought the following important gains for the Anatolia movement.

At the beginning of the National Struggle, Italy allowed the Nationalist Forces (Kuva-yı Milliye) to get organized in its zone of occupation and allowed the units retreating in the face of Greek advances to enter its zone. Italy was also helpful in procuring weapons for the Anatolia movement. The Italians sold their surplus weapons and permitted weapons and people to move from Istanbul to Anatolia. To this end, Italian ships were transporting weapons and munitions to Söke and to ports like Antalya. Italy also allowed the Anatolia movement to use Italian-controlled ports of Kuşadası and Antalya as links to the outside world. The British expressed their displeasure over this permissive Italian policy. The growing presence of the Italians in the southwest and especially Antalya,

however, was becoming a source of concern (Soysal, p. 167; Çelebi, pp. 281–96).

With the convening of the TGNA in Ankara, contacts with Italy intensified. In September 1920 M. Kemal sent to Italy as representative of the Ankara government its first minister of the interior, Cami Bey [Baykurt]. The representative's office was ostensibly a press office, but it was also engaged in arms purchases. In addition, it was molding public opinion by publicizing the National Struggle in the Italian press (Tamkoç, pp. 155-56). During this period Count Sforza, the Italian high commissioner in İstanbul known for his sympathy to Turkey, became foreign minister. This appointment had a positive impact on relations. After this, Rome became Ankara's main channel to the West. As noted earlier, Count Sforza interceded to secure Ankara's invitation to the London Conference in January 1921. The Turkish delegation sailed from Antalya to Italy on an Italian ship and proceeded from Rome to London with a formal invitation from Italy.

After the London Conference, Bekir Sami Bey signed an agreement with Italy on 12 March 1921. M. Kemal alluded to this agreement in his Great Speech, but its text was never published. Only fragments of the agreement were published in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur's Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyasası. From these fragments we know that in the agreement Italy promised to support the retention of İzmir and Thrace by Turkey. In return Turkey agreed to grant concessions to Italy in Antalya, Burdur, Muğla, Isparta, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Aydın, Konya, and other regions to be determined later. Furthermore, the exploitation right to the Ereğli mine would be granted to an Italian-Turkish company, in which the Turkish share would be 50% (for the concessions promised to the French by B. Sami at the same conference, see "The Bekir Sami-Briand Agreement and Its Rejection" above). This agreement, similar to the one concluded with Britain and France, met with a negative reception at the TGNA. Its rejection by the assembly annoyed the Italians but had no other lasting effect. With the evacuation of Antalya in July 1921, Italy's occupation in Anatolia came to an end.

The war had inflicted heavy loss of life and brought economic hardship to Italy without providing any of the expected political or economic rewards. The postwar economic difficulties and the political instability, widespread labor unrest, and unemployment were feeding Communist and Fascist tendencies in the country.

In this political and economic environment the Fascist movement found fertile ground to develop in 1919 and resulted in the establishment of the Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista) in 1921. The adherents of this

party, known as "Black Shirts," led a march from Naples to Rome in August 1922 and came to power in October. After this event Italy (now under the leadership of Mussolini) would pursue a foreign policy of acquiring the territories that it failed to acquire in World War I.

The first signs of change in Italy's attitude to Turkey appeared at the Lausanne Conference. Italy had agreed to pursue a common policy with Britain and France. At the conference Italy sought the demilitarization of the Straits, freedom of navigation, and the continuation of the capitulations under a different guise. But Turkey's real quarrel with Italy was over the ownership of the Dodecanese Islands and especially the island of Meis (Megisti). In the end all of these islands went to Italy.

Italy's policy toward Turkey was actually no different than the policies of Britain, France, and Greece. It sought to have a say and a share in the partition of Anatolia, obtain the right to exploit the coal mines at Ereğli, and acquire commercial concessions. The difference was that Italy sought to reach its objectives through cooperation with the government of the TGNA. It sought to gain its economic advantages from its evacuation of Anatolia.

## IV. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

The Ottoman state and Germany, allies during the war, followed different courses during the postwar era. In Anatolia there was resistance to Sèvres, and a new state replaced the Ottoman state. This new state followed a pro-Western, pro-status quo course. Germany submitted to Versailles but pursued a revisionist policy against the Western countries to free itself from the constraints that had been imposed.

In compliance with the peace treaties signed by Turkey and Germany in early 1920, their bilateral relations were at a low point. The Armistice of Mudros compelled Turkey to break off relations with the Central Powers under its twenty-third article. Article 275 of Sèvres read as follows: "Turkey recognizes that all the treaties, conventions, or agreements which she has concluded with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, or Hungary since August 1, 1914, until the coming into force of the present Treaty, are and remain abrogated by the present Treaty." The Versailles Treaty signed by Germany contained a corresponding provision.

The only noteworthy events during the period from 1918 to 1923 were the effort of the Istanbul government to have Enver Paşa, Cemal Paşa, and Talat Paşa extradited—which Germany refused—and the attempt to purchase arms from Germany during the National Struggle.

During the National Struggle the main sources of arms were the USSR and Italy. The Turks also worked toward procuring arms from Germany, although this proved to be more difficult, because the Treaty of Versailles had placed Germany under strict controls and supervision. Nevertheless, twenty-six aircraft and other war materials were clandestinely bought from Germany using the 1,760,000 gold rubles obtained from the USSR in March 1921. The Turkish ambassador in Moscow, Ali Fuat Paşa [Cebesoy], wrote in his memoirs that because of the Allied controls and other impediments the aircraft and other equipment could not be delivered. But at the closed session of the TGNA it was revealed that these purchases were indeed shipped from Germany and arrived in Anatolia via the Russian port of Novorossiysk (Yaman, p. 147).

İlhan Uzgel

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# Relations with the Soviets

Until 31 December 1922 the official name of the country was the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). After that date it became the USSR (Box 1-7). The beginning of relations between the government of the TGNA and the RSFSR goes back to the restructuring of Europe following World War I.

In this process, tsarist Russia was replaced by a Bolshevik government that advocated a new system to replace the capitalist system (Box 1-8). In the summer of 1916 Russian troops had overrun Trabzon, Erzurum, Erzincan, and Van in eastern Anatolia. On 8 November 1917 the Bolshevik administration promulgated the peace law. On 5 December 1917 it signed an armistice agreement at Erzincan with the Ottoman Empire.

During the period of hostilities the Ankara government took advantage of all actors in the international arena. As a first step, in September 1919 Mustafa Kemal had contacts with American general James Harbord, who came to the Caucasus and Anatolia to appraise the situation. The conversations with the general related to the future of the Anatolia movement. This was the American dimension of the policy of the Representative Delegation (Heyet-i Temsiliye). The second move was the talks held with France and Italy, starting in 1921. Thanks to these talks, the clashes in the southern front were of limited scope and duration. Third, M. Kemal maintained close contacts with Talat Paşa in Berlin and Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa in Moscow and Central Asia. These contacts, lasting until 1922, allowed him to keep abreast of developments in those places. The development of the Turkish-Islamic movement in Central Asia helped in determining the direction of the policies pursued in Anatolia. The most important partner of the Representative Delegation and subsequently the Ankara government, however, was Moscow. Before we look at the relations between the two administrations, let us examine developments in the RSFSR and the course of Soviet foreign policy.

#### Box 1-7. From the October Revolution to the USSR

The Bolsheviks overturned the tsarist regime and came to power on 8-9 November (26-27 October in the Julian calendar) 1917. In the Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) they held the majority against the Mensheviks. V. I. Lenin was president, Leon Trotsky was commissar for foreign affairs, and Joseph Stalin was commissar for nationalities. The RSFSR was proclaimed on 23-31 January (10-18 January in the Julian calendar) 1918. The first Constitution of the RSFSR was adopted on 10 July 1918. On 30 December 1922 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was established with the accession of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus republics. Thus we should refer to relations with the RSFSR and other republics during the period 1919 to 1923. The first Constitution of the USSR was adopted on 26 January-2 February 1924. The Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan joined the USSR on 27 October 1924. On 5 December 1929 Talkistan attained the status of a republic.

Article 13 of the Constitution adopted on 5 December 1936 states that the USSR consists of twelve republics: the Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan.

(E. TELLAL) (Source: USSR: Sixty Years of the Union, 1922–1982 [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982])

# I. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT

The foreign policy of the Bolshevik administration between 1917 and 1923 can be divided into two distinct periods: 1917–21 and 1921–23.

During the first period, when the RSFSR was trying to win the civil war, its main objective was to establish a window to the outside world. When the British occupied Baku in August 1918, Moscow found its southern outlet blocked.

At this time, many people were convinced that the revolution would spread to Europe. There were efforts to work with the eastern nations and especially those

#### Box 1-8. Bolshevik-Menshevik

The Bolsheviks were the group led by Lenin in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). At the second party congress, held in 1903, Lenin and his followers insisted that only professional revolutionaries should be admitted into the party. They won a majority of seats in the party's central committee and on the editorial board of the party publication *Iskra* (Spark) and became known as Bolsheviks, signifying majority. Their opponents who defended a social democratic party of the masses on the Western European model were known as Mensheviks, signifying minority.

After the 1903 congress the rift between the two groups grew, Lenin wanted to apply Karl Marx's: "permanent revolution in stages" thesis in Russia and claimed that the working class could lead such a revolution. The Mensheviks wanted to establish a liberal capitalist regime to develop productive forces and considered this an essential precondition for the establishment of socialism.

The Mensheviks sought to become a legal opposition after the revolution, but civil war and foreign intervention led to a sharp polarization. In 1922 the Menshevik opposition was suppressed, and many Mensheviks were exiled.

(F. KESKIN)

within the borders of tsarist Russia. The Soviet government launched an appeal to the workers of Russia and the Muslims of the East on 3 December 1917. It declared that it was repudiating the secret agreements aimed at seizing İstanbul entered into by the tsarist regime and endorsed by the Menshevik prime minister A. F. Kerensky after the bourgeois revolution of February 1917. The Bolsheviks promised to end the war, distribute land to the peasants, and grant self-determination to the different peoples of the country. They obtained the support of the masses with the slogan "Peace, bread, freedom." The failure of White Russian general A. I. Denikin in the south was due to his position on the issues of land ownership and nationality. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were collaborating with national leaders like Mir Said Sultan Galiev (Box 1-9), Neriman Nerimanov, and Zeki Velidov [Velidi] and thereby gaining in strength.

The eastern policies of the Bolshevik administration had at least two dimensions. First, those regions within the borders of tsarist Russia were brought under Bolshevik control until 1923. This was done by cooperating with local leaders. Afterward the policy of cooperation gave way to a policy of Russification. The most significant reflection of this change in policy was the disgracing and subsequent arrest of Sultan Galiev at the twelfth congress of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party (Box 1-10), held on 17–25 April 1923.

The second dimension is relations with the peoples

#### Box 1-9. Sultan Galiev and Islamic Socialism

In order to impose Soviet administration on all of tsarist Russia, including the Muslim peoples, the Bolsheviks cooperated with local Communists. The support obtained from the Muslims in the civil war against the White Army and the imperialist states was very important. Thanks to this support, the Soviet administration assumed control of a large swath of land stretching from the Caucasus to Central Asia.

The Islamic socialism idea propounded by Sulfan Gallev was based on nationalism. Because the colonialists exploited the colonials without regard to class, all colonial peoples were proletarians. Gallev substituted the Muslim nations for Marxism's proletariat and turned to Bolshevism to free "proletarian nations" from colonial exploitation and achieve equality. He was interpreting Bolshevism for national liberation just as Lenin had Interpreted Marxism for the Bolshevik revolution.

According to Gallev, the proletarian revolution expected in the West would only be possible with the success of the alliance of the eastern colonial peoples and the future Socialist State of Turan. This was one of the points on which he disagreed with the leaders of the revolution. While Lenin relied on the glad tidings of revolution in the West, Stalin (who was now in power) was bent on establishing a new state, expecting nothing from anywhere: He directed his full attention to building socialism in a single country—Russia. Under Stalin, all the Muslim leaders who had collaborated with the revolution, including Gallev, were liquidated.

(E. TELLAL)

#### Box 1-10. From RSDLP to CPRF

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was one of the forces that shaped the twentieth century. It was born on 1 March 1898 in Minsk as the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). At the party's seventh congress, held on 6–8 March 1918, its name was changed to Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party (RC[B]P). In 1925, it became the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Soviet Union (CP[B]SU). Finally, in 1952 it became the CPSU at the nineteenth party congress. In August 1991 its activities were suspended, and in November it was closed down. With the disintegration of the USSR, the Communists broke into numerous splinters but regrouped on 13–14 February 1993 as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). The CPRF is regarded as the successor of the CPSU.

(E. TELLAL)

outside the borders of tsarist Russia, most of whom were living in colonial territories. At the second congress of the Third International held in July 1920, the Bolsheviks secured the adoption of a decision to support all anti-imperialist movements without regard to whether they were pursuing proletarian revolution or not. There were two opposing theses at the congress. Lenin won the

argument against Roy, and the decision was adopted to support non-Communist movements in eastern countries (Box 1-11). The first manifestation of this policy was the Baku Congress, held in September 1920 (Box 1-12).

The western policy of the Bolshevik administration from 1919 to 1923 was to profit from differences among its adversaries during the war and "peaceful coexistence" after 1921. The economic crisis confronting the Bolsheviks was the major factor that induced them to adopt the "peaceful coexistence" policy. The economy was in ruins. To this was added the 1921 drought in the Volga basin, which brought hunger and penury to the 25 to 30 million people living along the river. The Bolsheviks' hold on power was in danger unless something was done very quickly to redress the economy. To consolidate power and improve the economic situation, it was essential to trade with the West. In 1921 the war was at an end, and the situation was stabilized in the western border areas. The expected proletarian revolution in the West had not materialized. In this situation the Bolsheviks concentrated their attention on consolidating their hold on power. The construction of "socialism in one country" started in 1921.

As a consequence of this situation, the Bolsheviks issued a decree in December 1920 on foreign investments.

### Box 1-11. The Lenin-Roy Argument

At the second congress of the Third International (Comintern), an argument broke out over the policy to follow in regard to the movements fighting imperialism in the eastern countries. The Indian Communist M. N. Roy argued that it would not be correct to support movements that were not pursuing proletarian revolution and that only Communist groupings should be supported. Lenin based his arguments on the absence of a significant proletariat among the Eastern peoples: consequently, all peoples and groups struggling against imperialism should be supported. In his defense of his thesis, Lenin enunciated the doctrine of the different stages of the struggle. In the first stage, power would be seized by an anti-imperialist movement that would change from being "bourgeois-democratic" to being "national-revolutionary." This would weaken imperialism and contribute to the revolution of the proletariat in these countries. In the second stage, the revolutionary forces in the country would join the government and share power. In the final stage, they would eliminate the nonrevolutionaries and seize power. It should be noted that this model corresponded to the revolutionary takeover in Russia.

In the end Lenin's argument prevailed, and Moscow supported the anti-imperialist movements in India, Iran, and Anatolia. In this manner the flow of raw materials from the colonies to the metropolises would be interrupted, an economic crisis would be induced in Western Europe, and this in turn would help return members of the "worker aristocracy" to their proletarian origins and help them to seize power.

By this decree they allowed foreigners to invest in Soviet territory. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was adopted at the tenth congress of the RC(B)P in March 1921.

# Box 1-12. The Baku Congress of 1920 (First Assemblage of Eastern Peoples)

The First Assemblage of Eastern Peoples that was held in Baku on 1–7 September 1920 was an attempt by the Bolsheviks to intervene in the unsettled region stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia. The congress was organized and fully controlled by the Bolsheviks.

There are three views of the congress. The first view holds that the failure of Communist movements in the West induced the Bolsheviks to try to influence the Eastern peoples and bring about revolution among them. According to the second view, the purpose of the congress was to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks among the Muslims and help bring them under Bolshevik control. The third view considers this congress to have been convened to influence the negotiations in progress with Britain to conclude a trade agreement. This third view appears to be the most plausible. After the conclusion of the agreement with Britain, the second congress was never convened. Nor were the decisions of the first congress ever implemented.

In addition to the independent delegations and Communists from Anatolia who participated, a delegation representing the government of the TGNA explained the goals of the Anatolia movement to the congress. Enver Paşa submitted a paper to the congress, which resulted in the following resolution on "The Turkish National Revolutionary Movements":

(i) The congress ... looks upon the Turkish fighters against world imperialism with sympathy... (2) However, the congress declares that the national revolutionary movement in Turkey is against foreign exploitation and that its success does not signify that the Turkish peasants and workers will be freed from all slavery and exploitation ... (3) The congress considers it necessary to warn against leaders who in the past allowed the toiling masses to be destroyed for the sake of a group of rich, high-ranking officers and permitted the farmers and toilers of Turkey to be massacred for the benefit of one of the imperialist groups ... The congress calls on all the toiling masses of Turkey and the east to support Turkey's national revolution and appeals to the Turkish peasants and workers to unite in independent organizations to block the intervention of foreign imperialists in liberation movements and to thwart them from exerting their influence over local rich bureaucrats, generals, pashas, feudal lords, and others... Only the defeat of all rich elements will prevent the governing clique from sacrificing the interests of Turkey's toilers in favor of this or that imperialist group. (Ataöv, p. 51)

Although the resolution was in the form of a reply to Enver Paşa, Mustafa Kemal looked askance at this congress and feared that it might attempt to direct his actions. The slogan of "overtaking America" came into current use. This slogan was to be revived in the 1950s. In his 14 April 1921 speech addressed to the Caucasus Republics, Lenin exhorted them "not to lose a single day in making trade with the capitalist countries the foundation of your economies."

The trade agreement concluded with Britain on 16 March 1921 was the first economic result of Russia's foreign policy. In addition to regulating trade and addressing the question of outstanding debts between the two countries, it signified that the two governments recognized one another. According to the agreement, the two sides would refrain from actions harmful to the other side and end all hostile propaganda. Furthermore, the RSFSR undertook not to engage in any military, diplomatic, or propaganda action aimed at instigating any activities on the part of Asian nations, and especially Indians and Afghans, that might be detrimental to British interests or to the British Empire. For its part, Britain agreed to refrain from similar actions among the countries that formed part of the tsarist empire that were independent at the time. In other words, the decision made in July to support national liber-

Box 1-13. Soviet Aid during the War of Liberation

An important dimension of the relations between Ankara and Moscow during the period from 1919 to 1923 was the assistance provided by the Bolshevik administration to the Anatolia movement in the form of military equipment and loans.

The breakdown of the assistance rendered during the War of Liberation was as follows: 39,275 rifles, 327 machineguns, 54 cannons, 63,000,000 rifle bullets, 150,000 cannon shells, gunpowder for 1,000 shots, 4,000 hand grenades, 4,000 shrapnel shells, 1,500 swords, and 20,000 gas masks:

Different sources are agreed that from 1920 to 1922 financial assistance amounted to 11,000,000 gold rubles and

gold bullion worth 100,000 liras.

To get some idea of the scope of this assistance provided over this period, it should be compared with the size of the defense budget. In 1920 the assistance received amounted to 850,000 liras (converted to liras on the basis of 1 gold ruble equaling 750 kurus) while the defense budget amounted to 27,500,000 liras. In 1921, when the defense budget amounted to 54,000,000 liras, 4,897,500 liras were received. In 1922 the respective figures were 2,625,000 and 35,000,000.

In conclusion, the financial assistance never exceeded 10% of the defense budget. This assistance did not exceed the sums owed by Russia to Ottoman nationals: To understand the value of this aid, however, it should be recalled that the Russian economy was in dire straits during those years. It should also be emphasized that weapons and munitions were more important than financial aid. The assistance played the primary role in the development of bilateral relations.

(E. TELLAL) (Source: Müderrisoğlu, pp. 521–50; Yaman, pp. 138–49) ation struggles was being abandoned after seven months. Through this agreement the Bolsheviks gained time to consolidate their hold on power, while Britain was able to preserve the status quo by preventing the spread of revolution to the east. Accordingly the Bolsheviks ceased to support the Gilan revolutionaries in Iran as well as the groups struggling against Britain in Afghanistan and India.

# II. COOPERATION: ITS REASONS AND AGENTS

#### Reasons

Ankara had the following reasons for cooperation:

- The principle "my enemy's enemy is my friend" was valid for both sides. Both were fighting imperialist occupation, and this was a powerful force impelling them to cooperate.
- Ankara did not have its own arms-production facilities, so Moscow was the chief supplier of arms and economic assistance (the exception is the arms left behind by France when it evacuated its forces in 1921) (Box 1-13).
- 3. By closing its eyes to Bolshevik administrations to be set up in the Caucasus, Ankara secured its eastern front, thus allowing it to concentrate all its forces on the western front. This was an important factor in ensuring ultimate victory.
- 4. The Bolsheviks were among the very first governments to establish contacts with Ankara. They recognized Turkey's independence and territorial integrity and by the agreement of 1921 rejected the capitulations, the first government to do so.
- At the London Conference, which met from 21 February to 12 March 1921, Ankara used Moscow as a ploy in its dealings with the Western countries.

Moscow's reasons for cooperating were the following.

- Moscow also adhered to the principle of "my enemy's enemy is my friend."
- A victory by the Ankara government over the Greeks, who were under Britain's protection, might trigger an awakening among the Muslims under Britain's exploitation.
- 3. A Turkish victory against imperialism would help secure Moscow's southern front. This would also ensure the establishment of Bolshevik administrations in the Caucasus, while bringing the Straits under the control of an independent Turkey rather than the Allies. Such a victory would also end Moscow's isolation.

- Good relations with Ankara would enhance Moscow's prestige among the Central Asian nations.
- 5. In the early stages of the relationship (at least up to the 1921 treaty), the hope that the Ankara government might follow a Bolshevik revolutionary course was also a contributing factor.
- Moscow realized that without resolving the Eastern Question the international system would not become stabilized, so it was ready to help solve it in Ankara's favor.

#### The Actors: Unionists and Communists

In the region stretching from Anatolia to central Asia the distinctions between communism, Turkism, and Islamism were not all that clear during this period. In the course of the power struggle that took place in Anatolia the Islamists used Bolshevism for their purposes, while the Turkists used Islamism and the various Communist factions used both Turkism and Islamism. The movement that prevailed in this power struggle was the one led by Mustafa Kemal, who made the best use of the opportunities in the proper historical context to achieve his objectives.

In the development of relations between the government of the TGNA and the RSFSR, there were two major actors: the Unionists and the Communists.

The influence of the leaders of the Union and Progress movement on relations between Ankara and Moscow can be evaluated from the points of view of Ankara, Moscow, and the Unionists.

From Ankara's point of view, the objective was to secure aid from the RSFSR by using the Unionists. At the early stages of the War of Liberation, Mustafa Kemal's links with the Unionist leaders had not been severed.

From Moscow's point of view, there were two goals. The first was to use the influence of these people in the Islamic world for the purpose of stirring up the Muslims of Central Asia and India against British imperialism in order to establish their own rule in these areas. The second goal was to use the Cossack cavalry intended to be sent to Anatolia to support the Turkish army and the Communist Party to bring about a power struggle between the Ankara government and Enver Paşa and thereby set up a Soviet government in Anatolia.

As to the viewpoint of the Unionists, their leaders, and especially Enver Paşa, were striving to gain the leadership of the anti-imperialist forces in Anatolia, but their vision was not confined to Anatolia. They were struggling for a Republic of Turan, encompassing the Turkic peoples of Central Asia (Box 1-14).

#### Box 1-14. The "Basmacı" Movement

It was difficult for Soviet power to become established in Central Asia, where the feudal structure and the Islamic faith were well entrenched. While some collaborated with the White Army, others started nationalist revolts against the Bolsheviks The biggest was the revolt that broke out in Turkmenistan. The word "Basmaci" was derived from basmak, meaning raid. According to the historian E. H. Carr (Bolsevik Devrimi [original title: The Bolshevik Revolution], vol. 1, trans. Orhan Suda, 2nd ed. [istanbul: Metis, 2002], p. 304), this label was applied by the people to brigands who lived outside the law in the hills. During the period from 1917 to 1922 the Basmacı terrorized the Fergana valley. They consisted of bands with little cohesion. The Soviets tried to suppress the Basmaci movement by using Enver Paşa, with whom they were in contact at the time. But, having sensed that the Anatolia movement was out of his grasp, Enver took up the leadership of the Young Buhara movement in September 1921. This movement was motivated by Pan-Turanian ambitions for Central Asia, and a big uprising occurred when it united with some of the Basmaci. Unity among the bands was lacking, however. The uprising was suppressed after several months of fighting, and Enver Paşa was killed on 4 August 1922. The Basmaci movement came to an end in 1934.

(E. TELLAL)

The strivings of the Unionists yielded no positive results, but they were used by both Ankara and Moscow for their own purposes and helped in the forging of closer relations.

As regards the Communists, it should be recalled that the October revolution had reverberations both in Anatolia and in İstanbul. From 1919 to 1921 the political movement with the highest prestige in Anatolia was Bolshevism. The members of the TGNA were attaching red bands to their fur caps. At first Moscow tried to transform the Anatolian movement into a Bolshevik one. On 12 September 1919 the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs issued an appeal to the "Laborers and Peasants of Turkey," which declared that the country's fate would be decided by the laborers and peasants fighting imperialism. In the utter confusion reigning in 1920 a "Green Army," part Islamic, part Bolshevik, was established in the TGNA (Box 1-15).

For its part, the Communist Party set up by Mustafa Suphi was making ready to transplant itself to Anatolia and operate from there. Ankara was aware of what was going on. İsmet Bey sent a telegram to Kazım Karabekir on 2 September 1920, advising him that the first official Soviet delegation to come to Anatolia to open an embassy in Ankara was more in the nature of a delegation coming to engage in propaganda and organizational matters. Mustafa Kemal, who was determined not to let his movement come under Soviet control, also took his measures.

#### Box 1-15. The Green Army

The Green Army is one of the organizations that appeared during the War of Liberation. Its program, consisting of thirty-two articles, was published in May 1920. In an atmosphere where nationalism, socialism, and Islamism were all intertwined, the Green Army was "established to prepare the ground for the inevitable cooperation with the Soviets by claiming that Bolshevism is nothing other than Islam put into practice" (Tunçay, p. 77). Among the basic principles of the program can be cited the need to fight imperialism and its local agents, land reform, and the democratization of the state structure. Its flag was the green banner. Among its supporters were eighty-five deputies in the TGNA who swore on the Quran and set up a group called Popular Caucus. Against Mustafa Kemal's thesis of "national sovereignty," the Popular Caucus defended the thesis of "popular sovereignty." A number of guerrilla groups, including 6,000 fighters of Cerkes Ethem (Ethem the Circassian), joined the Green Army. The Communist leanings of the Green Army also drew criticism, however. Although this criticism caused the minister of the interior, Hakki Behic Bey, to resign, he was replaced on 4 September by another adherent of the Green Army, Nazim Bey. As head of government Mustafa Kemal would not accept this appointment and designated Refet Bey [Bele] for this position. The Green Army then decided to disband itself. The members who refused to accept this joined the Turkish Popular Socialist Party (Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Partisi), founded on the orders of M. Kemal to keep the Communist movement under control.

(E. TELLAL)

In a telegram dated 16 September 1920 sent to Ali Fuat Paşa [Cebesoy], he warned that "the local Communist movement would result in absolute Russian control and was contrary to the national interest. The secret Communist organization must be stopped and sent away." On 18 October 1920 M. Kemal established the Turkish Communist Party, under his control. After the killing of Mustafa Suphi in January 1921, he gained control of the political process. With Mustafa Suphi's death and the signing of the 1921 treaty, Moscow's attempt to bring Anatolia under Bolshevik control came to an end. In 1922 communism was declared illegal and the Communist Party closed down.

# III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS

Political relations between the government of the TGNA and the RSFSR government were established on 3 June 1920. The negotiations undertaken by the TGNA delegations that went to Moscow in the summer of 1920 and the winter of 1921 resulted in the signing on 16 March 1921 of the Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity. Developments in the Caucasus until the end of 1921 played a major role in the establishment of relations.

After the October Revolution an armistice agreement was signed in Erzincan on 5 December 1917. This was followed by the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, signed on 3 March 1918. Article 3 of the treaty provided that

the Russian state shall evacuate the eastern provinces of Anatolia and secure their orderly return to the Ottoman government.

The Sancaks of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum will also be evacuated without delay. The Russian state will not interfere with their new status under international law and will allow the populations of these sancaks to determine their status by agreement with the neighboring states [at that time Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were being established] and especially with the Ottoman state.

In this manner the three provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum were ceded to the Ottomans on condition that their populations agreed to this. The Russian armies in the Caucasus were demobilized, resulting in a huge power vacuum. The Mensheviks in Georgia, the Musavat (Egalitarian) movement in Azerbaijan, and the Tashnak Party in Armenia profited from the power vacuum and declared independent states in May 1918. The Ottomans pursued an expansionist policy in the region, but defeat and the Mudros Armistice brought this policy to an end. Starting in 1918, the struggle for power in the region led to various short-term alliances. These alliances depended on common interests, were not based on written agreements, and shifted according to circumstances and needs.

In the first group were the Unionist-Musavat alliance and the imperialist Tashnak-Menshevik alliance. Their common trait was that they were anti-Bolshevik. During the Ottoman period and afterward the Unionist Paşas acted in unison with the Musavat movement of Azerbaijan in order to establish Turkish-Islamic supremacy in the region, which would later embrace all of Turkistan. At times they had the support of the anti-Bolshevik Mensheviks and the imperialists. On some occasions the imperialist forces used the Tashnaks and the Mensheviks to establish a "Caucasus Wall" that would separate Moscow and Ankara (Box 1-16).

A second alliance was between Moscow and the Armenians. As in the case of their alliance with the imperialists, the Armenians were also after territorial gains in their alliance with Moscow. The expected territorial gains would be in eastern Anatolia. As for Moscow, it was intent on holding onto this vitally important region, rich in

#### Box 1-16. The Caucasus Wall

It was important for the governments of the RSFSR and the TGNA in their formative period to gain supremacy in the Caucasus region. After the Mudros armistice, British units established a presence in Baku and Batum in late 1918 and thereby took control of the Batum-Baku railroad. This meant that the British had established a corridor from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. With this "wall," they were able to check the advance of the forces under Karabekir into the Caucasus. They were also preventing the Bolsheviks' expansion by cutting off their energy supplies. With the occupation of the Straits, aid could be directed at the White Army, creating further difficulties for the Bolsheviks.

But the British were not able to prevent rifts among the regional states: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. General Denikin's White Army was also seeking to bring the region under its control. In the face of growing domestic opposition the British concluded that they could not maintain their presence. Their evacuation started in March 1919, and by the end of the year only a small garrison remained in Batum.

After the British evacuation there were attempts to establish independent states under Allied protection. This was harmful to both the Bolsheviks and the Anatolia movement. The government of the TGNA gave the Bolsheviks the greenlight to establish control in the region, because it would not be possible to pursue the struggle in Anatolia without securing the eastern front. Furthermore, independent states would be obstacles to receiving military and financial assistance from the Bolsheviks.

With the convening of the TGNA on 23 April 1920 and the subsequent establishment of relations and cooperation with Moscow, the Caucasus Wall was in effect demolished. The first wall had been harmful to Ankara. But the establishment of the "Second Caucasus Wall" after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 would bring Ankara great benefits by eliminating the common border with Russia and by allowing direct links with the Caucasus and Central Asia and access to the energy resources of these regions.

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energy resources and industries, by imposing Bolshevik control.

The third alliance was between Moscow and Ankara. The parties in this alliance were struggling against imperialism while striving to demolish the Caucasus Wall.

# A. The Establishment of Relations and the TGNA's First Delegation

Relations were established between Turkey and Russia when fighting broke out in Anatolia in 1919. The Bolsheviks followed the Anatolia movement from its very beginning and established relations with both the Unionists in Istanbul and the nationalist forces in Anatolia. A Soviet delegation headed by Col. S.M. Buduyeni met Mustafa Kemal when he was at Havza near Samsun (May 1919). As already noted, on 13 September 1919, two days after the

congress of Sivas, the commissar for foreign affairs, G. V. Chicherin, issued an "Appeal to Turkish Laborers and Peasants," which declared that the fate of the country was in the hands of the workers and peasants fighting imperialism. Moscow dispatched the commander of the Bolshevik armies in the Caucasus to Istanbul to report on the state of the Ottoman Empire. The commander contacted the organization of the nationalist forces in Istanbul to inform it that Moscow would recognize Turkish national rights and provide support as well as material assistance.

After 23 April 1920 Ankara had an assembly and its government but no arms or financial means to pursue the struggle. The first decision of the TGNA in the field of foreign affairs, on 26 April, was to send a delegation to Moscow to seek aid and to preempt the efforts of the Unionist leaders, who were already in Moscow attempting to influence the Bolshevik government. The decision was entitled "First Proposal to the Moscow Government from the TGNA" and bore the signature of Mustafa Kemal. It consisted of the following text:

- We agree to work and act together with the Bolshevik Russians who are struggling against imperialist governments and striving for the liberation of the downtrodden people suffering under the domination and exploitation of these governments.
- 2. If the Bolsheviks move their forces into Georgia or secure the adhesion of Georgia to the Bolshevik union through political or other means and instigate Georgia to move against the British forces, the Turkish government commits itself to take military action against the imperialist Armenian government and secure the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the group of Bolshevik states.
- 3. The Russian Soviet Republic is requested to provide, as a first installment, five million gold rubles and ammunition, military equipment, and medical supplies in amounts sufficient to expel the imperialist powers occupying our national territory and subsequently to prepare our forces for the future common struggle against imperialism. Also requested are food supplies for the exclusive use of the army in its eastern campaigns. (Yerasimos, p. 232)

With this decision the TGNA agreed to cooperate with the Bolshevik Russians, undertook to secure the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the group of Bolshevik states, and, in return, requested 5 million gold rubles and military and food supplies.

Chicherin, the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR, replied to this proposal on 2 June in these terms:

The Soviet Russian government is pleased to learn the basic principles of the foreign policy of the Turkish government of Ankara's Grand National Assembly. These principles are (1) The assertion of Turkey's independence. (2) The attachment of all incontestably Turkish territories to Turkey... (4) In accordance with the decision of the GNA, the recognition by Turkey of the right of self-determination of all the peoples of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the Batum region, Eastern Thrace, and all territories where Turks and Arabs cohabit... (5)...[t]he recognition of all the rights of national minorities. (6) The submission of the question of the Straits to a conference of the Black Sea riparian states for its resolution. (7) The abolition of the financial control of foreign states along with the capitulations. (Yerasimos, pp. 238–39)

By his reply, Chicherin not only was agreeing to establish relations and to cooperate but also was stressing the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of Anatolia and the need to solve the question of the Straits at a conference of Black Sea states. This correspondence marks the beginning of political relations between the two new administrations.

After this decision of the TGNA the first government came into being on 3 May 1920. Bekir Sami Bey became minister of foreign affairs. The delegation that was to leave for Moscow on 8 May 1920 was given a brief that contained two important points:

(2) Turkey aspires to enjoy full internal and external independence within its present national borders and if this basic aspiration is supported, Turkey is ready to unite its destiny and future with Russia... (4) Navigation through the Straits will be free for all Black Sea states. To secure this, no fortifications would be built on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles fortifications would be defended conjointly with Russia, on the understanding that the Russian navy comes to Istanbul at our discretion and request. To insist on the Russians' holding the Dardanelles

fortifications by themselves or the Russian navy coming to Istanbul at its own discretion would negate the principle of Istanbul being under Turkish control. It is obviously preferable to secure freedom of navigation through the Straits for Russia exclusively through an agreement or to deal with the defense and control of the Straits as the common concern of all Black Sea countries. (Yerasimos, p. 233)

In other words, the brief states "the present national borders" instead of National Pact borders. This was a sign that Batum would be given up. It also accepts that the question of the Straits concerns all of the Black Sea states, with the defense of the Dardanelles being undertaken jointly in case of need. This position was abandoned at Lausanne. These two points reveal how claims and negotiating positions can change according to circumstances. Through this delegation, direct communication was being established with Moscow, and the influence of the Unionists on relations was being reduced. With the conclusion of an agreement, it was expected that the speedy flow of aid would start.

At that juncture a group of deputies in the TGNA came out against establishing relations with the Bolsheviks. At a closed session, Mustafa Kemal reassured them by declaring that "we must not confuse two different issues: to become Bolshevik and to enter an alliance with Bolsheviks. We the members of the government are talking about an alliance with Bolshevik Russia. We have no intention of becoming Bolsheviks" (Borak, p. 89). The delegation was headed by Bekir Sami Bey. Other members were the minister of economy, Yusuf Kemal Bey [Tengirşenk]; Col. Dr. İbrahim Tali Bey [Öngören]; the deputy from Lazistan, Osman Bey; and Staff Lt. Col. Seyfi Bey [Düzgören]. The delegation left for Moscow on 11 May 1920, the day when the Allies submitted the draft of the Sèvres Treaty to the Ottoman government.

The road through the Caucasus being closed, the delegation sailed from Trabzon and, after crossing the Black Sea, reached Moscow after an arduous journey of sixtynine days, on 19 July (Box 1-17).

The delegation was received by Chicherin and his Armenian deputy L. M. Karahan on 24 July. At this meeting a question of representation emerged. At the time, Cemal Paşa and Halil Paşa were in Moscow, and the necessary principles had been established with them. Bekir Sami Bey reminded the Russians that they were the first delegation to arrive in Moscow representing the TGNA government; consequently, these generals could only have

spoken as private individuals. Either they had claimed to be representing the Anatolia movement and the Soviets had failed to understand who spoke for whom in those chaotic circumstances or the Russians were using them as a ploy to strengthen their hand in the negotiations. On the same day, a separate meeting was held with Karahan, at which the Turkish side asked that the direct road, which had been closed by the Armenians, be reopened to allow the flow of aid. Turkey was seeking to eliminate the "Caucasus Wall."

The RSFSR was actually seeking the same objective, but without letting Turkey acquire a foothold in this region. Russia wanted to accomplish this through the destruction of the Menshevik administrations in the Caucasus. It succeeded when the Red Army entered Azerbaijan on 28 April and the Bolsheviks took over. At the meeting Karahan reported that the Armenian road would be opened without resorting to force. He also indicated that a ton of gold had been sent to Ankara by courier. This gold was confiscated by Armenia, and its fate remains unknown to this day.

The delegation had another meeting with Karahan on 4 August and with Chicherin on 13 August. The delegation was received by Lenin the next day, and on 24 August a friendship agreement was initialed. But the negotiations kept dragging on for three reasons.

First, the RSFSR was gradually imposing itself in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan had already become Bolshevik. In May and June of 1920 Bolshevik revolts took place in Armenia; and while the Turkish delegation was in Moscow the Red Army crossed the Armenian border and forced Erivan to sign a treaty on 10 August. Meanwhile the situation of the TGNA government was growing more precarious. The future of the Anatolia movement was quite uncertain. Greece was advancing in Anatolia, having captured Bursa on 8 July and Uşak on 29 August. (It would be necessary to wait until 9 January 1921 for the Greek advance to be checked at the first Battle of İnönü.) Ankara's hand was weakening vis-à-vis Moscow.

Second, on 30 May 1920 a Turkish-French Armistice of twenty days had been signed, and Moscow was still not sure that the weapons and supplies procured under the deal would not be used against it. This was because the Allies were inciting Ankara, and others too, against the Bolsheviks.

Third, because the Russians were sure that they would eventually have Armenia under their control, they were hardly eager to put pressure on that country for Turkey's benefit. In fact, by the terms of the above-mentioned Soviet-Armenian Treaty of 10 August they allowed Ar-

#### Box 1-17. The Failure of the First TGNA Delegation

The first TGNA delegation was unsuccessful in the negotiations that got underway in Moscow on 24 July 1920. From the moment of its arrival in Moscow on 19 July the Bolsheviks snubbed the delegation. There was no official to greet the delegation members upon their arrival at the railroad station. An individual who had befriended them on the train agreed to telephone the Russian foreign ministry, and a car was dispatched after one hour. The delegation was so neglected during its stay in Moscow that the members were frequently hungry; some Tatars provided them with food (\$\frac{1}{2}\text{in sign}, pp. 29-33).

At the end of the negotiations, the delegation failed to sign a treaty. The return journey to Turkey was equally eventful. Although Ismail Soysal (p. 28) wrote that the other members of the delegation continued with the negotiations when Bekir Sami Bey returned, what Bekir Sami really did is not very clear. On 11 September he left Moscow and disappeared from the scene for three months. Rumors were floating around Moscow that he was in Chechnya and Daghestan, agitating among the counterrevolutionaries (Yerasimos, p. 185).

Bekir Sami Bey returned to Ankara on 31 January 1921 and submitted his report to the TGNA on I February. He received his full powers on 5 February and left Ankara. On 19 February, when he was in Brindisi, he got an invitation to attend the London Conference.

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menia to remain in control of the road linking Russia to Anatolia and recognized Armenian sovereignty on some Turkish territories. At the meeting held on 13 August, Chicherin demanded that Bitlis, Van, and Muş be ceded to Armenia and made this a condition for providing aid. Needless to say, the demand was rejected.

In these circumstances the negotiations reached a deadlock. When the negotiations broke off, Bekir Sami Bey left Moscow on 11 September and presumably proceeded to the southern Caucasus, where he originated. As an "Ossetian Prince," Bekir Sami was, if rumors are to be believed, seeking to establish an administration under his leadership in Ossetia (see Box 1-17 above).

### B. A Provisional Solution to the Armenian Question: The Treaty of Gümrü

On 19 June 1920 Armenian bands attacked the Muslim population of the border areas. When reports on these attacks reached Ankara on 9 July, a protest note was delivered to Erivan by Ankara. This attack coincided with the Greek offensive that was launched on 22 June on the western front. The Ankara administration decided to ignore the Armenian attack. To fight on two fronts could result in total annihilation in the event of a reverse. There was also the possibility of British intervention in support of the Armenians. Finally, the Bolsheviks, who had reached an

agreement with the Armenians on 10 August, might have intervened or might have reconsidered their decision to provide assistance to Ankara.

By September the circumstances had changed. One of the reasons for the deadlock in the negotiations at the end of August was the Russian demand for territorial concessions in favor of Armenia. As the Armenians kept up their attacks, Karabekir Paşa launched a counterattack on 28 September 1920. The next day Sarıkamış was recovered. This was to be the initial move, with more to follow.

On 21 October 1920 the Tevfik Paşa cabinet, consisting of supporters of the nationalist forces, was sworn in at the capital. The new cabinet in Istanbul suited the government of the TGNA in two ways. First, on 22 October Ahmet Muhtar Bey, the "commissar of foreign affairs of the Ankara Government," wrote a letter to Chicherin in which he indicated that the new cabinet in Istanbul was bent on drawing the Anatolia movement to Britain's side, away from the Bolsheviks and Muslim groups. This gave Ankara room for maneuver in the negotiations with Moscow. If the Bolshevik government wanted the Turkish nation to continue its struggle against imperialism, it had to abandon its claims on behalf of the Armenians.

Second, Britain's move to establish contacts with the Anatolia movement also gave the TGNA some leeway. These British soundings, made through the new government, helped persuade the government of the TGNA that Britain would not intervene in the Caucasus. This allowed Ankara to undertake its second push on the eastern front on 27 October. Kars fell on 30 October and Gümrü on 7 November. Peace negotiations between the victorious Karabekir Paşa and the Tashnaks, who were losing their grip on power, were undertaken on 26 November, resulting in the signing of the Gümrü (Alexandropol) treaty on 2 December 1920.

This was the first treaty between the TGNA government and a foreign state. Although it became invalid only a short time later, it is worth looking at some of its terms.

Article 4: "The Yerevan [Armenian] Republic undertakes not to maintain forces other than sufficient gendarmes armed with light weapons to maintain internal order and a force consisting of no more than 1,500 professional soldiers armed with 8 mountain or field cannons and 20 machine guns to defend the country. There shall be no conscription in Armenia."

Article 5: "After peace is attained, the Yerevan government agrees to allow Turkey's political representative or Ambassador in Yerevan to undertake at any time inspections and investigations with regard to the aforementioned subject."

Article 10: "The Yerevan government considers the Sèvres Treaty, rejected by the TGNA, null and void, agrees to recall its representative delegations in Europe and America, who are acting as instruments of incitement, and undertakes not to let into its government grasping and militaristic individuals."

Article 12: "The Turkish state shall keep railroads and other roads in the Yerevan Republic under control and observation pending the achievement of general peace."

Article 14: "The Yerevan Republic agrees and undertakes to consider null and void all provisions relating to Turkey or harmful to Turkey's interests in treaties entered into by the Yerevan Republic with any other state."

This could be described as a colonial treaty. With it the Ankara administration was compelling Armenia to give up its claims on all of the territories that had been promised to it under the Sèvres Treaty. At the same time, it was imposing its own Sèvres on Armenia: Ankara was tracing the border, Armenia's armed forces were being limited, Turkey was being granted the right to intervene, and the country's transport network was being placed under Ankara's control.

Three days earlier, however, the revolutionary committee set up at Icevan (Karavansaray) had proclaimed a Bolshevik administration in Armenia on 29 November. On 2 December (the day the Treaty of Gümrü was signed) the interim government of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic entered Yerevan with the help of the Red Army and signed an agreement with the RSFSR. By this agreement the RSFSR undertook to defend Armenia and declared that it would not recognize the Treaty of Gümrü. In other words, the government that signed the treaty with Ankara lost power on that day. Nevertheless, the Gümrü treaty helped stabilize the situation at the border until the Kars Treaty, which would settle all the region's outstanding questions, was signed.

#### The Second TGNA Delegation

The coming to power on 21 October 1920 of the Tevfik Paşa government, which was sympathetic to the nationalist forces, raised the possibility of a rapprochement between Ankara and Britain. This was a setback for Moscow.

The nonimplementation of the Gümrü Treaty, however, was a setback for Ankara. It was necessary for both sides, cut off from the West, to establish permanent diplomatic relations and resume the negotiations.

In October Moscow assigned Budu Mdivani to Ankara as its representative. He arrived in Ankara on 21 February 1921 and presented his credentials on 5 March. He happened to be the brother of Simeon Mdivani, the

representative of Menshevik Georgia in Ankara. His counterpart was the commander of the western front, Ali Fuat [Cebesoy], who was appointed ambassador to Moscow on 21 November after his reverses at Eskişehir and Kütahya.

The second TGNA delegation to go to Moscow was headed by the minister of economy, Yusuf Kemal Bey [Tengirşenk], and consisted of the minister of education, Dr. Rıza Nur Bey, and Ali Fuat Paşa, who was already on his way to Moscow. In addition, the delegation included secretaries and cipher clerks. The delegation's brief was to sign a treaty. After a long journey the delegates arrived in Moscow on 19 February 1921 (Box 1-18).

Unlike the first delegation, the second was received with fanfare. The first meeting took place on 21 February 1921 with Chicherin and his deputy Karahan. At the meeting Chicherin requested the abrogation of the Treaty of Gümrü, the evacuation of Gümrü, and an end to the assistance to the Tashnaks. He also complained about the persecution of Communists in Anatolia and indicated that Russia could not sign a treaty of alliance with Turkey but was prepared to sign a treaty of friendship (Cebesoy, p. 138). The Turkish objectives were to avoid discussing Armenia, draw the border at Kars and thereby avoid territorial concessions, secure de jure recognition of the government of the TGNA, cancel the Turkish debts to tsarist Russia, and, above all, secure financial aid, weapons, and ammunition (Nur, pp. 764–65).

When Chicherin got tough and raised the Armenian question, the delegation obtained an appointment with Stalin on the night of 22-23 February. Stalin explained that they could not sign a treaty of alliance because of the trade agreement they were about to sign with Britain, but he indicated their readiness to provide all kinds of assistance. The meeting helped clear the obstacles. This was due to the negotiating tactic of the Russians and had nothing to do with the personalities of Stalin or Chicherin. Stalin was probably taking into account two recent developments: (1) at that time Bekir Sami Bey was in London negotiating with the Western powers on behalf of the government of the TGNA; (2) at the first Battle of İnönü the Greek armies had been checked for the first time. When the official negotiations started on 26 February, Chicherin was joined by Celal Korkmazov, a member of the Pan-Russian Central Committee. Chicherin was polite and forthcoming, but this time the Batum issue constituted an obstacle.

The two parties agreed to sign the treaty on 16 March. This was the date of the British occupation of Istanbul, and the Soviet side wanted to mark it by signing the Moscow treaty exactly one year later (Nur, p. 795). The Anglo-

#### Box 1-18. Notes on the Second TGNA Delegation

The memoirs of Dr. Riza Nur, which describe the adventures of the delegation (pp. 679–815), give a good idea of the conditions under which the Anatolia movement operated.

The members of the delegation left on 14 December 1920. The delegates did not use the Black Sea route for fear of the Allied fleet. They proceeded by unheated train from Ankara to Ulukisla via Eskişehir and Konya. From there they went to Kayseri by carriage, where they procured a case of pastirma (cured meat) to consume in Moscow. The pastirma proved to be inedible. From Kayseri they proceeded to Sivas by car, by carriage, on horseback, and on foot. The next stops were Erzurum, Sarikamış, Kars, Gümrü, Tbilisi, Baku, and finally (by train) Moscow.

As the train passed through the tunnels, it had to move slowly, stopping and reversing from time to time to break glant icides. When they asked why the train was running backward, they were informed that the female leader of a band was raiding trains and killing Jews, who were identified as such because they were circumcised. The driver of the train had been tipped off about an imminent raid.

In Kars the delegation caught up with Ali Fuat Paşa, who had left on a December. The delegation also ran into Mustafa Suphi, the Turkish Communist leader, who was returning from Moscow with thirteen followers. M. Suphi and his companions were to proceed to Trabzon via Erzurum, when they were embarking in Trabzon to proceed to Ankara, the boatman murdered them all and dumped their bodies into the sea. It was bizarre that, as the delegation seeking Russian ald was en route to Moscow, the Communists sent to Ankara by the Comintern were being eliminated. At Kars the delegation also ran into Budu Mdivani on his way to Ankara. He advised the Turks to see Stalin to clear up any difficulties they might run into in Moscow. At the railroad station in Moscow they were greeted by a ceremonial military guard.

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Soviet trade agreement had also been signed on 16 March, however, and it is quite likely that the Soviets might have wanted to guarantee this agreement before signing with Turkey (Gürün, p. 68).

The Turkish delegation also signed a treaty of friendship on 1 March 1921 with the representative of Afghanistan, Mehmet Velihan, who was in Moscow to conclude an agreement with the Soviets. After Gümrü, this was the second treaty signed by Ankara. The third would be signed with the RSFSR.

#### D. The Moscow Treaty of 1921

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The Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity is the first treaty signed by the government of the TGNA with a major power and contains many important provisions.

Article 1: "The contracting parties agree in principle not to recognize any peace treaty or other international agreement imposed upon one of them. The term 'Turkey' in this treaty will be understood to mean the territories included within the National Pact that was adopted by the parliament in Istanbul on 28 January 1920." A major power was acknowledging the National Pact for the first time.

Article 2: "Turkey agrees to relinquish its sovereignty over the district of Batum and its port to Georgia under the following conditions. First, the inhabitants of these localities will enjoy far-reaching administrative autonomy. Second, Turkey will have full access to the port of Batum and enjoy free transit rights without payment of any taxes or duties." With this treaty, Turkey's eastern border had been fixed and the eastern front secured. Batum, which had been included in the National Pact, was the sole concession made by Ankara to secure the signing of the treaty.

Article 3: "The contracting parties have agreed that Nakhechevan will become an autonomous region under the protection of Azerbaijan and never be placed under the protection of a third state."

Article 4: "Having observed the closeness between the national liberation movements of the eastern nations and the struggle of Russian workers for a new social order, the contracting parties openly declare the right of these nations to freedom and independence and their right to be governed by the regime of their choice."

Article 5: "In order to secure the opening of the Straits to the commerce of all nations as well as freedom of navigation, the contracting parties agree to leave the question of the final regime of the Black Sea and the Straits to a decision of the riparian states, who will convene a conference for this purpose. The decisions taken at the conference will in no way encroach on the sovereignty of Turkey or endanger its security or the security of its capital, Istanbul." Ankara had agreed that the regime of the Straits was a matter for the Black Sea countries to determine. This principle was not upheld at Lausanne, however.

Article 6: "The contracting parties agree that all the covenants entered into by the two nations do not always conform to their interest. They agree that such covenants have lost their validity and are null and void. The government of the RSFSR declares that Turkey is freed from all financial and other obligations arising from international treaties between Turkey and tsarist Russia." With this provision, Turkey was being freed of its debts to tsarist Russia.

Article 7: "The government of the RSFSR agrees that the regime of the capitulations is incompatible with a country's right freely to pursue its national development and the full exercise of its sovereignty. It therefore considers invalid and abolishes all rights and privileges associated with this regime." The Moscow Treaty was the first

international document prior to the Lausanne Treaty that declared the capitulations in Turkey to be incompatible with the concept of national sovereignty.

Article 8: "The contracting parties undertake not to allow at any time the establishment on their territories of organizations or groups claiming to represent the government of the other party or of groups hostile to the other party. Turkey and Russia undertake identical commitments, on condition of reciprocity, in relation to the Caucasus Soviet Republics." This meant that Turkey would no longer harbor the remnants of the White Army or the Musavat movement, while the RSFSR would not harbor either the Turkish Communists or the Unionists.

Article 15: "Russia undertakes to make the necessary representations to the southern Caucasus Republics to ensure that in agreements between Turkey and these Republics the provisions relating to them contained in the present Turco-Russian Treaty will be adhered to." In other words, the RSFSR undertook to secure the acceptance of this treaty by the Caucasus Republics, and in particular the clauses relating to Turkey's eastern frontier.

The treaty came into effect with the exchange of the instruments of ratification on 22 September 1921. This treaty became the cornerstone of the relations between the two states during their early years. From then on, all treaties between the two states would make a reference to this treaty. During the 1950s, when there was an effort to improve relations, the Soviet leaders would never fail to allude to this treaty in their declarations.

#### E. The Treaties of Kars and Ardahan

At the time of the signing of the treaty in Moscow a serious crisis was brewing in the Caucasus. On 8 March 1921 the Red Army attacked Menshevik Georgia. Upon the request of the Georgians for a "temporary occupation," Karabekir Paşa occupied Batum on 11 March. The 16 March treaty had ceded Batum to Georgia, even if certain conditions were attached. But Turkey refused to evacuate Batum. The clashes that erupted between the Red Army and Karabekir's units on 17 March continued until 24 March. Finally the Turks evacuated Batum. But in doing so they blew up the magazines containing ammunition. This led Chicherin to condemn the government of the TGNA. Batum was the outlet for the products of the region. After Azerbaijan and Armenia came under Soviet domination, there was an attempt to set up the "Caucasus Wall" at Batum, and the port became the subject of intense negotiations at the London Conference. When the evacuation of Batum was delayed, the flow of aid from Moscow started faltering. Ali Fuat Paşa met with Stalin on

the night of 21–22 April and secured a promise that the sending of aid would continue.

In 1921 the government of the TGNA was forced to direct its attention to the western front. After the Battle of Sakarya a friendship treaty with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia was signed at Kars on 13 October 1921. The content of this treaty was almost identical to the content of the one that had been signed in Moscow. As already noted, article 15 of the Moscow Treaty had foreseen this result. Following the arrival of M. V. Frunze in Ankara on 13 December, a Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity was signed with Ukraine on 2 January 1922. In this manner, bilateral relations were placed on a sound basis prior to the Lausanne Conference. With the Kars Treaty, the obstacles to a smooth flow of aid were removed. Furthermore, the neighboring states officially recognized Turkey's eastern frontier and the principles of the government of the TGNA (Soysal, p. 39). After the treaty with the RSFSR, the signing of treaties with the Soviet Republics in the Caucasus facilitated the agreement of 20 October with France.

The friendly relations established with the RSFSR were marred by a diplomatic scandal in April 1922. The personnel of the military attaché's office of the Turkish Embassy were involved in an espionage affair, together with the personnel of the British and Polish missions. When the Soviet police raided the homes of the personnel of the military attaché's office and arrested them, Ali Fuat Paşa delivered a sharp note of protest to Karahan. Karahan tried to minimize the issue; but Ali Fuat Paşa was not easily appeased, which aggravated the crisis. On 26 April the RSFSR demanded the recall of the arrested men. Ankara responded by recalling its ambassador. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR had suspected Ali Fuat Paşa of secretly collaborating with Enver Paşa. On 10 May 1922 Ali Fuat Paşa left Moscow, accompanied by fifteen of his subordinates. To help settle matters, Rıza Nur was sent to Moscow. His contacts there and the efforts of ambassador S. I. Aralov in Ankara helped to clear things up.

## F. Relations at Lausanne: The Question of the Straits

With victory in September 1922, the question of making peace was at the top of the agenda.

The first issue was the matter of participation in the peace negotiations. The Allies were against the participation of the RSFSR and the other Republics, because they had not fought Turkey and because they had settled their outstanding questions with the Moscow, Kars, and Ankara treaties. That is why the Soviet Republics were not

among the countries that received invitations on 20 September 1922 to come to Lausanne.

Another important question that had to be settled was the future regime of the Straits. In article 5 of the Treaty of Moscow, it was agreed that this question would be decided by the Black Sea states. But the Allies, who now faced the prospect of evacuating the region of the Straits, wanted to have a say in the settlement. Furthermore, they were against Moscow's participation in the settlement. The Bolshevik administration declared to the Allies that a settlement reached in its absence would be invalid and reminded Turkey of its contractual obligation. On 30 October 1922 Ambassador Aralov delivered a note to the MFA, calling on Turkey to take up a common position on the matter.

A solution was reached whereby the Soviet delegation (consisting of the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia) attended only meetings that took up the question of the Straits. On 27 October 1922 Lenin gave an interview to the Observer and Manchester Guardian and explained the Russian position on the question of the Straits: Turkey's national aspirations must be given satisfaction, the Straits must remain closed to all warships in war and peace, and merchant ships must enjoy full freedom of navigation. At the negotiations İsmet Paşa and Chicherin reached an agreement to consult and to adopt a common position. On 4 December Chicherin delivered a speech in which he accepted, on behalf of the Soviet government, that the Straits belonged to Turkey. He also stressed the importance of the Straits for the Soviet Republics and recalled that before the war 70% of Russia's wheat exports went through the Straits. The Straits were also important for their security. It was thanks to the provisions of the Mudros Armistice that the White Army had been able to attack Black Sea ports. Chicherin read out the text of the fourth article of the National Pact to demonstrate that his views were identical to those of Turkey on the question of keeping the Straits closed to warships. Article 4 stated that "the security of İstanbul, the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanate, and of the Sea of Marmara must be free from all threats." This speech led Lord Curzon to remark that Chicherin was more royalist than the king.

Although Moscow insisted on the Straits being kept closed to all warships and under Turkish control, Turkey was eager to reach a peace agreement and appeared ready to compromise. The Soviets accused Turkey of being insincere at the negotiations. Chicherin described the demilitarization of the Straits and their being made accessible to warships as the policy of Damat Ferit, whereupon Ismet Paşa asked whether the Soviets were prepared to

help if the negotiations broke down and fighting resumed. Chicherin was unable to give a clearly affirmative answer. Ismet Paşa informed him that Turkey was not prepared to endanger the outcome of the negotiations on account of this question. On 12 December the Soviet delegate found out that the Allied members of the experts' committee on the Straits were engaged in secret negotiations with the Turkish members to reconcile the Allied and Turkish drafts. On 7 January 1923 the Soviet delegation submitted a note to the conference president, complaining that a draft convention for the Straits was being negotiated without its knowledge.

Despite these complaints, agreement had been reached when the question came before the committee on 1 February 1923. Warships would be allowed to enter the Black Sea under certain conditions, and the security of the Straits would be ensured by an International Commission.

The conference reached a deadlock on the question of the capitulations on 4 February 1923 and broke up. When the conference resumed its work, the question of the Straits was no longer on the agenda. The Soviets signed the convention not in Lausanne but in Rome on 14 August 1923.

EREL TELLAL

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## Relations with Greece

When the Ottoman Empire signed the armistice ending World War I on 30 October 1918 at Mudros, its leadership believed that the state could continue its existence with the indulgence of the Allies. There were two reasons for this. First, prime minister Lloyd George had declared on 5 January 1918 that Britain would not prevent the Turkish Empire, with its capital in Istanbul, from continuing its existence on the lands inhabited by Turks. Second, Woodrow Wilson had declared in his speech to the joint session of Congress on 8 January 1918 in which he enumerated the principles on which peace would be based that the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire would be allowed to preserve their sovereignty.

The armistice was signed on behalf of the Ottoman Empire by navy minister Hüseyin Rauf Bey [Orbay]. Despite articles 7 and 24, which clearly demonstrated the intention of the Allies, in his statement to the press he declared that the state's independence and the rights of the sultanate had been secured, that no enemy soldier would set foot in İstanbul, and that naval yards would not face occupation. The important thing was to maintain law and order within the country, because otherwise everything might be lost.

There was no way to preserve law and order, however, once the terms of the armistice were revealed. Those who read between the lines could see what the Allied intentions were. The Eastern Question, which had been preoccupying the international community for a hundred years, would be resolved in the interest of the major powers. The Allies had partitioned the Ottoman Empire through their secret agreements concluded during the war (see Box 1-23 below). To carry out the partition plans, it was necessary to convince international public opinion before the signing of the peace treaty that the Ottoman Empire could no longer maintain its existence. To realize their ambitions and lend them some legitimacy, it was necessary to demonstrate that the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire could not cohabit peacefully and that the Allies must as-

sume the role of bringing harmony among these clashing ethnic groups.

The intentions of the Allies toward the Ottomans were also interpreted correctly by the non-Turkish subjects. In the postwar period, when multinational empires were coming apart, each national group was bent on establishing its own state over the largest possible area. Each nation was having its contacts with the Allies and informing them about its "legitimate" rights. The Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds were pursuing this path while making sure that article 7 of Mudros would come into effect by creating disturbances in their regions. The first step in their march toward independence was to free themselves from Ottoman sovereignty.

These developments were being closely followed by the Ottoman intelligentsia, whose main concern was the survival of the state. Notwithstanding the provisions in the armistice agreement for laying down arms, the people were reluctant to part with their weapons. Occupation would undoubtedly be met by local resistance, although there were serious doubts about the feasibility of organizing countrywide resistance to occupation. Shortly after the Mudros Armistice, Britain and France occupied the southeast and Italy landed troops in the south without running into organized resistance. When the Allied fleet sailed into Istanbul on 13 November, there was no reaction from the Turkish population, while the non-Muslim population rejoiced. The first resistance movements were to appear in 1919.

### I. GREEK ASPIRATIONS IN ANATOLIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE (1919)

In 1919 the Allies were consulting among themselves to prepare for the peace negotiations while the non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman state strove to influence the Allies to meet their aspirations. The Muslim-Turkish ele-

# Box 1-19. Greece's Foreign Policy and the Megali Idea

After Greece attained independence, it was a poor, distant, and "forgotten" country in the eyes of the Western nations. Hence the Greek kingdom turned its face toward its wealthy kin living in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Greeks were likewise beginning to establish ideological links with the Greek kingdom. The road to development for this kingdom was to expand into the rich lands inhabited by ethnic Greeks. This objective became known as the Megali Idea (Great Idea). It was described for the first time in 1844 by the minister of foreign affairs, Joannis Kolettis, in his speech to the constituent assembly. After that date Greece embarked on expansion, first into the Ionian Islands in 1864, when they were relinquished by Britain. In 1881 Thessaly and the Arta district of Epirus were annexed. In 1897 Crete acquired autonomy.

These territorial gains might appear substantial; but the country was getting deeper into debt, and there was no letup in internal disturbances. When the Cretan lawyer Eleftherios Venizelos came to power in 1910, he was able to double Greece's territory and population within a few years. Following the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the northern Aegean coast and the islands were added to Greece.

This rapid expansion turned Venizelos into a legendary figure. His successes blinded him to the fact that his compatriots needed a period of peace to put their economic house in order. To realize his dream of a greater Greece with its capital in Constantinople, he joined the Allies in World War I. After the war he was responsible for the misadventure in Asia Minor (known as Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi in Greek). As the leader who had come closest to achieving the Megali Idea, he found himself compelled to sign the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the dream of the Megali Idea once and for all.

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ments of the population, however, were desperately trying to get organized to oppose occupation and eventual dismemberment. Greece played a central role in the inter-Allied peace talks as well as in the coming into being of the Turkish national movement.

# The Paris Peace Conference and the Greek Position

The defeat of the Ottoman state in World War I and the signing of the Mudros Armistice were greeted with jubilation by the Greeks living within the Ottoman lands as well as in Greece itself. For the first time it looked like the Megali Idea (Great Ideal), the dream that had aroused and inspired all Greeks under the sway of nationalistic ideology since the second half of the nineteenth century, was about to come true (Box 1-19).

Greece was represented by prime minister Elefterios Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference, where the peace terms with the vanquished nations were being discussed. Venizelos was counting on giving satisfaction to the ambitions of the Greek people and leaving his mark in history as the leader who had, for the first time since the Byzantine Empire, brought all the Greeks under the roof of a single state. He had assumed power in 1910 and led the Greeks from war to war. His staying in power depended on the sacrifices of the Greek people being rewarded with the realization of the Megali Idea dream. To understand the nature of the claims put forward by Venizelos at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, we must bear in mind the historic role that he had undertaken to fulfill.

During the war Greece had complied with all Allied demands. It now considered itself fully justified in seeking its due reward. When Venizelos arrived in Paris in November 1918, he was ready to put forward Greece's territorial claims, starting with İzmir. These claims had the full backing of all quarters in Greece, with the exception of the Socialists. The press (again with the exception of the Socialist newspaper *Rizopastis*) was behind Venizelos.

On 30 December 1918 Venizelos submitted a memorandum to the Allied delegates, containing Greece's territorial claims: Northern Epirus (southern Albania), Eastern and Western Thrace excluding Istanbul and the Straits, Pontus (he called it "Trabzon" so that it could unite with Greater Armenia), western Anatolia, İmroz, Bozcaada (Tenedos) and the Dodecanese Islands, and finally, in a roundabout way, Cyprus. The inflated Greek claims were concentrated in western Anatolia. Venizelos let it be known that he might make concessions over the other claims. The Greek prime minister based his claims on Wilson's principle of self-determination and provided statistics on the Greek population of these areas. In the absence of official statistics, these were obtained from church records. To persuade delegates that Greeks outnumbered Muslims in certain areas, Venizelos put forth the idea that the islands were an integral part of Anatolia and, based on this logic, included the population of the islands in the population of the mainland. He also added the Greek colonies in southern Russia to the Greek population of Trabzon. While Venizelos was in Paris, he was being supported by the Greek community in Anatolia and its leadership (Box 1-20).

The Allied reaction to the Greek claims was not uniform. The British and the French, under British influence, wanted to see Greece in control of a large slice of western Anatolia, although they were not prepared to grant all of the Venizelos claims. The U.S. was against the claims because in all the districts outside of İzmir the Greek population was outnumbered by the Muslim population, and the U.S. was opposed on economic grounds to detaching the city of İzmir from its hinterland. Italy was against

# Box 1-20. The Greek Community of Anatolia during the Armistice

When it became apparent that the Ottoman Empire was going to lose the war, the Greek Orthodox patriarch, Germanos V, was forced to resign and the archbishop of Bursa, Dorotheos Mammelis, was proclaimed acting patriarch (locum tenens). Dorotheos set up a "national committee," established contacts with European centers, severed direct links with the Sublime Porte (Bab-: Ali, the Ottoman seat of government), eliminated Turkish from the curricula of Greek community schools, and made the decision to unite with the motherland, Greece. In March 1919 the Patriarchate decided to end all links with the Ottoman state and to refrain from participating in elections. Dorotheos also went to the Paris Peace Conference, where he submitted a memorandum inviting the Allies to liberate the Greek population, which he described as enduring Turkish oppression. The archbishops of Trabzon and Izmir also sent letters to the conference providing statistics and describing the condition of their communities in these regions and appealing to the Allies to save them from Turkish tyranny. The archbishop of Trabzon, Ignoring Venizelos, put forth extravagant claims, which went beyond even the Greek claims. Aside from Lazistan, whose population was totally Muslim, the archbishop wanted to see an autonomous Pontus to be controlled by a single state. This entity would include the province of Trabzon plus Samsun, Sinop, Amasya, and Karahisar. He indicated that this autonomous state would engage in close cooperation with the future Armenian state. Although the conference did not heed these demands, they served the purpose of Greek propaganda in its efforts to sway international public opinion.

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having the Greek claims discussed at the conference. It wanted İzmir to be taken up in conjunction with the peace arrangements for the rest of Anatolia. Furthermore, it considered the Greek claims on İzmir to be in conflict with earlier decisions made in London and St.-Jean-de-Maurienne on the final disposition of the territories in question. Italy considered that these territories should come under its sovereignty.

While the presumed "heirs" waited in harmony for the death of the "sick man," disputes broke out over the disposition of the "estate." Italy was in disagreement with the other Allies over western Anatolia. It also had differences with the U.S. over Fiume in the Adriatic. When these differences became insurmountable, the Italian delegation walked out of the conference on 24 April. The Allies started worrying about Italy's further moves. When the news came on 2 May that Italy had dispatched two cruisers to İzmir, the arch—Greek sympathizer Lloyd George, ignoring the warnings of his military advisors, persuaded President Wilson to allow the Greeks to land in İzmir to forestall an Italian fait accompli. On 6 May the Allies communicated their decision to Greece. When

V. E. Orlando, the head of the Italian delegation, returned to the table on 12 May, he was asked to adhere to the Allied decision. French premier Georges Clemenceau undertook the task of persuading Orlando. He obtained Orlando's consent by not revealing the intention to keep Italy out of İzmir. He said that Greece was landing in İzmir solely to protect the local inhabitants, that this did not imply occupation or laying a claim to the city, and that the final disposition of İzmir would be decided later.


Shortly thereafter, having completed its military preparations, Greece landed its troops in İzmir under the cover of Allied warships.

#### The Occupation of İzmir and Its Consequences

The Greek soldiers who set foot in İzmir on 15 May 1919 were greeted by jubilant crowds of Greeks, headed by Archbishop Hrisostomos. They also found a resentful Turkish-Muslim population. The excesses in the rejoicing of one community and the anger of the other led inevitably to clashes. The first shot fired at the invaders heralded the changes that were about to take place in the destiny of the Anatolian peoples. From then on, the local nationalist resistance movements (Kuva-yı Milliye) would be merged into a force at the national level. Its leadership would be assumed by Mustafa Kemal, who was to set foot in Samsun four days after the Greek landing.

At a time when M. Kemal was striving to organize the nationalist resistance on a nationwide basis, the İstanbul government was responding to the Allied invitation and sending its delegates to the Paris Peace Conference to put forth its views. On 11 and 17 June 1919 Damat Ferit Paşa submitted two memoranda to the conference, containing these views on the Greek territorial claims.

- 1. Thrace: the safeguarding of peace in this region is dependent on the existence of a frontier that would allow Edirne to be effectively defended. The defense requirements of İstanbul also demand such a frontier. To comply with Wilson's principles, and for economic reasons as well, the territories to the north and west of Edirne, with their Turkish majorities, must remain within Ottoman borders.
- 2. Asia Minor: the prewar Turkish-Russian frontier should be restored, with the Black Sea in the north and Mosul and Diyarbakır vilayets in the east and as far as the Mediterranean, including parts of Adana.
- 3. Aegean Islands: the islands off the Ottoman coast are a prolongation of the coast itself. They must remain Ottoman for historic and economic reasons and also to prevent smuggling and allow for the defense of the coast-line.



Map 1-5. The Expansion of Greece

The arguments put forward by Damat Ferit Paşa made no impression on the Allies, and on 27 June the Ottoman delegation was asked to leave the conference. Hungary aside, peace treaties had been concluded with all the vanquished states by then, but the deliberations over the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire dragged on. One of the reasons for the delay was the resistance movement gathering strength in Anatolia. The other reason was the conflicting interests of the Allies, arising from their desire to extend their areas of occupation at the expense of their partners.

By 1919 Mustafa Kemal had overcome the opposition of the groups who sought to become a U.S. mandate under the LoN regime and those who favored resistance at the local level and had managed to unify the resistance at a national level. The Amasya Declaration had been released on 22 June, and the Erzurum (23 July-7 August) and Sivas (4-11 September) congresses had been held. From reports reaching the Allies in Paris regarding the unfolding events in Anatolia, they realized that unless they concluded a peace treaty very soon the situation might develop against their interests. The British High Commission in Istanbul reported that the nationalist movement in Anatolia was gaining strength because of the landing of Greek troops in İzmir. The reports indicated that if the Greek and Italian forces of occupation were to evacuate Anatolia most of the difficulties facing the Allies would disappear, the prestige of the Istanbul government would rise, and the nationalist movement would lose its raison d'être. In this situation Britain and France decided to provide additional support to the Damat Ferit government and on 3 August informed İstanbul that the Greek zone of occupation in Anatolia would be kept within strict limits. But, as already noted, the Anatolia movement's decision to resist was not the only obstacle delaying the advent of peace. The inter-Allied squabbling was also a contributing factor.

The Greeks did not confine themselves to İzmir when they landed their troops. They pushed forward and rapidly extended their occupation to include Turgutlu, Ödemiş, and Aydın. This angered Italy because of its own

designs on the region. Britain's support for Greece was frustrating Italy. Realizing that it could not impose its views in Paris, Italy shifted its policy. It could serve its interests better by making peace and seeking economic privileges, so it set about befriending Turkey. It went even further and started relaying information to M. Kemal about Allied decisions, provided support for the irregulars opposing the Greek advances, and gave sanctuary to these irregulars in its zone of occupation.

At this point France too was beginning to review its policies. Mustafa Kemal's improving relations with the RSFSR and the intensifying nationalist resistance against French occupation in the southern regions during November 1919 were beginning to have an effect on warweary French public opinion.

While France and Italy gauged the nature and resilience of the nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal accurately, Greece and Britain opted for the policy of force. Venizelos felt that M. Kemal did not dispose of a proper army as yet but that an army would come into being and the movement would gather strength if his movement was not crushed soon. The Greek army was ready to do its duty but would expect its due reward in the form of additional territory for its services. With British backing, the Greek army would launch its drive to the interior of Anatolia and toward Ankara itself in the summer of 1920.

# II. THE TURKISH-GREEK STRUGGLE FOR ANATOLIA (1920–1922)

By 1920 the Allies were getting impatient to conclude a peace treaty with the Ottoman state. More than a year had elapsed since the signing of the armistice, yet there was no peace treaty and the Anatolia movement kept gathering momentum. Faced with Mustafa Kemal's pressure, the İstanbul government had held elections in 1919; and the new parliament had adopted the National Pact on 28 January 1920, reflecting the demands of Anatolia. Britain and France wanted to see the treaty signed with minor modifications that would not affect their interests: the Turks would be evicted from Europe, an international arrangement would take charge of Istanbul, and Greece and Italy would be induced to evacuate Anatolia by being offered economic and other privileges. This would pave the way for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia. But when news arrived of the growing intensity of the clashes between Turkish resistance forces and French troops in Cilicia and Maraş and of the massacre of thousands of Armenians in the region, the negotiations were interrupted and the policy of force prevailed. On 16 March 1920 İstanbul was occupied by Allied forces and the parliament building was attacked and taken over. Venizelos was waiting for just this opportunity.

#### The Greek Army's Advance in Anatolia

As the British and the French were engaged in discussing possible changes in the peace terms, Venizelos held that the only way to impose these terms on the Turks would be by crushing the Anatolia movement and sought permission from the Allies to let the Greek army carry out this task. The fate of Venizelos and of his government depended directly on the success of his Anatolian gamble. He had taken Greece into the war despite the king's objections, secured his exile with the help of the Allies, and landed troops in Anatolia without regard to strong domestic opposition. The Greek people had grown weary after enduring many years of war. Nevertheless, the Greek army in Anatolia was getting restless for action. The ethnic Greeks of Anatolia were enthusiastic backers of Venizelos and were eager to see results. To remove Greek troops from Anatolia at this juncture would seal the political fate of Venizelos.

Venizelos knew well that he could not take unilateral action, that he would need the blessing of the Allies before he could order his troops to march forward. Although the Turks were engaged on three fronts (Armenia, Cilicia, and western Anatolia), Greece was unable to take on the nationalist Turkish forces without Allied backing.

Until the spring of 1920, however, the Allies were not prepared to approve the adventurist Greek policies. After the occupation of İstanbul, Venizelos stepped up his pressure on Britain to give him the go-ahead signal. Britain indicated that it could not provide troops to fight in Thrace or Anatolia but that it stood ready to provide whatever arms or military supplies might be necessary. Greece had been notified that it would have to proceed on its own; neither Britain nor France would participate directly in a military operation.

When the Allies occupied İstanbul and dissolved parliament, M. Kemal, who was thoroughly opposed to the parliament meeting in İstanbul, got his chance to convene the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 23 April 1920. The coming into being of a government in Anatolia that represented the national will was a sign that a peace agreement with İstanbul would be rejected by Ankara. Sure enough, as the preparation for Sèvres went ahead at San Remo in April 1920, the resistance movement was gaining in strength in Anatolia. France was involved in talks with the government of the TGNA in May 1920 to conclude an armistice agreement in the southeast.

The armistice negotiations implied France's recognition of the government of the TGNA, and they brought on a sharp reaction in Britain. Furthermore, Turkish nationalists had for the first time skirmished with British troops in the vicinity of İzmit. Against this background the Greeks got Britain's green light to push into Anatolia on 20 June 1920. The Greek army occupied Bursa on 8 July, Tekirdağ on 20 July, Edirne on 25 July, and Uşak on 29 August. As the Greek advance unfolded in Anatolia, the İstanbul government gave in to Allied pressures and signed the Peace Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August.

By the peace treaty Greece was acquiring Thrace, Izmir, and its hinterland and all of the Aegean islands apart from the Dodecanese. Venizelos wanted to capitalize on this success by holding an election. In the election held on 14 November Venizelos was able to obtain only 33% of the votes. Most of these votes were cast in regions that had been annexed by Greece after the Balkan Wars. Venizelos was forced to admit that the Greek nation was tired of war. A new government was formed by Dimitrios Rallis. In the meantime King Alexander had died in exile. Following a referendum held on 5 December, his successor, King Constantine, returned to Greece on 19 December.

The 14 November election had important effects on Greek politics. After the election the gulf separating the supporters of Venizelos, the liberal republicans, and the monarchists widened. This gulf would remain a salient feature of Greek politics for many years. The election also had profound effects on the fate of Anatolia.

Although Rallis was originally opposed to the Anatolia operation, the new government decided to pursue the

Venizelos policy of using the army to compel the Turkish nationalist movement to accept Sèvres. In any case it was difficult to persuade Greek public opinion to accept a withdrawal, when it had no inkling about what was really going on in Anatolia. At this point it would also be very difficult to abandon the ethnic Greeks of Anatolia to their fates. Although Greece maintained its former policies, the Allies changed their position vis-à-vis Greece after the 1920 election.

The Allies were uneasy about the return of King Constantine to Greece. The situation was extremely fluid. The government of the TGNA was consolidating its position and had declared its opposition to Sèvres. It had scored victories over the Armenians and was close to persuading Moscow to provide aid and to engage in cooperation against regional governments enjoying British backing. France was in an extremely delicate position in the south on account of the stiff resistance encountered there. The British and French people wanted to know why their troops were not coming home despite the signing of the peace treaty. In these circumstances the Allies were looking at ways to soften the terms of the Sèvres Treaty. But they had also assumed responsibilities toward Greece by allowing it to land in Anatolia. The return of King Constantine provided the Allies with an excuse for relieving themselves from their responsibilities to Athens.

France articulated its new policy unambiguously: relations must be established with the government of the TGNA and the Greek army must get out of Anatolia. Britain's position was not that clear. It was ready to revise Sèvres so as to secure a split between the government of Ankara and the Bolsheviks, but it did not favor a Greek withdrawal even if it had cut financial aid to Athens. In these circumstances it followed a policy of "wait and see." Britain was determined to safeguard its interests whatever the outcome of the standoff; meanwhile it would pursue the war through its proxy Greece. The appraisal of the Turkish-Greek battles of 1921–22 should be made against this background of relations between Greece and its allies after the election of 1920.

In 1921 the tide started turning in favor of Turkey. In the east the Peace Treaty of Gümrü had been signed with Armenia and preparations were going ahead for a treaty with Moscow. In the south the French army was in difficulties, and Paris was seeking ways to reach an armistice agreement with Ankara from May 1920 on. Italy was maintaining its covert support to Ankara. Mustafa Kemal had declared his rejection of Sèvres and his determination to pursue the armed struggle until the objectives of the National Pact had been attained. Relations with the Istanbul government had been severed, and Anatolia's fate was

now in the hands of the nationalists. The armed bands and irregulars had been replaced by a regular army. Peace in the east allowed some troops to be deployed to the western front. The fighting spirit of the army was high, despite shortages of materials and supplies.

In Greece the opposite situation applied. After the 1920 election the Allies had cut their aid. Only Britain continued to support Greece in Anatolia, and this was confined to moral support. The army was tired of waiting and was getting anxious to return to Greece. The soldiers began questioning the need to fight on behalf of their Anatolian kin, whose habits differed from theirs and who, while providing financial support, refrained from fighting for their own cause. At this point the new Rallis government made changes in the army high command and put Venizelos opponents in top positions. These changes proved to be misguided. The Greek Communists were exploiting the restlessness in army ranks by distributing tracts that exhorted soldiers not to fight for the imperialist cause. Despite these unfavorable factors, the Rallis government was quick to launch a new operation in Anatolia.

#### The First Battle of İnönü

The royalist Rallis government wanted to demonstrate the resolve of the Greek army. It also wanted to confirm that it had not abandoned the Venizelos policies. So the order to advance was issued. On 6 January the Greek army moved in two directions: from Bursa toward Eskişehir and from Uşak toward Afyon. The prime objective was Eskişehir, located on the İstanbul-Baghdad railroad. On 9 January 1921 the Greeks came into contact with the Turkish army under the command of Colonel İsmet [İnönü] in the İnönü region. After two days of clashes the Greek army withdrew to its original positions for a larger operation. The success of the Turks led Gen. Anastasios Papoulas to request reinforcements but did not shake his confidence in his ability to take Eskişehir.

The first Battle of İnönü was not a decisive encounter, but it was important as the first time the two armies had fought one another. It had a very positive effect on Ankara's morale. More than its military consequences, its diplomatic consequences were noteworthy. The treaty negotiations underway with Moscow were given a boost, and the Allies decided to convene a conference in London to revise Sèvres. This situation would also allow Ankara to play Moscow against the West.

### The London Conference

In the new circumstances prevailing in Anatolia, Britain, France, and Italy decided to invite İstanbul and Athens to the London Conference scheduled to take place on 21

February 1921. The invitation addressed to the İstanbul government called for the inclusion of representatives from the government of the TGNA within the İstanbul delegation. At the TGNA doubts were expressed about the true Allied intentions, which were perceived as being designed to gain time for the Greeks after the first Battle of İnönü. M. Kemal stated that this invitation would not be accepted. His condition for attending the conference was an invitation addressed directly to Ankara. When the Allies complied with this request and sent a proper invitation, Bekir Sami Bey (who is sometimes referred to as Bekir Sami Kunduh because his father was called Musa Kunduh Paşa, as if his last name was Kunduh) went to London upon his return from Moscow.

The invitation to the London Conference shook up the domestic political scene in Greece. After having responded positively to the Allied invitation, Rallis was castigated for being conciliatory and forced to resign. He was replaced by Nikolaos Kalogeropoulos, who was expected to demonstrate Greece's determination to the Allies. On 23 February the Allies heard the Turkish views. Although there were two Turkish delegations at the conference, İstanbul's representative, Tevfik Paşa, ceded the floor to Bekir Sami Bey. As a result, the Ankara government's view was heard as the Turkish view. Bekir Sami Bey started off by repeating that Ankara did not recognize the Treaty of Sèvres. He went on to demand the withdrawal of Greek troops from Thrace and İzmir, the evacuation of İstanbul by the Allies, and the recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits.

After Bekir Sami Bey's speech, the Allies presented their views on the revisions they were prepared to make in the Treaty of Sèvres. These were minor changes in the terms relating to Istanbul and the Straits, the Financial Commission, minorities, and Armenia. The contemplated changes were far from meeting Ankara's expectations. In regard to the revisions dealing with İzmir, the city would remain under Turkish sovereignty; but a Greek armed presence would remain in the city, and law and order would be maintained by a force of gendarmes under Allied command and reflecting the ethnic composition of the city's population. The administration would be under a Christian governor to be designated by the LoN. He would be assisted by an elected general assembly and an administrative assembly. The governor would be responsible for delivering to the Turkish government a specific proportion of the city's tax revenues. This status would be reviewed in five years upon the request of one of the two sides. It was also proposed that a census be held in the region to determine the size of the Turkish and Greek populations. There was no question of Ankara accepting these terms, but the Turkish delegation left London with the request that it be given twenty-four days to examine them further. Upon Bekir Sami's return to Ankara, the agreements that he had signed while on this trip were sharply criticized at the TGNA and were not ratified. Bekir Sami himself was dismissed.

# The Greek Army's Advance on Afyon and Eskişehir and the Second Battle of İnönü

Even before the Turkish delegation returned to Ankara from the London Conference, the Greek army had launched its offensive. As on the previous occasion two months earlier, it thrust forward from Bursa to Eskişehir and from Uşak to Afyon farther south. On 27 March it occupied Afyon without meeting serious resistance. In the north it was confronted by a regular army under İsmet Paşa's command. This force held fortified positions and was armed beyond the expectation of the advancing Greek army. The clashes started at the İnönü positions on 27 March and lasted three days, after which the Greek army started an orderly retreat on 1 April. The Greeks were meeting their first reverse because of their attack plan, hastily conceived without a proper appraisal of the adversary's forces. The Greek haste was due to the perceived need to deal a crushing blow to Ankara before it had time to get its military forces properly organized. In their haste the Greek commanders were unable to perceive that the forces they were confronting were no longer the opponents of 1920.

Despite this setback the Greek general staff continued its probes, seeking a military victory. The second operation had been undertaken with the arrival of reinforcements. Now a better-prepared summer operation would be undertaken in order to strike a decisive blow at Ankara. Reservists were quickly mobilized, and the size of the Greek army in Anatolia was doubled, reaching 200,000 men at its peak strength. Most of these soldiers were not adequately trained or subject to proper military discipline.

The Greeks had not lost hope, but the second Battle of İnönü provided Ankara with important diplomatic dividends. The Italians had started their evacuation of Antalya in June. France sent Henri Franklin-Bouillon and initiated peace negotiations, while evacuating Zonguldak. Britain released forty of the Malta exiles in April and made proposals through Gen. Charles Harrington to initiate peace talks. The talks were unproductive, but the government of the TGNA gained prestige in the eyes of the Allies.

While Greece was pressing on with preparations for a new offensive, Britain made an attempt at mediation in June. Having completed its preparations for an offensive, Greece rebuffed Britain. It knew well that it had to win a decisive victory over Ankara if it was going to keep alive its hopes of establishing itself in Anatolia. The talks between the government of the TGNA and General Harrington proved inconclusive, and Britain realized that the two armies were destined to settle their scores on the battlefield. Thereupon Britain decided to relax its policy of neutrality, adopted after the Greek election of November 1920, and tilt toward Greece. At that point Britain would be helpful by opening the Straits to Greek shipping and allowing these ships to carry supplies to Anatolia from Istanbul and other Marmara Sea locations. Depending on developments, weapons and financial assistance were also to be provided at a later stage. Greece understood that Britain's position would become clearer after the military operation.

### The Battle of Sakarya

On 10 July the Greek army resumed its advance for the third time in seven months. As on the previous occasions, the objective was to capture the rail link between Eskişehir and Afyon. But this time a different strategy was being followed. All of the Greek forces would converge on Kütahya and then swing north to Eskişehir. Kütahya was captured on 17 July. On that day Mustafa Kemal went to the front and ordered the army to retreat. While the Turkish army was trying to delay the Greek advance with rearguard action, an effort was being made to move military supplies eastward by rail. By the time Eskişehir fell on 19 July the Turkish had already evacuated the city, and by 25 July all of the Turkish forces had retreated east of the Sakarya River. The Greeks were beginning to think that the road to Ankara was now open to their forces.

Mustafa Kemal was implementing the policy of pulling back despite the strong domestic opposition. In doing this he was risking his political fortune. His objective was to draw the Greek army away from its operational center while regrouping his own forces. Although he drew strong criticism in the TGNA, he was allowed to assume the supreme command with special powers for a period of three months.

On 14 August the Greek army left its positions east of Eskişehir and started its march on Ankara. After advancing for nine days in territory inhabited by an alien population, it encountered the Turkish army on 24 August. Following pitched battles that lasted three weeks, the Turkish army counterattacked and pushed the Greek forces west

of the Sakarya River. As the Greek army retreated toward Eskişehir, it was destroying everything that could be of use to the Turks: railroad bridges were being blown up, and evacuated villages were being torched.

For Greece, the Battle of Sakarya was the end of the dream to impose Sèvres on Ankara by force of arms. Sakarya was to lead to a series of diplomatic successes for Ankara. On 13 October the Treaty of Kars was signed with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; on 20 October the Treaty of Ankara with France; on 23 October an agreement for the exchange of prisoners with Britain.

The Battle of Sakarya caused profound demoralization among the people of Greece. There was widespread skepticism about Greece's war aims. The army in Anatolia was suffering from serious shortages, providing Communists with opportunities to intensify their pacifist propaganda to the soldiers.

The majority of the Anatolian Greeks held the king and the royalist government responsible. After the 1920 election the National Defense Movement based in Istanbul, consisting of Venizelos backers, intensified its activities. In the election for patriarch held on 6 December 1921, Meletios Metaksakis, a Cretan cleric, was chosen despite the opposition of Athens. Metaksakis was pro-Venizelos and opposed to the monarchy. From then on, the idea of an independent Ionian state started gathering increasing support. The adherents of the idea were mostly the Greeks of Thrace and western Anatolia. Those who lived in central Anatolia, known as the Orthodox of Karaman, had started shifting their support to the government of the TGNA (Box 1-21).

#### The General Offensive

The development of the national defense movement in Anatolia started raising concern in Athens and led to a change in the high command of the army prior to the General Offensive. Papoulas, the commander-in-chief of the Anatolian armies, was dismissed and replaced by the commander of the army in Thrace, Georgios Hacianestis. This officer had no Anatolian experience, was a strict disciplinarian, and had a poor reputation among the ranks because of personality problems. The last-minute change in the command would be one of the weaknesses of the Greek army in the decisive encounter.

Feeling itself under growing pressure, the Greek government made an appeal to Britain for immediate help. The government warned Britain that without such help it would evacuate Anatolia unilaterally, leaving Britain alone to sort out its problems with Mustafa Kemal. The help being sought from Britain was not just moral support

#### Box 1-21. Papa Eftim and the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate

The members of the community known as the Karamanlıs were of the Orthodox Christian faith but spoke Turkish as their mother tongue. They lived in the region of Konya, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kayseri, and Ankara. There are different theories about their origins. According to some historians, these people were of Greek extraction; but as the Turks settled in Anatolia, they gave up their own language and shifted to Turkish. According to other historians, the Karamanlıs were among the earliest Turkish settlers of Anatolia. Having encountered Christianity before Islam, they adopted the Christian faith.

Because the Karamanlis lived in the interior, they remained immune to Greek nationalism for a long time. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that Greek nationalism started directing its attention at the Karamanlis. During the War of Liberation, their stance differed from that of the other Christian populations. In April 1921 they sent telegrams to several newspaper editors, declaring that they wanted to break away from the Phanar Patriarchate for pursuing policies detrimental to the state. Their aim, they declared, was to set up a Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, since they were Turks. Like the Bulgarians, they had a right to have their own independent national church. Subsequently they applied to their local governors to register their claims formally.

The Karamanlis were led by the acting bishop of Keskin, Pavli Eftim, who took the family name Erenerol after 1934 and was known as Papa Eftim. Papa Eftim remained in permanent contact with M. Kemal and actively supported the cause of the National Struggle. He worked hard not only in the region of Keskin but also

in adjacent districts to block the subversive activities of the agents of the Phanar Patriarchate.

Immediately after the General Offensive on 29 August an ecclesiastical congress was convened on 21 September 1922 under the presidency of Prokobios, the archbishop of Konya. In this congress, where eighty ecclesiastical districts were represented by seventy-two clerics, the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate was founded, with a Holy Synod of twelve laymen. An account of the proceedings was then sent to the TGNA. This Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate was never recognized by the Patriarchate of Phanar.

Papa Eftim identified himself not as a friend of the Turks but as an authentic Turk. Mustafa Kemal described his services during the National Struggle as being as valuable as the services of an army. Papa Eftim was the bearer of the Independence Medal (Istiklal Madalyası), awarded to the veterans of the War of Liberation. And yet he was unable to spare his community of Karamanlis from the "catastrophe" of the postwar exchange of populations. During the exchange he moved to Istanbul to set up his own church and to continue his struggle with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Phanar. Small to begin with, the community dwindled with the passage of time. While the Turkish government lent him support in the first instance, its interest waned as Turkish-Greek relations developed in the 1930s.

Papa Eftim died on 14 March 1968 and was succeeded by his son, Turgut Erenerol. When Turgut Erenerol passed away, the community consisted of just the Erenerol family.

(M. FIRAT)

but tangible aid. Britain was also reminded that British Middle East policy would come apart if Greece removed itself from the struggle. While Britain's reply to the request for tangible aid was negative, it proposed a meeting of the three Allies in Paris to seek a diplomatic solution to the Anatolian problem.

On 22 March 1922 the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Italy met in Paris. On 27 March telegrams were sent to Athens and Ankara, in which the three ministers declared that they had met to restore peace in the Middle East and secure the evacuation of Anatolia without loss of life or property. To this end they demanded an immediate armistice, during which the two sides would refrain from reinforcing their armies.

The next day the three Allies communicated their peace terms:

- A. The LoN would get directly involved in the protection of minorities in both Turkey and Greece, in the implementation of rules to secure such protection, and in the establishment of an Armenian homeland.
- B. To secure the freedom of the Straits, a demilitarized zone would be established in the Gallipoli peninsula and in the region of the Straits.
- C. The boundary in Thrace would be redrawn to al-

- low Turkey to retain Tekirdağ and Greece to hold Kırkkilise, Babaeski, and Edirne.
- D. İzmir would remain Turkish, but the Greek population of the city, as well as the Turks of Edirne, would be fairly represented in the two city administrations.
- E. After the conclusion of peace İstanbul would be evacuated by the Allies.
- F. The ceiling placed on the Turkish armed forces by the Treaty of Sèvres would be raised from 50,000 to 85,000 men and the Turkish military would still be professional soldiers.
- G. The Financial Commission would be abolished, while a system would be devised to reconcile Turkey's sovereignty with the protection of the economic interests of the Allies and the payment of war reparations.
- H. A committee would be set up to secure revisions in the judicial and economic capitulations.

While Greece responded positively to the Allied proposal for an armistice, it did not accept the peace terms. The minister of foreign affairs of the government of the TGNA, Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk], declared that Turkey would accept an armistice only on the condition that there would be a concurrent evacuation of Anatolia. If

agreement was reached on this point, Turkey would be ready to dispatch its delegates within three weeks to negotiate the peace terms.

The Allies refused to evacuate Anatolia concurrently with an armistice. They declared that such an evacuation would be considered only if Ankara accepted all of the peace terms. While these diplomatic contacts were going on, Ankara completed its preparations to deal the final blow to the Greek army, which Ankara knew was in a precarious situation.

The offensive was launched on 26 August. Within a short time the Greek lines were breached and the Greek army was in full retreat. The Greek forces had practically lost their contact with İzmir, and the orders coming from there bore no relation to the situation on the ground. The officers in the battlefield were acting on their own initiatives. By 30 August the Greek army had been effectively destroyed at the Battle of the Commander-in-Chief. After that, Hacianestis was dismissed by Athens and replaced by Gen. Nikolaos Trikoupis as commander-in-chief. Trikoupis would be informed of his appointment by Mustafa Kemal after being captured in Uşak.

Following a chase lasting ten days, the Turkish army entered İzmir on 9 September. It was now the turn of the Turks to display their jubilation the way the Greeks had done on 15 May 1919. Much confusion accompanied the jubilation, however. The Greek population of the region was also fleeing, along with the defeated Greek army. They were fearful of the possible consequences of four years of hostile occupation. İzmir was overrun by refugees. All available craft were desperately trying to ferry people to the offshore islands. One day before the arrival of the Turkish army in İzmir, the Greek navy weighed anchor and, amid the saluting Allied warships, sailed to Çeşme to evacuate the remnants of the Greek army.

Although law and order was restored after the Turkish army entered the city, individual killings were going on. It was impossible to control the urge for revenge resulting from four years of enmity between the non-Muslim and Muslim populations. The most striking instance was the lynching of the archbishop of İzmir by a crowd at the instigation of "Bearded" Nurettin Paşa. On 13 September the city was to suffer a terrible fate. A fire broke out in the district inhabited by non-Muslims (Punta, the present-day Alsancak) and spread rapidly to reach the waterfront. The responsibility for this fire is still a matter of dispute among historians. The majority of Turkish historians claim that it was the Greeks or the Armenians who started the fire, while Greek and European historians assert that it was the Turks, driven by feelings of revenge, who started the fire.

In any case, the result was plain: some quarters of İzmir were turned to ash.

The Turkish army entered Bursa on 10 September and Bandirma and Mudanya on 17 September. The advance toward Çanakkale and the Straits was proceeding despite the diplomatic efforts of the Allies, and only a narrow strip of neutral territory remained between the Turkish and British troops. Although the Turkish units entered Çanakkale on 23 September and the neutral zone the next day, diplomatic contacts were taking place to conclude an armistice. Thanks to Mustafa Kemal's wisdom and statesmanship, the Chanak affair (see "Relations with Britain" above) did not lead to fighting and the armistice talks (see "The Armistice of Mudanya" below) could get underway.

On 19 October Refet Paşa [Bele] was appointed governor of Eastern Thrace and charged with the duty of taking over the region from the occupation authority. When it became apparent that the Turkish army would enter Thrace, the Christian population started evacuating the region and moving to Western Thrace. Within a short period thousands of refugees had moved to Greece, leaving their homes and property behind. When the refugees arrived in Western Thrace, they took possession of the property and livestock of the Muslim population of that region. Once again it was the civilians on both sides who were suffering the consequences of war.

In October 1922 the Turkish-Greek war came to an end. This war demonstrated once again that the flow of history cannot be reversed. The Greek army charged into Anatolia with the dream of restoring the multinational Byzantine Empire and came to grief at the hands of the Turkish army, which was seeking to break away from the multinational Ottoman Empire and create a nation-state. Given the historic trend, the result could not have been otherwise: the twentieth century was to be the century of nationalism and of the nation-state. Turkey and Greece accepted this reality at Lausanne and established the foundation of a new relationship between the two countries.

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## Relations with the Middle East

Although the term "Middle East" is widely used today, it was employed for the first time in World War II when Britain established the Middle East Command in Egypt. Previously the region had been known as the Near East. Both terms reflected a European vantage point; the region was east of Europe but closer than the Far East.

The confusion in the terminology is also reflected in the different ways in which the region is delimited.

In its broadest sense the Middle East stretches from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east and from Turkey in the north to Ethiopia in the south. Some scholars include India, the Balkan Peninsula, and even the Caucasus. There are also more restrictive descriptions of the Middle East.

In this book the Middle East is understood to be the region stretching from Egypt to Pakistan. It includes Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the countries of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria), and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen).

Many ethnic and religious groups coexist in the Middle East, the birthplace of writing and of the three monotheistic religions. Arabs are the dominant ethnic group, followed by Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, Kurds, Jews, Afghans, Armenians, Assyrians, Beluchis, and Copts (Box 1-22).

The region is just as complex in religious composition. There is a majority of Muslims, who share the region with Christians and Jews. Two-thirds of the Muslims are Sunni and the remainder Shiite. In addition, there are the Kharijites, Nusairi, and Druze sects. Among the Christians, the Orthodox, who owe allegiance to the Patriarchate of İstanbul, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, are in a majority. Other churches broke away in the fourth and fifth centuries, including the Gregorian Armenian, Coptic, Nestorian, Syrian, and Maronite churches, plus the Melchite Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Coptic Catholic, and Chaldean churches. To this should be added the Ro-

man Catholics and the Protestants. Another small group is the Yezidis. Religious affiliations frequently cut across ethnic groups (see Box 1-22, following page).

After the nineteenth century the Middle East started attracting the attention of the great powers, especially after the discovery of oil. The region quickly became a scene of competition among the powers. The complex religious and ethnic structure of the area became even more complicated with the advent of nationalism. This mix turned the Middle East into a bundle of unresolved problems that have remained with us to this day.

While it was striving to establish its nation-state and afterward, Turkey had its face turned to the West, in keeping with its basic ideology. This orientation meant that its relations with the Middle East, and especially with the Arab countries, remained limited. But a number of factors helped change this course, including geography, history, and culture. However much it had its eyes fixed on Europe, the Middle Eastern countries were Turkey's neighbors. Just as it was a Balkan and a Caucasus country, it was also a Middle Eastern country and could not avoid relations with the Middle East to deal with common problems.

In addition to geography, the region also shared a long common history. Ottoman sovereignty was established over the Middle East in the sixteenth century. With the exception of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the countries of the Middle East lived under Ottoman administration for centuries and conducted their initial nationalistic struggles against the Ottomans. This long common existence created many positive and negative sentiments among the countries involved. When Turkey or the Middle Eastern countries probe into their past, they cannot avoid running into their joint history. The ties of history bind Turkey firmly to the Middle East.

Despite its secular official structure, Turkey's population is overwhelmingly Muslim, sharing many common cultural traits with the peoples of the Middle East. Shared religious beliefs bring the people closer together,

irrespective of the state of official relations. While Turkey is not an Arab country and its state structure is not based on Islam, its Muslim background ensures that it will remain inextricably linked to the Middle East.

#### I. RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES

When the Mudros Armistice was signed on 30 October 1918, the British army had just occupied Aleppo and had reached the southern regions of Mosul and İskenderun. At the time, the Ottoman forces holding the front against the British consisted of the 6th Army under the command of Ali İhsan Paşa [Sabis] in Mosul; the 2nd Army with headquarters in Adana, attached to the Lightning Group of Armies under the command of Otto Liman von Sanders; and the 7th Army at Raco. In addition there were some forces in Tripoli and Bengazi and three units attached to the Lightning Group of Armies in the Arabian Peninsula: the Mobile Force of Hijaz under the command of the governor of Medina, Fahreddin Paşa [Türkkan]; a division at Asir under Muhiddin Paşa; and an army corps in Yemen under Tevfik Paşa.

### A. The Mudros Armistice and Subsequent Developments

When we look at the military arrangements made in the Middle East after the Mudros Armistice, we see the implementation of article 5, which calls for the immediate demobilization of the Turkish army other than the forces needed to control the frontiers and maintain internal order. Article 16 stipulated that all garrisons in Hijaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq must surrender to the nearest Allied command; all forces in Cilicia except for the forces needed for the purposes mentioned in article 5 were to be evacuated. Article 17 provided that all Turkish officers in Tripoli and Bengazi should surrender to the nearest Italian garrison. Article 18 stated that all ports under occupation in Tripoli and Bengazi, including Misrata, should be surrendered to the Allies. Concerning military occupation, only article 10 stipulated that the railroad tunnels in the Taurus Mountains would come under Allied occupation.

No boundaries were traced in Mudros; nor was it clear which areas were included in the regions of Syria, Iraq, and Cilicia that were mentioned in article 16. When M. Kemal took over the command of the Lightning Group

#### Box 1-22. The Suryanis

The Suryani, as the ancient people of the Middle East identify themselves, is a name that can be translated into English alternatively as Syriacs, Syrians, Assyrians, and Assyrian-Chaldeans. Their numbers have dwindled in recent years in Turkey. Their history is very complex but can best be summarized in the following manner.

When dealing with Christian sects in the Middle East, we must first examine the term "Suryani," which is often confused with ethnic groups. "Suryani" has one broad and several narrow definitions. In the broad sense the Suryani are the source of several other sects. These are the first Christians, the Arameans (Arami), meaning "people of the mountain" in Chaldean. The Arameans were a Semitic tribe that spread its language throughout the Middle East, Jesus spoke Aramaic.

When differences in doctrine on the nature of Christ arose, the Christians split into two groups at the Council of Chalcedony in 451 AD. The first group accepted the council's ruling that Christ had a divine and human nature. These were known as Rumi (meaning Roman), also known as Melchites (Melkai or the emperor's men; they were the Byzantines, the forebears of the present-day Greek Orthodox Church). According to them, the two natures of Christ were unmixable, unalterable, and inseparable. The second group rejected the council's ruling and became known as the Monophysites. They maintained that Christ has one nature, partly divine and partly human, and they broke away from the Eastern church (in Byzantium). Seen from a political perspective, they were the ones who wanted to get rid of the Byzantine influence. It is said that they welcomed the outcome of the Battle of Malazgirt (the Turkish victory against the Byzantines in 1071). The Coptic, Suryani, and Armenian churches can be classified as Monophysite. After this there were splits within the Suryani Church.

The first to break away were the Nestorians (Nasturi), also known as the eastern Suryani and Assyrians (Asuri). When the teaching of Nestorios, the patriarch of Constantinople, that the divine and human natures of Christ were separate was rejected by the Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedony (451), the Nestorians broke away. They stressed the human nature of Christ. The Nestorians developed in Syria and Anatolia and came under the influence of Iran.

In 1445 the Nestorians broke into two groups. (1) the Cypriots, who accepted the teachings of the Roman Church (that is, Catholicism); and (2) those who did not, known as Assyrians in the narrow sense.

The group that broke away from the Nestorians in 1551 and united with the Roman Church became known as the Chaldeans (Keldani). This term was used for the first time by the pope to distinguish the Cypriot Nestorians who were linked to Rome from the Assyrians.

With the breaking away of the Nestorians, the remainder were referred to as Jacobites (Yakubi) and also West Suryani or just Suryani. These are the ones who remained under Byzantine influence.

Some of the Jacobites came under the influence of the Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries and broke away in 1656 to form the Suryani Catholics. The remainder would be referred to as Suryani Orthodox. The famous Deir Zafaran (Deyrulzafaran) monastery at Mardin; dating back to the fifth century, belongs to the Suryani Orthodox sect.


of Armies for a short spell after the armistice, he asked the Ministry of War what was intended by Syria and Cilicia. The ministry replied that Syria included only the vilayet of Damascus, from which Aleppo, where three-quarters of the population were Turkish even if they spoke Arabic, was excluded. The ministry also added that the regions of Iskenderun, Antakya, Cebelseman, Katma, and Kilis had Turkish populations. There was no doubt in Istanbul that Mosul, where the 6th Army was deployed, was Turkish territory.

But the British did not share this view. Mosul had been the subject of tough bargaining during World War I. To implement the agreement in a way that would safeguard British interests, it was essential to bring Mosul under British administration. Furthermore, oil had been discovered in the Mosul region, with indications of more deposits elsewhere in the area. The question went beyond the simple apportionment of land.

As a matter of fact, Britain started occupying the lands it had not been able to overrun during the war, even though the Mudros Armistice contained no provisions to justify such action. A week after the signing of the armistice, Britain occupied Aleppo and İskenderun on 9 November. Britain subsequently allowed France to take over these places.

A similar development proved to be more problematic in Mosul, because the Turkish commander Ali İhsan Pasa refused to evacuate the region. Britain was convinced that it must take over the area without delay, so it claimed that the local Armenians were evacuating Mosul out of fear for their safety. With this pretext Britain invoked article 7 of the armistice agreement, which allowed Allied occupation to restore order, and demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces. Ali İhsan Paşa rejected the British claims and declared that all the measures were in place in the city to ensure the maintenance of order. On 7 November he was notified that if the Ottoman army failed to evacuate Mosul by 15 November he would be held personally accountable for any loss of life. Istanbul remained passive in the affair, and Ali İhsan Paşa did not want to act on his own initiative, so the evacuation of the city started on 8 November. The British flag was hoisted on the building that housed the governor's office. By 15 November Mosul was totally under British control.

Although the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement had allocated the region to France, Britain had no intention of allowing this oil-rich region to pass into French hands (Box 1-23). In December 1918 French premier Clemenceau agreed to allow Mosul to be included in the British zone of influence. Thus began the Mosul question, which was



Map 1-6. The Sykes-Picot Agreement

to be a source of tension between Britain and Turkey and to which a solution could not be found at the Lausanne Conference.

### B. Conflicting Interests over the Middle East at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and the Arab Policies of the Representative Delegation (Heyet-i Temsiliye)

In January 1919 the conflicts of interest among the participants of the Paris Peace Conference came to the surface. During the war Britain had made overlapping promises to its allies and to the Arabs and Jews in secret agreements, and now each contender wanted its piece of territory. When the peace conference got underway, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine were under British occupation and Cilicia under French occupation. Emir Faisal had established his administration in Damascus.

During the conference Britain was striving to reconcile the conflicting French, Arab, and Zionist interests. France indicated that after Mosul it would accept no other changes to the arrangements made in the course of the war. The spokesman for the Arabs, Emir Faisal, signed an agreement on 3 January 1919, in which he allowed Jewish immigration to Palestine in return for the promise of independence. The Zionist delegation sought to have the Balfour Declaration adopted at the conference and to secure a British mandate over Palestine.

At the beginning of the conference President Wilson was the principal actor, declaring that the wartime secret accords were invalid. He took a stand in favor of

#### Box 1-23. Secret Agreements on the Middle East

After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 the socialist government in Moscow revealed the contents of secret inter-Allied agreements on the Middle East. This created an uproar, not only because it exposed the secret appropriation of territories but also because it laid bare how Britain had made promises about the disposition of the same territory to both Arabs and Zionists.

#### Agreements Signed among the Allies

The Agreement on Istanbul (18 March 1915): the document signed by Britain, France, and Russia contained provisions for turning the Straits into a free port, while Russia recognized that Britain and France had special rights over Turkey's Asian territories. The Muslim holy sites would be detached from Turkey and, together with Arabia, placed under Muslim control.

The London Agreement (26 April 1915): when it became necessary to review the Istanbul Agreement after Italy joined the war on the side of the Allies, a new agreement was signed by Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. By this agreement the Dodecanese Islands (under Italian occupation since 1912) as well as Libya were promised to Italy. Italy was acknowledged to have special rights in the Mediterranean and was promised a share in the Antalya region.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916): the foreign ministers of Britain and France signed this agreement to partition the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman state. Although prior Russian agreement had been sought for this agreement on 26 April, it was kept secret from the Italians as well as from the Arabs. Under its terms, (1) Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Bitlis, Muş, and Siirt would be given to Russia. (2) France would get coastal Syria, the vilayet of

Adana in Cilicia, and the regions of Antep-Mardin, Aladag-Kayseri, and Egin-Harput. (3) Britain was to receive southern Iraq (including Baghdad) and the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine. (4) A confederation of Arab states or an Independent Arab state would be established in the region between the territories under British and French sovereignty. But here too there would be a division into British and French zones of influence. Syria's hinterland and Mosul would be under French influence, while Britain's zone of influence would extend from Palestine to the Iranian border. (5) Iskenderun (Alexandretta) would become a free port. (6) Palestine would be placed under international administration.

The Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne (17 April 1917): to appease the Italians, who had become aware of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, they were offered the region between İzmir and Antalya, including Konya, as well as a zone of influence to the north of this region.

#### Talks between Britain and Arab Nationalists

The British decided to provide financial aid and weapons to Sharif Hussein, who proposed to start an armed revolt against the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the borders of the Independent Arab kingdom that would be established after the war were traced. Once the agreement in principle had been reached, the Arab revolt was started in June 1916. On 2 November 1916 Sharif Hussein declared himself "King of the Arab Lands."

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self-determination and proposed that a committee be set up to determine which Arab territories would come under which country's mandate. When Britain and France opposed this proposal, the U.S. set up the King-Crane Commission to report on the situation in the region (Box1-24).

The report of the King-Crane Commission was never considered at the conference. By the time the document appeared (28 August), President Wilson had left the conference because of negative reactions back in the U.S. Britain and France ignored this report that reflected the wishes of the local inhabitants.

When it became clear that the Paris Conference was not going to fulfill the expectations of the Arabs, their nationalist movement took a stand against Britain and especially France. Uprisings broke out in different localities. At this stage Arab nationalists established some contacts with Turkish nationalists, who had also taken a stand against occupation; but nothing much came from these contacts. Nevertheless, it is on the record that there was increasing sympathy in Syria for the Turks, that the press was supporting Mustafa Kemal's movement, and that he was using every opportunity to urge the Syrians to resort

#### Box 1-24. The King-Crane Commission

The U.S. government set up a commission consisting of Dr. Henry C. King (the president of Oberlin College in the U.S.) and Charles Crane (an American businessman). The commission went to the Middle East in May-July 1919 and submitted a report on its findings on 28 August, According to this report, the Arabs of Syria and Palestine wanted a fully independent Syrian state that included Palestine and Lebanon. Failing this, they were in favor of an American or British mandate. In any case they were opposed to a French mandate and to Zionism. The commission made the following recommendations. Syria should become a kingdom under Emir Faisal and include Palestine. It should be placed under a U.S. or British mandate, with an international administration to oversee the holy places in Palestine. The committee members also spoke to the Iraqi Arabs and determined that they wanted full independence and were against their country becoming a mandated territory. The committee therefore made no recommendation regarding a country to take over the mandate there. The state of Iraq would be established within the Diyarbakir, Mosul, and Mohammara triangle and come under the rule of Emir Abdullah or Emir Zeid. The commission also had talks with the leaders of the Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti (Association for the Development of Kurdistan).

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to arms and resist the attempts of foreign powers to dismember their country.

When British troops evacuated Syria and Cilicia in November 1919 and were replaced by French troops, contacts with Arab nationalists intensified. M. Kemal made maximum use of this opportunity. Salahi R. Sonyel has summarized the Arab policies of the Representative Delegation thus: "To secure the cooperation of the inhabitants of the Arab lands lying beyond the southern frontiers of Turkey; to force the French to fight on two fronts and thereby compel them to reach an agreement with Turkish nationalists on Cilicia; to foment trouble on the Iraqi border in order to harass the British" (Sonyel 1995, pp. 194–95).

Whatever goals the Turkish and Arab nationalists may have pursued in their contacts and whatever the actual policies of the Representative Delegation may have been, the official Arab policy of the government of the TGNA took shape in the National Pact.

### C. Arab Policies from the National Pact to Sèvres

As we have already seen, the National Pact embodying the objectives of the War of Liberation was adopted on 28 January 1920 by the last Ottoman Parliament. Its first article enunciated the policy vis-à-vis the Arabs. It provided that the future of those Ottoman territories with Arab majorities that were under enemy occupation on 30 October 1918 when the armistice was signed should be determined by the freely expressed will of their inhabitants. The Turkish nationalists acknowledged the right of the Arabs to self-determination but placed three conditions on where this right would apply: there must be an Arab majority, this majority must be settled, and the area must be under enemy occupation on 30 October 1918. By these criteria Mosul and Iskenderun were included within the National Pact boundaries and excluded from Arab territories whose future would be determined by plebiscite.

Although Turkey's national policy envisaged self-determination for the Arabs, international politics would not allow this to happen. At the preparatory conference that opened on 24 April 1920 the mandate treaties previously adopted at San Remo were signed. Under this system France was given Syria and Britain was given Iraq and Palestine. Article 4 of the mandate agreement that France signed with the LoN provided that France could not relinquish any portion of its mandate to another state. Britain added the Balfour Declaration to its mandate agreement on Palestine (Box 1-25).

#### Box 1-25. The Balfour Declaration

During World War I the Zionist movement under Chaim Weizmann was in constant contact with the governments of Britain and the U.S. As a result of these contacts, the British foreign secretary, Lord A. J. Balfour, sent a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild, who was Jewish, Informing him that his government viewed the Jewish Zionist aspirations with sympathy and would provide every facility to secure the establishment of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine on condition that this did not prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish Inhabitants of Palestine and that the rights and political status of Jews in other countries also would not be affected. By setting up a national home for Jews in the territory that was promised to Sharif Hussein as part of the Arab Kingdom, Britain was sowing the seeds of the conflict that has lasted to our day.

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The Syrian National Assembly, which met in March, declared that Greater Syria had been established, including Palestine and Jordan, and proclaimed Faisal king of Syria. The French administration in Syria realized that it would not be able to rule the country without getting rid of the nationalists in Faisal's circle, whereupon it launched a military operation in July. As a result the nationalists were routed, and Faisal was forced to flee the country.

Britain followed a wiser policy in its mandated territories. It operated on the assumption that its administration would be temporary and sought to preserve a good image with the local Arabs. To demonstrate that Britain kept its promises, it proclaimed Faisal king of Iraq and Abdullah king of Trans-Jordan at the Cairo Conference of 1921.

The Ottoman Empire gave its consent to these arrangements by articles 94 to 97 of the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. Neither the İstanbul administration nor the TGNA ever ratified Sèvres, however, so Ankara's consent to these Western arrangements came from the Turkish-French agreement of 1921 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

#### D. Clashes with Britain and Kurdish Revolts

After reaching agreement with France on the demarcation of the Syrian frontier in 1921, Ankara directed its full attention to the Greek army on the western front. But at that time clashes were occurring with British forces on the Iraqi border.

After Sèvres, Britain's Kurdish policy underwent changes. It started pursuing policies that aimed to incorporate regions with Kurdish majorities in Iraq. This policy

caused anger among the Kurdish tribes, which had been restless since April 1919. The Ankara government and Britain, who were feuding over Mosul, both used the discontented Kurds to achieve their ends. On 18 October 1921 British units supported by the Royal Air Force compelled the Turkish garrisons at Rania and Revanduz to retreat.

Further clashes occurred in 1922. Both sides wanted to improve their situation on the ground before entering into peace negotiations and launched attacks on one another's positions in the border regions. On M. Kemal's orders Ali Şefik el Mısri (also known as Özdemir Bey) was sent to Revanduz to harass the British. Upon completing his preparations, Özdemir Bey engaged the British forces. When the situation turned unfavorable for Britain, it reached an agreement with Sheikh Mahmut Berzenci, who had been living in exile in Baghdad. The agreement provided that Berzenci would dislodge the Turks from the region and take over its administration. When Berzenci arrived in Suleymaniyah on 30 September, however, he declared himself king and got into contact with the Turks. Soon Özdemir Bey and Berzenci were working together. The British found themselves in a tight fix, so they shifted their ground to the diplomatic field. One of the basic issues on which the British made no concessions at Lausanne was Mosul.

#### Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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## II. RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB COUNTRIES

#### A. Relations with Iran

Relations with Iran were very cool during this period. This was in stark contrast with Ankara's ties to other Eastern countries. Furthermore, Soviet Russia was making intensive efforts to secure a united front against British imperialism through bilateral treaties between Moscow and Ankara, Kabul, and Tehran. The only one of these that failed to materialize was a treaty between Turkey and Iran.

Ankara was more eager than Tehran to improve ties between the two states. In June 1921 the minister of foreign affairs, Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk], declared in a speech delivered at the TGNA that "concrete steps were about to be taken in relations with Iran." This was in connection with the arrival in Ankara of an unofficial representative of Reza Khan. The first official contact with Iran took place a year later, however, when an Iranian delegation headed by the minister of education, Mumtaz-ud Dovled, visited Ankara in June 1922. This was reciprocated by the visit of a delegation headed by Muhiddin Paṣa [Akyüz] to Tehran. On 22 June 1922 Iran announced that it had decided to recognize Ankara and that it had appointed Mofag Khan

# Box 1-26. The Basis of the Sunni-Shiite Conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Iran

Shah Ismail established the Safavid state in 1501 with Tabriz as its capital. From then until 1639 there was constant strife between the Safavid and Ottoman states. The reason for the chronic strife was that Istanbul represented Sunni Islam while Tabriz represented the Alevi form of Islam. But this religious difference had its roots in the differing infrastructure of the two countries. The Ottomans represented a sedentary order, while the economy of the Safavids was of a seminomadic nature. After the conquest of Istanbul, the Ottomans were making an effort to rid themselves of seminomadic elements and move on to a fully sedentary structure. The people who had established the Safavid state were the seminomadic Alevis Ilving in Anatolia. They had left the country because of the Ottoman pressure, conquered Iran, and imposed the Kizilbash form of Islam on the country.

It was not by coincidence that the Sunni-Alevi divide and the sedentary-migratory divide were in full concordance. The Sunni form responded to the hierarchical needs of a sedentary way of production, while the Alevi form corresponded to the simpler needs of a seminomadic mode of production. When the dominant mode of production shifted from seminomadic to sedentary in the first half of the seventeenth century in Iran, the country's sect was transformed from Alevi to Shiite, which, like the Sunni form, corresponded more closely to the sedentary mode of production.

и (A. Akdevelioğlu)

Eshag as ambassador to Ankara. Ankara's first ambassador to Tehran, Muhiddin Paşa, was to present his credentials on 7 February 1923.

Despite these visits and the appointment of ambassadors, it was not possible to bridge the gap between Iran and Turkey and sign a treaty of friendship. There were very good reasons for this holding back.

- 1. The historic reason: relations between the Ottomans on the one hand and the Safavids and Qajars on the other were always characterized by lack of trust. This missing ingredient was due to the rivalry between Shiites and Sunnis; even when not in direct conflict, the two sides remained cool toward one another (Box 1-26).
- 2. Pan-Turanian policies: the Pan-Turanian policies pursued by Union and Progress during the latter stages of its hold on power were a source of concern for Iran, which had remained neutral in World War I. Despite its neutrality, Ottoman forces occupied the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and spread nationalist propaganda among its inhabitants. After the Ottoman evacuation, the Azerbaijanis under the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad Hiyabani proclaimed the socialist-oriented Republic of Azadistan.

It was not out of the question that the architect of these nationalist policies, Enver Paşa, might yet assume the

#### Box 1-27. Iran (Up to 1923)

In 1907 Britain and Russia agreed to divide fran into three zones of influence. When Russia's influence on Iran evaporated with the collapse of the tsarist regime in 1917, Britain took advantage of this situation and forced Iran to sign the treaty of 9 August 1919, which in effect brought all of Iran under British influence. The nationalists, however, who constituted a majority in the Majlis, refused to ratify the treaty. At that stage Britain was not up to using force to secure its objectives in Iran.

In its search for a way to counterbalance Britain, Iran sought a rapprochement with the Soviets, which resulted in the treaty of friendship signed in Moscow on 26 February 1921. Article 6 of this treaty gave the Soviets the right to intervene in Iran in the event of "Iran being occupied by another country [meaning Britain] or foreign troops being forcibly introduced into Iran for use against the Soviets."

Another reason for Iran's moving closer to the Soviets was the activity of separatist movements in northern Iran after. World War I. Iran reached an agreement with Soviet Russia to put an end to all foreign aid to the separatists, which helped the Tehran government to reestablish its authority throughout the country.

During this period the authority of the Turkmen Qajar dynasty, which had ruled Iran since the eighteenth century, was in decline. Real authority was shifting to the elected governments. Reza Khan, the commander of the Cossack regiment, the only disciplined force in the country, became minister of defense on 21 February 1921 and soon became the focus of power within these elected governments. In 1923 Reza Khan became prime minister in a coup and ended up as absolute ruler.

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leadership of the Anatolia movement. Furthermore, it was not clear whether the nationalism of the Kemalists would or would not take a Pan-Turanian turn. It should not be forgotten that the ideologue of Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp, had once formulated a project known as Oğuzistan that would unite the Turks of Anatolia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Iran was worried about an ethnic partition and that Turkey would encourage this.

- 3. The British factor: Iran did not want to rouse the anger of Britain through a premature recognition of Ankara. The political situation in Tehran was very unstable at the time (Box 1-27). Both the British and the Bolsheviks were exerting considerable pressure on Iranian governments. The reason for Iran's rapprochement with Moscow was to counterbalance British influence, strengthen internal stability, and thereby create the conditions that would allow Tehran to avoid having to implement the August 1919 treaty that Britain had imposed on Iran. The last thing Iran wanted to do was to antagonize Britain.
- 4. The question of the Kurdish tribes: after World War I a serious frontier dispute arose between Iran and Turkey. Actually, neither country had any objections

to maintaining the common frontier as it was. In other words, it was not a question of establishing sovereignty over a given territory.

The Kurdish tribes living along the common border had begun to feel independent of any authority and were disturbing the peace on both sides of the border. They were able to evade punitive action by crossing over the border. This situation was creating tensions between the Turkish and Iranian frontier guards and even giving rise to occasional clashes.

The question came to a boil with the rebellion of the Kurdish leader Simko Aga. He had fought against the Armenians, so when he revolted on the Iranian side of the border he received the aid of Kazım Karabekir Paşa. Through this support Simko Aga was able to control the region from 1919 to 1922. Iran was able to put down the revolt only when Turkey withheld its support in August 1922.

5. Territorial claims: at the Paris Peace Conference Iran made a claim to Turkish territory in the east. Although this claim never reached the agenda of the conference, it soured the Turkish attitude to Iran. After Reza Khan took over the reins of power, the question of territorial claims was put to rest.

Actually, there was no real territorial dispute between the two countries. Iran had advanced the claim in order to extract possible concessions from Britain at a time when London was pressuring Iran to ratify the 1919 treaty.

For the first four reasons described above, Iran felt in no hurry to establish ties with Ankara. Even when ties were established in 1922, little cordiality existed. There were even occasional crises. This situation lasted until 1926.

#### B. Relations with Afghanistan

Afghanistan achieved its independence from Britain, even if it was only partial, in 1919. The policy of Afghanistan and its leader, Amanullah Khan, was to preserve this independence and set up stable institutions in the country (Box 1-28). The new government in Kabul was eager to establish ties with governments, such as the government in Ankara, that would contribute to the attainment of its objectives.

Even before formal ties were established between the governments, two individuals played a decisive role in setting the course of relations between Turkey and Afghanistan. The first was Tarzi Mahmut Bey, an Afghan national who completed his education in Istanbul and returned to his country. Tarzi was in good standing with both the king, Habibullah Khan, and his son and successor, Amanullah

#### Box 1-28. Afghanistan (Up to 1923)

Under the leadership of Amanullah Khan, Afghanistan obtained its limited independence from Britain by the Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on 8 August 1919. Like Iran, Afghanistan sought a rapprochement with the Soviets to counterbalance the Britain. Two days after Iran signed a treaty with the Soviets, Afghanistan concluded a nonaggression treaty of friendship with the Soviets in Moscow on 28 February 1921. Nevertheless, contrary to the Soviet-Iranian example, Soviet-Afghan relations deteriorated, because Amanullah Khan was helping the Central Asian nations to resist the Bolsheviks. Along with Enver Paşa, Amanullah Khan was supporting the principal anti-Bolshevik independence movement in Central Asia: the Basmacı Uprising. Once the Soviet forces achieved supremacy in Central Asia, Afghan-Soviet relations started to improve.

Eventually a treaty of friendship was signed with Britain on 22 November 1921, allowing Afghanistan relative external autonomy. After this Amanullah Khan was to concentrate his attention on modernizing his country.

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Khan. Tarzi persuaded both leaders to emulate Turkey in establishing institutions based on Western models. As a result, members of the Turkish elite, most of them army officers, were invited to Afghanistan to help in setting up institutions in the Western pattern (the first batch arrived in Afghanistan prior to the Balkan War).

The second individual was Cemal Paşa, a member of the Union and Progress troika. He reorganized the Afghan army and spoke up for Afghanistan in Europe. Cemal Paşa had Mustafa Kemal's support and kept him informed about his connections and activities in Afghanistan. Until he was killed in 1922, Cemal Paşa exerted a decisive influence on the relations between the two countries (Box1-29).

In 1920 the Ankara government appointed Abdurrahman Bey as its representative in Kabul. On 1 March 1921 a treaty was signed in Moscow between the Kabul and Ankara governments. This treaty had the support of the Soviet government. It was signed by Yusuf Kemal and Rıza Nur, members of the Turkish delegation then in Moscow, and the leader of the Afghan delegation, Muhammed Veli Khan. After the Treaty of Gümrü signed with Armenia on 2 December 1920, this was the second international agreement of the Ankara government. Article 1 of this treaty declares that "the Turkish State...considers it a duty to recognize the State of Afghanistan as fully independent." This demonstrates the desire of Afghanistan to have its independence recognized. Article 8 reflected Tarzi's efforts to get the Turkish elite involved in institution building in his country: "Turkey undertakes...to assist Afghanistan in

the field of culture and to send officers and teachers." The cultural and technical assistance provided by the Ankara government would be the salient feature of the bilateral relations between the two countries for many decades.

In April 1921 Sultan Ahmad Khan took over his post as Afghanistan's ambassador in Ankara. Fahreddin Paşa [Türkkan] left Ankara in the same month, bound for Kabul as Turkey's ambassador. He had made a reputation for himself during World War I as the defender of Medina, which played a part in his appointment. In this way the common religion of the two nations was also being emphasized. Britain considered the appointment of a soldier an attempt to intervene in India in the event of a Muslim revolt and also believed that the Afghan-Turkish Treaty of 1 March 1921 had secret military clauses.

Actually, one clause in article 2 of the treaty directly threatened the interests of the British Empire and was designed to unleash a wave of decolonization throughout Asia: "The contracting parties declare that all eastern peoples have the right to be fully independent...they recognize the independence of the states of Bukhara and Khiva." Obviously, neither country had the material means to bring this about, but every allusion to the "independence of eastern nations" in an international agreement was of significance. That is why Britain's uneasiness was not groundless. Article 5 read: "The contracting parties undertake not to be a party to any treaty or convention...that would be detrimental to the interests of one of the parties." Therefore the treaty was more than a mutualsupport document. As a matter of fact, Article 4 showed that it was in the nature of a treaty of alliance: "Any one of the contracting parties...shall regard any attack by an imperialist state against the other contracting party as being directed against itself and accepts to repulse this attack with the means and possibilities at its disposal."

The relations that Ankara established with Afghanistan and the Indian Muslims were a source of concern for Britain and one of the important successes of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

# C. Relations with the Indian Muslims and the Caliphate Movement

The Pan-Islamist policy of the Ottoman Empire during World War I and the declaration of a *jihad* (holy war) did not have the expected results on the world's Muslims. The Muslims of the Western empires fought under Christian flags against the Ottomans. Nonetheless, the caliphate in Istanbul stood as a symbol and gave hope of eventual independence to the Muslims living under colonial rule. This was especially valid for the Indian Muslims. When

Box 1-29. The Killing of Cemal Pasa and Afghanistan

When Cernal Paşa was returning to Afghanistan from Europe, he was killed by an Armenian in Tbillsi. There were rumors that this assassination had been planned in London or Moscow. It is a fact that both the USSR and Britain were uneasy about Cernal Paşa's activities in Afghanistan. Even Ankara was somewhat wary about his "mission."

London's uneasiness derived from the important role played by Cemal Paşa in modernizing the army of a country that had fought against Britain before gaining independence in 1919. Cemal Paşa went from Kabul to Berlin via Moscow and worked as Afghanistan's spokesman in Germany and France, trying hard to persuade those he met to recognize the independence of the country. Had Cemal Paşa not been slain, he might have persuaded Amanullah Khan to make an effort to recover Afghanistan's southern provinces, which had been ceded to Britain after the war of 1919.

Moscow was apprehensive because the 1921 Afghan-Soviet treaty had a clause that foresaw independence for the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva following a plebiscite. The Soviets had Ignored this commitment, and the independence of these regions was now no longer on the agenda. Amanullah Khan was unhappy with this situation and might have given Cemal Paşa his support to join Enver Paşa's adventure in Central Asia.

Finally, Ankara was also uncomfortable because the perception was gaining ground that Cemal Paşa had assumed the leadership of Union and Progress. Cemal Paşa was restoring his links with former colleagues in Union and Progress and trying to present Pan-Islamism as one of Ankara's policy objectives. The disappearance of Cemal Paşa from the scene would allow Ankara's relations with Kabul to take their normal course.

(A. AKDEVELIOĞLU)

Istanbul was occupied and the institution of the sovereign caliphate appeared to be in danger, a wave of sympathy for the Anatolia movement swept through the Muslim community of India and led to the establishment of the Caliphate Movement, led by a Caliphate Committee with its seat in Bombay. The chairman of the committee was M. Chotani. The Caliphate Committee organized several meetings under the banner of the All India Caliphate Conference, with the earliest meeting taking place in November 1919.

The main objective of the leaders of the Caliphate Movement was to engage in anti-British activities in order to make progress on the road to independence. Its name implied saving the caliphate, but this was only a façade. As a matter of fact, the movement's attitude toward Ankara did not change when Ankara abolished the caliphate.

In May 1918 Lloyd George had promised the Indian Muslims that after the war the caliphate's sovereignty—at least in those regions with a Turkish majority—would not be affected. When it became clear that Lloyd George




Figure 1-2. Indian Muslims' support for the War of Liberation (Orhan Koloğlu, Türk'ü Dünyaya Tanıtan Adam [Ankara: Yeni Özgür İnsan Yayınları, 1988]).

would not honor his promise, the Indian Muslim reaction got underway. In addition to Chotani, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili sect, Aga Khan III, and the future leader of Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, were among those who joined the protest movement. The Muslim leaders were conveying their demands to the secretary for Indian affairs, E. S. Montague, or directly to the Foreign Office in London and threatening to start a revolt in India if their demands were not met. The demands of the Caliphate Movement and the objectives of Ankara were totally convergent. At that time, the Caliphate Movement was among the principal issues in India. More than 10,000 people took part in the demonstration organized in Bombay by the Caliphate Committee on 14 May 1919, one day before the landing of Greek troops in İzmir.

The Caliphate Movement had the following effects.

- 1. It contributed to the split between Hindus and Muslims in India: until then, the Muslims had been fighting British imperialism under the umbrella of the Congress Party. With their movement to save the caliphate, they asserted their separate identity from the Hindu majority. This became more manifest when the Muslims broke from the Congress Party and established the Muslim League. Mahatma Gandhi saw the danger of partition in these developments and consequently gave his full support to the Caliphate Movement. He also secured the participation of the Hindus in this struggle against British imperialism. Nevertheless, the majority of the activists in the Caliphate Movement were Indian Muslims.
- 2. A pro-Turkish lobby was established in London: to forestall any problems that the Caliphate Movement might create in India, Montague became a defender of Kemalist views. His reports were given a hearing at cabi-

net meetings in London. Venizelos was uneasy about the misgivings in London over the situation in India. To appease the Indian Muslims and reduce the influence of Montague in London, he felt compelled to propose the idea of preserving the caliphate in Istanbul even if the Turks were expelled from the city. He was thinking of a Vatican-type arrangement for the caliphate.

The effects of the Caliphate Movement were also seen in the House of Commons and in the British press, where the government's policy toward Islam was frequently questioned. The pressure of the Caliphate Movement on the British government's anti-Ankara policies was growing. On 19 September 1922, one day after the Greek evacuation of Anatolia was completed, British newspapers published "The Open Telegram of the Caliphate Committee to the British Public": "At a time when the Indian Muslims are in joy over the Kemalist victory, news is being received that the British government is seeking assistance from the colonies to engage in a possible new conflict with Turkey. God forbid!...It is impossible to describe the horror and revulsion that this news has provoked among the Indian public... Millions of Indian Muslim volunteers stand ready...to come to the assistance of their Turkish brothers."

3. This development had a sobering effect on France: it started worrying about the possibility of similar movements in its colonies. When formulating its policies toward Ankara, France felt the need to consider their possible effects on its possessions.

Furthermore, the representative of the Caliphate Committee in Europe, Muhammad Ali, also defended Ankara's position to the pope and the Italian government.

4. Financial assistance was secured: the Caliphate Committee established the İzmir Fund to secure the liberation of İzmir from Greek occupation and subsequently the Ankara Fund to help in the rehabilitation of Anatolia after the damage inflicted by the fleeing Greek forces. In all, 110,000 (or 125,000) gold pounds were collected in these funds. Some claimed that the amount collected was actually greater but that part of the money disappeared in Amsterdam or Paris on its way to Ankara. It is impossible to verify the accuracy of these claims. The money was deposited in Mustafa Kemal's account by the Ottoman Bank, and a receipt bearing his signature went to India. Mustafa Kemal loaned this money to the state treasury on two occasions. When the treasury repaid the loans, he used the funds to furnish the initial capital of İş Bankası, established in 1924. By his will, the shares of İş Bankası were bequeathed to the Republican People's Party and the income from the shares to the Turkish Language and

History Societies (Karaman, pp. 231–41; Müderrisoğlu, pp. 653–55, 660, 661).

In addition, the Caliphate Committee undertook the formation of an Ankara Regiment, consisting of volunteers. It never saw action in Anatolia, because the war came to an end before the unit became operational.

#### Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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# The Armistice of Mudanya

The struggle of the Anatolia movement lasted over three years and ended with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne. This was preceded by an armistice signed at Mudanya.

The Chanak crisis was overcome through M. Kemal's strategy of not confronting the West and also through the cool-headedness of both sides. Nevertheless it did jolt the adversaries. As a result, when the French were able to persuade the British to allow Edirne to remain Turkish, the armistice conference was convened in Mudanya on 3 October 1922.

The negotiators and signatories at Mudanya should actually have been Greece and Turkey, since these were the countries that had been fighting. But the negotiations were conducted by Turkey (Ismet Paşa) and, representing the real players in the War of Liberation, Britain (Gen. Charles Harrington), France (Gen. Charles Antoine Charpy), and Italy (Gen. Ernesto Mombelli). The armistice document was signed by these four negotiators.

The Turkish side demanded that Greece evacuate Eastern Thrace, including Edirne and the east bank of the Meriç (Maritsa) River, and that the whole territory be transferred to the government of the TGNA within twenty days. Should it be decided that the territory would be placed under a neutral administration pending a peace treaty, then Turkey wanted guarantees regarding the ultimate fate of the territory.

The Entente countries agreed to the evacuation but wanted Allied troops stationed on the east bank of the Meric. The conference was deadlocked on a number of occasions; but once again agreement was reached, through France's persuasion of Britain, and the armistice was signed on 11 October. Although Greek general Alexandros Mazarakis participated with his delegation at the negotiations, he stayed on board a Greek warship anchored off Mudanya and refrained from signing the armistice on the ground that he did not have authorization. Despite this, General Harrington gave assurances that the armistice would be implemented by the Allies. The question was

settled on 14 October when the Greek representative in İstanbul, Haralambos Simopoulos, formally approved the document.

By the Armistice of Mudanya, officially known as the Military Convention of Mudanya, the Armistice of Mudros of 1918 was superseded, and the Turkish-Greek War was ended. Although the evacuation of Eastern Thrace was completed on 25 November 1922, the convention provided that the evacuation of Istanbul and the Straits would take place after the signing of the peace treaty. This evacuation finally took place in October 1923.

With the signing of the convention, British prime minister Lloyd George's Turkish policies were totally wrecked, leading to his resignation. The important provisions of the convention are listed below.

Article 1: "With the coming into effect of the present Convention, all hostilities between the Turkish and Greek armed forces shall cease."

Article 2: "Greek forces shall retreat to the west of the Meriç River from its outlet into the Aegean Sea to the point where it meets the Bulgarian frontier."

Article 3: "Pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the right bank of the Meriç River and Karaağaç will be occupied by allied forces to forestall any possible disorders."

Article 5: "The evacuation by Greek forces of Eastern Thrace shall commence when the present Convention comes into effect and will be completed within 15 days."

Article 9: "Eastern Thrace shall be occupied by allied forces. These forces shall maintain order during the evacuation and the transfer of responsibility."

Article 10: "The evacuation by the Allies shall be completed within 30 days of the...evacuation [by Greek forces]."

Article 11 traces the line south of the Marmara Sea beyond which the government of the TGNA would not cross before the end of the peace conference.

Article 12: "The allied forces shall remain at their presently held positions. The government of the TGNA

undertakes to respect this situation pending the decisions of the peace conference." A listing of the territories that come within this category follows.

Article 13: "The government of the TGNA undertakes not to transfer troops to Eastern Thrace, or to recruit an army or to maintain troops there until the ratification of the peace treaty."

As noted above, the Greek representative did not sign the document, but the Greek representative in Istanbul made the following statement to the Allies on 14 October:

The Greek government holds the view that the observations made by the Greek delegates at Mudanya regarding the guarantees for the safety

of the Christians of Eastern Thrace and of their properties have to be kept in mind. The Greek government places its trust in the humane approach of the allied states toward the Christians and, in compliance with the wishes of these states, undertakes to abide by the decisions taken and feels compelled to accede to the Armistice Convention signed at Mudanya on 11 October 1922.

Signed, Sinopulos [Simopoulos], Ambassador. (Soysal, p. 66)

BASKIN ORAN

## The Peace Treaty of Lausanne

# I. THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE

### A. Preparations for the Conference

One week after Mudanya, the three Allied states Britain, France, and Italy, also acting on behalf of Japan, issued invitations to the Ankara and İstanbul governments to attend the Lausanne Conference "for the purpose of bringing full peace to the East."

# The Question of Turkish Representation and Its Solution: Abolition of the Sultanate

Ankara had maintained all along that the government of Istanbul was not capable of representing Turkey. A regime that based its legitimacy on national sovereignty and that emerged victorious from the War of Liberation could not share political power with a regime based on the authority of an individual who had sent troops to suppress the War of Liberation. Nor would it agree to share the right to represent Turkey at an international event.

At this point Istanbul sent a message signed by grand vizier Tevfik Paşa to the Ankara government, requesting it to send a representative and warning that the Istanbul government would select and dispatch a representative for Ankara if it failed to do so. The message was dated 29 October 1922.

M. Kemal had already made up his mind to declare a Republic and made good use of this message. Together with his close companions, he tabled a draft resolution at the TGNA to the effect that "the Ottoman State had collapsed and that a new Turkish State had risen in its place." When the draft resolution was being discussed in committee, M. Kemal replied to his critics to remind them that the TGNA was a revolutionary assembly. He said that the Turkish nation was now sovereign. All that needed to be done at this point was to confirm this state of affairs by a law; whether this was acknowledged or not would not change the outcome "but might well result in some heads

rolling" (Kemal, p. 691). This declaration made on 1 November 1922 proved effective, and the critics drew back. They declared that they had seen the matter from the wrong angle and thanked M. Kemal for his clarifications, whereupon the committee prepared a bill consisting of two articles. The first article abolished the sultanate without actually saying so:

With the constitution, the people of Turkey have decided that their sovereignty shall be embodied in the TGNA, their true representative; that this sovereignty cannot be relinquished or shared; and that it shall be exercised by the TGNA. The people shall recognize no force or group that is not based on national sovereignty and therefore cannot accept the existence of another government within the frontiers of the National Pact. Therefore, the people of Turkey consider the government of Istanbul, based as it is on personal sovereignty, to be buried in history forever, starting from 16 March 1920.

Article 2 provided that the caliph would be selected by the TGNA from the members of the Ottoman dynasty (Turan, pp. 277–80). The bill was enacted on 1 November 1922.

The İstanbul government then submitted its resignation. Ankara had won. The Sultan Vahideddin did what other leaders who had lost after bitter turmoil had done. Following the example of Enver, Talat, and Cemal, who had left the country on board a German vessel on 1 November 1918, Vahideddin, who considered his life to be in danger, informed General Harrington on 16 November that he wanted asylum in Britain and left İstanbul on board the battleship *Malaya* the next day. He would live modestly in San Remo, Italy, until his death in 1926. He was interred in Damascus.

# The Participating States and the Turkish Delegation

Ankara proposed İzmir as the venue for the peace conference, but this was not accepted due to the lack of adequate infrastructure, communications facilities, and so forth. Lausanne became the venue of the conference. M. Kemal trusted the negotiating skills of İsmet Paşa and thus wanted him to head the Turkish delegation. The TGNA replaced Yusuf Kemal Bey with İsmet Paşa as minister of foreign affairs and appointed him leader of the Turkish delegation.

The participating states can be placed in the following categories (Soysal, p. 69):

- 1. The inviting states: Britain, France, Italy, Japan.
- 2. The states invited to all of the negotiating sessions: Greece, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the U.S. on the one hand and Turkey on the other. (The U.S. acted as an observer; although an active participant in the negotiations, it did not vote or sign the treaty or its annexes. It was only in 1927 that the U.S. established formal relations with Turkey.)
- 3. The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, which was invited only to the negotiations relating to the Straits (originally Russia had not been invited, but Ankara insisted on Russia's presence in order to strengthen its negotiating position), and Bulgaria, which was invited to the sessions dealing with the Straits and the frontier in Thrace.
- Belgium and Portugal, which were invited to the sessions dealing with certain topics such as trade and residence.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene State's representative did not sign the treaty, so annex 17 stated that this country would be able to sign the documents in Paris before the treaty came into effect.

The Turkish delegation at the conference consisted of chief delegate İsmet Paşa and two delegates: the minister of health, Dr. Rıza Nur, and former minister of finance Hasan Bey [Saka]. It also included twenty-one advisors, two press advisors, one advisor and secretary-general, one translator, and eight secretaries (making thirty-three people in all in addition to the delegates themselves).

On the other side of the table were two important diplomatic personages: Venizelos and Curzon. Unlike other heads of delegation, Venizelos was there without any official position. He was empowered to sign any document at his discretion without having to consult Athens. This showed both his importance and the utterly helpless condition of Greece at the time. Curzon was in full charge of the conference, thanks to his diplomatic skills and his

profound knowledge of the Middle East; he was the undisputed spokesman and coordinator of the Allies, keeping them united throughout the conference.

#### The Turkish Delegation's Brief

Before the delegation left for the conference, the cabinet met and quickly approved a three-page brief consisting of fourteen items (Şimşir 1990, p. xiv):

- Eastern frontiers: there can be no "Armenian homeland"; if the question comes up, the negotiations shall be terminated.
- Iraqi frontier: the provinces of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk, and Mosul will be claimed; and if a contrary situation develops, instructions shall be sought from the government.
- 3. Syrian frontier: the frontier shall be rectified in the following manner: Re'si Ibn Hani to Harim, Müslimiye, Meskene, the Euphrates, Deirzor, the desert up to the southern border of the vilayet of Mosul.
- 4. The islands: depending on the negotiations, the closest islands to the mainland will be claimed; if contested, instructions will be sought.
- 5. Frontiers of Thrace: the 1914 line will be maintained.
- Western Thrace: the National Pact will apply [i.e., a plebiscite will be sought].
- 7. The Straits and the Gallipoli peninsula: no foreign troops will be allowed; if it becomes necessary to end negotiations, Ankara is to be informed.
- 8. Capitulations: unacceptable; if it becomes necessary to end negotiations, what is needed will be done.
- 9. Minorities: a solution to be sought based on exchange.
- 10. Ottoman debts: debts to be shared with the countries breaking away; Greek reparations to be set aside for settling debt; if not attainable, a twenty-year grace will be sought. The Ottoman Public Debt administration will be abolished; if difficulties arise, instructions will be sought.
- No limitations on the army or navy can be accepted.
- 12. Foreign institutions must be bound by Turkish legislation.
- 13. The National Pact shall apply to the breakaway states.
- 14. The rights of Islamic communities and pious

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foundations shall be secured in accordance with previous agreements.

The first seven items of the brief had to do with frontiers, the next five dealt with the structure of the state, and the last two had to do with the structure of the breakaway states. In other words, the brief sought to trace the frontiers and to establish an independent state within these frontiers (Şimşir 1994, p. 26).

It is noteworthy that the delegation was given binding instructions on two issues. If the Allies insisted on the establishment of an Armenian homeland or the preservation of the capitulations, the delegation was to reject these demands without referring them to Ankara and, if necessary, terminate the negotiations and return home. This was proof of Ankara's sensitivity and determination on these two issues.

The delegation's brief was just an outline, so the delegation was in continuous contact with Ankara and with M. Kemal personally. This cable traffic was of use to the British, who had their code breakers on the job. The damage that this inflicted on the Turkish side, however, was somewhat mitigated by the cumbersome nature of British bureaucracy. The British intelligence service in Istanbul transmitted the secret correspondence only in outline form to Lausanne, with the full transcript going to the Defense Ministry, from there to the Foreign Office, and only then to Lord Curzon. The British also tended to underestimate the Turkish delegation, which often caused them to stray from realism. All of this prevented the British from making the best use of this intelligence (Jeffery and Sharp, pp. 149 and 151).

## The General Features of the Conference and of the Signed Instruments

The Organization of the Conference and Its General Atmosphere

The conference was known officially as "The Lausanne Conference on Questions of the Near East." It was held in two sessions. The first session, lasting two and a half months, ran from 21 November 1922 to 4 February 1923. The session ended mainly because of the capitulations, with the Turkish delegation returning home. Two and a half months later, the second session got underway on 23 April 1923 and lasted until the signing ceremony on 24 July 1923. It took the conference about eight months to complete its work.

M. Kemal took advantage of the two and a half months of the break to hold the Economic Congress of İzmir. The congress conveyed two important messages to the Allies. The speeches at the congress demonstrated that Turkey was not about to stray from the "system." It would stay in the capitalist Western camp and had nothing to do with the order established by the Bolsheviks in Russia. The second message was that Turkey would not agree to the maintenance of the capitulations under any circumstances. In short, the new state was not antisystem, but it wanted to join the system on its terms as a fully independent, equal member.

The work of the conference was divided among three main committees. The first committee, chaired by Britain's Lord Curzon, took up territorial and military questions, including frontiers, citizenship, minorities, the regime of the Straits, and so forth. The second committee, chaired by Italy, was dealing with the status of foreign nationals in Turkey, including jurisdiction issues, capitulations, privileges, and other issues. Under France's chairmanship, the third committee was responsible for economic and financial issues, including the Ottoman debt. In other words, each one of the Allies was chairing a committee that dealt with issues of greatest interest to that country. Britain was focused on Mosul and the Straits, France on the debt issue, and Italy on the capitulations, the islands, and cabotage rights. The reasons for this were plain: Mosul had oil, and the Straits were important for the Royal Navy; most of the creditors of the Ottoman Empire were French nationals; Italy was a long-time beneficiary of the capitulations through its links to Venice and Genoa, while the Dodecanese Islands were important as a stepping stone for Italy, as a latecomer in the colonial business, to develop a colonial empire. The issues that led to the adjournment of the first session were precisely the Ottoman debt, the abolition of the capitulations, and the evacuation of İstanbul and the Straits.

Turkey was not able to take any administrative responsibility in the drafting committee other than providing a member. Actually, İsmet Paşa was very strict about the question of equality. When Curzon delivered a speech at the inaugural ceremony after the opening speech of Switzerland's head of state, İsmet Paşa insisted on his right also to take the floor and delivered a short speech (Meray 1969, p. vi). Although he was warned about would-be Armenian assassins, he never removed the flag from his official vehicle. As noted earlier, however, Curzon was completely in charge. The people sitting across the table were all seasoned European career diplomats, while İsmet Paşa had a military background and had to operate in a foreign tongue: French. Only three of the advisors and six of the secretaries in the Turkish delegation were from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The biggest stumbling block at the conference was that the Allies had adopted Mudros as their point of reference while the Turkish side was focused on Mudanya. This was highlighted in İsmet İnönü's preface to Seha L. Meray's translation of the Treaty of Lausanne. "Whenever the occasion arose, I emphasized that as chief delegate I had come to the conference following the armistice of Mudanya, while Lord Curzon tried to remind me of the armistice of Mudros. We never saw eye to eye on this issue" (Meray 1969, p. v). The Lausanne Conference brought to an end both World War I and the Turkish-Greek War. That is why the treaty was very difficult to put together and the final document was not one that awarded victory to any one side. It was very much a compromise text. Therefore the criticisms leveled at Ismet Paşa and the Treaty of Lausanne in Turkey, both at the time of its signing and subsequently to this day, have little validity. The treaty was negotiated in very difficult circumstances, and the new Turkey was in great need of signing it as early as possible.

The Allies had natural advantages, but the Turkish delegation was able to resort to two weapons whenever it felt cornered. (1) The National Pact: the members of the delegation made plain at every occasion that they were bound to this document and that if they deviated from it in any substantial way they would be pilloried at home and the TGNA would refuse to ratify the resulting treaty. (2) Westernization: Ankara's general tactic was to stress to the Allies that it was not necessary to press Turkey on issues like minority rights, judicial competence, privileges, and so forth, because new legislation based on Western models, including a civil code, would be adopted as soon as the new state was established. This tactic proved useful, especially in getting rid of the capitulations. It had to be admitted that the justification for the capitulations, and especially the judicial capitulations, was the Ottoman theocratic order's significant deviation from the order existing in the Western world. The precondition for ending the privileges of the foreigners and non-Muslims was the elimination of the distinction between Muslims and Christians and treating all citizens as equals. Turkey undertook to do this at the negotiations and, after signing the peace treaty, introduced a series of Westernizing reforms, especially legal reforms.

#### General Information about the Instruments

The package of instruments signed at the conference consists of three categories of texts (Soysal, p. 72). The originals of these texts as well as the conference records are in French.

1. The peace treaty.

- 2. The annexes to the treaty, consisting of conventions, agreements, declarations, and protocols. There are seventeen such instruments, some of them provisional.
- 3. Letters exchanged between Turkey and some Western countries. There is no agreement over whether these letters also form part of the Lausanne package of instruments.

In this book, the texts contained in Meray 1973 have been used as source material for the first two categories and Soysal's original texts have been used for the third category.

Of the eighteen texts in the first two categories, three are noteworthy: (1) the peace treaty, (2) the convention concerning the exchange of populations, and (3) the Straits Convention.

From the viewpoint of the independence of the new Turkey, five more follow suit: (i) the convention on conditions of residence, business, and jurisdiction, (2) the commercial convention, (3) the declaration relating to sanitary matters in Turkey, (4) the declaration relating to the administration of justice in Turkey, and (5) the protocol relating to certain concessions granted in the Ottoman Empire and the attached declaration. The important provisions of these instruments are noted below, after examining the peace treaty. The letters in the third category that clarify certain aspects of the instruments are dealt with in conjunction with the instruments.

#### Details of the Conference

The thorniest questions of the conference were taken up, and generally settled, in the first session. In the second session these questions were tidied up and finalized and secondary questions were dealt with.

Because of its humanitarian urgency, the first item taken up at the conference was the question of the repatriation of interned civilians and prisoners of war held by Turkey and Greece. An agreement on this item was signed on 30 January 1923. The convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations was also signed on the same day. This convention had great political importance for both Turkey and Greece (see "Relations with Greece" in Section 2). The other sixteen instruments would be signed six months later, on 24 July 1923, at the end of the conference.

The main topics of the conference and the position of the parties can be summarized as follows:

1. Frontiers: territorial questions had been settled on the battlefield to a large extent. With the USSR and Iran, there was no problem. The Greek armies had left. The matter had also been settled with France and Italy. Britain had confined itself to the occupation of İstanbul. Only Thrace and the region of the Straits were under Allied occupation. This constituted a handicap for the Turkish delegation.

The Turkish position on Thrace was that the frontier with Bulgaria (traced in 1913 after the Balkan War) should be respected, while a plebiscite should be held to determine the future of Western Thrace, where the majority of the population was Turkish. This would be in keeping with article 3 of the National Pact. Venizelos replied to this argument by pointing out that Turkey had lost Western Thrace to Bulgaria in 1913, that Bulgaria had lost it to the Allies in 1918, and that the Allies had transferred the territory to Greece in 1920.

The differences over the Iraqi border were very serious; when these differences proved insurmountable, it was decided to return to this question after the conference. This postponement was proof that Britain was not about to relinquish Mosul.

The question of frontiers was a key issue for Turkey, because great importance had always been attached to the land and because the leadership consisted entirely of military men whose primary duty had always been to defend their land. M. Kemal was a realist, however, and the objectives that were being sought were "defensible frontiers" and "a nation-state." These objectives did not require a strategy of holding onto a maximum amount of territory. The objective was a size that was adequate to ensure self-sufficiency and a homogeneous Turkish population.

2. The Straits: on this issue Britain and Russia were the main contestants, with Turkey playing a secondary role. During the nineteenth century Britain had sought to keep the Straits closed in order to keep the Russian Black Sea fleet out of the Mediterranean. This was done in cooperation with the Ottoman Empire. Now that Russia's fleet was diminished and Britain was the leading commercial and naval power, it was pressing for completely open Straits (Hale, p. 54). The position was in concordance with Woodrow Wilson's twelfth point. The Soviets were trying to keep access to the Black Sea by the great powers restricted. That is why they favored strengthening Turkish control over the waterway. Turkey had sought the invitation of Russia in order to gain this support at the negotiations.

In addition to Turkey's generally pro-Western stance, Realpolitik also called for Turkey's rapprochement with Britain. That is why the Convention of the Straits reflected Britain's position. But in line with Turkey's traditional policy of balance, Ankara insisted on certain restrictions being imposed on non-Black Sea powers. Turkey's views

prevailed. Nevertheless, Russia was dissatisfied with the convention and refrained from signing it until 14 August 1923 in Rome.

3. The capitulations and concessions: this was an issue of crucial importance for Turkey. Although it caused the conference to adjourn for two and a half months, it was finally settled to Turkey's satisfaction. But concessions had to be made to secure the abolition of the capitulations.

As will be seen below, instruments IV, V, X, XI, and XII and the letters attached to them provided that customs duties would not be raised for a period of five years; concessions granted prior to October 1914 would be recognized; a temporary derogation was made in regard to cabotage rights; and temporary restrictions were accepted on sovereignty in the fields of health, residence, and judicial competence.

- 4. Minorities: as a result of the deportation of the Armenians and the exchange of populations with Greece, the population of Anatolia had become more homogeneous and the number of non-Muslims was greatly diminished. Ankara had agreed to grant minority rights under article 5 of the National Pact. The difficulties arose over these issues:
- (a) In defining minority, the Allies proposed the criteria of racial, linguistic, and religious minorities. This conformed to the standard of the period and had been accepted by other countries. Turkey maintained that in the Ottoman Empire only the non-Muslims were considered minorities. Turkey also recalled that the question of minority rights had been abused by foreign powers and used as a pretext to interfere in the country's internal affairs. In the end, minority rights under international guarantees were only recognized for non-Muslim minorities.
- (b) The Allies wanted the non-Muslims to be exempt from military service against payment of a fixed sum, but this idea was not upheld.
- (c) The issue of an Armenian homeland gave rise to heated debates. But the Turkish delegation stood its ground, and there was no allusion to this in the treaty or in its annexes.
- (d) The Allies agreed that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate's competence would be restricted to spiritual matters only as the price for maintaining its seat in the country. Although it was the subject of long debates, the patriarchate is not mentioned in any of the Lausanne documents.
- 5. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-1 Umumiye): although it was the subject of long discussions, the question was not fully settled. Because

Turkey was one of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire, it took over part of the debt. The final settlement with the creditors, most of whom were French, would be reached after Lausanne in 1928 and 1933. The last installment was paid on 25 May 1954.

### The Fundamental Importance of Lausanne

The Lausanne Conference came to an end when the peace treaty and the other instruments were signed on 23 July 1923.

Lausanne was important for Turkey in three ways.

First, Lausanne was a treaty signed by equals. All the treaties ending World War I, in particular Sèvres, were texts that had not been negotiated but had been imposed on the vanquished by the Allies. All of them contained the Covenant of the League to demonstrate that they were reflecting the postwar order established by the Allies. Lausanne is the sole exception. It was signed after an arduous negotiating process. Because it is a compromise text that emerged from negotiations, it is the only peace treaty that has endured to this day. The others have all been discarded.

Second, Lausanne signifies economic independence and constitutes the first step toward nationalizing the economy. The capitulations were abolished and the Ottoman debt rescheduled, allowing the state to repay the debt by 1954. This made it possible for Turkey to establish the infrastructure on which its economic independence would be based.

Third, Lausanne reflects the political independence of Turkey. Aside from some restrictions, the treaty recognizes Turkey as an independent state and confirms this on an international plane. It is the founding document of the Turkish state. The establishment of a Republican regime was to come three months later, on 29 October 1923.

Let us now examine the principal instruments signed at the conference.

### II. THE PEACE TREATY (INSTRUMENT NO. I)

The following countries participated in the negotiations leading up to the peace treaty: Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the one hand and Turkey on the other.

The treaty consists of 143 articles.

### A. Political Clauses

Frontiers

The Soviet frontier traced in 1921 and the Iranian frontier fixed in 1639 were not discussed at the conference.

The western frontier: Bulgaria's southern frontier from the Black Sea to the Meric River would be identical to the Greek-Bulgarian frontier of 1919. After reaching the Meric River, the frontier with Greece would be the river to the Aegean Sea, with the city of Edirne left in Turkey (article 2). Under the provisions of the convention respecting the Thracian frontier, the frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece would remain demilitarized to the depth of about thirty kilometers on either side of the line. The demilitarized zone would be abolished by mutual agreement under a treaty concluded in 1938.

The southern frontier: the frontier with Syria would be the line described in the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 20 October 1921. This is the line that exists today, with the exception of Hatay, which is left outside of Turkey. The frontier reaches the Mediterranean north of the city of Iskenderun (article 3/1). Hatay was to join Turkey in 1939.

The frontier with Iraq could not be fixed. Article 3/2 stipulated that Turkey and Great Britain would try to reach an agreement through negotiations within nine months. In case of failure, the dispute would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for a final decision. In the meantime the two countries would refrain from modifying in any way the present state of the territories. (For the full text of Art. 3/2 see pp, 156–157.)

This provision meant that Mosul was being ceded to Britain. Britain would prevent a decision from being reached within nine months and would have the matter referred to the Council of the League, where Britain was in a position to ensure a decision in its favor. Consequently, it can be said that the ceding of Mosul to Iraq (Britain) happened not in 1926 but at Lausanne in 1923. M. Kemal and İsmet Paşa were probably in disagreement on this question. But M. Kemal knew that Turkey could not have Mosul because of its oil reserves. He did not want to face the prospect of renewed hostilities with Britain even before peace was attained. At a press conference in İzmit in January 1923, when the conference was still in session, he made the following off-the-record declaration to journalists: "Now that all is over, is it reasonable to continue the war over Mosul?" (Perinçek, p. 96). At this press conference M. Kemal also declared that the British wanted to establish a Kurdish government in northern Iraq and that this could have an effect on the Kurds of Turkey, so the border should be drawn farther south to prevent this. But at the same time he may well have noted the difficulties that the Iraqi Kurds under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmut Berzenci were causing Britain and not wanted to "import" these problems.

The islands: according to articles 12, 13, and 14 all of the northern Aegean islands were left to Greece and demilitarized, with the exception of Gökçeada (Imbros), Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Rabbit Islands. Article 15 left the Dodecanese Islands to Italy.

Article 20 read as follows: "Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November 1914."

### **Capitulations**

This was a difficult issue, which led to the conference being adjourned. It was dealt with in article 28, which read: "Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the capitulations in Turkey in every respect."

### Protection of Minorities

Unlike Sèvres, Lausanne dealt with the question of minorities not as a "part" of the treaty but as a "section" among the political clauses (articles 37–45). This is an indication that the question was considered of secondary importance.

Article 37: "Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them." This provision for protecting minorities was present in all of the peace treaties, including Sèvres (article 140). The provision stipulated that the rights enumerated in this section could under no circumstances be denied by the Turkish authorities.

This issue is important today in regard to making the democratic reforms necessitated by the process of Turkish candidacy for the EU. The hierarchical relationship of the provisions of laws and constitutions and international treaties is open to debate. Can the Turkish state enact laws or introduce constitutional provisions that would nullify the stipulations of this section of the Treaty of Lausanne? By article 37, the answer to this question must be no. The tendency in legal practice is to give equal weight to domestic and international provisions. But if the rights enumerated in this article are abridged or denied by subsequent legislation, it would signify that the Turkish state has invalidated its signature affixed to the treaty by which it came into existence. Such a situation occurred when the 12 September military regime adopted the 1982 Constitution. Under articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution and Law No. 2932, the use of languages other than Turkish is proscribed (see "Appraisal of the Period" in Section 6). This is a clear violation of the Treaty of Lausanne.

As a part of the EU Harmonization Packages, however, a fifth paragraph was added to article 90 of the Turkish Constitution in May 2004: "International treaties on fundamental rights and freedoms have precedence over national laws treating the same subject."

Article 38 states:

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, race, or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order or good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order

This article introduced negative rights (see Box 1-6 above). Although in substance the article contained the same rights as the ones included in article 141 of Sèvres, the striking issue was that rights were bestowed upon noncitizens and even upon "inhabitants of Turkey" in a section titled "Protection of Minorities." The Lausanne records show (Report of Montagna, chairman of the Subcommittee on Minorities, in Meray 1969, pp. 309–10) that the Allies accepted the Turkish opposition to the criteria of "race, language, religion" and therefore agreed to exclude the Muslim communities of Turkey from being considered minorities only after the inclusion of this article. It would be correct to assume that the Allies were trying to ensure the rights of their nationals residing in Turkey.

Article 39: after three paragraphs ensuring negative rights for non-Muslims, paragraphs 4 and 5 stipulated as follows:

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts.




Figure 1-3. The heated debates in the Subcommittee on Minorities at Lausanne as seen by Derso (Derso and Kelen, Guignol à Lausanne [[stanbul: İnönü Vakfı Yayını, 1993]).

Paragraph 4 of article 39 is important for Turkey today, when respect for human rights carries great importance, because it has never been implemented in regard to the use of native languages. The paragraph clearly states that any Turkish national may freely use any language in any place in Turkey and adds that no restrictions can be imposed on this freedom. It is clear that, aside from government offices, the paragraph provides for the use of native languages just about everywhere and also in "publications of any kind." Consequently, it is pointless to argue over whether languages other than Turkish can be employed in radio and TV broadcasting in Turkey today because generic terms such as "publications" are interpreted according to their meaning at the date of interpretation.

Paragraph 5 of article 39 relates to the right of defense in courts. Because of the importance of this right, it allows individuals to exercise this right in the language in which they are most fluent. Obviously, that is intended to include the mother tongue of Turkish nationals who speak non-Turkish languages. This is the only exception made to the use of languages other than Turkish, even orally, in any government offices. It is the only instance of a positive right recognized for individuals not in the category of non-Muslims.

The provisions of these two paragraphs were present in all the treaties relating to the protection of minorities during that period. They were also present in the Turkish delegation's proposals. The Treaty of Sèvres contained these provisions in its article 145, but it will be remembered that the right was more extensive and included the use of native languages in written form in the courts as well as orally.

Article 40: after making provisions for their negative rights, the Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities are granted important positive rights: "they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense any charitable, religious, and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein."

The rights to establish educational establishments and to use one's own language as the language of instruction are not

recognized for the Muslims of Turkey. There are two important aspects to this question. First, since it says "and other establishments," non-Muslims may set up any schools from the primary to the university level. Second, since it says "an equal right," it means that in the establishment, management, and control process minorities will be subject to the same rules as the majority. This is identical to article 147 of Sèvres, with just one difference. The Sèvres version includes the phrase "without interference by the Turkish authorities."

Article 41 introduces rights that have been exercised only sporadically to this day in Turkey:

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant, in those towns and districts where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal, or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

Article 42 also has not been fully implemented:

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of these minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature.

What is meant in article 42, paragraph 1, is, for example, the right to get married in a church or synagogue. This is an obvious example of a positive right. When the Civil Code adopted in 1926 made official civil marriages obligatory, the state asked minorities to give up this positive right and agree to an official civil marriage ceremony before the church or synagogue marriage. Otherwise the Muslim majority could have claimed the same right for themselves. To secure this, the "special Commissions" foreseen in paragraph 2 of article 42 were called upon to meet; after official insistence, they decided on 29 November 1925 to relinquish the right mentioned in paragraph 1 (Alexandris, pp. 135-39). This question is examined in greater detail in paragraph 2 of the subheading that follows. It should be mentioned here that on 11 September 1926 Greece lodged a complaint with the LoN and claimed that the treaty provisions were not being observed. The secretary-general of the LoN informed Turkey by his let-

#### Box 1-30. The 1936 Declaration

The Law on Foundations came into force in 1936 as a Republican reform law. The state called on each foundation to declare all real property in its possession. The purpose of the declaration (in fact a circular order) was to make arrangements that would deprive the Islamists of their financial means. But Atatürk died shortly thereafter, and the declaration fell into oblivion.

After 1972 the Directorate General of Foundations, as a means of pressuring Greece in the Cyprus affair, wanted to put pressure on Greek (Rum) Orthodox foundations and started calling on non-Muslim foundations to submit their founding charters. These foundations had no such charter, however, because they had been set up through imperial decrees during the Ottoman era. The Directorate General informed these foundations that the 1936 declaration would be accepted in lieu of a charter and started appropriating all real estate acquired after 1936. The legal justification for this was that the 1936 declaration did not indicate that these foundations could acquire new properties.

The argument that the 1936 declaration was merely a listing of all fixed property and therefore could not contain such a clause was to no avail, and all property acquired through purchase, donation, legacy, or other means and not listed in the declaration was expropriated. The property thus expropriated was returned, free of charge, to the sellers or their legal heirs or, in the event of their absence, to the treasury. This violation of the Lausanne treaty as well as of the right to property came to an end in 2003 with the promulgation of an EU Harmonization Package. Seizures were stopped, real estate buys were permitted, and confiscated real estate was legally returned to the owner foundations, but no solution had yet been found (by the end of 2007) for real estate sold to third parties.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Oran 2005, pp. 117; 123–29)

ter of 18 June 1927, however, that the council committee had reached a decision not to submit the question to the Council of the League (Bilsel, pp. 41 and 53).

The facilities foreseen for foundations in paragraph 3 of the article were forgotten and even reversed in the negative atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s when the question of Cyprus was preying on minds and the crimes of ASALA (Armeé Secrète Arménien pour la Libération de l'Arménie) were causing outrage. The most egregious example of this practice is the question of the "1936 Declaration," which has lasted into the 2000s (Box 1-30).

Article 43 contained a provision that would lose its applicability with the Westernizing reforms carried out in the 1920s when the weekly day of rest was shifted from Friday to Sunday:

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

Article 44 contained a guarantee clause. The rights guaranteed by this article were those of non-Muslims. "Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations." Modifying these provisions would be possible only with assent from the majority of the LoN.

In case of a violation of these obligations, any member of the Council of the League could bring the matter to the attention of the council (44/2). Any difference over this issue could be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice for a final ruling. It will be recalled that in the Treaty of Sèvres there was a completely different mechanism whereby the Principal Allied Powers were given a blank check.

Article 45 stipulated: "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory"

This clause is frequently labeled as reciprocity. As stipulated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (article 60/5), reciprocity is invalid in the case of "treaties of a humanitarian character." In other words, if either of these two countries decided not to implement its part of the minority protection, the other could not get rid of its commitments on the pretext of reciprocity. Article 45 pertains to what can be called "parallel obligations."

### The Concept of a Minority at Lausanne, Minority Rights, and Implementation

At Lausanne, "minority" was defined as non-Muslims. Actually there is no such definition in section III or in any of the other Lausanne instruments. The reasons for this particular definition are well grounded and have two basic causes. (1) The first and therefore the template of the minority protection treaties imposed by the Allies on a number of countries after World War I was the Polish Treaty of 28 June 1919. Wherever the term "race, language, or religion" is used in these treaties, it was replaced with the term "non-Moslems" in Lausanne. (2) As noted above, only the rights of non-Muslims were placed under international guarantees. In the postwar years, the era of

the LoN was characterized by minority rights under full international guarantees.

There are a number of misconceptions and instances of erroneous implementation regarding Lausanne and "minorities" in Turkey.

- 1. In the Treaty of Lausanne the criteria of race and religion have not been reduced to just the religious criterion when determining who is to be considered a member of a minority group. Religion too has been eliminated. Had it been otherwise, the Alevis, because they are religiously different, would also be considered a minority and enjoy international guarantees for their rights (Nur, p. 1044).
- 2. It is true that at Lausanne only non-Muslims were given minority status. Based on this, some have argued that only the non-Muslims enjoy rights. This is incorrect in two ways.

First, in practice all non-Muslims do not enjoy the rights guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty. Only the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities enjoy full rights. The rights of Syrians/Syriacs, Chaldeans, and others pertaining to establishing their own schools and teaching their own language as provided by article 40 are not recognized in practice. Nowhere in the Lausanne text are the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities identified as "minority"; the reference is merely to "non-Muslims." When asked why the members of the Syrian sect do not enjoy these rights, the official response is that this community relinquished these rights with the establishment of the Republic. Even if there was such a formal relinquishing of rights, it is null and void, because minority rights have been considered individual rights ever since Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Although enjoyed collectively, these rights have been conferred not on the group but on the individual. The group is not the right holder. Therefore the leader or representative of a group cannot relinquish a right that belongs not to the group but to the individual. This is even more the case if the right has been conferred by an international treaty that states explicitly that its provisions cannot be nullified in any way (article 37).

Second, Lausanne has conferred rights not only on non-Muslims. Rights have been granted to three other groups as well (Box 1-31).

### B. Financial Clauses

Article 46 of the treaty divides the Ottoman Public Debt into four parts:

- 1. "Turkey";
- "the States in favor of which territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913";

### Box 1-31. The Four Groups Benefiting from Rights under the Treaty of Lausanne

A reading of section III on the Protection of Minorities reveals that four groups are being granted rights.

A. Non-Muslim Turkish nationals (articles 38/3, 39/1, 40, 41/1 and 2, 42/1, 43). Naturally these rights also apply to groups B, C, and D.

B. Turkish nationals speaking a language other than Turkish (article 39/5). This right also applies to groups C and D.

C. All Turkish nationals (articles 39/3 and 4). The rights of this group also apply to group D.

D. All inhabitants of Turkey (articles 38/1 and 2, 39/2).

If we examine these four groups and the rights conferred on them, we can draw the following conclusions.

The treaty grants different rights to these four groups, all of them irrevocable under article 37.

The non-Muslims are only one group out of four. They are conferred the most extensive rights, and only their rights are internationally guaranteed under article 44/1. Bearing in mind article 39/5, it is not true that only non-Muslims have been given positive rights.

Lausanne is a document that defines minority as being non-Muslim. When it is considered that rights are also conferred on those who are not members of a minority group and even on non-nationals, then it becomes clear that section III is concerned not only with minority rights but also with human rights. It would be wrong to confine the section to minority rights by only looking at its title. This is the title used in all the documents dealing with minority rights signed after World War I. At that time the concept of human rights did not exist in international law, minority rights was the only concept. Human rights entered the international instruments only at the end of World War II, in article I, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Oran 2005, pp. 69–71)

- 3. "the States to which the islands referred in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the territory referred to in the last paragraph of the present Article have been attributed";
- 4. the States newly created in territories in Asia which are detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty."

Article 47 provides that the amounts of the annuities for the loans that are payable by the states concerned would be determined by the Council of the Ottoman Debt.

Article 49 stipulates that a commission would meet in Paris after the final determination of the amount of the annuities to establish the detailed conditions of repayment.

Article 50 distributes these loans among the four categories of states according to whether they were contracted prior to the Balkan Wars or between the Balkan Wars and World War I.

When Turkey reached an agreement with its creditors on the repayment of its debts, the income of the Ottoman Public Debt reverted to the state. The organization would be removed from Turkey and become a vehicle for transferring Turkey's repayments to the creditors.

Article 58 provides for the reciprocal renouncing of claims and certain payments:

Turkey on the one hand and the other Contracting Powers (except Greece) on the other hand reciprocally renounce all pecuniary claims for the loss and damage suffered...between 1st August, 1914 and the coming into force of the present Treaty...Turkey renounces in favor of the other Contracting Powers (except Greece) any right in the sums of gold [payable to the Reichsbank on behalf of the Council of the Ottoman Debt]...Turkey also agrees not to claim from the British Government or its nationals the repayment of the sums paid for warships ordered in England by the Ottoman Government which were requisitioned by the British Government in 1914.

Article 59 was the counterpart of article 231 of Sèvres and placed Greece in the same situation in which the Allies had tried to place Turkey:


Greece recognizes her obligation to make reparations for the damage caused in Anatolia by the acts of the Greek army or administration which were contrary to the laws of war.

On the other hand, Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and from its consequences, finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek Government.

Nevertheless, the district of Karaağaç on the Greek-Turkish border was left to Turkey in lieu of reparation under the protocol signed as annex XV.

# III. EXAMINATION OF THE OTHER NOTEWORTHY INSTRUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

Among the other instruments signed at the conference, the most important for Turkey was the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and the attached protocol (this instrument is examined in detail in "Relations with Greece" in Section 2).



Map 1-7. The Region of the Straits according to the Treaty of Lausanne

### A. Convention Relating to the Straits (Instrument No. II)

The countries that participated in the negotiation of the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits were Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Russia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey.

Article 1 introduced the principle of freedom of navigation. "The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and air in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, hereinafter comprised under the general term of the 'Straits.'"

Article 2 regulated passage through its rather extensive annexes. Two groups of craft were envisaged.

1. Merchant vessels and nonmilitary aircraft: their passage was regulated in time of peace and time of war.

In time of peace, vessels with any cargo and under any flag could freely navigate by day and by night without any formalities, subject only to international sanitary provisions. Pilotage would be optional.

Passage in time of war was divided into two cases: (a) if Turkey was neutral, passage would be under the same conditions as in time of peace; (b) if Turkey was a belligerent, neutral vessels and aircraft would enjoy freedom of navigation provided that they did not assist the enemy and Turkey was given the right to visit and search such vessels and aircraft. Turkey was free to take whatever measures were necessary to deal with enemy vessels and aircraft.

2. Warships, military aircraft, and aircraft carriers:

their passage was also regulated according to time of peace or time of war.

In time of peace warships of any flag enjoyed complete freedom of passage by day and by night, with one restriction. A non-Black Sea Power could not send a force through the Straits greater than the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers. The powers had the right to send at any time a force of not more than three ships, however, of which no ship should exceed 10,000 tons.

Passage in time of war was divided into two cases: (a) if Turkey was neutral, passage would be free as in time of peace, but no hostile action was allowed during passage; (b) if Turkey was belligerent, neutral vessels had freedom within the limitations applicable in peacetime. Turkey would be able to investigate neutral military aircraft. The passage of the Straits by submarines of powers at peace with Turkey could only be on the surface.

Under article 4 certain parts of the Straits region were demilitarized (Map 1-7). This demilitarization clause would be removed at Montreux in 1936.

Article 6 provided that there would be no armed forces in the demilitarized zone other than police and gendarmerie forces for the maintenance of order.

Article 8 stipulated that a garrison with a maximum strength of 12,000 men would be stationed in the region of Istanbul for the requirements of the capital.

Article 10 provided for the setting up of an international commission in Istanbul to be called the Straits Commission. Article 11 declared that "[t]he Commission will exercise its functions over the waters of the Straits."

Article 12: "The Commission shall be composed of a representative of Turkey, who shall be President, and representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Russia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, in so far as these powers are signatories of the present Convention."

Article 14: "It will be the duty of the Commission to see that the provisions relating to the passage of warships and military aircraft are carried out."

Article 18 provided that, if the security of the Straits was endangered, the signatories and, in any case, France, Britain, Italy, and Japan would take the necessary measures to eliminate the danger.

It will be seen that the Straits Convention of Lausanne restricted Turkish sovereignty in two ways. One was the demilitarized zone, and the other was the Straits Commission. Both of these restrictions would be lifted at Montreux.

# B. Convention on Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction (Instrument No. IV)

This convention is one of the instruments that temporarily restricted Turkey's sovereignty. Admittedly, the restrictions placed on Turkey applied in equal measure to the other countries. Turkish nationals would enjoy the same privileges in the other signatory states. Nonetheless, questions of residence and jurisdiction that should be regulated by a country's national legislation were being made the subject of an international convention.

The convention was concluded for a period of seven years and would remain in force unless it was denounced by one of the signatories one year before expiring. It expired after seven years.

As explained earlier, at the end of the Lausanne Conference the parties exchanged letters that made up the third group of instruments.

Among these letters were some that dealt with this convention. The Turkish delegation addressed almost identical letters to Britain, France, and Italy. In these letters Turkey recognized the religious, educational, health, and charitable institutions of these countries located in Turkey. Turkey declared that in their financial affairs these institutions would be treated in the same manner as their Turkish counterparts and that they would be subject to Turkish laws and regulations. But their working condi-

tions and the manner of their establishment would be taken into account. This arrangement was to allow foreign schools to continue operating in Turkey (Soysal, pp. 222–26) (Box 1-32).

### C. Commercial Convention (Instrument No. V)

This convention brought temporary restrictions on Turkey's sovereignty in the field of customs. This is how the restriction was formulated in article l: "From the coming into force of the present Convention, the tariffs applicable on the importation into Turkey of the produce or manufactures originating and emanating from the territories of the other contracting countries shall be those of the Turkish specific tariff which came into operation on 1 September 1916." Thus the 1916 tariff was being imposed on Turkey.

Article 18 specified that "the present Convention will remain in force for a period of five years." The convention had expired when the worldwide economic crisis occurred in 1929, and Turkey was able to protect itself from the effects of the crisis by raising its tariffs.

Article 9 accorded Turkey the right of reserving for the national flag maritime cabotage ("transport by sea of goods and passengers embarked in one port of its territory for another port in the same territory") and the rendering of port services.

The Turkish delegation submitted almost identical letters to Britain, France, and Italy in regard to this article. These letters indicated that negotiations would be undertaken with three specified shipping companies from each of the states starting on 1 January 1924, that the operations of these firms would be allowed to continue for another two years if these negotiations did not yield results, and that reciprocity would be taken into account (Soysal, pp. 231–35). In other words, three firms from each of these three countries would enjoy a two-year waiver on the restriction on foreign flags.

### D. Declaration Relating to Sanitary Matters (Instrument No. X)

This declaration signed by the Turkish delegation stated that "the Turkish Government will appoint, for a period of five years, three European medical specialists as counselors for the sanitary administration of the frontiers. These medical specialists shall be Turkish officials and shall be attached to the Ministry of Health." This restriction on sovereignty ended at the end of the five-year period stipulated in the article.

### Box 1-32. The Legal Status of Foreign Schools in Turkey

Foreign schools started getting established in the Ottoman Empire in the early 1800s and proliferated within the disorderly educational system of the time. The General Educational Regulation (Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi) of 1869 regulated the legal status of these schools. The Regulation of Private Schools of 1915 forbade foreign corporate bodies from establishing private schools. The regulation allowed foreign real persons to establish private schools on condition that official records indicated that there were enough inhabitants to justify a school and on condition of reciprocity.

During World War I, only the schools belonging to Allied states were allowed to operate. After the armistice, foreign schools resumed their activities. The subject was regulated at Lausanne by the convention on residence and jurisdiction and the attached letters.

The "national" and "secular" educational policy of the Republic prevented foreign schools from providing religious education and insisted on Turkish being taught as a compulsory subject by Turkish instructors. Students receiving a falling grade in Turkish had to repeat the year.

The Private Educational Institutions Law of 1965 imposed many restrictions. No new foreign schools could be set up and existing institutions could not expand their buildings or build new ones, replace old buildings, add new divisions, acquire property, or rent premises.

By an amendment to this law in 1984, foreigners were allowed to open schools at the primary level to cater exclusively to foreign children. These schools were designated international

schools, and there are several operating in this category. Schools not in the primary school category are also accessible to Turkish students,

The 1984 amendment eased some of the restrictions and allowed private schools set up by foreigners to be expanded; the buildings, number of students, and equipment can be doubled with the permission of the Ministry of Education. The acquisition of new land and the expansion of capacity by a factor of up to five require the permission of the Council of Ministers.

The regulation of 1985 regarding private educational institutions was amended in 1999 to specify that repairs required the permission of the Ministry of Education.

Law No. 4306 of 16 August 1997 regarding the extension of primary education from five to eight years affected seventeen foreign schools that did not have a primary level of five years. Since the 1965 law provided that primary schools established by foreigners could not be attended by Turkish nationals, an indirect way was found to enable these schools to include the first five years in their program. The usual practice was to allow graduates of Turkish nationality to set up the elementary level of five years and to combine this with the existing middle level.

In addition, there are the consular schools established in accordance with bilateral cultural agreements. These institutions are outside the system of the Ministry of Education. Examples of these are the Pierre Loti school in Istanbul and the Charles de Gaulle school in Ankara.

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### E. Declaration Relating to the Administration of Justice (Instrument No. XI)

This declaration signed by the Turkish delegation was also a temporary abridgment of sovereignty. "The Turkish Government proposes to take immediately into its service, for such period as it may consider necessary, not being less than five years, a number of European legal counselors... These legal counselors will serve under the Minister of Justice... They will take part in the legislative commissions."

This declaration also expired in five years. During this interval Turkey completed the most important of its legal reforms,

### F. Protocol Relating to Certain Concessions Granted in the Ottoman Empire (Instrument No. XII)

The concessions granted during the Ottoman period were being recognized through this document. Article 1: "Concessionary contracts and subsequent agreements relating thereto, duly entered into before 29th October, 1914, between the Ottoman Government or any local authority, on the one hand, and nationals (including companies) of

the Contracting Powers, other than Turkey, on the other hand, are maintained."

Through letters submitted by Turkey to Britain, France, and Italy, the provisions of this article were elaborated. The letter submitted to Britain indicated that "if for a period of 5 years, starting from the date of signature of the Peace Treaty, the Turkish Government decides to resort to foreign industry or capital, the said companies will be so informed and they will be given a chance to enter into competition on a footing of equality with an individual or company." In this manner, Britain was given satisfaction regarding the two companies mentioned in the protocol that had obtained concessions in 1913 and 1914 without Turkey entering into any concrete commitment.

The letter submitted to France contained similar phraseology. The French company mentioned in the protocol that had received a concession in 1914 would, in the event that it failed for any reason to obtain a new concession, be notified by the Turkish government of any call for tenders to build the Black Sea rail network. Here too Turkey undertook to ensure competition on a footing of full equality.

The letter to Italy was formulated in similar fashion. This letter undertook to "respect the concession

agreements concluded by the Ottoman Empire prior to 29 October 1914 regarding the Anatolia, Baghdad, Mersin-Adana railroads and the Eastern Railroad and the Port of Haydarpaşa." Another sentence declared that "[t]he provisions of the concession agreements will be adjusted to suit the new economic conditions within one year of the signing of the Peace Treaty" (Soysal, pp. 236–38).

The issue of concessions granted by the Ottoman Empire had delayed the signing of the peace treaty; but the problems were resolved through this formulation without Turkey having to concede anything of substance.

### IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LAUSANNE AND SÈVRES TREATIES

The two peace treaties have to be compared to get an idea of how the tough provisions of Sèvres were attenuated at Lausanne.

- 1. There is no blank check in Lausanne such as the recurring phrase in Sèvres whereby "Turkey hereby agrees to execute" or to "renounce all rights and title" without knowing what the big powers would rule concerning the subject in question in the future.
- 2. Lausanne contains no provisions regarding Kurdistan, Armenia, or İzmir.
  - 3. The capitulations are abolished.
- 4. The Financial Commission is absent from the Lausanne text.
- 5. The Straits Commission is no longer an autonomous body.
- 6. Although the provisions relating to minorities in both texts are derived from the Polish Treaty for the Protection of Minorities of 1919, there are important differences between the two. First, the provisions relating to minorities are no longer a separate "part" but a "section" of the treaty. Second, the responsibilities imposed at Sèvres go beyond the standards of the period, whereas at Lausanne they are less onerous than the standards of the time: instead of referring to the criteria of race, language, and religion, the only criterion for a "minority" at Lausanne is being a non-Muslim. Third, Lausanne contains no provisions for the return of relocated Armenians. Fourth, there are no references to an electoral system that would provide proportional representation to a racial minority. Fifth, the phrase "without any interference of the authorities in schools" has been removed. Sixth, Turkey is not bound to recognize foreign diplomas and to allow the holders of such diplomas to practice their professions in Turkey. Seventh, Turkey is not bound to recognize privi-

leges and immunities granted by imperial orders or edicts to churches, to schools, or in the field of judicial matters. Eighth, there are no blank checks to great powers to reassure them; if there is a disagreement, the question is to be referred to the Permanent International Court of Justice.

Baskin Oran

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### SECTION 2

1923-1939

Relative Autonomy—1

Table 2-1. The Administration of the Period 1923-1939

| PRESIDENTS                                      | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                              | SECRETARIES-GENERAL<br>OF MFA   |
|---|--|--|---|
|   | 1st M. İsmet [İnönü] Government HF<br>(30 Oct. 1923–6 Mar. 1924)<br>2nd M. İsmet [İnönü] Government HF<br>(6 Mar. 1924–22 Nov. 1924) | M. İsmet [İnönü]<br>(26 Oct. 1922–<br>22 Nov. 1924)          | Tevfik Kamil Bey [Koperler]<br>(3 Sept. 1923–<br>9 Nov. 1925)   |
|   | Ali Fethi [Okyar] Government CHF<br>(22 Nov. 1924–3 Mar. 1925)   | Şükrü Kaya<br>(22 Nov. 1924–<br>3 Mar. 1925)                 |   |
| Mustafa Kemal                                   | 3rd M. İsmet [İnönü] Government CHF<br>(3 Mar. 1925–1 Nov. 1927)   |  | Ahmet Hikmet Bey<br>[Müftüoğlu]<br>(9 Nov. 1925–<br>17 Aug. 1926)<br>Ali Şevki Bey [Berker]<br>(22 Aug. 1926–<br>1 Nov. 1927) |
| [Atatürk]<br>(29 Oct. 1923–10 Nov. 1938)        | 4th M. İsmet [İnönü] Government CHF (1 Nov. 1927-27 Sept. 1930)  | Tevfik Rüştü [Aras]  | Mehmet Enis Bey<br>[Akaygen]<br>(1 Nov. 1927–<br>27 June 1929)  |
|   | 5th M. İsmet [İnönü] Government CHF<br>(27 Sept. 1930–4 May 1931)<br>6th M. İsmet [İnönü] Government CHF<br>(4 May 1931–1 Mar. 1935) | (4 Mar. 1925–<br>11 Nov. 1938)                               | • •   |
|   | 7th M. İsmet [İnönü] Government CHP<br>(1 Mar. 1935–1 Nov. 1937)   |  | Numan Rifat<br>[Menemencioğlu]<br>(1 July 1929–   |
|   | 1st Mahmut Ceial [Bayar] Government CHP<br>(1 Nov. 1937–11 Nov. 1938)  |  | 9 Aug. 1942)  |
|   | 2nd M. Celal [Bayar] Government CHP<br>(11 Nov. 1938–25 Jan. 1939)   |  |   |
| M. İsmet<br>İnönü<br>(11 Nov. 1938–22 May 1950) | 1st Refik Saydam Government CHP<br>(25 Jan. 1939–3 Apr. 1939)  | Mehmet Şükrü<br>Saraçoğlu<br>(11 Nov. 1938–<br>13 Aug. 1942) |   |
|   | 2nd Refik Saydam Government CHP<br>(3 Apr. 1939–9 July 1942)   |  |   |

### Appraisal of the Period

### THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

The international environment in the interwar period displayed features seldom seen in modern times. Two developments profoundly affected the continent.

The first feature was the struggle between revisionists and defenders of the status quo, the former challenging and the latter defending the post–World War I order. This left a deep imprint on the age. The principal peace treaty following World War I was Versailles. Its harsh terms rendered it impossible to implement and prevented peace from taking root. Immediately after its signing, the old rivalries between a defeated Germany and the victors, Britain and France, were resumed. The second feature was the great depression that followed the economic crisis of 1929. Both of these developments had important short-term and medium-term consequences.

In the medium term, Europe started losing its central position in the world. Europe had been drained of its energy during the war and was now suffering from the ravages of the economic slump. At the end of World War II Europe found itself relegated to a secondary position when compared to the U.S. or the USSR.

The short-term effect of losing its central position was that Europe lost its ability to impose its "pax" on the peripheral countries. This situation allowed these countries to gain a substantial degree of "relative autonomy" (see Box Intro-6 in the Introduction).

For the new Turkey, this situation was a blessing for three reasons. First, it was among the countries that gained relative autonomy. Second, as a result of the struggle between the defenders of the status quo and the revisionists, both camps courted Turkey for its important geostrategic location. Third, its historic foe, Russia, ceased to be a threat after 1917 as it struggled to overcome the effects of war. In fact it became a valued friend in the circumstances prevailing at the time. These advantages were exploited with skill and realism by M. Kemal, drawing his inspira-

tion from the Ottoman policies of preserving a balance between competing foreign powers.

### II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

When surveying Turkey's domestic structure from the economic and political angles, a distinction must be made between the period from 1923 to 1930 and the period from 1930 to 1939. These periods were quite distinct economically, politically, and socially.

### A. The Period from 1923 to 1930 and Liberalism

The Economy

It is generally assumed that in the interwar years the state played a highly interventionist role in the economic and political life of Turkey. This is correct only insofar as it relates to the second part of the period.

Turkey's economic policy in the period from 1923 to 1930 was conceived in February and March 1923 at the Economic Congress of İzmir when the Lausanne Conference was still in progress. The landowners and traders in undeveloped countries make up the dominant class. It was these two groups that controlled the congress and laid down the principles that would guide Turkey's economy in the 1920s. The economy would be open to the world, foreign capital would be welcomed, and the guiding principle would be liberalism. This was the most "wide-open" period of the Turkish Republic (Gülalp, p. 30). Only in the globalization process of the twenty-first century would this degree of openness be surpassed.

In fact, contrary to the generally held view, the first government's program dated 9 May 1920 contained this sentence: "We are prepared to reconcile the economic interests of states that are true friends with our own economic interests and work with them" (Arar, p. 10). The nationalist regime objected to foreign capital operating

under the protection of the capitulations. Therefore during this period a good number of foreign companies received concessions with monopolistic features, and the country benefited from a relatively large influx of foreign capital. Gündüz Ökçün's research reveals that one-third of the 210 joint-stock companies established between 1920 and 1930 were foreign owned. Of the concessions granted by the government or municipalities, 51% were to foreign-owned firms that operated in the banking sector or were engaged in exporting raw materials or importing finished products. None introduced new technologies to the country. These foreign firms ensured their position vis-à-vis the administration by placing senior bureaucrats on their firms' managing boards or allowing them to become shareholders or founding partners without having to put up any capital (Ökçün, pp. 117 and 153-70). According to Çağlar Keyder's calculations, foreign investments in industrial enterprises were twice as high as domestic investments during the ten years after 1920 (Keyder, p. 79).

This economic dependency is clearly reflected in Hikmet Uluğbay's table of basic economic indicators (Table 2-2 and Box 2-1). The ratio of foreign trade to GNP is very high until 1930, with the average for the period from 1923 to 1929 being 25.27%. It falls sharply to less than 20% in 1929 and follows a gradually diminishing trend in subsequent years. The ratio of exports to imports was continuously unfavorable until 1930. The deficit in foreign trade (in million U.S. dollars) was 36.1 in 1923, 18 in 1924, 26.3 in 1925, 25 in 1926, 27 in 1927, 25.4 in 1928, and 48.7 in 1929.

Actually, this course was the economic policy of Union and Progress, which had sought to create a local bourgeoisie, and the founders of the Republic were mostly Unionists by background. This excessive dependence on foreign capital was due to the scarcity of local capital and was compensated by the Turkification policies being pursued at the time. There was a campaign to ensure that all citizens spoke Turkish, and administrative measures had been put in place to eliminate the

#### Box 2-1. Various Kinds of External Economic Dependency

In theory, all countries engaged in any form of economic relation with others are interdependent. As relations develop, so does interdependence. To take one example, the country that receives a loan becomes dependent on the lender. But the creditor nation must consider a possible default. Although dependency cannot be totally eliminated, the objective is to seek a reasonable level of balance.

This should not lead us to conclude that, since all countries are interdependent, economic dependency is not important. Everything is relative. Sometimes the level of economic dependency of a nation is such that its political sovereignty is seriously compromised.

In the modern world there are four kinds of economic dependency: (1) on foreign technology, (2) on foreign capital, (3) on foreign borrowing, and (4) on foreign trade. Excessive foreign dependency comes about when three of these elements are present.

The first, technology, is a relatively recent element. The second, foreign capital, is present in limited amounts in Turkey, so we refer to it in this book in absolute figures (thousands or millions of dollars). The third and fourth elements are of great importance for Turkey and are reflected in absolute terms as well as in ratios. The ratio is to the gross national product (GNP), the total value of goods and services produced in the country. In a way, GNP reflects the strength of a country, so a low ratio of foreign debt or foreign trade to GNP denotes low economic dependency. This is assuming that imports are not kept low through protectionism and that exports are not low due to lack of competitiveness.

In any country the external debt/GNP ratio is one of the key factors showing external dependency. The larger the share of short-term debt in external debt, the greater the risk of this dependency. This understanding is further underlined by the Maastricht Criteria, which were accepted by the European Union in 1991. According to these criteria, total public sector debt (PSD) should not exceed 60% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Those EU members that exceed the criteria face difficulty in the EU. When the ex-

ternal debt/GNP ratio continues to increase and the PSD/GDP ratio stays above 60%, the country faces a higher risk premium in its new borrowings and difficulty in finding new credit, if it can find any credit, it will be short-term and with a high risk premium. A country could face difficulties in finding external credit even if the above-mentioned ratios are within acceptable boundaries. Turkey faced such a problem during the early 1970s (External debt shown in the tables of this book denotes both public and private sector external debts. Domestic debt corresponds solely to the treasury's domestic stock.)

The subject of foreign trade needs elaboration. It is not a good sign if a country's foreign trade volume is low; this is a sign of a closed and therefore underdeveloped economy. The higher the ratio of foreign trade to GNP, the higher the country's economic dependency. This dependency can pose serious problems in the following circumstances:

- 1. If a country cannot find a quick substitute outlet or new source for any particular product whose export or import has been disrupted: to cite an example, Turkey is dependent on American spare parts for its military equipment and faced difficulties in keeping its military aircraft in the air when the U.S. Imposed an arms embargo in 1975.
- When foreign trade has a large place in a country's economy: the high level of dependency of the Japanese economy on Middle East oil is an example of this.
- When the economy is dependent on the export of a single or a few commodities: for instance, Ghana's economic well-being is closely linked to the price of cocoa on the international market.
- 4. If the country's imports include a product of critical importance; for example, the U.S. share in Turkey's foreign trade is roughly 10%, but a good proportion of this consists of military spare parts that are considered indispensable.

Table 2-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1923–1938

| YEAR | GNP AT<br>CURRENT PRICE<br>(MILLION TL) | TL/\$<br>RATE | GNP<br>(MILLION \$) | EXPORTS<br>(000\$) | EXPORTS<br>AS %<br>OF GNP | IMPORTS<br>(000 \$) | IMPORTS AS<br>% OF GNP | FOREIGN TRADE<br>VOLUME<br>AS % OF GNP | REPAYMENTS OF THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEST (000 \$) | DEBT REPAYMENTS AS % OF EXPORT BARNINGS |
|------|---|---------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--|--|---|
| 1923 | 952,60                                  | 1.67          | 570.4               | 962'05             | 8.90                      | 86,872              | 15.23                  | 24.13                                  | 1  | 1                                       |
| 1924 | 1,203.80                                | 1.93          | 623.7               | 82,435             | 13.22                     | 100,462             | 16.11                  | 29.32                                  | 4,573.3  | 5.55                                    |
| 1925 | 1,525.60                                | 1.88          | 811.5               | 102,700            | 12.66                     | 128,953             | 15.89                  | 28.55                                  | 4,459.7  | 4.34                                    |
| 1926 | 1,650.50                                | 1.94          | 820.8               | 96,437             | 11.33                     | 121,411             | 14.27                  | 25.61                                  | 2,684.1  | 2.78                                    |
| 1927 | 1,471.20                                | 1.96          | 750.6               | 80,749             | 10.76                     | 107,752             | 14.36                  | 25.11                                  | 3,039.6  | 3.76                                    |
| 1928 | 1,632.50                                | 1.97          | 828.7               | 88,278             | 10.65                     | 113,710             | 13.72                  | 24.37                                  | 2,116.1  | 2.45                                    |
| 1929 | 2,073.10                                | 2.07          | 1001.5              | 74,827             | 7.47                      | 123,558             | 12.34                  | 19.81                                  | 15,360.1                                       | 20.53                                   |
| 1930 | 1,580.50                                | 2.13          | 742.0               | 71,380             | 9.62                      | 69,540              | 9.37                   | 18.99                                  | 12,357.2                                       | 17.31                                   |
| 1931 | 1,391.60                                | 2.12          | 656.4               | 60,266             | 9.18                      | 59,935              | 9.13                   | 18.31                                  | 14,256.7                                       | 23.66                                   |
| 1932 | 1,171.20                                | 2.11          | 555.1               | 47,972             | 8.64                      | 40,718              | 7.34                   | 15.98                                  | 21,513.5                                       | 44.85                                   |
| 1933 | 1,141.40                                | 1.66*         | 9.789               | 58,065             | 8.44                      | 45,091              | 6.56                   | 15.00                                  | 27,716.4                                       | 47.73                                   |
| 1934 | 1,216.10                                | 1.27          | 922.6               | 73,007             | 7.62                      | 68,761              | 7.18                   | 14.80                                  | 36,826.1                                       | 50.44                                   |
| 1935 | 1,310.00                                | 1.26          | 1,039.7             | 76,232             | 7.33                      | 70,635              | 6.79                   | 14.13                                  | 43,703.4                                       | 57.33                                   |
| 1936 | 1,695.00                                | 1.26          | 1,345.2             | 93,670             | 96.9                      | 73,619              | 5.47                   | 12,44                                  | 41,831.1                                       | 44.66                                   |
| 1937 | 1,806.50                                | 1.26          | 1,433.7             | 109,225            | 7.62                      | 90,540              | 6.32                   | 13.93                                  | 41,670.0                                       | 38.15                                   |
| 1938 | 1,895.70                                | 1.26          | 1,504.5             | 115,019            | 7.64                      | 118,899             | 7.90                   | 15.55                                  | 43,426.5                                       | 37.76                                   |

Sources: Deviet Istatistik Enstitüsti (DİB), İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923–1998, pp. 404–5 and 588–89; T. C. Maliye Bakanlığı, Bittçe Gider ve Gdir Gerçekleşmeleri 1924–1995 (Ankara: T. C. Maliye Bakanlığı, 1995); pp. 1777–205.

GNP = Gross National Product; TL = Turkish lira.

\* On 5 April 1933 the dollar was taken off the gold standard. After this, the TL's value began to rise against the dollar.

(Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

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presence of non-Muslims from the economy and replace them with Muslim Turks. This was the second phase of "nationalizing the economy" after the first phase at the Lausanne Conference was over. We know from British ambassador R. Lindsay's dispatches to London that in the 1920s foreign companies were required to keep their books in Turkish and that at least 75% of their personnel had to be Muslim Turks. This Turkification policy led to Law No. 2007, dated 11 June 1932, entitled "Law on Professions and Services Reserved for Turkish Citizens in Turkey." It excluded foreign nationals from a long list of professions and trades (including photographers, barbers, shoemakers, construction workers, chauffeurs, security guards, veterinarians, chemical engineers, and others) (Aktar, pp. 4–18).

The economic dependency of the 1923–30 period was in part due to the Treaty of Lausanne's prohibition against raising customs duties for a period of five years. It also derived its strength from the corrupt practices known as "affairism" and the political circumstances of that period (Box 2-2).

#### **Politics**

Between 1923 and 1930 M. Kemal and his friends were able to resolve three important questions.

The first question related to the elimination of the alternative leadership and the coalitions of the War of Liberation. The alternative leadership, consisting entirely of Unionist soldiers and civilians, was eliminated by taking advantage of the Sheikh Said uprising of 1925 and the 1926 attempt on the life of M. Kemal in İzmir. In regard to the coalitions, the Islamists were eliminated when the caliphate was abolished in 1924. The Communists and Kurds were dealt with as a result of the 1925 uprising. It was after this that M. Kemal, having established his undisputed leadership, would deliver his great speech in 1927 and demonstrate that he was in charge.

The second question, dealing with the principal Westernizing reforms, took up most of the government's time until 1930. These reforms were the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the new civil code in 1926, the penal code in 1927, the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, and the removal from the Constitution of the phrase "the religion of the state is Islam" in 1928.

The third and most important question was the suppression of the Kurdish nationalist revolt in 1930. It was only after eliminating this serious question of internal security that the state was able to assert its authority in the east. With the Tunceli operation in 1937, the regime

#### Box 2-2. Affairism and Affairists

The word affairiste (derived from the French affairisme) is defined in the Larousse Dictionary as someone who is constantly seeking his or her own interest, a profiteer, a trickster. Affairisme (defined as "[political] racketeering" in Le Grand Robert dictionary) is defined as the tendency to put commercial considerations above all else. This word was coined in Turkey in the 1920s and was inspired by the name of the is Bankasi, which is translated into French as Banque d'Affaires.

When the Türkiye İş Bankası was founded, a number of politicians converged on the bank to use their influential positions to secure loans and other benefits by acting as the representatives of entrepreneurs and/or foreign business circles. They were not averse to taking advantage of the fact that M. Kemal was the principal shareholder in the bank. The easiest way to earn money in Turkey was to use the influence of the state, even if it put the capital of the bank at risk. To secure business, foreigners had to acquire a "mask" (intermediary) in Ankara. This practice became so widespread and so natural that at one point two rival foreign firms bidding for a defense contract hired the same member of parliament to represent their respective firms (Atay, p. 455).

As a result, the regime's policies of supporting local capitalists resulted not in nationalizing the bourgeoisie as intended but in giving a Levantine aura to Ankara and to the deputies who operated in this environment. (Levantines were the European nationals who lived in Ottoman port cities over a long period.) The only thing that was different from Ottoman times was that the only intermediary between the foreign trader and the consumer in the past was the Levantine, whereas now the members of parliament were a new tier of intermediaries, rendering the condition of the consumer worse than before.

The most damaging effect of the affairists was their effort to give the production rights of basic commodities like paper or sugar to private enterprise rather than to the state. Affairism was also present in the 1930s and resulted in the resignation of prime minister Ismet Inonu in November 1937 for advocating the public ownership of key sectors of the economy. Upon his resignation, Celal Bayar, the first general manager of Türkiye iş Bankası, became prime minister. The magazine Kadro, which saw statism (state ownership of the means of production) as a "third way between communism and capitalism" that could be a model for all developing countries and the sole means for Turkey to achieve its independence, ceased publication as a result of its criticism of the Türkiye is Bankası and its circle of friends. The magazine had been in publication from 1932 until October 1934. Its publisher, Y.K. Karaosmanoğlu, was sent as ambassador to Tirana (Albania) when the magazine was forced to cease publication.

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was able to break the last focus of resistance in Dersim (Box 2-3).

In dealing with these questions, the regime neglected both foreign policy and the endemic corruption of the influential politicians. But with the 1930 Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi (SCF: Free Republican Party) event (Box

#### Box 2-3. The Kurdish Uprisings, 1925-1937

The Kurdish tribal chiefs' uprisings during the Ottoman eraoccurred mainly from 1806 to 1843 as a reaction to the centralizing policies of Mahmut II. The last uprising instigated by the shelkhs who replaced these tribal chiefs was in 1925 (see Box 2-6).

In the Ottoman Empire the Kurdish population was semiautonomous, and its allegiance to the state in the last years of the empire derived from the fact that it saw the Armenians as the common foe and felt bound to the caliphate. With the deportation of the Armenians in 1915 and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, these ties of allegiance lost their raison d'être. Although their numbers were relatively small, the Kurdish elite caused the Kurdish uprising in 1925. When this uprising was suppressed, a nationalist nucleus that established the Hoybun organization in Lebanon in 1927 supported the Ağri uprising (see Box 2-12). This uprising was suppressed in 1930 by operations that also involved the air force.

After Ağrı the Kurdish revolts were more in the nature of aftershocks of the 1925 uprising. In 1937 Ankara decided to extinguish the last focus of rebellion under the leadership of Seyit Riza in Dersim by mounting the Tuncell operation. In preparation for this operation, roads and railroads had been built to transport troops and military outposts had been strengthened. In 1934 the law on resettlement and in 1935 the Tuncell law were passed. In 1937 the Sadabad Pact was concluded. The military operation extended to 1938, when Kurdish resistance was finally broken. The pacification operations had been in progress from 1925 to 1937, but the two principal revolts occurred in 1925 and 1930. These successive revolts constituted the chief domestic question of the interwar years.

The next Kurdish uprising took place forty-six years later when the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kürdistan: Kurdistan Labor Party) carried out raids in 1984 against Eruh and Şemdinli in southeastern Turkey. This uprising was suppressed to a large extent after the apprehension of Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999 (see Box 7-16 in Section 7) and in the antiterrorism atmosphere of 9/11 but restarted after June 2005 (see Section 8).

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2-4) the discontentment of the people became manifest and the leadership was aroused. Corruption was weeded out, and measures were subsequently taken to control the chaos caused by the crisis of 1929. As a result, the system of "statism" would be introduced and the industrialization through import substitution (IIS) model would be adopted.

### B. The Period from 1930 to 1939 and Statism

#### The Economy

The statism of this period was made necessary by the developments of the preceding period (Gülalp, pp. 29–31). That period witnessed corruption and the difficulties

### Box 2-4. The Free Republican Party Event of 1930

The Free Republican Party (SCF: Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkası) was established at the behest of President M. Kemal, who was aware of the domestic problems, by his friend Ali Fethi [Okyar] on 12 August 1930. The intent was to rouse up the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) and to gauge the strength of the opposition. The new party's political and economic ideology was liberal, and it was friendly to foreign capital. This compelled prime minister İsmet İnönü to declare in Sivas on 30 August 1930 that the CHP was "moderately statist." He thus introduced the term "statist" to Turkey's political discourse. Seven years after the War of Liberation the SCF received unexpected popular support in reaction to the "affairism" of the CHP and the hardship caused by the economic crisis of 1929. Within twelve days of its registration as a party, the SCF had 130,000 applications for membership (Keyder, p. 101). Against this, the CHP did not even have an organized presence in some southeastern provinces. When Fethi Bey went to Izmir in September, a child was shot by a police officer during disturbances. The child's father placed the body before the party leader and exclaimed: "Here is a martyr! We are prepared to endure more sacrifices! Please save us!" The incident aroused the concern of the government (Aydemir, p. 398). When the SCF scored big successes in the local elections held in October, Fethi Bey too was alarmed. He realized that the party could only come to power by opposing president Ataturk and hence dissolved the party.

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resulting from the opening of the economy to the world superimposed on the penury of the Anatolian population, which was suffering from the effects of successive wars since 1911. The people were at the end of their tether. The regime had loosened up, especially after 1927, and the shock of the Free Republican Party forced it to reappraise the situation. The settling of accounts within the revolutionary cadres was over, the Kurdish uprising had been suppressed, the main reforms had been carried out, and the five-year restriction on raising customs tariffs imposed at Lausanne had expired. Above all, there was the global economic crisis. The combined effect of these factors forced the government to undertake an industrialization program led by the state. The Soviet Union had provided planning assistance as well as credits to support the program that opened up new employment opportunities and helped to relieve the scarcity of imported goods. The new development model would close the economy to the outside world, reduce dependency to a minimum, and provide the economic basis for ensuring the relative autonomy of the state. Whereas the balance of trade was in deficit until 1930, the situation was reversed after that year with successive surpluses ranging from \$0.3 million

to over \$20 million up to 1938, when a deficit of \$3.9 million was registered (see Table 2-2 above).

#### **Politics**

Statism in the economy and the state's full control of the country's political life were the distinguishing features of this period. During this time new lands were brought under the plow; despite the crisis, 200 kilometers of railroad were added to the network each year. This helped in reviving the economy (Kuruç, pp. 22-23). But that did not result in any measurable improvement in the people's daily lives. It was necessary to resort to ideology in pursuing the government's nation-building project (Kuyaş, pp. 9–10). For this purpose, a campaign was launched to build new schools and set up "People's Houses" where citizens could get involved in cultural activities. All of this was designed to gain the support of the masses. To this was added a campaign of indoctrination. The tools used for this campaign were pseudo-scientific and occasionally detrimental, but the project (which included the so-called Turkish History Thesis, which extolled the worth and accomplishments of Turks) did help in boosting the people's morale and overcoming the "sick-man" psychosis.

As a result of these policies, the state's relative internal autonomy increased. The intellectuals (aydınlar: the enlightened) took advantage of this to reduce Turkey's dependency on the outside world to a minimum. The aydınlar had no challengers in Turkey. Apart from the southeast, landholdings in Turkey were usually small to medium in size. The economic dominance of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie had been largely broken. The non-Muslims were reduced to a fortieth of the total population, whereas before World War I they made up a fifth (Keyder, p. 67). Foreign capital in the country was negligible, and the Turkish bourgeoisie that had replaced the non-Muslims was not even capable of maintaining the export trade because of the global crisis. From 1931 on, the single party established by the regime turned into a mechanism for controlling all aspects of life.

Much of the regime's ideology was borrowed directly from authoritarian models originating in Italy and Germany or the USSR (like One Nation/Ein Folk, One State/Ein Reich, One Leader/Ein Führer, One Party/Ein Partei, etc.). The single nation was the Turkish nation, the single state was the Turkish Republic, the single leader was Atatürk, the single party was the Republican People's Party (CHP), and the single ideology was Kemalism.

Despite the similarities with the authoritarian models, there were significant differences deriving from

Turkey's particular features and Atatürk's realism. First, nationalism was confined within the country's frontiers, with no suggestion of a nationalism that would embrace other Turkic peoples. Irredentism had no place in Turkish foreign policy. (That is why "Atatürk's nationalism" and "Turkish nationalism" are different concepts. Present-day ideologically committed Turkish nationalists reject the first concept.) Second, the regime employed nationalism not as a pretext for imperialistic actions but as a vehicle for standing up against imperialism. Third, although an authoritarian structure came into being, the ultimate goal was to "be like the West." The Western model in Atatürk's mind was not the German but the British version, so it was bound to lead to democracy. Fourth, although it actively sought to create a national bourgeoisie, it kept the bourgeoisie under strict state control. Fifth, although the state was under the control of the party in the Nazi, Fascist, and Communist regimes, in Turkey the party was always under state control. In 1935 the minister of the interior became the secretary-general of the CHP and the provincial governors became the CHP's provincial chairs. This arrangement was designed to keep the local notables under supervision. Sixth, unlike the Nazis and Fascists, the state never established paramilitary organizations to bring pressure on dissidents. Finally, the nation-building method employed by Atatürk's nationalism, although it had its ethnic overtones and mainly emphasized "Turkishness," did not base itself on blood as in Germany but adopted a culture-based territorial model as in France (Ernest Renan model). In the 1990s advocates of democratic reforms reinterpreted this model as "constitutional citizenship" (Oran, pp. 41–50).

It is because of these factors that Turkey drew closer to Britain and France rather than Germany and Italy in this period. Thanks to its relative internal autonomy, Turkey was able to take rational economic measures to cope with the 1929 crisis without being hindered by its class structure and was also able to make rational decisions that reflected on its foreign policy.

### III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

### A. Three Views on Atatürk's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the period from 1923 to 1939, which can be described as Atatürk's period, was the subject of arguments in the late 1960s and 1970s when foreign policy discussions began. It is important to review these arguments (some of which are still going on) before analyzing

Table 2-3. Share of Selected Countries in Turkey's Foreign Trade, 1923–1938 (%)

|      | , a     | USA     | GERA    | GERMANY | FRA     | FRANCE  | BRIT    | BRITAIN | ITALY   | LY      | TOTAL FOR | LFOR    |
|------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|
| YEAR | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS   | IMPORTS |
| 1923 | 8.0     | 7.6     | 0.6     | 6.4     | 12.4    | 1.6     | 18.6    | 17.3    | 18.0    | 19.6    | 0.99      | 60.0    |
| 1924 | 10.3    | 5.9     | 12.9    | 6.6     | 11.8    | 9.5     | 14.7    | 17.7    | 22.0    | 21.2    | 71.7      | 64.2    |
| 1925 | 13.2    | 8,1     | 14.4    | 11.4    | 12.5    | 10.8    | 8.9     | 15.7    | 26.1    | 18.0    | 75.1      | 64.0    |
| 1926 | 12.7    | 3.5     | 12.6    | 13.8    | 12.1    | 13.7    | 11.4    | 14.1    | 27.8    | 15.8    | 76.6      | 6.09    |
| 1927 | 15.5    | 3.9     | 9.3     | 14.2    | 10.7    | 13.8    | 10.6    | 13.6    | 23.4    | 12.8    | 5.69      | 57.8    |
| 1928 | 15.9    | 4.6     | 12.8    | 14.2    | 10.6    | 13.0    | 10.1    | 12.3    | 18.2    | 11.8    | 9.79      | 55.9    |
| 1929 | 6.6     | 6.7     | 13.3    | 15.3    | 12.6    | 10.4    | 9.6     | 12.2    | 21.8    | 12.5    | 67.2      | 57.1    |
| 1930 | 11.8    | 4.1     | 13.1    | 18.6    | 12.2    | 10.5    | 8.9     | 11.2    | 21.1    | 13.8    | 67.1      | 58.2    |
| 1931 | 10.0    | 3.3     | 10.7    | 21.4    | 9.6     | 10.1    | 8.5     | 11.3    | 24.2    | 14.6    | 63.0      | 60.7    |
| 1932 | 11.9    | 2.6     | 13.5    | 23.2    | 7.7     | 8.4     | 8.6     | 12.4    | 16.1    | 12.9    | 29.0      | 59.5    |
| 1933 | 10.5    | 3.1     | 19.0    | 25.5    | 6.4     | 9.9     | 8.9     | 13.5    | 13.5    | 11.4    | 58.3      | 60.1    |
| 1934 | 10.3    | 4.3     | 37.3    | 33.8    | 3.0     | 7.4     | 5.7     | 6.6     | 11.2    | 8.5     | 67.5      | 63.9    |
| 1935 | 10.1    | 7.0     | 40.9    | 40.0    | 3.2     | 4.7     | 5.4     | 8.6     | 6.6     | 6.4     | 69.5      | 6.79    |
| 1936 | 11.1    | 6.7     | 51.0    | 45.1    | 3.3     | 2.5     | 5.4     | 9.9     | 3.7     | 2.2     | 74.5      | 66.1    |
| 1937 | 13.9    | 15.1    | 36.5    | 42.1    | 3.8     | 1.1     | 7.1     | 6.2     | 5.3     | 5.3     | 9.99      | 8.69    |
| 1938 | 12.3    | 10.5    | 42.9    | 47.0    | 3.3     | 1.3     | 3.4     | 11.2    | 10.0    | 4.8     | 71.9      | 74.8    |

Source: Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü (DİB), Istatistik Göstergeler 1923–1998, pp. 418–30. (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Ulngbay)

this period. They are focused on three areas: (1) Does the Turkish revolution belong to the Third World or is it Western-oriented? (2) Is it anti-imperialist or not? (3) Is it expansionist? The first two questions were raised by the Left, while the third question was raised by the racist segment of the Right (Oran, pp. 157–79).

With reference to the first question, some authors claimed that the War of Liberation was the forerunner and perhaps the inspiration of the Third World (that is, the downtrodden nations). These concepts were much in vogue during the 1970s. It was also claimed that Atatürk's foreign policy was the first example of nonalignment, another fashionable concept of the time. They quoted from his speeches to prove their points.

As a matter of fact, Atatürk had uttered words that confirmed such views: "The day will come when the oppressed nations will surely destroy the oppressors. With this, the words oppressed and oppressor will disappear from the earth and mankind will achieve a social condition befitting its dignity" (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, C. II, p. 29, 3 January 1922). "If Turkey's battle had been fought solely for its own benefit, it would probably have been less bloody and would have ended sooner... What Turkey was defending was the cause of the oppressed, the cause of the eastern peoples" (p. 40, 7 July 1922). "In this sacred struggle our nation is proud to help secure the salvation of Islam and promote the prosperity of the oppressed of the world" (p. 19, 14 October 1921). "They want to destroy, trample on, dismember Anatolia... The ultimate target of this attack is the entire East... With its defiance, Anatolia is not only doing what is necessary for its own survival, but protecting the East from aggression" (p. 21, 18 October 1921).

All of these phrases were uttered before the final victory and in diplomatic gatherings where there were no Westerners. The first quotation is from the speech delivered at the banquet in honor of General Frunze, the Ukrainian envoy; the second at the banquet of Soviet ambassador Aralov; the last two at meetings attended by the ambassador of Azerbaijan. Atatürk's purpose was to gain the support of the East for the ongoing Anatolian revolution.

It should also be recalled that in the interwar years there were only a handful of independent downtrodden nations, which carried little weight. There is no doubt that Atatürk's realistic foreign policy was pro-West. In any case, with the abolition of the caliphate, relations with Islamic Eastern states turned sour, and they did not start improving until 1933.

In regard to the second argument, some authors have

contended that the War of Liberation, which formed the basis of the Turkish Revolution, was not anti-imperialist in character because it was not waged against the West but against the Armenians and the Greeks. Furthermore, the Western states were granted new economic concessions even during the war.

As a matter of fact, the Turkish revolution had nothing to do with anticapitalism. It was the reverse: the revolution was intended to integrate Turkey with the international system. But the capitalist features of the state created by the revolution did not prevent it from being against imperialism. It was seeking development not through international capitalism but through national capitalism that would bring prosperity to the country and protect the economy from the outside world. At the time, it was not possible to foresee that the local capitalists would be pursuing the same goal of profit maximization and that they would link up with international capitalism when the time was ripe in order to achieve this. Atatürk's Westernism was a strategy that can be described as "Westernization with full independence." The Soviets had noted this feature of the revolution and provided great assistance both during the War of Liberation and in the interwar years.

In regard to the granting of concessions during the War of Liberation, it will be recalled that these were used to play one Western state against another.

The racist far Right in Turkey got involved in the third argument by rejecting the restrictive interpretation of the National Pact. The rightists saw this document as a constricting vise and claimed that Atatürk favored expansionist policies, basing themselves on his policy in regard to Hatay. This school of thought was supported by the followers of the "Neo-Ottomanist" trend after the 1990s and has found adherents up to the present.

Hatay was Atatürk's personal cause, and the annexation of Hatay was a result of this fact. On repeated occasions (24 February 1920, 1 May 1920, 28 December 1920) he had declared that "our national rights extend to the south of Iskenderun" and claimed that Hatay was included in the National Pact (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, C. I, pp. 28 and 71; Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, C. II, p. 12). But when Atatürk was pressed on the issue in the TGNA on 16 October 1921, he was embarrassed and forced to declare: "What is the armistice line? Does such a line exist? Of course not...The line that we'll fix with our might shall become the frontier line" (TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, pp. 354-55). He was forced to make this statement because four days later, on 20 October, he would be reaching an agreement with Franklin-Bouillon. In this agreement Atatürk consented to drawing the frontier north of Iskenderun in order to secure the evacuation of Anatolia by French forces.

This concession rankled Atatürk. At a time when there was no serious domestic pressure to correct the situation and when his leadership was unchallenged at home, he decided to do something about it before he died. The formal annexation of Hatay occurred on 7 July 1939 after his death, but Atatürk lived to see the declaration of an independent Hatay Republic on 2 September 1938.

That is why the annexation of Hatay, which was an irredentist act, cannot be taken as an example of a policy of irredentism.

Let us now turn our attention to the implementation of Turkish foreign policy.

### B. Foreign Policy in the East: The Kurdish Question

During this period Turkey concluded a number of agreements and protocols dealing with friendship, security, good neighborliness, neutrality, nonaggression, and cooperation with countries to its east and south. Among these can be cited agreements with Iran in 1926 and 1932, with France as trustee for Syria in 1926, and with Britain as trustee for Iraq in 1926. In 1937 Turkey signed the Sadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

When these agreements are examined, it becomes clear that Turkey's single concern with regard to the security of its eastern and southern frontiers was the common denominator in all of them: to ensure the joint control of the Kurdish tribes. This concern reached its pinnacle with the Sadabad Pact, which was the foreign policy dimension of the Tunceli operation carried out in 1937–38. The motive for the pact was that Kurdish insurgents who were pursued and cornered in one country slipped across the border to another country. The main task of Turkish foreign policy concerning the eastern provinces in that period was to prevent Turkey's principal domestic question from having international repercussions.

These concerns even led Turkey to occupy a portion of Iranian territory in 1930. The insurgents from the region of Mount Ağrı (Ararat) had fled to Iran when cornered and sought sanctuary on Lesser Mount Ağrı. The army pursued the insurgents and surrounded Lesser Mount Ağrı, located on Iranian territory. The problem was subsequently resolved through an exchange of territory with Iran, whereby Lesser Ağrı was incorporated in Turkey and Iran was compensated with an equivalent stretch of Turkish territory. This incident reveals how preoccupied the Turkish foreign-policy establishment was with the Kurdish question.

### c. Foreign Policy in the West:The Question of Balance vs. Alliance

As in the case of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, Turkey as a strategic medium power was compelled to choose between relying on the balance of power or joining an alliance (Hale, p. 72). There was always the danger that a medium power in alliance with major powers would end up as a satellite.

As long as it was possible, Turkey relied successfully on the balance of power. In this instance, there were three groups to consider: (1) Britain and France; (2) Germany and Italy; and (3) the USSR.

Turkey's foreign-policy strategy was laid down by Atatürk and carried out by Tevfik Rüştü Aras. The general approach to these three groups was as follows.

- 1. The top priority was to resolve outstanding problems with the first group. To this end, Mosul was given up in 1926, leaving no contentious issue with Britain. Turkey established friendly relations with Greece in 1930 and obtained membership in the League of Nations (LoN) in 1932.
- 2. The policy was to remain distant from the second group and to ward off the threats emanating from Italy. Although the Turkish regime derived much inspiration from these countries, Atatürk never gave any thought to cordiality or alliance with these countries. He saw this group only as a counterweight to the first group. Atatürk perceived the West in the Anglo-Saxon context and was by nature averse to adventurism. He was probably also influenced by the fact that his archrival and adversary Enver Paşa was strongly pro-German.

Fascist Italy was pursuing a policy of looking upon the Mediterranean as "Mare Nostrum" (Our Sea); it was entrenched in the Dodecanese Islands and was openly coveting Antalya. This forced Turkey to distance itself further from Germany even though Germany and Italy had a major share of Turkey's foreign trade (see Table 2.3 above).

3. Unlike the situation in previous periods of history, no threat came from the USSR during this time. On the contrary, the USSR provided welcome assistance in the area of planning, which was greatly needed at the time to carry out the policies of statism. Turkey used its friendship with the USSR as a counterweight to the countries in groups 1 and 2.

#### The Search for a Balance of Power

Until the mid-1930s foreign policy had a low priority in Turkey. The pressing domestic questions and the absence of any particular external threat kept foreign policy issues in the background. Turkey's main concern at the time was to tidy up the questions left outstanding after Lausanne and to bring the Kurdish question under control in cooperation with its neighbors.

After Hitler came to power in 1933 and with the emergence of the Italian threat, Atatürk shifted course toward a search for a balance of power in an environment that was headed toward war. This policy found its expression in the Balkan Pact of 1934. But the search for a regional balance of power proved unfruitful, because the Balkan states other than Greece proved to be timid and because Britain and France were not ready to confront Germany and Italy.

In these circumstances Turkey would seek an alliance with the first group and try to draw the USSR into this alliance.

### The Search for Alliance

Some writers and scholars in Turkey have considered the Turkish policy of entering into an alliance with Britain and France in October 1939 and remaining on the side of these countries rather than staying neutral during the war to be a departure from Atatürk's foreign policy.

Turkey chose this course, however, only after it became apparent that the policy of relying on the balance of power was no longer a viable option. The manifestation of this was the 1936 Medite ranean Pact, which foreign policy experts in Turkey have not analyzed sufficiently. Through this pact Britain give unilateral guarantees to certain Mediterranean countries when Italy started fortifying the Aegean islands and undertook the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Britain retracted its guarantee, again unilaterally, some months later. Turkey was eager to be a part of this arrangement, even though being a beneficiary of a unilateral guarantee would not contribute to its standing in the world. Atatürk had close relations with the British ambassador Percy Loraine, with whom he frequently exchanged ideas. Atatürk pressed the ambassador to help transform Turkey's relations with Britain into a bilateral alliance. But Britain still harbored hopes of drawing Italy to its side while pursuing a policy of appeasement vis-àvis Germany. Had Britain agreed, the alliance of October 1939 could have been consummated in 1936, because Turkey had already made up its mind at that time.

The course of Turkish foreign policy became evident with two apparently economic decisions that were actually political. When the restrictions on Turkish sovereignty over the Straits were removed at Montreux in 1936, Britain was awarded the contract for the refortification of the waterway. Turkey also awarded the contract for the construction of the Karabük Iron and Steelworks to

Britain in 1936. Nevertheless, Turkey did not want to stray too much from a policy of balance: a German firm was selected to carry out the technical supervision of the construction of the steelworks. After this, the two contending European powers would vie with one another to offer loans to Turkey on favorable terms.

Because of Britain's indecision, the alliance could not be achieved right away. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 finally aroused Britain.

The alliance of October 1939 was a natural outgrowth of Atatürk's foreign policy. The essence of Turkey's Western European policy in this period was to draw close to Britain and France while trying to get the USSR to join this group. Turkey went to great lengths to achieve this end. It kept the USSR informed about its negotiations with Britain in the hope that Moscow would join the alliance. Moscow, however, was aware of Britain's policy of pushing Germany to attack the USSR, which drove it to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany in August 1939. It was the USSR that, at Germany's request, tried to dissuade Turkey from forming the tripartite alliance of October 1939. (When Saracoğlu, the minister of foreign affairs, went to Moscow, Joachim von Ribbentrop was also there.) Once the Hatay question with France was resolved, the alliance was ready for signature. The delay occurred because of the expectation that Moscow would change its stance.

Three weeks after the occupation of Poland, Saracoğlu went to Moscow (September–October 1939) to try to persuade his hosts to join the alliance. When he failed in his impossible mission, the tripartite alliance was signed even before the minister of foreign affairs returned home.

### IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

The foreign policy of this period has been described in Turkey as being based on self-respect. This characterization is apt.

1. Turkey was able to achieve this despite the constraints of its foreign trade. In effect, Britain's share in Turkey's exports in 1938 was 3.4%, while the corresponding figure for Germany was 42.9%. Britain's share in Turkey's imports was 11.2%, while Germany's was 47%. In 1936 Germany's share in Turkey's exports was 51%, while it supplied 45.1% of Turkey's imports. Through its clearing policy in trade (a barter system that renders a country's foreign trade dependent on the stronger partner), Germany had established a stranglehold on Turkey's foreign trade

Italy's share in Turkey's foreign trade was also considerable until Turkey's open disapproval of Italy's Abys-

sinian adventure. In 1931 Britain received 8.5% of Turkey's exports, while Italy's share was 24.2%. In that year, Britain provided 11.3% of Turkey's imports, while Italy's share was 14.6%. Despite the dominant position of these two countries in its foreign trade, Turkey maintained a balance by aligning itself politically with the first group.

As regards the USSR, Turkey was able to reject communism domestically while cooperating with Moscow in the international arena. This approach was realistic and balanced.

- 2. Turkey pursued this balanced policy at a time of great economic hardship. It was repaying the Ottoman debt, coping with the effects of the 1929 depression, building railroads, nationalizing foreign-owned railroads, and so on. Foreign debt repayments occasionally reached figures in excess of 50% of Turkey's export earnings (see Table 2.2 above). As a result of the agreements reached with French creditors, the ratio of debt repayments to export earnings rose from 2.45% to 20.53% in 1929 and peaked in 1935 at 57.33%.
- 3. Turkey pursued its policy even while it obtained new loans from abroad. It could do this because it did not borrow haphazardly and continuously. It borrowed in a rational way to nationalize the concessions, finance industrialization, and strengthen its defense capabilities. This allowed it to repay these debts in an orderly way until 1950 (Gürsel, pp. 471–72).

The secret of this success lies in the three factors explained earlier.

- 1. In the interwar period Turkey enjoyed, for the first time, an international environment that allowed it to exercise a broad degree of relative autonomy. This was a considerable blessing for a medium power like Turkey.
- 2. Turkey was able to make maximum use of this situation. It was able to reinforce its relative external autonomy with rational economic policies. Among these were industrialization through import substitution, minimum foreign borrowing, observing strict financial discipline, constructing railroads without external assistance, and so forth. It implemented a rational foreign policy commensurate with its possibilities and means. It knew how to observe rules. As a striking example of this, one can cite the annexation of territory by adhering to rules and thereby avoiding complications: the occupation and annexation of Lesser Mount Ağrı in 1930 was carried out by relinquishing land and without disturbing regional or global balances. The annexation of Hatay was also carried out with the consent of the influential regional power, France, and no irredentism arose after that episode.
  - 3. While conveying the message to the first group

that it had no intention of deviating from the Western structure, Turkey used the second and third groups as a counterweight and let it be known that it would be a part of this structure on its own terms.

As a result, Turkey took its place in the international arena as a successful country enjoying relative autonomy during this period.

Baskin Oran

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### Relations with Western Europe

#### RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

As a result of the successful conclusion of the War of Liberation, the Allied forces evacuated Anatolia and İstanbul; but Britain's presence in the Middle East remained through its mandates in the region. With the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925, a relative stability was established in Europe. Aside from the issue of Mosul with Britain, no serious question came up in the Middle East during the 1920s.

### A. Developments after Lausanne

At the Conference of Lausanne, which opened on 20 November 1922, the principal actors were minister of foreign affairs Ismet Paşa on the Turkish side and his adversary Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary.

Another issue that affected relations with Britain was the question of moving the British Embassy to Ankara. Having led the Anatolia movement from Ankara, M. Kemal and his comrades proclaimed Ankara the capital of the new state. This was a strategic decision. In the final stages of the Ottoman Empire, its capital, Istanbul, was easily besieged in wartime.

Like several other states, Britain did not accept this move and for a long time refused to transfer its embassy to Ankara. It even used undiplomatic language when referring to this subject. Foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain declared in November 1924 that Britain could not send a diplomat with the rank of ambassador to "a small, dirty mountain village in remote Anatolia" (FO371-10194, E9848-210-44, in Acar, p. 90, footnote 2).

This was just an excuse with little validity. What rankled Britain was that Turkey had established a new state after a national struggle and that its capital had been shifted from Levantine Istanbul to Anatolian Ankara.

Ankara was eager to eliminate this source of discord with Britain, because it wanted good relations with London. It gave Britain, free of charge, a plot for an embassy building in Ankara. Nevertheless, Britain moved its embassy to Ankara only in 1926, after the Mosul question had been resolved to Britain's satisfaction.

The Mosul question was the most important source of tension between the two countries in the mid-1920s.

#### B. The Question of Mosul

From the 1923 Lausanne Conference to 1926 the question of Mosul was one of the main obstacles to the smooth development of Turkey's relations with Britain and with the Western states in general. As a matter of fact, the question of Mosul would remain on Turkey's foreign policy agenda in different guises after 1926 and even in the 1990s.

As noted earlier, a substantial portion of Mosul was in Ottoman hands when the armistice was signed on 30 October 1918. Britain started occupying the region on 3 November, and by 15 November the province was under total British control. When the Mudanya Armistice was signed in October 1922 following the War of Liberation, Mosul had not yet been liberated. Its ultimate fate would be discussed at the Lausanne Conference. (The following information is mainly based on Kürkçüoğlu 1972, pp. 275–89, and OTDP, pp. 70–73.)

For Turkey, Mosul was important for security reasons and because of the composition of its population. It was also rich in oil. Britain was interested in the province because of the oil and also because it was located on the route to India. Lord Curzon underlined Britain's strategic considerations when he asserted that the Euphrates was the western limit of Britain (meaning India) (Box 2-5). With these considerations in mind, Britain tightened its control over the region and in October 1922 signed an agreement with Faisal, who had been installed as king of Iraq by Britain. Although the Shiite and Kurdish segments of the population and most of the inhabitants of Mosul objected to the agreement, Britain's pressure ensured its ratification by Iraq. However, this did not result in full British control of northern Iraq. As noted above, at the time when the Lausanne Conference got underway in

### Box 2-5. Britain's Kurdish Policy in the 1920s

Britain's Kurdish policy from the late 1910s to late 1920s shifted from one period to another, but the objective remained constant to maintain its control in the region. To achieve this objective Britain considered different approaches: establishment of a Kurdish state located in Turkey and Iraq, an autonomous Kurdish region, a chain of easily controllable Kurdish statelets, a Kurdish state in Iraq. But carrying out these different options was another matter, and Britain faced many obstacles.

First, Britain had promised the territory in question to the Kurds, Arabs, and Armenians, and it proved very difficult to reconcile their conflicting and overlapping claims. The Kurds informed Britain that they would not accept being placed under Armenian rule and would join forces with Turkey if that occurred. To prevent a negative Kurdish reaction, Britain had to withdraw its support of the Armenians and sought to involve the U.S.

Second, Britain had trouble bringing the Kurds under its control and overcoming their internal differences. The same question would confront the U.S. in the 1990s.

Finally, the British establishment itself was divided on the issue of how to deal with the Kurdish question. The India Office wanted to see an autonomous Kurdish state, Lord Curzon called for turning the Kurdish region into a British zone of influence, and Winston Churchill advocated the creation of a Kurdish state that would serve as a buffer between Turkey and the Arab region.

In 1918 Britain sent Maj. E. W. C. Noel, an expert on the region, on a fact-finding and special intelligence mission to southeast Anatolia and Mosul. This mission would have an important bearing on Britain's Kurdish policies. Noel was pro-Kurdish by inclination,

which earned him the sobriquet of "the Kurdish Lawrence" (in reference to the famous "Lawrence of Arabia"). Even the Foreign Office found him to be too friendly to the Kurds. Noel's efforts were aimed at sowing discord between Turks and Kurds, securing the allegiance of the Kurds to Britain, and creating a Kurdish state. He was the architect of a failed plan to storm the Congress of Sivas with the help of the governor of Elazig, Ali Galip.

The Kurdish issue was discussed in April 1920 at the preparatory meeting in San Remo, and the envisaged settlement of the question took its final form in articles 62–64 of the Treaty of Sèvres (see "The Peace Treaty of Sèvres" in Section 1).

By this arrangement, Kurdistan was to be divided into a northern and a southern region, with the southern region (that is, Mosul) remaining under British rule. The concept of a unified Kurdistan was being dropped because the two regions were completely different, in Britain's view. The north had no oil fields and was mountainous and hence difficult to control. The south was rich in oil and was flat, so it came under British domination. The northern Kurds were opposed to being incorporated in an Armenian state, so they threw in their lot with Ankara's liberation struggle. The Iraqi Kurds were to cause trouble for Britain with their insurgencies.

At Lausanne the Kurds were not given the status of a minority. In fact, there was no mention of Kurds anywhere in the treaty. After Lausanne the Kurds were used by Britain to unsettle Turkey and to undermine Turkish claims to Mosul.

(I. UZGEL)

November 1922, the insurgency led by Sheikh Mahmut Berzenci was taking place in Suleymaniyah and Revanduz. The insurgents were being given support by the district officer (kaymakam) Özdemir Bey (see "The International Environment and Dynamics" in Section 1), whom M. Kemal had sent to the region. Britain was hard pressed to suppress the insurgency, having to use all the means at its disposal, including the Royal Air Force. It took Britain a full year after the Lausanne Conference was concluded to pacify and occupy the region.

### 1. The Question of Mosul at the Lausanne Conference

The negotiations started in Lausanne against this background. At first Ismet Paşa requested that this question be taken up in bilateral negotiations. At these negotiations, Ismet Paşa reminded Lord Curzon that Anatolia was poor and needed the income from petroleum. Lord Curzon claimed that the question of Mosul had nothing to do with oil and suggested that it would be more advisable to seek loans from London rather than insisting on Mosul. He also recommended talking to the oil companies.

When these bilateral talks proved fruitless, the question was taken up at the conference on 23 January 1923.

Britain had a very inflexible position at the negotiations. İsmet Paşa put forward the Turkish arguments while rejecting the validity of Britain's arguments, many of them based on questionable facts. The arguments are summarized below.

### The Turkish Position

İsmet Paşa used ethnographic, legal, historical, economic, political, military, and strategic arguments when presenting the Turkish position at the conference.

Turkey's ethnographic argument was that the region's population of about 500,000 was made up of 263,000 Kurds, 146,000 Turks, 43,000 Arabs, 18,000 Yezidis, and 13,000 non-Muslims. Ismet Paşa informed the conference that the Kurds and Turks were a clear majority in the region. Basing himself on the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, he claimed that the Kurds were of Turanian origin and that—contrary to Britain's claims—the Turks and the Kurds wanted to live together. He also declared that the government of the TGNA was the government of the Turks as well as of the Kurds and that the Kurdish deputies in the Assembly did not want to see Mosul detached. Since Arabs were a minority in the region, there were no valid grounds for giving Mosul to Iraq.

The legal argument was that Mosul had been occupied after the armistice. This was against international law as well as Wilson's principles. Britain's arguments based on the right of conquest violated the spirit of the time as well as international law. Turkey asked for a plebiscite, which Britain rejected on the grounds that the local population was poorly educated.

The historic argument was that Mosul had been Turkish without interruption since the eleventh century.

İsmet Paşa also reminded the conference that geographically Mosul was an extension of Anatolia. With the construction of railroads to the Mediterranean, Mosul would be linked to Anatolia rather than to Iraq. Economically Mosul's links were with Diyarbakır and Mediterranean ports. Iraq would get Baghdad and Basra, and this would be enough to give the new state economic viability and self-sufficiency.

Mosul was also important for Turkey militarily and strategically, because it provided the link between different parts of southern Anatolia. If the security of Baghdad was important, as Britain claimed, then the same argument applied to İstanbul and the regime of the Straits had to be formulated with Turkey's security in mind. In any case, Turkey had no intention of attacking its neighbors.

In addition to these arguments, the Turkish delegation also drew attention to the inconsistencies in Britain's arguments regarding Mosul. Britain argued that by its agreement of October 1922 with Baghdad it was committed to defending Iraq's territorial integrity. İsmet Paşa recalled that when Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement it agreed to detach Mosul from Iraq and give it to France. He also asserted that the agreement with Iraq could have no validity because it was signed at a time when Iraq was still formally part of the Ottoman Empire.

İsmet Paşa repudiated the argument often used by Britain that it had responsibilities toward the Arabs. He rejected the British approach that Iraq must remain under a mandate regime.

Ismet Paşa gave assurances that the world would not be deprived of its oil resources if Mosul remained within Turkey. He also showed his determination to Lord Curzon by declaring that he would not return to Ankara without Mosul.

#### The British Position

Britain contested the accuracy of Turkish population figures. It argued that the Turks of the region made up one-twelfth of the total population. According to Britain, there were 455,000 Kurds, 66,000 Turks, and 62,000 Christians in the region.

The main British argument was to refute the Turkish assertion that Turks and Kurds were of the same stock. Britain claimed that the two peoples came from different origins and had different characteristics. Lord Curzon tried to undermine the Turkish thesis by referring to Kurds as a Muslim minority. In addition to this argument, Curzon accused the Turks of mistreating the Armenians and other minorities.

Curzon recalled that under article 8 of the October 1922 agreement with Iraq Britain undertook not to give up any Iraqi territory and leaving Mosul to the Turks would violate this provision.

On the subject of economic viability, Britain maintained that the region's economic links were with the south and the west.

Britain also pointed out that if Mosul went to Turkey the frontier would be only sixty miles from Baghdad and that this would constitute a threat to Iraq's security. Turkey had to insist throughout the conference that it had no designs on those territories that were not included in the National Pact.

Against the Turkish argument that Mosul had been occupied after the signing of the armistice, Britain replied that word of the armistice was late in reaching Mosul and that, in any case, article 7 of the Mudros Armistice allowed for such an occupation. While Turkey referred to its need for petroleum, Britain claimed that Mosul's petroleum had no effect on the British position. Curzon contended that the issue was not the fate of Mosul but the demarcation of the Turkish-Iraqi frontier.

Given Britain's intransigent stand on Mosul and Turkey's wish not to delay peace, İsmet Paşa agreed to having the matter settled with Britain within one year, whereupon the question of Mosul was removed from the conference agenda. Article 3/2 of the Lausanne Treaty was drafted to read as follows:

The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the mentioned time, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

Hence the question of Mosul was referred to the LoN, in line with Britain's wishes. Turkey's acceptance of this formula drew sharp reactions from some deputies in the TGNA and led to heated debates on the subject. M. Kemal found himself forced to defend the arrangement. According to him, Mosul could be taken but hostilities could persist, and that was why a war with Britain should be avoided.

Ismet Paşa's compromise on Mosul was also criticized not only at the time but in later years as well and seen by the critics as a sellout for the sake of Westernization and to earn Britain's friendship.

### The Haliç Conference (İstanbul Conference)

After Lausanne, Britain asked the Turkish government in October 1923 to enter into bilateral negotiations to settle the Mosul issue.

The conference met on 19 May 1924 at Haliç (Golden Horn) and therefore came to be known as the Haliç Conference. It is also referred to as the İstanbul Conference. This time the Turkish delegation was led by Fethi Bey [Okyar]. The delegation advanced the arguments that had been employed at Lausanne. Fethi Bey also stressed that the Turks and Kurds were two fraternal peoples who were committed to a united political future and who had established the Republic as equal partners: consequently, the region of Mosul, where these two elements constituted a clear majority, should revert to Turkey. To trace the frontier in any other way would be a cause of permanent insecurity and instability. This time the Turkish delegation introduced a new element into the negotiations by proposing that, as a quid pro quo for Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk, and Mosul remaining within Turkish borders, Turkey would offer Britain a partnership in the region's oil.

The head of the British delegation was Britain's high commissioner for Iraq, Percy Cox. In the course of the negotiations, he came up with the unexpected claim for Hakkari to be relinquished to the Nestorians (see Box 1-22 in Section 1). The British knew that such a claim would be rejected by Turkey. They resorted to this diplomatic maneuver of claiming more than just Mosul in order to block the negotiations so that the matter would be referred to the LoN. After the conference wound up on 5 June, a Nestorian uprising took place in the region of Hakkari on 7 August. This uprising was engineered by Britain and received British support from the air.

### 3. The Question of Mosul at the League of Nations

When the Haliç Conference reached a deadlock, Britain asked that the question be referred to the LoN in line with the provisions of article 3/2 of the Treaty of Lausanne. As a last resort, Turkey tried to get the Turkish Petroleum Company to use its influence over the British government in favor of Turkey, but this produced no results.

The Council of the League of Nations started its deliberations on the subject on 20 September 1924. Turkey asked for the question to be settled through a plebiscite. The British position was that the issue was not about the future of Mosul but merely a question of tracing frontiers. Britain argued that because the people of the region were mostly uneducated, holding a plebiscite could not be the solution. Instead Britain proposed the setting up of a committee. The head of the Turkish delegation pointed out that the members of the committee could not be familiar with the wishes of the inhabitants and insisted on a plebiscite.

### The Committee's Report

In line with Britain's position, the Council of the League of Nations decided to set up a committee made up of three members from neutral states. The committee would have the authority to correspond with the interested states and, when necessary, to engage in fact finding. The committee consisted of Hungary's Count Paul Teleki, the Belgian Colonel Poulis, and the Swede A. Wirsen. When the committee started its work in the region, clashes erupted as a result of Britain's attempt to expand its area of control northward. Therefore the Council of the League met in Brussels and on 29 October 1924 drew a temporary line separating Hakkari from Mosul. This line came to be known as the Brussels Line. At the same time, Britain set out to create an anti-Turkish climate in the region.

Following its investigations in the region, the committee submitted its report on 16 July 1925. It accepted as valid the statistics submitted by Iraq regarding the geography and ethnic composition of the region. The committee concluded that the Kurds of the region were neither Arab nor Turkish and accepted the Brussels Line as the frontier. It acknowledged that for eleven centuries Mosul had been under Turkish sovereignty but declared that most of the region's trade was with Iraq and Syria. It concluded that the inhabitants were hardly eager to join Iraq but were not enthusiastic about joining Turkey either. The sheikhs and tribal leaders of the region had taken a stand against Turkey. To a certain degree, this was due to fear of Britain, but it was also because they expected the region to be more

prosperous under a British mandate than as part of a warimpoverished Turkey.

The committee's verdict was as follows. The people want to join neither side. But from the point of view of their interest, the disputed region should not be partitioned. This decision is based on economic grounds. Consequently, the territories lying to the south of the Brussels Line should belong to Iraq under the following conditions.

- 1. The country should remain under League of Nations mandate for twenty-five years (Iraq was freed from the mandate in 1932).
- The judiciary and educational systems will employ Kurds, and Kurdish will be considered an official language.
- 3. If the mandate comes to an end and the Kurds are not granted autonomy, the people will prefer to be with the Turks rather than with the Arabs. Since the condition of Turkey is better than the condition of Iraq, the region will have to be transferred to Turkey.
- 4. If it becomes necessary to partition the territory, the Lesser Zap River could serve as the frontier. (In that case, Mosul would remain in Turkey and Kirkuk in Iraq.)

### The Decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice

Britain accepted the committee's report. T. Rüştü Bey, who had replaced Fethi Bey as head of the Turkish delegation, objected on the ground that according to the Treaty of Lausanne the LoN could not make a binding decision on this subject. It could only make the decisions foreseen in the Covenant. Upon this objection, the Assembly of the LoN decided to seek the legal opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice on the following questions:

- 1. What is the legal status of a decision rendered by the League of Nations Assembly in conformity with article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? Is it an arbitral award, a recommendation, or mediation?
- 2. Is unanimity required for such a decision or will a majority of votes suffice?
- 3. Can the parties to the dispute take part in the voting?

Turkey claimed that because the question was political it was not susceptible to a legal solution. It stood against referring the matter to the court and did not participate in its proceedings.

The opinion of the court, dated 21 November 1925, was as follows:

1. Article 15 of the Covenant provides that the Assembly cannot make binding decisions. However, since article

3/2 of the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that the League of Nations shall decide on the future of the territory, its decision in this case shall be binding.

- 2. In accordance with article 5/1 of the covenant, the decision will have to be unanimous.
- 3. The parties may take part in the voting, but their votes will not be taken into account in determining the existence of unanimity.

In the meantime the Estonian general who was charged with carrying out investigations in the region was not allowed by Turkey to proceed to the areas north of the Brussels Line. In his report to the LoN, the general stated that Turkey was mistreating Christians in the region. At that time, the Sheikh Said uprising also had started (Box 2-6). It was against this background that the Assembly of the LoN decided on 6 December 1925, in Turkey's absence, to award the territory north of the Brussels Line to Turkey and the territory south of it to Iraq. Thus Mosul was awarded to Iraq.

This decision provoked a sharp reaction in Turkey. Turkey recalled its representatives in Geneva. In his address to the Congress of the Republican People's Party (CHP), M. Kemal declared that the Mosul question had revealed clearly that the European states had not given up their wish to oppress the eastern nations. The minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü, declared that—since Turkey had not given its consent—its sovereign rights over Mosul would continue. On 17 December 1925, one day after the LoN's decision, Turkey reacted by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the USSR. Turkish public opinion took a strongly anti-British turn. This forced many British companies to close their operations in Turkey.

### Why Turkey Lost Mosul

The most important reason for the LoN decision in favor of Britain was that Britain was the most influential member of the organization, while Turkey was not a member. Turkey had rejected the Sèvres Treaty and waged a war of national liberation. It would be unthinkable to expect that Britain and France would allow Mosul to go to a country that had upset their plans, especially since the region contained oil and had a strategic location.

At that time, British agents were spreading rumors about an impending attack by Italy and Greece in Thrace and western Turkey. These rumors caused alarm in Turkey, because of the possibility that it might find itself fighting on two fronts at once.

Furthermore, Turkey's refusal to send its representative to the Permanent Court and to allow the Estonian

#### Box 2-6. The Sheikh Said Uprising

Numerous Kurdish uprisings occurred from the time the Republic was declared to 1938. The first and most important of these was the Sheikh Said uprising, which erupted in February 1925 and, after spreading to fourteen provinces, was suppressed in April. Although the uprising was launched prematurely, before the necessary preparations had been completed, because of an accidental encounter, the rebels were able to lay siege to Diyarbakir. The uprising forced the Republican government to incur heavy expenditures. It was finally suppressed after the army traveled over the French railroad through Syrian territory and struck at the rebels from the rear. (Article 10 of the 1921 Turkish-French agreement had made provision for such travel by military personnel.) The aftershocks of the uprising continued until 1937 and included the Ağri uprising of 1930 (see Box 2-12 below).

The 1925 uprising has given rise to two important debates: the first on the true nature of the uprising; and the second on the question of Britain's involvement.

There are three contending theses about the nature of the uprising. The first claims that this was a religious movement, a view expressed by Sheikh Said himself at his trial. It is clear that one of the reasons why the Kurds participated enthusiastically in the War of Liberation was to save the caliphate, the other being the fear of the establishment of Armenia. This thesis is based on the argument that the abolition of the caliphate triggered the uprising. The Turkish leadership also agreed with this thesis by describing the uprising as a reactionary move. The regime would use this uprising as a pretext to break down the opposition to the reforms already carried out or contemplated and to silence the opposition through the law on the establishment of public order (Takrir-I Sükun). The first to be arrested under this law were the Communists, although they had been against the uprising.

The second thesis contends that the uprising had feudal roots and was retrograde in its nature. According to this thesis, the Kemalists were carrying out a bourgeois revolution and the backward eastern provinces were reacting to this progressive move. This is the thesis of the Turkish Communist Party and is based on the assumption that bourgeois revolutions get rid of the feudal social-economic order. This argument does not carry much weight, however, because the Kemalists waged the War of Liberation in alliance

with the provincial notables and made no move to eliminate the feudal order in the rural regions when they came to power.

The third thesis sees this uprising as a manifestation of Kurdish nationalism. According to this view, only the appearance of the uprising is religious; the real force behind the uprising was the Azadi movement set up toward the end of 1921 or 1922. The leaders of the secret Azadi were regular army officers seeking Kurdish independence. They were forced to use a cleric as a front man because they needed someone to whom the simple tribal Kurds could relate, while they themselves remained in the background. Sheikh Said, a cleric of the Nakshibendi sect, was the brother-in-law of the leader of the Azadi movement, Col. Halit Bey of Cibran. During the trial the judge confirmed that the object of the uprising was Kurdish independence.

Regarding the second debate, those who assume British implication in the uprising cite three pieces of evidence to make their case. First, catalogs of British arms manufacturers were found at Sheikh Said's headquarters. This is not very persuasive, because British manufacturers of arms sold their wares to anyone, even British senemies. Second, the British had instigated and supported the Nestorian uprising of 1924 in Hakkari. Third, the uprising greatly facilitated Britain's acquisition of Mosul in 1926. This is the reason that is most frequently advanced to claim that Britain was responsible for the uprising.

Before reaching a verdict on this issue the following points should be taken into account. The British consulates in Anatolia sent dispatches to London claiming that the uprising was a ruse by Ankara to justify an intervention in Iraq. The uprising originated in the vilayet of Genç, today a part of the vilayet of Bingöl. This locality is very far from Iraq, where the British were in control. Indeed, the published British archives give no hint of British implication in the uprising. In view of the facts at our disposal, the theory of British involvement is a typical case of making assumptions about the causes by looking at the results. It assumes that since Britain benefited from the uprising, it must have had a hand in starting it.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Oran, pp. 214–20)

general access to the areas under Turkish control and the allegations that it was mistreating the region's Christians weakened its position.

The occurrence of the Sheikh Said uprising at that particular time also weakened Turkey's hand at the negotiations, while damaging its economy and upsetting its military posture. Turkey's argument that the Turks and the Kurds shared a common destiny was undermined, giving Britain an important bargaining advantage. When Turkey argued that Turks and Kurds belonged to the same race and were destined to live together, Britain was able to counter by pointing out that the two peoples were at war with one another.

Although it was not directly linked to the question of Mosul, the abolition of the caliphate on 3 March 1924 also

worked against Turkey. This decision angered Muslims throughout the world. Britain was pleased at this development, because it was always somewhat apprehensive about the possibility that Turkey might use religion to stir up trouble among Britain's Muslim subjects in India as well as in Egypt and the Middle East. British officials referred to Turkey's action as being harmful to its own interests. The abolition of the caliphate was also the immediate cause of the Sheikh Said uprising. Sheikh Said claimed that the abolition of the institution had severed the link that bound the Kurds to the Turks.

As a country that was just emerging from war, Turkey could not risk getting involved in a new conflict. Furthermore, the British public also was tired of war and could not contemplate the prospect of further fighting in the east, but Turkey was held back because it was not sure that it could count on the support of the USSR in case of conflict. Domestic rebellions were another reason to be cautious.

A more important reason for drawing back from conflict was Ankara's desire to reach an understanding with the Western states at an early date, establish secure borders, and get on with the task of carrying out internal reforms. A Turkey with contentious issues with Western states could not aspire to become a Western state. Without settling the Mosul question, Ankara was also finding it difficult to improve its relations with France. For example, the 1926 agreement signed with France failed to be ratified by Paris because of this. Turkey felt compelled to settle this question, which represented a serious obstacle to the Westernization of the country.

### 4. The 1926 Treaty and Turkey's Acceptance of the Revised Frontier

Although Turkey declared that it did not recognize the LoN decision, it did eventually enter into negotiations with Britain to reach an agreement. In the course of these negotiations Turkey made two demands. It wanted Turkey, Britain, and Iraq to agree to allocate the territory lying south of the Brussels Line to an independent Iraq. This Turkish demand produced no result.

Turkey also demanded a share of the oil wealth of the region. Britain proposed a payment of £500,000 or a royalty of 10% of Iraq's oil income for a period of twenty-five years. Foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü replied that this would not suffice and recalled that in 1909 the Ottoman Empire had received a lump sum of £2,200,000 when giving up Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The negotiations were concluded with the signing of the Treaty on the Turkish-Iraqi Frontier and Good Neighborliness in Ankara on 5 June 1926. The signatories were Turkey, Britain, and Iraq. In tracing the frontier, a slight rectification was made in the Brussels Line in favor of Turkey.

The treaty's first part related to the frontier. The second part, consisting of articles 6 to 13, dealt with good neighborly relations. Article 6 provided that "the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to resist with all the means at their disposal the preparations by armed individuals or groups to engage in plunder or brigandage along the frontier regions and to prevent these individuals or groups from crossing the frontier." Article 7 stipulated that "when officials receive information regarding preparations by armed individuals or groups to engage in plunder or brigandage along frontier regions, they will speed-

ily inform their opposite numbers." According to article 9: "If armed individuals or groups succeed in taking refuge in the other country after committing a crime in the frontier regions, these shall be arrested in accordance with the law and handed over, with their arms and their loot, to the authorities of the state of which they are nationals." Article 10 described frontier regions as the territory lying within seventy-five kilometers on either side of the frontier. Article 12 provided that "Turkish and Iraqi officials shall refrain from entering into any official or political communication with tribal leaders, sheikhs, or other members of tribes who are nationals of the other country, but who happen to be on their side of the frontier; nor will they allow organizations located in frontier regions to engage in propaganda activities directed at the other country." Article 13 called for the establishment of a frontier commission to meet twice a year to implement the provisions of the treaty. It is obvious that these measures were designed with the activities of Kurdish tribes in mind.

The third part of the treaty contained general provisions. Article 14 stated that "the Iraqi government shall set aside 10% of its oil revenues for payment to the government of Turkey. This shall start on the day the treaty enters into force and last for 25 years." Article 17 provided that the treaty would have a duration of ten years.

As an annex to the treaty, notes were exchanged on 5 June 1926 whereby Turkey was allowed to convert its 10% share of oil revenue into cash within twelve months if it wished to do so. Thirty days after the notification to this effect, the Iraqi government would pay Turkey the sum of £500,000.

No provisions were made in the treaty for granting the Turks (Turcomans) of the region minority rights. The main reason for this was that Turkey was opposed to making distinctions between Turks and Kurds. Had such a request been made by Turkey, Britain might have raised the question of granting minority rights to the Kurds of Turkey.

After the ratification of the treaty, Turkey's relations with Britain and France as well as with Iraq started improving. Turkey and Iraq established embassies in one another's capitals in 1928. After the mandate regime ended in 1932 and Iraq became a member of the LoN, relations continued to develop on a bilateral basis.

When the 1926 treaty expired after ten years, the two sides decided (through an exchange of notes on 8 December 1936) to extend the validity of articles 6 to 13 indefinitely. Each party would be able to give notice of termination two years in advance. On that occasion it was also decided to change the frequency of the meetings of the

frontier commission. From then on, the parties would decide when the commission would meet. Britain left Iraq in 1932, so Turkey's counterpart was now Iraq. Britain retained two military bases in Iraq after its departure.

On 29 March 1946 the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness in Ankara. Article I of the treaty declared that the two countries "undertake to respect the frontier fixed by the 1926 treaty." Article 4 stipulated that "if the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the borders of one of the parties should come under threat of attack or if an attack should occur, the parties commit themselves to notifying immediately the competent organ of the United Nations."

Article 6 mentioned six annexed protocols. Article 1 of the sixth annexed protocol provided that "the parties are agreed to secure the resolution of all incidents and disputes liable to disrupt the stability of the region lying within 75 kilometers of either side of the common frontier." Article 11 of the same protocol stipulated that "the Parties shall reciprocally take whatever useful measures they deem appropriate on their side of the frontier to prevent the use of the frontier regions against the security and territorial integrity of the other Party."

It will be noted that from 1926 on the two countries constantly emphasized the need reciprocally to ensure the security of the frontier regions and prevent the activity of armed bands. This demonstrates that the Kurds of the region have been the most important continuous source of preoccupation from 1926 to the present. Similar arrangements were foreseen in the Sadabad Pact of 1937. These developments acquired increasing urgency in the 1980s and 1990s when it was erroneously claimed that Turkey's hot-pursuit operations in northern Iraq were based on the provisions of these agreements. Turkey and Iraq had concluded an agreement on 29 March 1946, however, by which they ended the validity of articles 6 to 13 of the treaty and the subsequent extension thereto.

### The Financial Aspect of the Treaty and Its Consequences

As noted earlier, the sum of £500,000, which Turkey at first considered inadequate, was included in the letter annexed to the treaty with Turkey's consent. Research work and official publications indicate that Turkey preferred the lump sum of £500,000 to a 10% share of Iraq's oil revenues. Hikmet Uluğbay's book *The Politics of Oil from the Empire to the Republic (İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik*) challenges this assertion, however. His research on the budgetary legislation and the government's financial accounts calls for a review of this question.

Table 2-4. Royalty Payments to the Government of Iraq and Royalty Dues and Actual Payments to the Government of Turkey

|         | ROYALTY PAID<br>TO IRAQ | 10% ROYALTY<br>DUE TO TURKEY | ROYALTY PAID .<br>TO TURKEY |
|---------|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| YBAR    | (£ STERLING)            | (£ STERLING)                 | (£ STERLING)                |
| 1931-36 | 450,000                 | 450,000                      | 302,755                     |
| 1937    | 1,100,000               | 110,000                      | 114,582                     |
| 1938    | 2,200,000               | 220,000                      | 172,957                     |
| 1939    | 2,300,000               | 230,000                      | 162,223                     |
| 1940    | 1,800,000               | 180,000                      | 131,407                     |
| 1941    | 1,700,000               | 170,000                      | 118,425                     |
| 1942    | 1,700,000               | 170,000                      | 118,879                     |
| 1943    | 2,000,000               | 200,000                      | 154,820                     |
| 1944    | 2,400,000               | 240,000                      | 192,246                     |
| 1945    | 2,500,000               | 250,000                      | ,-i                         |
| 1946    | 2,500,000               | 250,000                      | 164,507                     |
| 1947    | 1,900,000               | 190,000                      | 216,499                     |
| 1948    | 2,300,000               | 230,000                      | 213,598                     |
| 1949    | 3,300,000               | 330,000                      | 125,227                     |
| 1950    | 6,900,000               | 690,000                      | 271,673                     |
| 1951    | 15,100,000              | 1,510,000                    | 496,916                     |
| 1952    | 40,600,000              | 4,060,000                    | _                           |
| 1953    | 58,300,000              | 5,830,000                    | _                           |
| 1954    | 68,400,000              | 6,840,000                    | 517,282                     |
| 1955    | 73,700,000              | 7,370,000                    | _                           |
| Total   | 295,200,000             | 29,520,000                   | 3,473,996                   |

Source: Hikmet Uluğbay, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik, revised 3rd ed. (Ankara: DE-Kİ Yayınları, 2008), p. 382. (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

Uluğbay's book shows that Turkey did not give up its share of the royalty for £500,000. On the contrary, its preference was for oil income (an annual royalty payment for twenty-five years, as stipulated in 1926 treaty signed by Turkey, Britain, and Iraq). Turkey had received approximately £3.5 million as royalty payment from Iraq between 1931 and 1955 (Table 2-4). The amounts paid by the Iraqi government were far below 10% of the royalty that Iraq collected from the Iraqi Petroleum Company. Therefore Turkey continued to include a line item in its annual budget revenue estimates as "receivables from Iraqi petroleum." During this period Turkey's share of Iraqi oil royalty amounted to £29,520,000, of which £3,473,996 was collected up to 1954 (Table 2-4). As a result, £26,046,004 remained due; Turkey continued to include a reminder

entry in its budget estimates. The 1926 treaty foresaw that the royalty payments to Turkey would start after the ratification. The agreement signed between the Government of Iraq and Turkish Petroleum Company (the previous name of Iraqi Petroleum Company) in 1925, however, indicated that the royalty would start after the completion of the export pipeline, which was accomplished at the end of 1934. There was also a letter exchange between Turkey and Iraq in 1932, which accepted that Iraq would start paying royalty from 1931 onward.

After Turkey and Iraq entered into the Baghdad Pact, relations between the two countries were very cordial in the period from 1954 to 1955. Nevertheless the line item was kept as is until Iraqi general Abdulkarim Kassem's coup in 1958. After this event, the line item was not retained in the revenue estimate tables any longer, but was transferred among the main budgetary articles. This was done because budget paragraphs were considered and approved one by one in the Assembly. The intention was to underline the claim and give it greater exposure to the media.

This practice was maintained until the 1980s. As commercial relations with the Middle Eastern countries and particularly with Iraq improved, however, the competent government agencies decided in 1986 to remove this item from the budget.

The question of Mosul had been settled in a manner that did not give Turkey much cause for satisfaction. Although it left a bitter taste, there were no further differences with Britain. In fact, even when the dispute was most intense, Turkish officials were declaring their wish to entertain cordial relations with Britain. Relations from 1926 to 1929 were uneventful. While Turkey was immersed in its internal reforms, Britain too was involved with domestic questions as well as the situation in Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.

Things began to stir in 1929. The British Mediterranean fleet paid a visit to İstanbul in October of that year and its admiral traveled to Ankara, where he was received by Atatürk. This symbolic event was seen by the government as a move in the right direction and created a positive impression in Turkish minds toward the country with which Turkey had been at war some years earlier and which had seized Mosul from its rightful owner.

#### C. Developments in the 1930s

In the 1930s Europe and the Middle East entered a period of destabilization. In the Middle East, growing Jewish immigration to Palestine started giving rise to concern among the inhabitants and whipped up Arab nationalism.

In Europe, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy

and Hitler in Germany brought these countries closer in a revisionist front. Germany was systematically violating the restrictions imposed at Versailles, while Italy invaded Abyssinia and started challenging Britain's preeminence in the Mediterranean. Germany's efforts to develop its friendship with Turkey and Italy's intensifying activities in the Mediterranean enhanced the importance of Turkey in Britain's eyes at a time when the clouds of war were gathering on the horizon.

The effects of the financial crash of 1929 gradually diminished throughout the 1930s. At the same time, nations were becoming polarized in opposing camps. The pro–status quo camp led by Britain and France found itself confronted by the revisionist states led by Germany and Italy.

Turkey entered this period with its internal reforms in large measure completed and the problems left over from Lausanne mostly resolved. As the revisionist states grew stronger and made their challenge to the status quo increasingly felt, Britain and France sought to intensify their cooperation with Turkey because of its pivotal position. At that time, Britain feared that Turkey might join the revisionist front. Although Turkey was conscious of not having fully achieved the objectives of the National Pact, it did not make any move to join the revisionists. Italy's aggressive revisionist policies in the Mediterranean basin made Turkey wary of the revisionists and helped in steering it into the status-quo camp.

Two other factors helped to improve Turkey's relations with Britain. Turkey's improved relations with Greece in the 1930s had a positive effect on Britain. The second factor was that the USSR was seeking improved relations with Britain and France.

#### 1. Direct Cooperation

The 1930s witnessed increasing direct cooperation between Turkey and Britain. This cooperation had two dimensions: economic cooperation and political rapprochement, leading eventually to alliance.

This cooperation was stimulated by the developments in Europe and the Mediterranean and their effects on Turkey.

Britain was concerned about the increased German influence in Turkey during the 1930s. Germany had systematically created a zone of influence for itself through the economic ties it had established with the east European and Balkan states. In the case of Turkey, its economic ties involved the purchase of commodities like tobacco and chrome ore and the sale of manufactured goods. Germany's share in Turkey's trade was rising steadily. This situation created concern among Turkish leaders as much as

it did in Britain. In 1936 the contract for the building of the Karabük Iron and Steelworks was awarded to the British firm Brassert, even though the German firm Krupp had offered better terms. (The supervision of the construction would be carried out by the Germans, however.) In June 1935 Turkey signed a trade agreement with Britain. British firms would be given preference to carry out maintenance work on the Turkish railroads and would also undertake the construction of irrigation systems. At the Montreux Conference, Britain supported Turkey in a number of instances; and when Turkey regained the right to fortify the Straits, it opted for British firms when awarding the contracts for this job.

In May 1938 Britain extended Turkey a loan of £10 million. This was a part of Britain's efforts to dilute German economic influence in Turkey. Determined to keep Turkey in its economic camp, Germany countered the British move by extending a loan of 150 million marks in October of the same year.

In the summer of 1936 King Edward VIII paid a visit to İstanbul. The visit created a positive attitude toward Britain among the public. The next year, on the occasion of the coronation of King George VI, prime minister İsmet İnönü paid an official visit to London. This was a further sign of how close Turkey's relations with Britain were becoming.

Another event related to Mediterranean security helped bring Turkey closer to Britain and France. In 1937 a number of merchant ships were sunk in the Mediterranean Sea, presumably by Italian submarines. A conference was convened at the initiative of Britain and France in Nyon in September 1937 to consider this question. The USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania also participated at the conference, which was boycotted by Germany and Italy. Turkey worked in close consultation with Britain at the conference and agreed to take joint measures to ensure the safety of shipping in the Mediterranean. On the eve of the outbreak of World War II, Turkey and Britain had taken another step closer.

### The Mediterranean Pact between Turkey and Britain

The Mediterranean Pact was the first important indicator of direct cooperation between Turkey and Britain in the 1930s. Being wary of Italian intentions, Turkey was seeking an alliance with Britain to ensure its security. But Britain still entertained hopes of drawing Italy away from Germany, so it was reluctant to get involved in alliances with states in southeast Europe.

When Italy started fortifying the Aegean islands and attacked Abyssinia in 1935, the danger that Italy posed in

the Mediterranean became manifest. This drew Turkey and Britain closer. Turkey decided to join the states applying sanctions imposed by the LoN on Italy following its attack on Abyssinia. This led the Italian government to threaten Turkey, along with Yugoslavia and Greece. The British government promised to come to the aid of France, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece should any of them be attacked by Italy for applying sanctions. This alliance was based on article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant and came into being through an exchange of notes. Turkey joined this alliance on 22 January 1936. Britain invalidated the alliance unilaterally on 27 July 1936, however, after the sanctions on Italy were lifted earlier that month.

Although Britain had for a short time given certain Mediterranean countries, including Turkey, multilateral guarantees, it was not ready to respond to Turkey's desire to conclude a formal bilateral pact. Britain was not sure that it could shoulder the commitments such a pact would impose; nor did it want to alienate Italy, which it still hoped to draw into its camp.

Atatürk's personal inclinations also played a part in Turkey's policy of getting closer to Britain. At that time, Atatürk had established ties of personal friendship with the British ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, and directly conveyed to the ambassador his desire to enter into an alliance. The appointment of Fethi Okyar, a close friend of Atatürk, as ambassador to London also demonstrated the importance that Turkey attached to its relations with Britain.

## 3. The Road Leading to the Tripartite Alliance of Turkey, Britain, and France (The Ankara Pact)

Despite the revisionist policies of Germany and Italy in Europe, the Neville Chamberlain government formed in 1937 pursued a policy of appeasement. In their desire to avoid war, the British people supported this policy. The policy of appeasement helped accelerate Germany's plans to overturn the order established at Versailles. In March 1939 Germany annexed Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland. Hitler was gradually carrying out his long-term policy of first breaking the chains of Versailles, to be followed by the creation of a single nation and a single state (Ein Volk, Ein Reich). The third stage would be the creation of living space (Lebensraum) for the Germans. Such policies were proof that Hitler would never be restrained through the policy of appeasement.

As already noted, Turkey was seeking to move closer to Britain and France as well as to the USSR to bolster its security against the German-Italian threat. At that time, the USSR was holding talks with the representatives of Britain and France within the context of the collective security concept that it had formulated. Turkey's actual preference was not to become involved with blocs, but the political circumstances of the time were making it difficult to pursue such a line. In September 1938 France communicated its proposal for an agreement to the Turkish Embassy in Paris.

Following preliminary consultations, France submitted the first draft of an agreement to the Turkish side in November 1938. The draft envisaged the harmonization of the policies of the two countries on subjects of common interest and the development of Turkish-British relations in step with the development of Turkish-French relations. Britain had been kept informed about the course of the Turkish-French consultations. At that time, the British foreign secretary, Edward F.L. Wood, Lord Halifax, was seeking to find out from the newly appointed Turkish ambassador, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the degree of Turkish support that Britain could count on in the event of war. Britain was still reticent about getting involved with Turkey in an alliance. Britain believed that such a pact would also have to involve Greece and that the emergence of a four-country alliance might elicit a negative reaction from Germany and Italy.

The Italian aggression against Albania in April 1939 demonstrated that the revisionists were prepared to use force even in Europe. Britain now had tangible proof that the policy of not taking a firm stand against Italy's aggression in Abyssinia had failed. Germany and Italy were expanding toward southeast Europe, and this was threatening Britain's imperial routes through the Middle East. Italy's attack on Albania proved that it could not be drawn into the circle of pro-status quo countries. This situation forced Britain and France to pay more attention to security in the Mediterranean and to the guarantees to be given to Greece and Turkey. In fact, on 13 April 1939 Britain and France issued a unilateral declaration that gave guarantees to Greece and Romania in the event of an attack. Britain and France intended to bring Turkey under this guarantee umbrella. They also felt that Bulgaria should be included within a Balkan cooperation system or, failing that, rendered neutral. Ankara was of the opinion that Britain's response to Albania's occupation by Italy was unsatisfactory and that a one-sided guarantee would not properly ensure Turkey's security.

The Italian occupation of a Balkan country gave rise to concern in Turkey and led it to insist that the British-French guarantee be in the form of a treaty of alliance. In a meeting of the cabinet presided over by İsmet İnönü, a formal decision was made to strengthen relations with

Britain and France. The cabinet also decided to pursue negotiations with the USSR.

In the course of the contacts that followed, Turkey submitted to the British government a proposal for an agreement that would ensure Britain's cooperation with Turkey in the event of war in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The Turkish proposal stressed the need to complete and balance the Turkish-British agreement with separate Turkish-Soviet and British-Soviet agreements. Turkey was keeping the USSR informed of these developments at a time when Moscow itself was in contact with Britain and France. The declaration that was issued, however, did not mention the Balkans, because Britain was not willing to assume any responsibility in the region. Nor was it possible to conclude a Turkish-Soviet agreement.

Franz von Papen, who arrived in April 1939 in Ankara as German ambassador, tried hard to stop Turkey from entering into an alliance with Britain and France. In April of that year, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Vladimir Potemkin, arrived in Ankara to hold talks on a possible Turkish-Soviet agreement, but the talks proved inconclusive. Turkey felt that a Turkish-Soviet Treaty in combination with a Turkish-British Treaty would help forge stronger ties between Britain and the USSR, even if only indirectly. But in actuality the USSR had come to the conclusion that it could not reach an agreement with Britain and France. As a matter of fact, it suspected that the two allies were inciting Germany to confront the USSR, so it sought ways of gaining time and preparing for war by itself reaching an agreement with Germany.

Eventually, on 12 May 1939, a Turkish-British Declaration was signed in Ankara and read out by British prime minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons and prime minister Refik Saydam in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The key provision was in article 3: "Pending the conclusion of a final agreement, the Government of Turkey and the Government of Great Britain stand ready to engage in active cooperation and to assist one another with all the means at their disposal in the event of an act of aggression in the region of the Mediterranean leading to war." Article 4 made clear that the declaration was not directed against any state. Article 6 provided that "the two Governments are agreed on the necessity of ensuring security in the Balkans, and shall remain in close contact with one another to secure this end."

At this point negotiations were still going on with France over the question of Hatay, so it was necessary to wait for the conclusion of these negotiations before such a joint declaration could be signed with France. Eventually a declaration was signed with France in Paris on 23 June 1939. As war approached, Britain had been urging France to relinquish Hatay to Turkey. The two declarations signed with Britain and France were the stepping stones that led to the alliance that would follow.

After the declaration, negotiations proceeded with Britain to conclude a treaty of alliance and to secure financial aid and arms. While talks were taking place in Ankara between the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, and British officials, General Kazım Orbay was in London to negotiate arms purchases. The commander-in-chief of French forces in the Middle East, Gen. Maxime Weygand, arrived in Ankara to discuss the issue of arms sales. As the danger of war in Europe grew more imminent, Ankara would be able to argue that financial aid to Turkey would help in freeing its economy from excessive dependence on Germany.

As the talks continued with Britain and France to transform the joint declarations into a treaty of alliance, the USSR was simultaneously holding talks with Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other. The USSR reacted positively to the declaration, while the Axis powers felt uncomfortable. Germany claimed that Turkey had joined the camp of those who wanted to unleash a war.

Although Turkey had opted for Britain and France in its foreign policy, it was still careful not to allow its relations with the USSR to take a turn for the worse. While Turkey kept Moscow informed about its talks with Britain and France, the USSR did not reciprocate by keeping Turkey informed about its contacts with Germany. When the USSR signed a nonaggression pact with Germany on 23 August 1939, Turkey was taken by surprise. Yet Turkey continued to seek ways of reconciling its efforts to forge an alliance with Britain and France with its desire to reach some kind of agreement with the USSR.

In the meantime Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and on 3 September Britain and France declared war on Germany. This signaled the beginning of World War II. Turkey found it particularly alarming that the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, invaded Poland on 17 September and partitioned that country with Germany. Ankara feared that Turkey might meet a similar fate.

Upon the invitation of the Soviet government, the minister of foreign affairs, Şükrü Saracoğlu, went to Moscow on 24 September 1939 to have talks with the Soviet leaders. In the contemplated agreement, the Soviets wanted an arrangement for the Straits to be defended jointly by the two countries. They also wanted to reserve

their position on Germany. After spending three fruitless weeks in Moscow, Saracoğlu left for home on 17 October.

The Turkish-British-French negotiations were concluded while Saracoğlu was still on his way back from Moscow, and the tripartite treaty of alliance was signed on 19 October 1939.

One day after that, economic and financial agreements were signed with Britain and France. These two countries wanted to strengthen Turkey as the war got underway and therefore provided Ankara with a twenty-year loan of £25 million. After this, Turkey's relations with the two countries, and especially with Britain, developed very positively. Contacts intensified and became very cordial.

As World War II started, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, which had been friendly since Turkey's War of Liberation, cooled off. Against this, Turkey had succeeded in its long-lasting efforts to conclude a treaty of alliance with Britain and France. Just as Turkey established its alliance with the British, however, Britain was entering a period of decline; its strength and influence in absolute and relative terms were sharply reduced as a result of the war and the changes occurring in the international arena. After this, Turkey's foreign policy would concentrate on staying out of the war, while its traditional aim of conducting a balanced foreign policy would be abandoned. Turkey's alliance with Britain had only been achieved in wartime and in circumstances that were unfavorable to Turkey.

İlhan Uzel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

### **II. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE**

After the National Struggle, the most pressing issues with France were the question of debt and the even more serious question of Hatay. France was important for Turkey as the first Western state to reach an agreement with the Ankara government. At the Lausanne Conference and subsequently—as in the case of the Mosul question—France sided with Britain, however, and rendered Turkey's task more difficult. Nevertheless, Turkey strove to give its balanced foreign policy a Western tilt; in this context France had an important place in Turkey's foreign relations. As the German threat increased in Europe, France also made an effort to keep Turkey on friendly terms.

### A. Developments after Lausanne

At Lausanne, the French delegation acted in concert with its Western partners, much to the chagrin of Turkish officials. France was particularly difficult on the issues of the abolition of the capitulations and the Ottoman debt. As a matter of fact, when M. Kemal and Franklin-Bouillon held their talks, most of the time was spent on the capitulations. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne argued that the intransigent French stance was in violation of the 1921 agreement, but to no avail. France took this tough position because of the size of French investments and commercial interests in Turkey. The question of debts and their repayment would continue to vex the two countries well into the 1930s.

The first important question that arose in relations with France after Lausanne was the demarcation of Turkey's frontier with Syria, which at the time was under French mandate. Under the terms of article 8 of the agreement of 20 October 1921, a commission consisting of the representatives of the two sides was to meet within a month of the signing of the agreement to demarcate the frontier. It took until September 1925 for the commission to undertake this task. When the commission's work proved fruitless, the French high commissioner in Syria and Lebanon, Henri de Jouvenel, came to Ankara, where he initialed a convention with the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü, on 18 February 1926. France delayed signing this convention, however, out of consideration for its relations with Britain, which at that time was involved in the issue of Mosul. But when the Mosul question was finally settled, the convention was signed in Ankara on 30 May 1926, eliminating another obstacle on the way to establishing smooth relations between the two countries.

The Bozkurt-Lotus case came up at this time, but relations between the two states were unaffected, because the case was referred to international adjudication (Box 2-7).

A question of lesser importance arose in connection with the French missionary schools in Turkey. When the question was taken up at Lausanne, İsmet Paşa indicated that he could make no commitments regarding the establishment of new schools and refused to accept exemption from customs duties in favor of these institutions (see Box 1-32 in Section 1). At Lausanne, it was provided that foreign scientific, religious, and charitable institutions would refrain from propaganda, teach the Turkish language and history, and operate under Turkish laws. When the Turkish government decided that courses in all foreign schools would be in Turkish and that the curricula would be determined in line with Turkish national viewpoints, the French government made an attempt to intervene on behalf of the institutions. The Turkish government took a firm stand in refusing to admit French interference in the matter, however, and the French government decided not to insist.

#### Box 2-7. The Bozkurt-Lotus Case

On 2 August 1926 the French merchant ship *Lotus* was involved in a collision with the Turkish freighter *Bozkurt* about six miles off the coast of the island of Lesbos. The *Bozkurt* sank as a result of this collision, with a loss of eight lives. The masters of the two ships were arrested upon their arrival in Istanbul, on the grounds of having negligently caused the deaths of the victims of the collision. In September 1926 the court sentenced the Turkish captain to four months and the French captain to eighty days of Imprisonment for negligence.

France claimed that the Turkish court had no jurisdiction in this case and demanded the release of the Frenchman. Turkey contested this view. Therefore the two states decided to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In the compromise document the two sides agreed to ask the court to rule on whether Turkey had acted contrary to international law by trying the French national in violation of article 15 of the Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction signed at Lausanne.

France contended that the law applicable in this case could not be the Turkish Penal Code. Under international law and the principle of the freedom of the high seas, a crime committed on board a merchant vessel would have to come before the courts of the state where the vessel was registered.

Turkey claimed that the place of the crime was the *Boz-kurt*, a Turkish-flag vessel. The charges against the French captain were not related to transport but had to do with a public case; consequently, the Turkish court had jurisdiction.

The Permanent Court declared on 7 September 1927 that Turkey had not acted contrary to international law. Its justification rested on the fact that the Turkish court was not trying the French captain for violating the rules of navigation but for causing death by negligence. The verdict of the Permanent Court was split, six votes for and six against, with the presiding judge breaking the tie by deciding in favor of Turkey.

(İ. Uzgel)

#### B. The Question of the Ottoman Debt

Although the question of the Ottoman debt concerned a good number of countries, it became a contentious issue primarily with France. Most of the Ottoman bonds had been sold in France, making that country Turkey's main creditor. It will be recalled that under article 46 of the Lausanne Treaty the principle of distributing the Ottoman Empire's debts among the successor states had been accepted. Article 47 provided that the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt would determine the share of each successor state, while article 49 made provisions for a commission to meet in Paris to determine the conditions of repayment.

There were differing views within the Turkish delegation at Lausanne over this issue. İsmet Paşa favored repayment with banknotes, while Cavit Bey, the economic advisor of the Turkish delegation, favored gold. After Lausanne, the negotiations went on until 13 June 1928, when an agreement was signed by the Turkish ambassador in Paris, Fethi Okyar, and the representative of the Ottoman Public Debt. Under the terms of this agreement, Turkey agreed to repay 62% of the debts incurred prior to 1912 and 73% of the debts incurred subsequently. This amounted to a total of 107,528,461 gold liras (82,456,377 was principal, with the remainder being accrued interest). Subsequently it was discovered that an error had been made in the calculations, and the amount of the repayment was reduced. Turkey agreed to repay 2,000,000 gold liras annually up to 1936, 2,800,000 from 1936 to 1942, 2,780,000 from 1942 to 1947, 3,180,000 from 1947 to 1952, and 3,400,000 from 1952 on.

Turkey paid its first installment on time; but with the global economic crisis of 1929, there were difficulties with the annuity, which amounted to 14% of the state budget. All states were suffering from the effects of the crisis. In these circumstances Turkey deposited 6,000,000 TL in banknotes in the Ottoman Bank on 25 November 1930 and suspended repayments. Talks were held between the officials of the two countries both in Ankara and in Paris. Turkey wanted to carry out the repayments in a manner that would not affect its general economic situation.

Eventually, after difficult negotiations lasting over a year, the repayment schedule was revised in Turkey's favor on 22 April 1933 (Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 43–45). The repayment of the Ottoman debt came to an end on 25 May 1954 with the payment of the last installment.

İlhan Üzgel

#### C. The Question of Sancak (Hatay)

Before we examine the question of Sancak (Hatay), it will be useful to clarify the origin of the region's name. In Ottoman times the region was known as the Sancak (subdivision of a vilayet) of Iskenderun. After the administrative reform of 1856, it became a mutasarrıflık (administrative division) but continued to be called the Sancak of Iskenderun or often just Sancak in all Turkish and international documents. The region, which includes the cities of İskenderun and Antakya and their surrounding districts, was renamed Hatay by Atatürk in 1936. When the question of the region became topical, the name "Hatay" was selected to underline the Turkish character of the place. This was the period when the Sun-Language Theory (according to which all languages stemmed from Turkish) was very much in vogue, and the name was designed to prove the correctness of the theory. The Turkish names Eti, Ata, Hata, and Hatay were all derived from the

same root: the ancient state of Hatay in Central Asia. The Turkish origin of the Anatolian civilization of the Hittites was being confirmed in this way, while the inhabitants of Iskenderun and Antakya were dubbed Turkish.

In this section (which is based on sources from *OTDP*, and Soysal, pp. 531–81) we refer to the region as Sancak up to the time when it was officially designated as Hatay.

### 1. Developments in Sancak after Lausanne

At the time when the Mudros Armistice was signed, British forces were to the south of Iskenderun, but Sancak was still in Ottoman hands. On 9 November, ten days after the armistice, British forces occupied Sancak, based on article 7 of the armistice agreement. Subsequently they transferred Sancak to France under the terms of the wartime secret agreements. France had already occupied Urfa, Antep, Adana, and Mersin. Sancak was within the frontiers traced in the National Pact. When the opportunity came up to sign a separate peace agreement with France, however, the Syrian border was drawn by the Turkish-French Agreement of 20 October 1921, leaving Sancak on the Syrian side but with special arrangements for its administration. In this way the Syrian frontier was traced before Lausanne.

At Lausanne, the Syrian frontier was hardly discussed and created no problems. Because the Ankara Agreement had not been ratified by the French parliament, Ankara wanted this matter to be confirmed at Lausanne. It was opposed to having only article 8 of the 1921 agreement (the article that traced the frontier with Syria) included in Lausanne, because it felt this would weaken the other articles of the agreement, including those relating to the special administration for Sancak.

France argued that the 1921 agreement was local in character and would acquire a different character if incorporated in toto in the Lausanne Treaty. France declared that it had scrupulously implemented all the provisions of the 1921 agreement and would continue to do so in the future. It added that legally the agreement had been signed by France on behalf of its mandate Syria and therefore did not require ratification by the French parliament. Finally, France said that it was prepared to give guarantees that it would continue to implement the agreement in full.

Eventually agreement was reached on this subject. Article 3 in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne declared that the Syrian frontier would be "the frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 20 October, 1921." On 24 July 1923, the day the Lausanne Treaty was signed, the government of France submitted a letter confirming

that the Peace Treaty of Lausanne did not affect the provisions of the 1921 agreement in any way. It also issued a declaration to the effect that the necessary steps had been taken to ensure that the 1921 agreement would remain in effect in its entirety. Thus the Turkish-Syrian boundary as traced in 1921 and the arrangements made for Sancak at the time were reconfirmed at Lausanne.

The stand taken by the Turks living in Sancak influenced Ankara's policies. The Turks of Sancak were in contact with Ankara and conveyed their wish to unite with their motherland. To this end, starting in 1921 and, when necessary, in alliance with Arab nationalists, they conducted guerrilla warfare against French forces.

On 24 July 1922 the LoN granted France mandate powers over Syria. The treaty to this effect came into force on 29 September 1923, soon after the Lausanne treaty was signed. France started reinforcing its administration in Syria, including Sancak. It divided Syria and Lebanon into four states: Aleppo, Damascus, Lebanon, and Alevi Latakia. In addition, there was the autonomous Sancak of Iskenderun, attached to Aleppo. While pursuing this policy of divide and rule in Syria, France was establishing a highly centralized system dependent on its administration in the new states. This caused much resentment among the inhabitants, and in 1925 Arab nationalists started an uprising that spread rapidly to all the regions of the country. France suppressed the uprising by using Armenian units. As a result of these events, France understood the need to take administrative measures to lessen discontent and merged the states of Aleppo and Damascus on 1 January 1925. One day prior to this, France had issued a decree by which Sancak was attached to the Syrian state (that is, to Damascus), although the special regime of the region would be preserved.

These measures, designed to placate Arab nationalists, gave rise to disturbances in Sancak. The Arabs of Sancak wanted full union with Syria. The Turks, Alevis, and Armenians, who did not speak Arabic, reacted negatively to the new arrangements. It looked like the resistance would be led by the Turks, who made up the largest element. The pro-independence movement of the Sancak Turks found no echo in Ankara, however, which at the time was preoccupied with the Sheikh Said revolt and the Mosul question.

#### The Turkish-French Convention of 30 May 1926

The full title of this convention signed on 30 May 1926 is the Convention on Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of France Acting as the Authority over Syria and Lebanon Based on International Compacts. The convention was initialed on 18 February, but the signing was postponed because of the Sheikh Said uprising and the tension with Britain over Mosul. Once the Mosul question was ripe for settlement, the convention was signed, to be followed six days later by the Turco-British agreement on Mosul

The convention consisted of fifteen articles and had five protocols and one letter annexed to it. Article I read as follows: "The Republic of Turkey and the countries that were detached from the Ottoman Empire and that are now under the Mandate of the Republic of France undertake to entertain friendly and good neighborly relations on a permanent basis. They will not attempt to revise the frontiers fixed under the present Convention. They will refrain from encouraging or assisting any act of aggression directed at one of the parties." Article 7 was significant: "The High Contracting parties undertake...to take the necessary measures to prevent and suppress actions emanating from their territory directed at the other." This article referred to the actions of the Kurds who had fled from the Sheikh Said camp into Syria and were continuing their fight from there.

The convention was concluded for a term of five years with automatic one-year extensions until denounced by one of the parties. The provisions relating to the frontier would be amended in the course of the settlement of the Hatay question.

The first protocol annexed to the convention consisted of a detailed demarcation of the frontier. Protocol No. 2 related to extradition. Protocol No. 3 contained the details with regard to the provisions of article 7. The protocol, entitled "Measures at the Frontier," consisted of nineteen articles. Article 1 provided that "the parties shall take all the measures necessary to prevent armed individuals operating in the frontier region with the intention of engaging in brigandage or pillaging from carrying out their activities or crossing the frontier." Article 4 made it mandatory for the frontier authorities "to arrest individuals who after committing a felony or a misdemeanor manage to cross the frontier and to deliver them to the authorities of the country of which they are nationals together with their loot and their weapons." Article 6 described the region where the convention would apply as "the entire frontier separating Turkey from Syria and the adjacent region to a depth of 50 kilometers on either side of the line." Article 9 dealt with tribes who traditionally grazed their herds across the frontier. These tribes had to notify the competent authorities fifteen days in advance of their

intention to cross the frontier, indicating the exact location and the number of herders involved. This information would be relayed to the authorities on the other side of the frontier. At the time of the Sheikh Said uprising, Ankara feared for the stability of the new state and took all the necessary measures to deal with the emergency.

Another annexed protocol stated: "This Convention supplements the Ankara Agreement of 20 October 1921 but in no way amends any of the terms of that Agreement." This provision ensured that the special administrative regime for Sancak as foreseen in that agreement would continue to apply.

As relations with France improved following the signing of the 1926 convention, the condition of the Turkish inhabitants of Sancak improved too. During this period these Turks started closely following the new developments in Ankara and implementing all the reforms being carried out in Turkey. Early on, they established the Popular Party and secured greater discipline in their organization. These developments received French support. France wanted to use the Sancak for its own purposes in its struggle with those in Damascus who opposed the French administration. Things took an unexpected turn, however, when Britain granted independence to Iraq in 1930. This excited the Syrian Arabs, which in turn stoked nationalist fires among the Turks of Sancak. Separate provisions were introduced in connection with the special regime of Sancak in the Syrian Constitution of 14 May 1930. In this way France gave satisfaction to the Sancak Turks, while the Syrian Arabs were reminded of the special status of Sancak and thereby given a warning.

As it became clear that the French presence in Syria would be coming to an end soon, the conflicting interests of Syria, Turkey, and France in Sancak began to affect their relations with one another. In 1934 the governor of Gaziantep paid a visit to Sancak. On that occasion the warm reception of the governor by the Sancak Turks and their demonstrations, waving Turkish flags, gave an indication of what was coming. In 1936 the matter came up formally among the three states.

#### The Franco-Syrian Preliminary Agreement of 1936 and Its Effect on Sancak

The developments taking place in the international environment in 1936 were very disturbing. Italy had invaded Abyssinia a year earlier and was now adopting an aggressive posture in the Mediterranean. Germany under Hitler was busy discarding the fetters imposed on it at Versailles. It had remilitarized the Rhineland. In this perilous environment France wanted to become focused on Europe

and announced that it would end the mandate regime in Syria. France calculated that it would be better for its security to conclude an alliance with a friendly Syria, to which it would grant independence. The alternative was to rule directly over a nation that harbored hostile sentiments toward its rulers, which was far from being a satisfactory solution. Furthermore, the expenses incurred in Syria were a drain on the weak French economy. In 1936 the Popular Front came to power; the new Socialist prime minister, Léon Blum, in line with his ideology, was in favor of granting independence to French colonies and mandated territories, despite the opposition of the conservatives and the military. Also, French hopes of finding oil in Syria had been dashed, so Syria held little attraction for France in 1936.

The Preliminary Agreement between France and Syria was signed on 9 September 1936. It was designed to end the mandate regime in Syria and to come into force three years after ratification by the French and Syrian parliaments, when Syria would become a member of the LoN. Although there was no reference to Sancak in the agreement, article 3 contained the following provision: "When the Mandate regime comes to an end, the High Contracting Parties will take all the necessary measures to transfer to the Syrian government all the rights and obligations emanating from treaties, conventions, and other international commitments concluded by France on Syria's behalf or relating to Syria." This clause appeared to jeopardize the status of the Sancak Turks. The agreement caused a furor in Turkey.

When Syria declined to discuss the matter with Turkey, the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, made a statement at the Council of the League in which he declared that France had a duty to conclude an agreement with the people of Sancak similar to the one that it had made with Syria. He called for "the people of Sancak to be given the same rights as the Syrians had been given to run their own affairs."

The French reply was that such an agreement would result in the partition of Syria, which was excluded under the convention establishing the mandate.

#### The Sandler Report

When the parties concluded that they could not reach an agreement, they decided to refer the matter to the LoN. On 14 December the Council of the League appointed Rickard Sandler, a Swedish national, as rapporteur and decided to dispatch a team of three observers to Sancak.

At this juncture the international situation was developing in a direction that enhanced the importance of

Turkey. As a result of the pressure of British foreign secretary Anthony Eden, who felt deeply troubled by Germany's expansionist policies designed to wreck the order imposed at Versailles, France relented and agreed to abide by whatever decision the Council of the League would make, including treating Sancak as a separate entity. In any case, by now it was clear that the 9 September 1936 agreement would not be ratified by the French parliament, because the deteriorating situation in Europe had added to the strategic importance of overseas possessions. Furthermore, French conservative circles feared that granting independence to Syria might constitute a precedent for French colonies, especially for those in North Africa (Syria obtained its independence only in 1946).

Sandler submitted his report to the Council of the League, where it was unanimously adopted on 27 January 1937. The report made the following recommendations.

- I. A committee of experts would draft a status and a Constitution for Sancak, which would be regarded as a "distinct entity" with internal autonomy but dependent on Syria for its foreign relations. Syria would not be allowed to restrict Sancak's independence without the permission of the Council of the LoN.
- 2. Sancak would be in a customs and monetary union with Syria, and common duestions would be dealt with by special officials who would be charged with assuring coordination.
- 3. The official language of Sancak would be Turkish, and the question of a second official language would be decided by the Council of the LoN.
- 4. A French national would be appointed as a delegate to oversee, on behalf of the council, the implementation of the status and Constitution of Sancak.
- Sancak would have no armed force other than a sufficient number of police officers and gendarmes.
- 6. Turkey and France would respect the recommendations of the council and would sign a treaty that would ensure the territorial integrity of Sancak.
- 7. A treaty would be signed by Turkey, Syria, and France to ensure the inviolability of the Turkish-Syrian frontier and prevent any provocation.
- 8. Provisions would be made in the Status of Sancak to enable Turkey to use the port of İskenderun.
- 9. The Status and Constitution of Sancak would come into effect by a decision of the council. The council's decisions with respect to Sancak would be taken by a two-thirds majority.

Demonstrations broke out in Syria as soon as the council adopted the Sandler Report. France was accused

of betraying Syria. In statements made in Damascus, Jamil Mardan, prime minister of Syria, stressed that Sancak was an integral part of Syria.

Turkey wanted full and unconditional independence for Sancak. France held that independence would violate the mandate regime established by the LoN and that Sancak could only enjoy the regime of autonomy foreseen in the Ankara agreement of 1921. This Turkish-French agreement was an interim formula pending Syrian independence. It was approved by the Council of the League because it was not contrary to the Mandate regime (Soysal, p. 534).

#### 4. The Documents of 29 May 1937

In accordance with the Sandler Report, a five-man committee of experts prepared the Status and Constitution of Sancak. These documents were submitted to the council and unanimously approved on 29 May 1937, whereupon Sancak legally became a "distinct entity." On the same day, two treaties were signed by Turkey and France. The documents of 29 May are examined here under three headings: the international compacts establishing the Sancak of Iskenderun as a "distinct entity"; the treaty guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Sancak; and the agreement guaranteeing the Turkish-Syrian frontier.

### a. The International Compacts Establishing the Sancak of İskenderun as a "Distinct Entity"

Sancak became a "distinct entity" through three documents adopted by the LoN: the frontiers of the Sancak of Iskenderun; the Status of Sancak; and the Constitution of Sancak.

#### The Frontiers of the Sancak of İskenderun

The line traced in this document became the Turkish-Syrian frontier, apart from minor changes, after Hatay joined Turkey.

#### The Status of Sancak

Article 1 of this document declared: "In its internal affairs, Sancak is a fully independent distinct entity... Sancak's external relations are the responsibility of the Syrian State."

Syria's responsibilities were diluted with many exception clauses. Article 15 provided: "No international agreement of the Syrian State that in any way affects its independence and sovereignty can apply to Sancak without the prior and official consent of the Council of the League of Nations." Article 16 declared: "When the Sancak Government found it necessary...it had a right to request any

international agreement to be subjected to a special examination before it was signed."

Although article 1 provided that "Sancak and Syria would be within a single customs and monetary system," a number of exceptions were also introduced. Article 34: "Sancak and Syria shall have separate customs administrations." Article 36: "An agreement between Sancak and Syria shall determine Sancak's share of customs revenues... In no case shall Sancak's share be less than onetenth of total customs revenues." Article 39: "Sancak shall join an agreement that Syria shall conclude with a Central Bank. This agreement shall provide Sancak similar benefits to those enjoyed by Syria and shall protect its special rights and interests... Upon the request of one of the Governments, one part of the banknotes may bear the marks of Syria and the other part that of the Sancak." Article 40: "The share of Sancak in all the benefits and profits derived from the right to issue currency cannot be less than onetenth of the total benefits and profits." Article 41: "Syria and Sancak shall be allowed to mint identical coins." Article 54: "Sancak has the right to issue valuable postal papers for domestic use." All of these articles were of a nature to transform Sancak, already independent in its domestic affairs, into a state within a state.

In addition, the Turkish Republic itself had a considerable presence in Sancak. Article 43: "Turkey shall have the right to make full use of the port of İskenderun for its transport requirements. For this purpose, Syria shall lease Turkey the necessary port facilities. The rent agreement shall be for a period of 50 years and the annual rent shall be 1 gold Syrian pound." Article 44: "This area to be called Turkish Free Zone shall be a part of the Sancak territory and shall be under its police and juridical jurisdiction. However, since this area will be a Turkish zone, it will be under the management of the customs authorities of the Republic of Turkey." Article 45: "All of the employees and agents of the Turkish Free Zone shall be appointed by Turkey." Article 47: "[All economic activities] in the free zone shall be undertaken by the Turkish Government. Taxes and charges for the use of buildings and installations shall be imposed by the Turkish Government and this Government shall be the recipient of revenues derived from these taxes and charges."

Article 22 of the Status of Sancak demilitarized Sancak. Articles 25 to 31 gave racial, linguistic, or religious minorities rights that were almost identical to the minority rights that Turkey had undertaken to respect under the provisions of articles 38 to 43 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne. Whereas article 44 of Lausanne placed the rights of

non-Muslim minorities under the guarantee of the LoN, article 33 of the Status provided the same guarantee to racial, linguistic, or religious minorities.

#### The Constitution of Sancak

Article 2 of the Constitution stipulated that this document would be interpreted, implemented, and amended without prejudice to the provisions of the Status. Article 5 of the Constitution provided that "[1]egislative power shall be exercised on behalf of the people of Sancak by an Assembly consisting of 40 members, elected for a term of 4 years."

The people would vote for the electors who would, in turn, elect the deputies of the Assembly. Voters would indicate their community when registering with the following choices: Turkish, Alevi, Arab, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Kurdish, and Other Communities (article 9). According to article 10, "the number of voters registered for each community would determine how many deputies and how many electors that community would be allocated." The electors would be responsible for electing the deputies. In other words, the registration of voters was a kind of election census that would determine everything.

Article 10 also provided that "whatever the results of the electoral process, the minimum number of deputies each community will have in the assembly is 8 for the Turks, 6 for the Alevis, 2 for the Arabs, 2 for the Armenians, and 1 for the Greek Orthodox." These figures give an indication of how France perceived the ethnic makeup of the population of Sancak.

Article 19 declared that "[e]xecutive power shall be exercised, on behalf of the inhabitants of Sancak, by the President of Sancak and the Executive Council." "The President will be elected by the Assembly for a term of 5 years. During his term, the President will receive an emolument, which cannot be changed in his favor, plus compensation." Although elected by the Assembly, the president enjoyed extensive powers. He could refrain from promulgating laws and send them back to the Assembly within one month (article 22), dissolve the Assembly after consulting the Executive Council (the government) (article 23), and designate the president of the Executive Council (article 24).

Article 26 provided that "no power can rectify or amend decisions of the judicial power." Article 27, however, stated that "the Superior Court and other courts are not empowered to consider the constitutionality of laws."

The Constitution had a section on fundamental rights of the individual that was very advanced for its time.

### the Treaty Guaranteeing the Territorial Integrity of Sancak

Under this treaty signed by Turkey and France, the two countries guaranteed the territorial integrity of Sancak (article 1) and undertook to inform the Council of the LoN without delay, severally or jointly, of any threat to the integrity of Sancak's territory (article 2). "If a threat emerges against Sancak or in the event of any attack requiring urgent preventive action, the two Parties undertake to eliminate the threat with all the means at their disposal" (article 3).

#### ,c. The Agreement Guaranteeing the Turkish-Syrian Frontier

This is another document that was signed by Turkey and France on this occasion.

According to article 1, the two countries recognized the definitive character of the Turkish-Syrian frontier and guaranteed its inviolability. Article 2 provided that "the two Parties [would] take all necessary measures to forestall the preparation or the carrying out of any action on either the Turkish or Syrian side of the frontier aimed at the political administration or security of the other state." This article was formulated with the threat of Kurdish insurgencies in mind.

On 3 June the Syrian Parliament adopted a resolution by which it condemned these documents purporting to remove a part of Syrian territory from Syrian sovereignty. The resolution also declared that the Syrian nation would reject any solution that would bring harm to its unity and its rebirth and that it was determined to defend itself with all its strength derived from its faith and its righteousness. But Syria's protests had no effect on Ankara, Paris, or the LoN at Geneva.

# 5. The Creation of the State of Hatay and the Decision to Join Turkey

When Sancak was accepted as a distinct entity, its population was 219,000, according to French statistics. Of this population, the Turks accounted for 39.7%, the Alevis for 28%, the Armenians for 11%, the Sunni Arabs for 10%, and the Greek Orthodox for 9%, with the remaining approximately 3% consisting of Kurds, Circassians, Jews, Ismailis, and Albanians.

The election was scheduled for 15 April 1938. To arrange and supervise the election, the LoN sent an election committee to Sancak. The committee worked throughout the summer of 1937 in cooperation with French officials. Very soon the work of the committee started drawing

criticism from the Sancak Turks and from Turkey itself. There were disturbances that heightened the tension. The main difficulty had to do with the registration of voters. As the registers were based on both ethnic origin and religion, the election committee was able to make decisions that went against the interests of the Turks. The problems originated mostly from the Alevis, some of whom spoke Turkish while others spoke Arabic as their mother language and thus could easily be persuaded to register as Turks, Arabs, or Alevis.

Since the time this question emerged, Atatürk had declared that Hatay was a matter of personal concern for him. On 29 October 1937 he told the French ambassador that he was not interested in territorial expansion and was not the one who would endanger peace. But he would insist on Turkey's right that derived from treaties; he was determined to obtain it. He had given his word to the nation from the pulpit of the parliament. If he should fail to deliver, he could not face the nation that had put its trust in his word; nor could he stay at his post. In this way Atatürk conveyed to the ambassador his absolute determination on the issue. In his speech inaugurating the new session of parliament on 1 November 1937, Atatürk declared that "the development of Turkish-French relations in the direction that we desire will depend largely on the manner in which the Hatay issue unfolds." In this way he emphasized that the course of Turkish-French relations would be determined by the Sancak question.

When the election committee prepared the regulations for the election and submitted the document to the Council of the LoN without first consulting Ankara, Turkey's reaction was swift. On 29 December 1937 it denounced the Turkish-French Treaty of Friendship of 1930. Disregarding his failing health, Atatürk went to Mersin and Adana on 29 May 1938 to inspect army units in the south. A force of 30,000 men was redeployed to the southern frontier.

Turkey was fully determined on the Sancak issue. At the same time, the revisionist countries' aggressive intentions made it essential to woo Turkey into an alliance in the Mediterranean. This situation and Britain's prodding forced France to step back. The Council of the LoN made the necessary revisions in the regulations governing the election to give satisfaction to Turkey. The election committee resumed its work, but Turkey was still not satisfied. It entered into bilateral talks with France, and the two countries applied jointly to the council with an appeal to halt the work of the election committee. The election committee left Sancak on 29 June. The election was no longer under international supervision.

#### The Military Treaty

Another result of the Turkish-French talks was the conclusion of a military treaty. Atatürk was in his sick bed when, at his insistence, the French MFA sent instructions on 3 July 1938, which happened to be a Sunday, for signing the military treaty in Antakya. This treaty provided for the measures to be taken in the event of an attack on Sancak. There would be an equal number of Turkish and French troops in Sancak, and if necessary their strength could be increased by agreement between the parties. In the event of an attack from Syria or by sea (this denoted the fear of an Italian attack) to Sancak, the level of troops to deal with such an attack and their operational plans were also foreseen in the treaty. A protocol annexed to the treaty provided that a Turkish military contingent consisting of 2,500 men under the command of a colonel would enter Sancak on a date to be agreed jointly, follow a predetermined route, and encamp in specified locations. The protocol also provided that the French garrison in Sancak would be reinforced to reach a level of up to 2,500 men.

Although the treaty stipulated that the date for the introduction of the Turkish contingent would be agreed upon jointly, at Turkey's request the Turkish army contingent entered Sancak the next day (4 July 1938) under the command of Col. Şükrü Kanatlı. A new treaty of friendship between Turkey and France was signed in Ankara. Because of the speed with which events were unfolding, the treaty was not ratified by either parliament and never went into effect. The treaty provided that in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other would maintain its neutrality. On the occasion of the signing of the treaty, a joint communiqué was issued that contained a phrase of significance in the context of the Sancak issue: "In putting into effect and implementing the Status and Constitution of the Sancak of Iskenderun, the Parties recognize the preponderance of the Turkish element in Sancak... However, they continue to remain bound by the Ankara Agreement of 20 October 1921, which declares that the Sancak issue is not a territorial question for Turkey." By reconfirming the validity of the Ankara Agreement, France was seeking to prevent Turkey, whose troops had been introduced into Sancak, from carrying out an annexation.

After Turkish-French relations were restored to normalcy, the election process got underway on 22 July. With the conclusion of the registration of voters on 1 August, it was revealed that there were 35,847 Turks, 11,319 Alevis, 5,504 Armenians, 1,845 Arabs, and 2,098 Greek Orthodox on the register. In accordance with these figures, there would be 358 Turkish, 113 Alevi, 55 Armenian, 18 Arab, and 20 Greek Orthodox electors.

The election took place on 24 August. Of the forty seats in the Assembly, twenty-two would be held by Turkish deputies, with the Alevis getting nine seats, the Armenians five, and the Arabs and the Greek Orthodox two seats each. The government appointed Cevat Açıkalın as envoy extraordinary to Sancak.

When the new Assembly was convened on 2 September, all the deputies took the oath in Turkish. Abdülgani Türkmen was elected as Speaker of the Assembly, Tayfur Sökmen as head of state, and Abdurrahman Melek as prime minister. Until then the state had been known internationally as Sancak. This was changed to Hatay. A flag was selected that bore a striking resemblance to the Turkish flag.

Members of the Turkish Nationalist Movement of Hatay had taken up the highest positions in the land, which demonstrated clearly that the State of Hatay would not have a long life. It was a question of waiting for the appropriate moment to join Turkey. Many Turkish laws were enacted as Hatay's laws. As Hatay started moving into Turkey's orbit, the Arab and Armenian elements of Hatay, led by Arab nationalists, began moving to Syria.

In 1939 Europe was rapidly drifting toward war. On 15 March Germany occupied Czechoslovakia and denounced its nonaggression pact with Poland. It entered into the Pact of Steel with Italy on 22 May. These developments were alarming the pro-status quo powers and in particular Britain. In its search for allies to shore up security in the Mediterranean, Britain issued a Joint Declaration with Turkey on 12 May 1939. This was the first step in the direction of establishing an alliance. Turkey wanted a similar declaration with France, however; in fact it wanted a tripartite alliance, on condition that Hatay would be absorbed into Turkey. France acceded to this request at Britain's insistence and also under pressure from its own military. French diplomats and politicians were against any retreat from overseas territories, which they regarded as symbols of French power. According to them, a step in this direction would set a precedent and create problems in the colonies, and especially in Algeria. But the French General Staff was aware of the seriousness of the situation in Europe and was also conscious of the importance of an alliance with Turkey, so it pressed the government to relent in Hatay.

#### The Union with Turkey

On 23 June 1939, when the second step toward the Tripartite Alliance was taken with the release of the Turkish-French Joint Declaration, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Şükrü Saracoğlu, and the French ambassador in Ankara, René Massigli, signed the Agreement Regarding the Final Settlement of Territorial Questions between Turkey and Syria.

Article 1 of the agreement included Hatay in Turkey, with this provision: "France agrees to the following modification being made in the previous frontier demarcations of 1926, 1929, and 1930." These territories "shall be evacuated by 23 July 1939, and, on that day, the responsibilities of the French authorities will come to an end." In article 7 "Turkey undertakes to declare the frontier modified by the present agreement as the definitive frontier." The article went on to declare that Turkey "condemns any action against Syria's territorial integrity and undertakes to prevent and, if necessary, punish any action of this kind." Clearly France was concerned about irredentism in Europe and feared that Turkey might go even further with its claims.

Article 9 contained the usual provisions against Kurdish insurgents: "Turkey shall take all necessary measures on its territory and France on Syrian territory to prevent...activities directed against the security and the regimes of the neighboring states."

Even before this treaty came into effect, the Hatay Assembly unanimously adopted a decision on 29 June to unite with Turkey. By a law dated 7 July, Turkey established the province of Hatay and completed the legal formalities for the union. The French army evacuated the territory. Once the parliamentary procedures were completed, the treaty between Turkey and France was published in the LoN's official register of treaties.

Following the union of Hatay with Turkey, the Speaker of the Syrian Assembly sent protest telegrams to the French government and the Council of the League. He declared that Hatay was an inseparable part of Syria's territory, that the decisions made and the act of union were unacceptable, and that the treaty violated the decisions taken in Ankara in 1921, in Lausanne in 1923, and again in Ankara in 1926 as well as the frontier protocol of 1930 and the decision of 1937. On the day Syria declared its independence, it sent a circular note to all foreign embassies stating that it respected all international commitments entered into by France on its behalf. Syria never accepted the union of Hatay with Turkey, however.

Rome also objected to Hatay's union with Turkey. As a participant in the San Remo talks of 1920, Italy submitted a note to France on 10 July, complaining that it had not been consulted and its consent had not been obtained prior to the conclusion of the treaty and declaring the

treaty to be in violation of the mandate and the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory.

#### Appraisal of the Hatay Issue

The union of Hatay with Turkey raises certain questions about Turkish foreign policy in the interwar years. The general impression is that, although the international situation was extremely favorable, Ankara followed a prostatus quo policy and refrained from seeking territorial expansion through the use of force. Despite this generally held view, the Hatay episode can also lead to the conclusion that, like other revisionist states, Turkey was capable of massing troops on the border and acquiring territory by threatening to use force. It should not be forgotten, however, that at all stages Turkey maintained diplomatic contacts, respected the decisions of the LoN, sought revision of decisions that it found unacceptable through diplomatic demarches, refrained from the direct use of force, and always "played by the rules."

Despite these facts, the Hatay event remained etched in people's minds. When the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared independent in 1983, Turkey's opponents cited this example to prove Turkey's expansionist proclivity. The same example was used by those who wanted Turkey to grab Mosul in the 1980s and 1990s. It was also the cause of Syria's permanent hostility to Turkey.

In the period from 1923 to 1939 Mosul and Hatay were two basic issues of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, and there are interesting similarities between them. Both regions were included in the National Pact but had to be conceded at Lausanne. When the issues came to the negotiating table, they were referred to the LoN. In both cases there was no resort to force, though troops were deployed to the border. Mosul was the story of a failure, while Hatay was a success.

There are two important reasons for this. First, it was known that Mosul contained oil, while it eventually became clear that Hatay had no such riches. Second, the international and Turkish domestic circumstances of the 1920s differed fundamentally from the circumstances of the 1930s. In the 1920s Britain had emerged all powerful from the war, while Turkey was weak, having just emerged from long wars, with a newly created state trying to survive, modernize itself, and cope with internal unrest. In the 1930s France was threatened by revisionist states, buffeted by economic and political turmoil, and subject to British prodding. Turkey, in contrast, had reinforced its foundations, and its government enjoyed the full backing

of a united nation. In the 1920s the West was the guardian of the Versailles order. In the 1930s this order had collapsed; and as World War II approached, the West badly needed Turkey to strengthen its security.

#### Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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#### III. RELATIONS WITH ITALY

Italy was one of the occupying powers in Anatolia and İstanbul between 1919 and 1922, but, as mentioned earlier, it was well disposed toward Ankara. Although it had evacuated Anatolia in 1922, Italy started displaying expansionist tendencies in its foreign policy after Mussolini acceded to power. Nevertheless, relations between the two countries up to the early 1930s were relatively relaxed and smooth.

Italy's expansionist policy became more manifest, in both its rhetoric and its implementation, after 1934. Italy thus became one of the Western countries that most profoundly affected Turkey's foreign policy in the interwar years. Italy was in control of the Dodecanese Islands off Turkey's coast, and from this position it was a direct threat to Turkey's security. That is why Turkey took careful note of all Mussolini's declarations and actions.

#### A. The Period from 1923 to 1934

Mussolini was convinced that Italy had been dealt with unjustly in the postwar arrangements and was determined to remedy this situation. When Britain offered Italy some territories in Africa, Mussolini reacted angrily and rebuffed Britain by asserting that "Italy is not a collector of deserts" (Akşin, p. 218). In 1923 he declared to the Italian parliament that the Adriatic could not satisfy Italy, that it had to expand into the Mediterranean. During Turkey's struggle for liberation, Italy's dissatisfaction with the postwar arrangements worked in Turkey's favor. But subsequently this became a major source of concern for Ankara.

Italy declared the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans to be its areas of expansion. These were precisely the areas that were important for Turkey's security. Italy's occupation of Tripolitania in 1911–12 was still fresh in Turkish minds. During the mid-1920s Italy started asserting its influence in the Balkans. The targets of Italy's expansionist policies were Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. Italy forced Yugoslavia to make frontier adjustments in its favor, occupied the Greek island of Corfu, and brought Albania under its economic and political control. In order to monitor developments more closely, Turkey felt the need to establish an embassy in Tirana and a consulate in Avlonya (Vlore) in 1925.

At a time when Turkey's relations with Britain were strained in 1926 because of Mosul, rumors started circulating to the effect that Italy was about to invade western Anatolia. It was claimed that these rumors were deliberately circulated by the British intelligence services to create a diversion for Turkey. But Ankara really became concerned about Italy's intentions when Mussolini visited Tripolitania in 1926 and made declarations expressing his expansionist aims. Turkey was openly critical of such statements, and Italy kept reassuring Ankara that it had no designs on Turkish territory.

Parallel to the improvement in Turkish-British relations following the settlement of the Mosul question was a similar improvement in Turkish-Italian relations. In the late 1920s, when Italy was not feeling very strong, it sought to enhance its influence in the eastern Mediterranean by drawing Turkey and Greece into an alliance. Meanwhile Yugoslavia had signed a treaty of alliance with France in 1927 because it too was uneasy about Italian intentions. France had persúaded Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia to set up the Little Entente, and Italy wanted to establish a system that would rival and help counterbalance this alliance. For this purpose Italy was seeking to bring Greece and Turkey closer together.

It was in these circumstances that the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü, met with Mussolini in Milan in 1927. At that meeting Mussolini proposed the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and neutrality involving Greece, Turkey, and Italy, with Bulgaria to join this group at a later date.

The next year Turkey and Italy signed a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlement on 30 May 1928 in Rome. In conformity with the usual practice in such treaties of neutrality, the first article provided that "the High Contracting Parties undertake not to take part in any political or economic action directed at one of the Parties," while the second article stipulated that "[i]f one of the High Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful posture, finds itself under attack from a state or group of states, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain its neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." Article 4 provided that "[i]f differences should emerge in the interpretation or the implementation of the present treaty, these differences shall be referred directly to the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague upon a request to that effect."

After this treaty was concluded, Mussolini made statements praising Turkey and expressing satisfaction with the state of Turkish-Italian relations, which helped put Turkey at ease. A year later Tevfik Rüştü returned to Rome, where he was warmly received. But when a dispute

arose over the status of the island of Meis (Kastellorizo) and some other islands, the two countries signed a protocol on 30 May 1929 referring the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice in compliance with the provisions of the 1928 treaty. In 1932 prime minister İsmet İnönü visited Rome, where the 1928 treaty was extended for three years. It was also decided that a convention would be signed concerning the ownership of the islands Meis and Kara Ada (off the coast of Bodrum), which made it unnecessary to refer the matter to the international court at the Hague.

In article 1 of this convention signed in Ankara on 4 November 1932 about twenty islands and rocky islets mentioned by name were ceded to Turkey. Article 2 declared: "The island of Kara in the bay of Bodrum shall belong to Turkey." Article 3 left the island of Meis (Kastellorizo) and twelve other islets in its vicinity to Italy. These islets were described in article 3 as falling within a circle with its center located at the dome of the church in the city of Kastellorizo and its radius extending as far as Cape San Stephano. Article 5 demarcated the line separating the territorial waters of Meis and Anatolia in detailed fashion and clearly designated the islands and islets belonging to each party.

Although Turkey perceived Italy as a threat to its security during this period, that did not prevent its bilateral trade with that country from expanding. From 1924 to 1930 Italy became Turkey's main trading partner. In the peak year of 1926 Italy accounted for 27.8% of Turkey's exports and 15.8% of Turkey's imports. After 1931 Italy's share started declining, and Germany replaced Italy as Turkey's main trading partner. The main reason for the high volume of trade between Turkey and Italy was that some Greek businessmen from Anatolia settled in Trieste after leaving Turkey and used their Turkish connections in carrying out their business activities. Furthermore, Italy was importing a large proportion of the cotton produced in Anatolia.

#### B. The Period from 1934 to 1939

The development of relations with Italy took a turn for the worse in the 1930s as a consequence of Mussolini's expansionist policies. In January 1933 the Nazis came to power in Germany. Fascism was on the rise in Spain with Francisco Franco. With this favorable international environment, Italy's foreign policy became more aggressive. What caused the greatest consternation in Turkey was Mussolini's speech at the second Fascist Congress, held in March 1934, when he declared that Italy's historic aspirations lay in Asia and Africa. Two months later, in an interview given to the Daily Telegraph newspaper, Mussolini

said that Italy was a maritime power and that it required 29 million tons of grain to feed its population, while its domestic production amounted to only 6 million tons. This made it necessary for Italy to expand. During this period Mussolini started using the expression "Mare Nostrum" when referring to the Mediterranean. To pacify Turkey, Italian officials and Mussolini himself made reassuring statements. Mussolini told the Turkish ambassador in Rome that he considered Turkey to be a European country and that he felt great admiration for the revolutionary reforms being carried out there.

As a matter of fact, Italy even proposed the creation of an alliance in February 1935 consisting of Italy, Turkey, and Greece. Turkey perceived this proposal as an attempt to subvert the Balkan Pact established in 1934 and to cause rifts among the Balkan countries, so Italy's offer was rejected. At that time, Turkey and Italy were pursuing contradictory policies in the Balkans. Turkey was seeking an alliance among the Balkan states, while Italy sought to bind the Balkan states to Rome through bilateral agreements. Turkey's objective was to unite the Balkan states to counter a possible Italian threat, while Italy opposed any type of union in the Balkans.

Meanwhile France and Britain were becoming increasingly more apprehensive about the rising German threat and doing their best not to alienate Italy. In April 1935, when Germany reintroduced conscription, Britain and France signed the Stresa Agreements with Italy. A year later, however, Italy concluded a treaty with Germany and denounced the Stresa arrangements that were aimed at Germany. Nevertheless, Britain continued its policy of wooing Italy.

Meanwhile Italy was increasing its military activities in the Dodecanese Islands even as it was proposing an alliance with Turkey. Such activities had always created uneasiness in Turkey. When they were combined with bellicose statements that had emanated from Rome in the past, Turkey's concern started to grow. Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 helped in providing an explanation for the intensified activities around the islands, but this did not mitigate Turkey's anxieties. With Italy's attack, the LoN imposed sanctions on Italy in conformity with article 16/1 of the covenant, which reads as follows:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants...it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their

nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

Although Italy had an important place in Turkey's economic relations, Turkey joined in this decision as a new member of the LoN. In November 1935 Italy protested Turkey's action through a note verbale. Furthermore, it threatened Turkey and claimed that Turkey had been coerced to follow British policies. In the preparation of the reply to the Italian note, Turkey took the initiative in securing joint action with the Balkan states in the form of a common text handed to Italy. Turkey also consulted with Britain and France to ensure that the content of its reply was similar to their note. In this way Turkey conveyed the message that it was not acting in isolation and that its policies were a reflection of the sense of the international community.

In joining the action of the LoN, of which it had become a member three years earlier, Turkey severed its economic ties with Italy. Because of the importance of these ties, Turkey suffered serious losses. The sanctions on Italy were lifted upon Britain's initiative on 6 July 1936, shortly after their introduction. Britain took this course because Italy started inciting the inhabitants of Palestine and Egypt against British rule and because it still harbored hopes of drawing Italy away from Germany. It was in Britain's interest to allow Mussolini freedom of action in Abyssinia, a place of relatively minor importance from Britain's strategic and economic perspective.

In 1936, when Italy started fortifying the Dodecanese Islands and building air bases there, Turkey's uneasiness began to mount once again. The Turkish leadership described the Dodecanese Islands as "a loaded gun pointing at Turkey's heart." Atatürk never had a very high opinion of the Italian army's fighting capacity, but at the time the course of events gave rise to concern in Ankara. These developments led Turkey to seek stronger ties with Britain. As the danger of Italian supremacy in the Mediterranean grew, Britain was also motivated to come closer to Turkey. With Turkey and Britain drawing closer, Italy felt the need to give assurances to Greece and Yugoslavia as well as Turkey in July 1936 and confirmed that it remained bound by the 1928 treaty.

In January 1937 Britain entered into a gentleman's agreement with Italy by which both countries undertook to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean. In any case, Britain reigned supreme in the Mediterranean, as it

held the outlets of this sea both at Gibraltar and at Suez and had back-up bases in Malta and Cyprus. Nevertheless, it still had worries about the status quo being upset. This agreement helped ease Turkey's concerns.

In February 1937 Turkish minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras went to Milan, where he held talks with his Italian counterpart, Count G. G. Ciano. At these talks Aras tried to mend relations with Italy and sought to get Italy to sign the Montreux Convention, which Italy had refused to do to protest Turkey's participation in the sanctions imposed on Italy. Actually, it was Turkey's feelings of insecurity in the face of aggressive Italian intentions that had led Ankara to seek a revision in the regime of the Turkish Straits. Ciano agreed to sign the Montreux Convention if Turkey would legally recognize Italy's African conquests. He also attempted to take advantage of the circumstances to draw Turkey into the Italian-German camp. Although Turkey refused to accede to Italy's demands, the joint communiqué issued following the talks did reaffirm that both states considered themselves bound by the May 1928 treaty. There was no mention of Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention, however, even though it was one of the principal users of the Straits. Italy eventually acceded to the Montreux Convention on 2 May 1938.

Italy's invasion of Albania in April 1939 alarmed Turkey, which considered the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans of utmost importance to its security. From then on, Turkey would tilt increasingly toward Britain and France.

The salient feature of Turkish-Italian relations in the interwar years was Turkey's concern over Italian policies, especially in the 1930s. As in the case of Germany, the large volume of trade did not result in the stabilization and development of political relations. Turkey perceived Italy as the most serious threat because of Italy's expansionist policies.

## IV. RELATIONS WITH GERMANYA. The Weimar Period (1923–1933)

Because of the conditions imposed at Versailles, Germany was facing all kinds of economic, political, and social problems. Its payments of huge war reparations to Britain, France, and other European countries were making postwar conditions in Germany unbearable, leading to hyperinflation and high levels of unemployment. These adverse conditions were giving rise to movements in favor of "breaking loose from the chains of Versailles," but until the 1930s Germany was too weak to carry this out. As its economic condition improved, however, its foreign pol-

icy would gradually turn more effective as well as more aggressive. (The developments of this period have been compiled from Koçak 1991 and Özgüldür.)

#### The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and Subsequent Political Relations

Like Turkey, Germany was feeling isolated in the immediate aftermath of World War I. Although Turkey too had made certain concessions at Lausanne on issues such as the Straits and some other specific questions, the Weimar Republic was overwhelmed by the restrictions imposed at Versailles on both its domestic policies and its international relations. As recent allies, Turkey and Germany were readily able to establish relations and had no historic burden to overcome, as in the case of Turkey's relations with Britain or France. For Turkey, Germany was important as a European country that involved no psychological obstacles in bilateral relations.

Unlike Britain and France, Germany was not disturbed by Turkey's efforts to maintain good relations with the Soviets in the 1920s. All three countries were cold-shouldered and felt left out. By signing the Rapallo Treaty with the Soviet Union in February 1922, Germany was trying to overcome its sense of isolation.

After Lausanne, there were attempts to restore relations between Turkey and Germany. But Germany preferred to delay this in order to avoid incurring the displeasure of Britain and France. Negotiations between the two states started in early 1924 and ended with the conclusion of a Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship on 3 March 1924 and the restoration of diplomatic relations. Unlike Britain and France, Germany agreed to locate its embassy in Ankara, which helped create goodwill in Turkish circles.

Although relations remained limited in the 1920s, numerous German experts came to Turkey to alleviate the acute shortage of skilled personnel. Most of the experts were in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, and engineering. Germany was eager to develop its economic relations with Turkey and was glad to provide workers in these fields. At the same time, Turks were being sent to Germany to pursue their education.

During the interwar years an important aspect of Turkish-German relations was military cooperation. The first development in this sphere was the arrival of German officers to take up duties within the Turkish army. Germany had been deprived of its army under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and German officers found themselves unemployed. Some of these unemployed officers

took jobs under contract in Turkey to provide basic training as well as to teach in the War College. Turkish officers also went to Germany to further their education.

An important aspect of this cooperation was Germany's part in providing weapons and contributing to the establishment of defense industries in Turkey. At the bilateral negotiations undertaken to develop this cooperation, Germany was at first reticent because of the unresolved Mosul issue. Although it was in Germany's economic and political interest to develop such ties, it preferred to bide its time.

In April 1929 the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü, visited Germany. Among the subjects taken up during the talks were developments in the Balkans, membership in the LoN, and relations with Italy. In those years Turkey wanted to see a stronger Germany and approved of Germany's foreign policy. At these talks T. Rüştü conveyed the message that Turkey was a new state and that its foreign policy was not expansionist (Koçak, 1991, pp. 31–36).

#### 2. Economic Relations

In those years, economic relations were at the center of bilateral relations. With the implementation of the Dawes Plan and the rescheduling of Germany's reparation payments in 1924, Germany started attracting large amounts of foreign funds. By 1927 Germany's exports had reached the prewar level.

The first important transaction between the two countries was the signing of an agreement with the German firm Junkers in August 1925 for the setting up of an aircraft factory in Kayseri. Junkers was in financial difficulties, and the German government was ready to support the contract for political reasons. Another reason for the German government's support was that the Versailles restrictions prevented Germany from developing its defense industries. By building such factories in foreign countries, Germany was able to preserve its research and technological development skills without violating the letter of the Versailles Treaty. As a consequence, a joint Turkish-German company was set up to produce aircraft and aircraft engines (TOMTAŞ in Turkish and TOMTASCH in German, derived from Tayyare ve Motor Türk Anonim Sirketi). The factory was completed in one year. This was Turkey's first attempt at building an aircraft industry, which led eventually to the establishment of the facilities to manufacture the F-16 fighter in the mid-1980s.

While building the aircraft factory, Germany was also assisting in setting up an air transport system in Turkey. The project involved the establishment of an airline link-

ing Berlin and Baghdad via İstanbul and Ankara. Because full agreement could not be reached among the parties and the circumstances were not favorable, only part of the project was realized. In 1930 Lufthansa inaugurated the Berlin-İstanbul air link (Koçak 1991, pp. 66–82).

The developing economic ties acquired a legal basis when the two countries signed a commercial convention in Ankara on 12 January 1927. Soon this convention was unable to respond to the greatly expanded volume of trade, so the two countries signed a new trade treaty in May 1930. This treaty had a most-favored-nation clause and provided for customs reductions on certain products. Germany applied the customs reductions to raw materials imported from Turkey. There was a gradual but steady increase in Turkish-German trade until 1933. Germany's share in Turkish imports rose from 6.4% in 1923 to 23.2% in 1932. While Germany took 9% of Turkey's exports in 1923, this figure rose to 13.5% in 1932. Turkey's share in Germany's total trade hovered around 2% during this time, however.

Bilateral relations during this period developed without major problems in an atmosphere in which both countries sought to come closer to one another. When Hitler came to power, these relations underwent a radical transformation, especially in the economic sphere. As Germany's domestic scene changed, these changes were reflected in German foreign policies.

#### B. The Nazi Period (1933-1939)

When the National Socialist Party under Hitler's leadership came to power in January 1933, sharp changes took place in Germany's domestic and foreign policies. Because of this process, the two countries drifted apart as their foreign policy objectives started to diverge. It is interesting that economic relations maintained their intensity and developed even further in spite of these increasing differences in foreign policy.

As Turkey came closer to Britain and France in the 1930s, Germany was entering a period of tension in its relations with these countries.

#### 1. Political Relations

The first official contact with the Hitler administration occurred in July 1933 with the arrival in Berlin of a Turkish parliamentary delegation. In the course of the talks held on that occasion, Hitler told the parliamentarians that the Turkish War of Liberation was a source of inspiration for him, while the other German officials drew parallels between Hitler and Atatürk. The aim was to create a perception of common traits between the two countries and

prepare the ground for an alliance between Turkey and Germany.

But the divergence between Turkish and German foreign policies was gradually becoming more obvious. Actually, Turkey was not too comfortable with some aspects of the postwar order and looked upon Germany's efforts to free itself from the shackles of Versailles with some sympathy. Furthermore, in the beginning Germany's potential areas of expansion appeared to be in Eastern Europe, quite some distance away. Turkey did not approve of Germany's attempts to change the status quo by the use of force, however.

One of the contentious issues between the two countries was the Balkan Pact of 1934, in the formation of which Turkey had played a leading role. Germany saw this region as its zone of influence and did not approve of Turkey taking an active interest in this region. As Turkey drew closer to Britain and France, Turkey's expanded role in the Balkans meant an increased role for these two countries in the area. France had already established an alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania through the Little Entente. Germany was bothered by a pact that had as one of its objectives the containment of its World War I ally Bulgaria. Like Germany, Bulgaria pursued revisionist policies in its region.

Another issue that bothered Germany was the Montreux Convention. Germany realized that Turkey had, despite some disagreements, changed the status of the Straits with the cooperation and approval of Britain. It perceived this as another sign of rapprochement between Turkey and Britain. Although Germany was not a signatory of the Lausanne Treaty and therefore not invited to the Montreux Conference, it was uncomfortable with the changes being made in that document. In particular, Germany objected to the clauses of the convention regarding the passage through the Straits of auxiliary naval vessels and the right of Soviet warships to gain access to the Mediterranean. Germany wanted a bilateral treaty to regulate navigation in the Straits but failed to achieve its objective, despite persistent attempts.

In spite of these questions, no serious problems emerged in bilateral relations, and high-level diplomatic contacts did take place from time to time. Turkey was against Germany's expansionist policies but was careful to avoid a direct confrontation. When Germany was carrying out its *Lebensraum* policy, it wanted to draw Turkey closer or at least prevent Ankara from getting involved in an alliance with Britain and France. This was the main reason for Germany's carefully calibrated policy toward Turkey. Because of the Hatay question, Germany regarded Turkey

as a revisionist state and considered it to be a natural ally of a revisionist Germany. The Germans often recalled that the two countries had been comrades in arms in the recent war and kept alluding to their wartime alliance, even though this had produced such ruinous consequences for Turkey.

As tensions grew and Europe came closer to war, the stand that Turkey might take in the event of war became ever more important. Germany started taking active steps to pull Turkey into the revisionist camp. In July 1938 the German minister of foreign affairs, Ribbentrop, held talks with the secretary general of the Turkish MFA, Numan Menemencioğlu. Ribbentrop called on Turkey to join the revisionists. His argument was that Turkey's policies on Hatay and the regime of the Straits were revisionist in character, and he proposed that the two countries conclude a treaty of neutrality. Menemencioğlu replied that Turkey had concluded such treaties only with its neighbors and did not have such an agreement even with Britain. However, Turkey did not fail to give Germany verbal assurances on various occasions that it would not enter into any commitments directed against Germany.

When Italy attacked Albania in April 1939, Turkey's concern over the intentions of the Mussolini administration increased sharply. Germany's indirect support for Italy's actions deeply affected the development of Turkish-German relations. Germany wanted to allay Turkey's fears and prevent Ankara from drawing closer to Britain and France. To this end Germany proposed sending former prime minister Franz von Papen to the embassy in Ankara, which happened to be vacant at the time. But neither Atatürk nor İnönü wanted to see this politician, who had engineered the forcible annexation of Austria, in Ankara as ambassador (Güçlü, p. 70). This appointment took effect only in April 1939 at Germany's insistence. Von Papen noted Turkey's concern about Italy's intentions and realized that this was driving Turkey toward Britain and France. He informed Berlin that Turkish anxieties might be relieved if Mussolini gave Turkey assurances.

At this point Turkey was engaged in negotiations with both Britain and the Soviet Union to conclude treaties with those countries. The Germans were aware of these developments and worried about Ankara's intentions. Von Papen's actions designed to relieve Turkey's anxieties over Italy's policies proved fruitless. Germany was not prepared to press Italy over the issue, because Berlin's foreign policy attributed greater importance to having Rome on its side. Ankara did not want to antagonize Germany, so it kept giving Berlin evasive responses about its negotiations with Britain and France.

Turkey's increasing friendship with Britain finally drew Germany's ire, and Ribbentrop ordered the suspension of the deliveries of German arms and military equipment to Turkey. In fact, the German leadership even contemplated using trade as a bargaining tool and considered cutting off trade relations with Turkey. But this option was rejected because Turkish supplies of chromate were essential for Germany's defense industries. Turkey had already indicated to Germany that the suspension of arms deliveries would be met with the suspension of chromate sales. Both sides were being very careful in exercising their options in an unsettled environment.

After the signature of the Pact of Steel between Italy and Germany on 22 May 1939, Turkey's concerns were seen to be justified. Germany was opposed to the inclusion of the Balkans in the guarantees to be provided by a possible Turkish-British Treaty. Berlin wanted to keep Turkey from getting involved in the Balkans. Its immediate goal was to allow Italy maximum freedom of action in the Balkans to ensure its long-term goal of establishing German hegemony in the region. Meanwhile Turkey was seeking to ensure the security of the Balkans and the Mediterranean, which it considered to be within its security zone, through treaties to be concluded with Britain and France. These were the issues that were creating tension between the two countries on the eve of the outbreak of war.

The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 brought additional complications in Turkish-German relations. While Turkey was seeking to get closer to Britain and France and trying to reconcile this with a Turkish-Soviet Treaty and maybe even draw the Soviet Union closer to Britain, the Nazi-Soviet Pact brought these efforts to an abrupt end, much to Turkey's concern.

When Germany attacked Poland on 1 September, unleashing World War II, Turkey informed the German ambassador that it would maintain its neutrality. But Ankara continued to worry about Italy joining the war, thus causing hostilities to spread to the Mediterranean.

#### 2. Economic Relations

Turkish-German relations also had important economic and cultural dimensions. As Germany recovered from the ravages of the war and the postwar turmoil, its recovery was given a further boost by the American-sponsored Young Plan of 1929. This enabled Germany to make its weight felt in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Turkey was one of the countries that came within Germany's economic sphere. The countries attracting Germany's attention were endowed with natural resources and could

be classified as agricultural economies. Under the foreign trade policy devised by Hitler's minister of economics, Hjalmar Schacht, German industry was to draw its raw materials mostly from the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans and supply these countries with their requirements for finished products through barter arrangements. German firms were actively encouraged by the state to enter into these arrangements. Turkey fitted neatly into this pattern and ended up by becoming a supplier of raw materials for Hitler's Germany and a market for its goods. Through these policies Germany was able to accelerate the growth of its economy while bringing the countries that had become its trading partners under its political influence.

Germany's expansion into Eastern Europe and the Balkans coincided with the adoption of statism in Turkey. After having sought in vain to develop its economy through private enterprise during the 1920s, Turkey undertook large, state-sponsored industrialization projects in the 1930s. This required large-scale injections of capital and technology. Germany appeared on the scene as the country that could provide these inputs. Germany started providing loans for Turkey while also investing in the Turkish economy. In 1934 the negotiations with a visiting trade delegation led to the granting of a long-term loan equivalent to 20 million liras. Germany also provided experts (Güçlü, p. 51). Among the German projects in Turkey, in addition to the aircraft factory mentioned previously, were the paper factory at Izmit, new investments by German electrical equipment industries, and the construction of the ports of Samsun and İskenderun. When war broke out in 1939, the number of German experts in Turkey had reached 2,000.

The volume of trade between the two countries was also expanding fast. Germany purchased agricultural products and raw materials and sold industrial products through a clearing system. For a country chronically short of foreign exchange, the clearing system that allowed industrial goods to be procured by delivering agricultural products and raw materials had certain attractions. But in reality the system worked against Turkey. For political reasons Germany was purchasing agricultural commodities at prices above the prevailing market price. This would render the Turkish economy dependent on Germany. Against this, Germany was able to overcharge for its industrial exports. So Germany was able to derive both political and economic benefits from its trading system. After a while Germany became almost the sole purchaser of specific commodities, whereupon it was able to dictate the price. This led to problems in trade relations. In the 1930s Turkey relied almost exclusively on Germany for rail, air, and maritime transport. Practically all of the major German steel, electrical implements, and chemical goods producers had business connections with Turkey. Their commercial transactions were financed largely by Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Orientbank.

Eventually Ankara began to get concerned about this excessive dependence on one country in the field of foreign trade. At a certain point Germany was taking 51% of Turkey's exports and supplying 45% of Turkey's imports. As noted earlier, Turkey awarded the contract for the Karabük Iron and Steelworks to the British firm Brassert even though Krupp's terms were more favorable. Germany was prepared for such an eventuality and sent economics minister Hjalmar Schacht to Ankara to try to persuade the Turks. Despite this, the contract for the fortifications on the Dardanelles was awarded to a British firm. Britain and France were also concerned about the German hold on Turkey's foreign trade. This led Britain to negotiate a clearing agreement with Turkey in September 1936, with France following suit in June 1937.

Turkey became aware that the clearing arrangement with Germany was working against its interests and raised the issue at the negotiations. Furthermore, Germany was late in settling its debts to Turkey under the clearing arrangement.

Ankara was also feeling uneasy about German propaganda and its efforts to use economic, cultural, and military ties with Turkey to enhance its influence. This led Ankara to enter into negotiations with Britain and France to expand trade. As noted earlier, Britain extended a loan of £10 million to Turkey in May 1938. Not wanting to lose its privileged place in Turkey's economic life, Germany agreed (during the visit of economy minister Walter Funk to Ankara) to extend a loan of 150 million marks to Turkey, to be repaid over ten years. The agreement was signed in Berlin on 16 January 1939. The annual rate of interest of the loan would be 5%. This loan was to be used by Turkey to purchase military equipment and industrial products.

#### Cultural Relations and German Propaganda Activities in Turkey

In the 1930s Germany's propaganda activities in Turkey and the cultural exchanges between the two countries were an important aspect of bilateral relations. Intensive German propaganda started in 1933 with the publication in Istanbul of the *Türkische Post* newspaper. The German Embassy and consulates in Turkey maintained close links with the press corps. A group of Turkish journalists was invited to visit Germany. German firms were placing ad-

vertisements in Turkish newspapers and supplying them with cheap newsprint, undercutting British and French suppliers.

An association called Teutonia was established in Istanbul to serve German propaganda objectives. The primary theme of German propaganda was the historic friendship between the two countries and the military alliance during World War I. Members of German youth organizations as well as military delegations visited Turkey, and German officers serving in Turkish military academies sought to influence their Turkish colleagues. During this period Turkish officers still recalled the times when they were comrades in arms with the Germans and spoke highly of German military capabilities and discipline. Germany was also striving to make Turkey dependent on German armaments and military equipment.

After 1933 the Turkish government invited numerous German academics and artists who had lost their jobs because of their differences with the Nazi administration to come to Turkey to help in carrying out the reform of Turkish universities. These academics and artists settled in Istanbul and Ankara and made significant contributions to Turkey's academic and artistic life. Toward the end of the 1930s Germany claimed that these expatriates were engaged in espionage on behalf of Britain and called for their expulsion. Turkey appreciated the valuable services of these expatriates, however, and refused to accede to Germany's request (Box 2-8).

To sum up, Germany's Turkish policy in the interwar years was to keep Turkey under its grip if possible, or at least to prevent it from moving into the Anglo-French camp. Germany followed three courses to achieve these objectives: increasing Turkey's economic dependence on Germany, influencing Turkish public opinion through propaganda and intensified cultural exchanges, and rendering Turkey dependent on German military equipment while seeking to create a nucleus of pro-German elements within the officer corps.

Turkey was able to avoid being dragged behind Germany after Hitler came to power, but it needed Germany's help in the fields of technical assistance and economic relations during the 1930s. Despite its dependence on Germany in its trade relations, Turkey was able to use the limited diplomatic and political means at its disposal and avoid getting trapped in Germany's zone of influence like some other Eastern European and Balkan countries.

The major factor that contributed to Turkey's not being drawn into the German camp before the war was that Turkey had been able to break free of the Sèvres arrangement and negotiate the Lausanne Treaty. Questions that had not been satisfactorily settled at Lausanne (such as Mosul, the status of the Straits, and Hatay) were successfully dealt with through negotiations and in compliance with international law. In its Westernization efforts, Turkey gave priority to its relations with Britain and to a certain extent with France. A rapprochement with Germany would have been interpreted as a divergence from Turkey's goal of Westernization. The dire consequences of Turkey's alliance with Germany during World War I were still fresh in people's minds, and the mistake would not be repeated despite Germany's blandishments.

### v. Turkey and the Issues of International Security

After the catastrophe of World War I, the international community set about establishing a new order that would prevent the recurrence of such a conflict. The LoN was established to secure this objective and was the brainchild of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson. A Permanent Court of International Justice, disarmament conferences and agreements, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Soviet-sponsored collective security system were some of the principal instruments devised to achieve this objective and ensure the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

From the date of its establishment, the Turkish Republic gave priority to carrying out its internal reforms. Turkey followed the development of the policies of Italy and Germany with deep concern and made every effort to resolve the question of Mosul with Britain and the question of Hatay with France. It was natural for such a country to attach importance to international efforts to achieve collective security. As a country with a pro–status quo foreign policy, Turkey gave its support to the diplomatic processes aimed at achieving international security and participated actively in the arrangements designed to attain this goal.

# A. International Security, Disarmament Efforts, and Turkey

One of the initiatives designed to strengthen international security in the interwar years was the signing in 1928 by French minister of foreign affairs Aristide Briand and U.S. secretary of state Frank Kellogg of a pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. This was open to other states, and Turkey acceded to the pact in January 1929 when invited to do so.

Other initiatives in this direction were the disarmament conferences of this period. There was a widespread belief that the prewar arms race and the accumulation of

#### Box 2-8. Academics Who Sought Refuge in Turkey

In line with the old Ottoman practice, Turkey offered asylum to the German Jews and liberal dissidents who fled from Nazi repression during the 1930s. Germany attempted to prevent Turkey from providing asylum to these Jewish refugees by appealing to "traditional German-Turkish friendship" or by resorting to veiled threats. Turkey ignored the German requests and went ahead and opened its doors to the refugees, even employing those with special qualifications in public services and universities. This policy led to raising the academic level of universities in Turkey.

This was the time when the University of Istanbul (Darulfünun), representing scholasticism, was being transformed into an institution imparting the contemporary values of the enlightenment. The influx of mostly Jewish refugees from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy came at this juncture, including the prominent mathematician Richard Courant, the physicists Max Born and James Franck, the philosophers Ernest von Aster and Hans Reichenbach, the Jurist Ernst Hirsch, and the musicians Paul Hindemith and Carl Ebert. These academics and artists took an active part in Turkey's academic restructuring by establishing new faculties and chairs at the universities. They also helped introduce new teaching methods and aided in the establishment of libraries, the publication of scientific journals, the designing of new buildings, and the training of academic personnel. They made a major contribution to all aspects of the revolution in the field of university education in Turkev.

The close cooperation established between Turkish and German scholars and artists during these years continued after the German scholars left Turkey and provided the cultural basis for the resumption of cooperation between Turkey and Germany in the postwar period.

(H. Bingün)

vast arsenals both precipitated the war and contributed to its intensity. Because Germany was considered the main culprit in starting the war and causing it to spread, the Versailles Treaty contained detailed provisions to secure complete German disarmament. The Covenant of the LoN also contained provisions regarding disarmament. Article 8 declared that the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments.

In 1922 the LoN decided to secure a general agreement on disarmament. A Permanent Disarmament Committee was set up for this purpose. During the deliberations of the committee, the opposing French and British positions were debated at great length. The committee finally concluded its work in 1924 and prepared the Geneva Protocol. The protocol stated that security depended directly on disarmament and stipulated the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to achieve this. Britain refused to accept this protocol.

In 1925 the General Assembly of the LoN set up the Committee for Preparing Disarmament and issued invitations to a disarmament conference. Turkey participated in the work of the committee that got underway in March 1928. In the committee the USSR proposed the elimination of all armaments, much to the astonishment of the Western states, and Turkey supported this position.

Subsequently Turkey was to support the gradual reduction of armaments. The reduction was to be not in absolute terms but in relative terms. If a general reduction was carried out by all armies, states with relatively weak armies would find themselves at a disadvantage. As a matter of fact, Turkey did not believe that a generalized elimination of armaments could be realized but considered that it would be in its interest even if only partial success could be achieved. Both Turkey's resources and its military forces were very limited at that time, and Ankara felt that generalized disarmament would enhance its overall security.

After long preparations the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments and Disarmament opened in Geneva on 2 February 1932. The conference was under the control of Britain and France. Turkey proposed that upper limits be placed on armaments and men, with the requirement that those countries exceeding the limit gradually reduce their forces. Turkey also introduced some radical ideas like the elimination of air forces, tanks, and heavy artillery. Factories producing armaments were to be distributed among states and were to meet orders by producing equal amounts for each state. In the voting, the Soviet proposal for eliminating all armaments was rejected as well as Turkey's proposal for every country gradually to reduce its armaments to the same level. The conference concluded its work without achieving any tangible result.

# B. Turkey's Membership in the League of Nations

After its establishment following World War I, the LoN to a considerable extent came under the control of Britain and France and tended to serve the interests of these two countries.

Once the Mosul question had been disposed of, Britain advised Turkey to become a member of the LoN. This would signify that Turkey had become a pro-status quo country. But Turkey had not made any such commitment either at Lausanne or at subsequent negotiations. M. Kemal had once mentioned membership in the LoN in a speech in 1924. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey had agreed to recognize the competence of the LoN in certain areas. These were the question of Mosul in article 3/2, the protection of minorities in articles 42 and 44, the Mixed

Arbitral Tribunal in article 92, and sanitary issues in articles 116 and 118. There were also references to the LoN in articles 13, 15, and 18 of the Straits Convention and article 4 of the Convention Respecting the Thracian Frontiers.

Turkey was reticent about LoN membership for a number of reasons. For one thing, the league was completely under British influence on the question of Mosul and decided against Turkey. This created much disappointment and bitterness both among the Turkish public and among the leadership. The organization was regarded as a tool of France and Britain and its future looked uncertain, so there was no great enthusiasm to join.

Another factor was the USSR's approach to the organization. For long years the USSR regarded the LoN as the political and organizational extension of imperialism. Under the terms of the 1929 protocol extending the treaty of December 1925, Turkey was bound to consult the USSR on the subject of membership.

In the light of developments in the international arena and in Turkish relations with Britain and the Soviet Union, Turkey started giving signs in early 1932 that it was ready to consider LoN membership. Turkish diplomats went to Geneva to examine the way in which the LoN operated. In 1928 minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü participated in the meeting of the Disarmament Committee. He made a statement indicating Turkey's readiness to become a member of the LoN. At the time, the lines were being drawn between the revisionist and pro-status quo states in Europe. Since Turkey sided with the pro-status quo group, its membership would confirm its leanings and also serve as a vehicle for enhancing its security.

As Britain sought to persuade Turkey to join the LoN, Turkey kept replying that it would consider membership only on condition of being given a permanent seat in the council. Only major powers had permanent seats in the council, so it was clear that Turkey would not be admitted as a member. In a statement on the subject of membership, İsmet Paşa said that the USSR would show understanding if Turkish membership in the LoN came with a seat in the council, but a plain membership was bound to offend the Soviets.

As Turkey drew closer to Britain in the early 1930s, its views on LoN membership started to evolve. The Mosul question had revealed the disadvantages of nonmembership. As the balance in Europe started shifting, the USSR began to favor an eventual Turkish membership in the LoN. During their trips to the USSR, Ismet Paşa and Tevfik Rüştü had been able to soften Moscow's position vis-à-vis Turkish membership, and Turkey's leaders eventually obtained Moscow's assent in accordance with the 1929 protocol.

When the time came to join the LoN, M. Kemal wanted membership to be not upon Turkey's request but upon an invitation from the LoN. In compliance with this wish, the Spanish delegate proposed, with the support of Greece, that Turkey be invited to join the LoN. At the meeting of 6 July 1932 the Spanish proposal was unanimously approved. During the consideration of this item, those who took the floor, including Greece, made statements praising Turkey and its foreign policy and dwelling on the positive impact that Turkey's membership would have on the LoN. Turkey accepted this invitation by a decree of the council of ministers on 9 July 1932. This was transmitted to the secretary-general of the LoN by Tevfik Rüştü, whereupon the General Assembly of the LoN approved Turkey's membership with the unanimous vote of its forty-three members on 18 July 1932.

At the time of its membership Turkey registered certain reservations. One of these had to do with Turkey's particular circumstances, while another concerned its relations with the USSR and commitments emanating from treaties. The precedent for Turkey's action was Germany, which had also registered reservations with respect to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Turkey referred to the restrictions imposed by Lausanne (namely, the demilitarization of the Straits). Turkey would participate in the sanctions foreseen in article 16 only to the extent that they were compatible with its military situation.

Turkey's second reservation arose in the context of its relations with the USSR. Turkey reserved its position with respect to the sanctions provisions of articles 16 and 17 and formally notified Moscow of its decision. If the USSR became involved in hostilities with another country, Turkey would not consider itself bound by these articles but would make its own decision regarding the identity of the covenant-breaking state. Turkey wanted to make sure that it was free to make its own decision with respect to participating in sanctions that might be directed against the USSR.

In the course of its membership, Turkey was active in the LoN. Two years after its admission, it placed its candidacy for the seat in the council vacated by China. On 17 September 1934 Turkey was elected to the council with forty-eight votes and exercised its membership from 1935 to 1937. In 1937 minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras presided over the work of the council.

Turkey's active participation in the work of the LoN became more apparent during Italy's occupation of Abyssinia. Turkey did not hesitate in taking part in the sanctions imposed on Italy. This stand drew the criticism of certain circles within the country. It led to substantial

economic losses, given Italy's important share in Turkey's foreign trade. Turkey accepted the risk of provoking an Italian reaction to its policies. Turkey joined the Committee of Five together with France, Poland, Britain, and Spain, set up to help Abyssinia. Turkey also provided direct aid to Abyssinia through the Turkish Red Crescent.

The LoN was unable to prevent Italy's occupation of Abyssinia or Japan's occupation of Manchuria. Neither was it effective in preventing Germany from flouting the provisions of Versailles. But Turkey was able to make its mark on the activities of the world organization, and ten years after its establishment it had earned a good reputation among the family of nations. This was reflected in the manner of its admission to the organization and its election to the council.

In addition to the LoN, the Permanent Court of International Justice had been set up at the Hague in 1922. Turkey recognized its jurisdiction in settling disputes and also agreed, at Lausanne and in certain bilateral conciliation and arbitration treaties, to assign certain specific roles to the court. Turkey acceded to the Permanent Court's Charter in 1935. It accepted the court's compulsory jurisdiction under the following conditions: (1) there must be reciprocity; (2) it would be for a term of five years; (3) the dispute and its causes must not predate Turkey's accession; (4) the dispute must relate to the following cases mentioned in article 36 of the charter (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) a subject connected with international law; (c) a subject that, if determined to exist, would negate an international rule; (d) the nature and amount of reparations arising from the carrying out of an international commitment.

In addition, Turkey included in its protocol of accession the following reservation: if an agreement or convention to which Turkey is a party has provisions regarding the method of settling a dispute arising directly or indirectly from the implementation of these accords, this dispute must not be included in the four cases mentioned above.

The Permanent Court of International Justice considered some cases of interest to Turkey in the interwar years. It rendered an advisory opinion in connection with the *établi* question with Greece (see "Relations with Greece" below) and the Mosul question with Britain. It also considered the *Bozkurt-Lotus* case in 1926.

## C. The Mediterranean Security Conference of Nyon

In 1937 some merchant ships were torpedoed and sunk in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. This brought uncertainty to maritime transport and caused tension in international relations. It was suspected that Italian submarines were responsible for these acts of aggression. Security concerns were particularly acute because some of the attacks occurred in the vicinity of Bozcaada, just off the Turkish coast.

Britain and France arranged a meeting in Nyon, Switzerland, to consider measures to deal with such attacks and invited countries with interests in the Mediterranean to attend. The meeting began on 10 September 1937 with the participation of Turkey, the USSR, Romania, and Bulgaria. Italy, Spain, Germany, and Albania were absent. Articles 2 and 3 of the agreement signed at the meeting contained the warning that any submarines in the vicinity of a merchant ship under attack would be fired upon. The Mediterranean was divided into eastern and western sectors and would be patrolled by the British and French navies.

Subsequently the parties met on 17 September in Geneva and extended the warning issued to submarines to include warships and military aircraft. Turkey was among the signatories of both documents.

İlhan Uzgel

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### Relations with the USSR

#### I. THE BACKGROUND OF RELATIONS Turkey

This was the period when the new Republican regime was getting established and social restructuring was taking place. Reconstruction in an open economic environment was tried in the years from 1923 to 1929 without success. With the advent of the global economic crisis in 1929, the country changed course to protectionist-statist industrialization in the 1930s. Protectionism was introduced in 1929, and statism came in 1932. During these years Turkey was receiving loans from Britain and Germany as well as from the USSR and was making one-half of its trade exchanges with Germany, which affected the country's foreign policy. Once Turkey's problems with Europe were settled and it had been admitted to the LoN, its relations with Europe developed rapidly.

In foreign policy, the 1920s were the years when the problems left over from Lausanne were sorted out while in the 1930s the main concern was preparing for the approaching conflict in Europe.

In the course of its political restructuring, Turkey steered clear of communism and political Islam. The wholesale arrest of Communists between 1923 and 1929 caused friction with the USSR. This was balanced by Turkey's pro–status quo policies, which found their expression in the dictum "Peace at home, peace in the world." This signified that Turkey would not be involved with Turkic communities outside Turkey, including those within the USSR. This approach helped in keeping bilateral relations on a steady course.

#### The USSR

As indicated earlier, in 1921 the USSR started losing hope that its revolution would merge with another Communist revolution in Europe. When the German uprisings were finally suppressed in 1923, the Soviet hopes were dashed for good. After these events Stalin began to build his own administration in the Soviet Union. He took control of

the party and started running the state with the help of the secret security organizations. In this he was helped by Lenin's absence from the administration after the attempt on his life in 1922 and during his long illness, leading up to his death in 1924. Stalin eliminated all opposition within the party from 1920 to 1928 and gradually established Soviet control in Central Asia. Starting in November 1923, Soviet foreign policy came under his full control.

Until the mid-1920s Soviet foreign policy was focused on gaining the recognition of other states and establishing good relations with neighbors. In 1924 the USSR was recognized by Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark in quick succession. The Soviet-German Treaty was signed on 24 April 1926 and the Litvinov Protocol in 1928.

Toward the end of the 1920s the USSR abandoned the New Economic Policy (NEP). From 1928 to 1932 it carried out the First Five-Year Plan, during which collectivization of farms was achieved and the rich landowners (the kulaks) were liquidated as a class. Through the creation of farm machinery and tractor stations, the party's control over the production process was tightened. The five-year plan inaugurated a period of fast growth that would last until 1941. The system of production was transformed, and the process of converting peasants into farm workers was accelerated. The role and importance of the bureaucracy within the state apparatus increased during this period. In February 1934 the Seventeenth Party Congress approved and adopted the Second Five-Year Plan.

On 16 September 1934 the USSR was admitted to the LoN, two years after Turkey. Membership in the LoN was of significance to the USSR. When the LoN first came into being, the Soviets had described the organization as a "gang of plunderers bound by a holy capitalist alliance to suppress the workers' revolution" (Deutscher, p. 180). The USSR had come a long way from 1917 to 1934. It entered into negotiation with European states for the purpose of concluding alliances. When these negotiations proved

fruitless, the USSR signed a treaty of nonaggression with Germany to gain time and territory.

#### II. COOPERATION (1923-1936)

# A. The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925

The first notable event in Turkey's relations with the USSR following Lausanne was the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed on 17 December 1925 in Paris by the foreign ministers, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] and G. V. Chicherin.

From Turkey's point of view, the main reason to conclude this treaty was the negative outcome of the Mosul question on 16 December 1925. While the Mosul issue remained unsettled, the outbreak of the Sheikh Said uprising in February 1925 left Turkey in a very delicate situation both domestically and externally. At a time when Turkey's relations with the Western countries remained precarious, Ankara regarded the USSR as a source of support.

There was a similar perception in Moscow. The Locarno arrangements of 1 December 1925 assured the stability of Germany's western frontiers, but no provision was made for its eastern frontiers. Moscow perceived this as an anti-Soviet move. Although Western countries were gradually recognizing the Soviet regime, they were still excluding the USSR when making arrangements among themselves. This was causing concern in Moscow.

In September 1924 the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Iakov Z. Surits, made a proposal to İsmet Paşa to conclude a treaty that would develop the 1921 treaty and guide bilateral relations. But the treaty remained unsigned because of the ongoing negotiations between the USSR and Britain and the unresolved Mosul question. After the Locarno Treaties were concluded and the Mosul question was resolved, the Turkish-Soviet Treaty was signed in Paris on 17 December 1925 and came into effect on 26 June 1926.

The treaty consisted of three articles, three protocols, and one secret letter.

Article 1: "In the event of a military attack on one of the contracting parties by a third state or several states, the other contracting power undertakes to maintain its neutrality."

Article 2: "Each contracting party undertakes to refrain from any attack on the other. Each contracting party undertakes not to participate in any alliance or political agreement directed against the other contracting party by a third state or several states; nor shall it participate in any alliance or agreement directed against the other contracting party's security from land or sea by a third state or several states. Furthermore, each contracting party undertakes not to participate in any hostile act directed against the other contracting party by a third state or several states."

Article 3: "The treaty shall become effective immediately after ratification and will remain effective for a term of 3 years. If one of the contracting parties does not give notice of its intention to terminate the treaty 6 months prior to the expiration of the term, the treaty will be automatically extended for another year."

In addition to the treaty and protocols, Commissar Chicherin handed over a letter to Tevfik Rüştü that was kept secret. The letter contained this passage: "Mr. Minister, in furtherance of the treaty signed by the two governments today, I would like to declare that the sincere friendship prevailing between the two sides since the signing of the 16 March 1921 treaty in Moscow shall continue unaltered and shall remain the basis for their relations should one of the contracting parties find itself at war with a third state or several states."

İsmail Soysal points out that the letter was a unilateral Soviet initiative and was designed to provide Turkey with some, although insufficient, assurance at a time when Turkey's relations with Britain were very strained (Soysal, p. 265).

The 1925 treaty was the first of its kind concluded by the two states. The USSR signed similar treaties with Afghanistan on 31 August 1926, Lithuania on 28 September 1926, and Iran on 1 October 1927. This treaty introduced into international practice the system of securing neutrality and nonaggression through bilateral agreements and helped in strengthening peace in the Middle East (Vandov, p. 69).

In addition, the 1925 treaty was the legal and political determinant for the bilateral relations of the two countries in subsequent years when it was extended in 1929, 1931, and 1935 and also when it was denounced in 1945.

#### B. The Trade Agreement of 1927

The USSR established its first trade office in Turkey in 1922. The status of the office as well as its Communist propaganda activities created problems between the two governments. Given that in the USSR only the state could engage in international trade, the personnel of the trade office consisted of state employees, who expected to enjoy diplomatic immunity. Furthermore, in February 1926 the USSR introduced some restrictions on the import of certain Turkish goods. In May the port of Odessa was closed to imports from Turkey. This question was the main item on the agenda of the talks between Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü when they met in Odessa in November 1926. The

negotiations led to the signature on 11 March 1927 of the Agreement on Trade and Navigation.

This agreement achieved the following results.

- 1. The status of the Soviet Trade Offices in Turkey was clarified. Henceforth the trade representatives, their assistants, and the premises would enjoy diplomatic immunity. Trade offices would be allowed in Istanbul, İzmir, Trabzon, Mersin, Erzurum, Konya, and Eskişehir. The request to open offices in Kars and Artvin was turned down.
- 2. The parties agreed to allow goods shipped to a third country to transit their country without paying customs duties. This would allow Turkish products to use the port of Batum in transit to their final destination outside the USSR.
- 3. A ceiling was placed on the annual value of Turkish products to be exported to the USSR.

The agreement failed to eliminate all contentious issues between the two countries. One of the reasons for this was the economic difficulties that Turkey was facing following the 1929 economic crisis. In this period Turkey's trade exchanges with the USSR never exceeded 6 or 7% of Turkey's total trade.

#### c. The 1929 Protocol

The 1925 treaty was extended for two years by the protocol signed in 1929. This was an important development in the relations between the two countries. Before examining the protocol, it will be useful to review the positive and negative developments affecting bilateral relations.

The most positive development was the opening of the new Soviet embassy building in Ankara on 29 April 1926, followed by the signing of a protocol relating to the demarcation of the frontier between the two states. Although the talks between Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü held in Odessa in November 1926 did not lead to a trade agreement immediately, the two men did have useful exchanges of views on LoN membership and the political situation in the Balkans. Following the talks, Chicherin wrote a letter to M. Kemal, assuring him that the USSR would take no action in the Balkans that might damage Turkish interests in that region. After these talks, Turkey declared that it would not accept membership in the LoN unless it received a permanent seat on the council. It was clear that Turkey would not be given a permanent seat, so this declaration was an indication that Turkey would not become a member of the league.

After this, and at the suggestion of the USSR, Turkey was invited to the disarmament conference of the LoN in March 1928. The two countries acted in unison in con-

nection with the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Litvinov Protocol.

The negative developments in relations can be listed as follows.

- 1. The signing in 1928 of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and Italy.
- 2. Turkey's agreement in 1928 with creditor Western countries to settle the Ottoman debts. This agreement embarrassed the Soviet Union, which adamantly refused to repay tsarist Russia's debts.
- 3. The visit of the British Mediterranean fleet to Istanbul on 12 October 1929 and the fleet commander's visit to Ankara, where he was received by M. Kemal.
  - 4. The wholesale arrest of Communists.

It was against this background that the Protocol Extending the Duration of the 1925 Treaty was signed on 17 December 1929 when deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR L. M. Karahan visited Ankara. The protocol, which came into effect on 28 July 1930, consisted of three articles and an annexed protocol that was kept secret.

Article 1: "The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded in Paris on 17 December 1925 is extended for a term of two years starting on the day of its expiration. However, if one of the Contracting Parties does not give notice of its wish to terminate the Treaty 6 months prior to the expiration of the 2-year term, the Treaty shall be automatically extended for a new term of 1 year."

Article 2: "Each party declares that it has entered into no agreement, other than those made public, with a direct neighbor, by land or sea, of the other party. Each party undertakes not to enter into any negotiation that would lead to a political agreement with states that are direct neighbors, by land or sea, of the other party without informing it and further undertakes not to enter into such agreements without the approval of the other party."

In the secret annexed protocol, the neighbors of Turkey and the USSR were listed, so as to leave no room for doubt.

The neighbors of the Republic of Turkey: Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, the British Empire, and the authority acting on behalf of Syria [meaning France];

The neighbors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Iran, Afghanistan, China, Mongolia, Japan, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the British Empire.

The 1929 protocol was seen by some as bringing Turkish foreign policy under the sway of the USSR to a very considerable extent (Soysal, p. 266), based on the need to seek prior approval before concluding an agreement with a neighbor. But it should not be forgotten that the undertaking was reciprocal. Those who held this view also emphasized that during the 1930s Turkish foreign policy was able to shift from its fixation with the USSR and start improving its relations with the Western states.

Another view is that, whereas Turkey lived up to its commitments as provided in the protocol, the USSR failed to consult Turkey when concluding a Mutual Assistance Treaty with France in 1935 or when it entered into alliance talks with Bulgaria in 1940. This view is well founded, because these states were listed among the neighbors. If the USSR had sought Turkish approval in 1935 and 1940, it would have deprived Turkey of any cause for complaint. When Turkey was signing a pact with France and Britain in October 1939, it gave prior notice to the USSR and even sought amendments in the document to secure Soviet consent.

To summarize, it can be said that the 1929 protocol was an indication of how close Turkish-Soviet relations were in the early 1930s.

#### D. Relations in the First Half $\phi$ f the 1930s

In the 1930s the relations between the two states were based on cooperation. This was in reaction to developments in the international environment. In examining Turkish-Soviet relations, some claimed that Turkish foreign policy had become subservient to the USSR through the 1929 protocol, while others considered that in the 1930s, and especially after Turkey joined the LoN in 1932, a balance had been struck in relations. Such a balance was made possible because of the rivalry between the USSR and the Western states. Turkey's problems with the West were now resolved, and the status-quo powers were seeking to block the possibility of Turkey moving toward the revisionist camp. As regards bilateral relations, they represented neither "dependency" in 1929 nor "balance" in the 1930s. The best characterization of the relations up to the mid-1930s is to describe them as based on "cooperation."

#### Protocol to Limit Naval Forces

In 1930 minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü paid a visit to the USSR, which resulted in the joint declaration of 3 October 1930. Subsequently, on 17 March 1931, Ambassador Surits and Tevfik Rüştü signed two protocols in Ankara. These were the Protocol to Limit Naval Strength in the Black Sea and Adjacent Seas and the protocol that

extended the 1925 treaty by five years. The first protocol was described as an integral part of the 1929 protocol. It provided that "[e]ach High Contracting Party shall refrain from laying the keel of any warship that would strengthen its navy in the Black Sea and adjacent seas; nor shall it place orders for the construction of such a vessel in foreign shipyards nor take any other measure that would result in raising the present-day strength of its naval forces in these seas without informing the other Contracting Party 6 months in advance."

The protocol related to navies came into effect on 22 July 1931. The protocol extending the 1925 treaty was approved on 30 October 1931 during Litvinov's visit to Turkey.

#### Prime Minister İsmet Paşa's Visit to the USSR

Prime minister İsmet Paşa visited the USSR from 25 April to 10 May 1932. During this visit he traveled to the cities of Odessa, Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov. In his talks with Soviet officials, he took up the following subjects.

- 1. Expansion of cultural cooperation.
- Cooperation in the international arena. Turkey informed the USSR about its Balkan policies and secured Soviet consent to its wish to become a member of the LoN.
- Cooperation among countries with differing political systems.
- 4. The granting of Soviet loans to Turkey. The interest-free loans would amount to \$8 million and would be repaid over twenty years with agricultural products. The factories to be built with the loans would be supported with Soviet technology and experts.

This visit is significant because Turkey persuaded the USSR regarding its membership of the LoN. It was after this visit that Turkey joined the league on 18 July 1932, reserving its position with regard to the USSR. In connection with article 16 of the Covenant regulating sanctions, Turkey notified the LoN that it would not participate in the sanctions that might be applied by third states against the USSR if the USSR was not the aggressor.

Some have expressed the view that Turkey's membership in the LoN resulted in the deterioration of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. This view can be refuted by recalling that Turkey's membership in the LoN was with the consent of the USSR, as Tevfik Rüştü himself pointed out. It should be recalled that when the USSR finally became a member in 1934 the two countries continued their cooperation within the LoN.

The visit is also significant because of the Soviet loan. As Turkey adopted the statist model for its economic development, Soviet experts made a major contribution to the preparation of Turkey's First Five-Year Industrialization Plan. The loan covered a third of the cost of the plan. The protocol for the loan and the technical assistance was signed in Ankara on 21 January 1934. With this support, the Kayseri and Nazilli textile mills were opened in 1934 and 1935. The Soviet loan also served as a precedent for the loans on favorable terms that would be extended to Turkey in the late 1930s by Britain and Germany to earn Ankara's friendship and support.

During the visit Ismet Paşa was at the Kremlin to follow the 1 May celebrations along with the Soviet leadership, a far cry from the low point reached by Turkish-Soviet relations during the Cold War.

A year later, during the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, İsmet Paşa's visit would be reciprocated by the USSR. Although not at the level of prime minister, a large Soviet delegation headed by the commissar for defense and the navy, Gen. K. Y. Voroshilov, came to Turkey to underline, once again, the support of the USSR for the new Turkish state.

In September 1934 a meeting between Stalin and Atatürk at Sochi was contemplated. This was of some significance, because Atatürk had never left the country after becoming president. It was envisaged that on the occasion of this visit the 1925 treaty would be extended for ten years. But this visit never took place. The 1925 treaty was extended through a protocol signed on 7 November 1935.

To summarize, the relations between the Turkey and the USSR states in the first half of the 1930s were on the basis of close and friendly cooperation:

- 1. Arrangements regarding navigation in the Straits: in January 1930 the USSR transferred some units of its Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea through the Straits. No prior permission was sought from the Straits Commission for this transfer. Although Romania applied to the commission to express its opposition, it was not able to obtain satisfaction.
- 2. Cooperation in the international arena and within the LoN: at the Geneva Disarmament Conference that met in February 1932, Turkey supported the USSR. Turkey became a party to the agreement on the definition of aggression signed in July 1933, and the Balkan Pact was signed after consultations with the USSR. When the negotiations were in progress in Belgrade in January 1934, the USSR asked for the inclusion of an article in the annexed protocol. This is known as the Litvinov formula. In line with this formula, Turkey signed the Balkan Pact with the following reservation: "The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs has made the following communication to

the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs: On behalf of the Republic of Turkey, I have the honor to declare that Turkey shall not participate in any action directed against the Soviet Union."

3. In the economic sphere: as indicated above, the \$8 million loan extended by the USSR to Turkey played a major role in Turkish economic development and helped in attracting similar loans from Western states.

### III. THE PARTING OF WAYS (1936–1939)

### A. The Montreux Conference

In line with changes in the international scene, Turkey started canvassing in the early 1930s to secure the revision of the regime of the Straits set up at Lausanne. The question was raised in an international platform for the first time by the minister of foreign affairs on 23 May 1933 at the Disarmament Conference meeting in London. The question was also raised in the LoN in connection with the reintroduction of conscription by Germany in April 1935 and when the issue of measures to be taken against Italy was being discussed in November 1935. Bilateral talks were also conducted with the USSR and Britain. When Voroshilov came to Ankara in 1933, one of the important agenda items was the regime of the Straits. Before the Montreux Conference the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, went to Moscow on 1 May 1936 to exchange views with Soviet officials.

On 11 April 1936 Turkey sent notes to the interested states to inform them of its wish to make changes in the regime of the Straits and invited them to attend a conference to discuss the issue.

Along with the other states, the USSR responded positively to Turkey's invitation on 16 April. The USSR was also unhappy with the regime established at Lausanne and was in favor of revisions being made. At the conference the USSR wanted the Straits to be closed to the warships of non–Black Sea states, while it called for free navigation through the Straits for warships belonging to littoral states. It also supported the Turkish request to refortify the Straits and declared its readiness to provide the necessary arms for this purpose. But this Soviet proposal was not accepted. Eventually, the Straits Convention of Montreux was signed on 22 July 1936.

After the convention was signed, the USSR proposed at the meeting of the General Assembly of the LoN in October 1936 that the USSR and Turkey enter into an alliance. At that time, the USSR's concern was over which country would carry out the fortification of the Straits.

The USSR wanted to be entrusted with the fortification job. It also wanted Turkey to undertake to prevent the passage of a force that might attack the USSR through the Black Sea. Turkey asked the USSR to make a commitment to come to Turkey's assistance in the event of an attack from the Mediterranean with forces commensurate with the level of the attacker's forces. The Soviets refused to make such a commitment and proposed that the question be negotiated in Moscow. At this point Turkey informed Britain about the Soviet proposal. Britain declared that any alliance that would go against Montreux would nullify the convention, while an alliance that complied with the terms of Montreux would be superfluous.

The USSR claimed that the negotiations had failed because of Britain's meddling. On 19 November Litvinov bluntly told ambassador Zekai Apaydın: "It looks like you are awaiting another state's approval and can say nothing in the meantime" (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, p. 141). This development strained relations. It was not just Britain's advice that was keeping Turkey from concluding an alliance with the USSR. There were also economic reasons. Turkey did not consider such a course to be in its interest without a package of economic aid. İnönü made these remarks: "At present, our economic relations depend on the German market. If these relations were to be destabilized for any reason, we would suffer grievously." Although the idea of a meeting between Atatürk and Stalin was raised once again to relieve the tension, the meeting never took place. Finally, Tevfik Rüştü Aras went to Moscow on 13 July 1937. The agenda included the expansionist policies of Germany and Italy and the situation in the Middle East. The Sadabad Pact had been signed on 8 July. The Turkish delegation was not received well in Moscow; nor was it able to get an audience with Stalin. On 16 July a joint communiqué was issued, which purported to give third states the message that bilateral cooperation was continuing. After Montreux, bilateral relations were no longer that warm.

#### B. Preparations for War

In the final years of the 1930s Turkey and the USSR, like other countries, were getting ready for the approaching war. This situation affected bilateral relations. With the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu to Moscow in September 1939, the relations between the two countries entered a new phase.

#### Turkey's Preparations

Atatürk gave a warning of the approaching conflict when he declared: "At the end of this war, the conditions of the world and existing balances will be totally transformed. The slightest error on our part could land us in troubles worse than the ones we went through during the period of the armistice [1918–23]" (Aydemir, p. 87). Turkey took the following steps to prepare for the war that seemed inevitable.

1. The first initiative was to secure the revision of the Convention of the Straits at Montreux. This allowed Turkey to ensure the safety of what it considered to be its soft underbelly.

2. In 1937 the sinking of merchant vessels in the Mediterranean by pirate submarines created concern. On 17 and 19 August two Spanish republican ships were torpedoed off the approaches of the Dardanelles. When the Turkish press reported that the ships had been sunk by Soviet submarines, relations became strained. On 10 September 1937 a conference was convened in Nyon, Switzerland, to consider the question of ensuring security in the Mediterranean. The participating countries were Britain, France, Turkey, the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The members of the Balkan Pact took an anti-USSR stand at the conference. It ended with a decision to tighten security in the Mediterranean. The idea of Turkey and the USSR jointly patrolling the northern Aegean Sea was not adopted, because it was felt that this might drag Turkey into war with Italy. Atatürk held the view that Turkey would consider it a duty to come to the assistance of Britain and France, while Prime Minister İnönü held that such a course could force Turkey into war and should be avoided. This difference was one of the reasons why İnönü was replaced by Celal Bayar as prime minister.

Turkey sought to insure itself by seeking alliances. Some of these efforts achieved results, while others came to nothing. (a) When Tevfik Rüştü Aras went to Milan in February 1937 to hold talks with Italian leaders, this led to misgivings in the USSR. (b) On 23 June 1939 the joint declaration with France was issued. (c) Following on the cooperation established with Britain at the Montreux Conference, the contract for the fortification of the Straits was awarded to that country, with the job of supervising the construction going to Germany. Britain also received the contract for the construction of the Karabük Iron and Steelworks. After the signing of the Sadabad Pact, Britain extended Turkey a loan in the amount of £3 million. A further British loan of £16 million was extended to Turkey on 27 May 1938. (d) At the end of the 1930s Germany had become Turkey's principal trading partner. In 1938 Germany's loans to Turkey amounted to 87 million TL (at the time the lira was roughly on a par with the dollar).

This sum amounted to 48% of Turkey's total foreign debt stock. On 8 October 1938 Turkey signed an agreement with Germany for a loan of 150 million marks.

4. With the settlement of the Hatay question, another problem dating from Lausanne had been resolved.

#### The USSR's Preparations

In the USSR under Stalin all opposition had been effectively silenced. In 1936 a new Constitution was adopted, which put into practice the principle of "socialism in a single country." The purges within the party were designed to impose this policy, while the purges in the army were part of the preparations for war. The generals of the Red Army who had carried out the revolution were replaced by a younger generation of energetic officers who could take charge of the battlefield in the approaching war.

After Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the USSR felt itself under threat from the East and later in the 1930s from the West and took appropriate steps to deal with these threats.

- 1. In 1934 the USSR obtained membership in the LoN.
- 2. At Montreux in 1936 and later at bilateral talks, it sought to revise the security arrangements in the Straits to its advantage. Moscow considered this important to strengthen the security of its southern flank.
- 3. In preparation for war, the USSR reduced the number of its foreign trade offices and consulates. In this context, the Soviets closed their consulates in İzmir and Kars, while Turkey closed its consulates in Odessa, Baku, Yerevan, and Leninakan. The Soviet Union maintained its consulate in İstanbul, while Turkey kept its consulate in Batum.
- 4. Another sign of change in Soviet foreign policy was the replacement of Litvinov, who was Jewish, with V. M. Molotov. This was done to give satisfaction to Germany.
- 5. On 23 August 1939 the USSR signed a Nonaggression Pact with Germany. Soviet attempts to establish cooperation with the Western countries proved fruitless, and through this pact Moscow sought to preempt the Western policy of inciting Germany's fascism to attack the USSR. At the same time, it reached an agreement with Germany for the partition of Poland, thus gaining space and time in case of conflict. The pact also served to alleviate the pressures arising from the feeling of being hemmed in on two fronts.

#### The Saracoğlu Mission

As World War II got underway, the last high-level contact between Turkey and the USSR occurred during the visit of minister of foreign affairs Şükrü Saracoğlu to Moscow. Saracoğlu arrived in Moscow on 25 September and stayed on for twenty-three days. He held four meetings with his Soviet counterpart, at which the treaty initialed by Turkey, Britain, and France, the Soviet-German rapprochement, and the status of the Straits were discussed at length. The meetings ended with no agreement.

As a result, the initiative undertaken on 15 April 1939 aimed at concluding a Mutual Assistance Pact between Turkey and the Soviet Union ended in failure on 16 October.

This failure did not upset the USSR. Turkey was able to maintain its nonbelligerent status and, according to the Montreux Straits Convention, could exclude the warships of belligerent states when it was not at war.

In 1919 Moscow and Ankara found themselves confronted by a common foe in the form of Western imperialism. These circumstances resulted in a perception of shared destiny, which led the way to cooperation from 1923 on. Starting in 1936, the preparations for war changed the foreign policy priorities of the two countries. Relations deteriorated rapidly after the war.

At this point, it should be emphasized that the deterioration of relations cannot be attributed exclusively to the Soviet demand for bases in the Straits. The USSR had already proposed at Montreux in 1936 a separate arrangement between the two states and in 1939 openly asked for revisions in the Montreux Convention. As will be seen below, the demands of 1945 should be considered a repeat of the 1936 and 1939 demands, but in completely transformed circumstances when the Soviet Union had emerged victorious from the war and held sway over Eastern Europe. The USSR was also acting in line with wartime decisions taken at Yalta with Britain and the U.S. The Soviet demands, coming at a time when the Cold War was in its initial stages, had an extremely negative effect on bilateral relations.

EREL TELLAL

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### Relations with Greece

#### I. RELATIONS AT THE LAUSANNE PEACE CONFERENCE

Shortly after the Turkish army retook İzmir, the Allies met in Paris on 21-22 September 1922 and reappraised the situation. On 23 September a joint note was sent to Mustafa Kemal, in which they proposed a conference to be convened in Venice to discuss the conditions for peace between Turkey on the one hand and the Allies and Greece on the other. The Ankara government had İzmir in mind as the venue for such a conference. The change of government in Britain accelerated the peace process. Prime minister Lloyd George, who had given his unconditional support to Greece during the Anatolian war, resigned and was replaced by Bonar Law. The new foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, was eager to get the peace conference in motion without any delay to satisfy the British public's yearning for peace. As soon as the Mudanya Armistice was signed on 27 October 1922, Britain, France, and Italy handed the Istanbul representative of the TGNA a note verbale, proposing the convening of a peace conference in Lausanne on 13 November.

The proposal was conveyed to the Istanbul government as well. Ankara was as much in need of peace as the Allies were and accepted the offer on 30 September, suggesting Izmir as a venue for ease of communications.

- A. Turkey and Greece on the Eve of Lausanne In the brief consisting of fourteen articles given to the Ankara delegation leaving for Lausanne, the following articles dealt with Greece.
- 1. The islands: the delegation will adopt a position depending on how the negotiations develop. Islands in close proximity to the Turkish coast shall be claimed; and if the claim meets opposition, instructions will be sought from Ankara (paragraph 4).
- 2. The Thracian frontier: the delegation shall strive to obtain the 1914 frontier (paragraph 5).

- 3. Western Thrace: reference shall be made to the National Pact (paragraph 6).
- 4. Minorities: the aim shall be the exchange of minorities (paragraph 9).
- 5. Ottoman debts: debts are to be shared out among the states breaking away from the Ottoman Empire, with reparations to be received from Greece to be set aside for the payment of annuities. If this cannot be obtained, a grace period of twenty years shall be sought (paragraph 10).

On the eve of Lausanne, the political situation in Athens was very different from the situation prevailing in Ankara. As the Greek army evacuated Anatolia, about a million Anatolian Greeks had fled to Greece. This amounted to roughly one-fourth of Greece's population at the time, and there was no strong government to cope with the economic and social turmoil caused by an influx of this magnitude. The Greek military units that sought refuge in the islands of Chios and Lesbos after the disaster of Asia Minor (Mikrasiatiki Katastrofi) had mutinied on 10-23 September under the leadership of a revolutionary committee. The declaration of the revolutionary committee bearing the signature of Stylianos Gonatas reached Athens on 26 September. The declaration called for the abdication of the king and the dissolution of the parliament. King Constantine abdicated in favor of his son on that day, and parliament was dissolved. The revolutionary committee had effectively seized power. After King Constantine left the country on 30 September, a group of sympathizers of Elefterios Venizelos intent on getting rid of monarchist opponents started legal proceedings against those allegedly responsible for the defeat in Anatolia. On 28 November six politicians and officers were found guilty of treason and condemned to death, while another two officers received life sentences. The political scene in Athens had been temporarily purged of monarchists, but the division of Greek society into two camps consisting of

monarchists and supporters of Venizelos would continue to destabilize the country for many years.

The revolutionary officers acting on behalf of Venizelos suppressed the opposition and allowed him to take charge of the country's foreign policy. The revolutionary committee sent a cable to Venizelos, who was living in Paris at the time, and asked him to take charge of the Greek delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Venizelos was to represent Greece at Lausanne, along with Dimitrios Kaklamanos. Unlike other delegates, Venizelos had been empowered to discuss and sign any document at his discretion on behalf of Greece. A weak government was thus represented by a strong delegate empowered to 'decide on questions bearing on Greece's future. Having signed the Lausanne documents as the sole authority for Greece, Venizelos was to remain loyal to its spirit and become the architect of the Turkish-Greek rapprochement of the 1930s during his term as prime minister.

### B. The Basic Questions at Lausanne and Their Settlement

The Lausanne Peace Conference was inaugurated on 20 November 1922. The Turkish-Greek questions considered at the conference can be grouped under three basic headings: (1) territorial questions and frontiers; (2) humanitarian questions; and (3) financial questions and reparations.

#### 1. Territorial Questions and Frontiers

The territorial questions and frontiers between Turkey and Greece were taken up in the first committee under two parts: Thrace and the northern Aegean islands.

#### The Frontier in Thrace

When the committee took up the frontier in Thrace at its meeting of 22 November, İsmet Paşa presented Turkey's position regarding Eastern and Western Thrace in two parts.

- (a) The frontier of Eastern Thrace from the Black Sea to the mouth of the Meriç River on the Aegean Sea shall be the line drawn at the İstanbul Treaty of 1913 between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire following the Balkan Wars. Consequently, the portion of the İstanbul-Edirne railroad west of the Meriç River consisting of the Kuleliburgaz–Mustafa Paşa section and Karaağaç must remain in Turkey.
- (b) A plebiscite should be held in Western Thrace to determine its future.

Venizelos, with the support of the Allies, put forward the Greek position on these issues.

- (a) The frontier between Greece and Turkey in Thrace shall be the Meriç River.
  - (b) Turkey can have no claim on Western Thrace.

Turkey understood at the outset of the Lausanne Conference that it would not be possible for the Allies to agree to Turkey's views on Western Thrace, which had been lost in 1913. Hence Turkey agreed to the frontier being drawn along the course of the Meriç River, on condition that the frontier region be demilitarized.

Article 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne provided that the frontier between Turkey and Greece would be the course of the Meric River. The convention respecting the Thracian frontier signed at Lausanne stipulated that Turkey's frontiers with Bulgaria and Greece would be demilitarized on both sides of the frontier up to a depth of thirty kilometers. As we shall see below, this arrangement was invalidated in 1938.

#### Islands of the Northern Aegean Sea

Turkey maintained that the islands were bound to Anatolia and were important from the point of view of Anatolia's security and stability. The islands were divided into two categories by the Turkish delegation.

- (a) Those islands within the territorial waters of Turkey should be under Turkish sovereignty as a matter of legal imperative in addition to considerations of geography and security.
  - (b) As regards the larger islands:
- (i) İmroz (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) were left under Turkish sovereignty by the joint note of the major powers dated 14 February 1914. Consequently, there was no need to discuss the status of these islands.
- (ii) Semadirek (Samothrace) should, by right, stay under Turkish sovereignty because of its proximity to the Turkish coast and to the entrance of the Dardanelles.
- (iii) Although the major powers had awarded Limni (Lemnos), Midilli (Lesbos), Sakız (Chios), Sisam (Samos), and Nikarya (Nicaria) to Greece, Turkey could not accept this decision.

Turkey recalled that recent events had proven that a Greece driven by imperialist ambitions could use the islands to threaten Anatolia. Turkey held the view that to ensure peace it was essential that these islands be demilitarized and that their sovereignty not pass to Greece. Instead the islands of the northern Aegean Sea should be made a neutral and independent entity.

In the Greek view, the islands that had been under Greek sovereignty for some time should not be in the same category as the islands whose fate had not been decided by a treaty. Greece held that Turkish sovereignty over these islands, including Imroz and Bozcaada, could not be maintained on the following grounds.

- (a) Most of these islands have populations that are almost exclusively Greek.
- (b) In the last military operation Greece dispatched its troops to İzmir directly from the Greek mainland and did not use the islands as a stepping stone. Consequently, Greek possession of these islands would constitute no direct threat to Anatolia.

Speaking on behalf of the Allies, Lord Curzon replied to Turkey by pointing out that the Cretan precedent showed that autonomy for the islands was not the solution. He proposed that the status of İmroz, Bozcaada, and Samothrace be discussed in conjunction with the question of the Straits and that the question of the demilitarization of the remaining islands be referred to military experts.

At the meeting held on 29 November, the conference considered the report of the military experts. The report included Lemnos among the islands controlling the approaches of the Dardanelles and called for its status to be determined in conjunction with the status of the Straits. The proposal of the military committee to demilitarize the northern Aegean islands was approved.

Articles 12–14 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne made the following provisions for the northern Aegean islands. Article 12:

The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th—30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st—14th November 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15.

Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.

As a consequence of this article, Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nicaria and the

lesser islands of the eastern Mediterranean are awarded to Greece. Although the article's language is not very clear, the six islands awarded to Greece are demilitarized by virtue of the provisions of the treaties mentioned in the article. Lemnos and Samothrace are also explicitly demilitarized by virtue of article 4 of the Convention of the Straits.

Article 13 makes a concession to Turkey by explicitly demilitarizing those islands situated in close proximity to the Anatolian coast (Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria). This article stipulates:

- (1) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.
- (2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.
- (3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.

As article 13 makes a concession to Turkey, so article 14 does the same for Greece. "The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of person and property. The maintenance of order will be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders." This article not only exempts the local population from the exchange of populations but, in addition to the exemption enjoyed by the other "established" (établi) persons under the exchange of populations convention of 30 January 1923, provides them with the right to set up their own special administration. İmroz and Bozcaada, along with Lemnos and Samothrace, were demilitarized under article 4 of the Lausanne Straits Convention. This restriction would come to an end for İmroz and Bozcaada in the 1936 Montreux Straits Convention. Greece claimed that this also applied to the demilitarization of Lemnos and Samothrace.

In the course of the deliberations, a proposal was made to appoint an LoN official to oversee the implementation of article 14, but Turkey rejected this proposal.

The local administration foreseen for the islands never materialized.

#### 2. Humanitarian Questions

The humanitarian questions between Turkey and Greece at Lausanne were related to the exchange of populations and the patriarchate.

#### a. The Exchange of Populations

The Turkish delegation went to Lausanne with the intention of securing the acceptance of the Turkish nation-state by the international community. It had binding instructions to conduct its negotiations with the objective of obtaining an exchange of populations that would involve the Orthodox Greeks of Turkey and the Muslims of Greece.

During the retreat of the Greek armed forces from Anatolia and Thrace, around 1 million ethnic Greeks had already migrated to Greece; but there still remained an important Greek presence in İstanbul, then under Allied control. The Turkish delegation wanted to involve as many people as possible in the exchange in order to prevent a recurrence of the foreign meddling that went on throughout the nineteenth century and also because a homogeneous population was considered essential for a nation-state. Greece was under the heavy burden of serious economic and social problems, however, as it struggled to cope with a million displaced persons. Therefore Greece sought to restrict the exchange, to avoid having to cope with the extra economic, social, and political burdens that would be imposed on it by a new wave of mostly better-off people from the Greek bourgeoisie of Istanbul. It also wanted to avoid having to abandon for good a city that over the centuries had been regarded as the ideological and cultural center of Hellenism.

The Turkish delegation was uneasy about the possible reaction of the Allies to its wish to see an all-inclusive exchange, but the question was raised unexpectedly by the Allies themselves at the meeting of the first committee held on 1 December 1922, when the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war was being discussed. At that meeting Lord Curzon invited Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the LoN's expert on refugee questions in the Middle East, to take the floor. Dr. Nansen started by depicting the difficult conditions of the refugees and recommended that a solution be found through an agreement between the two countries to relieve the burden on their economies. He explained that once the legal situation of these people had been clarified, they could be resettled quickly. This was essential for them to be able to sow their fields so that they could become productive and self-sufficient by the following year. He concluded by noting that his contacts with the two governments had revealed that both were in favor of an exchange of populations.

Dr. Nansen's views came as a surprise to the Turkish delegates, who were delighted with his recommendations. The Turks had come with strict instructions and were uneasy about how the Allies would react to their stance. When they heard the Allied position as expressed by Dr. Nansen, Rıza Nur exclaimed: "This is a godsend!" After Dr. Nansen, İsmet Paşa took the floor and demanded that the exchange be compulsory and include all of the ethnic Greeks, including those of İzmir and İstanbul. The goal, though it went unmentioned, was to create an independent, homogeneous Turkish nation-state that could engage in active nation building. The biggest impediment to achieving this objective was the presence of the ethnic Greeks, the largest Christian community in the country. If the objective of drastically reducing their numbers could be achieved, the justification—or pretext—for interfering in the country's internal affairs would be removed, and Greek irredentists would be blocked from carrying out their designs.

Venizelos agreed to the question being considered by a subcommittee. His position was that the exchange should be on a voluntary basis and should exclude the Greeks of Istanbul. As a matter of fact, Greece needed such an exchange as much as Turkey did. It had been forced to admit 1 million refugees and needed empty land to resettle these people. After the exchange, there would be enough homes and farms vacated by the departing ethnic Turks to allow relatively painless resettlement. His reasons for insisting on the exchange being carried out on a voluntary basis and not including İstanbul's Greeks were obvious. (a) A new wave of refugees would pose additional problems for the Greek economy. Venizelos indicated that Greece could not bear the additional burden and would be forced to ask the U.S. to increase the immigration quota for Greece. This was a veiled threat directed at the U.S. (b) It would be a tremendous disappointment to the Greek nation, nurtured for years with the dreams of the Megali Idea, to see the Greeks of İstanbul departing from their ancestral homes. (c) If Istanbul lost its ethnic Greek population, the patriarchate would be left without its flock; this would force it to move, creating all sorts of conflicts with the national Greek Orthodox Church.

Speaking on behalf of the Allies, Lord Curzon declared that the only way to end the question of minorities in the Near East was to accept the principle of compulsory exchange of populations but that further consideration of the special circumstances of the Muslims of Western

Thrace and the ethnic Greeks of İstanbul would be necessary. He added that the commerce of the Western countries would be seriously disrupted if the İstanbul Greeks were forced to leave, which would also have negative effects on Turkey's economy.

Eventually it was decided to establish a subcommittee to consider the exchange of interned civilians and prisoners of war as well as the exchange of populations. As a result of the deliberations at the subcommittee, agreements were reached on both questions. The documents were signed on 30 January 1923, six months before the Lausanne Treaty itself was signed.

# The Agreement between Greece and Turkey respecting the Reciprocal Restitution of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Prisoners of War

During the deliberations at the subcommittee the Turkish delegation declared that the Greek army carried away 4,000 civilian Turks as it retreated from Anatolia, whereas the Turkish side had no civilian Greeks under detention. The Turkish delegation wanted these civilians to be released and repatriated right away. Turkey's delegation asked for the immediate return by Greece of all Turkish prisoners of war. It added that Greek prisoners of war held by Turkey might be repatriated before the conclusion of a peace treaty, provided Greece demonstrated its goodwill. The Greek side's main objection was to Turkey's claim that it held no Greek civilian detainees. Greece alleged that Turkey was holding civilian Greek citizens in the interior of Anatolia.

After long discussions an understanding was reached, and the Agreement between Greece and Turkey Respecting the Reciprocal Restitution of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Prisoners of War was signed. To contribute to the spirit of reconciliation, both governments undertook to declare an amnesty for all civilians and prisoners of war in their custody without regard to any crime they might have committed.

#### The Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations

The question of the exchange of populations was the subject of protracted negotiations in the subcommittee. There were three principal contentious issues relating to the following questions: (1) Will the exchange be compulsory or voluntary? (2) Which groups will it include? (3) What are the outer limits of the city of Istanbul?

Turkey wanted the exchange to be on a compulsory basis, while Greece favored a voluntary exchange. The principle of a compulsory exchange was adopted when the Allies, and in particular Lord Curzon, gave their support to this option.

The second question was who would be included in the exchange. The Turkish delegation wanted it to include all of the Muslims in Greece except the Muslims of Western Thrace, plus all the ethnic Greeks residing in Turkey, including those in Istanbul. The Turks pointed out that it would not be possible to resettle the Muslims coming from Greece unless the Istanbul Greeks were included in the exchange.

The Greek delegation noted that it would not be economically or socially feasible for Greece to accommodate the Greeks from Istanbul because it had already received close to a million refugees, so it wanted this group exempted from the exchange. The Allies also wanted to exempt the ethnic Greeks of Istanbul, with whom they had direct commercial links. After some tough negotiations, the Turkish delegation agreed that the Greek inhabitants of Istanbul would not be included in the exchange but set the following conditions:

- 1. All ethnic Greeks who are not Turkish nationals or those who are but were not born in İstanbul are to be included in the exchange.
- 2. Members of Greek associations and organizations that displayed hostility to Turkey over the last three years are to leave for Greece.
- 3. The privileges to be granted to the İstanbul Greeks will be applicable only to the Greeks of the Beyoğlu, inner İstanbul, and Üsküdar districts.
- 4. The Ecumenical Patriarchate is to be removed from İstanbul, with all of its councils and subsidiary organs.

During the negotiations at the subcommittee Greece accepted the second condition, and Turkey did not insist on the other conditions except the last one. As a result, the Greeks of Istanbul who had Greek nationality were also not included in the exchange. Agreement was reached in the subcommittee on all the questions except the one relating to the fate of the patriarchate, which was referred to the first committee. This question is examined below.

On the question of the limits of the city of Istanbul, Turkey wanted a restrictive approach and proposed Erenköy (a suburb of Istanbul) as the limit, while Greece wanted to extend the limits all the way to Izmit. Eventually the limits set by the Municipality Law of 1912 were accepted as a compromise.

Because of the pressing nature of this question, the Convention and Protocol concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed on 30 January 1923 without waiting for the negotiations on the peace treaty to be concluded.

Article 1 of the convention reads as follows:

As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.

These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.

Article 2 contains the exceptions to the rule established in article 1:

The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1:

- a) The Greek inhabitants of İstanbul.
- b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

Article 2 also describes the Greek inhabitants of İstanbul (the established [établi]) and the Muslims of Western Thrace:

All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of İstanbul, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of İstanbul.

All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

By this arrangement, a balance was being struck between Turkey and Greece with respect to minorities.

The convention provided in article 5 that the rights of property and monetary assets of the people who would be subject to the exchange would not be prejudiced. Article 8 provided that the emigrants were free to take with them all of their private movable property as well as the movable property belonging to their communities without paying any export or import duty or any tax. Articles 9 to 14 made the following provisions with regard to property left behind. Movable property left behind, as well as immovable property, would be evaluated and liquidated by a Mixed Commission. The proceeds of the sale would, in principle, be owed by the government of the country where the property was located to the government of the

country that received the emigrants, and the emigrant would receive property corresponding to the property left behind when migrating. Should one of the governments remain with outstanding debts after the final liquidation of all the properties, this debt would be settled in cash. Should the debtor government make a request for a post-ponement, provision was made for this to be granted under certain conditions.

According to article 1 of the convention, the criterion for the exchange of populations was the religion of the individual. In this arrangement, Catholic and Protestant Greeks were exempted from the exchange while the Turkish-speaking Orthodox people of central Anatolia (the Karamanlı) were forced to relocate. There were no religious qualifications for the Greeks of İstanbul, so all the established Greeks, whatever their religion or nationality, were allowed to stay. The Turks agreed to this under pressure from the Allies, who wanted to see a maximum number of Greeks remaining in İstanbul.

Turkish nationalists wanted a nation-state consisting exclusively of Muslims and accepted the İstanbul Greeks as the exception. In this sense, it accepted as its criterion the Ottoman "millet system." Greece was striving to convey the impression to its people that its links with the center of the Megali Idea remained, by securing the exemption of the largest possible number of Istanbul Greeks from the exchange of populations. The minorities that remained in both countries found their numbers drastically reduced. Their rights would be guaranteed by articles 37 to 45 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne.

The implementation of the exchange convention was not as easy as establishing its rules. As we shall see, it was a harrowing experience for many of those involved in the exchange. It created many economic and social problems in both countries. But most of all its implementation created misunderstandings, leading to serious political questions and tensions between Turkey and Greece. The question had to be referred through the LoN to the Permanent Court of International Justice and was finally settled only in 1930 through a treaty concluded by the two states (Box 2-9).

#### b. The Question of the Patriarchate

On its way to Lausanne the Ankara delegation had received no directive whatsoever concerning the patriarchate. The question of the patriarchate was introduced by the Turkish delegate Dr. Rıza Nur at the subcommittee on exchange of populations on 16 December. In a written statement he expressed the Turkish view that the patriarchate had to leave Turkey. This was a necessity for

### Box 2-9. Different Types of International Agreement

In international practice, documents reflecting an accord between two or more states are given different names. The name does not affect the binding character of the document, however. Although a hierarchy exists between a treaty and the implementation agreements or protocols relating to that treaty, there is no hierarchy among the other types of documents.

The most frequently used form is a treaty. A treaty reflects an accord of wills and denotes a document that requires ratification from the point of view of domestic legislation. An agreement is a relatively less important document that requires fewer official formalities. Although international organizations can also conclude treaties, it is usual to refer to their accords as agreements. A convention is an important multilateral document that establishes rules. A charter is a multilateral treaty that relates to basic rules of international relations, the basic document of an international organization, an international document that is not legally binding, or a document that lays down the basic principles of an idea. A protocol is an agreement of limited scope that supplements a treaty, while a final act is the document that emanates from a congress or a conference. A statute is a document that determines the working rules and conditions of an international organ. Treaties that establish military organizations or are military in nature are referred to as pacts. A document that refers a dispute to the International Court of Justice is a special agreement or compromis.

(F. KESKIN)

Turkey, but it would also be a relief for the members of the minority community. By separating the caliphate and the state and establishing a democratic order, the Turkish government had also put an end to the privileges of the non-Muslim communities that the Ottoman Empire had recognized. From now on, the relations between the state and the charitable, educational, and social institutions of the minorities would be conducted directly, without intermediaries. Clerics, including the person at the top of the hierarchy, must henceforth confine their activities to spiritual matters. The patriarchate, which had always been a political institution, would no longer enjoy political privileges. Since all the institutions that had formerly been organically linked to the patriarchate had ceased to exist, the patriarchate had lost its raison d'être.

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These views, as expounded by Riza Nur, met with sharp objections from the Allies, who stressed the universal character of the patriarchate and its importance to Christendom. France proposed that the patriarchate remain in Istanbul on condition that it sever all administrative and political links with the other autocephalous Orthodox churches as well as with the future Istanbul church, that the patriarch be selected from among candidates approved by the Turkish government and that in

his capacity as the leader of the Orthodox his authority be confined to spiritual matters, and finally that the Turkish government supervise his activities to make sure that they were indeed confined to spiritual matters. The French proposal was rejected by Greece.

Riza Nur had introduced the subject of the patriarchate as a negotiating tactic and, as he wrote in his memoirs, felt that it would be better if this institution was under the control of the Turkish government. The Turkish delegation was under strong pressure to accept the principle that members of minorities be exempt from military service. and the Turkish delegation took advantage of the issue of the patriarchate to gain room for maneuver. The question of removing a venerable and historic institution like the patriarchate from İstanbul created consternation among Christians around the world. Lord Curzon's assistant, Harold Nicholson, approached Rıza Nur and asked him not to press this issue. Riza Nur responded by pointing out that he would have to offer Ankara something tangible for allowing the patriarchate to remain in Istanbul. In the course of these negotiations Nicholson indicated that Lord Curzon would not insist on exemption from military service for members of minorities. In this way the fate of the patriarchate was settled in informal consultations before the first committee met on 10 January. The patriarchate would be able to remain in Istanbul as a strictly spiritual institution, stripped of all its political rights and responsibilities.

When the question of the patriarchate was taken up at the first committee, Lord Curzon declared that the removal of the patriarchate from Istanbul would deeply wound the civilized world and repeated the proposal to keep the institution at its historic seat as a strictly religious entity devoid of its political character and without its administrative responsibilities. Venizelos supported Lord Curzon's proposal and declared that Greece was ready to facilitate the early retirement of the incumbent. İsmet Paşa then indicated Turkey's readiness to take back its proposal to evict the patriarchate from Istanbul on the understanding that it would conform to the conditions and limitations agreed upon at the negotiations. The patriarchate would remain in Istanbul as an exclusively religious institution. İsmet Paşa's declaration regarding the future of the patriarchate was considered sufficient, and no formal provisions were inserted in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne. The status of the institution would be regulated by Turkish domestic law.

At the time of the ratification of the peace treaty in the TGNA, deputies expressed their displeasure that the patriarchate had been allowed to remain in İstanbul. They criticized the lack of provisions in the treaty regarding the patriarchate on the grounds that this would make it difficult to take appropriate measures if patriarchs got involved in political activities once again. In his reply to this criticism, Riza Nur explained that a patriarchate relocated at Mount Athos would be constantly engaged in anti-Turkish activities, whereas an institution in Istanbul, stripped of all of its temporal powers, would be under the full control of Turkey. But the question of the patriarchate would not end at Lausanne. As we shall see below, it would continue to be a source of tension in Turkish-Greek relations until 1925.

#### Financial Questions (The Question of Reparation)

The question of reparation came up at the second stage of the Lausanne Conference. The Allies and Greece proposed a mutual renunciation of all reparation claims by the two countries. The Turkish reply to this proposal was that Turkey owed Greece no reparation because it had not inflicted any damage to that country, whereas Greece had devastated parts of Anatolia and had to pay compensation. Turkey proposed that the two countries try to settle this question in direct negotiations and that the matter be referred to arbitration if they failed to reach an agreement. Turkey knew that the state of the Greek economy did not allow for reparation payments, and it did not want the conclusion of a peace treaty held up because of this. In the course of the negotiations Turkey indicated its willingness to give up all claims for compensation in return for Karaağaç, a territory that had been awarded to Greece. The railroad linking Turkey to Europe passed through this territory. Given the dire state of its economy, Greece readily accepted this proposal, and the question of reparation was settled on these terms.

Article 59 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne declares that "Greece recognizes her obligation to make reparation for the damage caused in Anatolia by the acts of the Greek army or administration which were contrary to the laws of war. On the other hand, Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and from its consequences, finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek Government."

Instrument number 15, signed on the same day as the peace treaty, provided for the return of the territory of Karaağaç to Turkey. This instrument was the "Protocol relating to the Karagatch territory and to the islands of Imbros and Tenedos signed by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Turkey on the 24th July, 1923."

Although the fundamental questions between Tur-

key and Greece were settled at Lausanne, this did not signify that problems between the two countries disappeared for good. The implementation of the agreements reached at Lausanne was creating new disputes between the two countries struggling with postwar political, economic, and social questions and was preventing a climate of friendship and trust from replacing the hostility that had reigned between them for years. It would take until 1930 to resolve all the problems and establish relations based on friendship between the two states.

### II. THE PERIOD OF TENSION (1923–1928)

The Peace Treaty of Lausanne heralded a new era in Turkish-Greek relations. Turkey had won the right to independence and to establish its nation-state by force of arms, and this right was now being recognized by the international community and confirmed by international law. In a sense, Lausanne was the founding charter of the new state. For Greece, the migration of the ethnic Greeks from Anatolia signaled the end of the Megali Idea as an objective of foreign policy. After this, both nations would engage in efforts to restore their economic and social lives after long years of war and seek to achieve political stability.

#### A. Turkey and Greece in the 1920s

In the 1920s Turkey carried out political and social reforms while seeking to develop economically by creating a national bourgeoisie. This process started with the establishment of the Republic. The impoverished population was quick to oppose this process, and this opposition found its expression in the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Fırkası). The Sheikh Said uprising soon after the establishment of an opposition party forced Ankara to resort to repressive measures.

The efforts to create a national bourgeoisie increased the pressure on the non-Muslims who controlled most of the commerce in Istanbul. These pressures were felt especially by the ethnic Greeks. Law No. 788 (dated 18 March 1926), regulating the conditions for public service, decreed that "only Turks" could be employed as public servants without specifying citizenship. This provision was later amended by article 48 of Law No. 657 (dated 14 July 1965), currently in force, which declared that "only Turkish citizens" could be employed in the civil service. Law No. 788 not only closed the civil service to non-Muslims but also made it more difficult for ethnic Greek lawyers, doctors, and so forth to exercise their professions or to become members of professional associations (Alexandris 1983,

pp. 105–12 and 131–35). Furthermore, while Turkish firms were supported with loans on easy terms, firms owned by ethnic Greeks were confronted with bureaucratic obstacles. These firms were compelled to hire Muslim employees. Law No. 805 (dated 22 April 1926) regarding the use of the Turkish language by commercial institutions required all firms to conduct their transactions and correspondence within Turkey in Turkish as well as keep their books in Turkish. The process of Turkification reached its peak with Law No. 2007 (dated 11 June 1932): the "Law reserving certain trades and services in Turkey to Turkish citizens." This law allowed only Turkish nationals to practice certain trades (such as salespersons, veterinarians, and many others). During this period the schools, associations, and libraries of ethnic Greeks were subjected to strict controls. These pressures were supplemented with popular campaigns exhorting everyone to speak Turkish. Article 14 of the Lausanne Treaty relating to Gökçeada and Bozcaada (Imbros and Tenedos) was never implemented. Furthermore, in 1927 Law No. 1151 was enacted, preventing the ethnic Greek inhabitants of these islands from being educated in their native language.

During this period Greece suffered from even worse problems and instability. About 1.2 million ethnic Greeks had migrated from Anatolia, including about 1 million who fled with the retreating Greek army. In his book İngiliz Belgeleri İle Sakarya'dan İzmir'e 1921–22 (From Sakarya to Izmir in British Documents 1921–22), Bilal Şimşir (1989, p. 381) estimates the number of Greeks fleeing with the Greek army at less than 500,000, of which 150,000 were Greeks who had moved to Anatolia from Greece and Russia after 1919. The generally held view, however, is that the number of people who left with the retreating Greek army approached 1 million. In any case, the arrival of 1.2 million migrants from Anatolia and the exodus of 400,000 Muslim farmers to Turkey created all kinds of short-term economic and social problems, including unemployment, a drop in agricultural production, and the spread of malaria and other contagious diseases as well as the difficulties of integrating 50,000 Turkish-speaking Orthodox newcomers. These problems also led to increased crime and the spread of mafia-type crime organizations. The negative short-term effects of the movement of populations brought political instability that was to last until 1928. But the long-term effects were highly positive: development of handicrafts (including rug weaving), introduction of new crops and farming methods, and-because those arriving from Anatolia were more bourgeois than the local Greeks-enrichment of the cultural life of cities and development of commerce. Unions and leftist movements also developed.

The struggle between the military and civilians as well as between monarchists and republicans led to weak governments until 1928. Coups and counter-coups succeeded one another, leading to repeated changes in the regime. When the monarchists boycotted the balloting in the election of 16 December 1923, republicans from different parties obtained a majority in parliament. A coup by monarchists was forestalled, and the king was sent into exile. In January Venizelos formed a government with the support of Gen. Theodoros Pangalos, but the strong opposition of Panagis Tsaldaris forced him to resign, ostensibly for health reasons, after which he left for France. This ushered in the period of governments with military backing. A Republic was proclaimed on 25 March 1924 with the support of the army. When the new regime failed to end domestic turmoil, Pangalos carried out a coup in 1926. The Pangalos regime failed to deal effectively with the country's political and economic problems. It was also repressive and collapsed seven months after coming to power. The election that took place that year ushered in a period of coalition governments. The political instability lasted until 1928, when Venizelos returned home and took power. The governments of the day were lacking in popular support and therefore weak. They were engaged in sterile bickering and incapable of coping with the economic and social problems. Nor were they capable of handling the country's pressing foreign policy questions. The thorny issues in Turkish-Greek relations that came up at this juncture would be settled by the strong government of Venizelos.

The economic and political turmoil of the 1920s also affected the Muslim population of Western Thrace. At the end of the war the ethnic Greeks of Eastern Thrace abandoned their homes and moved across the border to Western Thrace, where, with the support of the Greek government, they took possession of the homes, farms, and livestock of the local Muslims. The rights granted by the Treaty of Lausanne remained on paper. The Muslims of Western Thrace were being forced to give up their properties and migrate to Turkey. Although their status of being established in Western Thrace exempted them from the compulsory exchange of populations, the number of Muslims in Western Thrace significantly diminished immediately after Lausanne. The Greek law regarding the election of muftis and grand muftis (which had been enacted in 1920 in conformity with the 1913 Athens Agreement) went unimplemented, and the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace were prevented from electing their religious leaders.

The internal problems of Turkey and Greece in the 1920s and the continuous disputes between the two

countries led them to pursue illiberal policies toward their respective minorities. The minorities would not feel relatively comfortable until the 1930s, when bilateral problems would finally be resolved.

### B. The Aftermath of Lausanne

# 1. The Question of the Established (Établi)

In accordance with the Convention and Protocol concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed at Lausanne on 30 January 1923, the Orthodox Greek citizens in Turkey and the Muslim citizens in Greece were to be exchanged. The convention stipulated that the Greeks of İstanbul and the Muslims of Western \*Thrace would be considered established and therefore exempt from the exchange. The Mixed Commission foreseen in the convention to carry out the exchange started functioning in October 1923. The exchange was carried out with many difficulties and completed in 1927. Although several problems arose, the most serious was the question of which of the ethnic Greeks of İstanbul would be considered established. As noted earlier, article 2 of the convention provided that "[a]ll Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of İstanbul, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of İstanbul."

Once the exchange got underway, it became apparent that Turkey and Greece interpreted this article in different ways. Turkey believed that only Greeks who could prove with official Turkish documents that they had settled in Istanbul prior to 1918 could be considered established, whereas Greece held that the article must be interpreted according to the spirit and intent of the treaty. In other words, those Greeks who had come to Istanbul with the intention of settling there should be considered established without having to seek any justification based on a law.

Although the dispute appeared to be based on legal considerations, the disagreement had economic and social roots. Turkey wanted to send as many Orthodox Greeks as possible to Greece and thereby establish a homogeneous nation-state. This would also facilitate the settlement of the Muslims coming from Greece in the properties left behind by the evacuees. Greece, however, wanted as many Greeks as possible to remain in Istanbul in order to reduce the number of migrants it had to accommodate. It also wanted to preserve its links with Istanbul, especially in the field of commerce, and to soften the impact of having to give up the Megali Idea. There were about 4,500 Greeks in Istanbul who were not officially

registered as established. If the Turkish interpretation prevailed, they would be obliged to move to Greece.

The Mixed Commission took up the question, but no solution was found. So the matter was referred to the Secretariat of the LoN on 19 November 1924. The secretariat was asked for an advisory opinion on the question of under what conditions "the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople" would be considered "established" as provided in article 2 of the convention.

The question went to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which delivered its opinion on 21 February. (1) The term "established" implies a permanence and involves an actual residing in a certain place. (2) "The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople" can be considered established and therefore exempt from the exchange if they are living within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, and if they moved there, for whatever reason, prior to 30 October 1918 with the intention of residing there on a permanent basis.

This opinion of the court was unable to resolve the dispute between the two parties legally, and both states stiffened their positions on the issue. The Greeks expropriated the properties of the Muslims of Western Thrace and settled Greek migrants in these properties. Turkey retaliated immediately by expropriating Greek Orthodox properties in Istanbul. Greece subsequently returned some Turkish properties, and the Turkish government followed suit. When the dispute over the patriarchate erupted and compounded the dispute over the established, bilateral relations became even more tense. Although the first steps toward a solution were taken in 1925, the full settlement would come only in 1930.

### 2. The Question of the Patriarchate

When the issue of the future of the patriarchate was taken up at the Lausanne Peace Conference, Venizelos promised İsmet Paşa both at the negotiations in the first committee and in private conversations that Greece would do everything possible to remove Patriarch Melitos. Melitos had been elected patriarch on 6 December 1921. During the armistice period he supported the clerics who made the decision to sever all links with the Ottoman government; and after assuming the position of patriarch, he openly declared that he did not recognize the Turkish government. He supported the Venizelos policies of establishing a state in Asia Minor under the sovereignty of Greece. It was out of the question for this person to remain as patriarch in the Turkey that was established after Lausanne.

#### Box 2-10. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Phanar and Ecumenicism

The first church of Istanbul (Byzantium) was established in the year 37 by Saint Andreas as a bishopric attached to the Metropolitan of Heraclea. When Constantine the Great made Byzantium a capital in 330, the church there became a separate archbishopric with the title of "Archbishopric of New Rome and Constantinople." A Holy Synod with four to twenty members whose responsibilities included electing the archbishop administered it.

Seven ecumenical councils were convened at different dates to preserve the unity of the doctrines of Christianity and determine the administrative regions. They are referred to as ecumenical because all Christians accepted their decisions. The literal meaning of the word "ecumenical" is the entire inhabited world. After the Seventh Council, held in 787, the Orthodox and Catholic Churches split and started convening separate councils.

At the Fourth Council, held in Chalcedon in 451, the Church of Constantinople was raised to a patriarchate. The system known as Pentarchy (five-headedness) was adopted: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem were declared the historic centers of Christianity. Rome and Constantinople became equals in the hierarchy. The Asian, Pontic, and Thracian regions came under the authority of Constantinople. Constantinople was also granted the authority to establish bishoprics in "barbarian" regions.

When Constantinople was conquered by the Ottomans in 1453, Sultan Mehmet handed Patriarch Gennadios an Imperial edict (ferman) granting the patriarchate various privileges and awarded him the title of milletbasi, meaning head of nation. In the Ottoman millet system, the patriarch was recognized as the head of the Orthodox faithful. Whereas the patriarch was just a religious leader under the Byzantine Empire, he now also became a temporal leader of his millet along with the other milletbasis. The patriarch's authority was now significantly enhanced. He would be directly accountable to the sultan for the activities of his flock. This was

the reason why Patriarch Grigorius V was executed in 1821 when the Greeks revolted for their independence in Morea, even though he took a stand against independence and excommunicated the rebels.

When nationalism started gaining ground in the nineteenth century and new nation-states emerged, their churches also acquired a national character and broke away from the Patriarchate of Phanar. Among these were the Patriarchates of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania as well as the Greek Church. Despite these defections, the Patriarchate of Phanar has preserved its status as first among its peers (primus Inter pares) in the Orthodox world.

By the ordinance of 1862 the rights of the Patriarchate of Phanar in the spiritual, political, and administrative spheres were consolidated in one document. At Lausanne, Ankara allowed the patriarchate to remain in Turkey on condition that its powers would be confined to the spiritual sphere only, with no temporal powers or duties. This meant that its political and administrative rights under the ordinance of 1862 were abolished. It can be assumed, however, that the religious and spiritual provisions of the ordinance continue to apply to this day.

At present the following churches come under the authority of the Patriarchate of Phanar: the churches of Crete, the Dodecanese Islands, Neoi Chorol (literally, "riew lands" or the lands that came under Greek sovereignty after 1912), and Mount Athos and Patmos in Greece plus North and South America, the non-Orthodox European countries, Australia, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Church of Canada, and the Metropolitanate of Hong Kong. In addition, the churches of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, and Estonia are autonomous churches, but in their dealings with sister churches they depend on the patriarchate.

(M. FIRAT)

Even before the Lausanne Treaty was signed, Venizelos approached Patriarch Melitos informally and asked him to resign to spare the reputation of the patriarchate. Melitos was unable to stand up against the pressure of the Greek government. He left Fener (Phanar) on 27 June 1923, citing reasons of health, and went to the Monastery of Mount Athos without, however, resigning as patriarch. For some time he actively sought the transfer of the patriarchate to Cyprus, Salonika, or Mount Athos but failed to get his way and finally resigned on 12 October 1923 (Box 2-10).

When Melitos resigned, the question of the election of a new patriarch arose. The Turkish government was taking a close interest in the matter and did not want to see a development that it would consider to be against its interests. Until Melitos resigned, Papa Eftim had the support of the Turkish government (see Box 1-21 in Section 1). Papa Eftim was seeking to establish his control over the patriarchate. He was actively trying to get Damianos Damianidis, who came from Karaman, elected patriarch. To this end, Papa Eftim was seeking to bring the Holy Synod

under his influence. The Turkish government withdrew its support from Papa Eftim, however, when the Christian world reacted adversely to this interference and on 13 December approved the election of Grigorius Zervudakis, who had opposed the patriarchate's stand during the armistice period and who had retired to his own diocese of Kadıköy.

When the Turkish government's relations with the patriarchate were normalized and the support for Papa Eftim was withdrawn, he cut off his relations with the patriarchate on 6 June 1924 and a month later declared his Kafaitani Church at Galata to be the Turkish Orthodox Church. This was an autonomous church, which the Patriarchate of Phanar refused to recognize. Given the inflexible nature of Orthodox principles, it was clear that the Turkish Orthodox Church would remain a very small community. The Turkish government declared its neutrality by taking the stand that this was an internal matter of the Orthodox community. This allowed Papa Eftim to continue his activities within his own church while



making possible a normalization of the government's relations with the patriarchate.

The Turkish government demonstrated its neutrality upon the death of Patriarch Grigorios on 16 November 1924. Papa Eftim made one last attempt to get himself elected patriarch by pressuring the Holy Synod but received no support whatsoever from the Turkish government, and his bid failed.

Although Papa Eftim was now out of the picture, the election of a new patriarch caused further complications in Turkish-Greek relations, which were already strained because of the population exchange. The cleric elected patriarch on 17 December 1924 was Konstantinos VI (Arapoğlu), who was born in Bursa. He came to İstanbul in 1921, returned to Bursa, and came once again to Istanbul in 1924 as bishop of Terkos. It would be unthinkable for Ankara to agree to the election of a patriarch who belonged to the category of those to be exchanged at a time when the question of the established was at its height. Ankara not only opposed his election to the position of patriarch but also asked the Mixed Commission to speed up the procedures for his exchange. Greece, in contrast, held the view that because the patriarchate had to be considered established, it would be inappropriate to include Konstantinos VI, who was linked to the patriarchate, among those to be exchanged.

After considering the question, the Mixed Commission agreed that Konstantinos had come to İstanbul after 1918 but declared that it was not competent to decide whether, as patriarch, he should be exempt from the exchange. Greece then called for the question to be referred to the LoN and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Turkey claimed that these bodies were not competent to consider this question because the patriarchate was a Turkish institution. To demonstrate that it would not tolerate any meddling in Turkey's internal affairs, Ankara took a tough stand and on 30 January 1925 ordered the deportation of Konstantinos VI. Georgios Exindaris, the Greek member of the Mixed Commission, then quit his post. Konstantinos VI submitted a personal memorandum to the Council of the LoN, which recommended that the problem be resolved through bilateral talks. The Turkish government maintained its position on Konstantinos VI but retracted its demand to the Mixed Commission for the exchange of the other bishops on 11 April. After this concession, Konstantinos VI resigned as patriarch on 22 May 1925, and Vasileos Georgadis was elected patriarch on 13 July.

The question of the patriarchate that revolved around the person of Konstantinos VI had two important consequences. (1) It demonstrated that the Turkish government did not recognize the ecumenical status of the patriarchate, that it regarded this body as a Turkish institution, and that it would not allow foreign powers to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs using religion as a pretext. (2) The tension in Turkish-Greek relations caused by the implementation of the exchange of populations was defused through the talks between Tevfik Rüştü and Exindaris seeking to find a solution to the Konstantinos VI crisis. As a result of the reduction in tension, the two countries signed the Ankara Treaty of 1925.

# C. The 1925 Ankara and 1926 Athens Treaties

The bilateral talks that got underway in 1925 were a first step toward resolving the outstanding questions between the two countries, including the question of who would be considered established, the properties of those being exchanged, and the status of the patriarchate. The Sheikh Said uprising of 1925 was perceived by Ankara as a serious threat and led to a change in government. İsmet Paşa took over as prime minister from Fethi Bey [Okyar]. İsmet Paşa was determined to resolve the outstanding questions left over from Lausanne and bring to an end Turkey's international isolation. He was also determined to carry out economic and social reforms at home. The government of Andreas Michalakopoulos was facing similar economic and social problems in Greece and also wanted to settle outstanding questions with its Balkan neighbors. It was against this background that the bilateral talks led to the signing of the Treaty of Ankara on 21 June 1925.

The treaty dealt with the financial and legal questions arising from the population exchange. By this treaty, Turkey recognized as "established" all of the Greeks (even if they were not Orthodox or Turkish nationals) residing in İstanbul since 30 October 1918 without regard to whether they actually intended to settle in İstanbul or not. In addition, the Muslims established in Western Thrace and the ethnic Greeks established in İstanbul who had left their country were free to return to their homes and repossess their properties. This did not apply to those who had left their countries without valid passports. If these people were unable to repossess their properties, they would be entitled to fair compensation. By this accord, Turkey found the way to prevent the return of those Greeks who had left the country in wartime without valid passports, while Greece was being freed of the burden of returning lands belonging to Muslims in Western Thrace that had been allocated to Greek refugees from Turkey.

Although the Ankara Treaty appeared to resolve

fundamental disputes between the two countries, it was never implemented. It did, however, help in improving relations and led Ankara to appoint an ambassador to Athens. One reason for this nonimplementation was that the Mixed Commission objected to some of the clauses of the treaty. But the principal reason was that the Michalakopoulos government was overthrown and a dictatorship was established on 25 June 1925 by Gen. Theodoros Pangalos, who abandoned the previous government's conciliatory line and espoused a foreign policy bent on revising Lausanne. Pangalos had been encouraged by Mussolini's call for cooperation and the knowledge that London would not oppose Greece at a time when Britain was in confrontation with Turkey over Mosul. Pangalos delayed the ratification of the Ankara Treaty and bragged that the Greek army was the strongest in the Balkans. He was also working on military plans connected with Thrace and İstanbul. Italy's cautious policy of not signing a military pact with Greece and the resolution of the Mosul question prevented Pangalos from engaging in a military adventure against Turkey. When Pangalos was overthrown in August 1926, Greece was able to return to its policy of repairing relations with Turkey.

The dialogue that had been broken off was resumed. This resulted in the signing of the Athens Treaty on 1 December 1926, which came into effect on 23 June 1927. The treaty was designed to settle outstanding financial questions. Under its terms, all immovable properties located in regions subject to the population exchange belonging to Muslims and all Turkish nationals who left the country before 18 October 1912 (the date when the Balkan War broke out) or who resided outside Greece would become the property of the Greek government. Buildings and plots located in urban areas, groves, forests, and summer pasturage would be excluded from this expropriation. By the same token, the immovable properties located in regions subject to the population exchange belonging to ethnic Greeks or Greek nationals who left Turkey before 18 October 1912 or resided outside Turkey permanently would become the property of the Turkish government. The respective overall value of these expropriated properties would be calculated, and the difference between the two amounts would be settled with a cash payment.

The treaty also provided that the immovable properties of Greeks and Muslims in those localities such as Istanbul and Western Thrace that were exempt from the exchange of populations would be returned to their owners within one month of the coming into effect of the treaty.

The implementation of the Athens Treaty gave rise to new questions of a technical nature. The estimates of the value of the properties located in the two countries differed. In addition, both governments were dragging their feet in returning to their owners the properties located in Istanbul and Western Thrace. Unlike the Ankara Treaty, the Athens Treaty did not contain a provision describing those who were to be considered established. These questions would only be settled in the 1930s, when the domestic scene in the two countries and the international situation would be substantially altered.

# III. THE PERIOD OF FRIENDSHIP (1928–1939)

In 1928 important changes took place in both Turkey and Greece. Ankara had focused its attention on settling all questions affecting its relations with Western countries. The last of these questions concerned debts to France and was settled with a treaty. With these questions out of the way, the government could now embark on a peaceful, pro-status quo foreign policy, especially in the Balkans, where it played a leading role. Across the Aegean, Venizelos emerged as the winner in the election in August 1928. He was able to establish a majority government that brought to an end the long-lasting instability reigning in Greece. He could now direct his attention to foreign relations. His foreign policy differed markedly from the foreign policy of the early 1920s. The irredentist policies had now been abandoned, and the goal had become to settle outstanding bilateral questions with neighbors in a peaceful and pro-status quo spirit. Both Ankara and Athens were keenly aware of the growing threat from the revisionist camp led by Italy. Security concerns caused by mutual mistrust were compelling them to increase defense spending in particular for naval forces, placing an additional burden on their economies. They knew that only a peaceful foreign policy would enable them to deal with their nations' pressing need to develop economically and to carry out social reforms. They depended on one another's support to carry out their peaceful foreign policy in the face of Italian and Bulgarian revisionism. There were still unsettled questions between the two countries, however, and it would take some time to deal with them. The rapprochement between Ankara and Athens followed a strange course, and it was Italy that set this process in motion.

France had increased its influence in the Balkans by establishing the Little Entente with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. To counter this, Italy concluded pacts with Romania and Albania in 1926. It now wanted to extend its influence in the Balkans by signing similar

agreements with Turkey and Greece directed against Yugoslavia. To achieve this end, Italy toned down its menacing rhetoric and succeeded in signing two agreements with Ankara on 30 May 1928. These were the Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Adjudication and the Convention on the Demarcation of the Frontier between the Island of Meis (Megisti) and the Anatolian Coast. At the signing ceremony Italian officials reiterated that Italy had no ambitions in Anatolia and that Rome valued Turkey's friendship and the economic advantages it provided.

The Turkish-Italian agreements had repercussions in Greece. Venizelos brought to a conclusion the negotiations that had been underway with Rome, and on 23 September 1928 Greece too signed a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Adjudication with Italy. This treaty was similar in content to the treaty signed by Ankara and Rome earlier that year. This initiated the rapprochement between Ankara and Athens. Italy had a role in this rapprochement because it wanted a Balkan Pact under its leadership. To this end, Rome was in close contact with both Ankara and Athens and was seeking to reconcile the differences between the two nations.

Mustafa Kemal and Venizelos were aware that the rapprochement with Italy was not durable and decided to develop their bilateral relations. The first positive step came from Greece. Venizelos included in his government's program the intention to improve relations with Turkey as a basic foreign policy objective. On 30 August 1928 Venizelos wrote a letter to İsmet Paşa in which he declared that the Greeks were persuaded that Turkey had no territorial designs on Greece and, likewise, Greece had no territorial claims on Turkey. He also expressed Greece's sincere desire to settle all outstanding questions with Turkey. This letter made a positive impression in Ankara. On 13 September 1928 İsmet Paşa delivered a speech in Malatya in which he stated that the disputes between the two countries were not political but legal in nature. They related to the property rights of their nationals. These were important questions but were capable of being overcome with mutual goodwill. After this speech İsmet Paşa also wrote a letter of reply to Venizelos in which he emphasized that the letter from Venizelos had ushered in a new era of close friendship in Turkish-Greek relations.

In December 1928 the bilateral talks relating to questions resulting from the population exchange were resumed. The Greek ambassador who arrived in Ankara in July 1929, Spiridon Polikroniadis, had been instructed by Venizelos to develop relations further and reach an agreement. In 1929 the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Mehmet Enis [Akaygen], attended the celebration of the Greek Na-

tional Day for the first time. This rapprochement between Turkey and Greece culminated in the 1930 agreements.

## A. The 1930 Agreements

It was necessary to settle the legal questions arising from the exchange of populations in order to establish friendly political relations between Turkey and Greece. At the talks undertaken in December 1928, this was the first question taken up and led to the signing in Ankara on 10 June 1930 of the Convention on the Final Settlement of the Questions Arising from the Implementation of the Convention concerning the Exchange of Populations Signed at Lausanne on 30 January 1923 and the Athens Treaty of 1 December 1926.

### 1. The Ankara Convention of 10 June 1930

The political and economic questions between Turkey and Greece arising from the exchange of populations were settled through the Ankara Convention of 10 June 1930. As a first step, it specified who would be considered established. Article 10 stated that "Turkey considers as established all Orthodox Greeks of Turkish nationality who now happen to live in the region of Istanbul, which is exempt from the exchange, without regard to the date of their arrival in Istanbul or the place of their birth." Similarly, article 14 stipulated that "Greece recognizes as established all Muslims of Greek nationality who now live in the region of Western Thrace, which is exempt from the exchange, without regard to the date of their arrival in Western Thrace or the place of their birth."

In addition to this political question, other questions of an economic nature arising from the exchange were also settled. The convention contains clauses regulating the properties of the following five categories.

- 1. The properties of the exchanged: the movable and immovable properties left behind by the Muslims and Greeks subject to the exchange would be taken over by the governments of the country where the properties were located. Funds in bank accounts would be returned to their owners.
- 2. The properties of Turkish nationals: the immovable properties in Greece of Muslims of Turkish nationality would become the property of the Greek government.
- 3. The properties of Greek nationals: all immovable properties of Greek nationals located outside İstanbul would become the property of the Turkish government. This convention did not affect the ownership of immovable properties of Greek nationals located in İstanbul. If these properties had been seized, sequestrated, or taken over by squatters, this condition would be reversed within

one month and the properties would be returned to their owners free of any restriction on their use.

- 4. The properties of those established in Istanbul: the convention did not affect the movable and immovable properties in Istanbul of the Greeks considered to be established in the city. If any seizure or sequestration of these properties had taken place, the measure would be reversed immediately and the property in question would be returned to the owner free of any restriction on its use. Movable and immovable properties located outside Istanbul would be taken over by the Turkish government.
- 5. The properties of those established in Western Thrace: the convention did not affect the movable and immovable properties in Western Thrace of the Muslims considered to be established in Western Thrace. If any seizure or sequestration of these properties had taken place, the measure would be reversed immediately and the property in question would be returned to the owner free of any restriction on its use. Movable and immovable properties located outside Western Thrace would be taken over by the Greek government.

According to the convention, the Greek government was to place £425,000 at the disposal of the Mixed Commission. Of this sum, £150,000 would be used to compensate the established Greeks whose properties outside Istanbul were taken over by the Turkish government. The same sum would be used to compensate the established Muslims whose properties had been taken over by the Greek government. The Mixed Commission would hand over the remaining £125,000 to the Turkish government in three installments.

The Convention of 10 June 1930 helped settle the political, economic, and social questions between the two countries and inaugurated a new era of rapprochement. Greece's Prime Minister Venizelos paid a visit to Turkey from 27 October to 1 November. He was received warmly in Ankara, where he signed three agreements. For the first time, a period of friendship was inaugurated between Greece and Turkey. Seven years after their conflict, they were now embarked on political, economic, and military cooperation. In this atmosphere of cordiality and good will, Ankara raised no objections to a visit by the Greek prime minister to the patriarchate. In so doing, Ankara was conveying the message to all concerned that its problems with the patriarchate had been resolved.

### 2. The Agreements of 30 October 1930

On the occasion of the Venizelos visit to Ankara on 30 October, three agreements on political, military, and economic cooperation were signed: (1) the Treaty of Friend-

ship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration; (2) the Protocol on Limiting Navies; and (3) the Treaty on Residence, Commerce, and Navigation.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration provided that "the parties mutually undertake not to enter into any political or economic agreement or arrangement directed against one of the parties." Article 2 stipulated that "if one of the parties finds itself under attack by one or more states despite its peaceful position, the other party undertakes to maintain its neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." There were also provisions regarding the manner of settling disputes between the parties. If disputes could not be settled through normal diplomatic channels, the parties would resort to conciliation (articles 8 to 19); and if this failed, they would resort to adjudication or arbitration (articles 20 to 23).

The arms race between Greece and Turkey at the time when their differences remained unsettled had imposed a heavy financial burden on both countries as they struggled to overcome the effects of the war on their economies. After the economic crisis of 1929 both Ankara and Athens were ready to divert military funds to economic development. The Protocol on Limiting Navies was designed to prevent an arms race between the naval forces of the two countries. The protocol contained the following provision: "To prevent an unnecessary escalation in the expenditures for naval armaments and bearing in mind the special circumstances of the two sides, the high contracting parties intend to limit their forces reciprocally while maintaining parity as they advance in this direction...and, to this end, commit themselves not to place orders for or purchase or construct any warship or arms without giving the other party six months' notice."

The Treaty of Residence, Commerce, and Navigation was signed for economic reasons. Under article 1 of this treaty, the nationals of the parties would be able to enter the territory of the other party, reside and settle there, and travel within the country and leave without any restriction other than having to respect law and order and comply with the regulations governing foreign nationals. Where such regulations existed, the parties would enjoy most-favored-nation benefits.

This treaty also granted the nationals of one of the parties the right to own land in the other party's territory (article 3), the right to engage in commercial activities (article 4), the right to establish companies and factories (article 5), the right to engage in foreign trade (articles 10–24), the right to engage in maritime transport (articles 25–33), and the right to bequeath property (article 33).

When engaged in such activities, nationals of the other contracting party would be taxed at the same rate as the local inhabitants and would receive equal treatment with local inhabitants when they dealt with the courts or when they became subject to a judicial investigation. In the event of any restriction or prohibition on import and export activities or limitation of the freedom to engage in commerce, the parties agreed to grant most-favored-nation treatment to one another. The only exception to this rule would be in cases involving public order, cases concerning the country's defense or public health, or where there was a need to control the import of military equipment.

This treaty, which introduced free circulation of individuals forty years before post–World War II European integration, had two basic objectives. First, the 1929 economic crisis had led to a slump in economic and commercial activities. It was hoped that the economy might be revived through the creation of an Aegean free trade area. Second, the exchange of populations and the exodus of the ethnic Greeks had created a serious shortage of skilled workers in Turkey while aggravating unemployment in Greece. Through this treaty, Turkey was seeking to recover part of its lost workforce while Greece was trying to alleviate its unemployment problem. After the signature of the treaty, the unemployed started heading for İstanbul and other localities in Turkey for the purpose of settling there. Although exact figures are unavailable, their numbers are not thought to have been very large.

The real beneficiaries of the freedoms provided by the treaty were the İstanbul residents of Greek nationality who were considered established in 1923, who numbered 26,431 according to the 1927 census. The treaty was important because it provided them with a solid legal status.

Despite this legal status, as a result of the 1932 law by which certain trades and services were reserved for Turkish nationals (referred to above), about 9,000 Greek nationals in the established category lost their jobs and migrated to Greece after 1934. The number of Greek nationals dwindled from 26,431 in 1927 to 17,642 in 1935 (Aktar, p. 11). When the 1930 treaty was denounced by Turkey in 1964 following the events in Cyprus, the remainder of the Greek nationals, together with some Istanbul Greeks of Turkish nationality, found themselves forced to leave Istanbul.

## 3. Turkish-Greek Relations at Their Zenith: The Cordial Agreement of 1933

After the 1930 agreements, the two countries came closer in the political, economic, and military spheres. On 5 October 1931 prime minister İsmet Paşa and minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] paid an official visit to

Athens, returning the Turkish visit by Venizelos the previous year. The warm reception received by the Turkish guests in Athens conveyed a meaningful message to the public of the Balkan countries and beyond. In 1932 Venizelos resigned as prime minister when his policies failed to produce the expected political and economic results. But this setback did not affect the good relations between the two states. These relations were now based on a solid foundation and did not depend on any particular individual.

On 14 September 1933 prime ministers İsmet Paşa and Panagis Tsaldaris signed in Ankara the Cordial Agreement between Turkey and Greece. This ten-year agreement was designed to ward off any threat that might come from revisionist Bulgaria. Article 1 provided that the contracting parties would reciprocally guarantee their common border against any attack. Article 2 declared that it was in the common interest of the contracting parties to enter into prior consultations with one another on all international questions concerning them. Article 3 provided that at all international meetings with limited participation the representative of one of the contracting parties would have the duty and the competence to speak for the particular and common interests of both countries.

In addition to this agreement designed to secure cooperation in military and security matters, two barter agreements were signed on 22 December 1933 and 10 November 1934 to strengthen cooperation in the economic and trade fields. A Turkish-Greek Trade Bureau was established in İstanbul in May 1934. The friendship between the two countries attained a new high level when Venizelos nominated Atatürk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement also had its effect in the Balkans with the signing of the Balkan Entente Pact in 1934.

### B. The Balkan Entente

After World War I, there was general agreement that peace could best be secured through collective security arrangements, and the LoN was conceived to achieve this end. It was felt that the LoN by itself would not be enough, however, and should be supplemented with regional arrangements. This way of thinking was especially prevalent in the Balkans because the countries dissatisfied with the postwar arrangements (namely, Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria) were all focused on the Balkan region. The Locarno Treaties had made arrangements to secure the frontiers of Germany's western neighbors, but its eastern neighbors were not included. This gave rise to concern in the Balkans over the possibility that by containing Germany only in the west Britain and France were perhaps indifferent

to Germany's eastward expansion. The pro-status quo Balkan states were also concerned about Italy's growing interest in their region. As a result of this perceived threat, the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece led to initiatives to broaden this bilateral cooperation to include the other nonrevisionist Balkan states.

### The Establishment of the Balkan Entente

A number of statesmen had spoken about the desirability of cooperation among the Balkan states to ensure peace and strengthen collective security in the region. The first step in this direction, however, was taken at the Twenty-seventh Universal Peace Congress organized in Athens on 6–10 October 1929 by the International Peace Bureau. At this congress the former prime minister of Greece, Alexandros Papanastasiou, proposed the setting up of a Balkan Union Institute that would deal with questions among Balkan countries and consider subjects relating to their common interests. The proposal received a positive response, and the participating Balkan states decided to hold a series of informal conferences.

The first Balkan Conference was held in Athens on 5 October 1930, with the participation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. At the conference the political differences among the participating countries remained in the background, which allowed the following decisions to be made. (1) An annual meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Balkan states would be held. (2) Preparations would be made to conclude a Balkan Pact that would outlaw war, secure the peaceful resolution of disputes, and provide for joint action to assist a member country that came under attack. (3) By bringing the Balkan nations closer together in the economic, social, cultural, and political fields, the ground would be prepared to establish a permanent organization with the goal of setting up a Balkan Union. Despite these decisions, it immediately became apparent that it would be impossible to reconcile the positions of the participants on political questions such as the status of minorities and Italy's Balkan policies.

The second Balkan Conference met in Istanbul on 20–26 October 1931. The conference focused on economic, technical, and cultural cooperation in order to draw the pro–status quo and revisionist Balkan states closer together. The future alignment of the Balkan states had already taken shape, however. After settling their disputes, Turkey and Greece were acting in unison and making strenuous efforts to achieve a Balkan Pact. Bulgaria, which was showing signs of following a revisionist course, and Albania, which was under Italian influence, were cool toward the idea. Romania and Yugoslavia were members

of the Little Entente and, as such, were not overly enthusiastic about a Balkan Union to ensure their security.

The third Balkan Conference met in Bucharest on 23–26 October 1932. When the question of minorities came up for discussion, Bulgaria realized that its views would not be reflected in the decisions to be adopted and withdrew from the conference. The remaining five Balkan states established a number of committees of experts and decided to set up a Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Balkan Labor Bureau, a Balkan Postal Union, and a customs union. They also discussed measures for supporting cultural exchanges.

Turkey was of the view that a Balkan Pact without Bulgaria would be incapable of ensuring peace and collective security. İsmet Paşa and Tevfik Rüştü went to Sofia on 20 September 1933 to try to persuade Bulgaria to join the pact. In the course of this visit the Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration signed in 1929 between Turkey and Bulgaria was extended for five years. But Bulgaria rejected Ankara's proposal to sign an Agreement of Cordiality similar to the one concluded between Ankara and Athens.

At the fourth Balkan Conference, held in Salonika on 5–11 November 1933, the Balkan states had already made up their minds to proceed without Bulgaria and took up the subject of the Balkan Pact. The communiqué adopted at the end of the meeting expressed the hope that all Balkan states would participate. The door had been left open for Bulgaria to join the pact.

Despite the negative stance taken by Bulgaria and Italy, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania met in Belgrade in February 1934. At this meeting they approved the Balkan Entente Pact, which was signed in Athens on 9 February 1934.

Most scholars believe that the Balkan Entente Pact was conceived to secure cooperation among the Balkan states in order to ward off a possible Italian attack. They come to this conclusion in the light of Turkey's perception of the Italian threat during the 1930s. Although Turkey may well also have had Italy in mind, a careful reading of the text and its attached protocol reveals that the threat that was in everyone's mind was Bulgarian rather than Italian, even if the text was carefully drafted not to cause offense to Bulgaria.

#### The Balkan Entente Pact

The Balkan Entente Pact consists of a preamble and three articles. The preamble declares that the parties are determined to preserve and ensure the territorial status quo in the Balkans. Article 1 states that "Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania mutually guarantee all of their

borders in the Balkans." Article 2 declares that "the parties undertake to consult one another on measures to deal with possible threats to their interests indicated in the present treaty. They also undertake not to take any political action against any Balkan state that has not signed the present pact without notifying one another in advance and not to assume any political obligation vis-à-vis any Balkan country without the approval of the other parties." Article 3 regulates the coming into force of the pact and confirms that all Balkan states may accede to it.

The pact cannot be properly assessed without examining the annexed protocol, which is an integral part. Article 2 of the protocol declares that the pact is not directed against any state but also adds that the pact aims to ensure all Balkan frontiers against a possible attack originating from a Balkan state. Consequently, if a signatory's frontier not located in the Balkans comes under attack or if the attack originates from outside the Balkans, the pact will not become operative. This article clearly demonstrates that the pact was signed with a possible Bulgarian attack in mind. Article 3 reiterates this: "if one of the high contracting parties comes under attack from a non-Balkan state and if a Balkan state joins the attack at any time, the provisions of the Balkan Pact will become fully applicable to this Balkan state." Finally, article 7 declares that this is a defense pact; if one of the parties should be the aggressor, the commitments made under the pact will cease to be binding.

Both Turkey and Greece signed the Balkan Entente Pact with a reservation. Turkey declared that it would not be involved in any action directed against the USSR. When it ratified the pact, Greece declared that the objective of the pact was to repel an attack emanating from a Balkan state and that, consequently, it would not get involved in hostilities with a major power in compliance with the pact. In this way Greece confirmed that the pact could not be invoked against Italy and that it was conceived only against a Bulgarian attack. Greece was making sure that Italy took no offense.

On 2 November 1934, a short while after the Balkan Entente Pact was signed, the parties adopted the status of the Balkan Entente Organization. This established a Council of Ministers, consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the four signatories, which would meet on a regular basis twice a year and, when necessary, in special session to deal with specific issues. In addition, there was to be an Economic Council and a Special Committee charged with harmonizing legislation.

For a considerable time the four members of the Balkan Entente were able to establish common positions in response to international developments. On the eve of World War II, however, the inability of the pact to provide adequate security in response to the Balkan policies of the major powers forced the member states to resort to bilateral accords. The members also succeeded in signing an agreement with Bulgaria to enhance security and build understanding. On 31 July 1938 the president of the Council of Ministers, Ioannis Metaxas, signed a treaty on behalf of the Balkan Entente. This treaty abrogated the convention respecting the Thracian frontier signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 and brought to an end the demilitarized status of the border regions in Thrace.

The last meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Balkan Entente was held in February 1940, when World War II had already broken out. The council was unable to meet again after that, with Yugoslavia and Greece under German/Italian occupation and Romania in the Axis camp. The Balkan Entente had come to an end in the upheaval of war in 1941. After the war, there was an attempt to resuscitate Balkan cooperation, but it was far from being aimed at reviving the Balkan Entente.

### c. Relations on the Eve of World War II

Turkey and Greece established the Balkan Entente by extending their friendly relations to the entire Balkan region in order to check revisionism. They failed to obtain the accession of Albania and Bulgaria, however. For this reason and the other reasons mentioned above, the Balkan Entente was not able to ensure the security of the Balkan region. Because they felt threatened, Turkey and Greece continued to build up their bilateral cooperation after 1934, especially in the military field.

When Turkey sent a note on 11 April 1936 to the signatories of the Lausanne Straits Convention and informed them that it wanted a new arrangement for the Straits, it had already obtained Greece's support. In his speech delivered at the TGNA on 31 July 1936, soon after the signing of the Montreux Straits Convention, minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras said:

[N]ow that the Montreux Convention has been signed, the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, belonging to our neighbor and friend Greece, will no longer be under a demilitarized status as required by the Lausanne Convention. This is a source of gratification for us. In this connection, I would like to draw attention to a feature of Turkey's new policy. What we consider beneficial to us, we also consider beneficial to our friends, and what we consider unacceptable to us, we likewise consider unacceptable to our friends. Indeed not just to our friends but to all states. (TBMM Zabit

Ceridesi, vol. 12, Devre V, 81. İnikad, 31.7.1936, p. 310, quoted in Pazarcı, pp. 49–50)

With these words, he was giving a measure of the warm feelings and friendship between Turkey and Greece.

These words, which seemed so natural during a period of intense friendship, would subsequently be used by Greece to support its case when differences arose with Turkey over the demilitarization of the islands.

The change of regime that occurred on 4 August 1936 in Greece had no effect on Turkish-Greek relations. The political instability affecting Greece following the defeat of Venizelos in 1932 was brought to an end by General Metaxas, who took power and established a dictatorship. In its domestic policies, his "Fourth of August" regime took Italy and Germany as its model, but in foreign policy it pursued a pro-status quo line. Although Metaxas was determined to avoid getting involved in war, he was also aware that an armed conflagration in Europe was bound to spread to Greece. He therefore undertook to expand the military dimension of Greece's cooperation with Turkey. In January 1937 Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia. In 1938 the Balkan Entente signed a treaty with Bulgaria to end the demilitarized status of the Thracian frontier regions. These events created problems within the Balkan Entente and heightened Greek concerns. The waning of the spirit of solidarity within the Balkan Entente had the effect of strengthening Turkish-Greek solidarity.

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On 26 May 1937 Prime Minister İnönü paid a visit to Greece. On the occasion of this visit Atatürk sent a personal message to Metaxas in which he spoke of the lasting character of Turkish-Greek friendship and alliance and added: "The frontiers of the Balkan Allied States constitute one single frontier. Those who threaten this frontier shall meet with the burning rays of the sun. I advise them to beware" (Ayın Tarihi 42 [1–31 May 1937]: 226).

This warning was directed at Italy and Bulgaria. In October 1937 Metaxas came to Ankara on a return visit. At the same time, the military leaders were exchanging visits and holding talks. Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and Gen. Alexandros Papagos were exchanging views, and this process led to the signing of a military pact on 27 April 1938. The full title of this document was Additional Treaty to the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration and the 1933 Cordiality Pact between Turkey and Greece.

Article 1 provided that "in the event that one of the parties finds itself under attack by a state or states through no fault of its own, the other party undertakes to maintain its neutrality by preventing, if necessary by force of arms,

its territory from being used by the aggressor or aggressors to transport soldiers, arms, or military equipment, to procure food, animals, etc., to transport retreating troops, or to carry out military reconnaissance." It would also make an effort to reach a peaceful solution (article 2). The  $parties\,under took\,\'{}^*to\,prevent\,individuals\,and\,groups\,bent$ on harming the welfare and security of the other country or changing its government from getting established on their territory. Furthermore, they undertake to deny residence rights on their territories to individuals and groups intending to fight against the other party, whether by propaganda or any other means" (article 3). The treaty confirmed the validity of previously signed accords between the two sides. Although the treaty was concluded to meet Greek concerns, in reality it addressed Turkey's security concerns over threats coming from the west, since a threat from the east was unlikely. In other words, because there was no country that would attack Greece from the east by overrunning Turkey, the treaty brought Greece no practi-

In the years preceding World War II, Turkey and Greece were engaged in political, economic, and military cooperation based on a legal framework of treaties. This was not just due to the perceived threat coming from Bulgaria, Italy, or the southern Slavs. The convergence of the two countries was also due to the feeling of having overcome their political differences and economic problems as well as the similarity of their political systems. Their rapprochement was not confined to the political and military fields but also had a cultural dimension. In 1937 a Greek sculptor named Athinaios made a bust of Atatürk and presented it to Turkey. The municipality of Salonika purchased the house where Atatürk was born and gave it to the Turkish state. The universities of both countries introduced courses in one another's culture and language. The outbreak of war and its spread to the Balkans brought this cooperation to an end. Greece, attacked by Italy and subsequently overrun by Germany, took part in the war. Turkey made maximum profit of the prevailing conditions to stay out of the conflict. The war prevented direct cooperation, and Turkey was only able to provide indirect assistance to Greece.

### D. The Results of the Friendship

The friendship between Turkey and Greece during the 1930s helped to improve the condition of the minorities in both countries. As a result of this friendship, Greece was also able to take measures relating to its territory that had lasting effects.

In the 1930s there was a perceptible improvement in Turkey's treatment of the Greek-speaking minority living in İstanbul and the Aegean islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada. The same can be said about Greece's treatment of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. During these years Turkey withdrew its support for Papa Eftim, the patriarchate's rival. Turkey ceased to interfere in the election of patriarchs and allowed Greeks paying official visits to Ankara to call on the patriarch in Istanbul. Greeks schools and associations were allowed greater leeway in their operations, and some of the restrictive measures applied to school textbooks and teachers were relaxed. Greece acted in the same spirit and deported the individuals opposed to the Ankara regime who had been allowed to implant themselves in Western Thrace in the 1920s. Among these were the last Sheikh-ul-Islam, Mustafa Sabri, and others who were part of the 150 opponents of the regime who had been exiled from Turkey in 1923. The Muslim schools of Western Thrace dropped the Arabic script and switched to the Latin alphabet, following Turkey's example. It became easier for these schools to obtain textbooks and teachers from Turkey. As usual, the two countries' treatment of their respective minorities was directly related to the ups and downs of their bilateral relations.

In the atmosphere of friendship prevailing in the 1930s, Greece took unilateral measures to extend its territorial limits in the Aegean. This was to create long-term problems for Turkey. One year after the signing of the 1930 agreements with Turkey and one month before Ismet Paşa and Tevfik Rüştü went to Athens, Greece extended its airspace from three to ten miles beyond its coastline. This unilateral measure was taken on 6 September 1931. On 17 September 1936, a few weeks after Metaxas visited Ankara, Greece extended its territorial waters from three to six miles. In the cordial atmosphere of the time, Turkey did not object to these moves. In fact, as noted earlier, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras made a reference to Greece's right to remilitarize the islands lying off the mouth of the Dardanelles following the conclusion of the Montreux Straits Convention. These Greek moves would later haunt Turkey in the changed circumstances after World War II when Turkish-Greek relations turned sour.

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# Relations with the Middle East

### **I. RELATIONS WITH IRAN**

During this period Turkish-Iranian relations were marked by a border dispute. At the same time, the regimes of both countries had many common features. Once the border dispute had been set aside in 1932, bilateral relations went through a "golden age" until the outbreak of World War II. The climax of this unique relationship came in 1937 with the signing of the Sadabad Pact.

# A. Iran's Adoption of the Kemalist Regime as Its Model

Just as Mustafa Kemal Paşa laid the foundation of a new regime in Turkey in April 1920, so too Reza Khan, the Iranian minister of defense, established a new regime in Iran in February 1921 (Box 2-11). The two regimes shared similar objectives: creating modern and fully independent nation-states based on Western norms and institutions. They shared an ideology based on nationalism rather than religion. Their internal adversaries were the traditional economic classes, while their principal external adversary was Britain. These similarities allowed the two states to look upon one another with sympathy and understanding.

For historical, social, and economic reasons, the obstacles in Reza Khan's path were greater than those confronting M. Kemal. The reforms carried out by M. Kemal provided psychological backing for Reza Khan, who was seeking to emulate Turkey in his efforts to reform his country. For Reza Khan, M. Kemal's Turkey served as a model to which Iran could readily relate.

When Turkey, the role model, established a republican form of government, this event had significant reverberations in Iran. Tehran's following the same course became a hot topic of discussion in Iranian circles. The Turkish press was also dwelling on the positive aspects of such a move. Turkey's ambassador in Tehran, Muhiddin Paşa, was received by Reza Khan on a number of occasions and urged him to opt for a republic. Reza Khan

### Box 2-11. Iran (1923-1941)

Reza Khari came from a peasant family from the province of Fars. He became prime minister in 1923 and two years later overthrew the Qajar dynasty and became the sovereign. He adopted the name of an ancient Persian tribe, Pahlavi, as the name of his dynasty. By doing so he demonstrated his nationalistic leanings. After establishing an army loyal to himself and securing the backing of the merchants (bazaaris) and large landowners. Reza Shah sought to establish an independent, modern nation-state through reforms on the Turkish model.

At home Reza Shah tried to constrain the social and economic power of the mullahs, while pursuing a policy of Persianization. In foreign affairs he strove to get rid of the capitulations and follow a policy of balancing British and Soviet influence in his country. He succeeded in abolishing the capitulations in 1928 and curbing the opposition of the mullahs. After these successes, the shah saw Nazi Germany in the 1930s as a counter to the influence of Britain and the USSR. On the eve of World War II German influence in Iran was at its peak. As a consequence, Britain and the USSR would occupy Iran in August 1941 and force the shah to abdicate in favor of his son.

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was receptive to the idea. Iranian intellectuals who could be described as Kemalists were lobbying actively for Iran to emulate Turkey and declare a republic. But the republic never materialized, for reasons originating in Turkey. When the debates over the future regime in Iran were at their height, Turkey abolished the caliphate on 3 March 1924. The Iranian mullahs were extremely worried that this was the inevitable consequence of a republic. Reza Khan felt compelled to go to Qum to declare his opposition to a republic. In 1925 Muhiddin Paşa was replaced by Memduh Şevket [Esendal] as ambassador in Tehran. The new ambassador also conveyed Turkey's desire to see a republic in Iran; but that year the Qajar dynasty was replaced by the Pahlavi dynasty, and the matter was settled in favor of a monarchy.

The new shah, Reza Pahlavi, felt the need to inform

Memduh Şevket that he favored a republican system for Iran but that he was unable to take the step and was compelled to declare himself shah. This was a time when Turkey's influence in Iran was running high.

Despite this, the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey caused an important segment of Iranian society, led by the mullahs, to look upon Turkey and Reza Khan's ties with Turkey with suspicion. This faction was particularly influential in the first ten years after the establishment of relations. Nevertheless, Turkey continued to serve as a model for the Iranian administration as well as for the intelligentsia. M. Kemal's sweeping reforms drew much admiration. At the shah's coronation ceremony in 1926, Turkey's gift was brought to Tehran by aviators who put on an aerial display that greatly impressed Iranians. The border question between the two states remained unresolved until 1932, however, and this prevented relations from attaining their potential.

Bilateral relations started developing rapidly in 1932 and reached their high point with the visit to Turkey in June 1934 of Reza Pahlavi. The shah spent one month in Turkey, traveling extensively by land and sea. He inspected the trade route from Tabriz to Erzurum and Trabzon and was highly impressed by the results of Atatürk's "social engineering" efforts. The program for the shah's visit was designed to impress him. The battleship Yayuz was placed at his disposal for his voyage from Trabzon to Istanbul. The opera Özsoy that had been composed for this occasion was staged when the shah came to Ankara. The shah admired the results of the Westernization efforts carried out over a relatively short period. When he returned to Tehran, he displayed a new determination to develop his country's relations with Turkey. The unusual duration of the visit was in itself a measure of the importance that Iran attributed to its relations with Turkey. In regimes based on one man, it was not customary for this leader to leave the country for any length of time. In fact, this was the first occasion when the shah set foot outside Iran.

Turkish ambassador Hüsrev Gerede, a diplomat known for his toughness, accompanied the shah during this trip. The announcement that Mehmet Enis Akaygen would replace him came during this trip. Akaygen was the ambassador to Athens and was seen as the architect of the recent Turkish-Greek rapprochement. This was an indication that Ankara no longer required a tough negotiator in Tehran.

In 1934 Iran showed its solidarity by retracting its candidacy for a seat on the Council of the League of Nations in Turkey's favor. During the golden age of Turkish-Iranian relations following the shah's visit, there were frequent gestures of this kind, demonstrating that relations between the two countries were based on complete trust. When Atatürk died, the palace in Iran decreed a mourning period of one month.

The cordial atmosphere between Turkey and Iran lived on even after Turkey allied itself with Britain and France in 1939 while Iran's orientation turned toward Germany. The transfer of Ambassador Akaygen to Athens in 1939 and his replacement by Suat Davaz were not well received by the shah, however. He saw this move as being instigated by Britain and interpreted it as Turkey wanting to distance itself from a pro-German Iran. Even so, the excellent relations between the two countries continued until Iran was occupied in 1941 and the shah was sent into exile.

## **B.** The Border Dispute

The frontier with Iran was traced out by the Treaty of Amasya in 1555 and fixed in its details by the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639. This frontier has remained more or less constant to this day, even though the Ottomans and Persians carried out numerous redemarcations. The last of these demarcations was carried out in 1913, although its validity was questioned because it was never ratified. Minor disagreements about the frontier remained, however, and had a negative impact on the relations between Turkey and Iran from the early 1920s until 1932.

The dispute over the frontier had three causes.

- 1. Seeing things from a nationalistic perspective: the official ideologies of the new regimes were based on nationalism, so they looked upon one another with suspicion because of possible separatist provocations directed at ethnic groups living in their territories. For example, there were groups with Turkish roots in Iran (Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Qashqais) as well as Sunni Kurds that Tehran feared might be manipulated by Ankara. Meanwhile Turkey feared that Tehran might support those of Iranian extraction (Kurds) in Turkey. Any sign that this might actually be happening was greatly overblown.
- 2. The desire of Kurdish tribes to preserve their autonomies: the Kurdish tribes were unhappy about the curbs imposed on their autonomy within the framework of a nation-state structure with a central authority. They did not have a clear concept of the actual meaning of an international frontier. They reacted violently to every measure that would limit their autonomous status, and the authorities were compelled to use force to restore order and tranquillity. Disorder originating on one side of the frontier had a way of spilling over the line, bringing the two states into dangerous local confrontations that occasionally degenerated into actual clashes.

3. The frontier was not adequately marked: the last agreement delineating the Turkish-Iranian frontier was the 1913 İstanbul Protocol. This protocol provided for the formation of a border demarcation commission; but this body never came into being, and the frontier remained inadequately marked. As a result the security forces on both sides were never certain about the exact limits of their area of responsibility.

In addition to these three causes, there is also the claim that the USSR was inciting the Kurdish tribes. The northern regions of Iran carried out their trade with the world through two traditional routes, one through Turkey and the other through the USSR. When the Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon route became unusable owing to lack of security, the alternative Enzeli-Baku-Batum route came into use. This provided the USSR with economic benefits and allowed it to strengthen its influence over Iran. Consequently, it was argued that the USSR was encouraging the Kurdish tribes to intercept and plunder Iranian commercial traffic using the Turkish route.

Iran wanted to participate in the Lausanne Conference to settle the border question. But Britain refused to allow this, so Iran sought to settle the matter through bilateral talks. The Simko Ağa uprising in Iran and the Sheikh Said uprising in Turkey accelerated this process. Once the leaders had made up their minds to overcome the lack of trust, the first steps toward the settlement of the border dispute were taken in 1926, four months after the signing of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty.

On 22 April 1926 a Treaty of Friendship and Security was signed in Tehran. Article 2 of the treaty provided that "in the event of military action against one of the parties, the other party commits itself to maintaining its neutrality." Article 3 stipulated that "both contracting parties undertake not to attack one another...and not to enter into any political, economic, or financial alliance or treaty directed against the other contracting party." This treaty, however, was really aimed at securing the pursuit of joint policies against tribes that were creating problems rather than at guaranteeing neutrality. This was clearly stated in article 6, which contained the most important provision of the treaty: "The contracting parties shall take all measures to put to an end the unlawful activities and preparations of the tribes in the border regions that pose a danger to the public order and security of the two countries." Article 5 contained similar provisions: "The contacting parties undertake to prevent the formation or implantation in their countries of structures or organizations that aim to endanger the public order and security or overthrow the government of the other contracting party." The distinguishing feature of this treaty was article 6, which singled out the tribes as the adversary. Although a number of treaties (including the Sadabad Pact) that contained the somewhat vague phraseology of article 5 were concluded after this, none contained the explicit language of article 6.

Although the basic aim of the treaty was to solve the border question created by the tribes, the treaty was also important because it was the first accord signed by Ankara and Tehran. All subsequent accords would be based on this treaty.

Turkey wanted to see a similar treaty signed between Iran and the USSR. During this period, however, relations between these countries were strained, and Iran was uneasy about the right to intervene that it had granted the Soviet Union under the 1921 treaty. To restore trust between the two countries, Memduh Şevket Bey went to Moscow but failed in his mission.

Despite the 1926 treaty, the problem created by the border clashes remained unresolved because of the tolerant attitude of Iran toward the tribes. Both sides continued their search for a solution, however. On 15 June 1928 a protocol was signed in Tehran that was in the form of an annex to the 1926 treaty. Article 1 contained the following provision: "If one of the contracting parties finds itself confronted by hostile action on the part of a state or several states, the other contracting party shall strive to find a remedy to this situation. If war breaks out in spite of this striving...the contracting parties...undertake jointly to reexamine the situation." The intent was to secure cooperation in the event of a British or Soviet intervention. But this was an unlikely eventuality, and the burning question was the activity of the tribes. For two years after 1926, the talks between the two sides produced no results. Nevertheless, the passive neutrality foreseen in the 1926 treaty was turned into active neutrality in the 1928 protocol. This was a sign that both sides were displaying goodwill.

The 1923 Simko Aga uprising in western Iran led to border clashes. This and the Sheikh Said uprising in southeast Anatolia demonstrated the critical importance of the question of border security. The Ağrı uprisings turned the question into a full-blown crisis (Box 2-12). The most critical of these was the third and last uprising that erupted in June 1930. Whenever the rebels were pursued, they fled to the sanctuary of Lesser Mount Ağrı, located in Iran. Finally, Turkey came to the conclusion that these uprisings could not be fully suppressed unless the entire Mount Ağrı (Ararat) region was brought under its sovereignty and proceeded to occupy the region of Lesser Mount Ağrı. This put an end to the uprising, and Iran found itself unable to intervene.

Turkey proposed that Iran be compensated for the mountainous area under Turkish control with an equivalent piece of agricultural land that would be without strategic importance. Iran rejected this proposal, pointing out that the İstanbul Protocol of 1913 was still valid and that it would not consent to any modification in the frontier traced in that accord. Turkey argued that this protocol had been ratified neither by the palace nor by the parliament and therefore had no validity. It argued further that there was no reason to comply with the "tentative" border traced in this document. The real reason why Iran refused to accept Turkey's proposal was because the Istanbul Protocol of 1913 drafted during the Ottoman period also traced the frontier between Iran and Iraq at Shatt al-Arab on the Gulf, which was at the time part of the Ottoman Empire. This frontier arrangement contained articles favoring Iran. Therefore, if Iran accepted the nonvalidity of the 1913 protocol, it could not legally invoke this document against Iraq. Although the question remained unresolved diplomatically, Turkey continued its occupation of the region (Çetinsaya, p. 161).

In 1930 the ambassador in Tehran, Memduh Şevket Bey, who was perceived as a "dove," was recalled and replaced by Hüsrev Bey [Gerede], usually described as a "hawk." Hüsrev Bey was briefed by prime minister İsmet Paşa, who described his mission in these terms: "Your position will be similar to the Western ambassadors who, with their fleets in the Dardanelles, used to send their embassy dragomans to the Sublime Porte and dictated their wills to the Grand Vizier. You will have a fully mobilized army to back you up" (Şimşir, p. 345).

Hüsrev Bey conveyed Ankara's stern and determined message to his Iranian interlocutors. The long negotiations were only concluded when minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] went to Tehran. (The family name Aras was given to the minister by Atatürk to recall the Aras [Arax] River on the border with Iran.) Iran recognized the fait accompli created by Turkey and agreed to an exchange of territory. Two treaties were signed in Tehran on 23 January 1932, one demarcating the frontier and the other providing for cooperation in legal matters. The most recent rectifications in the Ottoman-Iranian frontier were incorporated in the treaty. This result was obtained under Turkish pressure, but the shah demonstrated that he was not resentful by placing one of his newly acquired Junkers aircraft at Tevfik Rüştü's disposal to fly him to Geneva, where the minister was to attend a meeting of

The actual demarcation in the field was only completed in 1934. In the course of the negotiations, agree-

# Box 2-12. The Ağrı Uprisings

Some of the rebels who participated in the Sheikh Said uprising (see Box 2-6 above) fled from the security forces and took refuge in Mount Ağrı (Ararat), where they were able to regroup. The clashes that erupted in Maying26 continued intermittently until the end of June. Whenever the rebels found themselves pressed, they crossed into Iran and took refuge in the Lesser Mount Ağrı, which prevented the security forces from dealing a decisive blow to the uprising. A year later, in September 1927, the security forces mounted a new operation in the region of Mount Ağrı against the second Ağrı uprising, which also ended without a decisive result.

The Kurdish notables who had fled after the suppression of the Sheikh Said uprising established the Hoybun Society in Lebanon in 1927. When a group under the leadership of Capt. Ihsan Nuri, a member of the Hoybun Society, joined the rebel camps on Mount Ağrı, the nationalistic character of the uprising became evident. This made it all the more dangerous. After a period of preparation, the third Ağrı uprising erupted in 1930. The army extended its operations into Iran and completely surrounded the Lesser Mount Ağrı. With their escape route cut off, the rebels were quickly defeated.

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ment could not be reached over a small tract of territory. It was decided to refer this issue to arbitration. The arbitrator selected for this purpose was none other than Shah Reza Pahlavi, who decided in Turkey's favor.

After the treaties of 23 January 1932, another treaty was signed on 27 May 1937, which traced the present-day frontier. According to this treaty, Mount Ağrı in its entirety (including Lesser Mount Ağrı) was to remain on the Turkish side, while Iran was to receive agricultural land in the region of Kotur in the province of Van. After this, frontier markings were renewed and the question of the frontier was removed from the agendas of the two countries. The question of the frontier created by the Kurdish tribes had lasted for ten years but was now set aside.

With the border question settled, two treaties were signed in Ankara on 5 November 1932, reaffirming the 1926 treaty and the attached 1928 protocol. These were the Treaty of Friendship and the Treaty of Security, Neutrality, and Economic Cooperation. The main difference between the new treaties and the previous ones was in article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship, which provided that "[t]he contracting parties accept that their diplomatic and consular representatives in the other country shall be subject to conditions no less favorable than the conditions enjoyed by the most favored nations." This signified that both countries were recognizing most-favored-nation status for one another in this field. That was psychologically

important and demonstrated the confidence that the two countries had in each other. The bitter memory of how capitulations granted by the Ottomans and Qajars to certain major powers had spread to other countries through most-favored-nation treaties was still fresh in both capitals. Consequently, it was significant that the atmosphere of friendship was strong enough to enable both regimes to overcome their aversion to this clause.

The desire to establish friendship and neutrality was reaffirmed through these developments, and the course leading to the Sadabad Pact was taken.

# II. RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN

As a result of Tarzi Mahmut Bey's initiative, Turkey started providing Afghanistan with technical implements and personnel in the educational, health, legal, and military fields. This assistance continued to develop during this period and constituted the basis of Turkish-Afghan relations.

Afghanistan's King Amanullah Khan paid a visit to Turkey in May 1928. In the course of this visit, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkey and Afghanistan was signed in Ankara on 25 May 1928. This treaty confirmed the solidarity treaty signed in Moscow in 1921 and contained similar clauses. Article 2 contained this provision: "In the event of hostile action against one of the contracting parties...the other contracting party undertakes to take all necessary measures to prevent an attack, and if, nevertheless, war breaks out, the two governments undertake to...jointly review the situation." Article 3 stipulated that "[e]ach contracting party undertakes not to participate in any alliance or political, military, economic, or financial treaty or in any hostile action directed against the other contracting party." This provision was a standard clause that figured in all neutrality treaties signed by Turkey in this period. The provisions contained in article 5 were unique, however, and reflected the special ties that existed between Turkey and Afghanistan: "The Turkish Republic commits itself to selecting and placing at Afghanistan's disposal legal, scientific, and military experts for the development of Afghanistan's educational system and its armed forces."

Disturbances broke out in Afghanistan soon after King Amanullah returned to his country. A delegation headed by Kazım Paşa [Orbay] went to Kabul to help the Afghan army control the situation, but very soon Amanullah Khan was replaced on the throne by his brother, Inayatullah Khan, who was also deposed and replaced by Habibullah Khan. Habibullah saw Turkey as the supporter

of the previous administration and ordered all Turkish personnel to leave the country. Shortly after these events, the exiled former king Nadir Shah returned to Afghanistan and took power. Nadir Shah pursued Amanullah Khan's policy vis-à-vis Turkey and recalled the deported Turkish experts. Soon afterward, Mohammed Zahir Shah succeeded Nadir Shah on the Afghan throne. Over a period of eighteen months, Zahir Shah was the fifth person to become ruler of Afghanistan. He finally managed to bring stability to the country.

During Zahir Shah's rule Turkish-Afghan relations achieved the vitality of relations during Amanullah Khan's period. In 1930 Memduh Şevket Bey was appointed Turkish ambassador in Kabul. His constructive efforts and the contribution of the Turkish experts had a significant impact on Afghanistan's modernization. Turkey even undertook the task of looking after Afghanistan's interests in places where there was no Afghan diplomatic representation.

The mutual trust between Turkey and Afghanistan in Zahir Shah's time also had a positive effect on Afghanistan's relations with Iran. These two countries had border disputes going back to 1903. To settle their disputes, the two countries asked Turkey to be an arbitrator. A delegation headed by Fahreddin Paşa [Türkkan] helped settle the disputes in 1934. Fahreddin Paşa had served as Reza Shah's aide-de-camp during the latter's visit to Turkey and had earned the shah's trust.

When the Sadabad Pact was signed in 1937, relations between the two countries were at their best; but the outbreak of World War II was to cut this period short.

### III. THE SADABAD PACT

## A. The Events Leading to the Pact

Turkey played a leading role in the preparation of the Sadabad Pact, which also included Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Although known as a pact, it was not conceived as a military alliance. Basically, it was a treaty of friendship and nonaggression. There were two main reasons for the conclusion of this pact.

1. The desire to settle border disputes on a lasting basis: the signatories had border disputes with Iran, the centrally located country. As in the case of Turkey and Iran, Afghanistan also had border disputes with Iran. Iraq had a dispute with Iran over where the line was to be drawn at the Shatt al-Arab River. Iraq also had concerns about Iran's influence over the Shiites in the southern part of its territory and the Kurds in the northern part.

Most of these problems emanated from a lack of trust,

due to the suspicion that the other party was supporting the border tribes involved in disturbances. The nonrecognition of borders by the rebellious Kurdish tribes living in the region where the frontiers of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey met constituted a major problem for all three countries.

By 1937 all of these questions had been settled, and the signatories wanted to reinforce and render permanent the atmosphere of trust that had been established among the neighbors. They did not want the activities of rebellious tribes to spoil their bilateral relations. This was the chief reason for the conclusion of the pact.

2. The desire to confirm the independence and sovereignty of the signatories: until a short time before, all four countries were either full colonies or semicolonies. Afghanistan emerged from this status in 1919, Iran and Turkey in 1923, and Iraq in 1932. With the exception of Iraq, it was important for all of them to stress their full independence and declare that they were not under the influence of any major power. Apart from Turkey, these countries were establishing an international organization for the first time. This was particularly important for Iraq.

Some authors have concluded that there were other motives for the signing of this pact. In general their views reflect the perception of the major powers of the day. This perception was that the pact was signed basically to check Italy (e.g., see OTDP, p. 106). It was in the interest of Britain and the Soviet Union to reinforce the claims that the Fascist government in Rome was aggressive by declaring that the Middle Eastern countries were uniting against the expansionist policies of Italy. In reality the preliminary preparations of the pact predated Italy's attack on Abyssinia. Furthermore, in the negotiations leading up to the pact, Italy was never mentioned.

In addition, it could be claimed that the Middle Eastern countries felt the need to join forces against British imperialism or that Moscow's neighbors were getting together due to fear of the spread of communism or that the USSR might still be pushing for outlets to warm seas. In this connection it should be noted that Iraq could never be a party to this kind of pact without Britain's approval. Iraq's dependence on Britain carried more weight than its membership in the pact. Furthermore, Britain was invited to join the pact, but it declined the invitation. As for the USSR, it had treaties of friendship with all of the signatories except Iraq. Not only did the USSR encourage the signing of this pact, but it also proposed that Afghanistan be included.

If we examine the preparatory stage of the pact, the above-mentioned claims about the objectives of the pact can easily be refuted.

# B. The Preparatory Stage, Signing, and End of the Pact

After Britain ended the mandate regime in Iraq and recognized its independence in June 1930, Baghdad wanted to develop its relations with its two powerful neighbors, Iran and Turkey. In July 1931 King Faisal and prime minister Nuri Said Paşa paid a visit to Ankara. This launched a series of negotiations between Iraq and Turkey conducted at the level of experts.

Because the question of the border between Iraq and Turkey was already settled, the experts considered the questions likely to arise on account of the activities of Kurdish tribes along the border. In addition, Iraq asked Turkey to intercede on its behalf with Iran, with which Turkey enjoyed excellent relations, to resolve some of Iraq's problems with its eastern neighbor.

When Iraq proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty by Iraq, Iran, and Turkey in 1933, Ankara responded by proposing that Britain and the USSR also join in the treaty. This was because the 1930 treaty had not granted Iraq full independence and allowed Britain to control Iraq's foreign policy. Therefore it would be meaningless to have Iraqi participation in a treaty from which Britain was excluded. Furthermore, according to the protocol of 1929, Turkey had undertaken not to join such a treaty without consulting the U\$SR, and Moscow could not have approved of Turkey's joining a treaty in which Britain was the sole major power. Hence Turkey's proposal for the USSR to take part. When the proposal to participate went to London and Moscow, Britain turned down the offer. At that time, Britain's policy was to avoid joining regional pacts because of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the existence of the LoN guarantees. The three countries would not contemplate the USSR's participation without Britain, so they retracted their offer. The USSR showed understanding and proposed that Afghanistan be included in the arrangement.

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey initialed the treaty in Geneva on 2 October 1935. One month later Afghanistan accepted the invitation and joined in. But it took two years to get the treaty signed because of Iraq's procrastination.

Iraq hesitated because the question of the Shatt al-Arab remained unresolved. It would have been unrealistic to sign a treaty aiming at establishing an atmosphere of trust and nonaggression among its signatories without first securing this atmosphere between Iran and Iraq. Also, Iraq was delaying the signing because it wanted Turkey, eager to secure this treaty, to use its influence on Iran and pressure it to reach an early agreement with Iraq over the border dispute. The tactic worked, and Turkey actively sought a solution to the Shatt al-Arab question. Another reason for Iraq's delaying tactics was that it did not want to be the sole Arab state in the treaty. It wanted to see Saudi Arabia and even Yemen included in the arrangement. Especially after the Hatay question erupted between Turkey and Syria in 1936, Iraq did not relish giving the impression of detaching itself from the Arab world and siding with Turkey. In 1933 Yasin Hashemi of the Vatani Party replaced Nuri Said Paşa as prime minister. As the new prime minister was pursuing a nationalistic foreign policy, King Faisal was being extra cautious about signing this sort of pact.

In October 1936 Bekir Sitki Paşa carried out a coup against Hashemi and installed Hikmet Suleiman as prime minister while he himself remained in the background. Both Bekir Sitki Pasha and Hikmet Suleiman were in favor of Iraq's settling all outstanding questions with its neighbors. As a consequence the treaty on the frontier between Iran and Iraq was signed in Tehran on 4 July 1937. With this treaty, the frontier was traced along the thalweg (a line joining the deepest points of a watercourse) in the Shatt al-Arab in accordance with Iran's wishes.

Four days after this treaty, on 8 July 1937, the text that had been initialed at Geneva was signed by the four ministers of foreign affairs (Tevfik Rüştü Aras signed for Turkey) at the Palace of Sadabad in Tehran. With the completion of the ratification proceedings, the pact came into effect on 25 June 1938. As already noted, this was not a treaty of alliance but rather a treaty of neutrality and nonaggression. The following four articles were very clear in describing the character of the pact.

Article 1: "The contracting parties undertake to refrain from interfering in one another's internal affairs."

Article 3: "The contracting parties have agreed to hold consultations on all international disputes relating to their common interests."

Article 4: "Each of the contracting parties...undertakes not to engage in any activity directed at any of the other contracting parties."

Article 6: "If one of the contracting parties should commit aggression against a third state, the other contracting parties may terminate this pact in relation to the aggressor without having to provide prior notification."

The real aim of the pact, the question of the Kurdish tribes, was contained in article 7: "Each of the contracting parties undertakes to prevent the establishment and the activities within its territory of armed bands, units, or organizations aiming to destroy the institutions or weaken the public order and security or destabilize the political regime of one of the contracting parties." It was this article that made the pact action-oriented. In the circumstances

of World War II, all of the other articles of the pact became inoperative.

On the day the pact was signed, an annexed protocol was prepared that established the organs of the pact. According to the protocol, there would be a council of ministers that would meet annually and a secretary-general of the pact.

Shortly after the pact came into effect, World War II broke out. In October 1939 Britain proposed to Ankara that the pact be turned into a defensive alliance against the USSR, but Turkey refused to consider this proposal. During the war, the pact was placed on the shelf and forgotten. The last meeting of the council of ministers was held in 1939. Because the post of secretary-general was supposed to rotate on an annual basis according to the presidency of the council and because it had neither a headquarters building nor any permanent staff, the pact ceased to exist in a practical sense. In 1979 the new regime in Iran implied that it had denounced the pact. But since Iran did not explicitly say so, it could be argued that the pact is still legally in effect.

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# The Montreux Straits Convention

# I. THE MONTREUX STRAITS CONVENTION

The Lausanne Straits Convention (LSC) remained in force for thirteen years. During the interwar years, no serious problems were encountered in connection with passage through the Straits and the convention was effectively implemented. Developments on the eve of World War II, however, necessitated a review of the regime of the Turkish Straits.

#### The New International Situation

Turkey accepted—albeit reluctantly—the limitations that the LSC placed on its sovereignty because Ankara was anxious to see the Lausanne Conference concluded with a peace agreement. Turkey also believed that the collective security system created within the framework of the LoN would function effectively and that international disarmament would be achieved.

All members of the LoN were committed to disarmament. The efforts to achieve naval disarmament were in large measure successful. At the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921-22, the tonnage of capital ships was limited to 35,000 tons for battleships and 27,000 tons for aircraft carriers. At the London Conference of 1930, limitations were also placed on the tonnage of smaller warships. But these successes were short-lived, and after 1931 the arms race was on once again. The attempts to place limitations on arms related to land warfare yielded no practical results. The disarmament committee set up by the LoN in 1925 was able to convene a conference only in 1932, and this ended in failure. Hitler had come to power in Berlin by the time the next conference met, and Germany withdrew from the conference in October 1934. In these circumstances the policy of force came into play once again. The atmosphere that prevailed in 1936 was completely different from the atmosphere of the immediate postwar years.

### Turkey's Initiatives Prior to 1936

Starting in 1933, Turkey made various diplomatic moves to amend the LSC by convening an international conference that would establish a new regime. At the London Conference on Disarmament of 1933, Turkey called for the lifting of the restrictions imposed by the LSC on rearming the shores of the Straits and the islands of the Sea of Marmara with the exception of the island of Imrali. This call went unheeded because it was not within the terms of reference of the conference.

Turkey repeated its demands at the Council of the League in 1935, at the Council of the Balkan Entente again in 1935, and at the General Assembly of the LoN in September 1935. Nothing emerged from these urgings. Turkey did not want to carry out a *fait accompli*. It was striving for a change of regime through negotiation and mutual accommodation. Eventually Turkey reiterated its position at the LoN in November 1935, when the league decided to apply sanctions against Italy after the aggression in Abyssinia. On that occasion Turkey's request received a favorable reaction.

# Turkey's Note of 10 April 1936

Turkey submitted notes to the parties to the LSC on 10 April 1936, calling for the convening of an international conference to establish a new regime. This request was based on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* (a doctrine in international law to the effect that a treaty may become inapplicable in case of a fundamental change in circumstances).

Turkey's note contained the following arguments:

1. The situation in the Black Sea has altered fundamentally since the coming into effect of the LSC, and the situation in the Mediterranean is also unsettled. "There is a tendency toward rearmament at Naval Conferences. Shipyards are constructing vessels of hitherto unmatched power. Air forces are being strengthened at a dizzying

speed. Armaments are continuously being increased on the mainland as well as the islands."

- 2. The system of collective security has ceased to function. Therefore "it is not possible to limit Turkish sovereignty over the Straits without effective, functional, and practical guarantees, because security of the Straits is essential for the country's general security."
- 3. The LSC contains provisions applicable only in peace and war. A new convention, however, should also contain provisions dealing with "an imminent threat of war." Only thus can Turkey exercise its legal right to defend itself.
- 4. "The circumstances that now prevail have come about independently of the will of the signatories of Lausanne and have made its provisions inoperable."

# Why the Note Received a Favorable Reception

The USSR was not happy with the regime imposed by the Lausanne Straits Convention and delayed its ratification. Consequently, Moscow supported Turkey's proposal on the assumption that it could bring about changes in its favor in the LSC.

Bulgaria did not favor strict control of the Straits by Turkey. However, it felt that the Turkish initiative would facilitate Sofia's efforts to rid itself of some of the disarmament provisions imposed on it by the 1919 Neuilly Treaty. As a result, it did not oppose the Turkish effort to secure a new regime. Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia supported Turkey because of the Balkan Pact.

France was strongly pro-status quo and did not want the situation in Europe or the peace treaties underpinning it changed. But Paris had signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR in 1935 to secure Soviet support against Germany and was reluctant to oppose a change that Moscow favored.

For its part, Britain favored the Turkish proposal even though it had been the architect of the LSC because it was seeking to draw Ankara to its side in the face of a growing Italian threat in the Mediterranean.

The opposition to the proposal to revise the LSC came from Europe's revisionist power, Italy. It is assumed that Italy opposed Turkey's proposal in order to punish Ankara for its participation in the sanctions regime imposed on Italy by the LoN in response to the Italian aggression against Abyssinia.

# The Positions of the Participants

The Conference of Montreux convened on 22 June 1936 with the participation of all the parties to the Lausanne

Straits Convention with the exception of Italy. The Turkish government submitted the text of a draft convention on 23 June. The Turkish draft contained provisions similar to the provisions of the LSC for regulating the passage of merchant vessels through the Straits. In its text Turkey sought to impose certain restrictions on the passage of warships of non–Black Sea Powers. To cite an example, Turkey would restrict the tonnage and duration of stay for the war vessels of non–Black Sea Powers. The draft text provided that, in the event of Turkey feeling itself to be under an imminent threat of war, the passage of warships would be conditional on Turkey's consent. Although it was not stated in the draft, Turkey also wanted to abolish the Straits Commission established by the LSC and to remilitarize the region.

Subsequently Britain submitted a revised version of the Turkish draft that was designed to mitigate the conflict of interest between the riparian and nonriparian states of the Black Sea. In the British text the Straits Commission of the LSC was preserved. The British text also contained provisions about an imminent threat of war and recognized Turkey's right to apply a special regime in this situation. But it also provided that this regime would be subject to review by the Council of the LoN, with the stipulation that if the council found the Turkish measures to be unwarranted the Ankara government would have to rescind its measures.

Although Britain supported the principle of freedom of passage through the Straits for warships, it was not against imposing certain limitations on the aggregate tonnage of warships that non–Black Sea Powers could maintain in that sea. This was because the British Admiralty had warned that insistence on unlimited access to the Black Sea could lead to counterdemands for unlimited access to the Mediterranean. Britain also feared that a Soviet fleet freed of limitations in sailing through the Straits might provoke Germany into denouncing the naval treaty that Berlin had concluded with Britain.

In its opposition to the British proposal to maintain the Straits Commission, Turkey enjoyed the full backing of Romania. This was because Romania had been forced to accept two different international commissions on its territory charged with the task of supervising navigation on the Danube. Romania held the view that such arrangements forced upon countries by outsiders were infringements of national sovereignty.

The anti-British position of the USSR was in line with Turkey's proposals with respect to both the remilitarization of the Straits and limitations on the passage of warships. But the USSR was against any limitations being imposed in regard to the passage through the Straits of warships of Black Sea countries. Furthermore, Moscow wanted Turkey to grant unconditional access in time of war (Turkey being a nonbelligerent) to warships carrying out international commitments and duties imposed by the LoN. In adopting this position, the Soviet Union was motivated by the mutual assistance treaties it had entered into with France to counter a possible German threat.

From the foregoing it will be seen that at the conference Britain stood for unrestricted freedom of passage for the warships of non–Black Sea Powers, while the USSR advocated complete freedom for the warships of Black. Sea Powers. France supported the Soviet position, even though it was a non–Black Sea Power, because of its treaty with the USSR.

To sum up, the general alignment of the participants at Montreux was Britain (supported by Japan) on one side, with Turkey (supported by the Black Sea Powers plus France) on the other side. At the conclusion of the conference the British position prevailed with respect to limitations imposed on warships, while the Turkish position prevailed with respect to the situation when Turkey felt itself to be under imminent threat of war, the remilitarization of the Straits, and the abolition of the Straits Commission.

# II. THE NEW REGIME ADOPTED AT MONTREUX

The Montreux Straits Convention was signed on 20 July 1936. The convention, along with its annexes, was ratified by the TGNA on 1 July 1936 and came into effect on 9 November 1936. The remilitarization of the region of the Straits by the Turkish army began on 15 August 1936 in accordance with the annexed protocol.

The Montreux Straits Convention came into effect after it had been ratified by all of the signatories of the LSC, with the exception of Italy. This country acceded to the convention in 1938, while Japan withdrew from the convention in 1951 as a consequence of the San Francisco Treaty it signed with the Allies.

# A. The Transit Regime and "Imminent Threat of War"

The Montreux Convention consists of twenty-nine articles. In principle, transit through the Turkish Straits is free. In effect, article 1 declares: "The High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits." Although the Montreux Convention has a duration of twenty years,

paragraph 2 of article 28 contains the following provision with respect to freedom of navigation: "The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in article 1 of the present Convention shall...continue without limit of time."

The regime established by the convention applied to the Straits. The preamble of the convention described the Straits in these terms: "the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term 'Straits.'"

The Montreux Convention regulates the passage through the Straits of merchant vessels, vessels of war, and aircraft separately. According to the convention, the rules applying to passage through the Straits of merchant vessels and vessels of war differ depending on the prevailing situation: (1) time of peace; (2) time of war (subdivided into Turkey being belligerent and nonbelligerent); and (3) when Turkey considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war.

### Passage of Merchant Vessels

Although the convention does not contain a definition of "merchant vessel," article 7 contains the provision: "The term 'merchant vessel' applies to all vessels that are not covered by Section II of the present Convention." Therefore all vessels not in the category "vessels of war" are deemed to be merchant vessels.

### a. In Time of Peace

Article 2: "In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in article 3." The formality referred to in article 3 relates to the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. "This control...shall be carried out by day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits" (article 3, paragraph 1).

In time of peace, "[n]o taxes or charges...shall be levied by the Turkish Authorities [on merchant vessels] when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits" (article 2, paragraph 1). Sanitary controls, lighthouses, and channel buoys and lifesaving services are subject to taxes and charges (annex I/1). In time of peace, "pilotage and towage remain optional" (article 2, paragraph 3). "The Turkish Government will publish, from time to time, the tariff of the taxes and charges to be levied for... optional services" (annex I/5).

#### b. In Time of War

Article 4: "In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits." Pilotage and towage remain optional.

Article 5:

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the

Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.

Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Merchant vessels in time of war and Turkey being belligerent are under the obligation of not assisting the enemy, so it can be deduced that Turkey has the right to visit such vessels and conduct searches. If Turkey were denied these rights, the obligation imposed on such merchant vessels would be meaningless.

# c. When Turkey Itself Is Threatened with Imminent Danger of War

Article 6: "Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of Article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by day and their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities. Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory but no charge shall be levied."

### 2. Passage of Vessels of War

The definition of vessels of war and of their specification and those relating to the calculation of tonnage are set forth in annex II of the convention, which is taken from the London Naval Treaty of 25 March 1936. According to this treaty, vessels of war are divided into six categories: capital ships, aircraft carriers, light surface vessels, submarines, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels (Box 2-13).




Figure 2-1. The Montreux Conference as depicted by Derso and Kelen (Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı [İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1998], vol. 1, p. 168).

# Box 2-13, Categories of Vessels according to the Montreux Straits Convention

Light surface vessels: surface vessels of war other than aircraft carriers, minor war vessels, or auxiliary vessels with a displacement of 100 to 10,000 tons that do not carry a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches.

Minor war vessels, surface vessels of war, other than auxillary vessels, with a displacement of 100 to 2,000 tons that do not mount a gun with a caliber exceeding 6.1 inches, are not capable of launching torpedoes, and do not have a speed of over 20 knots.

Auxiliary vessels: naval surface vessels with a displacement of over 100 tons, which are normally employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some way other than as fighting ships and which are not specifically built as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics: mount a gun with a callber exceeding 6.1 inches, mount more than eight guns with a callber exceeding 3 inches, are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes, are protected by armor plate, have a speed greater than 28 knots, are designed to operated aircraft at sea, or mount more than two aircraft-launching devices.

Capital ships fall into two categories: (1) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, or capital ships of subcategory 2 with a displacement exceeding 10,000 tons or carrying a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches; (2) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, with a displacement under 8,000 tons and carrying a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches.

Submarines: all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea.:

Aircraft carriers: surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a deck for landing or taking off on any vessel of war not designed primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea shall not cause such a vessel to be classified as an aircraft carrier.

(K. ÖZERSAY)

#### a. In Time of Peace

### Rules Applicable to War Vessels of All States

Article 10: "In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non—Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges." But these vessels must enter the Straits in daylight and must comply with the prior notification rule applicable to all war vessels. The aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels transiting the Straits cannot exceed 15,000 tons, and the number cannot exceed nine vessels. "Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non—Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits [upon the invitation of the Turkish government] shall not be included in this tonnage... Neither shall vessels... which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage" (article 14/3-4).

"The transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days, but it is desirable that in the case of non–Black Sea Powers, this period should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type, and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice" (article 13/1).

According to article 24, "as soon as they have been notified of the intended passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force, the Turkish Government shall inform...the High Contracting Parties of the composition of that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry into the Straits, and...the probable date of its return."

If a foreign naval force wishes to pay a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits upon the invitation of the Turkish government, such a force will not be subject to the limitations of tonnage and category (article 14/3). If this force belongs to a non–Black Sea Power, however, and, following the visit, proceeds to the Black Sea rather than returning home, the limitations imposed by the Montreux Convention on non–Black Sea Powers (articles 10, 14, and 18) shall apply (article 17).

According to article 15, "vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying." Furthermore, such vessels "shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage."

Paragraph 1 of article 10 of the convention regulates the passage of light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels through the Straits. Paragraph 2 of this article stipulates that "vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right to transit under the special conditions provided by articles 11 and 12." But articles 11 and 12 provide for the passage of submarines and capital ships belonging only to Black Sea Powers, so non–Black Sea Powers may not send ships other than the three categories mentioned above. In other words, their aircraft carriers, submarines, and capital ships are excluded from passing through the Straits. Because articles 11 and 12 make no provision for aircraft carriers, Black Sea Powers may not send their aircraft carriers through the Straits (for the implementation of this provision, see "The Issue of the Turkish Straits" in Section 6).

"When effecting transit, the commander of the naval force shall, without being under any obligation to stop, communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders" (article 13/3).

# Rules Applicable to the Warships of Non-Black Sea Powers

In time of peace, the light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels belonging to non–Black Sea Powers fulfilling the aforementioned conditions may freely transit the Straits. But these countries cannot send their aircraft carriers, capital ships, and submarines through the Straits (articles 10/2 and 11).

The restrictions by category and tonnage placed on the passage of war vessels of non–Black Sea Powers in peacetime are contained under the heading "Rules Applicable to the War Vessels of All States." Since the convention was concluded for the purpose of ensuring the security of Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers, it contains a number of other limitations. The aggregate tonnage of vessels belonging to non–Black Sea Powers that can be kept in the Black Sea as well as the length of time they can stay there are restricted:

Article 18: The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows:

- (a)...the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 30,000 tons;
- (b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum

of 45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power shall inform the Turkish Government, on the 1st January and the 1st July each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this information to the other High Contracting Parties . . .

- (c) The tonnage which any non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above;
- (d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces...for humanitarian purposes, the said forces, which shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea...[with] an authorization...from the Turkish Government in the following circumstances: if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above has not been reached and will not be exceeded by the dispatch of the forces which it is desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said authorization within the shortest possible time...if the said figure has already been reached...the Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers...and if [they] make no objection within 24 hours...the Turkish Government shall within forty-eight hours...inform the interested Powers of the reply which it has decided to make to their request.
- 2. Vessels of war belonging to the non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

# Rules Applicable to the War Vessels of Black Sea Powers

The general regulations applicable to the war vessels of all states are also valid for the war vessels of Black Sea Powers. But the convention makes certain allowances in favor of Black Sea Powers.

Black Sea Powers may send capital ships exceeding 15,000 tons through the Straits on condition that they pass singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers (article 11).

The second difference is in article 12:

Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey. Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed information on the matter is given to Turkey. In either case, the said submarines must travel by day and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.

#### b. In Time of War

The time of war is divided into two cases in the convention: Turkey being nonbelligerent and being belligerent.

### Turkey Being Nonbelligerent

When Turkey is nonbelligerent in time of war, the warships of nonbelligerents shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same terms as in time of peace. The passage of warships of belligerents through the Straits is in principle not allowed, however, with three exceptions.

In the first case, the warships of belligerents, whether they be Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, may pass through the Straits to return to their home base (article 19/4), but "vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or carry out any hostile act in the Straits" (article 19/5).

In the second case, warships may pass through the Straits if they are carrying out enforcement action decided upon by the LoN (article 25).

The third case is when assistance is being rendered to a state victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the LoN and duly registered and published in accordance with the Covenant of the LoN. In such cases, the warships may pass through the Straits even if they belong to belligerent powers (article 19/2).

### Turkey Being Belligerent

In this situation, "the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government" under the terms of article 20.

# When Turkey Itself is Threatened with Imminent Danger of War

Should Turkey consider itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, it shall have the right to implement the measures provided for times when it is belligerent (article 21/1). Before Turkey exercises this right, the warships that

find themselves separated away from their base may pass through the Straits (article 21/2).

It is up to the Turkish government to determine if a threatening situation exists. When Turkey makes a determination of the existence of a threat, it shall notify the parties to the convention and the secretary-general of the LoN (article 21/3). If the Council of the League of Nations decides by a two-thirds majority that the measures taken by Turkey are not justified and if this opinion is also shared by the majority of the contracting parties, the Turkish government undertakes to discontinue the measures as well as any measures taken under article 6 of the convention (article 21/4).

Of the two organs that are competent to check on the existence of a threat, the LoN has ceased to exist, but the right enjoyed by the signatory powers remains in effect. In Turkey there is no agreement on whether the right conferred on the Council of the League of Nations has passed to the United Nations. Neither is there any agreement among scholars as to whether the United Nations has taken over the specific responsibilities of the LoN.

### 3. Passage of Aircraft

The LSC introduced the principle of freedom of transit and navigation both by sea and by air and made provisions for both civil and military aircraft to everfly the Straits (articles 1 and 2). Montreux, however, does not accept the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by air and makes arrangements only for civil aircraft. Consequently, it is up to the Turkish government to grant or withhold flying rights over the Straits to military aircraft.

Article 23: "In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will indicate the air routes available for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these routes, provided that they give the Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights, a notification of three days, and as regards flights on regular services, a general notification of the dates of passage."

# B. The Lifting of the Restrictions Imposed at Lausanne

It will be recalled that at Lausanne various restrictions were placed on Turkey's sovereignty. It can be said that, thanks to Montreux, Turkey was able to recover its rights. These rights can be examined under two headings: (1) Remilitarization of the Straits; and (2) The Abolition of the Straits Commission.

### Remilitarization of the Straits

In the text of the Montreux Convention, there are no provisions for the remilitarization of the zone demilitarized under the LSC. Nevertheless, the first article of the annexed protocol is very clear: "Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the Preamble to the said Convention."

Based on this provision of the annexed protocol, Turkey introduced its army into the region of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus and started remilitarizing the zone. Thus the guarantees provided within the framework of the LoN under article 18 of the LSC came to an end.

### Abolition of the Straits Commission

The Straits Commission was established in accordance with articles 10 to 17 of the LSC. Article 24 of the Montreux Convention reads as follows: "The functions of the International Commission set up under the Convention relating to the regime of the Straits of the 24th July, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Turkish Government." By this provision Turkey will be responsible for informing the signatory powers of warships passing through the Straits as well as for the nonimplementation or erroneous implementation of the provisions regarding their passage through the Straits.

Turkey assumed international responsibilities in this sphere.

### C. Denunciation of the Convention and Its Revision

Article 28: "The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force." If this convention comes to an end and the present regime cannot be replaced by another regime (or is replaced by another regime), the principle of freedom of transit and navigation shall continue without limit of time (article 28/2). Revisions in the principle of freedom of transit or the termination of this principle can only be carried out with the unanimous agreement of the parties to the convention.

Article 28 provides for the following in paragraphs 3 and 4: "If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contacting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government, the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given... In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present article, the

Table 2-5. The Montreux Transit Regime

|                         |  | VESSELS OF BLACK SEA POWERS   | VESSELS OF NON-BLACK SEA POWERS   |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|
|                         |  | Passage by day  | Passage by day  |
| Threat of Danger of War |  | <ul> <li>Transit through route indicated by Turkey</li> </ul>   | Transit through route indicated by Turkey   |
| Inches                  | or Dunger or True                      | <ul> <li>Pilotage may be made obligatory but without charge</li> </ul>  | Pilotage may be made obligatory but without charge  |
|                         |  | Free transit whatever the flag and cargo  | Free transit whatever the flag and cargo  |
|                         | •                                      | By day and by night   | By day and by night   |
| In Time of Peace        |  | Reports its name, nationality, tonnage, destination, and last port of call  | Reports its name, nationality, tonnage,<br>destination, and last port of call   |
|                         | \$                                     | No other formality except sanitary control  | No other formality except sanitary control  |
|                         | ************************************** | Pilotage and towage optional  | Pilotage and towage optional  |
|                         | Turkey Being<br>Nonbelligerent         | Freedom of transit under same conditions as in time of peace  | Freedom of transit under same conditions as in time of peace  |
| In Tim                  | e - 1212                               | Transit of vessels belonging to a state at war with Turkey shall depend on Turkey   | Transit of vessels belonging to a state at war<br>with Turkey shall depend on Turkey  |
| of War                  | Turkey Being<br>Belligerent            | Vessels of a country not at war with Turkey<br>may transit on condition that they do not assist<br>enemy and navigate by day through route indi-<br>cated by Turkey | Vessels of a country not at war with Turkey<br>may transit on condition that they do not assist<br>enemy and navigate by day through route<br>indicated by Turkey |
| Threat                  | of Danger of War                       | Passage left to Turkey's discretion   | Passage left to Turkey's discretion   |
|                         |  | Auxiliary vessels, light surface vessels, and<br>minor war vessels:  The total number of foreign warships in the  | The transit of auxiliary vessels, light surface   |
|                         |  | Straits cannot exceed 9 and their aggregate tonnage cannot exceed 15,000 tons   | vessels, and minor war vessels shall be subject<br>to the same conditions as the vessels of Black<br>Sea Powers   |
|                         |  | Prior notification required (normal period of 8 days)   | Aircraft carriers, submarines, and capital ships<br>cannot pass through the Straits   |
| In Tim                  | e of Peace                             | Transit by day without stopping   | <ul> <li>Aggregate tonnage of vessels in Black Sea</li> </ul>   |
|                         |  | Capital ships of over 15,000 tons:  | cannot exceed 30,000 tons. This figure can go<br>up to 45,000 tons in certain circumstances   |
|                         |  | Pass through Straits singly, escorted by not more<br>than two destroyers  | The tonnage that one non–Black Sea Power  |
|                         |  | Prior notification required (normal period of 8 days)   | may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to<br>two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage allowed to<br>non–Black Sea Powers   |
|                         |  | No limitation on their total tonnage in the Black<br>Sea or the duration of their stay  | Holl-Diack Sea Fowels   |
|                         |  | The vessels of nonbelligerents may transit as in<br>time of peace   | The vessels of nonbelligerents may transit as in<br>time of peace   |
|                         |  | <ul> <li>The vessels of belligerents may not transit the<br/>Straits. Exceptions to this rule are:</li> </ul>   | • The vessels of belligerents may not transit the Straits. Exceptions to this rule are:   |
| In Tim                  | Turkey Being<br>Nonbelligerent<br>e    | Those vessels separated from their base may return thereto  | Those vessels separated from their base may return thereto  |
| of War                  |  | Vessels carrying out enforcement duties for the LoN   | Vessels carrying out enforcement duties for th<br>LoN   |
|                         | ·                                      | Vessels complying with provisions of mutual assistance treaty to which Turkey is a party  | Vessels complying with provisions of mutual assistance treaty to which Turkey is a party  |
|                         | Turkey Being<br>Belligerent            | Passage of vessels left to Turkey's discretion  | Passage of vessels left to Turkey's discretion  |

High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention." No such denunciation has occurred, so Montreux has remained in force up to the present.

The procedure to amend the provisions of the convention is regulated by article 29. "At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention [9 November 1936], each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention... Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them." A request for revision must be supported by at least one other contracting party if the revision relates to articles 14 (on the subject of the number and tonnage of warships) or 18 (on the subject of the number and tonnage of warships that non-Black Sea Powers can introduce to the Black Sea) and in the case of modifications to any other article by at least two other contracting parties.

"Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Contracting Powers agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose. Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving Articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient. The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey" (article 29/4, 5, and 6). In other words, these two articles cannot be amended without the consent of Turkey.

Kudret Özersay

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
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SECTION 3

1939-1945

Relative Autonomy—2



# Appraisal of the Period

### I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

World War II started with Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 and ended in Europe on 8 May 1945 at midnight. The war spread to five continents and affected every aspect of life, especially in Europe.

During the war Turkey pursued two broad objectives: to avoid getting embroiled in the conflict and to avoid occupation. From Turkey's perspective, the war had three specific turning points and two general features that affected Turkey directly.

To begin with, France's early defeat placed Turkey in a very difficult situation. In concluding the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France in October 1939, Turkey had made the assumption that France would resist Germany over

a period of time and wear it down. It had also assumed that the French fleet would check the Italian navy in the Mediterranean (Hale, p. 82). When these expectations were dashed, two events took place that shook Turkey. With Italy's declaration of war on 10 June 1940, the war had spread to the Mediterranean and the clause of the Tripartite Alliance requiring Turkey to enter the war became operative. The second event was the arrival of the German army at the Turkish frontier in March 1941. France's early collapse, however, also provided Turkey with a perfect excuse to avoid getting involved in the conflict.

A second turning point that was of immediate interest to Turkey was the German attack on the USSR in June 1941. This event helped free Turkey of its greatest fear: the "Polish syndrome." This was the fear of being invaded simultaneously by the Germans and the Soviets.

The third turning point was the German defeat at

Table 3-1. The Administration of the Period 1939-1945

| PRESIDENT                        | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS<br>OF FOREIGN<br>AFFAIRS                           | SECRETARIES-<br>GENERAL OF MFA   |
|----------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|
|                                  | 2nd Refik Saydam<br>Government CHP<br>(3 Apr. 1939–<br>9 July 1942)    | M. Şükrü Saraçoğlu<br>(11 Nov 1938–                          | Numan R.<br>Menemencioğlu        |
| M. İsmet İnönü<br>(11 Nov. 1938– | 1st Şükrü Saraçoğlu<br>Government CHP<br>(9 July 1942–<br>9 Mar. 1943) | 13 Aug. 1942)  | (1 July 1929-<br>9 Aug. 1942)    |
| 22 May 1950)                     | 2nd Şükrü Saraçoğlu<br>Government CHP<br>(9 Mar, 1943–                 | Numan R.<br>Menemencioğlu<br>(13 Aug. 1942–<br>25 June 1944) | Cevat Açıkalın<br>(16 Aug. 1943– |
|                                  | 7 Aug. 1946)   | Hasan Saka<br>(13 Sept. 1944–<br>10 Sept. 1947)              | 15 Oct. 1945)                    |

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): Republican People's Party. (Table by Atay Akdeyelioğlu)

Stalingrad in February 1943, from which Germany never recovered. This gave rise to new anxieties in Ankara, because it meant a resurgence of the Soviet threat. Throughout the German-Soviet war, Turkey was apprehensive about a decisive victory by either side, because it expected that once one of the antagonists had completely eliminated its adversary it would turn its attention on Turkey.

The main feature of the wartime period was that there were frequent and abrupt changes in the tides of war. This placed Turkey on the spot and compelled it to deal with incessant demands being made on Ankara.

Another factor affecting Turkey was the new conditions created as a result of the manner in which the war ended: in 1945 the world found itself divided into two very distinct camps. In these circumstances it would become very difficult for a medium power like Turkey in its particular geostrategic location to rely on the balance of

power in the conduct of its foreign policy (see "Turkey as a Strategic Medium Power (SMP): Military-Strategic and Economic Dimensions" in the Introduction).

# II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

As a general rule, it can be said that the direction of a country's foreign policy is determined by its domestic situation. This rule applies in normal circumstances and over the medium to long term. In extraordinary times such as war and in the short term, international factors can have a determining effect on the domestic situation.

Although it stayed out of the war, Turkey was deeply affected by it in a great number of ways. When the war came to an end, Turkey had changed beyond recognition.

Production suffered badly due to the war. As a rule, war has a stimulating effect on production in industrialized countries, especially if the country manages to avoid becoming a battlefield. (The U.S. economy grew substantially in both world wars.) But Turkey's economy was basically agricultural and suffered from the mobilization of 1 million men, most of them farmers. In addition, the Office of Soil Products Law (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Kanunu: TMO Law) of 1938 and the National Protection Law (Milli Korunma Kanunu: MKK) dated 18 January 1940 proved counterproductive (Box 3-1). As a result, production fell dramatically and farmers started diverting their crops to the black market. In 1945 agricultural production amounted to 40% of the 1939 level. Industrial production fared no better. While industrial production had doubled through statist planning between 1932 and 1939, in 1945 industrial production was at a level only 20% higher than the 1932 level (Keyder, p. 92).

The table of basic economic indicators (Table 3-2) gives the impression that the GNP at current prices as well as in dollar terms was increasing during the period. But this apparent increase is totally misleading. The increase in the GNP in dollar terms occurred because the rate of exchange of the Turkish currency was fixed at an artificially high level. The increase in the GNP at current prices was entirely due to inflation. The cumulative rise in wholesale prices from 1939 to 1944 reached 381.5%, notwithstanding a 22.2% fall in prices in 1944.

The same misleading situation emerges in the ratio of foreign trade to GNP, which fell from 11.92% to around 5%. This fall in the ratio might indicate that the country was becoming more self-sufficient, but in this case it does not apply. It is due to the fixed parity of the Turkish currency in a high-inflation situation. As a matter of fact, in dollar terms both imports and exports were rising steadily. Con-

# Box 3-1. The National Protection Law and Office of Soil Products Law

The National Protection Law (MKK) contained measures to enable the administration to manage the economy in extraordinary war conditions. Among these were measures such as the power to determine levels of production, to take over factories and mines, to take over production and distribution, to set prices, to declare martial law, and to confiscate property (Avcroğlu, p. 221).

In actual practice these measures were not implemented. The government assisted private enterprise by providing loans, purchasing surplus production, guaranteeing profits, and so forth. Low-income groups found their rights restricted through measures such as forced labor, restrictions on the workers rights to change employment, and the obligation to work on holidays or at irregular hours. In the agricultural sector, farmers were allowed to keep a pair of oxen for each plot of 40 dönüms (40,000 square meters). All oxen above this number had to be relinquished to the government to support the national defense effort (Oran 1969, pp. 240–41; K., Boratay, Türkiye'de Devletçilik (1923–1950) [Ankara: SBF Mallye Enstitüsü, 1962], pp. 181–83).

The Office of Soil Products Law (TMO Law) had been enacted to protect the farmer and ensure that there was an adequate national stock of food to meet the nation's needs. Combined with the MKK, its effect was to squeeze destitute farmers. The main concern of the government was to feed the army and provide for the food requirements of the urban population. For this, farmers were compelled to deliver their crops at rock-bottom prices. Meanwhile large landowners were able to divert their grain production to the black market. They also switched their production to high-priced products like cotton and made huge profits and accumulated capital while small and medium-sized farmers were impoverished.

(B, ORAN)

trary to the impression given by the table, Turkey had a serious problem of excessive dependency on Germany in the sphere of foreign trade. As both sides in the war needed Turkey's natural resources, there was a permanent surplus in the balance of Turkey's trade during the war years.

The economic situation was affected not only by the imbalance between supply and demand but also by mismanagement. The table reveals that the rate of inflation jumped from 38.5% in 1941 to 93.7% in 1942. This came about when the newly appointed minister of trade intimated in his electoral district in the Aegean region that prices, which had been kept in check with great difficulty, would be freed. This brought about a chaotic situation. The price of wheat rose from 13.5 kuruş to 100 kuruş, olive oil from 85 kuruş to 300 kuruş (Aydemir, p. 230), and wax from 70 kuruş to 380 kuruş (Oran 1969, p. 242, quoting from Hüseyin Avni [Şanda], Yurt ve Dünya, no. 19, 1 October 1942).

In addition to these negative factors, the repayments of the Ottoman Public Debt in 1942 absorbed 64.18% of Turkey's export earnings.

The economic difficulties had very negative effects on the social structure of the country. In an environment of shortages and soaring prices, small farmers and workers were being badly squeezed. At the same time, the black market enabled traders and large landowners to make huge profits, creating a new class of nouveaux-riches who became the butt of jokes in cartoons. Thanks to the war, this new class transformed itself into a bourgeoisie and soon entered the world of politics.

The general management of the economy was seriously disrupted by the war. In 1936 preparations were being made to launch the second industrialization plan, which would have transferred the production of mass consumption goods to the private sector. As a result of the war, the plan had to be abandoned (Gülalp, p. 32). As a consequence, the policy of industrialization through import substitution was also abandoned, leading to a drying up of public investments. This was a pity, because the policy of import substitution had yielded good results in the preceding period. The shortage of resources brought on by the war also led to falling incomes among workers, who were often working against their will under special wartime legislation. Inevitably the regime lost the support of the masses, who were outraged by the excesses of the profiteers. The social and political consensus that had been assiduously built up from 1923 to 1939 in order to set up the fabric of a nation-state was shattered (Kuruç, p. 26). The people's reaction became manifest in the 1946 election and even more decisively in the election held on 14 May 1950, when the rival of the CHP, the Democratic Party (DP), won. It consisted of a pro-American coalition of large landowners represented by Adnan Menderes and the trading bourgeoisie represented by Celal Bayar.

In these circumstances some CHP leaders attempted to develop a new model of a national consensus to replace the consensus that they felt was probably doomed (Kuruç, p. 26). In this venture they had the support of President Inönü, who described the circumstances of the country in the following terms: "Taking advantage of the unfavorable situation, the corrupt landowners and the greedy traders, who would turn even the air we breathe into a commodity for their personal enrichment, have insolently attempted to undermine the very existence of a great nation" (Oran 1969, p. 243, quoting from Ayın Tarihi 108 [November 1942]: 23). The measures introduced to deal with "greedy landowners" consisted of the Village Institutes Law of 17 April 1940, which had the aim of training young peasants along the lines of the revolution, and the Law to Distribute

Table 3-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1939–1944

| 64.18 49.60 50.05     | 58,081.7<br>80,934.5<br>97,583.1<br>89,070.9 | 6.61<br>5.05<br>5.00<br>5.96 | 2.50 2.39 2.20 2.47 | 55,349<br>112,879<br>155,340<br>126,230 | 2.67 2.79 3.49 | 91,056 126,115 196,734 177,952 | 2,216.5<br>4,729.7<br>7,047.1<br>5,102.8 | 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 | 38.5<br>93.7<br>73.8<br>22.2 |               | 2,992.3<br>6,195.9<br>9,231.7<br>6,684.7 |
|-----------------------|--|------------------------------|---------------------|---|----------------|--------------------------------|--|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------|--|
| 64.18                 | 80,934.5                                     | 5.05                         | 2.39                | 112,879                                 | 2.67           | 126,115                        | 4,729.7                                  |                     | 1.31                         |               | 93.7                                     |
| 63.79                 | 58,081.7                                     | 6.61                         | 2.50                | 55,349                                  | 4.11           | 91,056                         | 2,216.5                                  |                     | 1.35                         |               | 38.5                                     |
| 62:29                 | 53,228.3                                     | 7.52                         | 2.87                | 50,035                                  | 4.65           | 80,904                         | 1,741.6                                  |                     | 1.38                         | 25.0 1.38     |  |
| 41.58                 | 41,431.0                                     | 11.92                        | 5.74                | 92,498                                  | 6.18           | 99,647                         | 8,119,1                                  | Η.                  | 1.28                         |               | 1.28                                     |
| EXPORT<br>EARNINGS    | PUBLIC DEBT<br>(000 \$)                      | VOLUME AS<br>% OF GNP        | AS % OF<br>GNP      | (000 \$)                                | AS % OF<br>GNP | EXPORTS (000 \$)               | (MILLION<br>\$)                          | <u>M</u>            | TL/\$ (M<br>RATE             | TL/\$<br>RATE | (DEX TL/\$<br>RATE                       |
| repayments<br>as % of | OF THE<br>OTTOMAN                            | FOREIGN                      | IMPORTS             | ٠                                       | EXPORTS        |                                | GNP                                      |                     |                              |               |  |
| DEBT                  | REPAYMENTS                                   |                              |                     |   |                |                                |  |                     |                              |               |  |

Sources: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİE), İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923–1998, Pp. 404, 495, and 588; T. C. Maliye Balanlığı, Bütçe Gider ve Gelir Gerçekleşmeleri 1924–1995 (Ankara: T. C. Maliye

GNP: Gross National Product; TL = Turkish li (Commised and intermeded by Hillowet III, 25)

#### Box 3-2. Implementation of the Wealth Tax

The District Director of the Ministry of Finance in Istanbul described the purpose of the Wealth Tax (Ökte, pp. 35-38) in the following terms: (1) raise extra funds for the state; (2) reduce the volume of the currency in circulation to curb inflation; (3) tax the wealth of black marketers and hoarders (assumed to be mostly non-Muslim minority groups engaged in profiteering and exploiting), it would be a one-time tax assessed on large incomes and wealth, with no right of appeal. Assessment would take place in fifteen days, and payment had to follow in fifteen days. This period could be extended a further fifteen days, but a high rate of Interest would apply. Those who did not pay within thirty days faced arrest and being sent to labor camps, where half of their wage earnings would be withheld against their debts to the state. It was estimated that it would take 250 years to settle a tax debt of 100,000 liras by this method (Ökte, p. 57). Those who failed to pay the tax could also have their properties seized and sold with no right of recourse.

Although the text of the legislation makes no mention of "non-Muslims," in practice the main targets of the tax were the minority groups. Taxpayers were placed in one of four categories. The M group (Muslims) was assessed 12.5% of assets. The G group (gayrimüslim: non-Muslims) was assessed 50%. The D group (dönme: converted Jews) was assessed 25%. And the E group (ecnebi: foreign nationals) would pay 12.5%. Farmers were assessed 5% on their assets.

There was also discrimination in the way the assessment was made. A Jewish worker who was employed in oiling the shutters of shops was taxed as an oil dealer, while a non-Muslim merchant in Izmir who sold candy in jars was classified as the owner of a teahouse and taxed accordingly. As a result of arbitrary and discriminatory implementation, non-Muslims paid ten times and dönmes twice as much tax as Muslims. As a consequence, 0.55% of the population was assessed 20% of the total tax. For failing to pay their tax, 1,400 people were hauled to the labor camp at Askale in the eastern province of Erzurum. All of them were non-Muslims, with Jews in the majority. Taxpayers who wanted to avoid this fate sold their property in a market that was already depressed. The buyers were the Muslim merchants who had accumulated capital by profiting from the war and the notables from Anatolia.

The Wealth Tax was based on ethnic and religious discrimination. It was an operation designed to eliminate non-Muslims from the economy. From the state's perspective, it was the third stage in "nationalizing" the economy after Lausanne and the law of 11 June 1932 (see "The Domestic Environment and Dynamics" in Section 2). (The fourth and fifth opportunities were to materialize in 1955 and 1964: see Box 4-13 in Section 4 and the chapter "Relations with Greece" in Section 5.) From a class perspective, the tax provided the first opportunity for the Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie to acquire capital through a windfall. The second such opportunity was to come in the 1990s through privatization. From Istanbul's perspective, the law represented the replacement of the non-Muslims by landowners and merchants from Anatolia. Finally, from the perspective of Turkey as a whole, this meant that "money had changed hands."

(B. ORAN)

Land to Farmers of 11 June 1945. Article 17 of this law contained provisions for an effective land reform.

The Wealth Tax Law (Varlık Vergisi) of 11 November 1942 was designed to tax the profiteering bourgeoisie. But in the manner of its implementation, it came under the influence of the prevailing international racist currents of that period (Box 3-2). The harshness and arbitrariness of its implementation hardened the opposition of the new class to the CHP, while also attracting severe criticism from international quarters.

But all of these measures were late in coming. The new class had become strong enough to overcome these obstacles. The Law to Distribute Land to Farmers was never implemented. The only effect it had was to lead to the creation of the Democratic Party. The curricula of the Village Institutes were revised in 1947; they were turned into regular schools in 1951 and abolished in 1954. The Wealth Tax was allowed to lapse in March 1944, and no attempt was made to recover unpaid balances.

The new class fervently pushed Turkey into the Western camp. In this it was greatly assisted by the negative effect of the Soviet demands on Turkey made after the war. The new class felt that integrating with the international economy was a precondition for gaining strength and welcomed the Marshall Plan with great enthusiasm.

### III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

As Table 3-3 shows, the dominant position of Germany in Turkey's foreign trade prior to the war continued during the war years. Germany's chief rival was Britain; Britain's share of Turkey's exports during the war years averaged 17%, while Germany's averaged 28.4%. Britain's share of Turkey's imports averaged 13.4%, while Germany's share reached 23.2%.

Another fact emerges from this table: although the U.S. share in Turkey's imports was fairly modest, the U.S. share in Turkey's exports followed a rising trend. The average for the war years was 17.2%, considerably higher than Britain's average. This can be seen as a harbinger of the close Turkish-U.S. relations that would develop in the postwar period.

### A. Basic Objective and Strategy

First, a misconception about Turkish foreign policy during the war must be corrected. Turkey was not "neutral" during the war; it was merely nonbelligerent. This nonbelligerency was heavily biased in favor of the Allies, with Britain as the core.

The objectives of Turkish foreign policy changed during this period, in line with the changing fortunes of war. As already noted, in the early stages of the war Turkey was seeking to reconcile its friendship with Britain with its friendship with the USSR. This represented the ideal situation for Turkey. The signing of the German-Soviet alliance, however, dashed Turkey's hopes of pursuing such a policy.

In 1941, when Turkey found itself facing the Soviet army on its eastern frontier and the German army on its western frontier, Turkey's objective became the avoidance of a double invasion like the one suffered by Poland in September 1939 and Iran in August 1941.

Turkey was able to get over the fear of double invasion in June 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR. But it was replaced by the worry that Turkey might be "saved" by the USSR following the victory at Stalingrad in 1943.

During this period there were many reasons for Turkish anxiety. Turkey was weak in every respect, especially because its armed forces had been seriously neglected during the period from 1923 to 1939, when socioeconomic development was the priority item on its agenda. Turkey had to make use of these weaknesses to survive (see "The Elements of an SMP: The Economic and Military-Strategic Dimensions" in the Introduction).

#### B. Basic Tactics

Turkey's main goal was to remain nonbelligerent. Both sides were exerting pressure, and Turkey had to resort to all means and use different tactics to achieve its strategic objective of staying out of the war.

### 1. Legal Arguments

As expected, the greatest pressure for Turkey to get involved in the war came from the parties in the Tripartite Alliance of 1939, Britain and France. Turkey used three strong arguments to counter this pressure.

- (a) The Tripartite Alliance was signed with Britain and France. By signing an armistice, France, one of the countries that would come to Turkey's assistance, removed itself from the scene. In these circumstances, the argument that Turkey must join the war contradicted the spirit of the alliance.
- (b) Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Tripartite Alliance stipulated that "Turkey could not be forced into any action that might drag it into an armed conflict with the USSR." As the invasion of Poland demonstrated, Turkey

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| TOTAL FOR FIVE COUNTRIES | IMPORTS                 | 77.4  | 55.6 | 45.5          | 59.3 | 57.7 | 53.3 |  |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------|------|---------------|------|------|------|--|
|                          | EXPORTS                 | 717   | 55.2 | 54.6          | 60.4 | 57.6 | 68.7 |  |
| FRANCE BRITAIN ITALY     | IMPORTS                 | 8.5   | 16.3 | 3.2           | 3.0  | 1.7  | 0.3  |  |
|                          | EXPORTS                 | 10.0  | 16.1 | 2.3           | 3.1  | 1.8  | 0.0  |  |
|                          | IMPORTS                 | . 6.2 | 14.0 | 24.6          | 23.5 | 15.9 | 17.9 |  |
|                          | EXPORTS                 | 5.7   | 10.4 | 16.2          | 15.3 | 10.8 | 22.1 |  |
|                          | IMPORTS                 | 1.9   | 2.8  | 0.4           | 0.1  | 0.0  | 0.0  |  |
|                          | EXPORTS                 | 4,4   | 5.9  | 8.0           | 0.3  | 0.7  | 0.0  |  |
| GERMANY                  | IMPORTS                 | 50.9  | 11.7 | 11.9          | 27.8 | 37.7 | 30.5 |  |
|                          | EXPORTS                 | 37.3  | 8.7  | 21.8          | 24.7 | 23.8 | 22.7 |  |
| USA                      | IMPORTS                 | 6.6   | 10.8 | 5.4           | 4.9  | 2.4  | 4.6  |  |
|                          | YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS EX | 14.3  | 14.1 | 1941 13.5 5.4 | 17.0 | 20.5 | 23.9 |  |
|                          | YEAR                    | 1939  | 1940 | 1941          | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |  |

| %

Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİE), İstatistik Göstergeler 1913–1998, pp. 418–30. (Compiled and Interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

might become the victim of a Soviet attack if it entered the war. Consequently, Protocol No. 2 precluded Turkey from getting directly involved in the war.

(c) Article 6 of the Special Agreement signed along with the Tripartite Alliance provided for Turkey carrying out its commitment to enter the war only after France and Britain had furnished the promised military equipment to Turkey. In other words, Turkey was not bound to enter the war before taking delivery of the arms that had been promised. Turkey would use this argument that the arms assistance that it was receiving was inadequate all the way to the end of the war.

# <sup>1</sup>2. Taking Advantage of Differences

Turkey avoided entering the war by taking advantage of the differences between the opposing sides as well as the differences within the two sides. It also used its own internal difficulties arising from its weaknesses.

#### Differences between Axis Powers

After Turkey led Germany to understand that it was staying aloof because of Italy's aggressive stance, Germany's Ambassador von Papen requested his Foreign Ministry to restrain Italy. When Germany and the USSR were in alliance prior to June 1941, Turkey was able to counter German pressure by referring to a potential Soviet threat.

### Internal Differences among the Allies

These differences existed even within the British administration. In his speech of 11 July 1941, foreign secretary Lord Halifax declared that Turkey was justified in remaining nonbelligerent (Hale, p. 84). The chief of the British General Staff declared that, in the event of Turkey entering the war and being attacked by Germany, Britain would find it difficult to field the necessary forces to come to Turkey's assistance. Turkey used these arguments to steer clear of the war. If Turkey came under German occupation, it argued, the Allies would have to divide and divert their forces to liberate it and its nonbelligerency would actually harm Germany.

## The Opportunities Created by Turkey's Weakness

Unlike the Allies, Turkey was threatened on two fronts: by the Axis and the USSR. (The term "axis" was derived from the Nazi-Fascist agreement of October 1936, in which Germany and Italy declared that the Berlin-Rome axis was "Europe's perpendicular axis.") İnönü utilized this double threat to his advantage. He used the German threat as the reason given to the Allies for not getting involved in the war, while in 1940 the Soviet threat was the reason for not implementing the Tripartite Alliance (Hale, p. 103).

But most of all Turkey used two of its own weaknesses to find a way out. If Turkey got engaged in war, it was argued, the country would be invaded, which would have drastic geostrategic consequences for its friends. As long as the Turkish army was inadequate for the country's defense, Turkey could not enter the war. These arguments were also used to secure additional military equipment.

# Differences between the Opposing Parties and among the Allies

The pressures for Turkey getting involved in the war or staying out of it came from different countries in the two camps and changed according to the fortunes of war. This provided Turkey with freedom of maneuver. In 1940–41, before attacking the Soviet Union, Germany was pressing Turkey to join the war. In 1942–44 it was Britain and the U.S. that wanted to see Turkey in the war. The British considered it in their interest for Turkey to remain nonbelligerent in 1940–41, while it was the Germans who wanted Turkey not to get involved in the conflict after 1943. When the USSR came to the conclusion that it could win the war on its own, it wanted Turkey to stay out in order to keep it isolated.

While Turkey was able to fend off the pressures to become involved in the war, it also used the blandishments from the opposing parties to gain time. To cite an example, the Germans offered to give Turkey the Aegean islands. Since Lausanne, Turkey had been pursuing the policy of being a nation-state with defensible borders. Although it found the German offer of territorial expansion to be in conflict with its basic policy, Turkey kept this item on its agenda for a considerable length of time. Another instance of this policy involved Turkish minorities beyond its frontiers. Turkish foreign policy was based on maintaining a distance from minorities, especially from those in the USSR. Nevertheless, Turkey kept up a longlasting dialogue started by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of organizing the Turks of the USSR. After a year of futile talks, von Ribbentrop was fed up and gave instructions for these talks to be ended.

Turkey took advantage of the contradictions among the parties by alternately taking sides with one or the other, with some leaders appearing as Anglophiles while others appeared as Germanophiles. When German warships passed through the Turkish Straits disguised as merchant vessels, the British ambassador lodged a complaint with Prime Minister Saracoğlu, who replied that he had lost control over Minister of Foreign Affairs Menemencioğlu, who enjoyed the backing of the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Çakmak. When German ships were subsequently turned back in similar circumstances, however,

Menemencioğlu told the German ambassador that he had received his orders from the prime minister and that "regretfully" there was nothing he could do about the matter. In this scenario, President İnönü and Prime Minister Saracoğlu were represented as being pro-British while Minister of Foreign Affairs Menemencioğlu and the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Çakmak, were ostensibly pro-German. The Germans pressed for Saracoğlu's dismissal, although his ideology was nationalism bordering on racism and he was also a confirmed anti-Communist. (In Ottoman times European powers used to consider some Ottoman prime ministers sympathetic to their cause, which may have provided the inspiration for this game that was being reenacted during the war.)

When Germany appeared to be losing the war, the pro-Germans were dumped on the grounds of raison d'état (see Box Intro-4 in the Introduction). The "permanent" chief of the General Staff of the Republican era retired in January 1944. Menemencioğlu, who had allowed German warships disguised as merchant vessels to pass through the Straits, was forced to resign on 25 June 1944.

# 3. Domestic Policies as Instruments of Foreign Policy

Domestic politics in Turkey during the war was completely under the influence of the vicissitudes of the war. This was due in large part to tactical calculations on the part of the government and was designed to keep Turkey out of the war by favoring the side that seemed to be prevailing at the time. Public life and even court decisions were arranged to conform to the side that was currently strongest. There are many examples of this comportment.

On 18 March 1940 Turkey signed a trade agreement with Germany that excluded chromium, an important commodity used in the production of weapons. After Germany defeated France in the summer of 1940 and then attacked the USSR in June 1941, chromium was added to the agreement, and large deliveries were made to Germany. When the tide turned and Germany started to falter, deliveries were stopped in April 1944.

In February 1942 an attempt was made on the life of Germany's Ambassador von Papen in Ankara. It was discovered that the two Soviet nationals who had instigated the assassination attempt had taken refuge in the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul. Although it was against usual practice, the consulate was surrounded on the night of 5–6 March; the authorities gave notice that the men would be forcibly apprehended if they were not surrendered within forty-eight hours. The two men were tried, and each got a prison sentence of sixteen years and eight months (Oran 1970, p. 53). This was one year before the Soviet victory




Figure 3-1. U.S. cartoon depicting German and Soviet pressure in 1939 to drag Turkey into the war (Orhan Koloğlu, Türk'ü Dünyaya Tanıtan Adam [Ankara: Yeni Özgür İnsan Yayınları, 1988]).

at Stalingrad. When Turkey severed its diplomatic links with Germany on 2 August 1944, the two prisoners were released the following week.

The control of the press was more stringent than ever during the war years, including strict rules about even the size of type that was to be used in reporting war news. When Germany was advancing, there was much praise in the press for Germany and for the Pan-Turanian movements (racist and expansionist Turkism with the aim to unite all Turkic peoples politically) in Turkey. To start with, Saracoğlu was the prime minister at that time. He was the person who declared: "We are Turks, we are Pan-Turkists and will always remain Pan-Turkists. For us, Pan-Turkism is a matter of blood and even more so of conscience and culture" (Oran 1969, p. 251, quoting from Ayın Tarihi 105 [August 1942]: 31) and who was to introduce the notorious Wealth Tax three months later.

In July 1943, however, a few months after Stalingrad, a brochure was published that declared Pan-Turkism/Pan-Turanianism to be the "greatest danger." This was a sign that everything had now changed. The leader of the Pan-Turkist/Pan-Turanian movement, Nihal Atsız, was sentenced to four months in prison for allegedly slandering the leftist writer Sabahattin Ali. On 18 May an official communication revealed that Professor Z. V. Togan and R. O. Türkkan, who were prominent Pan-Turanian writers like Atsız, had been arrested. The official daily organ of the CHP, Ulus, claimed that Pan-Turanian thinkers could have nothing to do with the party. The next day, at the 19 May holiday celebrations, President İnönü declared that twenty-three people including university professors and young officers like Alparslan Türkeş, an army colonel who

was to play an important role in the 1960 coup d'état and eventually become the founder of the extreme-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: MHP) in 1969, had been brought to trial, because "these racists and Turanians have engaged in covert intrigues." He added: "We shall steadfastly defend our nation against such seditious elements" (Oran 1969, p. 253, quoting from the daily *Tan*, 19 May 1944). On 29 March 1945 those who stood accused were sentenced to varying prison terms by the martial law tribunals.

But the Military Court of Appeals quashed these sentences on 23 October 1945, and the defendants were all released. This happened four and a half months after V. M. Molotov demanded bases in the Straits and a revision of the Turkish-Soviet frontier as a condition for renewing the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty at his meeting with ambassador Selim Sarper on 7 June 1945. All of the accused would eventually be acquitted on 31 March 1947, nineteen days after the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed.

#### IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

World War II was a period that perfectly concretized the calamities that being "strategic" could cause for a medium state. Turkey survived, however, by using the balances and contradictions arising from the extraordinary wartime circumstances. In carrying out this feat, it adhered to the principle of serving the national interest in its rawest form. İnönü, who was a master at performing balancing acts and a model of caution, could claim a large share of the credit for carrying out this feat.

During this period Turkey was surrounded on all sides by armed conflict. Its foreign policy was not the sum of its relations with different states but rather the reflection of the fortunes of war. This foreign policy consisted of daily adjustments to domestic policies and foreign relations, depending on the way the war developed. This was the approach that allowed Turkey to come out of the war unscathed.

This success during the war brought postwar problems for Turkey. Turkey used every excuse and pretext to stay out of the conflict to the end, thus sparing the nation from the carnage of war. When İnönü was criticized for his wartime policies that drove people to drink tea with dried raisins as a sweetener because sugar was unaffordable, he replied, "Yes, but I did not make your child a war orphan." Now that the war was at an end, Turkey was quite alone and isolated.

This isolation forced Turkey to abandon and reverse its previous autonomous policies. The Soviet Union was

repelling Turkey, while the U.S. was drawing Turkey into its fold as the Cold War was getting underway. The bipolar world was having its effect. The developments in the class structure of the nation were also contributing to Turkey's new realignment.

One final comment should be made on the subject. Because of Turkey's strategic location, İstanbul in particular was swarming with spies during World War II. Both sides tried, by different methods, to win over important people to attain their objectives. It is known that the Germans bribed influential people with gold marks (see Box 3-5 below). It is to be expected that some high-level officials would be sympathetic to one side or the other. But these officials, whatever their leanings or their ideologies, never failed to serve the basic objective and strategy of Turkish foreign policy: to stay out of the conflict and pursue the policy of "active neutrality." Saracoğlu and his colleagues kept their personal ideological leanings out of foreign policy even when Germany had a dominant hold on Turkey's foreign trade.

Baskin Oran

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# World War II and Turkey, 1939–1945

# Turkey's International Commitments at the Outbreak of the War

When war broke out on 1 September 1939 with Germany's invasion of Poland, Turkey's main concern was to weather the storm without damage to its national sovereignty and its territorial integrity. But as the events of the next six years showed, this was no easy task. In order to ensure that Turkey emerged from the war without being invaded and with minimum damage, the decision-makers in Ankara were forced to steer a difficult course through the power struggles and clashes of interest of major powers. Much of their policy consisted of improvisation; still, it was a resounding success for a relatively small country trying to implement its national policy under pressure from major powers of the day.

In the process leading to war, Turkey sought to reconcile the contradictory aims of warring parties while scrupulously avoiding commitments that might drag it into war. It signed only nonaggression and mutual security agreements and sought to ensure the security of its frontiers without fully joining any of the blocs that were emerging in Europe. Among the agreements that Turkey had signed by September 1939, only the Balkan Pact somewhat limited Turkey's freedom of action and committed it to go to war under very specific circumstances. None of Turkey's other international engagements contained such a commitment. They merely included commitments to refrain from aggression. Furthermore, the provisions of the Balkan Pact did not address a war against a major power.

When war broke out on 1 September 1939, Turkey's international obligations that might affect its relations with the belligerent parties were the following:

- 1. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing war as an instrument of foreign policy.
- 2. The Friendship and Neutrality (Nonaggression) Treaty signed with the USSR on 17 December 1925 and its extensions, which committed Turkey to neutrality and nonaggression.

- 3. The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed with Afghanistan on 25 May 1928, by which each of the two countries committed itself not to enter into any pact directed against the other.
- 4. The Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Adjudication signed with Italy on 30 May 1928, which contained the commitment not to join "any political or economic agreement or arrangement directed at one of the parties" and to remain neutral in the event of one of the parties coming under attack.
- 5. The protocol signed with the Soviet Union on 17 December 1929, extending the Friendship and Neutrality (Nonaggression) Treaty of 17 December 1925. This protocol contained the commitment "not to enter into any negotiation for the purpose of concluding political agreements with states that are direct neighbors by sea or land of the other party without first notifying the other party and to conclude such agreements only with the consent of the other party."
- 6. The Treaty of Friendship and the Treaty of Security, Neutrality, and Economic Cooperation signed with Iran on 5 December 1932, which committed Turkey to nonaggression and neutrality.
- 7. The Balkan Pact of 9 February 1934, which contained the commitment to intervene in the event of an attack on a Balkan state by another Balkan state singly or in alliance with another state.
- 8. The Sadabad Pact of 8 July 1937, which committed its members not to intervene in one another's internal affairs, to respect the inviolability of borders, and to refrain from aggression.
- 9. The declarations signed with Britain on 12 May 1939 and with France on 23 June 1939, which contained the mutual commitment to provide assistance in the event of war in the Mediterranean and the declaration of intent to conclude a treaty to this end.

In examining Turkey's policies during the war, we can distinguish three subperiods in parallel with the course of the war outside Turkey: 1939–41, when Germany was

in full swing and both sides were positioning themselves; 1941–43, when German pressure on Turkey was intense; and 1943–45, when Germany was retreating and the Allies had the upper hand. Turkey's domestic and foreign policies at the time followed closely the development of the war outside Turkey and readily adapted to its changes.

# 1939–1941: THE BELLIGERENTS COURT TURKEY

# A. The Road Leading to War

The Italian Threat

Italy's invasion of Albania on April 12, 1939, with thirty divisions was seen in Ankara as a tangible threat to Turkey's security zone. Italy was already a direct neighbor through its possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Its expansionism in the Balkans compounded the concern in Ankara, where it was perceived at that time as the sole major power with designs on Turkish territory.

At the Second Fascist Congress on 19 March 1934, Mussolini declared that "Italy's historical objectives are in Asia and Africa" and that "this should be considered a natural expansion." When the Turkish ambassador in Rome sought a clarification of this statement, Mussolini claimed that he had not meant Turkey, which he considered to be a European power. This disclaimer was far from reassuring for Turkey, given that 95% of its territory was located in Asia (Ataöv 1965, pp. 135–36).

Mussolini's frequent references to "Mare Nostrum" (Our Sea) when talking about the Mediterranean also gave rise to anxieties in Turkey, which was already suspicious because of the concentration of Italian forces in the Dodecanese Islands. The sinking of merchant vessels by unidentified submarines in the vicinity of Turkish territorial waters starting in 1937 also led to the suspicion in Ankara that Italy was responsible for these acts of aggression. There was a feeling in Turkish circles that, having failed to get its slice of Anatolian territory after World War I, Italy would use the first opportunity to make up for its failure.

On 13 April, following Italy's invasion of Albania, Britain and France offered guarantees to Greece and Romania against a possible attack. When Britain offered a similar guarantee to Turkey, Ankara turned down the unilateral guarantee. Instead of accepting a guarantee that would draw the ire of the Axis powers, Ankara proposed that negotiations be started, with the aim of concluding a treaty of alliance between Turkey and Britain containing specific reciprocal commitments.

At the same time, negotiations were going on between Turkey and the USSR to conclude a similar agree-

ment on cooperation and solidarity. Ankara transmitted the Anglo-French proposals of 13 April that very day to Moscow to get the Soviet reaction. In response, Soviet foreign minister Molotov sent a letter to Turkish president İsmet İnönü on 15 April in which he proposed bilateral consultations to consider the measures to be adopted to counter a possible attack, bearing in mind the new situation prevailing in the Balkans and the Black Sea region. He suggested Batumi or Tbilisi as the venue for these consultations. In its reply dated 17 April, the Turkish government accepted the Soviet proposal but suggested Ankara or İstanbul as the venue. The Soviet response on 19 April requested that minister of foreign affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu come to Moscow "expeditiously." The next day Saracoğlu summoned the Soviet chargé d'affaires to his office and asked for a postponement of the visit to Moscow, agreeing to the original Soviet proposal to meet in Batumi. The Soviets replied that they considered Saracoğlu's offer to go to Moscow to be a promise; in order not to delay consultations, they would agree to send deputy commissar for foreign affairs Grigory A. Potemkin to Ankara on 28 April.

The intensity of these exchanges over a period of fifteen days was an indication that the two sides were unsure of each other's positions and were anxious to determine the other's real intentions. In line with the agreement reached, Deputy Commissar Potemkin arrived in Ankara on 28 April. All out this time, Germany demonstrated the importance that it attributed to Turkey by appointing one of its senior diplomats, Franz von Papen, as its ambassador to Ankara. The new ambassador's first task was to reassure Turkey about Italy's intentions and prevent Ankara from drifting into the Anglo-French orbit. In this context von Papen proposed to Berlin that Italy maintain a minimum number of troops in Albania, that Turkey be offered a nonaggression pact, and that the island of Meis (Kastellorizo), one of the Dodecanese Islands located in Turkish territorial waters, be ceded to Turkey along with some other islets. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs ignored these proposals, because they would clearly be unacceptable to Italy.

In these circumstances, Turkey perceived Italy's Albanian operation as part of a joint plan by the Axis powers and decided to take measures to prepare for all possible eventualities. To this end, Turkey sought to draw closer to Britain and France while preserving its friendship with the USSR. As a result, when Potemkin arrived in Ankara, he was given the details of the negotiations going on with Britain and was told that Ankara wanted to conclude a similar mutual assistance agreement with the USSR. In this manner Turkey was complying with the terms of

article 2/1 of the protocol of 1929 that it had signed with the USSR. At that time, the USSR was conducting similar negotiations with Germany but did not bother to inform Turkey about it. On the contrary, it proposed that the two countries cooperate against Germany and recommended that negotiations be pursued with Britain and France to find ways to check Germany. It should be recalled that under the 1929 protocol the USSR did not have the obligation to inform Turkey of its negotiations with Germany. Still, Moscow was pushing Turkey to become engaged in anti-German arrangements at a time when the USSR itself was involved in negotiations with Germany to conclude a nonaggression pact. This gave some idea of how the Soviets perceived Turkey's role in the approaching conflict.

Potemkin's visit ended on 5 May. A joint communiqué was issued, stating that there was a full conformity of views between the two countries on international issues. Later developments preceding the visit of Saracoğlu to Moscow in September, however, demonstrated that the state of relations between the two neighbors did not conform to the wording of the joint communiqué. As Europe drifted toward war, Turkey was unaware of the Soviet negotiations with both Germany and Britain and France. This led Ankara to pursue the unattainable objective of simultaneous friendship with Britain, France, and the USSR.

#### The Joint Statements

In the meantime Turkey's negotiations with Britain led to the signing of a joint statement on 12 May 1939 (see "The Road Leading to the Tripartite Alliance of Turkey, Britain, and France [The Ankara Pact]" in Section 2).

A similar joint statement would be signed with France in Paris on 23 June, the day when the Hatay agreement between the two states was signed in Ankara. Article 2 of the document signed with Britain announced that the two states would "sign a long-term definitive agreement containing reciprocal commitments designed to ensure [their] national security." Article 3 further provided that, "pending the signing of a definitive agreement, the parties shall cooperate effectively and lend each other all possible assistance in the event of an attack in the Mediterranean region leading to war."

In the course of the negotiations Britain proposed that this clause should also include the Balkan region, but Turkey refused to agree because of its agreements with the USSR and Bulgaria. Britain's desire to include the Balkan region was based on the calculation that, if it had to assist Romania in compliance with the guarantees it had given, such assistance could only be delivered through the Turk-

ish Straits. Under the Montreux Convention, however, belligerents' warships could not pass through the Straits. This would be possible only if Turkey was also a belligerent. But Turkey was reluctant to get involved in a guarantee to Romania that might bring it into confrontation with the Soviet Union and therefore refused to go along with Britain's proposal.

Article 4 of the joint statement made clear that neither this statement nor the envisaged agreement would be directed at any state and called for mutual assistance only in the event that it was clearly necessary. Article 7 provided that the document would not preclude the contracting parties from concluding agreements with other states for the purpose of promoting peace. This clause was designed to help Turkey in its relations with the USSR. To sum up, the joint statement, pending the conclusion of a definitive treaty, called for mutual assistance only in the event of an attack occurring in the Mediterranean. Although it was not stated openly, the potential aggressor was clearly Italy. Article 6 declared that the parties would merely consult one another on the question of Balkan security, thus precluding the possibility of a Turkish confrontation with Germany or the Soviet Union.

When Germany became aware of the forthcoming joint British-Turkish statement, it tried unsuccessfully to prevent its signing. The USSR appeared to approve the joint statement but was not pleased to see Turkey coming under British influence. Italy saw the arrangement as directed against it; claiming that the Dodecanese Islands were under threat, it signed a military alliance agreement with Germany in Berlin on 20 May. With this alliance, Italy had sided with Germany in the approaching conflict.

While Turkey was at an advanced phase in its preliminary contacts aimed at signing mutual assistance agreements with both the USSR and Britain and France, the USSR was carrying on similar negotiations with the Western powers. Because the Western powers dragged their feet at these negotiations, Moscow ended the talks and on 23 August 1939 signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. This unexpected development shocked all of the international actors, including Turkey. Until that time, Turkey had sought to reconcile its rapprochement with Britain and France with its policy of close friendship with the USSR. The German-Soviet Pact started a new and very difficult era for Turkey's foreign policy. This pact made a Turkish-Soviet alliance difficult to achieve. Until then, Turkey had expected that Britain, France, and the USSR would eventually unite in the face of the German threat. When seeking cooperation with Britain and France, Ankara had assumed that the main threat would come from the Mediterranean and possibly from the Balkan Peninsula. Turkey now realized that it had come to a parting of ways with the USSR, a country with which it had maintained cordial relations ever since the days of the War of Liberation. Henceforth it would have to rely on the guarantees of the two Western states in the changed circumstances of the day. Nevertheless, Turkey did not abandon all hope of concluding an alliance with the Soviets that did not conflict with the Tripartite Alliance, which was now ready for signature.

When World War II broke out with Germany's attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the subsequent declaration of war by Britain and France on 3 September, negotiations were still in progress to conclude the Turkish-British-French alliance while the Turkish-Soviet talks dragged on.

Although the first year of the war was totally confined to Europe, Turkey sought to create a solid Balkan bloc in order to prevent a German or Soviet move to the region but failed. The Balkan states were averse to doing anything that might be construed by Germany as a provocation. Furthermore, they perceived Turkey's moves stressing cooperation in the field of defense as a maneuver designed to draw them into the British-French orbit.

#### The Saracoğlu Mission

On August 4, at a time when Turkey still had not lost hope of reaching a deal with Moscow and the Soviet-British-French contacts were still in progress, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, A. V. Terentiev, called on Saracoğlu. He informed the minister about the negotiations with the Western powers in Moscow and reassured him that these contacts were progressing in a satisfactory manner. He inquired about Turkey's views regarding the conclusion of a pact or a mutual assistance treaty within the framework of the discussions held with Potemkin and invited Saracoğlu to Moscow to discuss the issue with the Soviet leadership. Saracoğlu, after consulting the government, responded affirmatively on August 10 and asked the ambassador to provide a draft text for the proposed treaty. Three days later, the ambassador called on the minister once again and raised a number of questions about Turkish views on the proposed treaty and its area of implementation. The same questions were also submitted in written form to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 August, one day after the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Turkey's answers to the questions, which had already been prepared, were submitted the next day, on 25 August.

On 4 September the Soviet ambassador called on

Saracoğlu once again and submitted a note verbale explaining the Soviet position with respect to the latest developments. The Soviet text explained that the talks with Britain and France had yielded no results. In order to forestall a possible plot against the USSR on the part of Britain and Germany, Moscow had accepted Berlin's proposal for concluding a nonaggression pact. In these circumstances, the text argued, it would be necessary to reappraise the relations between the USSR and Turkey in view of the completely changed international scene. On 8 September Ankara responded positively to this Soviet proposal; and on 15 September Saracoğlu was officially invited to visit Moscow. A Soviet warship and a special train were placed at his disposal, and he arrived in Moscow on 25 September 1939. He was returning Potemkin's visit to Ankara and would be discussing issues between the two states. On 23 September, one day after Saracoğlu left for Moscow, Turkey, Britain, and France initialed their treaty; but the signing was postponed until the results of the Saracoğlu mission became known.

Saracoğlu's mission when he was leaving for Moscow was still to try to find points of concordance between the soon-to-be-signed Turkish-British-French alliance and Turkish-Soviet friendship. The USSR, however, only one month after having signed an agreement with Germany, was seeking to change Montreux to suit its purposes, discover the true content of the Tripartite Alliance, and ensure Turkey's neutrality. Throughout Saracoğlu's visit to Moscow, the Soviets kept harping on the need to amend the Montreux Convention. According to archive documents that were declassified after the war, the Germans had formally requested the USSR on 2 September to secure Turkey's permanent neutrality, which was essential, among other reasons, for the delivery of materials to Romania through the Turkish Straits. The invitation to Saracoğlu came two days later, on 4 September, so there can be little doubt about the USSR's intention for the meeting.

It was difficult for Moscow and Ankara to find common ground at the negotiating table when their objectives were so divergent. Although the talks started in a cordial atmosphere on 26 September, Molotov's attempt to hand Saracoğlu a paper containing amendments that the USSR wanted to see in the Montreux Convention and Saracoğlu's refusal even to receive such a paper, let alone examine it, created a tense atmosphere on the very first day. Although the Soviet paper was withdrawn at this stage, it kept reappearing in different forms at subsequent meetings. After the frosty ending of the first meeting, the talks were suspended when Germany's Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop paid a visit to Moscow between 27 and 29

#### Box 3-3. Soviet Demands for Amendments to the Montreux Straits Convention (1 October 1939)

The text of the document that V. M. Molotov attempted to hand over to Saracoğlu on 1 October 1939 consisted of a series of Soviet demands. They were again brought to Saracoğlu's attention at subsequent meetings and were reiterated at the end of World War II. The demands consisted of following points:

- 1. Whenever the question of the passage of third-country warships through the Straits comes up, whether in time of peace or in time of war, and regardless of whether Turkey is a belligerent or not, the Turkish and Soviet governments shall hold consultations and reach a joint decision.
- Turkey shall prevent the passage of non-Black Sea Power warships through the Straits in excess of one-fifth of the tonnage allowed in article 18 [of the Montreux Convention].
- Turkey shall not allow access to the Black Sea for warships of non-Black Sea Powers sent for a humanitarian purpose without the consent of the USSR.
- 4. The passage of warships of belligerent states through the Straits in accordance with articles 19 and 25 shall only be possible if the USSR notifies the League of Nations of its approval.
- 5. Merchant vessels of third states transiting the Straits under the terms of article 4 that happen to be carrying military equipment or military personnel shall be considered naval auxiliary vessels and articles 20 and 21 shall apply in such cases. In these circumstances, the passage of merchant vessels of third states in time of war, Turkey being nonbelligerent or considering itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, will be left entirely to Turkey's discretion.

- 6. The passage of Soviet submarines through the Straits into or out of the Black Sea shall not be confined to the cases cited in article 12 of the Convention but shall be allowed in all situations involving the defense of Turkish or Soviet Interests as well as in situations involving the carrying out of commitments under the Turkish-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact.
- 7. When Soviet vessels of war transit the Straits in order to carry out commitments under the Turkish-Soviet Pact more effectively, the 8-day notification period may be shortened to 2 days when necessary.
- 8. The 3-day notification period foreseen in article 23 may be shortened to 1 day when necessary.
- 9. In accordance with the spirit of the Turkish-Soviet Pact, the parties shall notify each other of the aggregate tonnage of their navies in the Black Sea twice a year, on 1 January and 1 July.
- no. Turkey and the USSR commit themselves not to change the regime of the Straits unilaterally, not to enter into any negotiations with third states regarding the said regime, and not to reach any agreement on this question without first consulting each other and obtaining the other party's prior consent.
- TI. This secret protocol supplements the Turkish-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact and constitutes an integral part of that Pact.

(M<sub>.</sub>: AYDIN) (Gürün 1983, pp. 66–70; Bilge, p. 139)

September. During this visit the partition line in Poland was drawn, and the German and Soviet zones of influence in the Balkans were decided. Meanwhile Saracoğlu was getting impatient as he waited at the Spridonuka Palace in Moscow. He realized that the USSR would not be able to conclude a treaty with Turkey after reaching an agreement with Germany. Saracoğlu sought Ankara's permission to return if no agreement emerged from the negotiations. Ankara's response gave an indication of Turkey's priorities. It instructed Saracoğlu to make an effort to pursue the negotiations and try to make an appraisal of the USSR's true intentions. In case Saracoğlu determined that no deal could be made with the Soviets or that they were completely lacking in goodwill, he could then bring forward the date of his return.

The Turkish-Soviet talks resumed on 1 October, this time with the participation of Stalin himself. Nonetheless, the talks failed to make any progress, because the Soviet agenda still included items such as amending the Montreux Convention, joint defense of the Straits, exclusion of the warships of non-Black Sea Powers from the Turkish

Straits, and changes in the draft Turkish-British-French agreement (Box 3-3).

Toward the end of the meeting, Molotov raised the issue of the text relating to Montreux, which he had sought to hand over to Saracoğlu at the first meeting. Saracoğlu inquired whether this text was tied to the mutual assistance agreement that was being contemplated and if rejection of one meant rejection of the other. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, Saracoğlu declared that he was ready to call off the negotiations at that point and requested that Stalin facilitate his arrangements for returning home.

Stalin then declared that the two questions could be settled separately. Saracoğlu asked that the text that Molotov kept bringing up be withdrawn once and for all. Stalin took a glance at the text and replied: "This text is unsatisfactory and clumsily written; I withdraw it. Let us confine ourselves this time to signing the pact" (Gürün 1983, pp. 66–70). This intervention helped reduce the tension. The meeting was adjourned to allow Turkey to discuss with the related parties the changes that Stalin had asked to be made in the Turkish-British-French agreement. At

the third meeting, held on 13 October, however, another text similar to the ominous text relating to the Straits would surface once again.

In the meantime Stalin submitted a note in his own handwriting containing the amendments he wanted to see inserted in the draft of the Turkish-British-French agreement, including the following:

- 1. The commitment undertaken by Turkey in connection with the British guarantee given to Romania and Greece contained in article 3 of the draft prepared with Britain was to be removed from that article and inserted in articles 4 or 5 dealing with consultations.
- 2. The protocol expressing Turkey's reservations was to include the phrase "these commitments shall not compel Turkey to assist Britain and France should they engage in war with Russia, in which case the Turkish-British-French agreement shall not be implemented for the duration of the war."

When Britain and France accepted these proposed amendments, the negotiations were resumed on 13 October, after a lapse of twelve days.

During this period the Soviets sought to introduce a new reservation to the Soviet-Turkish agreement. The reservation, requested by Germany, would negate the Soviet commitment to assist Turkey in the event of a German attack on Turkey. At the second meeting, held on 1 October, the Soviets had already called for introducing clauses to the draft agreement that would reflect the new state of German-Soviet relations. When Saracoğlu objected to them, Stalin indicated that he would not insist. It appears that in the meantime the Germans had made further representations and insisted on the introduction of these reservations. At the meeting held on 13 October, when Saracoğlu pointed out that the reservations would render the agreement meaningless and bring about a deadlock in the negotiations, the question was left for the subsequent meeting. Then Molotov attempted to return to the Montreux issue and met with the same objections. Saracoğlu even refused to countenance a statement declaring that the two sides would reexamine the issue in the future, while Molotov kept on insisting on both the German reservations and the issue of amending the regime of the Straits. The meeting was adjourned without reaching any agreement.

At the fourth and last meeting, held on October 15, Molotov came back to the Montreux issue and presented a new document different in form from the first one but similar in content. Once again Saracoğlu refused to consider the Soviet document. Instead of including all the provisions regulating the passage of warships of non-

Black Sea Powers in time of peace and time of war, the new Soviet formulation proposed to make amendments only to articles 20 and 21 of the Montreux Convention. Article 20 provided that in time of war, Turkey being nonbelligerent, the provisions of articles 10 to 18 would not be applicable and the passage of warships would be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish government, Article 21 provided that, when Turkey considered itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, it would have the right to apply the provisions of article 20. In relation to these articles, the new Soviet draft was as follows: "To secure the most effective protection of the joint interests of Turkey and the Soviet Union in the Straits and the Black Sea region, the two governments have agreed on the need to act in concert in regard to the exclusion from the Black Sea of the warships, auxiliary vessels, and military transport vessels of non-Black Sea Powers within the terms of the Montreux Convention and, in particular, articles 20 and 21" (Gürün 1983, pp. 66–70).

In this way the Soviets were proposing that in situations when Turkey was a belligerent or considered itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war the decisions regarding the passage of vessels not belonging to Black Sea Powers would be taken jointly. Saracoğlu rejected this proposal, which would force Turkey to share with another country a right that had been granted exclusively to itself by an international agreement. By that point Saracoğlu had concluded that no agreement could emerge from the negotiations while the Soviets kept employing the tactic of constantly putting him off, so he informed his hosts that he wanted to go home.

The visit had originally been planned to last three days but went on for twenty-three days. In describing the unsuccessful negotiations, Saracoğlu later commented: "We seemed to be at each other's throats much of the time" (Gürün 1983, pp. 66–70). The foreign minister left Moscow on 17 October and arrived in Turkey on 20 October 1939. When the news of the failure of the negotiations reached Ankara, the Tripartite Alliance was signed on 19 October and went into immediate effect while the foreign minister was still on his way back. Thus Turkey and the USSR had come to a parting of ways. According to prime minister Refik Saydam, the reason for the failure of the talks was the incompatibility of the Soviet demands with the Tripartite Alliance, which was ready for signature, and with Turkey's international commitments within the context of the Straits. Also, the guarantees offered by the Soviets to ensure Turkey's security were not commensurate with the demands from Turkey (Armaoğlu, p. 147).

The Moscow talks can be taken as a turning point in

Turkish-Soviet relations. Up to that time, Turkey had always acted in consultation with the USSR and shied away from all anti-Soviet compacts. Ankara scrupulously kept Moscow informed about all of its relevant international talks and agreements. The Soviets, in return, kept trying to get Turkey to renounce the Tripartite Alliance throughout Saracoğlu's stay in Moscow. Furthermore, they came up with a revised draft text of a bilateral treaty that included subjects that did not figure in the text that had been agreed to previously. In addition, their insistence on demands made in connection with the Montreux Convention raised serious doubts in Ankara about Soviet intentions. These doubts would last until the end of the war.

## 2. The Tripartite Alliance

Officially known as the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Turkey, Britain, and France, the Tripartite Alliance was signed on 19 October 1939 by prime minister Dr. Refik Saydam for Turkey, ambassador Hugh Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen for Britain, and ambassador René Massigli for France. The treaty's main provisions were the following.

Article 1: "If Turkey finds itself at war with a European state following an attack by this state on Turkey, France and the United Kingdom shall actively cooperate with Turkey and render it all possible assistance and support."

Article 2.1: "In the event of an attack by a European state leading to war in the Mediterranean region involving France and the United Kingdom, Turkey shall actively cooperate with these countries and render them all possible assistance and support."

Article 2.2: "In the event of an attack by a European state leading to war in the Mediterranean region involving Turkey, France and the United Kingdom shall actively cooperate with Turkey and render it all possible assistance and support."

Article 3: "So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and to Romania by their respective declarations of 13 April 1939 remain in force, Turkey shall actively cooperate with France and the United Kingdom and shall provide all possible assistance and support in the event of hostilities arising from one of the aforementioned guarantees that might involve France and the United Kingdom."

Article 4: "In the event of an attack on France or the United Kingdom not covered under articles 2 and 3 leading to war against the attacker, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into consultations... In such a case, Turkey shall pursue toward France and the United Kingdom a policy of at least benevolent neutrality."

Article 6: "The present treaty is not directed against any state."

The treaty consisted of nine articles, a special agreement, a secret military convention, and three protocols, one of them secret. It was designed to secure mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a European state that would lead to war in the Mediterranean involving Turkey, France, or the United Kingdom (article 2). If the war did not spread to the Mediterranean, the parties would consult; in this particular situation Turkey would pursue a policy of at least benevolent neutrality vis-à-vis Britain and France (article 4). Should Turkey be attacked by a European power, Britain and France would assist Turkey (article 1), while Turkey would assist Britain and France in fulfilling their guarantees to Romania and Greece (article 3).

Under the secret Third Protocol, Britain and France committed themselves "to cooperate actively with Turkey and to grant, upon its request, all possible assistance and support as soon as a military action, initiated by a European state, reached frontiers of Bulgaria or Greece." The secret military convention provided that if the war spread to the Balkans "and the signs indicated that Bulgaria was about to join the action directed at one of the contracting parties" Turkey would be committed to "take any military action warranted by the circumstances" to secure Bulgaria's neutralization (article 2). In the event of any Italian action that would cause the treaty to come into effect, Turkish forces would pacify the Dodecanese Islands with British and French participation (article 3). In addition, there was a special agreement under which Britain and France undertook to provide Turkey with assistance in kind and cash. Turkey's obligations would become binding only after its allies had carried out their responsibilities as provided in the special agreement (article 6).

Turkey remained faithful to its friendship with the USSR and had the Second Protocol attached to the treaty. This protocol provided that the commitments arising from the treaty could not "be construed as to drag Turkey into an armed conflict with the USSR or into any action that would lead to a similar result."

The USSR's approach to the issue was quite different. Although Moscow had originally described the Turkish-British joint statement as a pro-peace initiative, it was now declaring that it considered the newly signed Tripartite Alliance to be an incitement to war. Moscow also accused Turkey of fomenting discord between Germany and Russia and of serving the interests of the British and the French, who were bent on extending the war to the Balkans by opening a new front against Germany in that

region. In a speech delivered to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October, Molotov declared that "by tying its fate to Britain and France, Turkey has given satisfaction to the countries that have declared war on Germany. However, by engaging itself on the side of the group of bellicose countries in Europe, Turkey has taken a fateful step that might well lead it to regret its decision in the future." Furthermore, the official gazette of the Comintern carried an editorial in its 7 December issue describing Turkey's reservations regarding the USSR contained in the Second Protocol attached to the pact as "meaningless words." The editorial went on to claim that, along with the aggressive imperialist states (Britain and France), Turkey was seeking to extend the war to the Balkans and establish a new front against Germany. The editorial concluded with the assertion that Turkey had signed a mutual assistance pact with those countries that were seeking to transform Turkey into a strategic base.

Having established an alliance with Britain and France to ward off the Italian threat, Turkey was now confronted with a Soviet threat, just three months into World War II.

# B. Turkey's Efforts to Stay Out of the War The Question of Chromium Sales

In its desire to remain neutral, Turkey sought to maintain its commercial links with both camps after war broke out, even though it had joined the anti-German, pro-status quo countries well before the war. As a condition for maintaining its trade relations, Germany demanded the delivery of at least 60,000 tons of chromium annually and declared that failure to meet this demand would be considered an "unfriendly attitude not compatible with neutrality" (Ataöv 1965, p. 67, quoting from DGFP, vol. 8, pp. 398–99). This put Turkey in a spot, because its total production of the commodity did not meet the level of demand. Up to that time, Turkey had been apportioning its production among the buyers lest any country should be displeased. In this way Turkey was also able to maintain its trade links with all the buyers without becoming dependent on a single market. Chromium was essential for the production of arms, and all of the belligerents were eager to satisfy their requirements for chromium while pressing Turkey to deny the precious commodity to their

Meanwhile Turkey was seeking to develop its trade relations with Britain in order to lessen Germany's political influence but was finding it difficult to divert its purchases of industrial equipment from Germany to Britain. For this reason Turkey felt compelled to supply Germany with raw materials for the arms industry and in particular chromium. No progress was made at the negotiations with Germany to renew the trade agreement that had expired on 31 August 1939 because of Germany's insistence on minimum chromium deliveries, so Turkey refused to renew the agreement. Instead it signed a series of economic agreements with Britain and France. These were important, because Turkey agreed to allow its allies to purchase all of its production of chromium for a period of two years. The agreements also provided for a British loan to Turkey in the amount of £25 million. With the addition of the French share, Turkey would be receiving a total of £27 million in loans.

Germany's pressure for the delivery of chromium continued, however, despite these agreements. In the course of the negotiations Turkey sought to procure military equipment from Germany while trying to maintain its former trade with the territories now under German occupation. Germany, in turn, was striving to keep Turkey out of the war and to increase its political influence in Ankara. Eventually, in June 1940, a one-year trade agreement was signed that made no provisions for the sale of chromium.

#### Italy's Belligerency and the Tripartite Alliance

During this phase the main concern of the belligerents was the reaction of Turkey to Italy's declaration of war. Both Germany and the USSR could perceive from their respective vantage points that the most effective way of preventing Turkey from going to war in the Allied camp was to keep alive Ankara's worries about Soviet intentions. As long as Italy remained nonbelligerent, they believed, Turkey also would stay out of the war. Even if Italy was to join the belligerents, Turkey would still invoke the Second Protocol (relating to the USSR) attached to the Tripartite Alliance to stay out of the conflict. Through its leadership, Turkey was sending out the same message to Germany and to the Allies.

It was true that the main factor keeping Turkey out of the conflict was the fear of the USSR. Germany was playing up the Soviet threat while it tried to appease Ankara's anxieties about Italian intentions in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. As for the Soviets, they were becoming aware that sooner or later they would come into confrontation with Germany in the Balkans. Thus their policy was to keep Turkey guessing about their true intentions and keep alive Ankara's concerns. Italy also was providing no clues about its strategic plans in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, thus exacerbating Turkey's anxieties.

The developments in the first six months of 1940 and the thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations allowed Ankara to overcome its worries over the Soviet threat. It was now exclusively the threat posed by Germany that kept Turkey out of the war. In the summer of 1940 Germany was pressing hard on the Allies on all European fronts and winning a succession of military victories. Berlin warned Ankara at this time that if Turkey entered the war against Italy it would find itself in confrontation with Germany. On 4 June 1940 the Allies managed to carry out the evacuation of the remnants of their armies at Dunkirk. On 10 June Italy declared war on Britain and France.

Italy's declaration of war required Turkey to enter the war on the side of Britain and France in compliance with the provisions of article 2/1 of the Turkish-British-French Alliance of 19 October 1939. The article provided that in the event of an attack by a European country that would drag France and the United Kingdom into war in the Mediterranean region Turkey would be required to cooperate actively with Britain and France and render all possible assistance. Turkey had expected that the Maginot Line would hold for at least four or five years and that this would keep Italy out of the war. The sudden collapse of France was unexpected and left Turkey in a state of shock. As Turkey sought to plot its course at meetings of the parliament, it was coming under increasing external pressure from both the Italian-German and French-British camps. Italy warned that the Mediterranean and Balkan countries that strayed from neutrality would find themselves at war, while Germany called on Turkey not to sever relations either with Italy or with itself. On the other side, Britain and France were insisting that the time had come for Turkey to join the war.

As a matter of fact, following Italy's declaration of war, the ambassadors of Britain and France officially informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 June that Turkey was legally bound to enter the war. The arms promised under the 1939 alliance, however, had not been delivered to Turkey. In these circumstances Turkey had no assurance that it would not be attacked by the USSR if it declared war on the Axis powers. The Polish experience was still fresh in everyone's mind. Furthermore, in line with the provisions of article 2 of the 1929 protocol extending the 1925 Friendship and Neutrality (Nonaggression) Treaty, Turkey consulted Moscow in connection with the British-French request to declare war and got a negative response from Soviet foreign minister Molotov. Rumors were circulating that the USSR was contemplating a military campaign in conjunction with Bulgaria aimed at the Straits. The Soviet ambassador warned Turkey that friendly relations would be possible only if Turkey would completely abandon Britain and turn to the USSR. In these circumstances Turkey had no guarantee regarding Soviet neutrality in the event of its joining the hostilities.

The Turkish government carefully examined the developments following Italy's declaration of war and on 14 June decided to invoke the Second Protocol of the Tripartite Alliance. On this occasion Ankara issued a statement: "Turkey's joining the conflict might lead to war with the USSR. Consequently, the government would bear in mind the Second Protocol of the British-French-Turkish Alliance and maintain Turkey's neutrality in the hostilities."

The statement did not satisfy British ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen, who continued to exert pressure. He declared that Turkey's stand was based on political expediency, that the Second Protocol was just a convenient excuse for Turkey to plead weakness, and that the Soviet threat could not be taken seriously.

Turkey was also following developments on the western front very closely and was receiving news of France's imminent collapse. When France admitted defeat and signed an armistice with Germany on 22 June, the Turkish policy of refusing to go along with the Allied demand to declare war was fully vindicated. Since France was no longer in a position to carry out its commitments under the Tripartite Alliance after its capitulation, the thesis that Turkey was bound to declare war automatically could no longer be maintained. Britain itself was now left alone in facing the German threat of invasion. In these circumstances it was clear that it would be difficult for London to provide Turkey with the assistance foreseen in the Tripartite Alliance.

With France no longer on the scene, the Allied pressure on Turkey lost its credibility, and Ankara reiterated on 26 June that it would comply with the Second Protocol. Thus Turkey would "maintain its present position of remaining neutral in order to ensure the country's security and defense." Britain, however, continued to hold that invoking the Second Protocol did not correspond to reality and was just an excuse. London considered that the Turkish declaration should have alluded to the Tripartite Alliance and that Ankara's decision to remain neutral should have been qualified as being only "for the time being." The British response to the Turkish declaration reflected London's disappointment and contained the reminder that "should Turkey request Britain to honor its commitments under the Treaty, Britain would have the moral right to tailor its actions to suit the prevailing circumstances" (Deringil 1982, p. 41).

The Turkish press contended that Turkey was true to its commitments and that its actions served the interests of the Allies. Writing in the 17 June issue of Akşam, Necmettin Sadak (an important journalist close to government circles, who later became foreign minister) held that if Turkey entered the war it would only help spread the conflict to the Mediterranean and that this would be an additional burden on the Allies. The parliament was divided on the issue. Kazım Karabekir declared that there should be a Turkish-German agreement to counter the common Soviet threat, while Recep Peker claimed that Turkey could be considered to be automatically in a state of war because of the treaties it had signed. Rauf Orbay declared that the final victory would belong to Britain but that it would be desirable for it to be weakened by the effects of a long war. He contended that a quick, overwhelming British victory would create problems for Turkey, so it would not be a bad thing if the war drained Britain's wealth and strength.

It could be argued that the wording of article 2/1 of the Tripartite Alliance (that Turkey would engage in active cooperation and render all possible assistance to France and the United Kingdom) was imprecise and left room for different interpretations. If taken literally, it could be said that, since there was nothing in the treaty that committed Turkey to enter the war on the Allied side, Turkey could provide assistance without getting directly involved in the conflict as a belligerent. It was clear, however, that the Turkish leadership must have interpreted "active cooperation" to mean becoming a full belligerent, because Ankara never resorted to this legal interpretation when the question of Turkey's joining the war came up. Instead it pleaded that the preparations for war had not been concluded. To be engaged in active cooperation without becoming a belligerent could have meant, for example, allowing the Allies to use Turkish air bases. But at the time the leadership rightly considered that resorting to such action would lead Turkey into a state of war with Germany. In other words, the decision-makers interpreted any active assistance as the equivalent of being a belligerent or declaring war.

In the meantime, although a nonbelligerent, Turkey was pressing on with its preparations to meet an attack from the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, or Syria, which was under Axis control at the time. To make provisions against the possibility of Syria, then under French mandate, being turned into a theater of war, Turkey started probing Iraq to determine if joint action could be taken to establish a common front. The Iraqi minister of justice, however, who paid a visit to

Ankara in June 1940, told Germany's Ambassador von Papen that Iraq wanted its full independence from Britain and hinted that the Iraqi army might well side with Germany against Britain. This stand brought to an end the Turkish attempt to take joint action with Iraq. When the pro-German Rashid Ali took control of power in Baghdad through a coup d'état in April 1941, Berlin pressured Turkey for two months to allow Germany to send aid to the Iraqi administration through Turkish territory.

#### The Plan to Attack Baku

With the end of the Finnish campaign in March 1940, the Allied hopes of establishing a northern European front against Germany came to an end. France and Britain had to seek new theaters for engaging their foe. Among these were the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. As long as the Balkan countries maintained their neutrality and continued to trade with Germany, it was not likely that Berlin would consider going on the offensive in that region. Nor was any German action likely in the Middle East in view of the fact that Turkey had mobilized 350,000 men. After the deployment of an Anzac force of 30,000 men to Suez in February 1940 plus the British forces in Egypt and Palestine and the French units in Syria, the Allies had no less than 500,000 men to discourage any German move in that theater. The result was that attention became focused on the Caucasus.

Toward the end of March it was announced that Turkish and Allied officers had met in Aleppo to discuss preparations for the Turkish army to act in concert with the Allies, should the need arise. This news led to much speculation about possible moves. The first possibility was an attack by the Allies on the oil installations of Baku. If the USSR was planning to supply Germany's oil requirements, this could only be done from the Baku fields. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union actually delivered 18 million barrels of petroleum to Germany from January 1940 to June 1941. If the Allies could seize the Baku oil fields or render them inoperative, this would deal a heavy blow to the Soviet economy and dash German hopes for regular oil supplies from that source.

At the same time, Soviet expansion at the expense of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States was causing anxiety in Paris. The Allies were eager to weaken the USSR's military capability by establishing a front as far away from France as possible. Although an attack on Baku through the mountainous terrain of the Caucasus posed formidable difficulties, the port of Batumi, which was employed to ship oil to the Romanian port of Constanta, was only thirty-three kilometers from the Turkish border. If

Batumi was occupied, the Soviet shipments of oil could be seriously disrupted. In addition, French and British aircraft based in Syria and Iraq could fly over Turkey and bomb the oil installations of Baku.

Although these Caucasus campaign plans were abandoned after closer examination, they caused Turkey much trouble. Ankara was opposed to any attack on the USSR either overland through Turkish territory or by sea through the Straits, because it knew that such action would automatically lead to war with the Soviet Union. But Massigli, the French ambassador, had informed Paris (on the basis of a conversation held with Saracoğlu) that Ankara would not be opposed to the use of Turkish airspace to attack the USSR. At their encounter, Saracoğlu informed Massigli that the Soviets feared an Allied attack in the Caucasus region, whereupon Massigli pointed out that the airspace of either Iran or Turkey would have to be used to mount such an attack. Saracoğlu's reply was: "Are you worried that Iran might protest?" Massigli considered this to be a clear indication that no difficulties would come from the Turkish government. When Massigli informed Paris of this conversation, he also proposed that in the event of such an attack prior permission from Turkey should not be sought in order to avoid confronting Ankara with a dilemma. His proposal was that Ankara be notified only after the operation was underway.

The Caucasus campaign was never executed, because the British were not persuaded that Turkey was ready to take part in the venture. They were also convinced that it was of vital importance to keep Turkey in the Allied camp. Another reason was the German victory in Norway. Although the campaign never got beyond the planning stage, it did cause a lot of commotion when the Germans released documents on 5 July 1940 that they claimed had been found in a freight car wrecked during a bombing raid. These documents contained the texts of the abovementioned dispatches sent by Massigli to Paris. The French ambassador claimed that his cables had been distorted, while the Turkish government and press reacted angrily to the allegations.

Although the real purpose of the German revelations was to cause a diplomatic row between Turkey and the USSR, the Soviet reaction turned out to be relatively mild. On 1 August Molotov said: "No substantial change has taken place in our relations with Turkey. However, the documents contained in the German White Paper have shed light on some of the unsavory activities taking place in Turkey." Probably the main reason for the mild Soviet reaction was that developments in Europe at that time were unfolding in Germany's favor and Moscow was fear-

ful that sooner or later these developments would lead to a confrontation with Germany. The Soviet government felt the need to come to some kind of agreement with Turkey, especially after the occupation of Romania.

The revelation of these documents was also motivated by Berlin's desire to see Saracoğlu ousted from the cabinet, because he was perceived to be pro-Allied to an excessive degree. On 12 June İnönü delivered a speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly in which he said: "Kemalist Turkey is not the Ottoman Empire of the viziers. No minister can be dismissed upon the request of foreigners. Everyone should note this very carefully and act accordingly" (Ataöv 1965, p. 79).

# Italy's Occupation of Greece

Soon after the uncertainty created by the publication of the Massigli papers had been overcome, German forces entered Romania on 7 October. This was followed by Italy's attack on Greece on 28 October. These events had wider implications, because they brought into play the Balkan Pact as well as article 3 of the Turkish-British-French Alliance regarding the guarantees given to Romania and Greece. It will be recalled that the Balkan Pact only guaranteed the internal frontiers of the Balkan states. At Greece's request, the clause that called for a response to an attack from outside the region (meaning Italy) had been removed. Consequently, there was nothing in the Balkan Pact that required Turkey to take up arms.

In regard to the Tripartite Alliance, Turkey alluded again to the Second Protocol of the pact and pointed out that a Turkish reaction to Italy's attack on Greece might well lead to a confrontation with the USSR. If Turkey sent forces to support Greek resistance, this would weaken its own defenses. Britain was aware of this and did not ask for Turkish involvement in repelling the Italian aggression. As a result, Turkey confined itself to sending a warning to the Bulgarian government—if Bulgaria attacked Greece, it would find itself at war with Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the Balkan Pact—and continued to maintain its neutrality. In fact, Turkey was feeling cornered after Italy's attack on Greece.

At this juncture the question of Turkey's participation in the war created a split between Britain's Foreign Office and its Ministry of Defense. The high echelons of the Defense Ministry held the view that, although militarily weak, Turkey should join the conflict immediately in order to bolster the Greek defenses while sparing Britain the need to weaken its forces in Egypt. In their view, if Turkey was not forced to live up to its commitments at that moment, it could evade its commitments relatively

easily at a later stage. Also, if Turkey became a belligerent, this would demoralize the Italians, who were already facing difficulties in Greece, and lessen the risk of a sudden German operation against Turkey.

The Foreign Office, however, was of the opinion that Turkey's belligerency would greatly increase the demand for arms and military equipment at a time when Britain was hard-pressed to meet its own requirements. The Foreign Office felt that Turkey should not be pressured and should be left to make its own decision in the light of its national interest. For the Foreign Office, Turkey was an essential element of Britain's Middle East policy, with far greater importance than Greece. Victory was attainable in the Middle East even if Greece was overrun. But the loss of Turkey would render Britain's position in the Middle East untenable. In these circumstances, "nobody in his right mind" would press Turkey to enter the war and cause the center of gravity of the conflict to shift from the Middle East to the Balkans and from Cairo to Istanbul (Churchill, vol. 2, p. 483).

Although Prime Minister Churchill concurred with the Foreign Office view, this did not mean that Turkey was now free from British pressure. In a message sent to the British ambassador in Ankara on 26 November 1940, Churchill indicated that Britain wanted to see Turkey in the war at the earliest possible date. But it would not press Turkey to join the war just to aid Greece. From Britain's point of view, it would become essential for Turkey to join the conflict only if Bulgaria attacked, either by itself or in league with Germany. Ankara had already been warned that Turkey would be totally isolated if it still remained neutral after such an eventuality (Churchill, vol. 2, p. 484).

The unfolding of events demonstrated once again that Turkey had made the right decision. With the collapse of France, Britain's position in the Middle East was seriously undermined, and its assistance to Greece remained insufficient. Furthermore, it was a widely held view in Germany that, if Turkey did not remain passive after the attack on Greece, the German army would strike and open the route from the Straits to Syria. After meeting with Molotov in Berlin on 12–15 November, however, Hitler had shifted all of his attention to the USSR. The Führer wanted to launch the Russian campaign right away and realized that a move against Turkey would inevitably result in a postponement of that campaign. As a consequence, he took the decision to avoid any disagreement with Turkey for the time being (Deringil 1982, p. 48).

As a result, although both Turkey and Britain confirmed their attachment to the Tripartite Alliance of October 1939, Britain refrained from calling on Turkey to

enter the war. All it wanted from Turkey was to remain neutral, which still favored the Allies, as long as possible while making sure not to trigger an attack from the Axis or the USSR. Turkey's foreign policy stance, however, as expounded by Saracoğlu, was that it was not "neutral" but merely a "noncombatant" and would pursue this policy until it was attacked or felt the time had come to honor its commitments.

## Nazi-Soviet Bargaining over Turkey (The Hitler-Molotov Negotiations, November 1940)

The cooperation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as a result of the Nonaggression and Friendship Pact of 23 August 1939 was flimsy and artificial. The cooperation came under even more pressure as the war shifted from Western Europe to the east and the Balkans. The first contentious issue in the Balkans was Romania. Neither Germany nor Italy wanted to see the USSR expanding in the Balkans, while the Soviets saw Germany encroaching into its security zone. The interests of the two sides were beginning to clash.

Meanwhile Germany was engaged in a cynical game of double-dealing. While Berlin was giving assurances to Turkey and offering to sign a pact, it was also trying to lure the USSR into the Axis camp by offering inducements at Turkey's expense. Von Papen was under constant pressure from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and kept querying Berlin about the decisions reached by Germany and the USSR in order to calibrate his response to the Turks accordingly. On 4 November 1940 von Ribbentrop responded by cautioning von Papen not to give any written guarantees to the Turks. Von Papen was informed for the first time that Germany intended to reach an understanding with the USSR over the Straits and through joint pressure to spoil Turkey's relations with Britain and in this way draw it closer to the Axis (Ataöv 1965, p. 82).

# The Issue of Turkey and the Straits in the Course of Molotov's Berlin Visit

The issue of Turkey came up in the course of Molotov's three-day Berlin visit, which started on 12 November. Hitler and von Ribbentrop met Molotov singly and together and in the course of their conversations indicated that, if the USSR, Germany, Japan, and Italy could establish a joint platform, Turkey would join this grouping. Von Ribbentrop declared that he understood the Soviet misgivings with regard to the Montreux Convention. He reminded the Russian visitor that Germany had taken no part in its elaboration and consequently favored its re-

placement with an agreement that involved the directly interested parties: Turkey, the USSR, Germany, and Italy. He concluded by indicating that Germany stood ready to lend effective support to Moscow to bring about changes in the regime of the Straits to bring it into line with Soviet aspirations (Sonntag and Beddie, pp. 222–23). Although the particulars of such a regime were not discussed at the meeting, agreement in principle was reached to grant the USSR special privileges, including the unrestricted right to send its merchant vessels as well as its navy into the Mediterranean.

At the meeting held on 12 November, Hitler asked Molotov how the USSR planned to defend its interests in the Black Sea and the Straits. Molotov replied that, historically, the British had conducted their attacks on Russia through the Straits and that the waterway was of vital importance for the USSR's defense and its interests. He added that he would like to know the German reaction to a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria (the country that was closest to the Straits), similar to the guarantee given by Germany to Romania. Molotov indicated that a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria would facilitate the defense of the USSR against an attack coming through the Straits.

Hitler declared that all of this was pretty much in line with German thinking. He believed that only Soviet vessels should have unrestricted access through the Straits, which would remain out of bounds for the warships of all other countries. Hitler would consult with Bulgaria's leaders about the proposed Soviet guarantee and also seek Mussolini's views on the issue. Molotov pointed out that the USSR would not be satisfied with anything other than firm guarantees; to this end, it wanted its own checkpoints either on the Aegean islands or on the Straits and saw the Bulgarian guarantee in the same context.

In short, before agreeing to join the Axis, the USSR demanded naval and air bases on the Straits and sought to have the region south of a line drawn from Batumi to Baku and up to the Caspian Sea recognized as a Soviet zone of influence. In a bid to gain time before embarking on its invasion, Germany insisted on seeking the views of Italy and Bulgaria.

Eventually the USSR agreed with Germany and Italy that Turkey should be freed from its present commitments and be won over in order to secure its political cooperation as well as the abrogation of the Montreux Convention. The agreement that would be sought would permit Soviet warships to sail through the Straits unhindered at all times, while denying access in principle to the warships of other countries, with the exception of Black Sea states plus Germany and Italy. In the event of Turkey's refusing

to join the USSR, Germany, Italy, and Japan bloc, Molotov proposed that Germany, Italy, and the USSR should consider taking joint military and diplomatic action and enter into an agreement that would provide for this kind of joint action.

The main theme of Molotov's talks in Berlin was the division of the world into zones of influence by the Axis powers and the USSR. As Molotov left Berlin for Moscow, he received the text of a draft treaty from von Ribbentrop. The treaty would divide the world among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USSR. The section dealing with Turkey contained the following proposals. Turkey would be freed from its commitments to Britain and induced to cooperate with the Axis. A new Straits regime would be established that would grant unlimited access to the USSR and close the Straits to the warships of non—Black Sea states. In the draft Turkey was not placed in any specific zone of influence. This was an indication that Germany had no intention of allowing the USSR to establish its control over Turkey by way of the Balkans and the Straits.

The Soviet response to the German draft came on 25 November. In its response Moscow enumerated its conditions for joining the Axis powers. Among these were that the Black Sea would be within the Soviet sphere of influence, that Moscow would conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, and that the Soviets would establish military and naval bases in the region of the Straits through long-term leases. In addition, Turkey's territorial integrity would be guaranteed if it agreed to join Germany, Italy, and the USSR by signing a pact. Should Turkey refuse to do this, then appropriate measures would be applied against it.

The Soviet demands on the highly strategic Straits both at the Berlin talks and in subsequent correspondence persuaded Hitler that the time had come to terminate his cooperation with the Soviet Union. Like the Soviet Union, Germany had no intention to share the Straits with any other nation. Nor did Berlin want to see the USSR getting a foothold in the Balkans through a guarantee to Bulgaria, because it considered this region to be within its own sphere of influence. Furthermore, Berlin felt that as the war progressed in its favor Turkey would join the German camp on its own relatively soon and thereby come within its sphere of influence. As a result, on 18 December Hitler gave the orders to start the preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the plan to invade the USSR. Hitler's instructions were that the planning for this undertaking would be completed by 15 May 1941.

Feeling that the war was approaching even closer to its borders, Turkey fortified its forces in Thrace, mined the

approaches to the Dardanelles, and took measures against the Italian navy and the German submarines thought to be based in the Romanian port of Constanta by requiring all vessels to identify themselves prior to sailing through the Straits. On 22 November martial law was declared in Thrace. Meanwhile, as the Soviet-Nazi bargaining over Turkey went on, Germany was also conducting negotiations with Ankara.

After his meeting with Molotov, Hitler met the Bulgarian king in Berlin on 17 November 1940. Hungary joined the Axis on 20 November, followed by Romania and Slovakia on 23 and 24 November. Von Papen had a long meeting with President İnönü on 29 November in the presence of Saracoğlu. At this meeting von Papen declared that a new order was being established in Europe, that Germany's political objectives had very little to do with Greece (embroiled with the Italians at the time), that Germany was ready to give guarantees to Turkey, and that this would not be incompatible with Ankara's commitments to Britain. He concluded by stating that in this way Turkey would be 100% secure.

'The Reich's aim in the Balkans was not very clear; nor was von Papen able to provide explicit written guarantees to Turkey. It was therefore decided to conduct further negotiations in secret between Saracoğlu and the undersecretary of the MFA (Numan Menemencioğlu) on the Turkish side and von Papen on the German side. Von Papen replied to the Turkish appeal for Germany to sign the Montreux Convention by declaring that Germany wanted to postpone taking up the issue of the Straits until the end of the war. Von Ribbentrop had instructed von Papen on 5 December to confine the negotiations with Turkey to a restricted field and not give away Germany's position on the issue of the Straits. In his message of 21 December, von Ribbentrop called for the continuation of the negotiations but told von Papen to refrain from making any commitments to Turkey that would conflict with Germany's position in its negotiations with the USSR.

#### The Nazis' Denunciation of the Soviets

Ankara heard about the Nazi-Soviet negotiations over Turkey on 17 March 1941. When Turkish ambassador Hüsrev Gerede delivered a letter from İnönü to Hitler, the German leader revealed what had transpired. From Hitler's explanation it was possible to conclude that it was the Soviet demand for bases in Bulgaria and the Dardanelles that prevented a Soviet-German agreement at Turkey's expense and kept the USSR from joining the Axis powers. Germany rejected this demand, because it wanted no rivals in the Straits and the Balkans.

On 28 March 1941 von Papen called on Menemencioğlu to announce that the Führer had turned down the conditions set by Moscow for the USSR to join the Axis "out of regard for the historic friendship between Turkey and Germany," which the ambassador considered to be worthy of the highest praise. Menemencioğlu's reply to von Papen gives an indication of the nature of Turkish foreign policy during this period and how it was based totally on Realpolitik:

Let us not talk of sentimentality, of old friendship and comradeship in arms. Instead let us concentrate on the present-day interests of the Reich and of Turkey, which are the determining factors of our respective foreign policies. We naturally considered every contingency and assumed that in your negotiations with Russia you discussed Turkey. If Germany chooses Russia and attempts to hand over the Straits to that country, any expectation of a German victory would be unrealistic. If Russia reaches the Straits and the Mediterranean by way of Romania and Bulgaria, this would lead to Germany being surrounded from the south. If Germany is prepared to pay such a high price, it will in all probability lose the war. We Turks would stand to gain in a different way. The Führer's refusal to hand over the Straits is consequently a wise decision and serves Germany's interests well. We do not want to see this war end with one side's total victory. It is in Turkey's interest to see the war coming to an end through negotiations. Although we are in an alliance, we have not allowed ourselves to be used by our allies. We are selfish and think only of our own interests. (DGFP, vol. 12, Doc. No. 231)

# II. 1941–1943: GERMAN PRESSURE ON TURKEY

## A. Turkey's Reaction When Germany Reached the Balkans

The failure of the Nazi-Soviet negotiations of November 1940 and the inability of the Germans to draw the Soviets into a grand coalition against Britain had a profound effect on the outcome of the war. As the attempts to bring the two countries closer ended in failure, both started preparing for war with each other. As Hitler was signing general order number 21 relating to Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets were deploying their units in Crimea to the west.

Early in 1941 Germany acquired Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria without firing a shot. Greece and Yugoslavia were occupied with a *Blitzkrieg*. All of this happened within the context of Operation Barbarossa. Before attacking the USSR, Germany was ensuring its southern flank. It wanted to make sure that the Allies had no opportunity to establish a bridgehead in Greece and open a second front against Germany in the Balkans.

#### The Importance of Bulgaria

In these circumstances the geographic location of Bulgaria acquired a special significance. This country had obtained Dobruja with German backing and harbored misgivings toward the USSR. From Germany's point of view, Bulgaria was important for launching an attack on the USSR. Bulgaria was also important for the USSR, which feared an attack from Germany or from the Allies through the Straits. Bulgaria could also be very useful to the USSR as a base for a possible operation against the Straits. For these reasons the Germans prevented the USSR from giving a guarantee to Bulgaria during Molotov's visit to Berlin. This triggered a fierce competition between Germany and the USSR for influence over Bulgaria, which also had repercussions for Turkey.

When Moscow failed to get a German concurrence for a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria, it decided to proceed unilaterally and sent an emissary to Sofia on 25 November 1940 to inquire whether Bulgaria would need a guarantee against the "Turkish threat." The USSR was intent on signing a mutual assistance pact with Sofia that would have the dual purpose of preventing the Germans from moving southward while allowing Moscow to acquire bases near the Straits through Bulgaria and thereby exerting pressure on Turkey.

The draft mutual assistance pact delivered to the Bulgarians had the following provisions relating to Turkey:

- 1. The Soviet government expresses its understanding of Bulgaria's interests in Western Thrace (to secure its access to the Aegean) and is prepared to cooperate to ensure these interests.
- 2. To further Soviet and Bulgarian interests, the USSR is renewing its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact. Such a pact will help Bulgaria in achieving its national aspirations not only in Western Thrace but also in Eastern Thrace.
- 3. If Bulgaria is confronted with the threat of aggression or finds itself under a Turkish attack, the USSR will render all possible assistance to Bulgaria and support its well-known claims on Turkey's European region.

Fearing the German military presence in Romania

and the pro-German elements in the Bulgarian government, the king rejected the Soviet offers.

It will be recalled that the 1925 Friendship and Neutrality (Nonaggression) Treaty between Turkey and the USSR had been extended by a protocol in 1929. Article 2 of the protocol provided that the parties would not enter into negotiations for concluding a political agreement with any state that was a direct neighbor of the other party without informing that party and would only enter into such agreements with the consent of the other party. The USSR had not informed Turkey about the guarantee that Moscow was offering to Bulgaria. Turkey only became aware of this when its ambassador in Moscow posed a question on the subject to Molotov in December. The full details of the negotiations became known to Ankara in 1942, when the Bulgarians handed the text of the Soviet proposals to Menemencioğlu.

At this juncture Britain was concerned about the possibility of Turkey succumbing to German pressure and allowing German forces to cross its territory to gain access to the Middle East in the event of Greece and Bulgaria coming under German control. To forestall such an eventuality, Churchill sent a letter to İnönü on 31 January, pointing out the dangers that German control of Bulgaria would pose to Turkey and concluding by calling on Ankara to join the Allies in the war. But the Germans had moved first and on 7 January had transmitted, through the German Embassy in Ankara, von Ribbentrop's offer of guarantee to the Turkish leadership. Turkey was being given assurances that German forces had entered the Balkans with the consent of the Hungarian and Romanian governments only in order to block Britain's efforts to establish a bridgehead in Greece and that the German action was not directed at any Balkan state, including Turkey (Sonntag and Beddie, p. 25).

# The Turkish-Bulgarian Declaration of Nonaggression

As Turkey's concern over German and Soviet intentions grew, Ankara accelerated the preparations to reinforce its military forces in Thrace to deter and if necessary repulse a possible attack. The Bulgarians became alarmed by this concentration of troops and called for a declaration of nonaggression. The negotiations leading to the declaration got underway on 17 February 1941.

Turkey's main concern at this point was not the likelihood of a Bulgarian attack but the certainty of a German occupation of Bulgaria. Sofia knew that, as long as it remained neutral and refrained from any aggressive act that would come within the terms of the Balkan Pact, it had no cause to fear an attack from Turkey. Turkey's objective was to prevent or at least delay for as long as possible Bulgaria's accession to the Axis to ensure itself against a possible Turkish attack. Ankara wanted to make sure that its efforts to stay out of the war were not frustrated by the Germans marching into the Balkans and reaching the Turkish frontier.

The declaration was a reaffirmation of the 1929 Turkish-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship and the 1929 Treaty of Neutrality. The declaration stated that the two countries had agreed to protect and enhance their mutual trust (article 2), to respect each other's territorial integrity, and to pursue their relations based on good neighbor-liness without attacking one another. Article 1 of the declaration announced that the two countries would "make refraining from aggression a permanent principle of their foreign policies." This undertaking went beyond the commitment in the 1929 treaty to maintain neutrality.

The declaration did not satisfy the Allies, who wanted to see Turkey taking a firmer stand against Bulgaria. Nor did it satisfy the USSR, which expected Turkey not to interact with Bulgaria in any way. There was speculation that, with the declaration, Ankara was drawing Bulgaria toward British policies, while some saw Turkey being drawn toward the Axis. In any case, the declaration did not prevent Bulgaria from joining the Axis on 1 March 1941. With German forces moving into Bulgaria, the German-Soviet-British tug of war over that country came to an end, with Germany the winner.

The concentration of German troops in the Balkans increased the probability of a sudden German move against Turkey or Greece. The motorized German units in Bulgaria could have moved against Istanbul and the Straits at any moment. On 3 March the USSR declared that the Bulgarian action was unacceptable, followed by Britain's severing of diplomatic relations with Sofia two days later. This situation led the USSR to review its previous policies and seek cooperation with Ankara, which shared the same concerns over Germany's intentions. Previously Moscow had been trying to work with Bulgaria to isolate Turkey.

#### The Turkish-Soviet Nonaggression Declaration

With the situation in the Balkans developing unfavorably, Britain sent its foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, to Ankara on 26 February to explore the possibility of resurrecting the Balkan Pact. Saracoğlu and Eden met again in Nicosia on 8–19 March. During the later meeting, Eden, already knowing that Yugoslavia was about to succumb to German pressure, asked Saracoğlu whether Turkey would consider sending a message to the Yugoslav government,

stating Ankara's readiness to declare war on Germany if Germany attacked Greece and Yugoslavia declared war on Germany as a result. In reply Saracoğlu pointed out that Ankara would find itself in a very difficult situation if Yugoslavia rejected the Turkish offer. Saracoğlu also indicated that before sending such a message Turkey would in any case want to have a Soviet promise that the USSR would remain neutral in the event of a German attack on Turkey.

At this point the Turkish press and foreign press were full of reports that the Soviets had made certain demands on Turkey and were seeking to take advantage of Turkey's difficulties as it tried to cope with British pressure for it to become a belligerent. What really caused anxiety in Turkey was the rumor that Germany would move against Turkey from Bulgaria and that the USSR would then take advantage of the situation, attack from the east, and partition Turkey with Germany the way they had partitioned Poland. When the Turkish prime minister himself referred to this possibility (the "Polish syndrome"), Britain, which had been in negotiations with the USSR since November 1940 in order to conclude an agreement, redoubled its efforts to get the Soviets to give Ankara a guarantee of their neutrality. Eventually, on 9 March, Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrey Vyshinsky summoned Turkish ambassador Haydar Aktay and informed him that they had heard from British source; about Turkish anxieties regarding possible Soviet attacks if Turkey found itself involved in armed conflicts. Vyshinsky noted that such reports, also appearing in the Turkish press, were without foundation. He wanted to give assurances that, if Turkey was obliged to defend itself in the face of an attack, Ankara could count on "full Soviet understanding and neutrality" based on the 1925 Nonaggression Treaty. With Turkey giving similar assurances, all of this was reflected in the Communiqué of Nonaggression of 25 March 1941, issued at Turkey's request. This was the last official text recalling the 1925 Friendship and Nonaggression Pact that the USSR would denounce in 1945.

Upon reports appearing in the international press that if Turkey was compelled to enter the war then the Soviet Union would take advantage of its predicament and attack it, the Turkish government sought clarifications from the Soviet government. The reply of the Soviet government is the following.

- 1. Such reports are totally unrelated to the Soviet government's stance.
  - 2. If Turkey does find itself under attack and

is compelled to defend its territory, then Turkey can count on the fullest understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union based on the Nonaggression Treaty between the two countries.

Upon this declaration of the Soviet government, the Turkish government expressed its sincere appreciation and stated that, should the Soviet Union find itself confronted with an analogous situation, it can count on the fullest understanding and neutrality of the Turkish government.

From the wording of the Soviet communiqué, the possibility of Turkey becoming engaged in war without being attacked was explicitly excluded. Therefore, if Turkey declared war on Germany without first coming under attack, the Soviet threat would continue to exist. From previous negotiations it was known that the price for a broader Soviet guarantee would be very high. Nevertheless, on 9 March the Soviet Union had declared (for the first time since the outbreak of the war) that, if Turkey found itself in trouble with a third country, Moscow would not engage in any activity that might cause difficulties for Turkey.

It will be noted that the Soviet reaffirmation of non-aggression occurred only after the collapse of the USSR's Balkan plans and after German forces approached the Straits. Until then the USSR had done nothing to dispel Turkey's apprehensions. With its proposals to Bulgaria at the expense of Greece and Turkey, the USSR also prevented the development of a spirit of solidarity among the Balkan nations. The ambivalent Soviet approach to Turkey continued until it became clear that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would definitely side with the Axis; only then did the Soviet Union adopt a more positive stance toward Turkey.

The biggest question mark in the Balkans at this time was Yugoslavia. Eventually Belgrade succumbed to the German pressure and joined the Axis on 25 March 1941. Two days later Yugoslav chief of staff Gen. Dusan Simovich came to power following a coup d'état. In response to this development, Britain made a new demarche in Ankara to have a message sent to the Yugoslav government in the same vein as the one requested earlier at the Nicosia talks. In a letter to İnönü, Churchill pointed out that this event should serve as a warning. He added that, if an anti-German coalition was not established in the Balkans, the Germans might well decide to overrun Turkey before attacking Greece. But when Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April and the Allies had not yet car-

ried out their commitments regarding the provision of military assistance, Turkey informed Britain that it would continue its policy of staying out of the war.

#### The German Proposals

Let us now examine the state of Turkish-German relations after the Turkish-Bulgarian Declaration. It will be recalled that the concentration of German troops in the Balkans was giving rise to concern in Turkey. The Turks feared that German units would march into Bulgaria at any moment and that Turkey would be the next objective of these forces. The Turkish fears were transmitted to Berlin by von Papen, who received the following message from von Ribbentrop: "As already stated on 7 January, Germany's measures in the Balkans are not aimed at Turkey but at Britain, which is trying to acquire a firm foothold in Greece. The Führer will send a personal letter to Inönü on the night of March 1, following Bulgaria's joining the Axis."

On 4 March von Papen delivered Hitler's letter to İnönü. In the letter Hitler gave assurances to İnönü that the German forces that had entered Bulgaria on 1 March would stay away from the Turkish frontier and that their movements were not directed at Turkey (Box 3-4). Subsequently von Papen called on Saracoğlu on 8 March to give assurances that the German units would under no circumstances come closer than a hundred kilometers to the Turkish border. In fact, the German forces came within sixty kilometers of the Turkish frontier before halting. İnönü responded to Hitler's letter on 12 March. In his letter İnönü expressed the hope that a Turkish-German confrontation would be avoided and reiterated Turkey's basic policy: "After the last Great War, in which we fought side by side and shared the glory as well as the pain, the policy of the new Turkey is the same as it was at the beginning of our War of Liberation: to defend Turkey's independence in the fullest sense without violating the rights of others to develop peacefully... Turkey would never consider preserving its territory and its integrity through political and military combinations with this or that country" (DGFP, vol. 12, Doc. No. 161).

But important events took place in the course of the first week of April that made Turkey's position even more difficult. As noted earlier, on 2 April Rashid Ali Geylani, a former prime minister known for his anti-British views, carried out a coup and took power in Iraq. On 6 April Germany and Hungary attacked Yugoslavia, while Greece was attacked by Germany and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia capitulated on 17 April and Greece on 23 April. At this point Berlin informed Turkey once again that the German forces

#### Box 3-4. Letter from Hitler to İnönü (1 March 1941)

I would like to take advantage of this occasion formally to reassure Your Excellency that these actions are in no way directed at Turkey's political and territorial integrity. Recalling the Great War that we conducted together, and the painful years that followed this conflict, I want to express to you my heartfelt and profound belief that all the conditions exist for true and friendly cooperation between Turkey and Germany in the coming years. This is based on the following considerations.

- Germany has no territorial ambitions in the region.
   When the dangers alluded to have disappeared, the German forces shall evacuate Bulgaria...and Romania.
- 2. The economic development that will take place in the postwar period to heal Europe's wounds will require that Germany and Turkey engage in trade once again, Germany is not merely interested in selling its manufactured products. It will also be in a position to import vast quantities of goods.

Furthermore, I am convinced that in the territorial rearrangements that will take place after the war Germany will not find itself in the position of having to oppose Turkish policy goals. Disagreement between the two countries will be equally harmful to the interests of the Axis and Turkey, I therefore see no cause for antagonism between our two countries, either now or in the future. With these thoughts in mind, I have ordered that the German forces now advancing through Bulgaria remain at a distance from the Turkish frontier in order not to lead to any doubts about their intentions. Of course, this will be on condition that the Turkish Government refrains from any measure that would force us to reconsider our decision.

(M. AYDIN) (Source: DGFP, vol. 12, Doc. No. 122)

advancing in Greece had been ordered to stay clear of Edirne and the Turkish frontier. As German forces reached the Black Sea and Aegean coasts, Berlin started worrying about Turkey's reaction. To forestall the possibility of a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement against Germany, Berlin started probing the Turks to determine if a nonaggression pact might be concluded between the two countries. In this context von Ribbentrop had a meeting with Turkey's Ambassador Gerede on 9 April, during which the German minister indicated that the Führer would like to see Germany's former friends on its side once again. Von Ribbentrop said: "[A]ll of our friends who have returned to our side have been able to place themselves in a position where they can realize their revisionist aspirations. This has been true for Hungary and Bulgaria, and these considerations shall apply once again in the current operations against Serbia and Greece" (DGFP, vol. 12, Doc. No. 303). Germany was hinting that, if Turkey joined the war on its side, new arrangements in Turkey's favor might be possible in the Aegean.

Until then Germany had been seeking to sway Turkey by reminding it of the Soviet threat. Now Berlin switched

to a policy of seeking to influence Ankara through promises relating to postwar territorial arrangements. Von Papen presented to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs more detailed versions of von Ribbentrop's promises. Von Papen went to Berlin in late April and returned to Ankara on 12 May. Upon his return he proposed the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement to Saracoğlu and İnönü. At his first meeting with Saracoğlu he pointed out that the Balkan operation had been concluded successfully and that the Führer had kept his promise to İnönü. Von Papen argued that this situation called for a fundamental change in Turkey's policies. He went on to enumerate the commitments that the Reich was ready to make to Ankara.

- 1. Our previous guarantee regarding the disposition of our troops [i.e., the German forces in the Balkans would stay away from the Turkish frontier] shall continue to be valid.
- 2. All Turkish interests and objectives shall be taken into account with fairness.
- 3. Germany declares formally that it fully respects Turkey's sovereignty and independence. Turkey's rights shall enjoy the same respect. Turkey's rights over the Straits shall be reinforced in the direction of Turkey's wishes.
- 4. We are ready to take up all political and economic issues with Turkey, and, should Turkey be interested, we can give full satisfaction to Turkey in its areas of security zones.
- 5. The region around Edirne and the islands in the Aegean close to the coast shall be ceded to Turkey.
- 6. We shall not request transit rights for our troops through Turkish territory. However, we may request the right to transport military equipment, in line with our existing trade convention.
- 7. If a gesture is forthcoming demonstrating trust and friendship between the two countries, we are ready to deliver all kinds of military equipment. As long as we can be assured that this equipment will not be used against Germany, we shall make no demands that might conflict with Turkey's existing commitments.
- 8. We undertake to sign an agreement that will not conflict with Turkey's secret or open commitments. (*DGFP*, vol. 12, Doc. No. 514)

At this point it has to be stressed that Turkey was not driven to these contacts and the search for avenues

of cooperation with Germany by the German promises, which were imprecise and uncertain as to their postwar feasibility. Turkey's motive was its concern about possible German-Soviet cooperation and the desire to prevent Germany from taking this course. In a conversation held with von Papen on 14 May, İnönü argued that Germany's agreement with the USSR could only be short-lived and that in a year's time Germany might find itself in a much more unfavorable situation. If Germany would undertake not to enter into any commitments directed against Turkey with another country, Turkey would do likewise and refrain from commitments that might harm German interests and would commit never to engage in armed conflict with Germany. İnönü added that such commitments could be put in writing in a way that would not clash with Turkey's commitments to other parties.

As noted, Ankara's main worry was a German-Soviet agreement and the possibility of Turkey being made a bargaining element in such an agreement. To prevent such an outcome Ankara was prepared to sign an agreement with Germany. Turkey's fears were not unjustified, because it is known that, as the Germans were bringing their proposals to Turkey, they were also in contact with the USSR.

Turkey notified its ally Britain about the German demarches and received London's approval to continue these contacts. To avoid a German trap, in which Turkey and the USSR would be used against each other, Britain also expressed the need to notify Moscow about what was going on.

In the meantime Germany wanted to provide assistance to the Rashid Geylani regime in Iraq by using Turkey for transit purposes, but Ankara kept refusing to allow this. After the coup of 2 April, Britain landed troops in Basra in an attempt to reverse the coup. Hence the Iraqi regime's minister of defense came to Ankara to seek von Papen's assistance. Such German assistance would only be possible via Turkish territory. This situation would have allowed Germany to influence Iraq and to gain access to the Syrian bases that the Vichy government had placed at its disposal. It would have also allowed Germany to gain control of the oil fields of Iraq and Iran and then to reach for the Suez Canal, through which it could establish direct contact with the Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean.

In this framework von Papen delivered to Menemencioğlu on 23 May 1941 Berlin's draft treaty, which also had secret protocols in its annexes. The first protocol would relate to the delivery of German arms aid to Iraq. A second secret protocol contained the following provision: "When peace is achieved, the Reich will consider favorably Turkish wishes with regard to Thrace, the islands,

and any changes in the status of the Straits. When military operations are extended, the same understanding shall be shown vis-à-vis Turkish interests in the east and the south" (*DGFP*, vol. 12, Doc. No. 545). In other words, should Turkey be prepared to engage in close cooperation, Germany was offering rectification of frontiers in favor of Turkey not only in the Balkans and the Aegean but also in the southern and eastern regions (i.e., in its frontiers with Syria, Iraq, and Iran).

Von Ribbentrop instructed von Papen, however, to make sure that in transmitting the German offer to the Turkish government he refrained from putting anything into writing and avoided being specific. From the correspondence between the minister and the ambassador, it is possible to discern that Germany was seeking to draw Turkey into closer cooperation with the Axis with vague offers, without making any binding concrete commitment. In the proposed agreement the objective was not only to secure the transit of military equipment to Iraq through Turkey but also, with another secret protocol, to secure a Turkish commitment not to prevent the equipment from being transported with its personnel. This amounted to allowing German soldiers to pass through Turkey masquerading as civilians.

On 26 May Menemencioğlu delivered the Turkish reply to the German offer: Turkey had no territorial claims whatsoever and should not be asked to do anything incompatible with the Turkish-British alliance. Consequently, the signing of secret protocols was out of the question. If Germany pledged not to attack Turkey, however, then Ankara would be ready to pledge to remain neutral in any war involving Germany (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973, p. 113). What spared Turkey from further German pressure on this ground was the surrender of Rashid Ali on 28 May. Britain regained control of Iraq, and a new pro-British administration was installed in Baghdad.

#### The Turkish-German Nonaggression Pact

Given the developments in Iraq, there was no more need for Germany to insist on transporting military equipment to Iraq through Turkey. Germany was still very interested in securing its right flank, however, by ensuring Turkey's neutrality on the eve of its attack on the USSR. With this goal in mind, Germany renewed its demarche for an agreement but removed the clauses relating to the shipment of arms to Iraq. On 1 January von Ribbentrop sent von Papen instructions to renew the talks to conclude a political agreement. Given the changed circumstances in Iraq, von Papen was not to make too definite formal commitments to Turkey. Berlin's draft agreement contained

these provisions: Article 1: "Germany and Turkey shall mutually respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories." Article 2: "The parties shall enter into friendly consultations on issues affecting their common interests with a view to resolving them."

The secret protocol was drafted in the following terms: Article 1: "Germany recognizes Turkey's territorial sovereignty over the Straits and declares that it will support all Turkish efforts aimed at securing international implementation of this sovereignty. For its part, Turkey undertakes to take into account Germany's maritime requirements in connection with the question of the Straits." Article 2: "When peace is attained, the Reich government shall, to the extent possible, take into account Turkey's wishes regarding arrangements in the frontier in the region of Edirne" (DGFP, vol. 12 Doc. No. 583).

When Turkey expressed its reservations about the German proposals, von Papen delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 June a sharp message from von Ribbentrop in which he reminded Ankara that at the moment Germany and its allies were the undisputed masters of Europe and could easily ignore Turkey if they chose to do so. Consequently, according to von Papen's message, the cooperation being offered to Turkey and the accompanying guarantees for its territorial integrity were very much in Turkey's favor. The German policy of offering a carrot had now been replaced by the policy of the big stick.

By this time, Britain was truly alarmed over the possibility of Turkey drifting into the German camp. London started reminding Ankara that it stood to gain nothing from a political agreement with Germany and that such an agreement would make it difficult for Ankara to pursue an independent foreign policy. Britain also got the U.S. to intervene to prevent a possible Turkish-German agreement. On 15 June U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull had ambassador J. V. A. MacMurray deliver a message to Ankara. It pointed out that, if Turkey relented in its resistance to the expansion of German aggression and Turkish-British cooperation came to an end, this would have a very negative effect on American public opinion. In such circumstances Turkey would not be able to continue benefiting from the Lend and Lease Law. But when MacMurray learned from his British colleague that the agreement was scheduled to be signed within a few days, he decided not to deliver the secretary of state's message right away. He felt that such forceful demarches would be counterproductive and sought new instructions from Washington.

The British also changed their tactics and shifted from trying to prevent the impending agreement to having a clarification inserted in the text declaring that the agreement would not weaken Turkey's alliance with Britain. In any case, during the course of negotiations Turkey had already asked Germany to insert a clause in the preamble of the agreement stating that Turkey's alliance with Britain would remain unaffected. Turkey would also reserve the right to appeal to Britain for help in case of an attack from a third party (meaning the USSR). With these insertions, the Turkish-German Nonaggression Pact was signed on 18 June. According to the pact, the Republic of Turkey and the German Reich would "base their relations on mutual trust and sincere friendship and conclude a treaty without prejudice to the existing international commitments of the two parties."

Article 1: "The Republic of Turkey and the German Reich undertake to respect mutually the inviolability and integrity of their territories and to refrain from any direct or indirect action against one another."

Article 2: "The Republic of Turkey and the German Reich undertake to remain in friendly contact in order to reach agreement for solving all questions affecting their common interests."

Article 3: "This treaty shall enter into force on the date of its signature and be valid for 10 years. At the end of this period, the high contracting parties shall reach a decision regarding the extension of the treaty."

The official title of the document was Treaty of Friendship between the Republic of Turkey and the German Reich. The phrase "without prejudice to the existing...commitments" contained in the preamble of the treaty meant that Turkey would not be forced to act in violation of the terms of the Tripartite Alliance of 1939 or the Turkish-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty of 1925.

This treaty, and its provision in the preamble, helped shield Turkey from external pressures coming from both the Allies and the Axis. The insertion, which Turkey introduced in the preamble, meant that Turkish territory could not be used against British interests. In other words, Germany had been forced to agree that German troops could not march through Turkish territory. At the same time, by agreeing not to engage in action directed against Germany, Turkey was preventing British aircraft from using Turkish air bases and British warships from passing through the Straits. From Germany's point of view, the treaty was a serious obstacle to any possible British assistance to the Soviet Union. With this treaty, Germany had secured its southern flank four days before launching its attack on the USSR. Italy made a proposal for concluding a similar treaty, but nothing emerged from this proposal because of Turkey's coolness to the idea.

After the war, President İnönü commented on the

treaty in the following terms: "The nation was alone in confronting the Axis forces, which were practically at the gates of İstanbul. America was not yet a belligerent. Britain had concentrated all its forces at home to repel a possible German invasion. Furthermore, the Germans were bound to the Soviets with a nonaggression treaty. In such dire circumstances, how could anyone expect us to refuse a German guarantee not to attack us?" (İnönü, p. 393).

This shows that Turkey had made a realistic assessment of the situation on the basis of realities well known to all. Despite these considerations, the treaty caused displeasure among the Allies. As soon as the treaty was signed, the U.S., a strong backer of Britain, displayed its displeasure by suspending Lend and Lease aid to Turkey even though it was not yet at war with the Axis. This aid was subsequently restored through British intervention, although at a lower level. This demonstrated once again that Turkey had to tread a fine line and maintain a delicate balance between the belligerents without relying exclusively on the goodwill of either side.

With its southern flank ensured, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa on 22 June. As the German forces crossed the frontier and entered Soviet territory, the war acquired a totally new dimension. Turkey had treaties of alliance or nonaggression with all of the belligerent parties, except Italy and distant Japan. With this dramatic turn of events, Ankara felt much more secure. It had managed to stay out of the war and was now free of the fear of sharing Poland's fate when that country was partitioned following joint German-Soviet aggression. Ankara was soon to discover, however, that it still could not afford to relax its guard.

#### B. The German-Soviet Conflict and Turkey

With the attack of the German army on the USSR on 22 June 1941, an incongruous and artificial alliance came to an end. The war had now spread to Turkey's north. Although the German-Soviet conflict brought temporary relief from some of Turkey's anxieties, very soon Ankara started experiencing a new kind of pressure. Before the German attack, the pressure on Ankara was coming from Germany and the USSR to interdict the passage through the Straits of vessels belonging to Britain and its allies. The USSR had made such a big issue of this that Turkey even expected a possible Soviet attempt to occupy the Straits militarily. What stopped the Soviets from taking this course was Hitler's rejection of Soviet demands relating to Bulgaria and the Straits. At that stage the USSR felt itself unable to confront Germany on this issue (Aydemir, p. 183).

Now the situation was reversed. Although there was no formal agreement between them, the USSR and Britain found themselves fighting a common enemy. The German-Soviet arm-twisting to keep Allied shipping out of the Straits was replaced by British-Soviet pressure on Ankara to allow Allied shipping to go through the Straits.

From Turkey's viewpoint the nature of its worries had not changed much. In the past Ankara had worried that there might be secret bargaining over the Straits between the Soviet Union and Germany. In addition to the uneasiness it felt about the Axis, Ankara now started worrying about whether the Soviet Union would extract territorial concessions from Britain at Turkey's expense as the price for its war effort against Germany. Indeed the Soviet behavior toward the end of 1942 only helped to increase Turkey's worries.

Three days after the start of the German-Soviet conflict, Turkey delivered a note to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that it would remain neutral in the conflict. This was in conformity with the Friendship Agreement between the two countries as well as the Declaration of Nonaggression of March 1941. Following the Treaty of Nonaggression with Germany, the Soviet attitude toward Turkey had been distinctly cool. After the German aggression, the Soviet attitude changed perceptibly. The German attack had greatly enhanced Turkey's strategic position vis-à-vis the USSR. Turkey was now in a position to affect the course of the war by joining the conflict on the side of one of the parties. Even in these circumstances, Turkey's uneasiness about the USSR continued, while the USSR was likewise concerned because of its tough line toward Turkey in the period from 1939 to 1941.

The U.S. started providing the Soviet Union with assistance as soon as it came under German attack but maintained its distant stance toward Turkey. Britain, however, appreciated the increasingly important position of Turkey. As long as Turkey remained nonbelligerent and free from German occupation, it would be denying the German forces access to the Middle East over its territory in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Alliance. This was a great relief for the British forces in Egypt. Had Turkey joined the war on Britain's side, this would have required Britain to shift sorely needed forces from Africa and elsewhere to Turkey.

At this stage the Allies were experiencing great difficulties in providing help to the USSR. The Baltic route was blocked because of German control of Norway and Denmark. As long as Turkey stayed neutral, it would not open the Straits to Allied shipping because of the Turkish-German Nonaggression Pact. Even if Turkey had relented and opened the Straits, the southern access route would have remained blocked because of the German occupation of the Aegean islands. The long route over eastern Asia was also unusable, because Japan was Germany's ally. The only remaining route was through the Persian Gulf and Iran, but this country was pursuing a pro-Axis policy. Convinced that Iran would deny access to aid shipments through its territory, Britain and the USSR agreed to occupy Iran. Under the agreement, northern Iran would come under Soviet occupation. This meant Soviet troops on Turkey's eastern border. Rumors were also circulating that, after the German attack, Britain had made promises to the Soviet Union regarding the Straits reminiscent of the promises made during World War I.

To allay Turkey's anxieties on this score, both countries delivered notes to Turkey on 10 August 1941. The two countries confirmed their respect for the Montreux Convention and gave assurances that the USSR had no aggressive designs or claims on the Straits. This signified that the USSR was now renouncing the claims over the Straits that it had made to Saracoğlu in Moscow in 1939. Furthermore, both Britain and the USSR undertook to come to Turkey's aid in case of an attack by a European state. When Anthony Eden went to Moscow to confer with Stalin in December 1941, he took the British ambassador in Ankara, Knatchbull-Hugessen, with him. Turkey saw this as evidence of the importance of Turkey in the British-Soviet negotiations and renewed the fears of a possible Soviet-British deal at its expense. Germany was eagerly stoking these fears for its own benefit.

In the meantime Washington's coolness toward Turkey because of its Nonaggression Pact with Germany continued to cloud Turkish-American relations. Relations became even more strained when Turkey concluded a new agreement with Germany for the sale of chromium on 9 October 1941. Churchill, who had a better grasp of Turkey's delicate position and believed that Ankara should be strengthened to resist German pressure, wrote to U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 20 October, urging him to restore aid to Turkey. Churchill pointed out that Turkey was very important for the protection of the rear of the British army in Egypt. But Churchill's urging failed to produce any change in the U.S. position. Nevertheless, Britain kept on transferring to Turkey some of the aid material that it was receiving from America.

As U.S.-Japanese relations worsened through the summer of 1941, President Roosevelt, worrying about the effects of possible Japanese entry into the war on the side of Germany, declared on 3 December 1941 that Turkey's defense was important to him. The American position finally changed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt ordered the restoration of Lend and Lease Law assistance to Turkey, starting from 1942.

As 1941 drew to an end, Turkey had freed itself to a large extent from the pressures of the belligerents and eased its relations with the Allies. As soon as the U.S. became a belligerent, however, German pressure on Turkey was renewed. It will be recalled that Germany had attacked the USSR after Turkey's neutrality had been assured. But now that the U.S. had joined the war, Germany started getting nervous about a possible second front in the Balkans being established by the Allies through Turkey. Until that time, this had been unlikely, because Turkey was staying out of the conflict, uncertain about the true Soviet intentions. But now that the U.S. was in the war, the situation could have changed.

Germany's plans for drawing Turkey to its side consisted of three elements. To prevent a possible Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, Germany revealed the Soviet demands in relation to the Straits put forward at the Hitler-Molotov talks in 1940 as the Soviet condition for concluding an agreement with Germany. The second element was to encourage Pan-Turanist currents in Turkey. Finally, there was an offer to transfer some of the Aegean islands under German control to Turkey (Armaoğlu, p. 16); Howard 1948, p. 71).

It cannot be said that Germany's efforts to draw Turkey into its camp were without effect. To begin with, the Soviet attitude during Saracoğlu's visit to Moscow in 1939 and the tough stand taken by the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941 had thoroughly shaken the Turkish government's confidence in the USSR. Turkey feared that the balance in Europe would be upset in favor of the USSR in the event of an Allied victory. Furthermore, the occupation of Iran in August 1941 by Britain and the USSR brought to mind a similar event (occupation of Iran by Britain and the USSR) that had taken place in 1907. According to leaked information, during his visit to Moscow in 1941 Eden had also discussed the question of redrawing borders in Europe with Stalin. All this inevitably brought to mind the secret agreements concluded at Turkey's expense by Britain, Russia, and France during World War I. In the course of Eden's talks with Stalin over the postwar arrangements, Stalin proposed that the Dodecanese Islands, parts of Bulgaria, and northern Syria be awarded to Turkey. In a dispatch sent to Ankara in February 1942, Turkey's ambassador in Moscow, Haydar Aktay, reported that "it is surprising that the Soviet Union would favor us to this extent, even when we are not involved in the war. This should be seen as a matter for concern rather than satisfaction." Ankara was also taken by surprise and remained suspicious over Stalin's sudden friendship (Gürün 1983, pp. 87–88).

The general impression in Ankara was that, if Stalin was ready to award certain territories to Turkey, he would probably demand corresponding concessions, perhaps in the Straits, from Turkey (Armaoğlu, p. 164).

Eden's talks in Moscow ended without a definitive agreement over the question of frontiers. The question was taken up once again by Molotov during his visit to London in May 1942, but once again no agreement was reached, owing to Soviet demands relating to Poland. When Stalin accepted Eden's offer of an agreement that left out the question of frontiers on 23 May, however, the two countries were able to sign an alliance agreement three days later. On the same day, Eden informed the Turkish ambassador that Britain remained faithful to Montreux, that Turkey's territorial integrity would be respected, and that Britain would come to Turkey's aid in case of attack.

In the meantime Turkish public opinion was gradually turning more pro-German. With substantial secret funds from Germany, Pan-Turanist movements were gathering momentum. Von Papen received 5 million gold marks "to support friends of Germany...who are experiencing financial difficulties" (Box 3-5). Turkey and Germany even held talks on the subject of organizing the Turks in the USSR (Armaoğlu, p. 164). Among those who were engaged in these activities were prominent personalities such as Ahmet Caferoğlu, the former minister of foreign affairs of Crimea, who had migrated to Turkey after the Communists took over Crimea; Ayus İshaki; Prφfessor Zeki Velidi Togan; Mehmet Emin Resulzade, the former Speaker of the parliament of Azerbaijan; Nuri Paşa, the stepbrother of Enver Paşa; and Gen. Emir Erkilet. Among the secret German documents published by the Soviets after the war was a letter written on 17 November 1941 to General Erkilet: "We are now waiting for the press finally to publish the articles that have been promised to us and the world" (Gizli Belgeler, p. 47).

In the meantime there was a failed attempt to assassinate von Papen in Ankara on 24 February 1942. The investigation indicated that this was the work of the USSR, which was seeking to create a rift between Germany and Turkey. This was a further blow to Turkish-Soviet relations, and the Soviet ambassador was recalled. The instigators of the attempt were two Soviet citizens, who were sentenced to prison terms of sixteen and eight years. Both were to be released one week after Turkey severed its relations with Germany on 2 August 1944.

Despite the pro-German tendency of the general public, the Turkish government had no inclination to join the conflict on Germany's side. During his meeting with von Papen on 27 August 1942, the new prime minister, Saracoğlu, declared that as a Turk he ardently wished to

Box 3-5. Telegram from von Ribbentrop to von Papen (5 December 1942)

SECRET

Special train, 5 December 1942, 2:30 Received 5 December 1942, 3:30 No. 1523

#### Personal to the Ambassador

In reply to your dispatch No. a-61154 of 20 November, I have issued instructions for the transfer to you of 5 million gold Reichsmarks to support friends of Germany in Turkey who are experiencing financial difficulties. You may use these funds freely and generously. Please keep me informed about how this money is spent.

RIBBENTROP

Sent to the Germany Embassy in Turkey under No. 1700. Berlin, 5 December 1942

> (M. AYDIN) (Source: Gizli Belgeler, pp. 113–14)

see the collapse of the USSR, which he regarded as an opportunity that might come "once in a thousand years." But as prime minister he was convinced that Turkey must pursue a policy of strict neutrality (Armaoğlu, p. 164). That was an indication that Berlin's campaign to draw Turkey to the German side, which had been going on for a whole year, had failed. This angered von Ribbentrop, who instructed von Papen in September 1942 to end his negotiations with the Turkish government on the subject of the Turks in the USSR.

At this time, Churchill was in Moscow conferring with Stalin. In these talks Stalin emphasized the importance of a second front in France. On the subject of Turkey, Stalin did not appear to mind that Ankara continued to pursue a policy of neutrality. As the British position in northern Africa continued to improve in the course of the year, however, the subject of Turkey came up in connection with the supplying of war materiel to the USSR. In the fall of 1942 Churchill and Stalin reached an agreement about the need to press Turkey to join the Allies in the spring of the following year.

# III. 1943–1945: NORTHERLY WINDS TOWARD THE END OF THE WAR

A. Allied Efforts to Draw Turkey into the War The German pressure on Turkey failed to produce results. Starting in the fall of 1942, however, it was the Allies' turn to exert increasing pressure on Turkey. After the German retreats in the battle of Stalingrad, which started in

November 1942, the Allies started planning the final defeat of Germany. Because of Turkey's strategic location, it was only natural that Turkey would figure in these plans.

Stalingrad also constituted a turning point for Turkish-Soviet relations. The understanding and friendship toward Turkey displayed by the USSR following the German attack evaporated quickly, and relations returned to their pre-1941 state after the Soviet victory. Turkey saw that the outcome of the battle of Stalingrad would be bad for the Germans and started considering its long-term implications. After the victory at Stalingrad, would the Allies be able to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming the master of Europe? This question was at the base of Turkey's apprehensions. Nevertheless, Turkey was determined to stay out of the conflict. But the Allied pressure on Turkey intensified with each German retreat.

As the battle of Stalingrad raged on, the German forces had also been stalled in North Africa. With the German armies pinned down in both fronts, the idea of pressing the Germans by establishing a new front in western or southern Europe came to the fore. This would relieve the German pressure on the USSR, enabling it to counterattack and thrust into the Balkan Peninsula. According to Churchill, the key element in all these plans was Turkey. Until then it had been enough for Turkey merely to remain nonbelligerent in order to contain Germany within Europe. But now the Turkish stance was preventing the Allies from moving into Europe in order to squeeze Germany. On 18 November Churchill ordered his generals to exert the necessary effort to get Turkey to enter the war on the Allied side in the spring of 1943. Churchill believed that to achieve this goal Turkey had to be supplied with the necessary weapons throughout that winter and Britain, the USSR, and the U.S. had to guarantee Turkey's territorial integrity (Churchill, vol. 4, pp. 697-98). After obtaining Roosevelt's backing, Churchill took up this question with Stalin. Stalin's response on 28 November was that he favored making every effort to get Turkey into the war in the spring of 1943. Nothing happened on this, however, until the Casablanca Conference.

#### The Casablanca Conference

On 14 January 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablanca, Morocco, and considered the progress of the war. It was there that they reached a very important decision: the war would be pursued until the enemy surrendered unconditionally.

Turkey was convinced that after the war Germany should be preserved as a stabilizing element against the USSR in order to ensure lasting peace in Europe. But, since Turkey was a nonbelligerent, its views were being ignored even though Turkey was among the important subjects considered at the talks. The two leaders concluded once again that a new effort must be made to get Turkey to enter the war and decided that Churchill should undertake this mission on behalf of both leaders. There was a tacit agreement at Casablanca that the U.S. would be responsible for dealing with China, while Britain would be responsible for dealing with Turkey. This even meant that the American military assistance to be provided to Turkey to secure its participation in the war would be delivered through Britain. Although it was not explicitly stated, this could well be interpreted to mean that in the postwar period Britain wanted to see Turkey in its zone of influence.

In line with their decision, the two leaders sent İnönü separate messages on 25 January calling on him to meet Churchill. İnönü agreed to do so.

#### The Adana Meeting (The İnönü-Churchill Talks)

The talks between İnönü and Churchill took place between 30 January and 1 February 1943 in the Turkish presidential train at the station of Yenice near Adana. The Turkish delegation included prime minister Şükrü Saracoğlu, minister of foreign affairs Numan Menemencioğlu, chief of staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, and a number of military advisors.

The subjects taken up at the talks were Turkey's nonbelligerent status, the state of Turkish-Soviet relations, the situation in the Balkans, and the need to build up the capability of the Turkish armed forces.

Churchill pointed out that the Allied victories at Stalingrad and in Egypt had largely eliminated the danger of a German attack on Turkey from the north or the south; but given the German need for petroleum, there might be a German thrust from the center toward the Middle East during the summer. He added that Turkey needed to be strengthened in order to be able to withstand such an attack. Furthermore, if the Soviets went on the offensive in the north and the Allies did likewise in the south through Turkey, Germany could be brought to its knees in a fairly short time. Churchill concluded by asking that Turkey enter the war on the side of the Allies before the end of 1943. In his response İnönü indicated first that the Turkish armed forces had to be equipped properly to enable Turkey to contemplate war. He added that Ankara was still unable to trust the USSR and worried that the Soviet Union would dominate Europe after Germany's defeat.

At subsequent negotiations it was decided that the necessary military preparations for Turkey to withstand a possible German attack must be undertaken at once and that, as a priority measure, Turkey must be provided with a one-year-supply of military equipment. In addition, a British aircraft squadron would be dispatched to defend localities likely to be targets of air attack, and some antiaircraft and antitank units would be placed under Turkish command.

On the second day of the negotiations, serious differences emerged on the subject of Turkish worries about the Soviet Union after Stalingrad. Churchill tried to dispel these Turkish anxieties by pointing out that he had talked to Molotov and Stalin on this subject, that they both wanted friendly and peaceful relations with Britain and the U.S., that the USSR would be preoccupied with reconstruction and development for the next ten years and would need technical assistance from the Allies, and that communism was in the process of changing. He concluded with the prediction that the USSR would maintain good relations with Britain and the U.S. İnönü and Saracoğlu referred to the possibility of the USSR emerging from the war as an imperialist power; following the final defeat of Germany, the Slavs and Communists might spread all over Europe and draw the former allies of Germany into the Soviet fold. Churchill countered that an international organization to maintain peace and security would be established after the war that would be much more effective than the League of Nations. He declared that he did not fear communism; should the USSR behave like Germany, the whole membership of the new organization would take a united stand against it.

It will be noted that at the Adana talks there was a sharp divergence between the Turkish viewpoint and Churchill's views regarding the USSR's postwar orientation. They agreed, however, on the need to strengthen the Turkish armed forces and that, even if it stayed out of the war, Turkey's position was of benefit to the Allied war effort.

In his memoirs von Papen wrote that at the time he had been issuing peace feelers in Ankara. Knowing this, İnönü proposed to Churchill at Adana that von Papen be used as an intermediary to transmit a peace offer to Germany. But Churchill turned down İnönü's proposal. Ş. Süreyya Aydemir (p. 263), however, claims that İnönü assured him that he had never made such a proposal to Churchill. Wherever the truth may lie, at that stage İnönü's main concern was to convince the Allies, and especially Churchill, that Germany must not be utterly destroyed but rather preserved as a stabilizing element against the USSR in Europe.

Although a major effort was made to keep the Adana meeting a secret, it soon became public knowledge

and had major repercussions, above all in Germany. By remaining neutral, Turkey was effectively preventing the establishment of a new front in the Balkans. The first step in an Allied invasion of the Balkans would have to be getting Turkey into the war.

The feeling in Berlin was that Turkey would remain neutral for the time being. If the war continued to go against Germany, however, it was concluded that Turkey would reappraise its position. As a result Von Ribbentrop instructed von Papen on 6 February to spare no effort to keep Turkey neutral and especially to keep on stressing that what kept Turkey safe vis-à-vis the USSR was Germany's determination to shield Turkey.

When von Ribbentrop met Mussolini in Rome on 25 February to discuss the course of the war, Turkey continued to be one of the main subjects. According to von Ribbentrop's appraisal, Turkey actually wanted Germany to defeat the USSR, knowing that, with Germany out of the picture, Britain and the U.S. would be unable to resist Molotov's demands regarding the Straits that were made in November 1940. Consequently, according to von Ribbentrop, even if Turkey did not enter the war on the side of the Axis, it would not appear to be anti-Axis either.

These analyses were in large measure in conformity with the Turkish state of mind. Menemencioğlu had informed von Papen during a conversation that the reason Turkey resisted all the Allied demands and remained non-belligerent was because it still did not fully trust the Allied policies.

Despite these misgivings, Turkey's relations with the Allies in the months after the Adana talks were quite close. The British press praised Turkey for its policies and its loyalty to its alliance. In a statement in the House of Commons on 11 February 1943, Churchill declared that Britain had no intention of pressing Turkey and that Ankara had consistently stood up to pressures from all quarters, thus preventing the spread of the war to new theaters and rendering a great service to the Allies.

It was clear that all sides were quite satisfied with Turkey's stance, at least for the time being. Only Stalin remained fairly cool toward Churchill when he reported the results of his talks with Turkish leaders. In his letter to Stalin, Churchill proposed a Soviet goodwill gesture toward Turkey to put Ankara at ease, but Stalin was not inclined to comply (Gürün 1983, pp. 91–93). In his reply to Churchill, Stalin recalled that before the German attack on the USSR Ankara had not responded positively to Moscow's friendly overtures and that he failed to see how Turkey was going to be able to reconcile its commitments to the USSR, to Britain, and to Germany. If Turkey still

wanted to maintain relations based on friendship with the USSR, however, it could signify its intentions and Moscow would meet Turkey at the halfway point. This was the first time that Stalin was saying, "If the Turks desire Soviet friendship, let them say so." This approach and the desire to see Turkey in a position of soliciting Soviet friendship would be displayed repeatedly by Moscow until the end of the war.

Upon receipt of Stalin's response, talks were started between Turkey and the USSR on Churchill's and Ankara's initiative. On 12 March Turkish ambassador Cevat Açıkalın briefed Molotov on the Adana meeting and indicated that Turkey stood ready to cooperate in seeking formulas that would help improve relations between the two countries. At subsequent contacts, however, the Soviet side, continuously stressing that the request for improving relations came from Turkey, tried to put Turkey in the position of a country making demands on the USSR rather than an ally engaged in bilateral talks. The USSR also rejected Turkey's request for a joint declaration on the ground that it was unnecessary. Moscow declared that the parties could make proposals in the future whenever necessary. This ambivalent Soviet stance only intensified Ankara's uncertainties (Gürün 1983, pp. 93-94). Subsequently Molotov twice received Açıkalın. On both occasions Molotov alluded to Turkey's nonaggression treaty with Germany and underlined the displeasure of the USSR over Turkey's good relations with Germany in a period when the USSR was struggling for its survival. He added that, at a time when Germany was being subdued, an intelligent move on the part of Turkey would have a positive effect on its relations with the USSR.

At this point both Turkey and the USSR were seeking to restore the atmosphere that had been lost in their relations four years earlier during Saracoğlu's visit to Moscow, when the Soviets rejected Ankara's offer to establish an alliance between the two countries. But Moscow was uncomfortable over the similarity of the Turkish and British positions that emerged at Adana. Moscow was also eager to see Turkey in the war at an early date. Turkey's policy at this juncture, however, was to preserve its strength in preparation for the postwar period rather than to become engaged in the war.

#### The Quebec Conference

Despite the USSR's misgivings and Turkey's resistance, Britain's efforts to get Turkey in the war on the Allied side continued after the Adana talks. If anything, these efforts were intensified as Italy's collapse loomed nearer. With Italy completely out of the picture, Turkey's anxieties over

the Mediterranean would be overcome. This would make it easier to apply pressure on Turkey to comply with its alliance commitments.

In 1943 the war had reached a decisive turning point. On the eastern front, the Germans had retreated from Stalingrad, but the Soviet counteroffensive had not yielded the expected results. In North Africa, the Allies had scored important successes and were now in possession of Sicily. At a time when the Allies had seized the initiative, the pressure on Turkey to declare war reached a critical level.

It was in these circumstances, after the victory in North Africa had been sealed, that Churchill and Roosevelt met in Washington on 12–16 May 1943 to appraise the situation. When the question of landing troops in Sicily came up, the two leaders noted that Turkey's policies were being formulated mostly with Italy in mind and decided that the circumstances were right to make a new effort to get Turkey into the war. This would enable the Allies to use Turkish bases to attack the Romanian oil fields, which were of vital importance to Germany. It would also establish a new front in the Balkan Peninsula. Churchill was in favor of opening a second front in the Balkans, while Roosevelt insisted on a landing on the northern coast of France.

The Quebec Conference was held soon afterward, on 11–24 August 1943. The main theme of the conference was the approval of the plans for landing in Normandy, but the subject of Turkey also came up. The conclusion was reached that it was still too early for Turkey to join the Allies in the war, but an attempt would be made to secure the immediate use of Turkish air bases for a second front in the Balkans. At Quebec, it was also decided to continue providing Turkey with military assistance. Turkey would be pressed to stop its exports of chromium to Germany and to prevent the passage of German ships through the Straits.

In addition to these decisions regarding Turkey, the Soviet position at the conference was also a source of concern for Ankara. The USSR was adamantly against the British idea of a second front in the Balkans. Moscow insisted that Turkey must be forced into the war without further delay. The Soviets would also maintain this position after Quebec, declaring that Turkey's neutrality was serving Germany's interests to an increasing degree: being sure of its Balkan flank, Germany was now able to concentrate the bulk of its forces on the eastern front. Now that the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt, Moscow did not want to see the forces of the Western Allies in the Balkans, a region it considered to be its natural zone

of influence. If Turkey entered the war, this would obviate the need for the Allies to establish a second front in the Balkans. During the course of 1944 and 1945 this Soviet position became even stronger.

#### The Moscow Conference

At Quebec, the question of holding a summit meeting with the participation of Stalin was also discussed. But subsequent correspondence revealed that Stalin was reluctant to attend, so it was decided to hold a meeting in Moscow at the ministerial level. At the preparatory meeting for the conference, Turkey did not figure in the agenda. The Moscow Conference acquired significance for Turkey, however, due to various bits of information reaching the Turkish government.

Shortly before the conference, the Turkish embassies in Madrid and Stockholm reported that rumors were circulating of a separate peace between the USSR and Germany (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1999, p. 17). At this point in the war, all of Turkey's western borders from Crimea in the north to Rhodes in the south were under German control. Of the military material promised by Churchill at Adana, only a small fraction had been delivered.

Under these circumstances, the rumors of a separate Soviet-German peace gave rise to serious concern in Ankara, particularly when it became known that the Soviets had put forward numerous claims against Turkey in negotiations with Germany in Berlin in November 1940. When the news came that Eden and Hull were going to Moscow, the question arose in Ankara whether the Allies would modify their war plans and whether Britain and the U.S. were considering offering Moscow any concessions to prevent it from concluding a separate peace (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1999, p. 18). At the dinner following the conference, Stalin declared that a separate peace with Germany was not on the agenda and that Berlin's soundings in this direction would be ignored. This confirmed that the rumors reaching Ankara were not groundless.

The meeting of Eden, Hull, and Molotov got underway in Moscow on 19 October 1943. At the first session, Molotov laid aside the agenda that had been agreed to at the preparatory meeting and proposed a new agenda, in which item 2 was Turkey entering the war. This agenda was adopted with no objection from Eden or Hull. In the course of the negotiations, Britain put forward the view that pressing Turkey to enter the war at that stage would lead to demands from Ankara for quantities of weapons that could not be met. If Turkey was allowed a grace period, however, it would eventually join the Allies of its own volition, and this would allow difficulties to be sur-

mounted. Eden also felt that the timing of Turkey's entering the war would be influenced by German moves in the Balkans.

The American position was that forcing Turkey into the war would entail diverting large quantities of arms and equipment from the Italian front as well as from the supplies earmarked for the Normandy landing to Turkey. The U.S. was firmly against this. Instead it favored asking Ankara to allow the use of Turkish air bases, even if Turkey remained neutral. Also, the U.S. was stating clearly that it could not provide any arms to Turkey to secure its joining the war. In these circumstances, the burden of supplying arms to Turkey to get Ankara to join the Allies would rest exclusively with Britain. Britain was well aware that Turkey's requirements for air defense support in the event of Ankara's active engagement in the war could not be met without affecting preparations for the second front.

Molotov argued that it should not be necessary to provide Turkey with arms assistance if its entry into the war was going to be further delayed. It was not enough to ask Turkey to make its air bases available to the Allies: Turkey should be asked to enter the war right away. At a later stage it would not matter all that much. Finally, a proposal for the big three to address a joint request to Turkey for it to abandon its policy of neutrality was approved (Gürün 1983, p. 100). Eventually, on 1 November, Eden and Molotov signed an agreement. Lacking authorization to do so, Hull was not among the signatories.

One. In order to be able to join the united nations to accelerate the defeat of Hitler's Germany, which is the common objective of Turkey and other peace-loving states, the two Ministers consider it to be highly desirable for Turkey to participate in the war on the side of the united nations before the end of 1943.

Two. On behalf of the British and Soviet Governments, the two Ministers have agreed to request from Turkey, at the earliest possible date to be determined between themselves, to enter the war on the side of the united nations before the end of 1943.

Three. The Ministers have also agreed to request immediately that Turkey provide the Allies with bases and other military services as will be determined by the two countries [Turkey and Britain] in order to render all possible assistance to the united nations. (*PRFRUS*, vol. 1, p. 697)

"At the earliest possible date" and "immediately" were phrases that caught attention.

The USSR demonstrated the importance that it attributed to this question by taking the initiative in the signing of this special agreement. The Soviet Union felt that it had suffered enormous losses in resisting the Germans and that, if the war was to be shortened, there was no reason why Turkey should not make similar sacrifices. In making these requests, it was not in the least interested in providing Turkey with any material or moral support to induce it to fight against Germany. The USSR held the view that only by engaging actively in the war could Turkey earn the right to be taken into consideration in the postwar arrangements (*PRFRUS*, vol. 1, p. 700).

Clearly the Soviet Union was very interested in seeing Turkey in the war as soon as possible. But it is doubtful that the reason for this was to "shorten the war" as it claimed. Toward the end of 1943 the German pressure on the eastern front had abated, and the USSR was confident that it would emerge victorious from the conflict. It should be noted that, even as the Soviets insisted on Turkey entering the war right away and providing air bases to the Allies, they were obstructing the Allied project for American bombers to hit German industrial installations from air bases located on Soviet soil.

Turkey's leaders knew that the Soviet need to have Turkey involved in the war to relieve German pressure on the Russian front was in no way as acute as it had been in 1941 or 1942, so they tried to discover Moscow's real motives. Ankara concluded that the Soviet motives were either for the USSR to "liberate" Turkey from German occupation at the end of the war or to deal with a war-weary, weakened Turkey alone (Gürün 1983, p. 100; Armaoğlu, p. 170). In his conversations with Eden in Cairo on 5 November 1943, Menemencioğlu remarked: "You report that the Russians want us in the war in order to bring the conflict to an early end. But couldn't we also conclude that they would like to see a debilitated Turkey?" (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973, pp. 152–53). These comments shed some light on how Turkey's leaders analyzed the situation.

It has also been claimed that Moscow was intent on stemming the flow of military aid to Turkey and gave backing to Allied demands for Turkey to enter the war while knowing full well that Ankara would not comply. In other words, the Allies would ask Turkey to enter the war; when Turkey failed to do so, they would suspend their military aid. This would leave Turkey in a weaker condition vis-à-vis the USSR at the end of the war.

It is difficult to assess the correctness of these analyses. But Moscow was worried about the continuing supply

of British arms and equipment to Turkey within the framework of the Adana agreement. The USSR suspected that the British were bolstering Turkey not only against Germany during the war but also against the USSR in the postwar period (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1999, p. 27). These Soviet suspicions were probably the reason for their insistence on seeking Turkey's immediate entry into the war in Moscow, even though the subject was not on the meeting's agenda. Knowing that Turkey would not agree, Moscow was seeking to secure the suspension of arms deliveries to Turkey by this tactic.

As noted above, by 1943 the Soviets could start considering the postwar period. With German pressure reduced and the tide of war running against Germany, Moscow could now direct its attention from survival to postwar arrangements. In this context the USSR was seeking to prevent a second front in the Balkans, which would result in the region being overrun by British and American forces. Britain's insistence on a second front to be opened in the Balkans, in turn, could also be interpreted as being motivated by the desire to prevent the Soviets from taking over the Balkans in the course of their relentless drive westward against the German invaders. It is not easy to gauge the true intentions of the parties. But after the Moscow talks the USSR gradually abandoned its insistence on active Turkish involvement in the war.

The most noteworthy outcome of these talks was the commitment made to the USSR by Britain and the U.S. to establish a second front in France in the summer of 1944. After this, the question of a full-fledged front in the Balkans was dropped from the agenda. This might also explain why the Soviet Union stopped insisting that Turkey enter the war.

# The First Cairo Conference (The Eden-Menemencioğlu Talks)

Even while Eden was in Moscow, he invited Menemencioğlu to Cairo to brief him on what transpired in Moscow. When the two ministers met on 5–6 November 1943, Eden sought to put Menemencioğlu at ease about Soviet intentions in the Balkans. On the basis of his observations, Eden indicated that the USSR was not expansionist (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973, pp. 151–66). Menemencioğlu dwelt at length on his suspicion that the USSR wanted Turkey in the war, not in order to shorten the conflict as it claimed but perhaps to weaken Turkey. He wanted to be convinced that, if Turkey entered the war, the USSR would continue to maintain close relations with Britain and the U.S. in the postwar period and would not do things that the two Western allies did not want. Eden

replied by reiterating that there was no sign of Soviet expansionism and tried to intimidate Menemencroğlu by saying that, even if the Soviets had expansionist aims, Turkey could not change them by staying out of the war. Eden also put forward the request for the use of Turkish air bases. Menemencioğlu opposed this request on the ground that to comply would directly draw Turkey into the war.

The Turkish government considered Menemencioğlu's report following his return from Cairo and communicated its official reply to the British ambassador in a note delivered on 17 November. The request for bases was turned down, because it would inevitably lead to war between Turkey and Germany. On the general question of declaring war, the note stressed that "the sacrifices this would entail exceed by far Turkey's physical means." It further stated that declaring war would not bring any benefits to either Turkey or the Allies.

Menemencioğlu's report gave rise to debates both within the government and in the parliamentary caucus of the Republican People's Party. As a result of these debates, the caucus made a decision in principle to declare war and subsequently communicated this decision to the British ambassador. But this declaration of war was made conditional on Turkey being equipped with the means to repulse a possible German attack. Another condition was that there must be a prior agreement on the joint plan of operations of the Turkish and Allied forces in the Balkans. At the time, İnönü had a tight grip over both the party and the parliament. It is difficult to imagine that the party caucus would get in touch with a foreign embassy on such a sensitive issue without İnönü's knowledge and without reference to the parliament. It can be thus assumed that İnönü was seeking to keep under control the likely British reaction to an official negative response. --

The Moscow Conference and the Cairo talks demonstrated that Britain and the USSR were eager to see Turkey in the war as early as possible, but their expectations were divergent. The USSR wanted Turkey in the war because this would relieve the German pressure on the eastern front prior to the establishment of a second front in France. It would also prevent the arrival of British troops in the Balkans. Britain wanted the Mediterranean and the Aegean cleared of German forces in order to secure the safety of the imperial routes to the east. Meanwhile the U.S. was against opening a new front in the Balkans because it wanted to concentrate all its forces in Western Europe and Italy.

Turkey was being pressed by its allies to join the beligerents even though it was not under attack. Turkey was

not against declaring war in principle but wanted to know beforehand what political guarantees it could count on regarding its military role during the war and its territorial integrity after the war. Turkey's first precondition for getting involved in the war was the provision of adequate defense aid. Even the aid that Churchill had promised at the Adana talks, however, had not yet been delivered. The second precondition was that the military and political cooperation plans should be drawn up as a preliminary stage to getting involved in the conflict. In this way Turkey wanted to secure political guarantees regarding postwar arrangements by basing its cooperation on solid foundations. This was important: although Turkey had an alliance agreement with Britain, it had no such binding agreements with either the U.S. or the USSR.

Before leaving Cairo, Menemencioğlu made some remarks to Eden in an informal context that gave an inkling of how the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs viewed the inconsistencies in the Allied position and why it insisted on the preconditions described above:

On three separate occasions, you made proposals to us that were unsound. If we had agreed to any of these proposals, your cause would have suffered great damage. When Italy entered the war in 1940, you proposed that we do likewise. What would have been the result if we had listened to you? In 1941 you did the same thing in connection with Yugoslavia... Finally, you sought to get us to force the Germans to attack us before they attacked the USSR. You would have paid dearly if you had succeeded in bringing ruin upon us in this way. Your actions were reminiscent of a divisional commander desperately trying to plug holes when things start going wrong. When you were in serious trouble, such errors may have been inevitable. But today you are strong and have the upper hand. Yet you are committing the same errors. Your proposals would appear to make Turkey dispensable. You are needlessly treating Turkey as if it were expendable just to please the Russians. At a time when our army lacks the means to mount offensive action because the promises made at Adana have not been honored yet, it would be suicidal for us to challenge the Germans. If our defensive line at Catalca is breached and the Germans overrun Istanbul, the Straits, and the adjacent regions, what gain would that bring to the Allies? Are we to wait and hope for the Russians to best the

Germans and liberate Istanbul? For whose benefit would the Russians be liberating Istanbul? While these facts are so obvious, you keep telling us that the delivery of war materials is difficult or practically impossible unless we declare war. Can't you understand that this is landing you in a vicious circle? As long as you withhold the military equipment, our combat capability will remain inadequate, forcing us to stay out of the war. As long as we stay out of the war, you will deny us the military equipment. Does that make any sense? (Gürün 1983, pp. 103–4)

# The Tehran Conference and the Changed Soviet Position

While the Cairo talks were taking place, the decision was reached to hold a summit meeting of the big three in Tehran. While assessments were being made of the Cairo talks with a number of ambassadors stationed in Ankara, Churchill and Roosevelt met in Cairo on 23-24 November 1943 in order to exchange views before proceeding to Tehran for the summit meeting. When the subject of Turkey came up, Churchill dwelt on the benefits to be derived from Turkey's entering the war and proposed that they meet with İnönü after Tehran. Meanwhile British and U.S. military planners were working out the details of the second front to be established in Western Europe. In this context, they agreed that the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war would only be supported on condition that assistance to Turkey would not be to the detriment of the second front and that it would not involve any diversion of troops.

In this situation, the vicious circle that Menemencioğlu had brought to Eden's attention in Cairo became apparent. The Soviets wanted to coerce Turkey into the war, while the Americans would only accept this on condition that no forces were diverted to Turkey from other fronts. The British position was more complex: they were seeking a compromise solution acceptable to all sides. They argued that no diversion of forces would be necessary while trying to persuade Ankara that limited arms aid would suffice, because Germany was not about to attack Turkey. Ankara did not accept the British arguments and stood firm; it was not prepared militarily and had not received any political guarantees.

While these contacts were going on, it became apparent that one of the main subjects on the agenda of the Tehran summit scheduled to take place on 28 November—1 December 1943 would be Turkey. The British and American positions on this subject had not yet been har-

monized. The topic of Turkey came up on each day of the four-day-long summit, while the different committees also discussed it in great detail. The subject of Turkey's entrance to the war was critical, because Ankara's action would have a profound effect on the course of the war and a decision to go to war could provide substantial advantages to the Allies. If Turkey entered the war, this would open a new supply route to the USSR through the Straits. All it would take to establish this route into the Black Sea would be to liberate some of the German-occupied Aegean islands lying off the Turkish coast. The establishment of this shorter route would be helpful to the USSR, while releasing considerable shipping for other purposes. Furthermore, it would be possible to hit sensitive targets under German control from bases located on Turkish soil. Among these would be the oil installations of Romania. This could also create conditions leading to the withdrawal of Bulgaria and Romania from the war (Berejkov, pp. 128-46).

It appears from the records that Stalin had reservations about Turkey's goodwill and its intention to enter the war under any condition. He openly asserted in Tehran that he did not expect Turkey to declare war and that he was prepared to allow British and American pressure to be applied to force Turkey to declare its true intention. From Stalin's point of view, this could also have the beneficial effect of bringing about a cooling in Turkey's relations with the Western Allies. Churchill was of the view that the USSR took a close interest in the subject and sought to reassure Moscow that the measures to be taken to assist Turkey would delay the landing in Western Europe by only two to three months.

Roosevelt was against any action that would delay the landing in Europe, and this included providing aid to Turkey to get it into the war. As the negotiations progressed, Stalin too adopted the position that the priority objective was the opening of the second front. He also took advantage of an opening provided by Churchill to raise the issue of the Straits.

On the second day of the conference, Churchill revealed the tactic that he would use to persuade Turkey to join the Allies: Turkey would be reminded that to ignore a plea made by the big three would have important consequences, especially with regard to the status of the Straits (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973, pp. 176–77). That day the matter was left there, but Stalin returned to the subject the next day and, with reference to the USSR's need for warmwater ports, declared that it was essential to revise the Montreux Convention. Churchill replied that he would be gratified to see the Soviet navy and merchant fleet in

the high seas and in British ports, but to raise the issue at a time when they were trying to persuade Turkey to enter the war would be untimely and counterproductive. Roosevelt said that the Straits would be open to world trade. At that point the discussion of the subject came to an end.

On the last day of the conference, it was generally agreed that asking Turkey to enter the war would inevitably be linked to the question of what kind of aid Turkey could expect from Britain and the U.S. Apart from the seventeen air squadrons that Britain said it could provide to Turkey for its air defense, however, the parties refrained from specifying the type and quantity of aid that they could provide if Turkey declared war on the side of the Allies. It also became clear that the parties had no intention of sending any troops to Turkey. The leaders agreed that Turkey would not allow the use of its air bases prior to actually becoming engaged in war. The declaration containing the final decisions was eventually signed on 1 December. In the parts related to Turkey, it was stated that "it would be highly desirable from a military point of view for Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the current year" (article 2); "if Turkey finds itself at war with Germany, and then Bulgaria declares war on or attacks Turkey," the USSR would immediately declare war on Bulgaria (article 3). It was also made clear that this was the last chance for Turkey to join the belligerents and earn the right to participate with the major powers to the peace conference (Gürün 1983, pp. 111-13).

#### The Second Cairo Conference

Even before the Tehran Conference was over, Roosevelt and Churchill got in touch with İnönü and invited him to Cairo for talks. Turkey's initial response to the invitation was cautious. If the purpose of the invitation was merely to inform Turkey about decisions reached with Stalin, İnönü would decline to go. If they intended to discuss how the common cause could best be served, however, İnönü would accept the invitation. Upon receiving assurances that the purpose of the meeting was the latter, İnönü proceeded to Cairo and met with Roosevelt and Churchill on 4–8 December 1943.

At this juncture the general public and the parliament were united in opposition to Turkey's direct involvement in the war. Although the government had gone to some lengths, especially in 1943, to prepare the public for war as a consequence of the Allied pressure on Turkey, public opinion was nevertheless generally opposed to declaring war without having been attacked. Many deputies within the Republican People's Party were even opposed to İnönü's trip to Cairo. In a dispatch to his government,

the British ambassador in Ankara noted that a number of influential deputies in the parliament would strongly oppose İnönü and Saracoğlu if Turkey went to war in its state of unreadiness at that time. If things went badly wrong, there would be serious consequences for İnönü as well as the Allies (top secret message, dated 3 December 1943; T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1999, p. 77). By agreeing to go to Cairo in these circumstances, İnönü was taking enormous political risks.

At the talks that began on 4 December, Churchill was particularly insistent on Turkey's early entrance into the war. He pursued the tactic that he had outlined in Tehran and emphasized the advantages that would accrue to Turkey if it agreed to go to war: Turkey would benefit from friendly relations with all of the Allies, including the USSR, and at the end of the war would take its place among the victors as a friend and ally. If it failed to heed the Allied calls, it would find itself isolated and, instead of "being among the powerful, it would be a mere spectator walking in the corridors" (Armaoğlu, p. 171).

Under heavy Allied pressure, İnönü finally agreed "in principle" to enter the war, but only if the necessary arms and supplies for the country's defense would be provided before Turkey's declaration of war. He also wanted the joint operational plans to be drawn up before taking any action. After this, the Turkish and British delegations spent a great deal of time on what was to be understood by the preparatory stage. Turkey interpreted this as the period when the army and air force would acquire their new equipment and complete their training, while Britain maintained that Turkey would be ready when the air bases had been made ready and the aircraft were delivered. Turkey stated that the delivery of aircraft would be tantamount to a declaration of war and might well lead to a "preemptive strike" by Germany, which had made a practice of striking preemptively up to that time. Britain declared that the air bases from which British aircraft would operate would be ready by 15 February 1944 and called on Turkey to declare war on that date. İnönü argued that the arrival of British aircraft did not signify that the Turkish army was ready and that to comply with the British request might well result in the army having to fight against Germany single-handedly. Consequently, he held his position that Turkey could only declare war at the end of the preparatory stage.

The negotiations remained deadlocked over this issue. Roosevelt tended to agree with the Turkish view and before leaving Cairo on 7 December told İnönü to "start your preparations right away and do not feel bound to take any particular course of action" (PRFRUS, p. 711).

Inönü and Churchill continued their talks for another day and left Cairo on 8 December without reaching any firm decision. Before leaving Cairo, Churchill handed İnönü a plan with a request that a reply be given in four or five days. İnönü made no commitment, however, other than repeating his agreement "in principle" that war would be declared if certain conditions were met. As a result, Turkey was able to gain time in Cairo and refused to be bound by the decision reached in Tehran to get Turkey into the war by a certain date.

An important development from Turkey's point of view was the absence of the Soviet Union from the Cairo meeting despite the Tehran decision for it to take part. Stalin pleaded that his schedule did not permit him to participate and appointed deputy foreign affairs commissar Vyshinsky to represent him in Cairo. Vyshinsky was also absent from the meeting, however, and the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Sergey Vinogradov, who did go to Cairo, did not attend the meeting. It can be surmised that Stalin had changed his mind about Turkey's participation in the war after Tehran. He probably concluded that the USSR was capable of defeating the Germans on the eastern front single-handedly and was firmly against seeing any Allied troops in the Balkans under any circumstances. Furthermore, he did not want the USSR to be a party to any assistance or "rewards" that would be bestowed on Turkey as a condition for it to declare war. In this way Stalin was able to evade any commitments regarding postwar arrangements and would remain free to negotiate with Turkey in a manner "that suited the new circumstances" (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1999, p. 76).

# B. The Crisis of Confidence: Tensions between Turkey and the Allies

At the second Cairo Conference, the efforts of the Allies to get Turkey into the war reached their peak. When İnönü returned to Ankara, the question was taken up in the cabinet, which concluded that the British plan would not be acceptable as it stood. This decision was communicated to the British embassy.

According to the British plan, the air bases would be made ready by 15 February, munitions and other military equipment would be delivered to Turkey by then, and the war plans and political issues would be discussed and settled. On 15 February permission would be sought from Turkey for the British aircraft to come to Turkey. If the response turned out to be negative, the Allies would give up their plans to cooperate with Turkey and transfer their military resources to other theaters. In the event of a positive response, the supplies of materials and equip-

ment for the Turkish army and air force would continue, British armored and antitank units would be brought forward, a maritime supply route to Turkey would be established, and Turkey would declare war according to a predetermined plan. There was also an annex to the plan describing the aid materials that would immediately be forthcoming.

According to Churchill's plan, British aircraft would reach Turkey long before the Turkish army was ready for even a defensive war from the point of view of equipment and ammunition. İnönü kept pointing this out to the British. In the event of a German attack in response to Allied bombing of German targets from Turkish bases, Turkey would have to resist such an attack alone and without adequate preparation. To reinforce the Turkish army with British armored and antitank units would take at least one or two months. The Ottoman Empire had been drawn into World War I against its will and unprepared, as a consequence of the actions of two warships operating out of Turkish ports under the command of a German admiral when they attacked Russia. It could not be expected that those who had lived through that experience would allow Turkey to go through a similar experience in World War II.

The note dated 12 December 1943 addressed to the British Embassy stated that, although Turkey accepted the Cairo proposals in principle, it could not accept a situation that might lead to an attack on Turkey before the Turkish army and air force had been adequately reinforced. It also stated that, in addition to the military equipment to be supplied by Britain, Turkey and Britain would have to prepare joint military plans and subsequently reach common positions on political questions. Thus it would not be possible to give a positive response to Britain's proposals for a declaration of war by 15 February before these conditions had been met (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973, p. 205).

In other words, the Turkish government wanted to complete all of its military preparations before declaring war and was also trying to see its way into the future as much as possible. By insisting on the preparation of joint military plans, the government was seeking to ascertain the role that the Turkish army was to play in the conflict. In referring to the settlement of political questions, the government also gave an indication that it wanted to reach an understanding in regard to the postwar situation.

This demonstrated that Turkey had concerns about postwar arrangements. In fact, the message to the Turkish Embassy in London conveying the decision of the Turkish government indicates that the minister of foreign affairs suspected that it was probably in response to Soviet insistence that Turkey was being asked to commit itself to

going to war before its minimum defense needs had been met. Furthermore, information had been received to the effect that the agreement signed at the Moscow Conference by Eden and Molotov contained secret clauses dealing with Turkey. These were some of the concerns and suspicions that motivated the Turkish leaders in Cairo.

Despite Turkey's negative response, Britain proposed that the commanders of the land, sea, and air forces as well as the commander of Middle East Forces meet in Ankara with the chief of the Turkish General Staff to consider the situation at a technical level. The arrival in Ankara of these senior Allied officers would be contrary to the decision made at Cairo to refrain from any action that might provoke Germany at the preparatory stage. Britain was notified of this, and an exchange of notes resulted in the arrival in Ankara of a low-level military delegation in January 1944 to hold talks with the General Staff. After almost a month of fruitless talks, the delegation left Turkey abruptly on 3 February, putting a strain on Turkish-British relations.

Britain was beginning to suspect that the Turks were asking for excessive amounts of military equipment. Deliveries of such large amounts could not be completed until the end of the war, so Turkey would be able to stay out of the war until it was over. As for the Turks, they were concerned that Britain had made promises to the Soviets and the Greeks regarding the Balkans and the Aegean islands. As a matter of fact, Menemencioğlu wrote a personal letter to Knatchbull-Hugessen in which he accused Britain of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish zones of influence in which London would allow full freedom to the USSR in the Balkans and also get Turkey into the war (Knatchbull-Hugessen, pp. 196–97).

One day after the British military delegation left Turkey, the Foreign Office sent a cable to the U.S. State Department reporting that the talks with the Turks had ended and that Turkish-British relations had been frozen and requesting the U.S. to follow a similar course. On 7 February 1944 the U.S. ambassador in Ankara, Laurence Steinhardt, was instructed to cool off relations with Turkey. Britain suspended its military aid to Turkey on 2 March, and the U.S. did likewise on 1 April. Turkey's relations with the Allies were now at their lowest point.

# The Problem of the Export of Chromium to Germany

At this point Turkey and the Allies were going through a crisis of confidence. Britain and the U.S. were reluctant to share their war plans with neutral Turkey, while Turkey refused to get involved in the war without being informed

about where, how, and when the Turkish army would have to fight.

At this juncture relations with the Allies became even more strained because of the question of chromium sales. As relations reached a low point in April, the Allies kept pressing Ankara at least to end the sale of chromium to Germany. The question became a hot issue because the Turkish-German trade agreement was due to expire on 30 April 1944. A German delegation had already been in Ankara since the end of March to negotiate an extension of the agreement.

On 9 April U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull made a statement in which he called on all neutral states to end their trade relations with Germany. The British and the U.S. ambassadors subsequently delivered notes to Ankara in which they threatened to apply to Turkey the blockade measures in force against other neutrals if Ankara kept on delivering strategic materials to Germany.

After the delivery of these notes, the Turkish government received intelligence reports that strained relations even further. According to these reports, the two ambassadors had recommended to their governments that, in the event of Turkey continuing its sale of chromium, this should be disrupted through sabotage or by bombing the two bridges on the Meriç (Maritsa) River.

This question was finally resolved when Turkey first agreed to impose a monthly quota of 4,200 tons on its chromium dispatches to Germany and subsequently, on 21 April 1944, stopped exports altogether on the grounds that Turkey was not a neutral country. Turkey's hesitance to stop the trade altogether from the beginning was not just because of political concerns but also because of the economic difficulties that Turkey expected to experience as a result. Turkey calculated that to suspend sales of chromium to a major trading partner would have inflicted losses that the Allies were not in a position to make up.

After the sales of chromium came to an end, the Allies demanded that the sale of all other strategic materials also be terminated. After negotiations, a trade agreement was concluded toward the end of May by Britain, the U.S., and Turkey, in which Britain and the U.S. agreed to make up for any diminution in Turkey's exports and imports and Turkey agreed to undertake to reduce its trade with the Axis countries by 50%.

# The Question of German Ships Passing through the Straits

Just as the question of strategic products was settled, the question of German shipping through the Straits came up. Actually, the question first came up in mid-January

when Turkey's relations with the Allies started souring. At that time, the British ambassador informed the Turkish authorities that four small cargo ships suspected of being warships had sailed through the Straits and that five other ships of the same class were preparing to enter the Straits from the Black Sea. Investigations had revealed that the vessels carried no weapons, however, and were too small to be considered auxiliary vessels (see Box 2-13 in Section 2). Similar British complaints nevertheless followed until June. Turkey was allowing these vessels through the Straits because it had determined that they were merchant vessels of small tonnage; according to the Montreux Convention, it could not inspect these ships except on health grounds. Britain contended that these ships had to be stopped because they either were carrying well-camouflaged weapons or were transiting the Straits without weapons but were being armed once they were in the Aegean and then used for military purposes.

Conversely, Turkey's stoppages and inspections of the German ships from time to time on the Turkish Straits based on British complaints were straining its relations with Germany. The difficulties came about because it was not possible to determine the true characteristics of the German ships sailing through the Straits. Furthermore, the British were also demanding that German merchant vessels, which did have a right to transit the Straits, be prevented from using the waterway. It can be argued that, having failed in its attempts to get Turkey into the war, Britain seemed determined to press Turkey in different areas and used the question of German shipping to this end. In contrast, Turkey was interpreting the Montreux Convention in a strict manner and was usually allowing suspicious German ships to sail through the Straits after a perfunctory sanitary examination.

By the end of May the crisis reached its climax when the USSR joined Britain in protesting Turkey's action. Finally, on 5 June, the German navy sought permission for a number of vessels to sail through the Straits on their way to Romania. Britain asked Ankara to deny this request on the ground that the ships in question were auxiliary naval vessels. When Germany gave assurances to Turkey that these ships were not war vessels, Turkey granted permission for the ships to sail into the Black Sea. When the Allies protested this action, Menemencioglu declared that the ships, which had not yet entered the Black Sea, would be allowed to proceed only if German ambassador von Papen gave his personal assurances. In the interval, officials conducted a search in the ships and, upon discovering weapons, radar equipment, and naval uniforms, prevented the ships from entering the Black Sea.

In the meantime the German vessel Kassel, proceeding from the Black Sea, refused to submit to a search. When the ship was searched anyway, it was discovered that it was an auxiliary naval vessel with armor, a camouflaged thirty-ton derrick, and a heavy machine gun. Von Papen claimed that the Kassel was actually a merchant vessel equipped with defensive weapons, but Britain's intelligence had proved to be accurate this time. Turkey delivered a protest to Germany for violating the terms of the Montreux Convention. Germany was also notified that henceforth all German vessels passing through the Straits would be inspected and that vessels of the EMS and Mannheim classes would be turned away without inspection. These measures brought about a tangible improvement in Turkish-British relations.

A few days after this decision, Minister of Foreign Affairs Menemencioğlu resigned on the ground that the policies he had been implementing no longer enjoyed the support of the government. Prime Minister Saracoğlu took on the job as acting minister of foreign affairs until 13 September 1944, when Hasan Saka took up the post. He had been assistant delegate at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Throughout the war years Menemencioğlu had resisted British efforts to get Turkey into the war. Britain perceived him as pro-German. Now that Germany's defeat was a certainty and it was time for Turkey to move closer to Britain, he was being sacrificed in order to shield the state from embarrassment. Actually, Menemencioğlu had been carrying out policies that had the support of both the government and President İnönü. But he assumed full responsibility and resigned to make way for new policies.

# C. The End of the War and Turkey

The landing in Normandy on 6 June 1944 and the opening of the second front signified the beginning of the end of the war in Europe. Toward the end of June, Britain and the U.S. started asking Turkey to sever all commercial and diplomatic links with Germany. As the end of the war approached, there was a certain apprehension in Turkey about the postwar arrangements and the way Turkish-Soviet relations would develop.

As a result, Turkey was motivated to seek a rapprochement with the USSR. In this context, strong measures were introduced in May to quell Turanist activities, which had become very noticeable during the war years. In his address on the occasion of the Youth Day festivities of 19 May 1944, İnönü accused the Turanists of plotting a coup d'état. He declared that "the racists and the Turanists have been resorting to covert activities and plots. We shall

steadfastly defend our nation against such seditious elements." In stating this, he was giving the first sign of the new mood in the country. In his speech İnönü also recalled the contribution of the USSR to the national struggle following World War I, thus making explicit Turkey's desire to patch up its differences with the USSR. In the meantime twenty-three Turanists, accused of "establishing an illegal association to overthrow the government, engaging in activities contrary to the national interest, and spreading propaganda designed to weaken national feelings," were arrested and put on trial on 18 May. (The defendants, who were subsequently sentenced to various prison terms, did not serve their time, because the Court of Cassation quashed the sentences in 1947, when relations with the USSR became very strained.) The individuals who had been convicted for the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate von Papen were also released from prison on 9 August 1944 (Oran, pp. 253-56).

The first formal action of the government in its attempt to improve relations with the USSR came on 22 May, when Menemencioğlu met with Ambassador Vinogradov. Menemencioğlu proposed that the two countries conclude an agreement that would provide for consultations on issues relating to the Balkans. The Soviet reply to the Turkish proposal came on 5 June: there could be no political cooperation unless Turkey's relations with Germany underwent a radical change. The USSR would make no agreement if Turkey did not sever its relations with Germany immediately and enter the war on the side of the Allies.

The contacts with the USSR were interrupted by the resignation of Menemencioğlu. But Cevat Açıkalın, secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with Vinogradov on June 22, seeking to revive the broken contacts. Nothing came from this attempt at rapprochement, however, because of the Soviet insistence on Turkey's declaring war on Germany. On 30 June the British ambassador paid a visit to Saracoğlu and handed him a note, which stated that, with the opening of the second front, the time had come for Turkey to consider severing its commercial and diplomatic ties with Germany. Such a course would allow Turkey to "shed light on its policies that had become murky and mixed up as a result of recent developments" (Gürün 1983, p. 128). The note concluded: "Turkey can play a fitting role both during the war and in the peace that will follow." On 1 July the U.S. ambassador called on Saracoğlu to indicate that his government supported the British request.

It is interesting to note that neither of them made any reference to Turkey's alliance with Britain. Until then the Allies had kept reminding Turkey of its alliance obligations when pressing it to enter the war. Now that the war was drawing to an end and preparations were actively underway for postwar arrangements, the reference to alliance obligations had suddenly been dropped from their notes. Turkey saw this omission as ominous. When Saracoğlu sought clarification from British ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen, he replied that London was trying to determine whether the 1939 Tripartite Alliance was still alive. This reply did nothing to put the Turkish government at ease in its concern over the possibility that after the war it would find itself alone to confront a muchstrengthened Soviet Union.

Saracoğlu summoned the two ambassadors on 3 July. He explained to them that Turkey would encounter problems and difficulties if it severed relations with Germany and let them understand that he was expecting them to assist Turkey on this matter. He also told them that the severance of relations with Germany would strengthen and reaffirm the ties of alliance established in 1939 with Britain. This should lead to Turkey's being treated as an equal partner and allowed to take part in the settlement of all international questions when peace was being made. The Lend and Lease Programs for Turkey should also be resumed. Military equipment, and especially aircraft, should be provided to repulse a sudden attack. If Turkey was attacked as a result of this decision, Britain should guarantee to provide the aid needed for Turkey to defend itself. Turkey was also seeking alternative suppliers and outlets for the imports and exports that would come to an end as a consequence of the severance of trade links with Germany. Turkey also wanted the additional financial burden imposed by the war to be shared. Saracoğlu concluded that, if these requests could be met, Turkey would be prepared to honor its alliance obligations and carry out Britain's request.

While these contacts were going on between Turkey, Britain, and the U.S., the USSR complained about Turkey's foot-dragging. Moscow asserted that it was no longer enough for Turkey to break its diplomatic relations with Germany and charged Britain with not carrying out the decisions reached in Moscow and Tehran to bring Turkey into the war. Moscow also complained about London's new offers to Ankara. Stalin wrote to Churchill on 15 July, accusing the Turkish government of pursuing "evasive and ambivalent policies toward Germany" and concluding that it would be best to let Turkey go its own way. The letter ended with the phrase "naturally, this will nullify any Turkish claims to have a say in the settlement of postwar questions" (Churchill, vol. 6, p. 71). Nevertheless,

Britain accepted Turkey's offer on July 23. The government then obtained parliamentary approval and informed the Allies that relations with Germany would be severed, effective 2 August 1944. In the communication made to London, the government also took issue with the British description of Turkey's policies as "murky" and "mixed up" and expressed the desire to see more appropriate terminology used in the future.

In a reply dated 27 July, Britain expressed its gratification in regard to Turkey's decision and declared that it viewed this action as confirmation of the Turkish-British alliance. Consequently, Britain would consider Turkey to be its ally once again.

Meanwhile the USSR replied to the Turkish proposal to confirm the friendship between the two countries. In a chilly tone, the Soviet message drew attention to the fact that Ankara had resisted the calls made since November 1943 for Turkey to enter the war in order to shorten the conflict. At this date, the Turkish proposal to exchange letters to confirm the friendship between the two countries would be useless, because it would not have the effect of shortening the conflict.

Furthermore, when the USSR found out that Turkey's decision to sever relations was made not in order to please the Soviets but at the request of Britain and the U.S., its resentment grew. From then or, the USSR lost all interest in getting Turkey into the war. In a note delivered to the U.S. by the Soviet ambassador in Washington on 22 June, the Soviet view was explained in the following terms: the question of Turkey's entering the war had been delayed for too long by protracted negotiations and half-hearted measures. In the present circumstances, the matter had ceased to carry any importance. Turkey should be pressed no further and left to its own devices.

As Turkey moved toward declaring war, the USSR was eager to appear uninterested in Ankara's actions. Moscow was keen to avoid any commitment to reward Turkey for its decision. It was also seeking to use the British demarches made without obtaining prior Russian approval as a pretext for evading its own commitments made at the Tehran and Moscow conferences to act in concert with Britain and the U.S. when dealing with Turkey. All of this can be taken as laying the groundwork for the Soviet demands that would be made on Turkey at the end of the war.

Turkey had indicated that breaking relations with Germany on 2 August would be a step toward an eventual declaration of war. But no request came from the Allies for such a step to be taken. In fact the British ambassador told Saracoğlu that "it was now too late for Turkey's belligerency to make any difference." It could be said that Britain and the U.S. had also lost interest in Turkey's becoming involved in the war.

Ankara would have welcomed this loss of interest earlier in the war. In the circumstances of 1944, however, it was a cause for much alarm. Ankara could see the hardening of the Soviet position as the end of the war approached and was uncomfortable with the notion that Britain and the U.S. no longer needed Turkey. Against this background, the entry of Soviet forces into Romania and Bulgaria in the summer of 1944 created anxiety, while the British landing in Greece in the autumn of that year brought relief. This was perceived as restoring some sort of balance in the Balkans. With these considerations in mind, Turkey wanted to establish close cooperation with Greece in the postwar period. Accordingly, Ankara informed Greece in November 1944 that it had absolutely no claims over the Dodecanese Islands (Armaoğlu, p. 174).

At this stage, Turkey regarded the October 1939 alliance as its only source of assurance in the face of its growing anxiety over the USSR's hostile behavior. Churchill's visit to Moscow on 9 October 1944 and the reports filtering out increased this anxiety even further. By now Churchill felt that Turkey's decision in respect to the war would not have any discernible effect on either the course or the length of the war. He was therefore in a more receptive mood for possible demands by Stalin regarding changes in the Montreux Convention in the framework of postwar arrangements (OTDP, p. 192). As a matter of fact, at the meeting with Stalin at which they agreed on the percentages of their respective zones of influence after the war, Churchill accepted in principle the Soviet demand to have the Montreux Convention amended. He requested that the detailed Soviet proposals be submitted to the Allies for their consideration. This was what triggered the Straits crisis at the end of the war.

Turkey's hitherto successful policy of staying out of the war was now turning into a liability as the war drew to an end. As Churchill was dividing up the Balkans with Stalin, he indicated his special interest in Greece but said nothing about Turkey (Churchill, vol. 6, pp. 198–99, 204, and 211). In these circumstances Turkey's postwar foreign-policy concerns would be largely determined by Soviet demands for amendments to the Montreux Convention and the reaction of Britain and the U.S. to these demands. As agreed between Churchill and Stalin, this issue would be on the agenda of both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.

Even before the war ended, however, there were signs of discord among the Allies. As indicated above, having failed in its attempt to get Turkey in the war, the USSR was now pursuing a policy of leaving Turkey isolated so that it could negotiate changes in the Montreux Convention with the Allies rather than directly with Turkey. At this point the U.S. and Britain wanted Turkey to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. The U.S. signed a Lend and Lease Agreement with Turkey. These were signs of a divergence in the policies of the U.S. and Britain on the one hand and the USSR on the other.

#### The Yalta Conference

By early 1945 it was clear that the Axis powers were approaching their final defeat. It was now becoming necessary to determine the shape of Europe after the war. On 4–11 February 1945 Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill came together at Yalta in the Crimea (USSR) to take up these questions and also discuss the issues of direct interest to Turkey.

Turkey was on the agenda on 10 February when Stalin raised the issue of the Straits and the status of the Montreux Convention. Stalin believed that the convention dated from a time when the Western states were not all that well disposed toward the USSR. The convention was a product of the defunct LoN system and did not correspond to the new era. It was time to change it. Stalin objected to Turkey's right to close the Straits not only in time of war but also when there was a threat of imminent danger of war. Stalin wanted a regime of free passage through the Straits. He wanted a new arrangement for the Straits that would safeguard Turkey's legitimate interests, but clearly it was out of the question to allow Turkey "to establish a stranglehold" (Gürün 1983, p. 137) over the Soviet Union. Roosevelt and Churchill were favorably disposed toward the Soviet position. It was decided that the Soviet proposals regarding the Straits would be submitted to the forthcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries.

Another important decision reached at Yalta dealt with the issue of the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, which was due to be convened at the end of April. It was decided that only those countries that were in a state of war with Germany and Japan on 1 March 1945 would be invited to attend the conference as founding members of the new organization. Turkey had already broken all commercial and diplomatic relations with Japan before the Yalta Conference on January 6. Now it declared war on both Germany and Japan, effective Feb-

ruary 23. This was done to secure an invitation for Turkey to attend the UN conference as a founding member.

# The Molotov-Sarper Meeting and the Soviet Note of 19 March 1945

Turkey's actions did not satisfy the USSR. Seven weeks before the end of the war in Europe, on 19 March 1945, Molotov summoned Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper to his office and handed him a note. Turkey was being informed that the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (Nonaggression) of 17 December 1925, which had been the basis of Turkish-Soviet relations for twenty years, would not be extended: radical changes had taken place during World War II; therefore the treaty was being denounced in accordance with the terms of the protocol dated 7 November 1935. What Turkey had been dreading throughout the war years had now come to pass.

Germany surrendered on 7 May and Japan on 14 August. World War II had come to an end, and Turkey had succeeded in avoiding the ravages of this terrible conflict without having fired a single shot. Now it had to strive to survive in a transformed environment where the balance of power in Eastern Europe had shifted dangerously in favor of the USSR after Germany's defeat. True, Turkey had been spared from the presence of Soviet troops on its territory either as occupiers or as liberators. But Turkey was now confronted with a different kind of Soviet threat.

On 4 April Turkey replied to the Soviet note of 19 March and inquired about the Soviet proposals. Turkey also proposed the conclusion of a new pact. No reply came from Moscow until June. Molotov invited Sarper to the ministry on 7 June and informed him that to renew the treaty between the two countries it would be necessary to settle certain outstanding questions: (1) the revision of Turkey's frontier with the USSR (the ceding of the region of Kars and Ardahan); (2) the granting of bases to the USSR in the Straits to ensure the joint defense of the waterway; and (3) the revision of the Montreux Convention (Box 3-6). All of these points had been put forward by the USSR in 1940 in the course of its negotiations with Germany. This was the price demanded by Moscow for joining the Axis. It was clear that the Soviet demands in connection with Turkey had remained unchanged throughout the war.

During the war years Ankara had been receiving signals regarding Soviet demands. With the denunciation of the 1925 treaty, the Turkish government was thoroughly alarmed and placed in a difficult situation (examined in detail in "Relations with the USSR" in Section 4). Until



#### Box 3-6. The Molotov-Sarper Meeting of 7 June 1945

Selim Sarper had a two-hour meeting with Molotov on 7 June 1945. His report to Ankara contains the following exchange:

Molotov: Before we conclude a new alliance agreement, we must resolve all of the outstanding questions between our countries. I will now enumerate these questions. The 1921 treaty, which brought about some territorial changes, was concluded at a time when the Soviet state was in a weak condition. Our first task must be to correct this.

Sarper: Are you referring to changes to be made in Turkey's eastern frontiers?

Molotov: Yes, I am referring to righting past wrongs.

Sarper: The 1921 treaty was not imposed on the Soviets by force. In regard to the search for past wrongs that need correction, this can be done by scrutinizing the bilateral relations of the two countries over the centuries, but such a search can yield no positive results. In any case, I do not consider the outcome of the 1921 treaty to be a historic wrong but rather the correction of a past injustice. It was Lenin himself who detected a wrong and decided to correct it. Molotov: An unfair treaty signed between the Soviets and Poland in 1921 has been rectified by Poland. As a result of this, It has become possible to establish a long-term friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union.

Sarper: ... First of all, no Turkish government could explain such a course to the public. Furthermore, I could not convey such a message to my government. Finally, I personally cannot justify what

you are saying to myself... There is no way that your request can be met... I am therefore asking you to set this matter aside. *Molotov*: Let us now pass to another subject... In the course of this war we have suffered grievous losses. Even during our darkest hours, we had to worry about our security in the Black Sea. We may have been mistaken in our concerns, and in the final analysis Turkey's policies and actions did not create any difficulties for us. However, the fate of 200 million people is ultimately dependent on Turkey's goodwill... We have no doubts about Turkey's goodwill. But we must be sure that the Straits are properly defended. *Sarper*: If Turkey's defense inadequacies lead you to the conclusion that bases must be granted in the Straits to the USSR, ... let me say right away that this is out of the question.

Molotov: You appear not to want to provide bases in time of peace, Could you consider doing so in time of war?

Sarper: I implied nothing of the sort...

Molotov: It will be useful to conduct the negotiations for the revision of the Montreux Convention parallel to the negotiations for a treaty of alliance.

Sarper: ... I do not consider it of any use to discuss this ... When we exercise our sovereign rights, contractual obligations apart, we do not seek anyone's permission ...

(M. AYDIN) (Source: T.C. Dişişleri Bakanlığı 1973, pp. 261–63, Bilge, pp. 269–71)

then Turkey had been successful in preventing either German or Soviet soldiers from setting foot in Turkey under any pretext. But in the immediate postwar period Turkey's relations with Britain and the U.S. were still not established on a firm basis. Nor was there a full accord among the Allies about the postwar arrangements. In these circumstances İnönü and the government were concerned that Turkey was on its own in confronting the USSR.

When initial Soviet demands were firmly rejected by Turkish leaders, Turkey came under intense pressure from the Soviet Union from the middle of 1945 onward. As Molotov communicated the Soviet demands once again to Sarper on 18 June, any hope of replacing the 1925 treaty between Turkey and the USSR with another compact came to an end.

As will be seen in Section 4 (in "Relations with the USA and NATO"), in the period from 1945 to 1960 Turkey sought to draw the U.S. closer to counter the USSR. In the period leading up to the Potsdam Conference, Ankara also sought to align the U.S. position in regard to the Straits with Turkey's own position. Although various problems were cropping up between Britain/the U.S. and the Soviets, however, the former still entertained hopes of maintaining harmonious relations with the USSR in the postwar years. They were therefore reluctant to confront Moscow openly on the issue of the Straits. Unlike other

European states, Turkey's wartime policies would place it in a precarious position on the issue of zones of influence in the postwar era.

### Turkey at the End of the War

The big three Allied leaders met in Potsdam from 17 July to 2 August 1945 to consider developments in Europe and the pursuit of the war in the Pacific theater. At the meeting Stalin tried to get the Allies to agree that the issue of the Straits was a private matter between the USSR and Turkey and made his demands on the Turkish Straits known to other Allied leaders. He also asked for a base in Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) on Greece's Aegean coast. This revealed very clearly the Soviet ambition to gain control of the Straits.

When the conference came to an end, the Allies had agreed in principle to revise the Montreux Straits Convention. They would submit their views to the Turkish government. On 8 August 1946 the USSR submitted its tentative proposals regarding the Straits to the Turkish government without prior consultation with its allies. After this, different interpretations of the agreement reached at Potsdam between the U.S./Britain and the USSR emerged, which brought the U.S.-British positions closer to Turkey's. In February 1946 Britain informed Turkey that it considered the Tripartite Alliance of 1939 still binding and, as a con-

sequence, would come to Turkey's aid in the event of an attack. Subsequently, on 5 April 1946, the U.S. battleship *Missouri* anchored in the harbor of Istanbul, bringing the body of the former Turkish ambassador in Washington, Münir Ertegün, who had died at his post before the end of the war. This was an unusual gesture, going well beyond the customary courtesies shown to a deceased envoy. These events signified that Turkey's wartime isolation was coming to an end. When the Soviet note of 8 August and another note dated 22 August renewing Soviet claims reached Ankara, the USSR's demands were rejected, this time with full British and American backing. The Soviet demands were formally submitted one last time on 24 September, without, however, being pursued further.

During the war years Turkey's policy had been to steer away from adventurism, not to become overly bound to any one side, and thus to keep out of the war for as long as possible. The leaders in Ankara were aware that Turkey's capacity and means were not sufficient to ensure the country's integrity. That is why they tried to keep the belligerents at arm's length by maintaining cooperation with both sides as necessary. The leaders were convinced that the Western Allies were in a position to ensure Turkey's long-term security, so they pursued policies that would bring about closer relations with these countries without, however, compromising Turkey's sovereignty. These policies were implemented in the war years without confronting the USSR. Early in the war the Italian threat appeared to be paramount, but maintaining friendly relations with Germany made it possible to neutralize this threat. The intensive economic relations with Germany were balanced by developing the economic relations with Britain. But the anxiety felt about the intentions of the bigger northern neighbor weighed upon the Turkish leaders all through the war.

This explains why the main objective of Turkish foreign policy during the war was to secure Allied guarantees that would ensure Turkey's safety without appearing to be anti-USSR. Turkey pursued a pro-Allied policy on the basis of its alliance with Britain and France while seeking to follow a balanced policy toward Germany. Apart from the period from November 1940 to June 1941, Ankara never felt particularly threatened by Germany. The main source of apprehension after June 1941 was not the possibility of German occupation but rather the possibility of being liberated from occupation by the USSR. In fact the threat that awaited Turkey after the war was precisely the threat that Turkey had been able to avert during the war, which was to be confronted, all alone, with a northern neighbor whose appetite had become voracious as a

result of the new international environment. This threat was to be the defining feature of Turkey's domestic and international policies after World War II. Ankara would now try to counter the perceived Soviet threat by courting U.S. support. This course would not be questioned until 1960.

Mustafa Aydin

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# **SECTION 4**

1945-1960

Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc—1

Table 4-1. The Administration of the Period 1945–1960

| PRESIDENTS                                       | GOVERNMENTS   | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                     | SECRETARIES-GENERAL<br>OF MFA                      |  |  |  |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|
|  | 2nd Şükrü Saraçoğlu Government<br>CHP (9 Mar. 1943–7 Aug. 1946) | Hasan Saka<br>(13 Sept. 1944–                       | Cevat Açıkalın<br>(16 Aug. 1943–15 Oct. 1945)      |  |  |  |
|  | Recep Peker Government CHP<br>(7 Aug. 1946–10 Sept. 1947)       | 10 Sept. 1947)                                      | Feridun Cemal Erkin<br>(15 Oct. 1945–28 June 1947) |  |  |  |
| M. İsmet İnönü<br>(11 Nov. 1938–<br>22 May 1950) | 1st Hasan Saka Government CHP<br>(10 Sept. 1947–10 June 1948)   |   |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2nd Hasan Saka Government CHP<br>(10 June 1948–16 Jan. 1949)    | Necmettin Sadak<br>(10 Sept. 1947–<br>22 May 1950)  | Fuat Carım<br>(25 Aug. 1947.–16 July 1949)         |  |  |  |
|  | Şemsettin Günaltay Government<br>CHP (16 Jan. 1949–22 May 1950) |   |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1st Adnan Menderes Government DP<br>(22 May 1950–9 Mar. 1951)   |   | Faik Zihni Akdur<br>(16 July 1949–12 Oct. 1952)    |  |  |  |
|  | 2nd Menderes Government DP<br>(9 Mar. 1951–17 May 1954)         | Fuat Köprülü<br>(22 May 1950                        |  |  |  |  |
| Celal Bayar<br>(22 May 1950–<br>27 May 1960)     | 3rd Menderes Government DP<br>(17 May 1954–9 Dec. 1955)         | 20 June 1956)                                       | Muharrem Nuri Birgi<br>(7 Nov. 1952–2 Apr. 1957)   |  |  |  |
|  | 4th Menderes Government DP<br>(9 Dec. 1955–25 Nov. 1957)        |   |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5th Menderes Government DP<br>(25 Nov. 1957–27 May 1960)        | Fatin Rüştü Zorlu<br>(25 Oct. 1957–<br>27 May 1960) | Melih Esenbel<br>(2 Apr. 1957–12 Mar. 1960)        |  |  |  |

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): Republican People's Party. DP (Demokrat Parti): Democratic Party. (Table by Atay Akdevelioğlu)

# Appraisal of the Period

# I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

Significant changes occurred in Europe as well as in the international system in the years following World War II.

The Western world had become divided between the democracies and the Fascists following World War I. Then came the U.S. and USSR to compete with Europe. At the end of World War II, Europe had lost its dominating position. The world was no longer Eurocentric, and Europe was now just another region of the globe.

# A. A Bipolar System

The international system had been completely transformed politically, militarily, and economically.

- 1. Politically: the most universal of international organizations, the United Nations (UN), was established in 1945. But its universality was reflected only in the General Assembly. The Security Council was under the control of the veto-wielding big five and reflected the power balance of the period. The U.S. predominated in the General Assembly, which upset the balance of the UN in America's favor.
- 2. Militarily: the defeat of the Nazis and Fascists in Europe was not the work of Western Europe but of the U.S. and the USSR. As a result, other countries tended to cluster around these two powers. The "bipolar system" that emerged from this clustering was the main feature of world politics for twenty years. This was the period of the Cold War, which started after 1946 and reached its peak in the mid-1950s (see Box 4-4 below).
- 3. Economically: both because of its geographic extent and because the capitalist system was the only workable system on a global scale, one side had a clear superiority over the other in this bipolar system. Even before the war ended, the U.S. had scored a coup by convening a conference at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire. The conference was to adopt the system proposed by the U.S. to regulate and manage the world economy.

The Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)—have the function of overseeing the management of the global economy under the control of the major capitalist countries (Boxes 4-1 and 4-2). The purpose of the IMF is to oversee the timely repayment of loans, while the purpose of the WB is to ensure "structural adjustments" that will allow the members to build an economic system that is in tune with the international capitalist economy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which came into effect in 1947 but was only institutionalized much later, was designed to secure the liberalization of international trade.

The Bretton Woods system made the U.S. the uncontested leader of the global economy until 1971. It recovered this position of leadership in the 1980s. The U.S. then led in the institutionalization of GATT in 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established. It was in the WTO that the U.S. sought to set up the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, the "basic charter of globalization" (see Box 7-4 in Section 7).

### B. The Eastern Bloc

Russia had been overrun by France in 1812 and by Germany twice within a period of thirty years. These invasions had come from Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Russia had experienced the intervention of the West in its civil war after 1917 and had also witnessed how the second front had been delayed in World War II, presumably to wear down the Soviet Union. In the light of this experience, it is no wonder that Russia wanted a buffer zone between itself and Western Europe to ensure its security. This buffer zone was to be Eastern Europe.

Contrary to what has been written, the Communist regimes established after the war in Eastern Europe were not the work of the USSR. These regimes were set up by local Communists. When the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie of these countries fled in the war or collaborated

#### Box 4-1. The International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the specialized agencies of the UN. Its main function is to prevent international trade from being affected by balance of payments difficulties. It also seeks to check inflation in the international field. The IMF carries out its function by allowing countries experiencing balance of payments problems to borrow from it to cover their deficits.

The IMF came into being in 1946. Its resources consist of the quotas contributed by member states as well as its borrowings. Members' quotas reflect their share of international trade and are revised every five years. The size of a member's quota determines the number of its votes as well as the amount it can borrow from the IMF. Members sign an agreement with the IMF when their borrowings exceed half of their quotas. When a member experiences temporary balance of payments difficulties, it signs a standby agreement and submits a letter of intent that lays out the economic policy recommended by the IMF. This allows the IMF to monitor its economic policies and performance.

As a rule, these loans are short-term (three to five years) and the rate of interest is below the market rate. In other words, these loans are not designed to support the development efforts of developing countries, because they cannot remedy structural problems. Consequently, it is not right to criticize the IMF for not doing what it is not intended to do:

But developing countries must borrow from developed countries or international markets to improve their economies. But since the 1974 oil crisis, international banks have been reluctant

to provide loans to countries that do not have the IMF's "green light." Without a sound balance of payments, repayment of loans becomes difficult; countries must adhere to the discipline imposed by the IMF. As a result, the IMF has gradually turned into an insurance system for the repayment of loans to developed countries that can no longer place a lien on a debtor's revenues the way this was done in the nineteenth century (the Ottoman Public Debt was a striking example). Through this practice the IMF has assumed a new role that was not assigned to it at its inception.

To remedy any imbalance, the IMF usually recommends devaluation as part of its "magic recipe." This ensures that exports grow and internal demand is contained. To curb inflation, public expenditures have to be reined in and wages frozen. The main concern of the IMF is to ensure repayment of loans and to prevent a member's difficulties from spilling over into international markets. Any internal imbalance resulting from IMF-imposed measures, such as growing disparity in incomes, is the member's internal problem.

At present the main function of the IMF is to ensure the free flow of trade by securing the observance of the necessary financial conditions and, in addition, to create the conditions that will allow borrower countries to service their debts.

> (B. ORAN) (Source: Gürsel, vol. 2, pp. 486–94)

with the Nazis, it was the Communists who led the struggle against the occupiers. When the Nazis were evicted, the Communists were able to get elected, joined the governments of their countries, and, from that position, eliminated the other parties. It was only after 1948 that the USSR turned the Eastern European countries into satellites. Stalin feared that the local Communists might remove their countries from Russia's orbit the way Josip Broz Tito had done, so he replaced them with officials who were totally subservient to Moscow (Sander 1993, pp. 208–11). The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was set up in 1947 to ensure the ideological alignment of these countries with Moscow. With the establishment of COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in 1949, the system was completed. The Eastern Bloc had been consolidated, and the USSR's security belt was now in place.

While the USSR completed its security arrangements, the nations of the Western world, and especially the USSR's neighbors, naturally started worrying about their own security. Where the Soviet security concerns ended and where Soviet expansionism began became a very contentious issue.

In the meantime (as we shall see below) the U.S. had started taking economic initiatives even before the end of the war. With the military pacts established after the war,

# Box 4-2. The World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)

The World Bank (WB) is one of the specialized agencies of the UN. In a sense it is the twin of the IMF. While the IMF provides short-term loans to correct temporary imbalances in a country's current account, the WB provides long-term loans for investments. Loans are extended to a member state or to a state-guaranteed corporation. The purpose of WB loans is to support the recipient country's structural adjustment to the global economy. From the point of view of the Third World, the IMF plays the role of the "bad cop," while the WB is perceived as the "good cop."

The WB came into being at the end of 1945. Its membership is open to IMF members only. Membership in the WB is required to join the other bodies in the WB group: the international Development Association and the International Finance Corporation. All of these bodies are intertwined.

The voting rights of member states in the WB are based on their shares in the bank's subscribed capital, which in turn is based on their quota in the IMF. As a consequence, the policy of the WB, as well as of the IMF, is determined in large measure by the U.S., Britain, Germany, Japan, and France. With a share in the bank's capital of 20.61%, the U.S. has provided all of the presidents of the bank since it came into operation.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Gürsel, vol. 2, pp. 472–73) it assumed the leadership of the western half of Europe. The Western Bloc or capitalist bloc was able to extend its influence over a major portion of the world, militarily through NATO and economically through its economic aid programs launched after 1947.

As would be expected, each outpost that the U.S. and its allies established exacerbated the chronic feeling of insecurity of the USSR. In this atmosphere, the Cold War became self-sustaining, with each action leading to a reaction, which in turn led to a further reaction. Also, it became harder to discern whether the U.S. presence in Europe and the world was serving the purpose of "containing communism" or protecting U.S. interests.

The rigid bipolar system, with its sharp cleavages, was somewhat attenuated by the changes that occurred in the USSR after Stalin's death. Molotov's call for a thaw in 1954 and the advent of the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two blocs brought about important changes in the international climate. This trend was reinforced by the emergence of the nonaligned movement, which rejected any allegiance to either bloc. These changes created new opportunities for the countries within the blocs as well as for the smaller, nonaligned countries.

Nevertheless, especially during the early stages of the Cold War, the "Aron paradigm" or model (referred to in the Introduction) became operative. It was no longer possible for medium powers considered by the bloc's leader to be important from a geostrategic point of view to pursue an independent foreign policy. Such a course was unfeasible and unrealistic.

#### c. The Western Bloc

### 1. The USA

#### Objective

The main U.S. objective after the war was to make sure that the USSR did not overrun Western Europe the way it had overrun Eastern Europe. Western Europe was in a shattered condition after the war and would need some time to recover. As the defense industries shut down and unemployment increased, it was essential for the American economy to capture this potentially rich market as quickly as possible. The Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey gave urgency to the American effort and facilitated Washington's task.

#### Methods

After the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1823, the U.S. remained aloof from European entanglements. Having now decided to get fully involved in European affairs, it employed three methods to reach its objectives.

1. Psychological preparation: the American public

was used to being focused exclusively on the Western Hemisphere. It took a shocking event like the raid on Pearl Harbor to get the U.S. into World War II. Now it was necessary to persuade Americans to get involved in European affairs, from which the U.S. had traditionally stayed aloof. For this, it was necessary first to prepare the public psychologically and second to do this on a global scale.

At this point two individuals became prominent. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Arthur Vandenberg, although a Republican, supported Democratic president Harry Truman and declared that the first task in the Cold War was "to scare the hell out of American people" to galvanize their fighting spirit. The fear of the Soviet Union and of communism had to be turned into a mass psychosis engulfing the U.S. and indeed the whole world. The other individual who gained prominence was U.S. senator Joseph McCarthy, who caused public alarm by claiming that there were 205 Communists in the State Department. At a time when the spread of communism in Eastern Europe and China was sowing fear, the senator launched investigations that caused many officials to lose their jobs, while others found themselves disgraced and cast out of society. McCarthyism became a byword for the persecution of individuals by labeling them as Communist and for forcing Americans to become compliant citizens. McCarthy would pursue his campaign for five years, until he was finally stopped when he accused Republican president Dwight D. Eisenhower of being soft on communism. McCarthy ruthlessly questioned his civilian and military victims in hearings that were broadcast on television for thirty-six consecutive days. McCarthyism was to spread to other countries, including Turkey, where members of the intelligentsia were to lose their jobs and university posts.

2. Military measures: the first U.S. action occurred in connection with an urgent issue. On 12 March 1947 President Truman enunciated the Truman Doctrine, under which Greece would receive \$300 million in military aid and Turkey \$100 million. The objective was to counter the Soviet threat to these two countries and bring them under U.S. influence. In this way, the U.S. would also be freed from the burden of having to ship U.S. military equipment in Europe back to America.

This was followed by more comprehensive military measures. Under the policy of "containment," the Eastern Bloc countries were encircled by military pacts under U.S. leadership. The most important was NATO, established in 1949. This was to be followed by the policy of "roll back," which meant the liberation of Eastern Europe by driving socialism back to the Soviet frontier. The driving spirit behind this policy of using force was U.S. secretary of state

John Foster Dulles, who became famous for his so-called pact-mania. During his tenure, new geographical concepts would be elaborated to respond to American military needs: the "Inner Crescent" and "Northern Tier." The U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) was established during Dulles's term in office (see Box 4-8 below).

Economic measures: in the year when NATO was established, the U.S. Congress enacted the Export Regulation Law. This law set up a comprehensive trade embargo against the socialist bloc. All of the NATO members and Japan eventually joined in the embargo. Under this system, U.S. exports to Eastern Europe, which amounted to \$400 million in 1948, plummeted to \$2 million in 1953. In the same period, U.S. imports from Eastern Europe dwindled from \$236 million to \$46 million. By 1952 to 1954 fully half of the products in international trade were on the proscribed list (Walter Krause and F. John Mathis, "The U.S. Policy Shift of East-West Trade," Journal of International Affairs 28, no. 1 [1974]: 26, quoted in Gerger, p. 31; G. Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947–1967 [Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1968], pp. 146–47). This led to a major shift to intrabloc trade, and the split in the blocs acquired an economic dimension.

But the main U.S. measure was the Marshall Plan, which came into effect in April 1948. This project was the economic counterpart of the Truman Doctrine and NATO.

The main feature of the Marshall Plan was that it provided loans on very favorable terms: a low rate of interest (2.5%), a fifteen-year grace period, and repayments extending over forty-four years (Gürsel, vol. 2, p. 474). Although the terms were attractive, the mechanism for disbursing the loans favored U.S. producers and suppliers. The recipient country indicated its requirements to the American aid mission, which transmitted the requests to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Washington. The required product was procured in the U.S. and shipped, as a general rule, on U.S.-flag vessels. The manner in which the aid would be utilized was determined in consultation with the U.S. In this way the U.S. was able to influence the economic policies of the recipient states. The local currency counterpart of the loan was deposited in a special U.S. account in the central bank of the recipient state. These counterpart funds were spent with U.S. approval, which gave Washington a second lever to influence the policies of the recipients (Avcıoğlu, p. 272).

The Marshall Plan had three objectives. The first was to secure the restoration of the economies of West-

ern Europe and allow them to resume their place in the international trading system. The second was to control the economies of the recipient countries (the USSR and its Eastern European partners refused to take part in the project). The third was to stimulate the U.S. economy by securing new markets for its products. All of these objectives were successfully achieved.

To sum up, by employing these methods the U.S. was able to establish a new world order, known as the Pax Americana. In the political and military spheres, it was launched by the Truman Doctrine, followed by NATO. In the economic sphere, it began with the Marshall Plan, followed by dollar loans. Countries not yet fully in the capitalist stage of development were given structural-adjustment recommendations. All of this turned the U.S. into a global hegemon (see Box Intro-3 in the Introduction).

### 2. Western Europe

Western Europe was heir to a deeply rooted civilization and a long industrial tradition. It also had a large reservoir of skilled labor. Thanks to the Marshall Plan, it was able to recover in a relatively short time, to become a valuable economic partner of the U.S.

Two other factors explain Western Europe's rapid recovery (Kuruç, pp. 27–28). The first factor was that the nineteenth-century order had changed fundamentally, and Western Europe was aware of this change. The Western European nation-state of the second half of the twentieth century was to be established on the basis of new institutions, above all, the welfare state. Western Europe understood that without this the nation-state could not gain legitimacy and continue. This applied to both the winners and the losers of the war.

The second factor was that Europe perceived that the nation-state could survive only if it became involved in cooperation on a continental scale. European integration was a concept designed to secure the continuation of the nation-state within a wider union.

At the end of World War II, Turkey was faced with this international environment and the U.S. and European models.

# II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

Even though Turkey's economic, political, social, and psychological condition after the war presented an integrated picture, we shall examine these under two headings: economic and political.

### A. The Economy

When we examine Uluğbay's table (Table 4-2; see Box 2-1 in Section 2), the following features stand out.

- 1. The foreign trade balance, which was in surplus every year during the 1930s (1938 being the exception), registered a deficit of \$21.3 million for the first time in 1947. This deficit increased progressively until 1960, when it reached \$147.5 million.
- 2. The ratio of foreign trade to GNP increased rapidly until 1952 and remained high until 1954. From then on it started to fall (this aspect is examined in detail below).
- 3. Turkey's foreign indebtedness until 1957 as reflected in the table understates the actual amount, because the accounting was never conducted properly. When Turkey applied to the IMF in 1958 for a rescheduling of its foreign debts, the IMF compiled Turkey's foreign debts and came up with the true picture for the first time. As shown in the table, the cumulative debt (starting from the beginning of the period) exceeded \$1 billion. This represented more than a 7.5-fold increase in the total debt since 1945. That made it very difficult for Turkey to obtain new loans.

# Unrestricted Exposure to the Outside World (1946–1953)

At the end of the war, the economy was abruptly opened wide to the outside, which led Turkey into difficulties. This was the result of the Marshall Plan, which Turkey joined with great enthusiasm. (Turkey originally was not due to receive any loans under the plan, but Ankara fought successfully to reverse this decision.) The main goal of the Marshall Plan was to integrate Western Europe into the global trading system while allowing Turkey to become the supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials to Western Europe.

Starting in 1946, various American reports on Turkey appeared. One of these was written by M. W. Thornburg and entitled "Turkey—An Economic Appraisal." He recommended the dismantling of statism, the sale of the Karabük Iron and Steelworks, the manufacture of metal ploughshares and hand tools rather than locomotives, and the abandonment of plans to set up chemical fertilizer factories. Thornburg also recommended the adoption of legislation encouraging foreign investments and granting such investments equal treatment with local businesses. He underlined that this was not a return to the capitulations, because foreign businesses were not seeking special privileges but only equal treatment. Thornburg favored a wider distribution of American books and magazines in Turkey. He was seen as a great friend of Turkey by the

local press and notably by the newspaper *Vatan*. Another one of these reports was written by James M. Barker, who had led a World Bank team to Turkey. Barker was more moderate in tone than Thornburg. He recommended that industry be given a lower priority and that comprehensive planning be abandoned. His emphasis was on agriculture and the production of raw materials. Barker also favored lowering the rate of growth to keep inflation under control (Aycioğlu, pp. 270–72).

Many years later, Süleyman Demirel, who could hardly be described as anti-American, was to make the following statement: "The West was never comfortable with Turkey's industrialization. This was the approach of the Barker report as well as others, where the emphasis was always on agriculture and light industry. But Turkey disregarded these recommendations in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and pressed forward with its industrialization. True, we are still in the early phases of this process, but if we had heeded their reports, Turkey would have no proper industry today" (Yetkin, p. 113). Mithat Perin, a deputy of the Democratic Party (DP), recalled that F.R. Zorlu walked out of a meeting he was attending in Germany when the Germans refused to consider the construction of refineries and iron and steelworks in Turkey (Yetkin, p. 51).

The implementation of the Marshall Plan, starting in 1948, progressed in this direction. Turkish analyses in the late 1960s usually defined the aim of the plan as transforming the country into "the greengrocer of Europe."

Thanks to Marshall Plan loans, vast sums were invested in agriculture. Prime Minister Menderes was always keen to gain the votes of peasants. New land was being brought under cultivation. The number of farm tractors grew from 1,000 in 1945 to 40,000 in 1955. The building of new railroads was halted while construction machinery was imported to undertake the building of roads and harbors. These would have a dual purpose: to allow the country to export its products and to supply the military bases that the U.S. was then constructing in Turkey. Industrialization no longer had priority.

The result of these policies was a big jump in agricultural production. New lands had been opened up to agriculture, while mechanization, increased use of fertilizers, and favorable weather conditions had all helped. The transportation, storage, and export of crops was now much easier than before, and the Korean War in 1950 led to increased demand for Turkey's products, especially cotton. The Democratic Party government had also utilized monetary reserves in the amount of \$245 million accumulated by the previous CHP governments. Marshall

Table 4-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1945–1960

| YEAR | GNP AT CURRENT PRICES (MILLION TL) | INFLATION<br>(WHOLESALE<br>PRICES) (%) | TL/\$<br>RATE | GNP<br>(MILLION \$) | EXPORTS<br>(000 \$) | exports as<br>% of gnp | IMPORTS<br>(000 \$) | imports as<br>% of gnp | FOREIGN<br>TRADE AS<br>% OF GNP | CUMULATIVE FOREIGN DEBTS (MILLION \$) | FOREIGN<br>DEBT AS<br>% OF GNP | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (000 \$) |
|------|------------------------------------|--|---------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1945 | 5,469.8                            | -3.2                                   | 1.30          | 4,207.5             | 168,264             | 3.99                   | 696'96              | 2.30                   | 6.30                            | 120                                   | 2.85                           | a and                               |
| 1946 | 6,857.6                            | 8.6.                                   | 2.01          | 3,411.7             | 214,580             | 6.29                   | 118,889             | 3.48                   | 77.6                            | I                                     | 1                              | 1                                   |
| 1947 | 7,542.6                            | 1.3                                    | 2.80          | 2,693.8             | 223,301             | 8.29                   | 244,644             | 90.6                   | 17.37                           | l                                     | !                              | ŀ                                   |
| 1948 | 9,492.9                            | 7.7                                    | 2.80          | 3,390.3             | 196,799             | 5.80                   | 275,053             | 8.11                   | 13.92                           | 1                                     | 1                              | I                                   |
| 1949 | 9,054.4                            | 7.9                                    | 2.80          | 3,233.7             | 247,825             | 7.66                   | 290,220             | 8.97                   | 16.64                           | ***                                   | I                              | F                                   |
| 1950 | 9,694.2                            | -10.2                                  | 2.80          | 3,462.2             | 263,424             | 7.61                   | 285,664             | 8.25                   | 15.86                           | 373                                   | 10.77                          | 1                                   |
| 1951 | . 11,644.3                         | 6.7                                    | 2.80          | 4,158.7             | 314,082             | 7.55                   | 402,086             | 29.6                   | 17.22                           | I                                     | I                              | 1                                   |
| 1952 | 13,389.3                           | 0.8                                    | 2.80          | 4,782.0             | 362,914             | 7.59                   | 555,920             | 11.63                  | 19.21                           | 355                                   | 7.42                           | l                                   |
| 1953 | 15,607.4                           | 2.3                                    | 2.80          | 5,574.1             | 396,061             | 7.11                   | 532,533             | 9.39                   | 16.66                           | 1                                     | 1                              | 2,800*                              |
| 1954 | 15,914.5                           | 11.0                                   | 2.80          | 5,683.8             | 334,924             | 5.89                   | 478,359             | 8,42                   | 14.31                           | I,                                    | Paragraph 2                    | 2,200                               |
| 1955 | 19,117.4                           | 7.2                                    | 2.80          | 6,827.6             | 313,346             | 4.50                   | 497,637             | 7.29                   | 11.88                           | I                                     | 1                              | 1,200                               |
| 1956 | 22,047.0                           | 16.8                                   | 2.80          | 7,873.9             | 304,990             | 3.87                   | 407,340             | 5.17                   | 9.05                            | I                                     |                                | 3,400                               |
| 1957 | 29,309.9                           | 18.7                                   | 2.80          | 10,467.8            | 345,217             | 3.30                   | 397,125             | 3.79                   | 7.09                            | 1,011**                               | 99.6                           | 1,300                               |
| 1958 | 34,999.9                           | 15.1                                   | 2.80          | 12,500.0            | 247,271             | 1.98                   | 315,098             | 2.52                   | 4.50                            | 620                                   | 4.96                           | 1,100                               |
| 1959 | 43,670.0                           | 19.5                                   | 2.80          | 15,596.4            | 353,799             | 2.27                   | 469,982             | 3.01                   | 5.28                            | İ                                     | 1                              | 3,400                               |
| 1960 | 46,664.3                           | 5.3                                    | 4.73          | 9,865,6             | 320,731             | 3.25                   | 468,186             | 4.75                   | 8.00                            | 365                                   | 10.05                          | 1,900                               |

Sources: Deviet Istatistik Enstitüsi (DIE), İstatistik Göstergəler, 1923–1998, pp. 404, 495, and 588; Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983–85), vols. 15, 16, 17, pp. 471–518; Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade and Economic Development: Türkiy, vol. 1 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974), p. 30.

GNP: Gross National Product. T.J.: Turkish lira.

\*\* Cumulative amount of foreign direct investments in Turkey up to 1954.

\*\* Derived from OEEC, Economic Situation in Turkey 1959 (Paris: OEEC, 1960), p. 30.

(Compiled and interpreted by Hilmet Uluğbay)

Plan loans helped flood the market with imported goods. Money earned through the black market and profiteering during the war years was now being directed to investments. Per capita income soared by 28% from 1950 to 1953.

Table 4-2 also shows that exports grew rapidly after 1950 and increased by a factor of 1.7 between 1949 and 1953. In the 1954 election, the Democratic Party was able to increase its share of the votes, and as a result the proportion of its deputies in parliament grew from 86% to 93%. The traditional support that the DP and its political heirs (the Justice Party, the True Path Party, etc.) enjoyed in rural areas and among those with a rural background is based on the fact that peasants were able to earn a decent income for the first time during this period.

# The Consequences of Unrestrained Extravagance

There was a serious deterioration in the economy after 1954. This was not just due to bad weather, the ending of the Korean War, and the restoration of agricultural production in Europe. The real reason was that the Turkish economy was being managed without any heed to planning or programming. Money was being printed and spent without control, causing inflation to climb. The increase in imports and agricultural subsidies was leading to deficits in the trade balance and the budget. The rate of inflation, at 0.8% in 1952, had climbed to 11% in 1954, 16.8% in 1956, and 18.7% in 1957. That is why the increase in the GNP in both dollars and Turkish liras (TL) was illusory. The increase in TL terms was due to inflation, while the increase in dollar terms was due to the fixed parity.

Actually, the reason for the rapid deterioration of the economy within a period of just three years can be traced back to earlier periods. The Recep Peker government had devalued the currency on 7 September 1946 to secure Turkey's membership in the IMF. The Turkish lira was devalued from 1.28 to the dollar to 2.80. Trade was liberalized, as demanded by the U.S. In 1947, the year following the devaluation, exports increased by \$8.7 million while imports rose by \$125.8 million. This was a period of plenty, and the excess production was used not for investments but for imports and subsequently to cover deficits. Since the Marshall Plan did not favor industrialization, Turkey's imports did not include capital goods that could have contributed to future production gains. To cite an example, the automobiles that would use the new roads under construction would require further imports, especially of fuel to run them.

The Economy's Dependency on Foreign Resources

The economy gradually started becoming overly dependent on foreign countries, who were counseling liberal-

ization and emphasizing agriculture. As a matter of fact, the foreign trade to GNP ratio went from 9.77% in 1946 to 19.21% in 1952. Imports were growing faster than exports. While exports grew by \$148 million, the corresponding figure for imports was \$437 million.

After 1952 there was a rapid decline in the ratio of foreign trade to GNP. But this decline was not because the Turkish economy was becoming less dependent on foreign resources. On the contrary, agricultural production was falling at a time when foreign loans could no longer be obtained. This situation was strangling foreign trade. There was a continuous and sharp decline of both imports (from 1952 to 1959) and exports (from 1953 to 1958); afterward these two items started to recover but never reached the 1953 level during this period.

Another reason for the decline was the overvaluation of the Turkish currency. The official value of the lira was 108% higher than its real value (Sönmez 2001, p. 94). As explained earlier, the steadily increasing GNP was not rising all that much in real terms. The increased GNP seen in the statistics was due to inflation, while the increased dollar value of foreign trade was because the official price of the dollar was kept artificially low. In other words, in real terms the GNP was not increasing, while foreign trade was declining.

# An Unsatisfactory Model for Borrowing: 1958

Turkey's poor economic condition led it to seek new foreign loans. In 1952 Turkey had drawn \$355 million from the IMF and its foreign debt to GNP ratio was at the acceptable level of 7.42%. But in the period from 1950 to 1954 there was excessive printing of money, and the economy suffered from the debilitating effect of liberalization. The reserves accumulated over the years by CHP governments had been exhausted in less than two years. The shortage of inputs and drought had also reduced agricultural production. The economy was face to face with a crisis, and relations with the IMF came under severe strain. In 1954 the IMF recommended a devaluation to relieve inflationary pressures and eliminate the deficit in foreign accounts. In a year when he was facing an election, Menderes rejected the IMF's recommendation and maintained the previous course even after the election. By 1957 Turkey was insolvent. The saying started circulating that "Turkey could not even afford to import a single horseshoe nail" (Gürsel, vol. 2, pp. 495-96).

The government eventually submitted its first letter of intent to the IMF on 4 August 1958, accepting a substantial devaluation of the Turkish lira. In 1956 the government had refused to devalue the lira from 2.80 TL to the dollar to 6. Now it was devaluing the lira to the level

of 9 TL to the dollar. At the same time, it negotiated the rescheduling of debts amounting to \$600 million and received \$250 million in new loans. Instead of implementing the new rate of exchange in all transactions, however, the government applied a tax of 6.20 TL to the old rate in a good number of transactions. This is why the exchange rate appears as 2.80 in Table 4-2 for 1958 and 1959 and the calculations are based on this rate. After the May 1960 military coup, the tax on foreign exchange was annulled and the exchange rate fixed at TL 9. The exchange rate in Table 4-2 for 1960 appears as TL 4.73 as an annual average for the purpose of converting GNP to dollars. In compliance with the letter of intent, the government brought the printing of money under control, raised the prices of the products of state economic enterprises, promised to balance the budget, and introduced tax increases.

These measures eventually came to be known as "IMF recipes." Actually, the agreement concluded by Menderes was almost identical to the proposals made by the British delegation that came to Turkey in 1854 when the Ottoman Empire was seeking a British loan. Lord V. H. Hobart and Mr. N. H. Foster called for an immediate cut in public spending and an end to the printing of banknotes. Over the medium term, there would have to be reductions in the number of civil servants and reform of the judiciary to combat corruption (Emine Kıray, "Turkish Debt and Conditionality in Historical Perspective: A Comparison of the 1980s and the 1860s," in The Political Economy of Turkey, ed. Torun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990], quoted in Attila Sönmez, "IMF ve Türkiye: Lütfen Sızlanmayı Bırakalım," Dünya, 3 April 2001).

When the Menderes government overcame the 1958 setback, it quickly forgot its commitments to the IMF and went back to its spendthrift ways. Turkey became the first country to exceed its IMF quota in borrowing and to seek a rescheduling of debts when payments became due. In 1958 the volume of its debt repayments in arrears equaled its total export earnings for that year (Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey, vol. 1 New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974], p. 30, quoted in Sönmez 2001, pp. 95-96). Meanwhile the industrialization policies based on import substitution that previously had been abandoned came into effect once again out of sheer necessity. When the supply of imported goods dried up, local production came to the rescue. But this industrialization was on a smaller scale than that which took place from 1923 to 1939. Furthermore, the financial incentives, inputs below real cost, and

subsidies provided to industrialists contributed to the growing budget deficits.

The 1958 crisis established an undesirable precedent for the crises that would follow. First, the form of borrowing had changed fundamentally. As in the days of the Ottomans, borrowing was being resorted to in order to repay past loans and cover deficits. Second, starting in 1958, relations with the IMF were strained by irresponsible policies. Fiscal discipline was relaxed as soon as there was temporary relief. The government approached the IMF too late, when the economy was already in dire straits, which meant an agreement reached under the worst possible circumstances. The IMF corrective measures would be applied belatedly and even then half-heartedly. The tendency was always there to return to the bad old ways at the first sign of an improvement in the economy's performance (Sönmez 1999, pp. 59–60).

The poor performance of the economy had a very negative social impact on the masses. Agriculture was adversely affected after 1954, when tractors became inoperable owing to the shortage of imported spare parts. There was an accelerating exodus of peasants from the countryside to urban areas, reminiscent of the migrations that took place in Britain in the nineteenth century. In Britain the migrants took up jobs in industry, whereas in Turkey the development strategies of the Marshall Plan and of the Menderes government had not provided for industrialization. The result was the growth of squatter settlements in the periphery of cities and armies of unemployed people.

#### **B.** Politics

The characteristic feature of this period was that politics developed in a direction and manner that reflected the special circumstances of the time. There was a deep sense of isolation in Turkey after the war and an acute awareness of the Soviet threat, made worse by the harping on the subject by the Western media. Necmettin Sadak, later to become minister of foreign affairs, described the situation as "a war of nerves" (*Ayın Tarihi* 148 [March 1946]: 66, quoted in Oran, p. 60).

The prevailing mood was one of anxiety, even fear. Turkey had categorically rejected the Soviet notes on 22 August and 18 October 1946 and was now seeking the support of the West. In order to become a founding member of the UN, Turkey had declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945. After this, politics developed along two different tracks.

In the first track, a process of liberalization both in the

economy and in politics became clearly discernible. The National Development Party was established on 7 September 1945, followed by the Democratic Party on 7 January 1946. The import of automobiles was permitted, starting on 15 February. On 11 May 1946 the title of "National Leader" attached to President İnönü's name was removed from the CHP's charter. On 5 June the ban on political parties based on class was lifted. On 12 June universities were granted autonomy. On 7 September a devaluation of the currency was carried out, to pave the way to membership in the IMF. On 11 March 1947 Turkey became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. The Truman Doctrine was proclaimed the next day, and the agreement concerning the aid to be received within the framework of this program was signed on 12 July. On the same day, President İnönü made his "12 July Declaration," in which he promised equal treatment to opposition parties. On 13 November it was decided at the CHP's congress to relax the strict implementation of statism and secularism.

In the second track, there was a progressive increase in McCarthyism as well as in "religious tolerance," which signified a deviation from strict secularism (laicism). On 4 December 1945 the premises of the left-wing newspaper Tan, as well as a number of publishing houses identified as leftist, were vandalized. On 15 December four academics in the Faculty of Languages, History, and Geography were suspended. On 11 December 1946 calls were made in the TGNA to rid the university of all leftists. On 16 December two leftist parties and two workers' associations were closed down. On 27 January 1947 the ban on the teaching of religion outside of schools was lifted. In the course of the debate in the TGNA on 29 January, minister of the interior Şükrü Sökmensüer labeled certain magazines published by professors as Communist, while minister of education R. S. Sirer was holding talks with those who were calling for the dismissal of these professors. Kenan Öner, the chairman of the İstanbul branch of the Democratic Party, accused Hasan Ali Yücel, the former minister of education who had founded the Village Institutes (rural schools where boys and girls in their late teens were trained as teachers and community readers) and initiated the mass publication of world classics, of being a Communist. Yücel sued Öner for slander on 17 April but received no backing from his party, the CHP, during the trial.

After this, the fear of being labeled Communist prevented liberal and progressive views from being expressed, as in the case of the McCarthy investigations in the U.S. On 18 April students in İzmir wrecked Mehmet Ali Aybar's Zincirli Hürriyet (Shackled Freedom) printing press (in

1962 Aybar would become the leader of the Turkish Labor Party). On 2 July permission was given to establish religion courses. The Ministry of Education was destroyed in a big fire on 23 December, and the perpetrators were alleged to have been Communists. On 27 December a number of students went to the lecture of Professor Pertev Naili Boratav, a well-known folklorist, with the intention of causing a riot and forced the rector, Şevket Aziz Kansu, to resign after threatening to throw him out of the window. On 11 January 1948 the University of Ankara fired P.N. Boratav, Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes, Mediha Berkes, Adnan Cemgil, and Azra Erhat (all renowned humanists and social scientists of the time). On 11 June Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu (one of the founders of social psychology, known in the U.S. as Muzafer Sherif) was also sacked, and all of the positions held by these academics were eliminated by the TGNA to prevent them from returning. On 2 April the author Sabahattin Ali was murdered on the frontier by intelligence forces, as would be learned later. On 4 June the Faculty of Divinity was established in Ankara. On 25 November elective religious courses were introduced in primary schools. On 15 January 1949 courses for preachers were established in ten provinces. On 28 March the executor of the Village Institutes project, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, was shifted to a new job: giving drawing lessons in a high school. On 2 May the mass arrest of Communists began. On 14 May 1950 the Democratic Party came to power. On 16 June it was announced that the call to prayer, made in Turkish since 1932, would be made in Arabic again. The president and secretary-general of the Turkish Peace Association were arrested on 29 July for opposing Turkey's participation in the Korean War. Each was subsequently sentenced to forty-five months of imprisonment. On 25 August the head of the Religious Affairs Department declared that Islam rejected communism. The Turkish brigade left for Korea on 28 September. On 21 October courses of religion became compulsory in primary schools. On 14 December leftist students studying abroad saw their foreign exchange allocations canceled. On 26 October 1951 there was a further mass arrest of Communists. On 18 February 1952 Turkey joined NATO.

It was at this point, when America was perceived as a "savior," that the battleship *Missouri* cast anchor in Istanbul on 5 April 1946, bearing the body of ambassador Münir Ertegün, who had died sixteen months earlier at his post in Washington. This was a highly symbolic visit demonstrating that the U.S. was ready to back Turkey. President Inönü remarked that "the closer American ships come to Turkey, the better" (*Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı*, p. 296).

In this atmosphere, the bureaucracy saw the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948 as underpinning the country's security, while the new bourgeoisie regarded the links to the U.S. as a safety net and a guarantee for obtaining loans. Except for the insignificant leftist opposition, all segments of society welcomed the American connection. In 1954 C.B. Randall, the president of the U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Commission, prepared the draft of the Law for the Promotion of Foreign Investments (LPFI) while Max Ball, a legal advisor of the international petroleum companies, prepared the draft of the Petroleum Law (PL). Both of these drafts were milestones in this period of economic and political change. The LPFI opened up agriculture and commerce to foreign investments. Article 10 provided that "foreign investments would enjoy all of the rights, immunities, and privileges enjoyed by local capital." The equality of treatment claimed by giant foreign firms meant in practice that they would be acquiring a privileged position in the market. The PL was a straightforward concession law. Under article 2, the state gave up its right to prospect for oil or to produce it. Only the private sector was allowed to be active in these fields, so the state's oil-producing agency, the Turkish Petroleum Company, had the status of a joint stock company. Under article 136, this law could only be amended with the approval of the foreign oil companies.

When the draft of the LPFI came to the TGNA, the opposition came out against some of its provisions. The word "privileges" in article 10 was changed to "facilities," and article 136 of the PL was removed at the insistence of the opposition. The debates in the TGNA gave an indication of the philosophy and inclination of the Democratic Party (Avc10ğlu, pp. 324–26).

#### III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

After the war, the U.S. became Turkey's most important trading partner. Britain remained a major trading partner until 1950. From 1945 to 1948 these two countries accounted for about 40 to 50% of Turkey's foreign trade.

Around 1950 Germany replaced Britain as Turkey's second trading partner and maintained this position until 1960. From 1954 to 1960 more than one-third of Turkey's foreign trade was conducted with the U.S. and Germany. In the 1950s Britain, Germany, and especially the U.S. were in the forefront in providing Turkey with financial assistance. From 1960 to 1980 Germany was to overtake the U.S. and become Turkey's first trading partner.

The table showing Turkey's foreign trade (Table 4-3) reflects the country's dependence on the West. As indi-

cated above, Turkey felt very isolated after the war and found the international environment extremely threatening. In these circumstances it was only natural for Turkey's foreign policy decisions to be fully aligned with the West. Turkey had never been able to join any alliance since the Ottoman Empire with the ease with which it joined NATO, with hardly a single dissenting domestic voice.

Taking this radical step posed no difficulties in the circumstances. International and domestic conditions aside, Turkey had been moving toward the West for centuries. Russia had been the threat throughout history. Greece and Iran were in a somewhat similar situation, with a covert Soviet threat in the form of Soviet infiltration, while the threat to Turkey was overt and external. This was the same threat confronting the West. Furthermore, the U.S. was not perceived as imperialistic.

In former times Turkey would have hesitated for fear of becoming a satellite; but now, unlike Greece, it joined NATO without first going through the process of a national debate. During this period the only foreign policy issue that created any controversy was the decision to send a brigade to Korea without first seeking parliamentary approval. These circumstances prevailed for about ten years when foreign policy remained outside the scope of party politics (Hale, p. 120).

The difference between Turkey and its neighbors Greece and Iran was most probably due to the fact that these countries had not suffered from profiteering and the black market to the same extent as Turkey had. This led the class structure to develop in such a way that, unlike in Greece and Iran, a powerful anti-Communist sentiment in Turkey persisted even after the USSR underwent important changes.

After the NATO and Korean decisions, foreign policy decisions were made in a steadily deteriorating political and economic situation. At first Turkey had sided with the Arabs at the UN; but in 1948 it voted for the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. In 1948 Archbishop Athenagoras, a U.S. citizen, was allowed to take over as Patriarch of Phanar. In 1949 Ankara stayed away from the Congress of Asian States. After 1950 it supported Britain on the Cyprus question. After 1954 it voted to keep the Algerian question off the agenda at the UN. In 1955 it helped set up the Baghdad Pact and incurred the wrath of most Arab countries. In 1955 Turkey attended the Bandung Conference at America's request and offended the developing countries by defending U.S. interests. It sided with Britain and France during the Suez crisis of 1956 and almost provoked a war during the Syrian crisis in 1957. In 1958 Turkey allowed the U.S. to use NATO bases to transport troops

Table 4-3. Share of Selected Countries in Turkey's Foreign Trade, 1945–1960 (%)

| TIVE                       | IMPORTS    | 41.5 | 55.1 | 62.2 | 61.4         | 51.8 | 62.2 | 65.1 | 63.1       | 59.1 | 52.8 | 57.4 | 64.0 | 64.4 | 64.6 | 62.9 | 68.0 |
|----------------------------|------------|------|------|------|--------------|------|------|------|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TOTAL OF FIVE<br>COUNTRIES | EXPORTS II | 60.2 | 44.3 | 55.3 | 52.3         | 49.5 | 61.8 | 67.0 | 87.8       | 60.3 | 51.3 | 53.8 | 59.3 | 63.9 | 57.8 | 63.0 | 56.5 |
|                            | IMPORTS BX | 0.0  | 4.3  | 14.0 | 9.0          | 5.0  | 4.7  | 7.0  | 7.1        | 7.1  | 4.8  | 3.6  | 6.4  | 9.2  | 11.1 | 7.1  | 6.4  |
| TALL                       | Å.         |      |      |      | Alice<br>No. |      |      |      |            |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|                            | S EXPORTS  | 1.0  | 25   | 10.6 | 6.4          | 1.6  | . s. | 4.2  | 7.1        | 13.2 | 6.2  | 8.1  | 10.1 | 0.6  | 5.8  | 8.3  | 8.6  |
| BRITAIN                    | IMPORTS    | 23.3 | 18.9 | 12.6 | 24.3         | 17.2 | 10.4 | 16.9 | 17.8       | 13.7 | 8.7  | 7.8  | 8.2  | 7.7  | 7.2  | 11.0 | 11.3 |
| 181                        | EXPORTS    | 14.9 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 14.7         | 12.3 | 14.0 | 8.3  | 9.9        | 6,9  | 6.9  | 7.4  | 7.6  | 9.2  | 9.9  | 9.6  | 9.7  |
| NCE                        | IMPORTS    | 0.0  | 0.7  | 2.3  | 4.2          | 5.5  | 5.0  | 5.6  | <b>4.8</b> | 6.1  | 7.0  | 6.0  | 7.4  | 3.2  | 2.9  | 3.7  | 3.5  |
| FRANCE                     | EXPORTS    | 1.4  | 4.5  | 4.5  | 5.7          | 5.2  | 4.3  | 9.9  | 14.4       | 4.6  | 3.0  | 7.1  | 5,3  | 6.8  | 7.6  | 4.7  | 5.1  |
| USA GERMANY*               | IMPORTS    | 9.0  | 0.0  | 0.2  | 0.7          | 3.9  | 17.6 | 23.6 | 25.0       | 20.9 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 23.6 | 13.6 | 15.5 | 17.8 | 21.0 |
|                            | EXPORTS    |      | 0.0  | 0.2  | 3.8          | 16.1 | 21.1 | 26.6 | 23.7       | 15.3 | 17.8 | 15.7 | 16.6 | 12.9 | 18.3 | 22.5 | 14.8 |
|                            | IMPORTS    | 17.6 | 31.2 | 33.3 | 23.2         | 20.2 | 24.5 | 12.0 | 8.4        | 11.3 | 15.0 | 22.4 | 21.1 | 30.7 | 27.9 | 26.3 | 25.8 |
|                            | EXPORTS    | 43.8 | 21.5 | 23.6 | 21.7         | 14.3 | 16.9 | 21.3 | 16.0       | 20.3 | 17.4 | 15.5 | 16.7 | 26.0 | 19.5 | 17.9 | 18.3 |
|                            | YEAR       | 1945 | 1946 | 1947 | 1948         | 1949 | 1950 | 1981 | 1952       | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 |

Source: Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923–1998, pp. 418–30. \* From to 1960, data relate to West Germany. (Compiled and interpreted by Hiltmet Uluğbay)

to Lebanon, and F. R. Zorlu expressed "the hope that the operation would be extended to Iraq" (Gerger, p. 87). In 1960 it provoked the USSR with the U-2 incident and the military bases established on its soil. In the Cuban crisis of 1962 Turkey was in danger of suffering a nuclear attack.

## IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

# From the Perspective of Joining NATO

1. It is generally accepted that the main reason for Turkey's joining NATO was the Soviet threat. There is no point in considering whether Stalin actually had the intention or the capability to move against Turkey, because in international relations perception is important: Turkey perceived a very real danger stemming from the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the generally held belief still prevalent in Turkey, the notion that the country was saved from the Soviet threat by U.S. action is erroneous.

Leaving aside the 1939 Saracoğlu mission to Moscow and the note of 19 March 1945, the latest date at which Soviet pressure was actually felt was 7 June 1945, when Molotov and Sarper met. The first sign of U.S. support for Turkey, however, was not until 5 April 1946, when the Missouri arrived in İstanbul. During the intervening ten months, Turkey had successfully stood against the USSR all by itself.

It is also worth considering whether the arrival of the Missouri was of much significance. The Soviets started submitting their notes to Ankara four months after the battleship's arrival, with the first note bearing the date 7 August 1946. The Missouri clearly had not deterred the LISSE

Finally, if we accept the Truman Doctrine as the beginning of U.S. involvement, this doctrine was proclaimed on 12 March 1947, five months after the last Soviet note was rejected by Turkey on 18 October 1946. The actual implementation of the Truman Doctrine began nine months after the note's rejection, on 12 July 1947.

2. It must be accepted that the circumstances in which Turkey joined NATO made it difficult for a strategic medium power like Turkey to pursue a policy independent of the blocs (see the concept of the "Aron paradigm" in "The Military, Political, and Economic Background of Turkish Foreign Policy" in the Introduction). We know that NATO did not pressure Turkey to join the alliance. On the contrary, there was considerable opposition to Turkey's membership from Britain and the Scandinavian members. Turkey had made an unsuccessful bid to join when NATO was in the process of being formed in November 1948 (Hale, p. 116) and subsequently on 11 May

1950 and 1 August 1950 (Sander 1979, pp. 70 and 76). All of these bids were turned down. Clearly, it was Turkey that was eager for membership. In order to attain this objective Turkey participated in the Korean War and lost 721 men there. Developments were influenced not by the international system but by Turkey's social and psychological makeup and its class structure that made use of it.

It would be wrong to attribute Turkey's economic woes to NATO, however. NATO can be perceived as restricting Turkey's independence, but it did not prevent Turkey from developing from a peripheral to a semi-peripheral position. Although the U.S. did not want to see Turkey industrialized during this period, Turkey's economic difficulties were essentially the result of its unplanned and haphazard economic policies.

3. Another reason why NATO membership received widespread support at the time was the belief that this would help bring democracy to Turkey. Many today support Turkey's accession to the European Union for precisely the same reason. On this basis it can even be concluded that a yearning for a better democracy can lead a country to join international groupings without too much questioning or caution.

A week after the decision to send a military contingent to Korea, Turkey made its second application to join NATO. NATO's response was that Turkey could not become a full member but would be accepted as an associate member. Ankara considered this to be second-class membership and turned down the offer (Hale, p. 118).

4. According to William Hale, Menderes had a "phobia of communism that exceeded even Dulles's phobia," and this led him to pursue a foreign policy that constrained Turkey's independence. It would be erroneous, however, to seek the reason for this phobia in Menderes's psychological makeup. The reason was that the economically bankrupt regime was seeking to obtain foreign aid and foreign loans by constantly overplaying the Communist menace. Even when the Soviet policies changed radically, Turkey refused to see this, acted as if the nonaligned movement did not exist, and did everything to sharpen the differences arising from the Cold War. Only after losing his last hope for further Western credits did Menderes make a U-turn and start planning an official visit to Moscow.

# From the Perspective of the General Nature of Foreign Policy

1. In the broadest sense, this period is the antithesis of the two preceding periods from 1923 to 1939 and from 1939 to 1945. Those two periods reflected a degree of relative

autonomy, while this third period did not. This period was the direct result of the policies pursued during the war and the accumulation of capital. In this respect, it resembles the Özal period starting in 1980, but with a difference. From 1945 to 1960 the effects of the war years (that is, the external dynamics) led to excessive dependence on outsiders, whereas in the post-1980 period internal dynamics (that is, the mistakes of the period from 1960 to 1980) led to external dependence.

2. Turkish foreign policy during the Menderes period followed the traditional Western orientation but veered from the usual pro-status quo foreign policy based on balancing conflicting outside influences. The Menderes policies disregarded the balances between East and West as well as the balances within the West. Turkey's foreign policy confined itself to following the American line exclusively, without taking into account international developments. This drastically reduced Turkey's freedom of maneuver.

Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy under Menderes steered away from its traditional regard for legitimacy and its traditional caution. An active foreign policy was pursued without much concern for the risks involved. A medium-sized power with a key geostrategic location should have paid more attention to following a cautious line.

From this point of view, the Menderes period was the precursor of the Özal period.

BASKIN ORAN

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# Relations with the USSR

# I. TENSION IN RELATIONS (1945–1953) A. The USSR after the War

Following World War II, the USSR went through a period of drastic restructuring in its economy, its federation, its armed forces, its party, and its politics.

The Soviet economy had suffered grievous losses during the war. Depending on the source, 20 to 27 million Soviet citizens perished in the conflict. With the transfer of thousands of factories to the east during the war, new industrial centers emerged throughout the land. The first step in the postwar restructuring was the launching in March 1946 of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. While the objectives of the plan in the field of heavy industry were largely attained, the results in the fields of agriculture and consumer goods were far from satisfactory. Even in 1950 agricultural production had not reached the level attained in 1940. In the course of the restructuring, the antireligious policies that had been relaxed during the war were resumed. The languages of the nationalities began to be written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and their histories were rewritten. On 25 February 1946 the Red Army was renamed the Soviet Army. The party too was reorganized. The word "Bolshevik" was discarded from the party's name at the 19th Party Congress, held in October 1952. (The previous congress had been held in 1939.) Important changes were made in the party structure: all power was now concentrated in Stalin's hands, while differences emerged among his subordinates. The ideology that prevailed after the war was known as Zhdanovism.

The wartime alliance with the U.S. had created a degree of sympathy toward that country, especially among Soviet intellectuals. After the war, A. A. Zhdanov worked hard to eradicate all traces of this. His sudden death in 1948 unleashed an ideological battle within the party. One group, headed by G. M. Malenkov, was for improving relations with the West. The other group, headed by L. P. Beria, the chief of the secret police, would prevail.

In the field of foreign policy, America's possession of the atomic bomb had a critical influence on the actions of the USSR. Having suffered enormous economic losses and casualties during the war, the main concern of the Soviet Union in these postwar years was security. The USSR was able to overcome its fears on 25 September 1949, when the Soviet news agency TASS (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza) informed the world that the USSR had successfully tested an atomic bomb on 29 August.

After the atomic bomb, another factor that influenced Soviet foreign policy was the appearance of the new socialist regimes, first in Europe and then in Asia. The USSR was eager to become the leader of these countries and soon succeeded in this through the creation of the Cominform in September 1947 and of the COMECON in October 1949. All of the countries of Eastern Europe came under Soviet influence, with the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia. Both of these countries had been able to end the occupation of their countries through their own efforts. When the People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949, the "socialist bloc" acquired the potential to challenge the capitalist system in every field.

Another factor that helped shape Soviet foreign policy after World War II was the policy of containment conceived in the Cold War period (see Box 4-4 below). The USSR tried by every means to frustrate this policy pursued by the West under U.S. leadership. After the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, followed by the establishment of NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Balkan Pact, and the Baghdad Pact, the foreign policy of the USSR was largely shaped by security concerns. Soviet territory had been occupied twice all the way to Moscow. Moscow's compelling desire to establish a "security belt" against the West has been used to explain the tight Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.

# B. The Soviet Demands on Turkey and Their Consequences

The developments following World War II caused almost irreparable damage to Turkey's relations with the USSR and affected bilateral relations for many years.

On 19 March 1945, seven weeks before the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7 May 1945, V. M. Molotov handed Ambassador Sarper a note informing him that the USSR would not extend the 1925 treaty (see "The Molotov-Sarper Meeting and the Soviet Note of 19 March 1945" in Section 3). It will be recalled that the 1925 treaty was extended for two years by the 1929 protocol, for a further five years by the protocol signed on 30 October 1931, and for ten more years by the protocol signed on 7 November 1935. When Molotov notified Sarper of Moscow's denunciation of the treaty, he stressed that conditions had changed fundamentally in the postwar period. He added that the USSR was prepared to start talks on concluding a new agreement in line with the changed conditions.

Turkey had feared such a development all along. Now the USSR would demand a say in the future regime of the Straits before it would agree to conclude a new treaty. The situation had changed completely since 1939, and Moscow now had the upper hand. A month earlier, at Yalta, Stalin had told Roosevelt that the Montreux Straits Convention had become outdated. Roosevelt reacted with the remark that the Soviet view "made sense."

Turkey replied to the 19 March note on 4 April and inquired about the Soviet conditions for a new treaty. This was followed by talks at the ambassadorial level. On 7 June 1945 Molotov received Sarper and informed him of the Soviet conditions for the treaty.

As will be remembered (see Box 3-6 in Section 3), Molotov first dealt with the 1921 treaty and started talking about "repairing the injustice of 1921." He pointed out that the Soviet Union had been weak at the time and that the frontier traced by the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 16 March 1921 should now be revised by ceding the districts of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey to the USSR. Sarper's reply to this Soviet demand was firm: "The 1921 treaty itself was designed to repair a previous injustice and was signed by Lenin himself. The USSR needs neither more land nor more people. It is not worth alienating Turkey and losing its goodwill with such claims. In any case, the issue is nonnegotiable." Although the Brest-Litovsk Treaty returned Kars and Ardahan to the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the provinces were actually transferred to Turkey only in 1921, which Sarper had in mind when he referred to redressing an injustice. Sarper's dispatch to Ankara contained the following passage: "I do not consider that the Soviets will cut off negotiations; nor will they insist on territorial concessions. They have advanced these claims only as a negotiating tactic" (İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları [1939–1946], p. 267).

After this, Molotov dealt with the Straits, declaring that "the fate of 200 million people depended on the ac-

tions of just Turkey alone." Sarper replied: "[I]f what you are saying implies Soviet bases in the Straits, this is out of the question." Molotov complained that the Montreux Convention was out of date and had to be changed. Sarper reminded Molotov that this was a multilateral compact and that the other signatories had to be consulted (Gürün, pp. 283–86).

By making these claims, the USSR committed a serious tactical error. Its real purpose was to ensure its security in relation to the Straits. By raising territorial issues, it hardened Turkey's position on the Straits and pushed it closer to the U.S.

On 18 June Molotov received Sarper one more time and repeated the Soviet claims. Thus the possibility of concluding a friendship treaty between the USSR and Turkey to replace the 1925 treaty was completely lost.

To apply pressure on Turkey in connection with the Straits, the USSR kept demanding territorial concessions. The Soviet demands were incorporated in the decisions adopted on the solemn occasion of the election of the Armenian patriarch at Etchmiazin. By this means the USSR sought to influence the U.S. through the Armenian diaspora living in America.

#### The Soviet Demands at Potsdam

At the Postdam Conference held by the Allies from 17 July to 2 August 1945, the Soviet claims were taken up once agair. The main topics at Potsdam were the Polish question, Germany's frontiers, the progress of the war in the Pacific theater, and war reparations. The question of the Straits came up at informal talks. At dinner on 18 July Stalin informed Churchill that an alliance between Turkey and the USSR was possible only following the settlement of differences but that Turkey was refusing to cede Kars and Ardahan to the USSR or to discuss revising the Montreux Convention (Churchill, vol. 6, p. 549). On 23 July Stalin asked Churchill whether it would be possible to obtain a base for the USSR at Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) in Greece if it proved impossible to gain a fortified position in the Marmara Sea. This clearly revealed Stalin's intention of gaining control of the Straits for the USSR. Churchill replied that he would support an arrangement in the Straits that would accommodate Soviet wishes but only on condition that Turkey's territorial integrity was not violated. He also stressed that a revision of the Montreux Convention had to be carried out within a multilateral framework.

Stalin responded by handing out a text calling for the termination of the Montreux Convention, the ensuring of security in the Straits jointly by Turkey and the USSR,

and the establishment of Soviet bases to allow the USSR to assume its share of the responsibility for security in the waterway. In addition, he also demanded revisions in the Turkish-Soviet frontier. Churchill indicated that the demand for a base was unacceptable. Stalin responded with these words: "The result is that a small country with British backing is allowed to apply pressure on the throat of a major power and deny it free access to the world." Paragraph 16 of the protocol adopted at the end of the Potsdam Conference stated that the three governments had agreed that the Montreux Convention no longer suited the new conditions and had to be revised, but there was no joint decision on how the convention would be updated. It was therefore decided that each government would take up the question with Turkey through bilateral channels.

Unlike Churchill, who stressed the need to respect Turkey's territorial integrity, Harry Truman felt that the territorial issue had to be settled by the Turks and the Russians between themselves (Truman, pp. 415–16). In summary, Turkey had not been able to secure the backing of the West in the early stages of the postwar negotiations between the USSR and the West and was quite alone in confronting the Soviet demands.

It has been claimed that the Russian and English versions of paragraph 16 (regarding the Straits) of the protocol signed on 1 August at Potsdam differed somewhat and allowed for different interpretations. The English version stated that each of the three signatories would submit to Turkey its views on the Straits regime on an individual basis, while the Russian version stated that each of the signatories would negotiate the regime of the Straits with Turkey individually (OTDP, p. 196). In the Soviet documents, the text reads "direct negotiations with Turkey on an individual basis" (Vneshnaya Politika SSSR: Sbornik Dokumentov, p. 444). Veteran diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin, who served as minister of foreign affairs and was an expert on the Straits and relations with the USSR, agrees with this interpretation.

# The Article of the Georgian Professors

During this interval, public opinion in both countries was becoming aroused. On 4 December 1945 an anti-Soviet demonstration was organized in İstanbul. The demonstrators ransacked two bookstores selling Russian books and wrecked the premises of the leftist newspaper *Tan* while the police stood by and watched. On 8 December the USSR delivered a note condemning the demonstrations. These attacks would be recalled as "the events of the *Tan* press" in later years.

Two professors, members of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, later wrote an article on the subject of territo-

rial claims entitled "Our Legitimate Claims on Turkey." It was first published in the newspaper Komunisti in Tbilisi on 14 December 1945 and later republished in the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya on 20 December. The article ended with these sentences: "The Georgian people must reclaim the territories they never gave up and never shall. These include the lands grabbed from Georgia, known as Eastern Lazistan, consisting of Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Tortum, İspir, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, and the Giresun and Trabzon regions." In 1948 and 1949 scholarly articles supporting the Soviet claims followed. On 9 March 1946 Ambassador S.A. Vinogradov met with Prime Minister Saracoğlu to complain about personal attacks directed at Soviet public figures appearing in the Turkish press and demand that they be prevented. When Saracoğlu asked whether the Soviet Union had retracted its claims, the ambassador replied that Molotov had advanced these claims and only he could retract them.

The events surrounding the claims during the period from March 1945 to August 1946 can be summarized as follows. The Soviets advanced their claims through Molotov, without putting anything down in written form. Because nothing was done formally, the U.S. and Britain were at first hesitant about taking an official position on the subject. The USSR then raised the issue with Britain and the U.S. at the Potsdam Conference, but no decision was reached. Although the international press took up the question, no official statement on the subject emerged from the Turkish government. In this way, Turkey gave the USSR the opportunity to abandon its claims without loss of face.

### The Battle of Notes

In line with the decision taken at Potsdam, the first note delivered to Turkey came from the U.S. on 2 November 1945. The U.S. was proposing the following amendments to the Montreux Convention:

(1) The Straits must remain open to all merchant vessels at all times; (2) the Straits must remain open to the transit passage of warships of the littoral states of the Black Sea; (3) the Straits must remain closed at all times to the warships of nonriparian states of the Black Sea above an agreed tonnage, unless a littoral state has granted its special consent or the warships are on a mission on behalf of the United Nations; (4) the League of Nations must be replaced by the United Nations and Japan must be excluded from the signatories of the revised convention.

The U.S. was also proposing the convening of an international conference to carry out these changes. Turkey was not happy with the proposal that Black Sea riparian states should have the right to use the Straits freely in time of war. This was because in the event of Turkish neutrality in time of war Soviet warships sailing into the Mediterranean might be pursued into the Straits by other warships on their return journey. There might even be naval engagements within the region of the Straits, causing embarrassment to Turkey and compromising its neutrality. A British note with a similar content followed the U.S. note.

The first Soviet note, which led to important developments in Turkish-Soviet relations, was delivered on 8 August 1946. A copy of this note was also sent to the U.S., which answered it on 19 August (see "The Visit of the Missouri and Turkish-American Rapprochement" in the chapter "Relations with the USA and NATO" below).

The events of the last war have clearly proven that the regime of the Straits established by the Montreux Convention signed in 1936 no longer corresponds to the security interests of the Black Sea states; nor does it meet the conditions that would prevent the Straits from being used to the detriment of Black Sea states... The Conference of the three states held in Berlin took the following decisions... For its part, the Soviet government is proposing a new regime for the Straits based on these principles.

(1) The Straits shall remain open to the merchant vessels of all states at all times; (2) the Straits shall remain open at all times to the warships of Black Sea states; (3) the passage through the Straits of warships of non-Black Sea states shall be forbidden except for special cases; (4) the establishment of the regime of the Straits, the natural waterway for entering and exiting the Black Sea, should be the exclusive responsibility of Turkey and the other riparian states of the Black Sea; (5) Turkey and the USSR are the countries most interested in the freedom of commercial navigation through the Straits and also the most capable of ensuring their security, so they should jointly undertake their defense to prevent the waterway from being used by others against the interests of Black Sea riparian states.

Even before Turkey replied to the Soviet note, the U.S. responded on 19 August and Britain on 21 August. Both countries were against the Soviet proposal that the regime of the Straits be formulated exclusively by the

Black Sea states. They also stressed that the defense of the Straits was Turkey's responsibility.

Turkey's reply was delivered on 22 August. In the Turkish note, the first issue taken up was the Soviet contention that certain ships passing through the Straits during World War II had violated the terms of the convention. The circumstances surrounding each case were expounded in the Turkish note, which reminded Moscow that the USSR had made no complaint during the war regarding the passage of any vessel through the Straits. Turkey accepted the proposal to convene an international conference to revise the Montreux Convention to bring it into line with technological developments and prevailing conditions. Turkey also accepted the first three Soviet proposals but declared that the fourth and fifth proposals were unacceptable. "The 4th point in the Soviet Note would establish a new regime of the Straits to be drawn up exclusively by Turkey and other Black Sea states and leave all the other interested states out... As for the 5th point, this Soviet proposal would restrict Turkey's sovereign rights, something Turkey would never agree to, and also endanger its security."

On 24 September the USSR submitted a note with a similar content. Moscow defended its fourth point by reminding Turkey that the Black Sea was an enclosed sea and that, under the terms of the treaty of 1921, Ankara had accepted the proposition that the status of the Straits would be determined by the Black Sea riparian states. The USSR also insisted on its fifth point. "The Soviet government is of the opinion that the implementation of its proposal would in no way constrain Turkey's sovereignty, and that the measures taken jointly by Turkey and the USSR to defend the Straits would be more effective than Turkey's single-handed measures, thus enhancing Turkey's security."

The second Soviet note also drew an American and a British response on 9 October, even though it had not been forwarded to Washington and London. These responses stated that it was time to end the correspondence underway in accordance with the decision made at Potsdam. This was followed by Turkey's response on 18 October. This response was forwarded to all of the signatories of the Montreux Convention, with the exclusion of Japan, in order to inform them of an eventual international conference.

In its notes, the USSR had raised four issues: (1) the decisions reached at Potsdam; (2) Turkey's alleged failure to carry out its responsibilities during World War II; (3) the inadequacy of the current regime of the Straits; and (4) its proposals for a new regime. Each of these issues was addressed in Turkey's reply.

The exchange of notes regarding the Straits was followed by the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. aid that came with it. In 1948 the USSR consolidated its grip over Eastern Europe, while Turkey participated in the Marshall Plan.

As soon as the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, the Soviet press launched a campaign against it. This was followed by a campaign against the Marshall Plan in the following year. The USSR was deeply suspicious of Turkey's efforts to join NATO and of its support for the project to establish a Middle Eastern command. On 3 November 1951 the USSR delivered a note condemning Turkey's efforts to join NATO. Moscow notified Turkey that by joining it would become a party to NATO's aggressive objectives and would have to shoulder the consequences of this move. Moscow regarded the membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO as an aberration, because these countries were at the doorstep of the USSR, while they were far removed from the Atlantic Ocean.

Turkey responded to the Soviet note on 12 November 1951 and reminded Moscow that NATO was a defensive pact. When it joined NATO in February 1952, it became the second member country (after Norway) to have a common border with the USSR. The project to set up a Middle Eastern command also elicited a Soviet protest in the form of a note dated 24 November 1951, to which Turkey replied on 19 December. The Soviet note of 28 January 1952 would remain unanswered. By now Turkey was fully integrated in the Western Bloc.

#### The Causes of the Soviet Demands

The USSR's post-1945 claims against Turkey have been generally appraised in Turkey from a pro-American and anti-Soviet vantage point. To bring some balance to this approach, it will be useful to look into the causes of these claims and also to see the question from the Soviet point of view. Let us start with the claims on Kars and Ardahan on the eastern frontier. This was the issue that poisoned bilateral relations most; but, paradoxically, Molotov advanced the claim only verbally during his talks with Ambassador Sarper on 7 June 1945 and only as a bargaining chip in the ongoing negotiations. As noted above, Moscow would pay dearly for advancing this territorial claim.

From the Soviet point of view, the question of the Straits was primarily a security issue. The manner in which the Nazis used the Straits during the war justified Soviet concerns, based on the desire to restrict the access of outsiders to the Straits. These concerns were voiced at Lausanne in 1923, at Montreux in 1936, and in connection with the subsequent proposal for the joint defense of the

Straits during the Saracoğlu mission to Moscow in 1939. They were reiterated during the war. In February 1945 the USSR persuaded Britain and the U.S. at Yalta that the Montreux Convention must be revised, and the notes it delivered to Turkey were based on the decisions reached at Potsdam in July and August 1945. The USSR had complained that the Germans had used the Straits during the war to further their aims and was now worried that the Western powers would use the Straits to strike at its soft underbelly.

To achieve its objectives, the USSR applied pressure on Turkey and also used threats but did not resort to the use of force. In fact it was too risky to apply force against Turkey before acquiring the atomic bomb. This is why Stalin was able to give assurances to British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin on 19 December 1945 (PRO, FO 371/59242) and to the American ambassador in Moscow, W. B. Smith, in early 1947 (Bilge 1992, p. 333) that Turkey would not be attacked. After the rejection of the second Soviet note, the USSR dropped the subject altogether. Following Stalin's death in 1953, it formally declared that all of its claims had been dropped.

#### The Consequences of the Soviet Demands

From the Soviet perspective, the demands on Turkey can be regarded as a failure. Moscow failed to achieve its aspirations, while it pushed Turkey into the Western fold. Looking at the matter from Turkey's perspective, some observations are in order.

At the end of the war, Turkey took its place in the Western orbit, seriously straining its relations with the USSR, its neighbor and the leader of the opposing bloc. On this issue, there is some debate about how one development led to the other. A. Suat Bilge argues that the territorial demands pushed Turkey into the Western Bloc. "These demands drove Turkey into the Western camp, although such a move was never contemplated at the outset" (Bilge 1992, p. 352). Kamuran Gürün reaches a similar conclusion when he states that Turkey's membership in NATO would not have come up had it not been for the Soviet demands. In his view, even if Turkey had contemplated membership, it would not have been possible to obtain the USSR's consent as called for by the 1929 protocol (Gürün, p. 315).

In another view, although Turkey was able to remain neutral during the war, it was compelled to maintain half a million men under arms. Because of the Soviet threat, Turkey was unable to demobilize its army, which rendered it dependent on military aid, which in turn led to its membership in NATO (Ülman, p. 12).

Feridun Cemal Erkin is right in concluding that the Soviet demands were the result of the competition between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon powers for domination following World War II. If the USSR had succeeded in bringing Greece and Turkey under its control, it could have altered the balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This explains why the U.S. came to the aid of these two countries and Turkey came swiftly under Western influence. After joining NATO, Turkey became an important military partner of the West in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, thanks to the bases established on its soil. From Turkey's vantage point, membership in NATO was seen as a "search for security in the face of demands that jeopardized both its territorial integrity and its sovereignty" (Bilge 1983, p. 15).

Another factor was that joining the Western alliance reinforced Turkey's anti-Communist tendency (present since the foundation of the Turkish state) by adding anti-Soviet sentiment. These two overlapping anti-Communist and anti-Soviet streaks became the determining factors shaping Turkey's domestic and foreign policies.

To sum up, the USSR's demands from Turkey following World War II resulted in long-term damage to bilateral relations, which would take many years to repair.

## An Appraisal of the Soviet Demands

Within the dynamics of the Cold War, the Soviet claims were focused on the Straits and Montreux. The claims were formally advanced in 1946 and were promptly rejected by Turkey. These events caused Turkey to go through an extremely jittery period in its foreign relations. It was at this juncture that the West reassured Turkey. First, Britain notified Ankara in February 1946 that the 1939 alliance was still operative and that Britain was bound to come to Turkey's assistance in case of an attack. The second reassurance came from the U.S. when the body of the Turkish ambassador in Washington, Münir Ertegün, was sent to İstanbul on board the battleship Missouri in April 1946. Despite a generally held but erroneous view, the Turkish government resisted the Soviet demands regarding the Straits not with American backing but on its own. This situation was clearly explained by Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, a professor of political history and director-general of the press and broadcasting from 1949 to 1954, writing in the context of the 1964 Johnson letter (see the next chapter):

The years 1945 and 1946 were the most perilous times for Turkey. Ankara's attempts to draw the attention of the United States and its ally Britain to the dangers confronting it proved fruitless. When we went to San Francisco in April 1945, our efforts to explain our situation to the United States were of no avail. We were reminded that Russia's heroic struggle had saved the lives of many of their sons. The Truman Doctrine came in March 1947. But Turkey resisted Soviet demands throughout 1945 and 1946 when it was all alone. We are thankful to America for its aid, even if it was delayed. But it would be a historical error to claim that this aid "saved" Turkey. We cannot allow [Lyndon] Johnson or Dean Rusk to assume the role of our "saviors." From whom did they save us and how? The Russian pressure was heavy, and if it was going to lead to war, this would have happened in 1945 and 1946. After that the situation changed. The Russians were forced to evacuate their forces of occupation even from Iran after 1946. There is no evidence that Russia was planning to extract its demands from Turkey by force of arms. If Russia had intended to follow up its pressure by going to war against Turkey, Ankara would have accepted the challenge and fought alone to defend itself. There is no indication from their attitude in 1945 that either Britain or America, which now likes to pose as our "savior," would have come to our rescue in that contingency. (Esmer, Ulus, 13 March 1966, quoted in Oran, p. 71)

# II. FROM TENSION TO DÉTENTE (1953–1960)

#### A. The USSR after Stalin

As we have already noted, industrial production in the USSR after World War II achieved the planned objectives, but agricultural production lagged. Great efforts were made in the 1950s to improve farm output. Starting in 1953, budgetary resources were diverted from heavy industry to agriculture and consumer goods industries. The Soviet economy was geared to the goal of overtaking America. Nikita Khrushchev explained Soviet economic policies thus: "We shall not destroy capitalism with bombs. Capitalism shall be dealt the biggest blow when we surpass the USA in per capita production of meat, cooking oil, and milk" (Gibney, p. 26). On 4 October 1957 the Soviet satellite Sputnik I was placed in earth orbit. This was a good indicator of the advanced technological level attained by the USSR. The economy would return to the agenda in the mid-1980s with the drive for perestroika (restructuring).

Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 was a turning point in the history of the USSR. It signaled a change in the relations between the people and the administration. The system of collective leadership had begun. Malenkov, who was regarded as the natural heir to Stalin, came to the fore and adopted a policy consisting of three main elements. In international relations, tensions would be eased. The economy would be restructured, and, to this end, relations with farmers would be placed on a new footing. Agricultural reform, launched in 1953, had an important place in this process. Khrushchev played a key role in the elaboration and implementation of these reforms. Malenkov resigned in February 1955 and was succeeded by Khrushchev as party secretary-general and N. A. Bulganin as prime minister.

These political developments and the attendant changes in the economic and bureaucratic structures also helped change the foreign policy of the USSR. According to Soviet scholars, this foreign policy rested on four pillars: carry out the prescriptions of socialism and communism along with the other socialist states (communism); promote the friendship and fraternity of the socialist states and peoples (internationalism); pursue peaceful coexistence and the preservation of humanity from a new world war (pacifism); and support wars of national liberation and the ending of exploitation (anti-imperialism). The 1950s saw the implementation of these principles in Soviet foreign policy.

One of the main features of Soviet foreign policy in this period was the attempt to control the other socialist states, and above all the People's Republic of China, by maintaining the closest relations with these states. The USSR saw the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 as a momentous event. With the success of the Chinese revolution, socialism was to become a world system embracing 800 million souls. Under Soviet leadership, the eight socialist states of Europe met in Moscow in 1954 and again in Warsaw on 11 May 1955, when they established the Warsaw Pact as a direct response to the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO. The pact, officially known as the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty, was signed on 14 May and had a duration of twenty-five years. The military alliance bringing together the Western states (NATO) now had its counterpart in a military alliance bringing together the countries of the socialist bloc (the Warsaw Pact).

After Stalin, the USSR revised its foreign policy and placed its relations with the capitalist countries on a new

basis. Its policy toward the West was now based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the principle of "different paths to socialism" was adopted. Although this created problems within the Eastern Bloc, it opened up new avenues of cooperation between the USSR and the countries of the Third World. These developments and especially the policy of peaceful coexistence allowed the USSR to take significant steps in improving its relations with its neighbors, including Turkey.

## B. The Development of Bilateral Relations

# 1. The Soviet Note of 30 May 1953 and Turkey's Reply

The process of normalization of relations between Turkey and the USSR began on 30 May 1953. For the first time after World War II, the USSR took a step to restore relations to their former state on that day. This step was followed with further initiatives. On 30 May 1953 the USSR delivered a note informing Turkey that the demands that had been made following World War II were being formally withdrawn.

The Soviet Government has recently been examining the issue of the relations of the USSR with its neighbors, and, in this context, it has focused on the state of Soviet-Turkish relations.

It will be recalled that, some years ago, the representatives of the two states engaged in official talks on the question of Soviet-Turkish relations in connection with the expiration of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1925. At these talks, the territorial demands on Turkey of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic were taken up as well as the considerations of the Soviet Government on the question of dealing with possible threats to the security of the Soviet Union that might come from the Black Sea Straits. The distress that these issues caused to the Turkish Government as well as to the Turkish public did not fail to affect Soviet-Turkish relations.

To further good neighborly relations and reinforce peace and security, the governments of Armenia and Georgia now deem it possible to renounce their territorial claims against Turkey. The Soviet Government has reviewed its previous position regarding the question of the Straits and considers that it is possible to ensure the

security of the Soviet Union in the region of the Straits in conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union as well as Turkey.

The Soviet Government hereby declares that the Soviet Union harbors no territorial claims on Turkey.

The note referred to the USSR's desire to improve relations. By declaring explicitly that all territorial claims had been withdrawn, Moscow signaled its intention, as the federal power, to remove this negative element introduced by Armenia and Georgia from the bilateral relations of the two countries. Finally, the note indicated that Moscow had reconsidered its position on the subject of the Straits.

It will be useful to examine how Turkey and its Western allies assessed the Soviet note. At the time of its delivery, Prime Minister Menderes was on a visit to London, so he assessed it with his British hosts on 1 June. Britain's first reaction was to establish a link between the note and Turkey's membership in NATO. Moscow was taking a step back. The Soviet initiative was also interpreted as an attempt to pull Turkey away from its Western allies as well as to frustrate the establishment of the Balkan Pact and the Middle East Command. France, for its part, saw the Soviet move as being motivated by the desire to bring about detente in East-West relations.

Turkey held the view that the note contained both positive and negative elements. First, it provided Turkey with the opportunity to cut its defense spending (which accounted for half of the budget) by one-third. At the same time, the note raised the possibility that Western aid to Turkey might be reduced. Another Turkish concern had to do with the Straits. The Montreux Convention had a duration of twenty years, and the two-year period for notice of renunciation was due to begin in approximately one year, in July 1954. In other words, starting on that date, one of the signatories could give formal notice that it wanted to terminate the convention. Turkey was concerned that the Soviet position on the Straits was somewhat ambiguous and was apprehensive that the USSR might denounce the convention during this period. It would later become clear that these fears were groundless.

Turkey formulated its reply in the light of these considerations and delivered its note to Moscow on 18 July 1953.

The Government of the Republic of Turkey notes with satisfaction the declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union that the USSR has no territorial claims on Turkey.

With reference to the Soviet statement that it wants to maintain relations of good neighborliness and reinforce peace and security, the Government of the Republic of Turkey declares that this corresponds fully to its own past position as well as the position it will continue to maintain in the future.

As the Soviet Union is aware, the question of the Straits falls within the terms of the Montreux Convention, a fact that the Government of Turkey wishes to underline.

The second exchange of notes that took place in July clearly revealed Turkey's concerns in connection with the question of the Straits area. Two days after the receipt of Turkey's reply, the USSR submitted a new note on 20 July, complaining about the ever-increasing number of American and British warships in the Straits. Turkey responded on 24 July by stating that "such courtesy visits are fully in compliance with the Montreux Convention and do not call for prior notification." The USSR submitted a similar note to Greece on 26 October 1953, pointing out that "turning Greek territory into a base for the forces of the Atlantic bloc endangers peace and security in the Balkans. The Soviet Government cannot remain indifferent to such developments and ... all responsibility for increasing international tension will have to be borne by the Greek Government" (Ayın Tarihi 239 [October 1953]: 205). The Soviet note was a reaction to the anti-Soviet alliance being forged in the Balkans.

By submitting its note to Turkey, the USSR was taking the first step toward the normalization of bilateral relations that had reached a breaking point following the claims made immediately after the war. The USSR had made a clear U-turn. Turkey's reply indicated that the new Soviet position was viewed positively but still considered unsatisfactory.

The note of 30 May and the Turkish reply reflected the foreign policies of the two countries. From the point of view of the USSR, the note was not just the consequence of Stalin's death; nor was it a deviation from traditional Soviet policy. As explained earlier, the country's social and economic profile was changing as it broke free from Stalin's influence, and its foreign policy began to reflect this. Just as important was the desire of the leadership to break out of the "containment" policy directed against it.

Similarly, Turkey's response reflected the objectives of its foreign policy. At that time, Turkey's main concern was not revising its relations with its neighbors. Ankara's goal was to reinforce its position within NATO and use its strategic location to obtain economic aid.

The USSR's statements and other steps aimed at improving bilateral relations continued throughout the 1950s. In his speech delivered on 8 August 1953 at the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov stressed that the Soviet note was designed to develop good neighborly relations between the two countries and added that this could only be possible if Turkey nurtured similar desires. Subsequently, on 26 April 1954, Malenkov complained that Turkey was not trying hard enough to improve relations.

At the reception held at the Kremlin on 7 November 1954 on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution, Bulganin told the ambassadors of Turkey and Iran that mistakes had been made in the conduct of relations with their countries in the recent past because of Stalin but that these mistakes would not be repeated. In his speech at the Supreme Soviet in December 1955, Khrushchev alluded to the cordial relations during the Atatürk and İnönü eras and their subsequent deterioration. He added that it would not be correct to blame only Turkey for this and emphasized that uncalled-for remarks from the Soviet side had also contributed to negative developments. Khrushchev declared that they had taken the necessary steps to improve relations but that this had not been reciprocated by the Turkish leadership. He also referred to American military activities in Turkey. Finally, he reiterated that the time had come to develop relations on the basis of good-neighborliness and friendship. In a broadcast in July 1957, Radio Moscow held Molotov responsible for the deterioration of relations.

#### 2. Turkey's Bloc Policy

Turkey's response to the USSR's overtures starting in 1953 was to pursue a bloc policy that would determine the course and nature of relations. This led to numerous problems between the two countries.

#### U.S. Bases and Activities in Turkey

Turkey's membership in NATO, the military bases established on its territory, and the joint military exercises carried out angered the USSR. On 4 February 1956 Moscow delivered notes to the U.S. and Turkey complaining about balloons released from American bases in Turkey and alleged that these were being employed to gather military intelligence. In its response delivered on 11 February, Turkey claimed that this operation was designed to gather

meteorological data, that the public had been informed of this by the semiofficial Anatolia Agency, and that it would be incorrect to interpret this as a threat to Soviet security. The Turkish note showed that Ankara would not be deflected from its policy of blocs.

# Turkey's Part in the Policy of "Containment"

Turkey's decision to become one of the principal actors in the policy of "containment" upset the USSR. Moscow kept quiet about the Balkan Pact initiative because this coincided with its note of 30 May 1953, but it used Bulgaria as a surrogate. Bulgaria issued an official statement declaring that it was disturbed by the intentions of the alliance of the "fascist aggressors" who had turned their attention to the Balkans and the Middle East.

With respect to the Baghdad Pact, the USSR expressed its misgivings without intermediaries. In its note dated 18 March 1954, Moscow declared that it considered the agreement signed between Turkey and Pakistan to be a new instance of American expansionism, which directly threatened the USSR's security and regional peace. The USSR reiterated that it desired good relations with all countries but especially with its neighbors, including, naturally, Turkey.

Turkey replied to this note on 8 May. Ankara declared that each step that it took to cooperate with peace-loving countries of goodwill to strengthen peace and security was met by a Soviet effort to depict its actions as being a threat to peace.

Despite the Soviet claims, Turkey argued that the Baghdad Pact had been established to counter the Soviet threat. The Baghdad Pact had the effect of enhancing Soviet influence in the Middle East, however, because this was a time of decolonization and the nonaligned movement was rapidly gaining in strength. As Soviet influence grew in the Middle East, this had a direct influence on Turkey's regional policy. Starting in 1955, the USSR became an important negative factor in Turkey's deteriorating relations with its Arab neighbors.

In the Balkans, the USSR reviewed its relations with Yugoslavia and prevented the envisaged military cooperation in the region from taking shape.

Despite its misgivings over Turkey's policies, Moscow refrained from adopting a totally negative stance toward its neighbor during this period. Moscow saw Turkey's policies and its actions in pursuit of these policies as the direct consequence of the aggressive and expansionist designs of the imperialists in the Middle East and the Balkans and strove to end Turkey's links with these forces.

### The Syrian and Iraqi Crises

In the course of the Syrian crisis of 1957, Turkey and the USSR came closer to an armed clash than at any other time since 1920, when relations were first established (see the chapter "Relations with the Soviets" in Section 1). The USSR's policy toward Syria was in line with its general policies toward the Middle East and the Third World. When the crisis was at its height, Khrushchev made a statement to the New York Times on 9 October 1957. "Turkey is extremely weak, and in the event of a war, it would not last even for a day. We are very close to Turkey and you Americans are very far, far away. If the guns start firing, rockets would also start flying and it would be too late to reconsider." On the surface, this statement sounded like a direct threat; but in view of the manner in which the message was conveyed, we might conclude that it was addressed to the U.S. rather than Turkey, as an appeal for America to review its policies.

The coup that took place in Iraq on 14 July 1958 strained Turkish-Soviet relations once again. Following the coup, Turkey toyed with the idea of intervening in Iraq. Khrushchev declared on 16 July that any attempt by Turkey to change the course of events would lead to a Soviet armed response. The moderate tone of Turkey's conciliatory response was attributed to the influence of its Western allies.

After this came the Soviet note of 24 July 1958. It referred to foreign minister F. R. Zorlu's statement to the Daily Mail in which he alluded to the 500,000 ethnic Turks (Turcomans) in Iraq as well as the 50 million Muslims in the USSR. The note also drew attention to military movements in Turkey's southern border region. It warned that Turkey would have to bear the consequences of any intervention in Iraq. The Soviet note was an attempt to intimidate Turkey.

As in the case of the Syrian crisis, what kept Turkey from undertaking military action in Iraq was not just the tough position taken by the USSR but also the policy of the U.S., which wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the USSR over an issue that was not of immediate concern to Washington.

# The Nuclear Missiles and U-2 Crises

In December 1957 the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey became a hot issue. On 13 December Bulganin sent a letter to Menderes (the third letter during that year). The exchange of letters had become an important means for dealing with bilateral problems. Bulganin's letter stressed that by allowing its territory to be used against its neighbors Turkey was needlessly exposing itself to grave dan-

gers. Countries that allowed the deployment of missiles on their territories would become the targets of counterstrikes. Bulganin reiterated that the USSR wanted nothing but good relations, good neighborliness, and more trade. This was the beginning of the missile crisis, which would last until 1962, when, as a result of negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. over the Cuban missiles, they would be removed from Turkey.

Bulganin sent Menderes a fourth letter on 8 January 1958 in which he recalled the important steps he had taken toward peace and disarmament and voiced his wish to end the Cold War and sign a disarmament agreement between the two alliances. He went on to remind Ankara that missiles acquired without payment could not enhance Turkey's security because it would never be allowed to use such missiles. His letter ended with the warning that a single match could start a big conflagration and Turkey would be the first country to be consumed by such a disaster.

Menderes replied to this letter on 25 February and indicated that all the measures taken by Turkey were of a defensive nature. Although the USSR interpreted Turkey's measures as aggressive, the USSR itself had all manner of bases and missiles, he pointed out, asking how Turkey was to interpret that.

The USSR delivered a note to Turkey on 13 December 1958, drawing attention to the signing of a new military agreement between Turkey and the U.S. that provided for the deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles. The note stated that it was contrary to the interests of the USSR for Turkey to become NATO's nuclear base. The USSR made an official statement on 25 March, alleging that the military agreement was in conformity with the Eisenhower Doctrine. By ignoring the USSR's pleas for improved relations and by signing the agreement, Turkey was turning itself into a target at a time when it was going through an economic crisis. This agreement was the result of a blind adherence to the dictum of "being well armed, even if naked."

The uneasiness of the USSR over military bases reached its climax with the U-2 incident. When the U-2 spy plane was shot down and the U.S. was forced to admit its responsibility, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in which Ankara declared that Turkey had not given permission for any American plane to fly over Soviet territory. The statement added that the aircraft that had been shot down had not taken off from Turkey and concluded by declaring that, outside of its airspace, Ankara could only accept responsibility for the activities of Turkish aircraft. This did not prevent the USSR from

delivering a note on 13 May, reminding Turkey that it was serving America's aggressive policies through its military bases. The note warned that the necessary measures would be taken should Turkey continue to allow such flights in the future. Turkey replied to this note on 18 May by emphasizing that the facilities provided by Turkey to its allies were only for defensive purposes. This incident prevented the holding of the U.S./USSR summit but led to no serious crisis in Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations, because Menderes had announced that he would be visiting the USSR in July. This visit was planned as the consequence of dissatisfaction with the level of economic aid being provided by the U.S.

#### 3. Economic Relations

After World War II, economic relations between the USSR and Turkey came to an end and were resumed only in 1953. In 1954 and 1955 Turkey's imports from the USSR grew to \$11.7 million from nil in 1953, while the USSR's imports from Turkey in 1953 to 1955 amounted to \$12.8 million.

These trade relations started with the USSR's participation in the International İzmir Trade Fair in 1954. When the USSR signaled its intention to participate in the fair in January 1954, it was allocated a modest stand in an out-of-the-way location. Nevertheless, the USSR indicated that it would participate again in 1955. At a time when strong anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policies were being pursued, the authorities ensured that these Soviet overtures received little press coverage in Turkey. Turkey basically used the Soviet efforts to increase trade exchanges as a leverage against the West.

After 1956 bilateral relations received a new boost. Early in April the president of the İzmir Chamber of Commerce and a group of industrialists from that city were invited to the USSR. The Turkish press, however, did not view the development of economic relations in a positive light. The offer of Soviet economic aid made in February was rebuffed by the journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in these terms: "We can accept no military or economic aid from Russia, since we are perfectly capable of assessing the true cost of such aid" ("Türkiye ve Rusya," Ulus, 26 March 1956). Other journalists dwelt on the political dimension of economic aid and, recalling the bitter experience of the Ottoman Public Debt, called for the rejection of Soviet aid offers in order to keep economic relations at a minimum level. These journalists failed to note, however, that Russia had no part in the Ottoman Public Debt. They also ignored the efforts being made at the time to obtain ever more U.S. aid and loans.

When the new Soviet ambassador, Nikita Ryzhov, ar-

rived in Ankara in April 1957, he proposed that bilateral relations be restored to their 1920 state. In 1957 İş Bankası and Soviet enterprises signed an agreement for the transfer of technology within the framework of the building of a plate glass factory in Turkey. The USSR extended a threeyear loan of 3.4 million rubles at 2.5% interest and guaranteed to buy the factory's products for a period of three and a half years. Economic delegations were exchanged, and economic relations developed markedly. Because Turkey was suffering from an economic malaise, there was increasing support for more trade with the USSR. The press, however, remained ambivalent. While expressing admiration for the USSR's rapid economic growth, the press was skeptical about the effectiveness of Soviet aid to Third World countries. While the importance of Western aid was being underlined, trade with the Eastern Bloc was seen as unprofitable. These arguments were being made at a time when the Syrian crisis was at its height.

In 1950 the volume of trade between Turkey and the USSR was 1.2 million rubles. By 1958 this had increased more than fifteen-fold to 18.3 million rubles. The press kept on warning that Turkey should beware of increasing its trade with the USSR beyond the current level. According to the media, the USSR used its loans as a means for exerting political pressure. Excessive dependence on trade with the Soviet bloc was dangerous. It would also be diplomatically inconsistent for Ankara to accuse countries like Syria, Egypt, and Afghanistan of receiving foreign economic aid that did not serve peaceful ends if Turkey engaged in similar practices.

A similar reaction came from Bülent Ecevit (a CHP member of parliament), when he addressed five questions to the government on this subject. In his reply to these questions on 12 June 1958, foreign minister F.R. Zorlu stated that the latest loan agreement with the USSR had been signed on 24 January 1934. This was the protocol for an \$8 million loan to finance the construction of the Kayseri textile mill and the Nazilli combine. No official delegation had gone to Moscow; nor would there be any Soviet experts stationed in Turkey. İş Bankası's agreement for the construction of a plate-glass factory with an annual capacity of 37,500 tons and Sümerbank's agreement to purchase textile machinery worth \$1,018,525 were private contracts. The government could only intervene in these private transactions within the framework of Turkey's general trade policies. The basic principle that applied was reciprocity. Over the last three years, the USSR's share in Turkey's foreign trade had fluctuated between 1 and 2.5%.

In his reply, Zorlu tried to brush off Ecevit's criticism by claiming that the transactions were between firms and not states. But this was not altogether persuasive, because everyone knew that the Soviet firms were all government owned and controlled, while neither İş Bankası nor Sümerbank could act without the knowledge and approval of the government. Turkey's increased trade with the Eastern Bloc countries and the USSR was largely due to its shortage of convertible currency. This shortage forced Ankara to trade more with those countries that employed the barter system. Furthermore, increased trade with the USSR would enable Turkey to ask for more economic assistance from the U.S. So, for a variety of reasons, economic relations with the USSR grew considerably, especially after 1957.

It is noteworthy that economic relations were developing at a time when political relations were in a constant state of crisis. While Turkey was in the grip of virulent anti-Communist and anti-Soviet sentiments, the USSR was deeply concerned by the deployment of nuclear missiles close to its southern borders. But these factors were ignored by the USSR in its quest to break free from the consequences of the containment policy, while Turkey was motivated by sheer economic necessity. The development of relations was not confined to the economic field but also included cultural, artistic, and sports contacts. The twenty-year period when the two countries completely ignored one another had come to an end.

#### 4. Menderes's Plan to Visit Moscow

Toward the end of the 1950s there was a thaw in relations between the two blocs, which also helped improve Turkish-USSR relations. Actually, this thaw was not particularly desirable from a Turkish point of view, because a reduction in tension weakened Turkey's hand when it sought American aid by advancing strategic reasons. But these developments were beyond Turkey's control, and Ankara was forced to make the necessary adjustments in its policies.

As usual, the first step came from the USSR. On 31 October 1959 Khrushchev declared in a speech that despite the missiles that threatened Soviet security Moscow would like to improve relations with Turkey. Unlike previous overtures, this one evoked a positive Turkish response. In 1959 the Turkish leadership had also started making positive statements aimed at improving relations. In a speech made on 28 February 1959, Zorlu declared somewhat vaguely that détente between the two blocs would enable Turkey, despite its bloc-oriented policies, to improve its relations with the USSR. This was followed by the speech made by president Celal Bayar at the inauguration of the new session of the Turkish Grand National As-

sembly on 1 November in which he supported the process of détente. The press was also beginning to dwell on the need for improved relations.

As a result of these developments, a delegation headed by minister of health Lütfi Kırdar went to Moscow in December. Before the departure of the delegation, minister of foreign affairs F. R. Zorlu hosted a dinner in honor of Ambassador Ryzhov on 26 November 1959. Although this function was merely a courtesy extended to the ambassador, it was significant because it constituted a first and came on the eve of President Eisenhower's visit to Ankara. Kırdar carried out his visit on 9 December, just a few days after having suffered a heart attack, and spent twelve days in the USSR.

This was the first ministerial-level visit to the USSR since 1939. Both Zorlu and the leader of the opposition, İnönü, made statements declaring that the Soviet administration was sincere in its efforts to improve relations and that the present leaders were trying to distance themselves from the errors committed by their predecessors. Zorlu added, however, that the new policies were the result of the rapprochement between the two blocs and concluded by declaring that "within its bloc, Turkey was neither in the forefront nor lagging behind. It was in full solidarity with the bloc, always ready to do its share to preserve peace" (TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, p. 502).

In 1960 mutual visits by the heads of government were on the agenda. On 11 April it was announced that Menderes's visit would take place on 15 July and that there would later be a return visit by Khrushchev. This would have been an important visit as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy and a new beginning in bilateral relations. At the preparatory talks before the visit, Turkey got the USSR to agree that it would continue to pursue policies consistent with its membership in NATO and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization, the new name of the Baghdad Pact) in matters dealing with national security, political alliances, and disarmament, that the question of missiles would not be discussed, and that no negotiations would take place in connection with issues concerning CENTO members. The visit never took place, however, because of the military coup of 27 May 1960 in Turkey.

Some have claimed that this proposed visit was one of the causes of the coup. This argument is difficult to sustain. At the time, the U.S. and the other NATO members were in the course of developing their bilateral relations with the USSR. Before the decision regarding the visit, Zorlu had informed the U.S. ambassador. The coup was not caused by the prospective visit, but the visit was prevented by the coup. Especially in foreign policy matters,

cause and effect should not be confused. It would take a further five years for an official visit to the USSR by a high-level Turkish delegation to occur.

EREL TELLAL

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## Relations with the USA and NATO

## I. RELATIONS DURING THE TRANSITION TO A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

## A. The Turkish Straits and the U.S. after the War

A fortnight before the Potsdam Conference convened on 17 July 1945, the U.S. State Department prepared a briefing paper for President Truman. In this paper, dated 29 June 1945, U.S. relations with Turkey were described in these terms: "Relations between Turkey and the USA from Admiral Bristol's time to the present have been peaceful and friendly. These relations have been based on the following principles. (1) The right of people to freely choose their political, economic, and social systems. (2) Equality of opportunity in commerce. (3) Freedom of the press to gather and publish information. (4) The preservation of American educational institutions operating in Turkey. (5) Protection of the rights of U.S. nationals" (Armaoğlu, p. 134).

These principles applying to Turkey were grounded on the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy dating from the latter years of World War II. The first two principles reflected the basic tenets of capitalism. The third principle reflected political liberalism. The last two principles reflected imperialism, which strove to shape the postwar international order and sought to control world markets.

The State Department paper asserted that Turkey, despite its location in a region with diplomatic, economic, and military disputes, could escape the fate of becoming a Soviet satellite if it continued to receive British support. Turkey had to be kept free of Soviet influence to safeguard vital U.S. interests. The status of the Straits was at the top of the list of vital interests. The U.S. took a close interest in the future of the Straits even though it was not a party to the Montreux Convention. Prior to the Potsdam Conference, the U.S. Department of the Navy had submitted a report to President Truman, which outlined U.S. policies with reference to the Straits. "In peacetime, the Turkish Straits must remain open to the merchant vessels of all

states as well as to the warships of Black Sea littoral states. In a war involving a Black Sea state, the warships of nonlittoral states should not have access to the Straits. No state other than Turkey should possess fortifications in the Dardanelles. If Turkey is at war or faced with imminent threat of war, it should be free to make whatever arrangements it deems fit in the Straits" (Armaoğlu, pp. 137–39).

On the eve of Potsdam, the priority for the U.S. was to prevent the Straits and the Black Sea from coming under Soviet control. The territorial claims against Turkey contained in the Soviet note of 19 March 1945 and reiterated at the Molotov-Sarper meeting of 7 June 1945 were not a source of additional concern to Washington. Truman told Stalin at Potsdam that the question of Turkey giving up territory was "a matter that had to be settled between Turks and Russians" but added that "the question of the Straits was of concern to the U.S. and the whole world" (Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 302).

When the question of the Straits came up for discussion at Potsdam, Truman reflected the U.S. position outlined above. At the conference, he signed, along with Stalin and the newly elected British prime minister Clement Attlee, a protocol that provided for the revision of the Montreux Convention to conform to the changed postwar conditions. The U.S., Britain, and the USSR were to communicate to Turkey their views on the envisaged revisions. The contents of this protocol, however, were not reflected in the final document of the Potsdam Conference.

This protocol was giving the U.S. the right, for the first time, to take a position on the subject of the Turkish Straits. Truman and Stalin had agreed on the need to revise the regime established at Montreux, but nothing had been said about the nature of the revision. At Potsdam, Truman held that the Straits should be given the status of an international waterway. As the Balkans came under increasing Soviet domination, however, he would abandon this position and call for the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits.

Turkey was closely following the proceedings at Potsdam in connection with the Straits. When the U.S. and the USSR reached agreement on revising the Montreux Convention without specifying how this was to be done, Ankara submitted notes to Washington and London on 20 August 1945, calling for American guarantees to ensure freedom of navigation and peace in the Straits. Ankara wanted the arrangements in the Straits not to encroach on Turkey's sovereignty. It also wanted to see steps to block Soviet demands.

This was a clear indication that Ankara had greater trust in London and Washington than in Moscow, that it perceived Soviet claims as a threat, and that it sought, for the first time, Western backing to block these claims.

American ambassador Edwin Wilson submitted a note on 2 November 1945 to foreign minister Hasan Saka in which U.S.

views regarding revisions to the Montreux Convention were spelled out. The U.S. wanted to see freedom of navigation for all merchant vessels even in time of war, freedom of navigation for the warships of Black Sea littoral states even in time of war, and no access to the Black Sea of nonlittoral states in time of peace unless authorized by the United Nations. Ankara was much relieved to see that these views did not constrain Turkey's sovereignty.

As the Soviet demands on Turkey became more insistent in 1946 and after the establishment, at Soviet instigation, of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran, the U.S. resolve to give full backing to Turkey on the question of the Straits grew perceptibly. After Potsdam, the divergence of interests between the U.S. and the USSR became more obvious. Washington began to perceive the Soviet moves against Turkey and Iran as part of an overall Soviet strategy of gradually taking over Western Europe. With its intervention in Iran's internal affairs and its threats against Turkey, the USSR was, from Washington's point of view, carrying out its plans to trample on U.S. interests all over the world.

Soviet postwar policies had brought Turkey's relations with the USSR to the breaking point. This led the U.S. to perceive Turkey as a country that was ripe for being drawn into the Western Bloc that was being formed at the time. The method for carrying this out was by fomenting anti-Soviet sentiments in Turkey. As part of this policy,



Figure 4-1. Members of the *Missouri* crew in Istanbul (Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeler Ansiklopedisi, p. 1945).

the American and British press dealt frequently with Soviet territorial demands to make sure that Ankara did not overcome the initial shock caused by these demands. By keeping the issue alive, tension in Turkey was maintained at a high pitch. Anti-Soviet feelings in Turkey reached their climat when the premises of the leftist newspaper *Tan* were sacked.

It was in these circumstances that the U.S. took a step of great symbolic significance to draw Turkey into the Western fold.

## The Visit of the Missouri and Turkish-American Rapprochement

The opportunity to demonstrate to Ankara the importance that the U.S. was attributing to Turkey after World War II came in March 1946. The body of the Turkish ambassador in Washington, who had died sixteen months earlier, was sent to Turkey on board the famous battleship Missouri. The Missouri sailed up the Dardanelles and anchored off the Palace of Dolmabahçe in İstanbul on 5 April 1946. With this grand gesture, the U.S. conveyed the message to the USSR that the status of the Turkish Straits could not be revised without its consent.

In his speech on the occasion of Army Day, which coincided with the day when the *Missouri* cast anchor in İstanbul, President Truman stressed the great economic and strategic importance of the Middle East and the Straits for the U.S. He also went on to declare that none

of the countries of the region had the means to resist an armed attack. Truman's speech underlined America's readiness to come to the assistance of these countries in case of need.

Following the visit of the Missouri, the U.S. concluded an agreement with Turkey on 7 May 1946 by which all of Turkey's debts arising from the Lend and Lease Law were canceled. This debt relief helped Turkey to cope with its postwar economic difficulties and made a major contribution to Turkish-American relations. During this period the U.S. was providing similar relief to its other European allies.

## The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry over the Straits

Despite the direct and indirect support provided by the U.S. to Turkey, the USSR continued to press for changes in the regime of the Straits. As noted earlier, the USSR delivered notes to Turkey, the U.S., and Britain on 7 August 1946 containing the following demands: (1) the Straits shall remain open to all merchant vessels at all times; (2) the Straits shall remain open to the warships of littoral states at all times; (3) with the exception of special circumstances, the Straits shall remain closed to the warships of nonlittoral states; (4) the regime of the Straits shall be determined exclusively by Turkey and the other littoral states; (5) the defense of the Straits shall be the joint responsibility of Turkey and the USSR (Ulman 1961, pp. 77–78).

The Soviet note was delivered on the last date provided by the Montreux Convention for giving notice to review the convention. In this way Moscow was signaling its intention to revise the convention through an international conference rather than through bilateral negotiations with Turkey.

The Soviet note caused concern in Washington. The State Department was of the view that the note's main intent was to bring Turkey under Soviet influence rather than to revise the regime of the Straits. The first three Soviet points might be acceptable, but the last two points were clearly non-negotiable. Although Truman had been indifferent to the Soviet territorial demands on Turkey at Potsdam, he now shared the State Department's views. The wartime alliance with the USSR was at an end. If Greece and Turkey came under Soviet control, this would upset the balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and endanger transport routes and the delivery of oil.

In this context, Washington delivered a note to Moscow on 19 August 1946. In reference to point 4 of the Soviet note, it declared that the proposal that the regime of the Straits be established exclusively by the littoral states

was unacceptable. Washington also opposed point 5, dealing with the joint defense of the Straits by Turkey and the USSR. Finally, the U.S. note stated, "the Soviet note makes no reference to the United Nations. However, the United States Government wants to see the regime of the Straits linked to the UN in one form or another and made to conform with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter" (Armaoğlu, pp. 148–49).

Ankara was reassured by the U.S. response to the Soviet note. As we have seen, the note delivered to Moscow on 22 August 1946 declared that the first three points could be negotiated but that the fourth and fifth points would not be considered under any circumstances.

On 24 September 1946 the USSR delivered a further note to Ankara in which it reiterated its demands that the Straits regime be formulated by the littoral states and their defense be undertaken jointly by Turkey and the USSR. Turkey rejected the Soviet demands in its note of 18 November 1946 and kept the U.S. and Britain informed about the correspondence.

When the USSR reiterated its demands, the U.S. delivered a note to Moscow on 9 October 1946 in which it recalled: "At Potsdam, a Protocol had been signed by the U.S., the USSR, and Britain intending to revise the Montreux Convention to make the regime of the Straits conform to the changed circumstances and that agreement in principle had been reached for each of the three countries to engage in direct negotiations with Turkey." In its note, the U.S. criticized the Soviet notes of 7 August and 24 September, which deliberately ignored the terms of the Potsdam Protocol by confining the determination of the regime of the Straits to Turkey and the other littoral states and thereby excluding the U.S. and Britain. The U.S. note went on to stress that the revision of the Montreux Convention could only take place through consultations with Turkey by all of the interested parties, including the U.S. The note also warned the USSR that the Security Council would take immediate action in the event of an attack on the Straits (Armaoğlu, pp. 150-51). It was not realistic to try to scare the USSR with the Security Council, however, given the possession of the veto power by the permanent members under the terms of the charter. Moscow just ignored the threat.

The U.S. position vis-à-vis the USSR with regard to the Straits was not designed to protect Turkey. In these early years of the Cold War, the U.S. was intent on protecting its national interests against the USSR all over the globe. Until the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, Ankara always felt that it was on its own when confronting Moscow (Box 4-3).

#### Box 4-3. The Doctrines of U.S. Presidents

In this context "doctrine" denotes the principles that guide foreign policy in a specific field. In the area of foreign policy, a doctrine not only binds the country that adopts it but also affects the countries to which the doctrine applies. Throughout its history, the U.S. has adopted a number of doctrines named after presidents to guide its foreign policy. Some of these doctrines were regional, while others were global so they had profound effects on the foreign policies of other countries. The most important among them are listed below in chronological order.

George Washington's Farewell Speech (1796): during the War of Independence and immediately thereafter, Americans were able to observe the negative impact on their country of the disputes among European states. In his farewell speech in 1796, the first president, George Washington, drew attention to this: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible" (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm). He specifically warned of the dangers to the U.S. of alliances with European states.

The Monroe Doctrine (1823): U.S. policy-makers complied with Washington's testament; but Spain, France, and Britain, with colonies in the new world, were eager to establish relations with the U.S. As the countries of South and Central America started gaining their independence in the early part of the nineteenth century, European intervention in the affairs of South American countries intensified. President James Monroe sent a message to the U.S. Congress on 2 December 1823 in which he stressed that the U.S. would not allow the European powers to colonize states of the Western Hemisphere. He declared that, while the U.S. had no Intention to Interfere in European affairs, the Europeans had no right to interfere in the affairs of the Americas, These principles, known as the Monroe Doctrine, usually kept the activities of the U.S. within the Western Hemisphere for about 100 years. Furthermore, the doctrine allowed the U.S. to carry out its imperialist expansion unhindered within the hemisphere from which Europe had been excluded.

The Truman Doctrine (1947): this anti-Soviet doctrine, spelled out by president Harry Truman on 12 March 1947, can be considered the precursor of the Cold War.

The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957): proclaimed by president Dwight Eisenhower on 5 January 1957, this doctrine symbolized the confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR in Cold War conditions in the Middle East.

The Guam Doctrine (1969); president Richard Nixon proclaimed this doctrine, which applied to Asia but was later developed and extended to cover the whole globe. The U.S. would continue to assume responsibility for deterring a nuclear war. But it was the responsibility of the regional countries to deter regional wars that threatened their security. The U.S. would be prepared to provide limited assistance to the regional countries, but they themselves were responsible for their defense.

The Carter Doctrine (1980): this was a response to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. In his State of the Union message in 1980, president Jimmy Carter declared that an attack in the Persian Gulf region would be considered to be an attack directed at U.S. vital interests. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that a U.S. president had indicated that Washington was prepared to use force to defend its vital interests. The U.S. military umbrella was being extended to cover the Gulf region.

The Reagan Doctrine (1985): president Ronald Reagan declared in an address in 1985 that the U.S. would support anti-Communist counterrevolutions and uprisings. He gave the following reasons for providing such support: (1) the revolutions would be fighting tyranny; (2) if not helped, the country in question could come under Soviet control; (3) coming to the defense of freedom was a well-established American tradition. The Reagan Doctrine was implemented in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodía, and Nicaragua.

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#### B. The Truman Doctrine

The U.S. opposition to the USSR's demands in connection with the Straits occurred at a time when the two powers were in close cooperation with one another. Consequently, Ankara stood alone in its resistance to Moscow's demands. The cordial relations established during the war between the U.S. and the USSR began to fray early in 1947, and this is when the U.S. started to make its presence felt. The spreading fear of the "red menace" in America led to a reversal of the perceptions of the U.S. public and of its leadership in regard to the Soviet Union. The main indication of this important change in perception was in President Truman's speech to the U.S. Congress on 12 March 1947, when he declared for the first time that the world was on the threshold of becoming divided into two opposing ideological camps.

Truman asserted that the gravity of the situation

made it necessary for him to address a joint session of the Congress. In this historic address, he enunciated the principle that came to be known as the "Truman Doctrine." He stated that he had received an urgent appeal from the Greek government for financial and economic assistance and added that the American Economic Mission and American Embassy in Greece had reported that such assistance was essential for Greece to remain a free country. Most of Truman's speech dealt with the devastation suffered by Greece during World War II and the damage done to Greece and to the Western world by the Greek civil war. He went on to declare that a few thousand armed men led by the Communists threatened Greece's existence, that the Greek government was unable to cope with this situation, that the Greek army was small and weak, and that Greece needed help for it to remain a selfsufficient and self-respecting democracy.

After dealing with Greece, Truman turned to Turkey:

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

With these arguments, Truman sought to persuade the U.S. Congress that Turkey must be supported (Armaoğlu, pp. 152–57).

After stressing the importance of Greece and Turkey to the Western world, Truman submitted three requests to Congress:

- 1. To appropriate a sum of \$400 million for the period ending on 30 June 1948, to assist Greece and Turkey. Of this sum, Greece's share would not exceed \$350 million.
- 2. To authorize the use of American civilian and military personnel stationed in Greece and Turkey upon the request of these countries to assist in reconstruction, to supervise the utilization of the financial and material aid to be furnished, and to train local personnel.
- To authorize the arrangements necessary to deliver the required materials in the quickest and most effective manner.

After making these requests, Truman reminded Congress that the U.S. had spent \$341 billion to win World

War II, that this had been an investment for the world's freedom and for peace, and that the amount now being requested was slightly more than one-thousandth of this sum.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

President Truman's speech placed aid to Greece and Turkey firmly on the agenda of the U.S. Congress. It also marked the end of the honeymoon between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

## The Background and the Objectives of the Doctrine

As one of the victors in World War II, the U.S. was pursuing the objective of restoring Europe's former political and economic influence. According to Harry Truman, his country had three basic goals in the postwar period: to ensure Europe's military, economic, and political stability; to bring the continent under the protection of America's nuclear shield; and to restore European power to ensure a worldwide defense capability under U.S. leadership. To achieve these goals, the U.S. started the preparations for launching the Marshall Plan.

As efforts were being made to restructure Western Europe, a civil war was raging in Greece and Turkey was confronted with threatening Soviet demands. Developments in these two countries would have serious implications for the attainment of U.S. objectives in Western Europe. Owing to its economic difficulties, Britain announced that it would have to end (as of March 1947) its substantial military and economic assistance program to Greece. At this juncture Britain delivered notes to the U.S. State Department, stressing the importance of Greece and Turkey for the defense of the West and requesting that the U.S. replace Britain in providing aid to these countries.

Truman felt that Greece had to be rescued from its difficult situation as a matter of urgency, because communism was becoming a growing menace to Western Europe. Yugoslavia was tilting to communism. After 1946 the Communists became an important factor in Italian

politics. In fact, after the election of 1946, they were in a position to share power with the Christian Democrats. In France, the first cabinet of the Fourth Republic had five Communist members.

The growing strength of the Communists led to fears in the U.S. that a large part of Europe would come under Soviet influence. Unless communism was checked in Greece, this menace could well engulf the rest of Europe, where circumstances were favorable for its spread.

Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine for different reasons. Turkey was located in a region that controlled the land, sea, and air routes linking Europe, Asia, and Africa. If the USSR managed to gain control of Turkey and the Straits, it would gain access to the oil-rich Middle East through Iraq and Iran and gain mastery of the trade routes linking three continents. By supporting Turkey, the U.S. would be fending off this danger.

The architects of U.S. foreign policy were trying to achieve two objectives through the Truman Doctrine. The short-term objective was to strengthen Greece and Turkey militarily and economically against communism, while the long-term objective was to check Soviet expansion wherever necessary and thereby help spread the American political and economic tenets of liberalism and capitalism (Spanier, pp. 40–44).

# The Enactment of the Doctrine, the Nature of the Aid, and Its Conditions

President Truman wanted to see the doctrine enacted quickly in the Congress in order to allow aid to Greece and Turkey to flow to these countries without any delay. The debate in Congress did not proceed very smoothly, however.

A number of legislators felt that the Truman Doctrine was a deviation from traditional U.S. foreign policy and were adamantly opposed to its enactment. In their view, the U.S. was inheriting Britain's role in the Middle East and was being saddled with the defense of Greece and Turkey with no tangible benefit to American interests.

Other legislators claimed that Greece and Turkey had autocratic regimes and that the proposed aid would only serve to strengthen these regimes. They were also against American funds flowing to foreigners so soon after the war.

Some members of Congress considered aid to Greece justified but tried to prevent Turkey from benefiting. They argued that Turkey had not fought in the war and did not suffer the devastation brought on by combat on its territory. Furthermore, Turkey's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to \$245 million, so there was no justi-

fication for providing it with aid. Some legislators recalled the sad experiences of the Armenians and called for withholding aid from Turkey.

Congress added a provision calling for freedom of the press in order to provide the necessary transparency to determine whether the aid was being used properly.

After the congressional debate, it was foreseen that Greece would receive \$300 million in aid, while Turkey would get \$100 million. Congress also decided that American military and civilian personnel would be stationed in both countries to supervise the use of the aid, while Greek and Turkish personnel would be trained in the U.S.

Congress also decided that the equipment provided under the aid program could not be sold, donated, leased, or transferred to another country without obtaining the consent of the U.S. government. Senator Arthur Vandenberg added a provision stipulating that the aid would end in the event of a request to this effect by the UN Security Council or General Assembly, if Greece or Turkey decided that it wanted to forgo the aid, or if the U.S. president made such a request.

The Truman Doctrine became effective on 22 May 1947 when President Truman signed the Act to Provide Aid to Greece and Turkey.

## The Reception of the Truman Doctrine in Turkey

The Turkish public welcomed the Truman Doctrine. Many expressed their satisfaction at seeing that the U.S. was now abandoning isolationism and getting ready to support the free world not just with words but also with deeds.

The Turkish press was full of news and commentary on the benefits that the doctrine would provide. Those who considered that an attack on Turkey would amount to an attack on the U.S. were writing about the end of the Soviet threat. According to some, Turkey would now become the forward bastion of the civilized world. With the implementation of the doctrine, the survival of the multiparty system established in 1946 in Turkey was no longer in doubt.

Some wrote that the U.S. could not be seen as having imperialistic ambitions, because it was not seeking bases from Turkey in return for its aid. Others noted uncomfortable similarities to the system established to manage Ottoman Public Debt, because the U.S. would supervise the use of the aid. These voices were easily drowned out, however, in the euphoria of that day (Ülman 1961, p. 101).

On 23 May 1947, just one day after the enactment of the Truman Doctrine, an American delegation of experts headed by Gen. Lunsford Oliver arrived in Ankara. The delegation was composed of representatives of the State Department as well as the War Department and Navy Department. The members of the Oliver Delegation remained in Ankara for six weeks and, in contacts with Turkish officials, indicated in which fields the aid should be utilized. According to the Americans, Turkey should demobilize some of the men in its defense establishment, modernize its weaponry, and employ the \$100 million available for this purpose. If this advice was heeded, the members of the delegation believed that Turkey would be in a good position to defend itself in the coming years.

Turkey had a good number of reasons for accepting the Truman Doctrine and American aid. The chief reason was that, confronted with insistent Soviet demands, Turkey felt anxious and was overcome by a feeling of being utterly isolated. The Turkish leadership was convinced that Stalin's encroachment on Turkey could only be blocked through cordial relations with the Western world and in particular the U.S.

A second reason had to do with Turkey's economic circumstances. Although Turkey had been spared the ravages of war, its economy was going through a difficult period. It was true that Turkey's gold and foreign exchange reserves stood at \$245 million, but Ankara wanted to keep the reserve as a hedge against the Soviet threat rather than spending it. The bourgeoisie had enriched itself through the black market during the war, while those on a fixed income had seen their earnings shrink through inflation. The military mobilization had deprived industry and agriculture of skilled manpower. The pent-up demand for imported products unavailable during the war years caused havoc in the balance of payments after the war. There was an acute need for funds to carry out the development plans. At the end of 1945 a request for a \$300 million loan was submitted to the U.S., but the U.S. Export-Import Bank made only \$50 million available in October 1946.

A third reason was that, while the armies engaged in World War II had employed all the latest military technology, the Turkish army consisted mostly of infantry and cavalry units equipped with obsolete weapons. The U.S. had provided \$95 million worth of military equipment during the war, but this supply was cut off when the war came to an end. It was therefore essential not to miss this opportunity to restructure and reequip the armed forces through American aid.

## The Agreement of 12 July 1947

After the consultations held by the Oliver Delegation in Ankara, Turkey signed the Agreement on Aid to Turkey

on 12 July 1947. This would allow Turkey to benefit from the Truman Doctrine (Armaoğlu, pp. 162–64).

Article 2 of the agreement specified:

[T]he [U.S.] Chief of Diplomatic Mission will determine, in consultation with representatives of the Government of Turkey, the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall from time to time be furnished under this agreement, except that the financial terms upon which specified assistance shall be furnished shall be determined from time to time in advance by agreement of the two governments. The Chief of Mission will furnish the Government of Turkey such information and technical assistance as may be appropriate to help in achieving the objectives of the assistance furnished under this agreement.

The second paragraph of article 2 stated that this assistance could not be used for purposes not indicated in the agreement and that the use of the assistance would be under the control of U.S. personnel: "The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission to fulfill freely his function in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he may request in the way of reports, information, and observation concerning the utilization and progress of assistance furnished."

The purpose of the assistance as described in the preamble was to "enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence... and to maintain the stability of her economy."

The agreement made provisions for transparency of the assistance program, which had been insisted upon in the congressional debate on aid to Greece and Turkey. Article 3 stipulated:

[T]the [parties] will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information concerning the assistance furnished... To this end, insofar as may be consistent with the security of the two countries: (1) representatives of the press and radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance; and (2) the Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the

purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such assistance.

Turkey undertook to provide full information to the members of the U.S. media, but the same provision had not been made for the Turkish media.

Article 4 of the 12 July 1947 Agreement was important because it was at the root of the problems that led to the cooling of relations between the two countries, especially after 1960. The problems arose from differences in the interpretation of this provision of the article: "the Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information, nor permit...the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished."

As stipulated in the introduction, the articles and information were furnished to protect Turkey's freedom and independence and to maintain its economic stability, so U.S. assistance could only be utilized within those limitations. Consequently, Turkey could not use the arms received from the U.S. for any purpose other than to repel an attack on its territory. This was not considered controversial at the time when the agreement was signed. The U.S. referred to this article when the question of Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus came up, however, and prevented the use of American arms during the intended intervention in June 1964 (see "The Question of Cyprus and the Johnson Letter" in Section 5).

The arrangement stipulated by article 4 was not confined to the military equipment in the amount of \$100 million provided within the terms of the Truman Doctrine. All military assistance furnished after 1947 would also come within the terms of this provision; as a result, Turkey was dependent on the U.S. not just in the area of defense but in the area of foreign policy as well.

## The Utilization of the Aid

At first, the assistance was furnished under a separate program. In 1948 Congress brought aid to Greece and Turkey within the general Foreign Aid Act. This gave the aid provided under the Truman Doctrine a permanent character. With the passing of the Mutual Defense Act on 6 October 1949, the aid began to be furnished within this framework. Economic assistance came under the management of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

There are differing views about whether the \$100 million worth of assistance foreseen in the Truman Doctrine was provided in full. According to some sources, the Americans made cuts in the assistance actually provided to Greece and Turkey, with Turkey getting only \$69 million worth of materials and equipment (Sander 1979, p. 23).

From 1947 to 1949 Turkey received American assistance amounting to \$152.5 million, including the military equipment delivered within the framework of the Truman Doctrine. Of this sum, \$147.5 million was used for modernizing the army, air force, and navy, while \$5 million was used for highway construction. The U.S. felt that in the event of a Soviet attack the invaders would be contained at a line along the Taurus mountain range, so it was important to have a proper route from Iskenderun to the mountain range.

The level of U.S. military aid to Turkey during the period from 1947 to 1951 reached \$400 million.

Although much of the equipment supplied to Turkey consisted of surplus World War II supplies, this equipment had been produced in the latter years of the war and was more modern than anything in Turkey's arsenal. To cite one example, an operation known as Project 500 was implemented in April 1948. Under this project, Turkey was furnished from the inventory of the U.S. Air Force 241 P-47 fighter aircraft, 32 A-26 light attack bombers, 100 AT-6 and 67 AT-11 advanced trainers, and 50 C-47 cargo planes (USAF Operations, p. 16). As some of these aircraft are still in use, it can be said that the Truman Doctrine made a major contribution to the development of Turkey's armed forces. But (as explained below) the cost of maintaining and repairing this equipment restricted Turkey's economic and therefore its political independence.

## The Consequences of the Truman Doctrine

From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy: the Truman Doctrine signaled the end of the cooperation established in World War II between Uncle Sam and Uncle Joe, as Stalin was popularly known in the U.S. It also accelerated the propaganda campaign claiming that it was the spread of communism under the leadership of the USSR that prevented Western-style political and economic liberalism (capitalism) from prevailing throughout the globe.

The main actors of the Cold War (Box 4-4) got involved in an escalating confrontation, using ideological principles as weapons. The two universal systems of capitalism and communism were transformed into mutually exclusive antagonists. Both sides started to perceive the

#### Box 4-4. The Concept of the Cold War and Its Chronology

The term "Cold War" denotes the hostile relations and the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the USSR in the aftermath of World War II. This period was characterized not by overt military action but by economic pressure, propaganda, and a continuous arms race. The beginning of the Cold War is usually considered to be, along with the Truman Doctrine, Churchill's speech in 1946 warning about the establishment of an "iron curtain" in Europe, while the end came with the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Nuclear weapons played a crucial role in the Cold War.

- 12 May 1945: Churchill's telegram to U.S. president Harry Truman ("I am profoundly concerned about the European situation... An Iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind").
- July 1945: the Potsdam Conference, marking the end of the wartime alliance and Europe's division into two camps.
- 12 March 1947: enactment of the Truman Doctrine.
- July 1947: publication of George F. Kennan's article in the jury journal Foreign Affairs advocating the policy of containing the USSR.
  - 1947: Integration of the British, French, and U.S. sectors of Berlin and introduction of a common currency.
  - 122 June 1948–12 May 1949: the Berlin blockade
  - 4 April 1949: signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
  - 29 August 1949: nuclear bomb tested by the USSR.
  - October 1949: accession to power of the Communists in China
  - 25 June 1950: start of the war in Korea.
  - 1954: establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
  - February 1955: establishment of the Baghdad Pact
  - May 1955: admittance of West Germany to NATO,
  - May 1955: establishment of the Warsaw Pact.
  - 1956: 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and adoption of the principle of "peaceful coexistence".
  - 1956: beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR.
  - 1956: the Hungarian revolt and its repression by the USSR.
- 5 January 1957: proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
- 1957: launching of Sputnik by the USSR.
- May 1960: shooting down of a U-2 spy plane over the USSR:

- 1961: construction of the Berlin Wall between the eastern and western sectors.
- October 1962: the Cuban missile crisis.
- 7 February 1965: direct involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam War.
- 1968: suppression of the Czechoslovak uprising in line with the Brezhnev Doctrine.
- 1969 to 1979: SALT I and SALT II negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR.
- 1972: signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) agreement.
- 1973: U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam
- 1973: beginning of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.
- 1975: the Helsinki Final Act.
- 1979: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- 1980; the Carter Doctrine.
- 1980 to 1981: the Soviet intervention in Poland.
- 1981: acceleration of U.S. rearmament and deployment of U.S.-made Pershing II and Cruise missiles by NATO members.
- 1982 to 1983: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR.
- 23 March 1983: launching of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).
- 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev elected secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- 1987: Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement
- 1988: MBFR talks replaced by Conventional Forces In Europe (CFF) negotiations.
- June 1989: free elections in Poland.
- November 1989: the fall of the Berlin Wall.
- October 1990: East and West Germany formally united.
- November 1990: the Treaty on CFE.
- 21 November 1990: the Charter of Paris
- July 1991: the end of the Warsaw Pact.
- 17 September 1991: recognition of the independence of the Baltic States by the USSR.
- 16 December 1991: Gorbachev's announcement of the dissolution of the USSR and its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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globe as an arena for conducting their ideological struggle by whatever means were available. A country was either in the Soviet camp or in the U.S. camp.

The successful implementation of the Truman Doctrine allowed the notion to take root in the U.S. that Communist aggression could only be checked by a resolute and solid economic and military buildup. Thus the Truman Doctrine became the precursor of the Marshall Plan as well as the military pacts like NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO as well as the Marshall Plan.

From the perspective of Turkish foreign policy: the doctrine led to fundamental changes in foreign policy.

The Turkish leadership saw the doctrine as a factor contributing to cordial relations between Turkey and the U.S. and helping Turkey in defying Soviet demands. In the face of Soviet policies in the Middle East, and under the influence of Britain, Turkey started pursuing policies that were totally pro-West and above all pro-U.S.

The equipment received by the Turkish army within the U.S. aid program required maintenance and spare parts, which could only be procured from the U.S. This quickly gave rise to serious problems. To maintain and procure spare parts for \$100 million (TL 280 million) worth of war surplus equipment provided as a grant required an

annual outlay of \$143 million (TL 400 million) from the budget (OTDP, p. 220). These expenses rapidly exhausted Turkey's postwar foreign exchange reserves. As Turkey's imports from the U.S. increased, the foreign exchange shortage kept getting worse and Turkey's balance of payments got hopelessly out of line. The Truman Doctrine had made Turkey militarily and economically dependent on foreign sources.

The military and economic dependency led Ankara to shift from some of its traditional foreign policy positions toward American objectives. The most striking example of this was the stance taken in connection with the question of Palestine. For years Turkey had been supporting the Arab countries in the search for a solution to this question. Now Turkey recognized Israel ten months after its creation, becoming the first Muslim country to do so. When Turkey allowed Turkish Jews to migrate to Israel, it contributed to the increase of Israel's population. This led to the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the Arab states.

Turkey turned its face completely to the West. It refused to participate in the Congress of Asian States held in 1949 on the grounds that it was not Asian but European. Turkey harmonized its foreign policy with Western policies. This became more pronounced after the nonaligned movement emerged at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

From the perspective of Turkish domestic policy: the rapprochement between Turkey and the U.S. resulting from the Truman Doctrine also affected Turkey's internal politics. The Turkish public got acquainted with American-style democracy. The Turkish leaders knew only the single-party system practiced in Turkey and were, in general, familiar with European-style administrations. It was too much to expect them to be influenced by the radically different American practices. Nevertheless, it was possible to detect American influences here and there.

In July 1947 İsmet İnönü declared that the president of the Republic must be impartial and gave up the leadership of the CHP.

Radical changes were made in the military establishment, and the army was brought fully under government control. In June 1949 the TGNA put all national defense agencies, including the General Staff, under the control of the Ministry of Defense. This was in large measure due to the American aid agreement, which stipulated that the responsibility for military matters would be concentrated in one government agency.

In the interest of good relations with the U.S., increasing extralegal pressure was brought to bear on those who dissented from the official ideology or who displayed

leftist leanings. University professors, including Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu (later known as Muzafer Sherif in the U.S.), and Niyazi Berkes, were fired or forced to resign. Many journalists and students found themselves under arrest. Those newspapers and magazines considered to be propagating the "red threat" were closed down.

Turkish society was going through a major transformation during the period that started with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine. As entrepreneurs like Vehbi Koç undertook the marketing of American products, including refrigerators and automobiles, these items flooded the market. People considered it a privilege to possess American products, with refrigerators placed in living rooms and even guestrooms. Crowds flocked to see American films, and children became familiar with American cartoon characters. The American way of life, which spread all over the world, also came to Turkey, then barely at the threshold of the industrial revolution. The Marshall Plan, following the Truman Doctrine, accelerated this process of rapid change. Turkey witnessed the ascendancy of the American style in politics, in the economy, and throughout society in general.

## C. The Marshall Plan The Background of the Plan

According to many American decision-makers, the ravages brought on by World War II and the resulting chaos in Europe led to the rise of communism and Soviet influence. Europe had to be strengthened physically and morally to contain Soviet expansion. If Europe could stand on its own feet economically, European nations would be able to preserve their political independence. At this point the U.S. wanted to bring Britain, West Germany, and France, as well as the rest of Europe, into a system of political and economic cooperation and thereby create an integrated Europe that would arrest the Soviet advance. A Europe deprived of its ability to consume had a depressing effect on America's production and its economy. To create a market for U.S. goods, Europe's economy had to be made to function again.

At the end of the war, the American leadership believed that Europe's rehabilitation could be achieved through bilateral loans, IMF-led stabilization programs, and reconstruction plans financed by the UN and the World Bank. But the persistent economic instability made it necessary to devise a more comprehensive program. The well-known American pundit Walter Lippmann wrote that if Europe's difficulties could not be overcome, this could quickly lead to worldwide chaos. What Europe

needed was a plan leading to greater economic integration, a plan no less bold than the Lend and Lease Law. According to Lippmann, European countries should be helped not individually but collectively. This would accelerate economic integration and facilitate reconstruction. All of the nations had to become involved in a single overall restoration plan.

The U.S. would be the main beneficiary of Europe's reconstruction. Deputy secretary of state Dean Acheson expressed this idea in the following terms:

There is a strong link between production in the United States and production abroad. It is in America's interest to help countries facing economic difficulties. The U.S. cannot enjoy long-term peace and prosperity without a stable world with economically self-sufficient countries. The problem that requires an urgent solution is to close the gap between U.S. exports amounting to \$16 billion and imports amounting to only \$8 billion. America must urgently increase its imports and help Europe to raise its production so as to raise the income level of Europeans. (Council on Foreign Relations, p. 57)

In his speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, U.S. secretary of state George Marshall outlined a plan that would be known as the Marshall Plan. After briefly describing Europe's condition, he explained that America was ready to engage itself in a common reconstruction effort with European nations. Marshall invited all European countries, including the USSR, to get involved in this plan. He said: "It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos" (http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/marshallspeech.html).

Marshall's proposal had three salient features. Unlike the Truman Doctrine, the emphasis was on economic rehabilitation. The new policy would be directed against hunger, poverty, and chaos. There was no reference to military aid. Another feature was that the plan was not at a national level but at a regional level, embracing all of Europe. Instead of dealing with countries on an individual basis, as in the case of Greece and Turkey, the U.S. was now shifting its policy. The third feature was that governments, political parties, or groups that attempted to hinder this

initiative would have to contend with the U.S. This was a clear warning addressed to the USSR and the Communist parties of Western Europe.

Britain and France were quick to welcome the plan. They were followed by the other Western European countries. The USSR's reaction was quite different. The newspaper Pravda argued that the plan was a follow-up to the Truman Doctrine and that "dollar aid would be employed to ensnare Europe." Nevertheless, the Soviet foreign minister, V. M. Molotov, met with his British and French colleagues, Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault, in Paris on 27 June 1948 to discuss the feasibility of the plan. Molotov felt that the plan would bring Europe under U.S. control. Although he did not directly oppose the plan, he advanced conditions that Britain and France were not prepared to accept. With the failure of the tripartite talks, Britain and France convened a meeting in Paris to which all European countries, including those with pro-Soviet regimes but excluding Spain, were invited. The meeting was to discuss the details of the plan and prepare a European Recovery Plan that the U.S. wanted. The USSR and the most of the Eastern European states did not participate in this preparatory meeting.

On 12 July 1947 a meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris with the participation of the representatives of Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden Switzerland, Turkey, Britain, and France. In conformity with U.S. wishes, the participants established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in order to help determine and meet Europe's urgent requirements (Mee, p. 142).

### Turkey and the Marshall Plan

At the Paris meeting, Turkey's representative declared that in order to implement the development plan that had been interrupted by the war Ankara would need \$615 million in aid. This was duly reflected in the meeting's final report.

The report was examined by U.S. experts, who concluded that, since the Marshall Plan was designed to restore the economies of countries devastated by the war, Turkey need not be a beneficiary of the contemplated aid. Turkey's foreign exchange and gold reserves, as well as its balance of trade, were in a much healthier condition than those of the other fifteen European nations. Furthermore, Turkey had indicated that it wanted the aid to implement its own development plan rather than participating in a common European effort. Finally, a country report prepared by experts and subsequently submitted to Congress

by the State Department had assigned Turkey the role of provider of raw materials to European countries. Consequently, in the short term, Turkey could be supplied only with manufactured products to help maintain its present economic level. The result was that, for the first fifteen months of the program, Turkey would be provided with \$58.9 million in aid to procure equipment, electrical implements, trucks, petroleum products, and timber for the benefit of its agricultural and mining sectors (Üstün, p. 35).

The approach of U.S. consultants led to great disappointment among the Turkish public: if the U.S. could abandon Turkey economically in this way, it might also do so politically. Under the pressure of public opinion, the government of Turkey appealed directly to the U.S. government and requested that Turkey be fully included in the Marshall Plan. In doing so, Turkey drew attention to the link between economic conditions and political and military stability. The U.S. Embassy in Ankara also reported to Washington that, because of its economic condition, Turkey was eligible to be among the aid recipients (Ülman 1961, p. 118).

For Turkey to be included among the aid recipients, the U.S. wanted to see changes made in the Turkish development plan that would bring it into line with the spirit of the Marshall Plan. The aid to be provided had to be used to raise farm production, modernize agricultural equipment, and refurbish the national transportation infrastructure. By revising its development plan in this direction, Turkey would become a supplier and storehouse of food and raw materials for the countries taking part in the European Recovery Program. In the field of industry, priority would be given to the extraction of minerals, notably chromium, needed for U.S. defense purposes. When Turkey stated that it would comply with these requests, the U.S. agreed to include Turkey as a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan.

The Europeans had requested \$22 billion in aid, but U.S. consultants pared this down to \$17 billion. The Economic Cooperation Act was passed by Congress and signed by President Truman on 3 April 1948.

To supervise the disbursement and utilization of the aid, the U.S. set up the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). No aid could be provided or utilized without the approval of this agency. The ECA was not a government agency but an independent entity that carried out its responsibilities as a private-sector organization. It maintained close links with private-sector groups through its consultative committees. The ECA was structured in this fashion to allow American companies to penetrate European markets and to eliminate obstacles preventing the formation of a single European market.

Across the Atlantic, the Europeans signed a cooperation agreement and established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In 1960 this organization would be transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in which the public and private sectors would work together to regulate national monetary and fiscal policies and strive to promote European stability and integration.

Unlike the Truman Doctrine, Turkey's share in the Marshall Plan was minimal. Turkey was expected to provide the agricultural and mineral products necessary for Europe's reconstruction, and the aid funds were to be utilized to this end.

In the summer of 1947 the American economist Max Weston Thornburg came to Turkey and prepared a report on behalf of the American Twentieth Century Fund. In this report, he indicated what was being requested from Turkey in return for what would be provided under the Marshall Plan. Thornburg wanted Turkey to go for full-scale privatization (this would be on the agenda again in the 1990s), even including the sale of the Karabük Iron and Steelworks (Athanassopoulou, p. 70).

Turkey's modest share in the Marshall Plan and the demands imposed upon it gave rise to disappointment in Turkey. The government was seeking long-term loans and grants. Economic development was high on the agenda at a time when the country was going through the transition from a single-party system to a multiparty system of governance. There was a pressing need for foreign aid for this to happen smoothly.

With the signing of the Economic Cooperation Agreement by Turkey and the U.S. on 4 July 1948, Turkey started receiving aid under the Marshall Plan (Armaoğlu, pp. 168–80). The preamble of the agreement read as follows: "The preservation of the principle of individual freedom, free institutions, and genuine independence in Europe depends in large measure on creating sound economic conditions and establishing stable international economic relations." It was also stated that the agreement was based on the European Economic Cooperation Convention signed by Turkey on 16 April 1948.

Article 1 of the agreement described the manner in which the funds would be disbursed. "The U.S. Government agrees to help the Turkish Republic by providing aid, upon the request of the government of the Republic of Turkey and the approval of the U.S. Government, to the Government of the Republic of Turkey or to a person, institution, or organization designated by that government." With the agreement, the U.S. wanted Turkey to ensure that the aid was used in a manner consistent with the objectives of the plan, to facilitate the OEEC's monitoring

of the manner in which the aid was being utilized, to control competition between public and private commercial enterprises, and to take measures to prevent restrictions on access to markets or actions designed to encourage monopolies.

As in the case of the 12 July 1947 agreement, this agreement also contained provisions in article 7 declaring that Turkey and the U.S. agreed that it was in their mutual interest to give wide publicity to the objectives of the aid and to its accomplishments and that Turkey would take all practical measures to ensure such publicity.

Article 8 provided that Turkey would accept a U.S. Economic Cooperation Mission to supervise the implementation of the agreement. It would be treated as a part of the U.S. Embassy and would enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. By the terms of the agreements, the manner in which the funds and the aid in kind coming from the U.S. would be utilized would conform to the advice of American consultants.

The agreement of 4 July 1948 was not well received by the Turkish public. Many intellectuals, representing all shades of political opinion, complained that the agreement was reminiscent of the capitulations of the Ottoman era and constituted an abject submission to the U.S.

Mehmet Ali Aybar, a socialist leader who was to become the leader of the Turkish Labor Party in the 1960s, wrote that the U.S. was bent on turning Turkey into a colony. The right-wing newspaper *Yeni Sabah* voiced similar misgivings.

## The Utilization of the Aid and Its Consequences

From 1948 to 1952 Turkey received aid amounting to \$352 million under the Marshall Plan. Of this sum, \$175 million was tied aid, meaning procurement had to be from the U.S. The direct aid consisted of \$84 million in loans, \$73 million in grants, and \$17 million in conditional aid. The remainder, amounting to \$177 million, was indirect aid, which meant it could be used for procurement from OEEC countries. Turkey was allocated 3.6% of the funds available under the Marshall Plan. During the same period, Turkey received \$687 million in military aid (Üstün, pp. 48–52).

In line with the advice of American consultants, 60% of the aid funds were spent to develop the agricultural sector. By 1953 Turkey had become a major producer, and for the first time an exporter, of wheat. As agricultural implements and equipment were being imported, there was increasing dependency on imported spare parts. A similar situation already existed in connection with military equipment obtained as aid. This meant that, in the long term, many of the aid funds ended up in the U.S.

Nevertheless, Marshall Plan aid did contribute to the development of Turkish agriculture. With the help of favorable weather conditions, much progress was registered between 1950 and 1954. This allowed the ruling Democratic Party to undertake much development work, even though it was done without proper planning. The American pleas to draw up development plans went unheeded. The Democratic Party enjoyed the support of the rural masses but gradually lost the support of the urban intelligentsia, which wanted to return to the planned statism of the Atatürk and İnönü periods, when policies of industrialization were being pursued.

The U.S. wanted to see the aid funds used also for developing the road network. This resulted in the abandonment of the railway construction effort undertaken in the early years of the Republic. Thousands of kilometers of highways linking all parts of the country were built, and broad avenues were constructed in major cities. On the initiative of American consultants, the Highway Department was established in 1949. As road transport grew, automobiles and other road vehicles began to be imported in growing numbers, leading to a rise in petroleum consumption.

It must not be assumed that all of the investments were carried out with Marshall Plan funds. Turkey's resources were also employed for investments in areas that were selected by American officials. In the 1949 budget, a total of TL 525 million was allocated for investments. Of this sum, TL 225 million was set aside for highway construction, TL 125 million for the construction of ports, and a mere TL 28 million for the manufacturing industry (OTDP, pp. 447–52).

To sum up, Turkey received less aid under the Marshall Plan than expected. Americans determined the areas where the aid money would be spent and decided what the objectives of Turkish economic policies would be. As a result, like the aid provided under Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan was instrumental in early 1950s in paving the way to render Turkey generally dependent on the outside world.

# II. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY PERIOD—I (1950–1955)

## A. The Road Leading to NATO Membership Reasons for Turkey's Interest in NATO

Turkey was closely interested in NATO, the alliance set up in 1949 at the initiative of the U.S. (Box 4-5), for a number of reasons. First, the country was still reeling from the shock of the Soviet demands made in 1945. Turkey had established close cooperation with the U.S. thanks to

the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, but this did not mitigate the concern over the demands coming from its large northern neighbor. There was a fear of being left isolated in the world because of the excessively realistic policies that the Turkish governments had to follow during World War II. Turkey was anxious to remedy this situation by joining the security arrangement set up by the countries of Western Europe and North America. This would allow for the effective defense of Turkish territory and help in modernizing the army.

Second, Turkish leaders were also convinced that by joining NATO Turkey would maintain the pro-Western foreign policy that had been pursued since the establishment of the Republic. As a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949, Turkey felt that it had the right to be admitted to NATO membership.

Third, Ankara felt that the economic aid it was receiving might be cut if Turkey did not join the alliance. As a member of NATO, Turkey wanted to preserve its aid levels and participate in future aid programs.

Finally, the Turkish public also felt that it was in the nation's interest to join NATO. Some Turkish intellectuals argued that in order to succeed in completing the process of building up the multiparty system launched in 1946 Turkey should join the other democratic nations of Europe in NATO. (Similar arguments were advanced in the 1990s in connection with joining the European Union.) Many worried that, if left outside of NATO, Turkey might veer away from democracy. As the main objectives of the Kemalist revolution were being achieved, the younger generation was no longer content with just nationalism. The liberal Western tradition and the associated prosperity had a special attraction for this generation. For economic and political liberalism to be properly assimilated, Turkey had to be represented in all of the institutions of the West. The "American way of life" was having its effect on Turkish society.

# Efforts to Secure Membership during the CHP Period

Turkey welcomed the signing of the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. The government was convinced that such a treaty was essential for Europe's defense and expected an early invitation for Turkey to join the new arrangement. The invitation never came, however, and the government's hopes were dashed.

When news started circulating that this alliance would be strengthened by the participation of the U.S. and Canada, Ankara used every opportunity to declare its eagerness to join the group. Prime minister Hasan Saka

## Box 4-5. The Establishment of NATO and Its Expansion

At the time when the U.S. and the USSR were contending for supremacy after World War II, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels on 17 March 1948. The signing of the Western Union Defense Organization followed in September 1948. This was a military organization to ensure the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. But Europe had not yet healed the scars left by war, and without U.S. participation its defense organization lacked credibility.

In line with the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. had stayed clear of entangling alliances for a whole century. But the circumstances of the Cold War forced the U.S. to abandon its traditional foreign policy. In consultation with the State Department, senator Arthur Vandenberg presented a bill that provided for the U.S., in case of an armed attack, to exercise (in conformity with article 51 of the UN Charter) its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense and thereby contribute to peace. The U.S. Senate approved this bill on 11 June 1948. Any obstacle to American participation in a defense pact involving European countries was thus removed. After this, the signatories of the Treaty of Brussels met in Washington with the representatives of the U.S., Canada, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Iceland and signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. It went into effect on 24 August 1949.

Turkey and Greece joined on 18 February 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany on 23 October 1954, and Spain on 30 May 1982 (Spain only joined the civilian structure of the organization). This raised the number of members to sixteen.

When France left the military structure on 1 July 1966, NATO headquarters was moved from Paris to Brussels. On 14 August 1974 Greece left the military structure, only to return on 20 October 1980.

At the end of the Cold War, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the alliance on 12 March 1999. This raised the NATO membership to nineteen. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO.

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wanted to turn the cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. into a tangible military alliance. On June 1948 he declared: "Turkey is not just any ally, but a very special ally of the United States" (*Ayın Tarihi* [June 1948]).

As the preparatory meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty took place, Turkey kept repeating its wish to be included in the proceedings. At the meeting of the OEEC in February 1949, foreign minister Necmettin Sadak proposed that, if Turkey did not join the Atlantic Pact, a Mediterranean Pact that would include Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and Britain should be established.

Despite all these efforts, Turkey was not allowed to join NATO, leading to much dissatisfaction in the country. On 11 May 1950, when the rule of the CHP was draw-

#### Box 4-6. The Korean War

During World War II, the Korean Peninsula remained under Japanese occupation. After the war, the U.S. and the USSR drew an arbitrary line along the 38th parallel and agreed that those Japanese forces in the peninsula north of the line would surrender to the USSR and those located in the south to the U.S. The negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR over the political future of the Korean Peninsula remained deadlocked. Eventually a socialist state was established in the Soviet-occupied zone, while a capitalist state took over in the U.S. occupied zone.

There were now two antagonistic states in the peninsula: the Korean Democratic Republic (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). On 25 June 1950 war broke out between these two states.

As soon as the war broke out, the U.S. called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. In its resolution, the Security Council appealed to member states to support the measures being taken by the UN to halt the North Koreans. At this point the Soviet Union, which had the right of veto, was boycotting the meetings in protest against the representation of China by Talpeh instead of Peking. Consequently, it was possible for the Security Council to adopt this resolution.

On 27 June U.S. forces became engaged in South Korea. Fifteen countries heeded the UN's appeal and also sent troops to Korea. After the U.S., Turkey sent an infantry brigade, which arrived in Korea on 17 October.

At this time, the UN forces under the command of Gen.

Douglas MacArthur had inflicted a heavy defeat on the North Korean army. After taking 125,000 prisoners, U.S. forces were advancing to the north of the 38th parallel. At this point the People's Republic of China declared that it considered the presence of UN forces in North Korea to be unacceptable. On 25 November 1950 a Chinese army of 180,000 men Joined the war on the side of the North Koreans. The battles that were fought in the region of Kunuri on 26–30 November 1950 were among the bloodiest of the war. The Turkish brigade had been given the task of ensuring the orderly withdrawal of the U.S. forces and suffered heavy losses at Kunuri.

After this confrontation between Chinese and UN forces, the possibility that the USSR might also get involved in the war became real. This led to the signing of a cease-fire on 27 July 1953, which ended the fighting. The cease-fire line (roughly corresponding to the 38th parallel) became the border between the two states, and the prisoners of war were exchanged.

The Korean War was the first armed conflict of the Cold War. The Turkish brigade remained in Korea after the signing of the truce, and the Turkish government continued to cover the salaries and allowances of its military personnel, amounting to \$100,000 a year. After 27 May 1960 the unit was reduced to a symbolic squad. This squad stayed in Korea until 1971, when it was finally repatriated.

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ing to a close, Turkey once again applied to join NATO but failed to gain admission. The Democratic Party government would make the subsequent applications.

## The Korean War and Turkey's Decision to Send Troops

In June 1950 Turkey was closely following the events taking place in Korea (Box 4-6). When the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on members to help South Korea to defend itself, the Cabinet held a meeting in Yalova, where prime minister Adnan Menderes was vacationing. The meeting was attended by president Celal Bayar; the Speaker of the TGNA, Refik Koraltan; and the chief of the General Staff, Nuri Yamut. After that meeting, it was announced on 25 July 1950 that Turkey would send 4,500 troops to Korea. The decision was made without reference to the opposition and without the approval of the TGNA. On 26 July the opposition CHP issued a statement claiming that the decision was a clear violation of the Constitution. This claim was well founded, because article 26 of the 1924 Constitution declared that "the Grand National Assembly shall be responsible for concluding treaties, making peace, declaring war." The government denied that its decision violated the Constitution, declaring that the Constitution did indeed give the responsibility for declaring war to the TGNA but did not indicate what constituted a declaration of war. The government's decision involved sending troops but was not a declaration of war. Hence the Constitution had not been breached.

Despite the stand taken by the opposition, the government did not rescind its decision. Menderes and his colleagues felt that "sending troops to Korea along with the other countries of the free world" constituted an opportunity to gain NATO membership, which must not be missed. On 1 August 1950, within a week of the decision to send troops, the government made its second application to join NATO. This application was turned down at the NATO Ministerial Council held in September. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared a report stating that the membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO would have an adverse impact on the development of the organization, which decisively influenced the NATO Council's decision. The report recommended that, instead of seeking NATO membership, Greece and Turkey should pursue their joint efforts to establish a Mediterranean Pact. Turkey was cool to the idea, because it wanted a treaty with binding clauses (Sever, pp. 66-69).

In the meantime the war in Korea raged on, with the participation of Turkish units. The opposition decided

to drop its arguments about the unconstitutionality of sending troops and aligned itself with the government in supporting the war effort. A resolution was adopted in the TGNA on 27 December 1950 in which the ruling DP and the opposition CHP jointly expressed the solidarity of the Turkish parliament with the troops on combat duty in Korea.

In his statement of 25 October 1951, the leader of the CHP, Ismet Inönü, affirmed that "in the area of foreign policy, there are no differences of opinion or principle in our country. We remain attached to our alliance, to the ideals of the UN, and to our friendship with the United States" (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1951, p. 4). His previous objection to the sending of troops had been fully retracted.

The decision to send troops was well received by the public. Immediately after the decision, the Student Union of İstanbul University organized a meeting with the representatives of the DP, the CHP, and the Party of the Nation at which they backed the government's decision and denounced communism. This backing continued throughout the war. Barraged with government propaganda, the Turks began to view the war in the Far East as if it was in the defense of Turkey itself. This atmosphere was used by the DP as an opportunity to legitimize the decision to send troops.

The attitude of leftist groups to the decision was totally negative. The Peace Association established on 14 July 1950 distributed tracts condemning the decision and was closed down for this on 28 July. Seventeen magazines located in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir were closed down for supporting communism when they published articles and caricatures critical of the decision.

In the first phase, Turkey sent 4,500 men to Korea. Among the fifteen countries with troops in Korea, Turkey had the largest contingent after the U.S. The brigade was commanded by Col. Tahsin Yazıcı and was incorporated within the American 25th Division. The size of the Turkish contingent subsequently rose to 6,000 men. At the Kunuri battle of 26–30 November, the Turkish brigade stood its ground against the Chinese forces despite heavy losses and allowed the American 8th Brigade to retreat in an orderly manner without getting mauled. By the time of the cease-fire (signed on 27 July 1953), 721 Turkish soldiers had been killed in action; 672 had been wounded and repatriated; 1,475 wounded men were receiving treatment in Korea; 175 men were missing; and 234 had been taken prisoner (see Sezgin).

Aside from the constitutionality of dispatching troops to Korea, an exceptional aspect of this action is also

important. Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, Ankara had never gotten involved in a military operation beyond the borders fixed in the National Pact. This was an intervention in a region thousands of kilometers away. With the Korean War, the TGNA started questioning the government's foreign policy, something that had never happened before. The war also had a profound effect on Turkish society.

#### The Proposed Mediterranean Pact

After Turkey's second application for membership in NATO, the U.S. proposed that Turkey and Greece take part in a Mediterranean Pact. This proposal bore some resemblance to the idea of a Middle East Command, which Britain had been advocating for a number of years. It was expected that the pact would include Britain, Italy, Greece, Egypt, and Turkey. This would bring members of NATO and nonmembers with similar orientations together in a pact that would ensure the security of the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey did not consider the idea of the Mediterranean Pact to be very feasible. First, it would be impossible to accommodate Egypt and Britain in the same pact. Second, the Arab states were far from being agreed among themselves on such issues, and it was obvious that Egypt would not join such a pact all by itself. Third, as long as a state of war existed between Israel and the Arab states, it was not possible to set up a defensive pact in the eastern Mediterranean.

Despite its doubts and misgivings, Turkey had not rejected the idea of a Mediterranean Pact altogether. The Turkish government regarded this as a stepping stone to NATO membership. When the U.S. Department of State sent a note to the Turkish Embassy on 19 September proposing that Turkey join in the defense planning of the Mediterranean region, Turkey agreed to the proposal on 21 October. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, wrote an article in the Reader's Digest entitled "U.S. Military Policy in the 1950s," however, in which he claimed that from the perspective of American interests Turkey had no significance for the U.S. As a result, the Turkish leaders realized that Turkey had no alternative to NATO membership (Athanassopoulou, pp. 156–60).

## Turkey in NATO

On 15 May 1951 the U.S. proposed to its allies that Turkey and Greece be admitted to NATO. The shift in U.S. position had nothing to do with Turkey's insistent pursuit of NATO membership. The real cause was the apprehension felt by the U.S. over the changing conditions of the world.

The USSR had announced in 1949 that it possessed atomic weapons. The National Security Council's report No. 68, prepared in April 1950 at the behest of President Truman, warned that "by 1954 the USSR's stocks of atomic bombs and delivery systems would reach levels that could inflict fatal damage to the United States." This meant that the U.S. nuclear monopoly and its ability to deter had come to an end. To respond instantaneously to a Soviet nuclear attack, it was necessary to have air bases in countries located close to the USSR. The U.S. had already sought bases for this purpose from Turkey but had been told that the request could not be granted before NATO membership.

The Korean War was perceived as part of a Communist campaign for world domination. There was the danger that an expansionist move might be made in Europe similar to the one undertaken in the Far East. It was clear that Turkey would be the most likely next victim. A Soviet occupation of Turkey would pose a threat to NATO's future as well as Europe's security.

The developments taking place in Yugoslavia were another reason why the U.S. sought NATO membership for Turkey and Greece. After Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, it had become a prime Soviet target. The best way to protect Yugoslavia and southern Europe was to reinforce NATO's southern flank through Turkish and Greek membership. NATO's supreme commander, General Eisenhower, held the view that the alliance could wield more influence in the Balkans if these two countries became members. Turkey's proximity to the increasingly important Middle Eastern oil fields also made it desirable for Turkey to be admitted to NATO.

Finally, the outstanding performance of the Turkish troops in the Korean War and the sacrifices they made to save American units from annihilation at the Battle of Kunuri made a great impression on Americans. Increasing numbers of Americans now felt that Turkey could not be left alone in the face of the Soviet threat.

The other members of NATO had differing views on the question of Turkish and Greek membership. France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands shared the American view, while Britain held onto the view that Turkey should concentrate on the defense of the Middle East and act in conjunction with the British military establishment in the region. In Britain's view, Turkey and its powerful army could be used as a vehicle for preserving British interests in the Middle East. To this end, the commander of British forces in the Middle East, Gen. Bryan Robertson, paid an official visit to Turkey on 22–24 February 1951. He proposed that, instead of placing the Turkish army under

the Mediterranean command within NATO, Britain and Turkey should form an alliance in the Middle East. The reaction of General Yamut, the Turkish chief of the General Staff, to the British proposal was positive. The government felt that before reaching an agreement with Britain, however, it would be advisable to consult the U.S. This undermined the British proposal, because the U.S. had already made up its mind that Turkey's place was not in a Middle East pact in partnership with Britain but in NATO as a full member. In effect, at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors in the Middle East held in Istanbul on 22 February 1951, the ambassadors recommended that the U.S. should urgently make mutual defense arrangements with Greece and Turkey (Athanassopoulou, pp. 204–5).

The Scandinavian members of the alliance, Norway and Denmark, were uneasy over the extension of NATO's area of responsibility in a way that might force them to go to war for the defense of the Mediterranean region where they had no particular interest. These countries also opposed Greek and Turkish membership on the grounds that NATO was more than a defense alliance and also had political, cultural, and social dimensions, bringing together countries holding similar values. Consequently, it would be wrong to include countries that did not share the traditions of Western Europe and the Atlantic region.

In the face of a common position adopted by the U.S., France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, Britain proposed that the new members be given a different status in the alliance. The founding members and the new members would have a status similar to the status of permanent and nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council. With strong Turkish opposition supported by the U.S., this proposal was rejected. Finally, Britain adopted a more flexible position on the issue of the new members.

At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting held on 16–20 September 1951, it was decided to invite Greece and Turkey to join the alliance. This brought up the issue of which command the new members would come under. Still hankering for the Mediterranean Pact, Britain proposed that Turkey come under a new Middle East Command, to be led by a British general. This command was to be responsible for the defense of the region, including Egypt. The idea of attaching Turkey and Greece to an Aegean or a Balkan Command was also floating around. At the suggestion of France, it was finally decided that the Turkish and Greek armies would fall under the jurisdiction of NATO's Allied Land Forces Southern Europe Command, while their navies would come under a new Middle East Command.

Despite this decision, Britain's Middle East Command initiative never got implemented. Egypt refused to cooperate, claiming that it would infringe on its sovereignty, while Turkey remained cool to an idea with an uncertain future that included areas outside of the Atlantic alliance.

Turkey and Greece were formally admitted to NATO on 18 February 1952.

## B. American Military and Economic Aid America's Reasons for Providing Aid

In the bipolar world that came into being after World War II, the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, started providing aid to countries in their respective camps or to countries they were actively courting. They did this to enhance their influence and effectiveness in world politics. The aid provided could be military, technical, financial, commercial, or social and was furnished through multilateral or bilateral channels.

Especially in the U.S., economists and social scientists were frequently drawing attention to the growing gap between the rich and the poor nations in the postwar period. American politicians were also concerned about the negative consequences of the unequal distribution of wealth in the world. If economic and social conditions were not rapidly improved in certain countries, the Marxist propaganda being disseminated by the USSR might have its intended effect: the lower strata of society might revolt and destroy the nascent bourgeoisie, as had happened in various parts of Europe in 1945. Such a movement could spread in waves throughout the world and bring about the dictatorship of the proletariat and the rejection of the values defended by the West and by the U.S.

To attain its political objectives and to stem the spread of Soviet ideology, the U.S. leadership decided to provide urgent economic aid to Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan. The outbreak of the Korean War, however, caused the nature of the aid furnished to these countries to change from economic to military and political.

When the Korean War came to an end, military aid continued; but there was also growing economic aid. The U.S. was providing foreign aid amounting to 1% of its gross national product. People in the U.S. started questioning the aims of this aid. Would foreign aid actually help turn poor countries into friends of the West? Some American writers claimed that as poor countries raised their living standards with foreign aid they would strengthen their independence. This, in turn, would lead these countries to distance themselves from the pernicious effects of the

Cold War. In the struggle between communism and the West, it was likely that these countries would turn their backs on the West. The policies pursued by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in the mid-1950s tended to reinforce American anxieties.

Another worry for the Americans was the extent to which the recipients of their aid were deserving. U.S. political, social, and business circles were not very knowledgeable about class struggle and social policy issues. The U.S. was established directly as a bourgeois democracy, and its inhabitants had no inkling of the struggles of their European cousins over basic ideological and economic issues. Although the founding of the U.S. has been described as a revolution, America had always been governed according to counterrevolutionary and conservative principles. In the circumstances of the time, the U.S. started providing aid to any country that described itself as anti-Communist, because the important thing was to prevent a Communist revolution. The U.S. was not much concerned about whether the aid recipient country's leaders were flouting democracy and Western values. The political and social upheavals that took place in the countries receiving aid during the 1960s were proof of the failure of America's poorly planned and misdirected aid policies.

The reasons for furnishing aid to Turkey: with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey started receiving considerable amounts of American military and economic aid. This aid increased further with Turkey's membership in NATO. There were four basic reasons for giving aid to Turkey. The first consideration of the U.S. was to minimize the damage to NATO from a possible Soviet attack through Turkey. In the event of such an attack on a weak member of the alliance such as Turkey, the Soviet Union would achieve its objectives before outside help could be brought in. During the 1952 Lisbon meeting, NATO foreign ministers focused their attention on an ambitious plan designed to build up national conventional forces within a decade. A weak Turkey could not succeed in doing this. The U.S. wanted to strengthen and modernize the Turkish army so that it could carry out the task assigned by NATO. The military assistance would accelerate the army's modernization, while economic aid would help alleviate the bottlenecks appearing in the economy due to heavy defense outlays.

The second reason was the increasing number of U.S. bases being established in Turkey. The aid would be utilized for the defense of these bases. Turkey continued to have strategic value for NATO in the 1950s and 1960s. But the U.S. also wanted to use its military presence in Turkey for purposes not related to NATO, such as interven-

Table 4-4. U.S. Economic Aid, 1948-1965 (million \$)

| 1948-52 | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959  | 1960 | 1961  | 1962  | 1963  | 1964  | 1965  |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 197.1   | 46.2 | 92.3 | 68.1 | 99.9 | 96.9 | 85.7 | 103.3 | 84.4 | 101.9 | 135.0 | 130.5 | 101.6 | 152.1 |

Source: Baskın Oran, "Türkiye'nin Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?" AÜSBF Dergisi 25, no. 1 (1970): 79. (Table by Baskın Oran)

ing in the Middle East to control political developments in the region. Military and economic aid was provided to assuage the possible negative Turkish reactions to such interventions.

The third reason for continued U.S. military and economic aid was to keep Turkey in NATO and prepare it for getting involved in American-inspired organizations such as the Baghdad Pact. The nonaligned movement, which got started in the mid-1950s, might also tempt Turkey. A nonaligned or neutral Turkey was highly undesirable from the point of view of pursuing U.S. interests in the region.

The fourth reason for the aid was that U.S. leaders felt that it was in their interest, as well as in NATO's interest, to have a politically and economically stable Turkey. The continued aid would create favorable economic conditions, which would ensure political stability.

## Turkey's Reaction to the Aid

Turkish governments were frequently stressing the country's democratic and secular nature and its attachment to Western values, especially after World War II. After the coming to power of the Democratic Party, policies continued to be pursued to Westernize Turkey and to allow it to take its rightful place among Western nations. The Democratic Party's model of the West was the U.S. Prime Minister Menderes believed that to turn Turkey into "a little America" would mean achieving a contemporary standard of development. In these circumstances, the cultural, religious, and social differences between Turkish and American societies and their differing perceptions of democracy were being totally ignored.

The DP government welcomed American military and economic aid. It also expected this aid to grow as Turkey's foreign policy was increasingly harmonized with America's. While the U.S. failed to achieve its policy objective of creating an environment of intensive economic cooperation in the Middle East due to the nationalist backlash started by Mosaddeq in Iran and Nasser in Egypt, no such backlash occurred in Turkey.

After 1954 the Turkish economy started to falter as a consequence of haphazard economic policies brought about by overreliance on American aid. The balance of trade went into deficit, inflation rose, and the Turkish currency became unstable, forcing the government to seek urgent remedies. But instead of taking corrective measures to nurse the economy back to health, the government resorted to seeking more foreign aid to overcome the crisis. In March 1954 president Celal Bayar and in June prime minister Adnan Menderes went to the U.S. and pleaded for increased aid. The U.S. not only turned down Menderes's request for \$300 million in supplementary aid but also called for the reduction of agricultural subsidies. By doing so, the U.S. was interfering directly in the conduct of Turkey's economic policy. (The IMF was to make a similar request for cuts in agricultural support prices in the 1990s.) At Turkey's insistence, the level of aid was increased for a while; but when that level started coming down in 1958, Turkey was plunged into a serious economic crisis.

## The Volume of Aid and Its Utilization

From 1949 to 1953 Turkey received \$225.1 million worth of American economic aid. Military aid amounted to \$305.7 million during the same period. From 1954 to 1962 the volume of economic aid reached \$867.5 million, while military aid rose to \$1.55 billion.

The aid received under the Marshall Plan consisted mostly of loans, whereas the bulk of the aid after 1952 was furnished in the form of grants, because of Turkey's economic difficulties. At first, these grants were directed into investments in areas chosen by American consultants; but after 1954 they were used to pay for imports. After 1954 grants were no longer in the form of cash. From that year on, Washington started providing aid in kind, consisting mostly of surplus U.S. agricultural products.

Between 1952 and 1958 the loans provided carried interest ranging from 2.5 to 4% and repayment terms from thirty-five to forty years. By 1958 aid in the form of loans had practically disappeared, but it was resumed in 1963.

The annual volume of American aid, consisting of grants, loans, and other forms of aid, from U.S. calendar years 1948 to 1965 is shown in Table 4-4 (Oran, p. 79).

The American economic aid was directed into areas determined by the U.S., rather than to meeting Turkey's requirements. A large portion of the aid was used to import agricultural machinery and road-building equipment

from the U.S. The number of tractors rose from 1,000 to 40,000 from 1940 to 1955. Land under the plow increased from 14,542,000 hectares in 1950 to 22,453,000 hectares in 1956. Turkey had to purchase the spare parts for the American equipment for cash from its manufacturers, so the U.S. was able to recover its aid money by this indirect method. This mechanism, employed during the Marshall Plan, continued to be used later. The funds thus recovered from the sale of machinery were used to provide military aid to Turkey. In this way, it became possible for the U.S. to provide both economic and military aid with a single appropriation.

The remainder of the money was used, on a limited scale, for investments. These investments included the development of the Meat and Fish Enterprise and the coke ovens at Karabük.

#### Privileges Granted to American Investors

The leaders of the Democratic Party were convinced that Turkey's economic recovery could only come about through new American economic aid. To secure this extra aid, it would be necessary to grant American businesses the opportunity to invest in Turkey.

Before the Democratic Party came to power, the CHP government had removed some of the obstacles to foreign investment and taken measures to facilitate the repatriation of profits. When the Democratic Party came to power, it passed a Law on Foreign Investments on 1 August 1951, further liberalizing the conditions for foreign investors. But the incentives provided by this law did not lead to the expected rise in foreign investments.

After this, the government enacted Law No. 6224 on 18 January 1954, entitled the Law for the Promotion of Foreign Investments. This law had been prepared to conform to the recommendations of American business leaders and economists. This law removed all restrictions on the repatriation of profits by foreign investors. Foreign investors also acquired all of the rights enjoyed by Turkish businesses. The terms of this law were so generous to foreign investors that the chairman of the U.S. Commission of Foreign Economic Policy, Clarence B. Randall, described it as the "most liberal law in the world" (Behramoğlu, p. 23).

The Law for the Promotion of Foreign Investments was followed by the Petroleum Law of 7 March 1954. As in the case of the previous law, this law too was prepared in cooperation with American experts, notably Max Ball, who had prepared Israel's petroleum law. Under the terms of this law, the profits from the extraction of oil in Turkey would be split 50-50 between the state and the foreign oil company.

These laws were not intended to benefit only American investors, but in practice many of those who took advantage of the legislation were Americans. Of the foreign investments made in Turkey from 1954 to 1965, 30.5% came from the U.S., 17.5% from Switzerland, and 17% from the Netherlands (Kongar, p. 349).

The main opposition party, the CHP, described these two laws as the "resurrection of the capitulations" and used that expression as the main theme of its 1954 election campaign. Confident that it had the support of the masses that brought it to power, the DP dismissed the criticism of the opposition and waited for the influx of foreign investments that never came. Despite these extraliberal laws, the economic instability after 1954 and political turmoil kept the level of foreign investments far below the set targets.

## C. Turkish-American Bilateral Agreements Principal Bilateral Agreements

When the question of Turkey's admission to NATO was under discussion, Turkey and the U.S. concluded some important agreements (Box 4-7). Here we consider five of the principal bilateral agreements concluded during the first half of the DP's tenure of power, while those concluded after 1955 are dealt with below.

Mutual Security Agreement: this agreement was based on an exchange of letters dated 17 October 1951, at a time when Turkey had been invited to accede to NATO, and ratified by the TGNA on 10 March 1954. Although the English title of the agreement was Agreement between the USA and Turkey Regarding Mutual Security, the Turkish text submitted to the TGNA had the following title: Law for the Ratification of the Agreement dated 7 January 1952 Amending the Revised Economic Cooperation Agreement Concluded between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America. This was done to facilitate the ratification procedure by not referring to the political and military aspects of the agreement (Armaoğlu, p. 184).

The agreement consisted of seven articles. In article 2, Turkey undertook to take appropriate measures to strengthen peace by promoting international understanding and goodwill; take action, in agreement with the U.S., for the purpose of eliminating the causes of international tension; carry out the military responsibilities emanating from agreements and treaties to which the U.S. was also a party, to the extent that its personnel resources, facilities, and general economic conditions allowed; take part as much as possible, consistent with its political and economic stability, in the development and preservation of its defense capability and the free world's defense capability; and take all reasonable measures to secure the effec-

## Box 4-7. The Bilateral Agreements between Turkey and the United States

As Turkish-American relations developed, particularly in the military field, numerous military, economic, and technical cooperation agreements were concluded between the two countries. These agreements started becoming controversial among the Turkish public and their representatives in parliament in the mid-1950s and continued to be unpopular as anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments grew, until the beginning of the 1970s.

Even today neither the exact number of these agreements nor their contents are fully known in Turkey. Also, government officials have provided different information at different times. In April 1966 prime minister Süleyman Demirel declared that fifty-four bilateral agreements were concluded between 1952 and 1960. In 1970 the Turkish government officials stated that there were ninety-one such agreements. The disparity arose because most of the agreements were classified and were never submitted to the TGNA.

Based on the figures provided by Demirel in 1966, three agreements were concluded prior to 1950, thirty-one in the 1950s, and twenty from 1960 to 1965. Of these agreements, sixteen had been approved with a law, twelve were technical cartographic agreements, four were scientific cooperation agreements, and thirteen were related to the implementation of the 1954 Military Installations Agreement. The remainder had to do with U.S. ald and the status of installations. In making his statement Demirel insisted that there were no U.S. military bases in Turkey as claimed, only installations.

In their objection to the bilateral agreements, the opposition parties as well as the general public complained mainly that the constitutional formalities regarding the ratification of agreements with foreign countries had not been observed in most of these agreements. Article 26 of the 1924 Constitution, which was in force until 1960, declared that "it is the prerogative of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to carry out actions like concluding conventions and treaties or making peace with foreign states." According to this provision, the executive could negotiate and formulate the texts of agreements with the representatives of foreign states; but for these texts to have validity, they had to be approved by the TGNA. After 1925, however, governments were able to secure parliamentary approval for this authority to be delegated to the Council of Ministers in particular circumstances. One of these laws that delegated power was the Law on the Implementation and Revision of Article VII, Paragraph 3A (ii), and Article VIII of the Convention on the Status of Forces among the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The government relied on this law to implement many of the Turkish-American bilateral agreements and also used it to respond to the opposition's objections.

In the 1961 Constitution, responsibility for the ratification of agreements was divided between the executive and the legislature. Article 65 provided that, for the president of the Republic to sign an agreement and bring it into force, the agreement had to obtain the approval of the TGNA.

Despite this provision, in line with past practice, laws were passed that allowed the Council of Ministers to conclude, approve, and promulgate certain agreements. Of these, the most important was the law dated 31 May 1963 entitled the "Law Conferring Responsibility for Concluding, Making Effective, and Promulgating International Treatles to the Council of Ministers." After 1963 this law was used to steer many bilateral agreements away from parliamentary approval. An application to declare this law unconstitutional was rejected by the Constitutional Court.

Whatever the constitutional provisions, governments were able to ratify certain agreements without going to the parliament. Some of these agreements drastically changed the traditional orientation of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. The ratification of such agreements without the benefit of a parliamentary debate may have been in accordance with the letter of the law but was in conflict with political and democratic principles.

(Ç. ERHAN)

tive utilization of the economic and military aid furnished by the U.S.

Thus, even before it became a NATO member, Turkey had committed itself to support and if necessary assist U.S. military operations.

The agreement of 4 July 1948 contained provisions about the distribution of aid furnished to Turkey under the Marshall Plan. Article 4, 5, and 6 of the Mutual Security Agreement made references to this agreement and thereby secured the same facilities for military aid as had been foreseen for American products entering Turkey under the previous agreement regulating American economic aid (Armaoğlu, pp. 184–87).

NATO Status of Forces Agreement: the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed by the NATO member states on 19 June 1951. When Turkey joined NATO, it too signed this agreement, on 25 August 1952, and the agreement was ratified by the TGNA on 20 March 1954.

With this agreement, Turkey accepted the establishment of U.S. military installations and bases and the stationing of U.S. troops on its territory. Some of the provisions of the agreement were ambiguous and open to interpretation, which would lead to many problems in connection with offenses committed by American military personnel in Turkey. These problems would create much resentment against the U.S. military presence in Turkey.

The most important article of the agreement was article 7, dealing with criminal jurisdiction (Armaoğlu, pp. 197–98). The article states:

[T]he military authorities of the sending State [the U.S.] shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State [Turkey] all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State... The authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over

the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State... The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.

These provisions clearly delineated the scope of the jurisdictions of both Turkey and the U.S. In other words, if an offense was punishable by U.S. laws, the person would be tried by the U.S.; and if it was an offense under Turkish laws, the person would be tried by Turkey.

But there was much room for argument over provisions concerning the procedure to be followed in cases involving a conflict of jurisdictions, when the offense broke the laws of both states:

In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply: The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to offenses solely against the property or security of that State, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent, or offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty. In the case of any other offense, the authorities of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

It was clear that Turkish courts could not claim jurisdiction in the case of an American who had committed an offense while carrying out official duties. Since the nature of the offense was not specified, this provision covered all offenses. Furthermore, there was no provision in the agreement specifying which party would decide on whether the accused person was carrying out official duties. The Turkish public had justified misgivings that these gaps might be misused.

A bilateral agreement was concluded on 28 July 1956 to eliminate this uncertainty: henceforth the U.S. commander in Turkey would be competent to decide whether the accused person was carrying out official duties. This rendered the problem more intractable. In conformity

with this agreement, the Ministry of Justice sent a circular to local public prosecutors informing them that it would be the head of the Joint U.S. Military Mission of Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) who would decide whether the accused person was performing official duties. In this way, a foreign judiciary authority was being allowed to get involved with the trial of a person who had committed an offense on Turkish territory.

Agreement on Military Installations: after its accession to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, Turkey concluded an agreement with the U.S. on U.S. military installations on its territory. The agreement was signed on 23 June 1954, based on the authorization given to the Council of Ministers by the TGNA on 27 August 1953. Because this newly signed agreement was considered to be in the category of agreements related to the implementation of an agreement already ratified by the TGNA, it was never submitted to the parliament for approval. The text of the agreement was kept classified until it was partially disclosed in 1970 by a member of the National Unity Committee (the junta that carried out the 27 May 1960 coup), Haydar Tunçkanat, in his book İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü (The Inside Story of the Bilateral Agreements) (Tunckanat, pp. 221-32).

Many technical agreements were concluded between Turkey and the U.S. based on this agreement, with the full title of Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Relative to the Implementation of the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces." Among these were agreements relating to flight control, communications and electronics, warheads, and nuclear installations.

With the Military Installations Agreement, the U.S. army, air force, and navy obtained permission to use Turkish territory. Exactly where the military installation (described as a defense installation, base, or position) would be located was not specified. It was agreed that U.S. military aircraft could use Turkish military airfields, that (after obtaining Turkish government authorization) materials, equipment, fuel, and supplies could be stored in the bases to be established, and that the two countries would share the expenses of bases and installations to be used jointly.

A short time after the U.S. signed the Installations Agreement with Turkey, it also signed a similar agreement with Greece. By examining the provisions of the agreement with Greece, which were not classified, it is possible to get an idea of the content of the secret provisions of the agreement with Turkey. The U.S.-Greek Installations Agreement of 12 October 1953 provided that, for the purpose of carrying out NATO's objectives, the U.S. was au-

thorized to use the roads and maritime nayigation routes in Greece, to establish and develop military installations, and to introduce its armed forces and its equipment into Greek territory. The military installations established by the U.S. would become the property of the U.S. government, and, when necessary, the movable equipment could be removed from the country. Permission was granted for the operation of the Army Post Office for the use of American military personnel.

Over the years more than ninety U.S. installations, both military and civilian, were established in Turkey under the Installations Agreement.

Tax Exemption Agreement: an agreement for exempting American personnel from taxes was signed on 24 June 1954 in conjunction with the Installations Agreement. The expenses incurred by Americans for mutual defense would be tax-free under the agreement. It was not clearly specified, however, which expenses and materials would not be included in the classification coming under mutual defense. Provision had been made in the agreement for both sides to take the necessary measures to prevent abuses in the duty-free import of personal belongings of military personnel. In the implementation of the agreement, the Turkish side showed great flexibility. No customs duties, transportation taxes, or other charges were levied on the personal belongings of U.S. military personnel. The electricity, city gas, fuels, postal and telephone services, alcoholic beverages, and cigarettes consumed in American installations were all obtained tax-free.

Like the Installations Agreement, the Tax Exemption Agreement was also considered an implementation agreement and therefore not submitted to the TGNA for ratification.

Atomic Energy Agreement: the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy was signed on 10 June 1955 and ratified by the TGNA on 14 December 1956. This agreement stated that the U.S. would provide scientific aid for the establishment in Turkey of nuclear research centers for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Article 2 stipulated that the enriched uranium to be provided by the U.S. would be on a loan basis. Article 9 declared that "the parties hoped and expected that the agreement would lead to further cooperation in the planning, construction, and operation of energy-producing reactors." This indicated that the research reactor to be established would be the first step toward the construction of energy-producing reactors in the future.

The Problems Arising from the Bilateral Agreements The preceding section contains the principal Turkish-American bilateral agreements concluded between the end of World War II and 1955. Other agreements were concluded later (discussed in other chapters below).

The Turkish-American bilateral agreements brought undeniable benefits to Turkey in the military and economic fields. But they also had contrary effects. One of these originated from the provisions of the 20 March 1954 NATO Agreement Regarding the Status of Forces (dealing with jurisdiction over foreign military personnel) and caused much popular discontent. One striking example will suffice to demonstrate why this was so.

In November 1959 Lt. Col. Allen L. Morrison, stationed in Adana, was driving his private car while drunk and plowed into a group of pedestrians on the sidewalk, killing one and injuring eleven. In conformity with the agreement and the circular of the Ministry of Justice, the Turkish authorities consulted the American commander of the Incirlik base. Upon being told that the officer was on official duty, they handed him over to the American personnel on the base. Morrison was tried by an American court-martial, found to be in breach of discipline, fined a mere \$1,200, and transferred back to the U.S.

This incident had the effect of justifying the opposition to the U.S. military presence in Turkey. The case of Lieutenant Colonel Morrison was cited for years as an illustration of how American military personnel enjoyed judicial privileges and immunities reminiscent of the former capitulations. The shortcomings of the status agreement were partially remedied with a new bilateral agreement signed in 1968.

Along with the bilateral military agreements, the structure of the Turkish army was also changed. Prior to World War II, the Turkish armed forces were modeled on the German, French, and British armies. After Turkey's accession to NATO, every aspect of the army was restructured according to the American model (including cadres, organization, training methods, drill-books, uniforms, doctrines, rules, etc.). This was considered necessary to achieve common standards in NATO armies.

# III. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY PERIOD—II (1955–1960)

## A. Emerging Disagreements in Bilateral Relations

Until 1954 the economy had been developing rapidly, boosted by massive foreign aid. Bottlenecks began to appear later, as a result of shrinking aid, incompetent economic management, and a drought that hit agriculture, the mainstay of the economy. When the Korean War came to an end, the U.S. and Canada released their stocks of grain on the world market, depressing the price of wheat,

which happened to be one of Turkey's primary export items. This was a further blow to the Turkish economy.

Between 1948 and 1954 most of the costs of development projects were being covered by foreign aid and in particular U.S. aid. By 1955, however, foreign aid covered a mere 10% of the cost of projects. As investments fell and the agricultural sector remained depressed, the volume of exports decreased rapidly. This in turn widened the trade gap and depleted foreign exchange reserves. As a consequence, the government was forced to curtail the import of certain goods. Sectors highly dependent on imports suffered, and inflation soared.

The government felt that the only way out of this bottleneck, which was damaging its political standing, was to secure more aid. Starting in 1955, prime minister Adnan Menderes made insistent appeals to the U.S. At the same time, Turkey applied to the IMF, which it had joined in 1947, to secure loans. As a first step, Turkey was requesting \$300 million in aid from Washington. At the technical-level meeting held in İstanbul in June 1955, the American side set certain conditions for providing this aid: inflationary policies had to be reversed, agricultural credits and price support had to be curbed, urgent tax reforms had to be carried out, and the Turkish currency had to be devalued. The IMF was making similar demands and refusing to provide loans before measures were taken to stabilize the Turkish economy. When Turkey refused to meet these conditions, the negotiations were suspended. After this, the U.S. stopped making requests on economic measures to Turkey directly to avoid straining bilateral relations further. These economic requests would now be conveyed to Ankara indirectly through the IMF.

When the long-awaited American aid failed to materialize, the economy deteriorated further. This led to the resignation of the government on 29 November 1955. The new government invited American experts to Turkey to work on the economic stabilization program. But the Americans once again came up with an extremely radical program. The DP government was against curbing agricultural subsidies; nor would it agree to devaluation. As a result, it had to make do with a \$25 million aid package.

The \$25 million in aid failed to redress the economic problems. When the government finally realized that the aid it was seeking would not be forthcoming, the Turkish lira was devalued on 3 August 1958 from 2.8 to the U.S. dollar to 9. Rigid credit ceilings were imposed on banks. Sectoral import quotas were introduced, but the three-year development plan recommended by the U.S. was ignored.

After the devaluation, the U.S., the World Bank, the IMF, and the European Payments Union provided an

aid package of \$359 million. In addition, the U.S. and the members of the European Payments Union agreed to reschedule those Turkish debts that were in arrears. Despite the massive aid, the 1960 budget would still show a deficit of \$387 million (*OTDP*, pp. 452–59).

After 1955 political differences with the U.S. also cropped up, caused mostly by the activities of American NGOs and media. In 1955 the *New York Times* published an article criticizing Turkey for applying censorship to the press. The Associated Press sent a telegram to president Celal Bayar demanding that detained newspaper reporters be released. In the same year, the American Mineworkers Union applied to the U.S. Department of the Interior and requested that all military and economic aid to Turkey be suspended until improvements were made in the working conditions of Turkish workers. These moves got a frosty reception in Turkey.

Opposition parties were highly critical of the economic privileges granted to U.S. firms investing in Turkey. The argument that the DP was using U.S. aid for partisan politics was dragging relations with the U.S. into Turkey's domestic politics. The Agreement on Expropriation and Confiscation signed with the U.S. in 1957 came to the TGNA for ratification in January 1959. The agreement provided that the U.S. government could be a party to disputes between American firms investing in Turkey and Turkish firms. The U.S. government could also intervene in cases where an American company was expropriated in Turkey. In the parliamentary debate, the opposition expressed its outrage at these provisions, which reminded everyone of the capitulations. The Turkish public would argue about this for a long time.

Compared to the tensions experienced in the 1960s, these problems were of minor importance and did not affect the general course of bilateral relations. These minor problems contained the seeds of future problems, however, and it would be a mistake to minimize their effect.

## B. Turkish-American Cooperation in the Middle East

#### Eisenhower and the New Look Strategy

The Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR started during Harry Truman's term as president. But it was during the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower, elected in 1952, and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, that the Cold War spread and intensified. Eisenhower, the first commander-in-chief of NATO forces, and Dulles, who conducted the peace negotiations with Japan under Truman, were convinced that communism under Soviet and Chinese leadership was a threat on a global scale. In this

context, in October 1953 Eisenhower started implementing a National Security Council decision known as the New Look Strategy.

The New Look Strategy had four main components.

(1) To deter a Soviet military move, the strategy of massive retaliation, including the use of nuclear weapons, would be developed.

(2) Psychological warfare using intensive propaganda would be waged, particularly to impair the USSR's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

(3) In conjunction with psychological warfare, the CIA would carry out covert operations in countries threatened by communism.

(4) The policy of containment launched during the Truman administration would be maintained and extended to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region (Gaddis, pp. 164–98).

During the Eisenhower administration, much effort was concentrated on the development of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to ensure a credible deterrence. The establishment of military bases in close proximity to the USSR was also accelerated. The construction of American bases in Turkey was part of this effort.

Dulles coined the concept of captive nations as part of the psychological war that was being waged. According to Dulles, 800 million people worldwide were living as captive nations under the physical and ideological yoke of communism. The U.S. would do whatever it took to free these nations. The concept of captive Turks in vogue in Turkey was inspired by Dulles's model. The Turanian parties and circles were bandying the term "captive Turks" in those days, and the issue would remain on their agenda until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The CIA was managing the operational part of psychological warfare. In 1947 the journal Foreign Affairs published the article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by George F. Kennan, who signed the article as "Mr. X" to maintain his anonymity. It was this article that brought him fame and contributed to the evolution of the concept of the Cold War. Kennan was also one of the architects of the Marshall Plan. Upon his proposal, the CIA undertook covert operations overseas, starting in 1948. During the Eisenhower-Dulles years, these operations were stepped up. In 1953 the government of Iran and in 1954 the government of Guatemala were overthrown by coups backed by the CIA. The CIA was also involved in unsuccessful coup attempts first in Indonesia in 1958 and then in Cuba in 1960. The CIA was organizing protest activities in Eastern Europe and instigating armed attacks on the People's Republic of China from Burma and Laos.

One of the priority objectives of the New Look Strategy was the pursuit of the policy of containment. In a

long-haul ideological struggle like the Cold War, Dulles wanted all countries to commit themselves unequivocally. For Dulles, there could be no room for either non-alignment or neutrality. Eisenhower showed greater understanding toward the nonaligned, however, perhaps recalling that the U.S. had been neutral during most of World War I. After reaching a compromise between Dulles's all-or-nothing approach and Eisenhower's more flexible approach, the U.S. went to work to establish anti-Communist alliances among the countries outside the nonaligned camp. In 1954 Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and the U.S. set up the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Bilateral security agreements were concluded with South Korea and Taiwan (Box 4-8).

With the establishment of SEATO, the containment through encirclement of the USSR and the People's Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region was completed. Now it was the turn of the Middle East, a region at least as important strategically for the U.S. and its Western allies as the Asia-Pacific region. A defensive alliance on the SEATO model was to be established there. For this purpose, the U.S. would set up the Baghdad Pact, with the help of its Turkish ally.

### The Baghdad Pact and the U.S.

The idea of bringing America's friends in the Middle East together in a defensive pact to ward off communism came from Washington. The U.S. was wary about becoming a full member, however, and decided to participate with the status of an observer.

This was because the Baghdad Pact Treaty stipulated that only those countries recognized by the member states could be admitted as members. This precluded the membership of Israel, not recognized by Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. This in turn led Israel to claim that the pact was anti-Israel and that it would embolden the Arab states. In these circumstances, the U.S. could not afford to alienate its best friend in the Middle East by joining the Baghdad Pact as a full member.

Another reason for the U.S. not to become a full member had to do with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Saudi oil was being extracted by American companies, and Washington could not afford to place U.S. interests in that country under jeopardy. Furthermore, attracted by the slogan of peaceful coexistence, Egypt was moving ever closer to the USSR. Keenly aware of Nasser's high standing among the Arabs, the U.S. did not want to lose Egypt completely.

Finally, there was also the danger that full U.S. membership might prompt the USSR to follow a similar course

#### Box 4-8. Geopolitical Theories

When the conflict of interests involving Britain, Germany, France, and Russia intensified in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, military and political analysts were trying to determine who the winners and losers in this struggle would be. Theories were developed to locate the strategic center of gravity of the globe in order to determine who would end up by dominating the world.

At first such theories did not have many followers, but things changed when the British geographer Halford John Mackinder delivered a lecture at the Royal Geographical Institute in 1904. The title of his lecture was "The Geographical Axis of History." According to Mackinder, the landmass of Asia, Africa, and Europe constituted an island on a global scale, and this region constituted the world's vital strategic center. He claimed that the most important center of the global island was the region between Eastern Siberia and the Volga basin, which was a huge plain with only the Ural Mountains dividing it. Mackinder called this region the heartland. He summarized his views as follows: whoever dominates Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; whoever dominates the heartland dominates the global island; and whoever dominates the global island dominates the world:

In Mackinder's theory, countries in the immediate vicinity of the heartland—Germany, Austria, the Ottoman State, India, and China—were the inner crescent of inner belt. Those farther afield—including Britain, South Africa, Australia, the U.S., Canada, and Japan—were the outer crescent.

When this theory was formulated, the heartland was under the control of Germany and Russia. According to Mackinder's theory, an alliance between Germany and Russia could end up with them dominating the world. To eliminate such a threat, it would be necessary to establish a belt of independent states between Germany and Russia to act as an effective barrier.

Although Mackinder's theory did not command a large following in Britain, his own country, it made a huge impact in Germany, where Gen. Karl Haushofer developed the theory into the concept of *Lebensraum* (living space), which would inspire Hitler's policies in the next century. The American Nicholas J. Spykman developed another geopolitical theory. It was based on Mackinder's theory but was more effective than its precursor in terms of producing results. Spykman argued that to dominate the world it was necessary to get hold of the inner circle. His argument was that possession of the inner circle allowed control of Eurasia and the possession of Eurasia allowed control of the globe.

Starting with John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, many Western leaders based their strategies during the Cold War on Spykman's theory. In the 1950s, when the USSR began to challenge the U.S., the inner crescent region consisted of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, China, Korea, and Eastern Siberia. Inspired by these theories, Dulles took the lead in establishing SEATO and the Baghdad Pact on the NATO model.

Another follower of Mackinder, Col. Harry Sachaklian, advanced the idea of deploying strategic air power in the periphery of the USSR. According to Sachaklian, Mackinder's theory was valid, but with the proviso that air supremacy was essential.

During the Eisenhower administration, air bases were established in the pro-American countries located in the inner circle. The Northern Tier, designed to encircle the USSR, was being created by these means. This belt was labeled the Northern Tier because it included Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan but not the Arab countries located to the south, which refused to Join.

With the onset of détente toward the end of the 1960s and the Introduction of weapons systems like intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles, all kinds of thermonuclear weapons, and military satellites into the arsenals of the super powers, geopolitical theories based on the nineteenth-century balance of power became irrelevant. Concepts like geostrategy and geoeconomics would replace these outdated theories (see Box 7-8 in Section 7).

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(Source: Erdal Hamzaoğulları, "Jeopolitik Kavramı ve Günümüz Jeopolitiği," thesis, Ankara University, 1996)

and establish its own pact in a region where it was eager to gain a firm foothold.

## The Eisenhower Doctrine

The background: when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, France and Britain, in cooperation with Israel, prepared a secret plan and attacked the canal at the end of October. Peaceful since 1949, the Middle East was suddenly plunged into war. After taking an active part in the UN to end the Suez crisis and assuming the role of protector of the Arabs in their struggle against imperialism, the USSR's influence and prestige in the region were rising fast, much to the alarm of U.S. leaders. The Suez crisis had also dealt a blow to the British position in the Middle East, forcing the U.S. to deepen its involvement in the region. Within the framework of the New Look Strategy, Eisenhower and Dulles established the Northern

Tier (see Box 4-8 above) in the form of the Baghdad Pact with a view to containing the USSR in the region. Despite this, Moscow succeeded in establishing warm relations with the Arab states, particularly with Syria and Egypt, causing apprehension in Washington.

At the summit meeting of the Baghdad Pact held on 29 November 1956, the U.S. declared that it would consider any attack on the territorial integrity and political independence of any member state to be a hostile act directed at America. The U.S. was seeking to prevent the USSR from upsetting the regional balance through indirect means, by using Syria and Egypt as proxies.

On 5 January 1957 Eisenhower submitted to Congress the policy paper that would come to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a turning point in the U.S. Middle East policy. Until that time, the U.S. had been conducting policy in the Middle East through Britain and

friendly regional countries. Now it would be asserting its vital interests in the region directly, without intermediaries (Armaoğlu, pp. 240–48).

In his message to Congress, Eisenhower declared: "Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks... The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East." Eisenhower was criticizing the USSR's increasing involvement in a region that was of utmost importance to the U.S.

Eisenhower stressed two points. The first point: "It [the Middle East] contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa... If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation." Eisenhower's second point: "the Middle East is the birthplace of three great religions... Mecca and Jerusalem are more than places on the map... It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism." Eisenhower was openly appealing to religious sentiments with these views.

Based on this, Eisenhower sought congressional authorization in three areas:

- 1. Authorization for the U.S. government to undertake cooperation programs, also including military assistance, in the Middle East with any nation or group of nations that desires such aid.
- 2. Authorization to provide assistance and cooperation, including the use of U.S. armed forces, to ensure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of those nations that request aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.
- 3. Authorization for the president to use, at his discretion, sums to be made available under the Mutual Security Act for economic and defensive military purposes during the years 1958 and 1959.

Congress approved these requests on 9 January 1957. The president got the green light not only to cooperate with Middle Eastern countries and strengthen their economies to assist them in preserving their independence but also to intervene militarily in the region.

The reactions to the doctrine: the Eisenhower Doctrine was an important milestone in America's Middle Eastern policy. It also marked one of the times when the Cold War reached a peak of intensity. After congressional approval of the doctrine, Eisenhower delivered a speech on 10 January in which he stated that the U.S. was determined to confront the Soviet threat anywhere in the world. He went on to declare that "America's interests are on a global scale. They extend to the two hemispheres and all the continents. America's interests coincide with the interests of all the nations of the free world. Only by respecting peace and the rights of all nations can these interests be furthered."

The sharpest reaction came from the USSR. Moscow called on the U.S., Britain, and France to make a formal commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries. There was no positive response from these countries to the Soviet proposal.

As of the end of January 1957 it started to become apparent which Middle Eastern countries were for and against the doctrine. On 19–20 January the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq met in Ankara and released a joint communiqué welcoming the doctrine. The nonregional member of the Baghdad Pact, Britain, did not share the view of the regional members: it realized that with the proclamation of the doctrine it had lost its regional leadership to the U.S.

Lebanon, Libya, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq formally announced that they were acceding to the doctrine. Other Arab countries, notably Egypt, remained distinctly cool toward it. Even America's principal ally in the Middle East, Israel, stayed away from the doctrine, out of fear that joining might sharpen Arab hostility to its existence.

The consequences of the doctrine for Turkey: ambassador James P. Richards, Eisenhower's special advisor, paid an official visit to Ankara. A joint communiqué was issued on that occasion on 22 March 1957, by which Turkey acceded to the doctrine. The communiqué reaffirmed that it was America's firm and unchanging goal to establish a just peace in a world where moral values would prevail. It also stated that it was in the common interest of America and the nations of the Middle East that the region would be secure against communism.

The main elements of the Eisenhower Doctrine were included in the text of the communiqué, and Turkey's approval of the doctrine was confirmed. In the communiqué, the two countries declared their intention, in line with their traditional policy, to oppose interference by one state in the internal affairs of another. Both saw international communism as a threat to the national independence of states and to the peace and security of the world. They also committed themselves to working together, in

#### Box 4-9. The "Out-of-Area" Question in NATO

The "out-of-area" concept is used in NATO jargon to describe regions lying outside the alliance's area of responsibility (this is not just a geographical concept but also includes NATO's objectives and principles).

Articles 5 and 6 of the treaty clearly state that NATO's area of responsibility consists of the territory of the member states, including their islands, aircraft, and ships located north of the Tropic of Cancer and the Mediterranean. At the same time, the area of responsibility is limited by the right of self-defense as described in article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 5 states that the parties shall interpret an armed attack on one or several of them in Europe or North America as an attack against all of them and shall exercise their right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter to repel such an attack. In other words, NATO will undertake military operations only in self-defense and will allow its facilities or installations to be used only for such military operations.

Although this was the legal situation, the out-of-area question came up because some members, and in particular the U.S., wanted to use NATO facilities for purposes beyond the alliance's area and objectives.

The question first came up when the U.S. used the incirlik alrbase in Turkey to intervene in Lebanon in 1958. Although the U.S. approached Turkey several other times, Turkey refused to allow its territory to be used for out-of-area purposes. These occasions were the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the disorders in Lebanon in 1969 and in Jordan in 1970, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the intervention in Iran in 1980.

The question came up once again after the disintegration of the USSR, when NATO was seeking a new role. The alliance sought different solutions to overcome this problem.

When the Gulf Crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 came to an end, a legal basis was sought for creating a Rapid Deployment Force, part of which would be stationed in Turkey. In November 1991 the decision was made that military forces could be employed out-of-area if vital interests were at stake due to the interruption of the flow of essential resources (meaning petroleum).

The claim that NATO's intervention in Bosnia was a violation of the out-of-area principle could not be sustained, because NATO was acting on behalf of the UN and in compliance with Security Council resolutions, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1998-99, however, was a typical case of out-of-area action in terms of its objectives, principles, and geographical location. There was no Security Council resolution; nor was there an attack against a member country calling for self-defense, NATO justified its intervention on the grounds of "eliminating the violation of human rights in the region and forestalling the possibility of a greater crisis that could affect the member states" ("Statement of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Air Strikes on Serb Military Targets," Federal News Service, March 24, 1999; press statement of Javier Solana, NATO Press Release, 1999 [040], 24 March 1999). To provide a legal basis for its action, the alliance adopted a document in April 1999 entitled the New Strategic Concept. According to this document, the elimination of ethnic and religious strife and terrorist activities likely to threaten members was incorporated within the alliance's field of responsibility. The essence of the North Atlantic Treaty, however, was legitimate defense to repel an attack. This meant that the elimination of a possible threat contradicted the basic principle of the treaty. In short, this was an out-of-area situation in terms of geography as well as the principles and objectives of the alliance.

Since the collapse of the USSR, NATO has been seeking to find a new role for itself. As long as things remain as they are, the out-of-area question is likely to continue to be a problem (see "The Out-of-Area Issue and Turkey" in "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 6).

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conformity with the charter of the UN, to counter this threat.

The Eisenhower Doctrine had the following consequences for Turkey. (1) The U.S. became more dependent on Turkey to carry out its operations in the region. This was reflected in the importance attributed to the U.S. military bases in Turkey. The İncirlik base, constructed in 1954, was developed further. (2) U.S. military aid to Turkey was increased. (3) U.S. economic assistance to Turkey had been declining ever since 1954, and new conditions were being attached to it. Now U.S. economic aid started increasing. (4) Turkey's relations with the USSR and Arab countries opposed to the doctrine became more strained. This brought Turkey and Syria to the brink of war in the summer of 1957. These developments suited Menderes perfectly, because they would lead to more aid. (5) For the first time, Turkey allowed the bases on its soil to be employed for non-NATO purposes to intervene in

Middle Eastern events (Box 4-9). In the first instance, the İncirlik base was used in 1958 to intervene in Lebanon and Jordan. This question would come up again in later years.

## Difficulties in the U.S. Plans for the Middle East

The Iraqi coup and the end of the Baghdad Pact: the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958 demonstrated that an organization like the Baghdad Pact could not be lasting without America's direct participation and full support. That is why the joint communiqué released following the meeting held in Turkey after the coup made an appeal for help from countries interested in peace, security, and stability in the Middle East. This appeal was obviously addressed primarily to the U.S.

This appeal for help got a prompt positive reply from Dulles. The members of the pact held an extraordinary meeting in London on 28 July, with the participation of the prime ministers of Britain, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey and the U.S. secretary of state. They reaffirmed their determination to work together against not just direct attacks but also indirect attacks coming from within a member country, to cooperate with other members of the free world for their collective security, and to work toward strengthening collective security.

The most important result of the London meeting was the U.S. decision to enter into cooperation agreements in the fields of security and defense with the participants of the meeting. Thus the U.S. became a de facto member of the pact that it had not joined at the time of its establishment in 1955.

When Iraq gave formal notice that it was leaving the pact on 24 March 1959, the organization's name was changed on 21 August 1959 to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Even before Iraq announced that it was leaving the pact, the U.S., acting in conformity with the London decision, signed almost identical security agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

The Turkish-American Security Cooperation Agreement: according to this agreement (signed on 5 March 1959), in the event of an attack on Turkey and upon the request of the Turkish government, the U.S. undertook to furnish all kinds of assistance and cooperation, including the use of armed force. Furthermore, the U.S. would continue to furnish military and economic aid to preserve Turkey's national independence and integrity and effectively support its economic development (Armaoğlu, pp. 259–60).

According to the agreement, U.S. assistance in the event of an attack on Turkey was contingent on the following conditions: (1) the Turkish government must request assistance; (2) the assistance must be based on mutual agreement; (3) the assistance must be compatible with the aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine; (4) there must be no provision in the U.S. Constitution preventing the assistance.

The preamble of the agreement stated that the assistance would be provided in the event of either a direct or an indirect attack.

The concept of indirect attack was interpreted in different ways by the Turkish government and the opposition. When the agreement came before the TGNA for ratification in February 1959, these different interpretations gave rise to a lively public debate in Turkey. The CHP deputies in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the TGNA wanted to know exactly what was meant by indirect attack. The officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the committee meeting informed them that indirect at-

tack included covert and subversive activities but refused to provide additional clarifications on the grounds of security. This caused much anger among CHP deputies. The opposition had misgivings that the agreement would be interpreted loosely so that a popular movement in the country against the DP government might be seen as an indirect attack and result in the U.S. being asked to intervene. In the course of the debates, CHP deputies referred to the events in Lebanon and claimed that the agreement was preparing the ground for a possible U.S. intervention in Turkey.

Another aspect of the public debate was whether this agreement was bringing a new dimension to Turkish-American relations. Hüseyin Müftügil and Coşkun Kırca, writing in the opposition newspaper *Ulus*, argued that as a member of NATO Turkey would be protected from an attack by this organization and thus the agreement added nothing to Turkey's security. Other writers—among them Bülent Ecevit and Esat Mahmut Karakurt—reminded their readers that the NATO treaty made no reference to an indirect attack coming from international communism. Therefore, they claimed, the agreement must have been concluded to achieve goals beyond those of NATO. The agreement would enhance Turkey's security.

In response to these reactions, the minister of foreign affairs, F. R. Zorlu, declared that the agreement had been concluded for the purpose of underpinning the organization that had been set up to defend the Middle East. There was no reason to seek any hidden motives in the agreement.

The agreement of 5 March 1959 should be examined from the vantage point of its detractors as well as its defenders.

The opposition had four arguments that carried some validity.

- 1. With a broad interpretation of the vague term "indirect aggression," the government could present even minor student unrest as a rebellion with foreign Communist backing. The next step could be to call for the assistance of American forces. The indirect aggression issue might be misused to gain political advantage within the country.
- 2. As a member of NATO, Turkey did not need a new defense agreement.
- 3. On the basis of the decisions of the London meeting, the U.S. had concluded bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan but not with Britain. By signing such an agreement, a European country like Turkey had lost international standing.

#### Box 4-10. NATO Strategies and Turkey

NATO's defense strategies have been classified under the following headings.

The first strategy: in the early years after NATO's formation, the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. Air Force were limited, so the major effort was directed at achieving numerical parity with the USSR. This was the strategy adopted at Lisbon in 1952 and aimed at achieving a rapid increase in NATO's military manpower. This approach was known as the strategy of limited warfare.

This strategy was adopted at the time when Turkey and Greece were admitted into the alliance. Since Turkey had a large army of twenty-two divisions, it was expected to absorb a Soviet attack "like a sponge" and wear the Soviet forces down. A Soviet thrust would be forced to lose its momentum by giving up all the territory beyond the southern Taurus Mountains. This would allow the American army to gain time; with the support of air power, it would deal a deathblow to a weakened enemy.

This strategy clearly would have the most serious consequences for Turkey. But as a newcomer trying to get familiar with the proceedings, Turkey raised no objections to it.

Massive retaliation: keeping a large number of personnel under arms was very costly. Furthermore, the USSR had been developing its nuclear weapons, and it would be difficult to contain a Soviet push with conventional forces. The massive retaliation strategy was adopted on 22 November 1954: As its name implied, retaliation against the USSR in case of attack would be with nuclear weapons. The new strategy did not result in diminishing Turkey's importance to NATO, because the U.S. needed bases on which it could deploy the weapon systems that would hit the USSR.

Flexible response: as the USSR developed effective nuclear weapons and missiles to launch them, the concept of nuclear deterrence had to be abandoned in favor of nuclear balance. In the event of an attack, NATO would resort to controlled escalation in the use of weapons and only use nuclear weapons as a last resort. In such a case Turkey, located on the front line, would suffer massive damage.

These considerations led to modifications in the flexible response strategy. Without abandoning this strategy, the forward defense doctrine was adopted, which called for establishing the

defense perimeter as far forward and away from inhabited areas as possible. This meant that the burden on flank countries like Turkey and Norway would increase. But it was soon realized that this strategy would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which enjoyed strategic depth and had an army organized to make full use of the elements of surprise and speed. That is why, in the early 1980s, the attack concept known by its acronym FOFA (Follow on Forces Attack) and the Air-Land Battle Doctrine (ALB) were conceived to supplement the flexible response strategy. Both of these concepts made it necessary to shift the core of the battle to enemy territory. This implied that, in a war, the Turkish army would be engaged as far away from its frontier as possible, which required a strengthening of the Turkish air force. Within this framework, the manufacture of F-16 aircraft was undertaken in Turkey in 1988 (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 6).

Post—Cold War NATO strategies: with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the need for NATO began to be debated more frequently. It was at this time, in October 1991, that NATO adopted its new strategic concept. This concept emphasized that NATO was not conceived merely to deal with collective self-defense but had a role to play in managing all kinds of crises threatening the security of its members. In April 1999 NATO adopted still more new principles under the rubric "New Strategic Concept." Ethnic and religious strife, terrorism, human rights abuses, and regional conflicts threatening member states were incorporated in the questions that would be under NATO's close scrutiny, and, when necessary, measures would be taken to deal with them. New areas of responsibility were being created for NATO.

The new concept also indicated that NATO supported the development of Europe's security and defense identity.

From being a flank country bordering on the enemy, Turkey became a frontline state within the new strategies, located right next door to the unsettled regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In this role, Turkey participated actively in NATO's Kosovo operation in 1999.

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4. The agreement only provided for U.S. help in the event of an attack on Turkey. In defense agreements, however, it was customary to observe the principle of reciprocity in conformity with the conventional principle in international law that all states are equal. This implied that Turkey's sovereignty and independence were under the guarantee of the U.S., which was not a desirable state of affairs.

The agreement also had some positive aspects.

- 1. After the coup in Iraq, the pact members were deeply shaken and in need of reassurance. With open U.S. support, the members were able to renew their commitment to continue their cooperation in the Middle East.
- 2. The agreement provided continued support for Turkey in the pursuit of its economic development.

Despite the objections of the opposition and the

public's misgivings, the agreement of 5 March 1959 was ratified by the TGNA on 9 May 1960.

## C. The Question of the Jupiter Missiles

On 4 October 1957 the USSR succeeded in launching the *Sputnik I* satellite into space. About a month later, *Sputnik II* was placed into orbit around the earth. These developments indicated that the USSR was in possession of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles and were the first signs pointing to the possibility of the Cold War turning into a global nuclear conflict.

American defense experts were of the opinion that with the USSR possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles the U.S. might become a target in a future war. After having gone through World War II without a single bomb being dropped on the continental U.S., the fear of being

directly threatened was acute among Americans. According to NATO's strategy of massive retaliation adopted in 1954, a conventional or nuclear attack coming from the Eastern Bloc would trigger a massive response with nuclear weapons (Box 4-10). In this situation, the ability to deliver a first strike became crucial. To deter the USSR from attacking and increase NATO's first-strike capability, Eisenhower proposed the deployment in allied countries of medium-range Jupiter missiles with nuclear warheads.

At the NATO summit of 1957, Eisenhower's proposal was adopted. Most members understood that the deployment of nuclear missiles on their soil would turn them into direct targets of a Soviet attack. This made them reluctant to accept the placing of these missiles on their soil. The USSR was also warning NATO members, from 1957 on, not to play host to missiles.

The shrill Soviet propaganda was effective: only Britain, Italy, and Turkey agreed to the deployment of missiles on their soil.

Turkey became one of the direct targets of the USSR by agreeing to the deployment of missiles on its territory. As the range of the missiles was insufficient, the probability of hitting the USSR's important military centers was low. Also, when compared with the missiles in Turkey, the Soviets had an advantage with their nuclear missiles. Rather than acting as a deterrent, the Jupiter missiles only served to anger and provoke the USSR.

After Menderes agreed to the deployment of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the Americans started seeing Turkey as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. As one of the flank countries bordering the USSR, Turkey's strategic importance began getting much more attention. NATO's subsequent strategy of flexible response was conceived at this time. The U.S. preferred a limited war to an all-out war. But since a limited war would be waged around the periphery of the USSR, this increased the Soviet threat to Turkey.

The secret agreement for the placement of Jupiters in Turkey was signed on 25 October 1959 in Paris. Along with many of the other bilateral agreements, this one too was dressed up as a technical cooperation agreement and was not submitted to the TGNA for ratification. The agreement would allow the deployment in Turkey of fifteen Jupiters. Britain would get sixty Thor missiles, while thirty Jupiters would be deployed in Italy (Uslu, p. 137).

By the end of 1960 the deployment of the missiles in Turkey had been completed. There were delays in the construction of the advanced-technology launching pads and the training of Turkish military personnel to operate the launchers, so the missiles only became operational in July 1962. These missiles were one of the factors that led to

## Box 4-11. The U-2 Incident

When the USSR launched *Sputnik* into space, the U.S. reaction was not confined to deploying medium-range Jupiter missiles in NATO countries. It was essential for the U.S. to have full knowledge of the quality and size of the forces at the disposal of the USSR in order to be able to take effective measures against a sudden Soviet attack. To this end, starting in 1956, the U.S. began to prepare detailed maps of Soviet territory. In plotting the location of targets in the Soviet Union, in addition to long-range radars, the newly developed U-2 aircraft played an important part, The U-2 had a very long range (maximum 6,090 km) and flew at extremely high altitude (maximum 21,212 km). With its sensitive cameras it was able to take high-definition photographs.

On 1 May 1960 a U-2 took off from the Incirlik base in Turkey and, after a refueling stop in Peshawar, Pakistan, went on to fly over the USSR, gathering intelligence until it was shot down. The U.S. announced that one of its meteorological aircraft was missing after taking off from incirlik airbase on 1 May and that it had presumably crashed. When it became known that the U-2's pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was alive and in Soviet hands, the U.S. was forced to admit that the aircraft was an intelligence-gathering U-2 aircraft.

Although President Elsenhower declared on 25 May that U-2 flights had been suspended, these flights continued in December 1965 an American spy plane based at incirilk was shot down over the Black Sea, As on the previous occasion, the USSR heaped criticism on Turkey On 28 December 1965 Turkey asked the U.S. to put a stop to all reconnaissance flights from Turkey. Upon this request, these flights were ended.

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the Cuban missile crisis that broke out in the fall of 1962. This was one of the most serious crises of the Cold War period.

## D. The U-2 Incident and Turkey

When an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the USSR in May 1960 (Box 4-11), this led to a short-lived crisis between Turkey and the USSR. Turkey was involved in the question because the U-2 had taken off from the base at İncirlik, near Adana. In the Soviet official statements, the countries that allowed the plane to use their bases received as much blame as the U.S.

In his statement of 5 May, Khrushchev declared that his government would give a stern warning to those countries that allowed the flights of U.S. aircraft. He also declared that an attack would elicit a retaliatory attack with guided missiles and that the primary targets would be the bases from which the attack had been launched.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with a statement on 8 May. The statement made it clear that the government of Turkey had granted no American aircraft permission to fly over Soviet territory for reconnaissance or any other purposes and that no such aircraft had crossed the Turkish frontier to enter into Soviet airspace. It also reminded the Soviet authorities that they had not claimed otherwise. Turkey would only be accountable for its own aircraft outside its airspace. It would be wrong to blame Turkey for this incident, even if the U-2 did fly over Turkey earlier (Armaoğlu, pp. 261–62).

After the U.S. admitted that the aircraft was on an intelligence-gathering mission and following the statement of the Turkish government, the Soviets refrained from issuing new statements criticizing Turkey. The crisis smoldered on for a while between the U.S. and the USSR. A similar row between Turkey and the USSR would occur in 1962 because of U.S. activities originating in Turkey and directed against the USSR, which were not under Turkish government control.

Çağrı Erhan

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## Relations with Greece

Turkey's relations with Greece throughout history have consisted of a succession of disputes and problems. The 1930s and the 1950s constitute the exceptions to this generalization. In effect, the rapprochement that began in the 1930s was interrupted by World War II but was resumed and pursued during the 1950s. Historians have noted that in the course of these decades both countries were striving to carry out their economic development and shared the same threat perceptions. The threat came from Italy in the 1930s and from the USSR in the 1950s. This made it easy for Turkey and Greece to pursue common policies and strengthen their friendship. Despite the similarities, there were important differences between the relationship of the 1930s and the relationship of the 1950s.

The threat perception of the two countries during the 1930s and their desire to develop their economies drove them to settle their problems and establish their relationship on a new basis. Once the problems between the two countries had been set aside, new avenues of cooperation were opened up in all fields (especially in the areas of foreign policy and military security), and solid progress was made. The friendship of the 1950s bore the traces of World War II, however, and did not prevent the emergence of new problems. In the 1930s both countries had decided to let bygones be bygones, whereas in the 1950s the two countries did not appear to be averse to creating new problems. That is why the friendship of the 1950s cannot be understood or the clashes of the 1960s explained without reference to the differing experiences of the two countries during World War II. Furthermore, the circumstances of the Cold War were totally different from the multipolar world of the interwar years.

## I. TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II (1945–1950)

In 1939, when war broke out, Turkey and Greece were engaged in military cooperation within bilateral and multilateral treaties of alliance. But the rapid changes in the fortunes of war in favor of the Axis powers rendered these treaties inoperative.

Greece was the victim of first Italian and then German and Bulgarian invasion and occupation. For four years the Greek people, and especially the Socialists and the Communists, put up a fierce resistance against the Fascist occupation. But at the end of the war the country was economically shattered and politically fragmented. This situation was to lead to a bloody civil war.

Turkey's experience was quite different. It did not experience occupation and by skillfully taking advantage of the balance of power among the belligerents managed to stay out of the war. Its economy had been affected by the war but was not in the ruinous condition of the economies that had gone through war and occupation. In the political field, Turkey had to cope with the drawbacks brought on by its wartime policy of neutrality. The USSR was highly critical of Turkey's nonbelligerence during the war and put forward insistent demands against Ankara.

In 1945 both Turkey and Greece were suffering from the consequences of the war, but they were not yet ready to adopt a common stand to deal with postwar conditions. It was necessary to wait for the emergence of differences between the U.S. and the USSR and for Washington to feel the need to bring Ankara and Athens closer together in pursuit of its Balkan and Middle Eastern policies for the two neighbors to formulate a common policy. The rapprochement started in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and gained strength with the ending of the Greek civil war and the coming to power of the Democratic Party in Turkey. Nevertheless, even though the two countries followed similar courses as members of the same alliance after 1952, Greece continued to criticize Turkey for Ankara's wartime policies, which it considered detrimental to its interests.

## A. Greek Criticism of Turkey's Wartime Policies and Turkey's Response

Athens held the view that the friendship established by Atatürk and Venizelos started fraying after 1938 when, during İnönü's presidency, foreign policy was no longer under the stewardship of Tevfik Rüştü Aras. This fraying accelerated as a result of Ankara's policies during World War II. Greece objected to a number of Turkish policies, which it regarded as being incompatible with friendship.

1. Turkey failed to carry out its contractual obligations arising from its military alliance treaties. Turkey's position facilitated the occupation of Greece by the Axis states and Bulgaria, which inflicted heavy tangible and intangible losses on Greece.

When World War II broke out, the two countries were allies by virtue of the Balkan Entente Pact, the bilateral military treaties of 1933 and 1938, and the Tripartite Alliance Treaty of 19 October 1939 signed by Turkey, Britain, and France. When Italy invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, the Allies, along with Greece, asked Turkey to honor its commitments under articles 2 and 3 of the Tripartite Alliance Treaty and declare war on Italy. Turkey claimed that it lacked the necessary military hardware and stayed out of the fighting.

When the German armies entered Macedonia and Thrace from Bulgaria on 6 April 1941 and started occupying Greece, the Allies, as well as Athens, turned once more to Turkey with the request that it carry out its commitments, under not just the Tripartite Alliance of 1939 but also the Balkan Entente Pact. When Bulgarian troops marched into Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia on 17 April, Allied pressure on Turkey increased. At this time, the German ambassador in Ankara, von Papen, was giving assurances to Turkey that the German army would not violate the Turkish frontier. When Germany occupied the Aegean islands in May 1941, von Papen not only guaranteed Turkey's territorial integrity but went further and offered the islands located in the immediate vicinity of the Anatolian coast to Turkey. When Turkey was sure that Germany would not attack it, it signed a nonaggression pact with Germany and pulled back its forces to the Midye-Enez line in Thrace. After this, Turkey kept on defying Allied pressure and stayed out of the war.

To sum up, Turkey disregarded its commitments under the Tripartite Alliance of 1939, the Balkan Entente Treaty of 1934, and the Cordial Treaty of 1933 when first Italy and then Germany and Bulgaria invaded Greece. Greece suffered as a consequence, and for the Allies the war took a turn for the worse.

2. In addition to disregarding its commitments by staying out of the war, Turkey also suspended its relations with the legitimate Greek government under the influence of German victories in the battlefield. After Athens fell to the Germans, the Greek government installed itself in Crete in April 1941. Turkey failed to accredit an ambas-

sador to this government. When the Greek government was struggling to continue its existence under very difficult circumstances following the German occupation, Turkey refrained from providing political, let alone military, support to this government.

3. In its negotiations during the war, Turkey used the Aegean islands as a bargaining chip, especially in its dealings with Germany. Turkey's territorial ambitions were arousing suspicion. In July 1939 von Papen told Count Ciano that after victory the future of the Dodecanese Islands would be reviewed. In April 1941 Ankara informed Berlin that the islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos were of strategic importance for Turkey and proposed that Turkey be allowed to occupy these islands until the end of the war. A year later, Numan Menemencioğlu told the Yugoslav ambassador that Turkey might move into the Dodecanese Islands if Germany took them.

This topic also remained on the agenda after 1943. In its contacts with Britain and the USSR, Ankara made clear that the Greek islands in close proximity to the Anatolian coast, the Dodecanese Islands, and, in particular, the island of Megisti (Meis, Kastellorizo) should come under Turkey's control for security reasons. Turkey did not consider its friendship with Greece when, during the war, some of the islands were offered to Ankara by both Germany and the Allies, as a prize for joining the conflict on their side. Although Turkey had no say in the disposition of the Aegean islands in the postwar settlements, the first signs of territorial disputes in the Aegean emerged during the war years.

4. In addition to its unfriendliness to Greece during the war, Turkey also repressed the Greek minority in Istanbul. In May 1941, shortly before the signing of the Nonaggression Pact with Germany, all non-Muslim men aged eighteen to forty-five in Istanbul were called up for military service as reservists. They were not given arms, however, but forced to work in labor battalions. Those aged thirty-eight to forty-five were demobilized on 8 December 1941, and the remainder were returned to civilian life on 27 July 1942 (Bali, pp. 408–23).

The most glaring measure against non-Muslims and one that had lasting effects was the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) imposed on 11 November 1942 (see Box 3-2 above). It was claimed that this tax was designed to alleviate the economic difficulties caused by the war and tax the income of war profiteers. It covered all the assets of the taxpayers, consisting mostly of minorities. The Greek minority made up 0.55% of the population but paid 20% of the Wealth Tax. Those unable to pay this tax were compelled to work as laborers at the Aşkale stone quarry in Erzurum province. In the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, a balance had been

struck between the Turkish minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. Ankara upset this balance during World War II and applied repressive, discriminatory policies toward its citizens of the Greek Orthodox faith.

In summary, these were the four main Greek complaints against Turkey. Turkey's response to these complaints was grounded on "extraordinary wartime conditions." In World War II, Ankara did not take advantage of Greece's difficulties by pursuing anti-Greek policies. Its Greek policies were shaped by its overall policy, which responded to its national interests in a situation of war. In appraising Turkish-Greek relations during the war from Turkey's point of view, the following points can be made:

1. Turkey chose to remain neutral from 1939 to 1945, which did not violate any treaty obligation. Neither Turkey's bilateral treaties nor the Balkan Entente Pact committed Turkey to go to war because of Italy's aggression against Greece.

The Cordial Treaty of 1933, signed by Greece and Turkey, guaranteed only the inviolability of their common border (article 1). The Supplementary Treaty of 1938 provided in article 1 that, in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other party would undertake to prevent, if necessary by force, the use of its territory by the aggressor and to remain neutral. Since no such situation occurred during World War II, it cannot be claimed that Turkey did not honor its bilateral treaty obligations.

From the perspective of the Balkan Pact, the common borders of signatories were not violated; nor did the attack originate from a Balkan country (article 2). In fact, it was Greece that demanded that the pact should not be applicable to cases of aggression from outside the Balkans.

Turkey did have obligations under the 1939 Tripartite Alliance. The war had spread to the Mediterranean (article 2/1), and Turkey was committed to assist Britain and France, which had given guarantees to Greece (article 3). In the annexes to the text of this treaty, however, these commitments were made conditional. The precondition for Turkey entering the war to help Britain was that it should have the necessary military hardware (Special Agreement, article 6, and Military Agreement, article 8). Turkey had not received the necessary economic and military assistance in 1940, however. At the time of Italy's aggression, Turkey did not provide direct military aid to Greece. But it warned Bulgaria in its official statements and diplomatic contacts that if Bulgaria took advantage of this situation and attacked Greece, Turkey would go to war. This prevented a Bulgarian move that could have

forced Greece to fight on two fronts. Thus Turkey provided Greece with considerable indirect help.

After the German and Bulgarian occupation of Greece, Ankara was able to persuade London that it would be against the interests of the Allies for Turkey to enter the war without adequate military hardware. Britain agreed that it would be better for the Allies if Turkey remained neutral.

- 2. At a time when the German army was at Turkey's border, Ankara had to follow an extremely cautious policy. It was out of the question to accredit an ambassador to the Greek government in Crete. Such a move would only draw Germany's ire and confront Turkey with the danger of being dragged into the war. Once the Allies started winning victories in 1943, Turkey appointed an ambassador to the Greek government in exile in Cairo.
- 3. During the war, a lot of bargaining over different territories took place among all states, but Turkey never accepted any of the offers made by Germany. This is proof of Turkey's sensitivity to the territorial integrity of Greece. Although Athens was critical of Turkey, it had itself asked Britain during the war to allow Greece to acquire Northern Epirus, Cyprus, and the Dodecanese Islands. This elicited reactions from Turkey.
- 4. Regarding minorities, Turkey always claimed that it did not pursue racist policies and observed the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. According to Ankara, the Wealth Tax covered all citizens. Being engaged mostly in business, the non-Muslims were the ones who made the greatest profits during the war and were consequently taxed more heavily.

No matter how strongly Turkey defended its Wealth Tax policies as not being racist, it did not enjoy the same credibility when refuting this last Greek allegation.

Be that as it may, Turkey also made friendly gestures toward Greece during the war. After the Italian attack, Turkey allowed volunteers from the Greek minority in Istanbul to join the ranks of those who were fighting Italy. It also allowed the aid materials collected by the minorities in Istanbul to be delivered to Greece by the Red Cross. Furthermore, the food aid delivered by the Turkish-flag vessels Kurtuluş and Dumlupınar was of great value to those suffering from famine under German occupation in 1941 and 1942. During this period, Greeks wanting to go to Cairo via Turkey, including military personnel, were allowed to do so. The Greek warship Adrias was allowed to take refuge in Turkish territorial waters when fleeing German units and was subsequently permitted to proceed to North Africa. Just as the bargaining over territory and other unfriendly policies were emphasized when relations

between the two countries became strained, the friendly policies and gestures helped in returning Turkish-Greek relations after the war to their former friendly course.

Rapprochement in Turkish-Greek Relations Even before the war ended, differences had emerged between the USSR and the Western powers over the postwar settlements. The USSR, having borne the brunt of the war, wanted a security belt between itself and the capitalist world. This would allow it to gain further strategic depth to defend itself, while allowing it to spread Soviet and Communist influence into the countries located in the belt. In 1944 Stalin and Churchill agreed on certain percentages in their partition of the Balkans into spheres of influence. In this agreement, Greece was left in the British sphere. Turkey had incurred the wrath of the USSR for staying neutral during the war. This led to Soviet demands upon Turkey, which the Western powers at first appeared ready to countenance. But this did not last long. After 1946 the Western powers started getting concerned over the USSR's growing influence in Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. As they took measures to deal with the threat, the Cold War was unleashed. The differences among the wartime Allies had major repercussions in Turkey and Greece.

In the new postwar situation, both Turkey and Greece moved toward the West, but for different reasons. Turkey was anxious to develop economically and needed foreign aid to carry this out. The war conditions had created a new bourgeoisie, which was pressuring the government to strengthen Turkey's economic ties with the West. The new bourgeoisie also wanted to have a voice in governing the country, so it was pressing for a multiparty political system to replace the single-party state. Moving closer to the West would hasten this process. These internal factors were reinforced by the USSR's demands on Turkey and accelerated the process of Turkey's integration with the West.

The same process was operating in Greece, but its progress was very troubled. The political forces that had come together to fight fascism during the war became engaged in a bitter struggle for power, dragging the country into civil war. The civil war lasted from 1946 to 1949 and came to an end through Western and, in particular, American intervention. The Communists were defeated and purged, allowing Greece to take its place in the Western Bloc.

By 1950 Turkey and Greece had begun to identify their national interests with the interests of the West and started assuming the role of the representative of the West in the Balkans and the Middle East. Until that time, Turkish-Greek relations had not been fully stabilized. The events of 1947 were to prove decisive for the two countries' relations. First came the Paris Peace Treaty, which decided the fate of the Dodecanese Islands. This was followed by the Truman Doctrine, which introduced an American factor into their bilateral relations.

### The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947

Soon after World War II ended, the arguments over the postwar settlements intensified. Greece and Turkey were also involved in these arguments in connection with the fate of the Dodecanese Islands. When Italy emerged defeated from the war, it became clear that its rule over the Dodecanese Islands, which it had grabbed from the Ottoman Empire in 1911, would come to an end. The Greek Orthodox population of these islands was following the same course as the Greek Cypriots and sending telegrams to the heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs of the Allied countries, voicing the desire to be united with Greece, the motherland. Britain, as the spokesperson for the Allies, favored giving the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. This would help neutralize the pressure being exerted on it in connection with Cyprus, reward Greece for its sacrifices during the war, and strengthen the Greek king and government in the face of the leftist opposition.

When it was announced on 12 May 1945 that the Greek king would be visiting the Dodecanese Islands, the Turkish government took action. The next day, the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, told the British chargé d'affaires in Ankara that some of these islands were very close to the Turkish mainland and had strategic importance for the security of Turkey. Furthermore, there were Turkish minorities living in Rhodes and Cos. Consequently, Turkey wanted the question to be dealt with through negotiations involving Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The Turkish public learned about the issue when Tevfik Rüştü Aras wrote an article in the newspaper Tan on 25 July 1945. In his article, Aras recalled that in the past he had been an ardent advocate of Turkish-Greek friendship and had worked strenuously to attain this objective. He accepted that the vast majority of the inhabitants of these islands were Greek Orthodox but maintained that the best solution would be to demilitarize the islands and grant them self-rule. Britain, Greece, and Turkey would jointly guarantee the status of the islands, as well as their security. This article was followed by editorials in the newspapers Son Telegraf and Yeni Asır, which argued that the islands should revert to Turkey.

Before the Turkish public had a chance to focus its attention fully on the Dodecanese Islands, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs became conscious of the growing Soviet threat and, under British prodding, announced its definitive position on the issue on 1 July 1946: Turkey did not object to the awarding of the Dodecanese Islands to its friend Greece but rather welcomed it. The islands of Cos, Simi, and Megisti were so close to the Anatolian coast, however, that it would be unthinkable to separate them from the mainland. Justice and fairness demanded that two or three of these islands be awarded to Turkey.

In its reply delivered on 8 July 1946, the British Foreign Office declared that Britain agreed that it would be appropriate to award some of the islands to Turkey. It went on to add, however, that such an award might provide the USSR with the pretext to create the dispute over the Straits that it had been seeking. The British reply also noted that the U.S. insisted that all the islands be awarded to Greece. The reply concluded that, provided the islands were demilitarized, their award to Greece would not jeopardize Turkey's security.

The series of conferences on peace treaties that ended World War II took place from 29 July to 15 October 1946, with the participation of twenty-one states. In the discussions on the Dodecanese Islands, the Greek proposal that a phrase be inserted in the treaty stating that the limits of the islands would be those set in the Turkish-Italian treaties of 4 January and 28 December 1932 was not accepted. Article 14 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 merely determined the legal status of the Dodecanese Islands. The article said that Italy transferred its sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands to Greece and provided that the islands would be demilitarized and would remain so in the future.

On 7 March 1947 the Dodecanese Islands came under Greek sovereignty. President İnönü preferred to remain silent over this event, which took place just prior to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. In later years, his opponents would harshly criticize him for adopting this stand. His silence can be attributed to the need to establish Turkish-Greek friendship under the U.S. umbrella to ward off the danger coming from the "common enemy," which was the USSR. A new era was beginning in which disputes would be pushed into the background as much as possible.

# The U.S. Factor in Relations and the Election of Athenagoras as Patriarch

The advent of the Cold War between the USSR and the Western allies had a direct effect on developments in Greece and Turkey. After civil war broke out in Greece in 1946, both the government and the guerrillas in the mountains were able to strengthen their forces for a whole year. Despite British support for the regular army, it became clear after a year of warfare that it could not deal with the guerrillas. When Britain announced in February 1947 that it could no longer support Greece and that it would withdraw its forces, the Greek government was left in a very difficult position. The Communists already controlled the countryside and, after Britain's decision to withdraw, might take over the rest of the country.

At this point the U.S. stepped in and on 12 March 1947 announced through the Truman Doctrine that it would help Greece and Turkey in facing up to the Communist threat. The U.S. economic and military aid allowed the civil war in Greece to be extinguished, with the Communists fleeing to Albania. From then on, Athens and Ankara would be pursuing policies consistent with Washington's expectations. Neither country could afford to ignore the U.S. in framing its foreign policy. Henceforth the U.S. factor would become the basis of Turkish-Greek friendship.

In May 1947, two months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish-Greek Cooperation Committee was set up in Athens. Negotiations dealing with military, cultural, and trade issues followed. In September 1948 an agreement to expand bilateral trade was concluded.

The rapprochement between Ankara and Athens and Washington's role in this process began to bear fruit in the political sphere with the election of the new patriarch.

During World War II and afterward, the USSR sharply revised its relationship with the Patriarchate of Moscow. This led Turkey to revise its position vis-à-vis the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Phanar, which, since the Treaty of Lausanne, had been based on the premise that the patriarchate was a national institution. This meant that the patriarchate's claim to be ecumenical went unrecognized by Ankara. Stalin described World War II as a patriotic war and had no qualms about using religion for his purposes. The Patriarchate of Moscow had remained vacant since 1924. In 1943 Sergius was appointed patriarch, succeeded by Alexios in 1945. When the USSR increased its interest in the Balkans after the war, it used the religious link to the Orthodox peoples of the region to achieve its objectives there. Moscow started claiming that the Patriarchate at Phanar was under Turkish pressure and therefore could not carry out its functions adequately. Hence Moscow contended that the patriarch should be elected by all the Orthodox churches. Moscow's policies led Ankara to soften its attitude toward the patriarchate, and the matter was taken up in the framework of the Turkish-Greek dialogue. The U.S. also got involved to counter Moscow's

policies and in 1948 secured the appointment of Athenagoras, a person it trusted, as patriarch of Phanar.

When Patriarch Veniamin died on 17 February 1946, Maximos Vaporcis was elected as his replacement. Both Turkey and Greece welcomed his election, because it was expected that his dynamic personality would check Moscow's activities in this area. These expectations were dashed, however, when Patriarch Maximos started making statements supporting the Communists in the Greek civil war. Furthermore, in early 1947 the bishop of Kition, Mihail Mouskos, who would later become archbishop of Cyprus as Makarios III, paid a visit to Patriarch Maximos. The patriarch told Bishop Mouskos that the Turkish government had no intention of getting involved in the question of Cyprus and that he did not think the Turkish government would be interested in events taking place outside its borders at this critical juncture. He added that most of the Greeks of Istanbul were attached to him. The patriarch had gone too far, and the reaction was swift. The U.S. also had been closely following the patriarch's activities and wanted action. Greece started exerting pressure on Patriarch Maximos, who resigned on 18 October 1948, citing "psychological reasons."

The U.S. played an active role both in the resignation of the outgoing patriarch and in the election of his successor. When Turkey rejected three of the candidates selected by Greece, the candidacy of Aristocles Spiru Athenagoras, Greek Orthodox archbishop of North America since 1931, was advanced. This cleric had been engaged in the effort to bring together all the Christian churches. He was anti-Communist and anti-Soviet and thus was considered suitable to play a role in the U.S. containment of Soviet expansion. The Turkish press described him as a friend of Turkey.

While Greece and Turkey accepted the candidacy of Athenagoras, the biggest reaction came from the Patriarchate of Phanar, because the candidate was not from within Phanar. It took the intervention of Greece to persuade the patriarchate. Then came a legal difficulty: Athenagoras did not have Turkish citizenship. This problem was quickly surmounted, and on 1 November 1948 Athenagoras I was elected patriarch. He would be the longestserving patriarch of the Republican era, carrying out his functions until 1972. Athenagoras arrived in Istanbul on President Truman's personal airplane on 26 January 1949 and was greeted at the airport by members of the Greek community and the press. The new patriarch demonstrated his loyalty to the state by first laying a wreath at the Monument of the Republic at Taksim Square before proceeding to the patriarchate. In February he went to Ankara in a special railroad car, where he paid a formal visit to President İnönü to convey President Truman's personal message. He also visited prime minister Şemsettin Günaltay and the minister of the interior, Emin Erişirgil. On his departure from Ankara, high government officials saw him off. All the signs indicated that there would be cordial relations between the patriarchate and Ankara.

When it came to thwarting the USSR, the U.S. demonstrated that it was prepared to play a decisive role even in a purely religious affair like the election of a patriarch. This also indicated that Washington's interest in Greece and Turkey was not confined to military and economic affairs. The U.S. would become an important factor in the domestic and foreign policies of both countries.

## II. THE SECOND PERIOD OF FRIENDSHIP (1950–1955)

Throughout the 1950s Turkey and Greece experienced similar political, economic, and social developments. In both countries right-of-center parties with U.S. backing were in power for roughly ten years. Their objective was to secure the economic and military integration of their countries with the capitalist West.

After World War II, the West insisted on a transition to a multiparty democratic system as a precondition for establishing close relations with Turkey. The Democratic Party came to power after the election of 14 May 1950 and ran the country until it was removed from power through a military coup on 27 May 1960. The transition to democracy was not that smooth in Greece. The country had been split in two by the civil war. In the period following the civil war, the system of proportional representation led to center-right coalition governments up to 1952. The Communist Party (KKE) had been driven underground, but the United Democratic Left (EDE) was gaining in strength. Alarmed by this development, the U.S. persuaded the Greeks to change their electoral system. The Right rallied around Marshal Alexandros Papagos, and in the 1952 election the Greek Resurrection Party came to power under his leadership. Upon his death in 1955, Papagos was succeeded by Konstantinos Karamanlis, who changed the party's name to Radical National Union but maintained the Papagos policies and managed to stay in power until 1963.

The Menderes government in Turkey and the Papagos-Karamanlis governments in Greece were pursuing similar economic goals: to become full-fledged capitalist countries with the support of U.S.-furnished aid. Most of the aid was being spent for military purposes and part of the borrowed funds had to be set aside to service debts, so industrialization was neglected, but the building

of infrastructure was accelerated. Roads were built connecting cities to rural areas, the use of tractors in farming increased, and the migration of surplus rural workers to the cities gained pace. The construction and service sectors developed in cities but could not absorb all the newcomers. Unemployment was rising steadily. Although industrialization could not be achieved in Greece and Turkey during the 1950s, the old feudal order based on agriculture was breaking down. The new urban social strata would be the catalysts for the political developments that would occur in both countries during the 1960s.

The dependence on the U.S. in the economic and political fields was great, but it was even more glaring in the area of foreign policy. In this period, national interest in Turkey and Greece was identified with first U.S. and then NATO interests, and all foreign policy decisions were made accordingly. The main goal of both countries after 1949 was to gain admission to NATO and thereby rely on the organization for military security. To achieve this goal, both countries sent troops to the Korean War in 1950, unfurled the anti-Soviet banner on all occasions, and provided military bases to the U.S. on their soil. When they achieved their common goal of joining NATO in 1952, they took on the role of defender of NATO interests in the region and guardian of the southeastern flank of the alliance.

### A. Reciprocal Visits and Strengthened Friendship

The rapprochement between Turkey and Greece following their accession to NATO in 1952 became visible with the increasing frequency of high-level visits. The first such visit was that of Greek prime minister Sophocles Venizelos (the son of Elefterios Venizelos) to Turkey on 29 January-5 February 1952. The Permanent Turkish-Greek Joint Committee was established during this visit to achieve greater political and economic cooperation and to promote trade. The committee was to work on the joint marketing of Turkish and Greek tobacco in third countries, the development of joint fishing activities in the territorial waters lying between the Aegean islands and the Anatolian coast, the lifting of visas for travelers, and the establishment of a customs union. In addition, the committee would explore the possibilities for cooperation in the field of defense and establish contacts with Yugoslavia on the subject of regional security. The idea of a Balkan alliance began to emerge during this visit. The atmosphere was so cordial that Sophocles Venizelos declared that "the friendly relations between Turkey and Greece are so close that soon we shall be claiming that the two countries are one and the same" (Ayın Tarihi 219 [February 1952]: 276).

On 26 April 1952 prime minister Adnan Menderes, accompanied by foreign minister Fuad Köprülü and the chief of the General Staff, Şükrü Kanatlı, went to Athens on a return visit. The rapprochement reached a peak during the visit to Turkey of Greece's King Paul and Queen Frederika in June 1952. This was the first visit of a Greek monarch to Turkey. While King Paul was holding official talks, the Permanent Turkish-Greek Joint Committee reached agreement on reciprocal and joint fishing rights in Turkish and Greek territorial waters in certain parts of the Aegean Sea. The king's visit to the patriarchate was well received by the Turkish press and public opinion in general. Although the people of both countries were displaying an interest in the question of Cyprus, their governments were avoiding the subject in order not to damage the atmosphere of friendship.

When the visa requirement was lifted in August 1952, a considerable number of Greek tourists started coming to Turkey. This warm atmosphere continued during president Celal Bayar's visit to Greece from 27 November to 2 December 1952. After Athens, Bayar visited Western Thrace, where he had contacts with the Turkish minority and participated in the opening ceremony of the high school named after him in the town of Komotini. This high school was to cater to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. The Turkish press drew attention to the need to develop relations between the two countries and to avoid issues likely to mar this friendship. In Turkey, there were concerns about the gradually emerging question of Cyprus and the coming to power of Prime Minister Papagos, who had previously made speeches declaring that Cyprus was a national issue for Greece.

The friendship that had been strengthened by the high-level visits continued in 1953. The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the conquest of İstanbul went smoothly, without creating complications. Cyprus was becoming more topical, but it still did not affect bilateral relations. In fact, as in the 1930s, these good relations displayed a tendency to spread into the rest of the region.

### B. The Balkan Pact and Alliance

The rapprochement between Turkey and Greece during both the 1930s and the 1950s led to a search for cooperation on a regional Balkan scale, and the security concerns of the two countries resulted in the signing of the Balkan Pacts.

Despite the superficial similarity, the conditions giving rise to the Balkan Entente of 1934 and the Balkan Alliance of 1954 were quite different. The Balkan Entente of 1934 took place in a multipolar world and was the result of the threat perceived by the signatories regarding the

intentions of the revisionist states as well as their desire to cooperate to increase their strength in order to face up to this threat. The Balkan Alliance of 1954 came during the Cold War within a bipolar world. It was established with U.S. support and in conformity with NATO's strategies and was a vehicle serving the differing interests of the members rather than their common interest.

### The Background of the Balkan Pact and Alliance

The gap in NATO's strategy and U.S. support: the Cold War that broke out soon after World War II also affected the Balkan Peninsula, which was divided into the socialist states, backed by Moscow, and Turkey and Greece, which had American backing.

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform because of Tito's revisionism brought a new dimension to the division of the Balkans. When Yugoslavia fell out with Moscow, Belgrade had to contend with reconstructing a war-torn economy and confronting a serious threat to its security. The U.S. took advantage of this opportunity and started providing first economic and then military aid to Yugoslavia.

With the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in 1952, the U.S. started implementing its containment policy. With new alliances to be set up in the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO's gaps would be plugged and the USSR contained with a military defense perimeter running from the Atlantic all the way to Iran. The only gap in this perimeter was Yugoslavia. Since it was unfeasible for Yugoslavia under the leadership of the socialist Tito to be admitted into NATO, the practical solution was to secure the cooperation of this country with NATO members Greece and Turkey and thereby draw Belgrade into the Western defense structure. This would eliminate the gap in NATO's defense strategy. The visit of Frank Pace, the deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Department of the Army, to Athens, Ankara, and Belgrade in August 1952 at a time when negotiations were going on among the three countries was tangible evidence of U.S. support for Balkan cooperation.

The perception of a threat from the USSR and the Eastern Bloc: the three countries that signed the Balkan Pact perceived a threat from the Eastern Bloc, and particularly the USSR. The Soviet notes sent to Turkey after World War II, the civil war in Greece, and Tito's version of national socialism had turned these countries against Moscow. Furthermore, Bulgaria had bilateral disputes with Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, while Albania had disputes with Greece and Yugoslavia. From time to time, these disputes flared up into full crises. These tensions with countries of the Eastern Bloc were an important

factor in bringing Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia closer together, especially because they had no quarrels among themselves.

The need for economic aid: all three signatories of the Balkan Pact were anxious to overcome the negative effects of the war on their economies. They also wanted to press on with economic development and needed American economic aid for this. By establishing a Balkan Pact that would strengthen NATO's defense strategy, the parties expected to increase the military and economic aid they were obtaining and also enhance their bargaining power.

Yugoslavia's desire to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Italy on the question of Trieste: in the treaty signed with Italy at the Paris Peace Conference after World War II, Trieste was declared a free city. Yugoslavia was apprehensive about Italy's close relations with the Allies. It wanted to prevent Italy from recovering Trieste and returning to the Balkans, so it chose to cooperate with Turkey and Greece to strengthen its position in its dealings with the West.

#### The Balkan Pact

When the negotiations leading to the Balkan Pact were proceeding, it became necessary to help Italy overcome its apprehension over Trieste. Once this was done, the negotiations went forward rapidly, and the Balkan Pact was initialed on 25 February 1953 in Athens. The pact, officially known as the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, was signed in Ankara on 28 February 1953. The Balkan Pact consisted of a preamble and ten articles. It was not in the nature of an alliance.

In the preamble, the parties declare that the treaty is signed pursuant to article 51 of the United Nations Charter and reaffirm their faith in the organization. Article 1 states: "In order to ensure their permanent collaboration, the Contracting Parties will consult on all problems of common interest." It goes on to say that the ministers of foreign affairs shall meet at least once a year to consider questions of common interest. On the subject of cooperation in the field of security, article 2 declares: "The Contracting Parties are determined to continue their common efforts for the safeguarding of peace and security in their area and to pursue in common the study of the problems of their security, including common measures of defense, the need for which might arise in the event of unprovoked aggression against them." Article 3 adds: "The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their collaboration in order to submit to their Governments recommendations concerning questions of defense that are formulated by mutual agreement, with a view to the

making of coordinated decisions." This article diverges from the Balkan Pact of 1934 and provides a basis of common defense. In the event of aggression, it will not require each country to intervene with its army. In that event, the treaty provides for common measures to be taken. This will not be done within an alliance, however. Only the collaboration of the General Staffs is foreseen. The reason for this shortcoming was that no way could be devised to overcome the legal hurdle of reconciling the positions of NATO members Turkey and Greece with the position of socialist Yugoslavia, not a member of NATO. Article 4 provides for collaboration in the economic, cultural, and technical fields. Under article 5, the parties undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means; under article 6, they commit themselves not to conclude any alliance directed against one of them; and under article 7, they agree not to sign any commitment that might be in conflict with the treaty. Article 8 states that the treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey under NATO, while article 9 makes provision for other states to adhere to the treaty if this will contribute to the accomplishment of its purposes. Finally, article 10 states that after five years any member may cease to be a party to the treaty by giving notice one year in advance to the other parties.

After signing the treaty, Yugoslavia gave special emphasis to article 4 and displayed its interest in cooperation in fields other than security and military matters. This required an organization, including a permanent secretariat, which was set up with a supplementary treaty signed in Belgrade on 7 November 1953.

### The Balkan Alliance

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was followed by an alliance among the three countries formed through the signing of the Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 9 August 1954 at Bled.

Article 1 of the treaty states that the "Parties undertake... to settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they may be involved, and to refrain... from the threat of or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Article 2 refers to action to be taken in the event of aggression: "The... Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of them... shall be considered an aggression against all the Contracting Parties who... shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking immediately and by common accord any mea-

sures, including the use of armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense." Article 6 provides that the parties will inform the UN Security Council about the measures of self-defense taken in the case of an armed attack and will discontinue their measures. In this respect the treaty carried the same provisions as NATO and was much broader than the 1934 Balkan Pact.

This treaty also established a Permanent Council that would meet at least twice a year, with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs of the parties. When the Permanent Council was not in session, the Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Ankara was to carry out its functions (article 4). Article 11 made clear that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Ankara on 28 February 1953 would remain in force. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the Bled Treaty made the Ankara Treaty more effective and turned it into a full alliance.

The Permanent Council of the Balkan Alliance held its first meeting in Ankara on 2 March 1955. At the end of the meeting, an agreement was signed to establish a Permanent Assembly. It was to consist of twenty members of parliament from each of the parties, and its mandate was to explore possibilities for expanding cooperation in all fields. On 19 March 1955 the Permanent Council met to sign an agreement on postal services. This was to be its last meeting.

The Balkan Alliance was a defensive arrangement among three countries with no disputes among themselves who felt threatened by the USSR and who enjoyed the backing of the West. When the circumstances that gave rise to this alliance disappeared, the structure was bound to lose its function. In fact, even as the Balkan Alliance was being signed, circumstances were changing. The death of Stalin in March 1953 heralded a softening in Soviet foreign policy, which was reflected in the USSR's relations with the Balkan countries. This change was most evident in the case of Yugoslavia. The first sign of this was Moscow's lifting of the economic blockade on Yugoslavia, the improvement in diplomatic relations, and the ending of incidents on Yugoslavia's borders by the Cominform member Balkan states. With the establishment of the Balkan Alliance, the USSR felt encircled in its southern region, so it went into action to remove Belgrade from this arrangement and prevent it from getting too close to the West. In June 1955 Prime Minister Bulganin went to Belgrade accompanied by the first secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev. The visit was a fence-mending mission in which the Soviet leaders indicated that they were not opposed to a national form of socialism. This Soviet approach allowed Yugoslavia to set its course toward the

nonaligned movement, for which it already had a predisposition. The final solution of the Trieste question also removed one of the reasons for Belgrade's involvement in the Balkan Alliance. After this, Belgrade would stress the economic and cultural aspects of the Balkan treaties, rather than their military cooperation dimension.

At a time when Yugoslavia's interest in the Balkan Alliance was waning, Turkish-Greek relations were souring because of the question of Cyprus (examined in greater detail below). The question became internationalized in 1954, and Turkey became fully involved in 1955. This would lead to growing differences between Ankara and Athens and render not just military cooperation but all cooperation within the Balkan framework impossible. Indeed, in 1955 Greece prevented the Permanent Council from meeting in Athens. On 23 December 1955 minister of foreign affairs Spiros Theotokis declared that cooperation with Turkey within the Balkan Alliance would not be resumed until Turkey paid compensation for the damage done during the events of 6–7 September. Despite Tito's efforts at mediation, the tension between the two countries persisted, and the Permanent Council failed to meet again. The Permanent Secretariat functioned in Athens until January 1957. When it became Belgrade's turn to take over and the transfer did not take place, it too ceased to function. The subject of resuscitating the Balkan Pact came up for consideration when relations mellowed somewhat in 1958, but the foreign ministers of both Greece and Yugoslavia made statements declaring that this would not be possible. In this way the Balkan Pact and Alliance Treaties were tacitly brought to an end. The Balkan Pact and Alliance had been the direct products of Turkish-Greek friendship and ended because of the growing differences between the two countries.

## C. The Effects of Friendship on the Minorities

We have already noted that historically the policies of the governments toward the minorities living in Turkey and Greece have been indexed to the state of relations between the two countries. The decade of the 1950s was no exception to this rule. During this decade of friendship in all spheres, the minorities lived in peace and contentment. Important developments took place in the field of education through the Cultural Agreement of 1951 and the exchange of letters in 1952. The governments agreed to the employment of teachers from Turkey in the minority schools in Western Thrace and teachers from Greece in the Greek minority schools in Turkey.

After the election of Athenagoras as patriarch, there

was a perceptible relaxation in Ankara's relations with the patriarchate. This resulted in the patriarchate's increased influence over the Greek Orthodox community of İstanbul. As the patriarchate mended its relations with the government, it was able to set up a press bureau. In 1951 it started the publication of the weekly magazine Apostolos Andreas in addition to the daily newspaper Orthodoxia, which it had been publishing since 1926. With Ankara's consent, it repaired the damage to the patriarchate building caused by the fire of 1941. The patriarchate also played a part in the arrangements dealing with the community's properties. The mukataa tax (a kind of rent paid for cultivated land turned into building land) was repealed in 1949. A law was passed to the effect that all the properties of the Balıklı Foundation formed part of the patriarchate's patrimony. Important progress was also registered in the field of education. In 1951 permission was granted to the Halki (Heybeliada) Theological Seminary to admit students from Greece and other Christian countries. The 1951 Cultural Agreement contained provisions allowing instructors from Greece to teach in the Greek minority schools. There were also provisions to facilitate the procurement of textbooks. The use of Greek as the language of instruction in the schools of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), which had been suspended in violation of article 4 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne since 1927, was resumed. In the election of 1950, the Greek minority in İstanbul gave its support to the DP. In return, it benefited from the economic policies of the DP when it came to power. Greek traders and business owners were able to obtain generous government loans, which allowed them, together with their Armenian and Jewish colleagues, to obtain an important share of Turkey's foreign trade business. The deputies of Greek extraction became more active in the TGNA.

During both World War II and the Civil War, the Turks of Western Thrace had remained loyal to Athens. During the 1950s they also benefited from the relaxed atmosphere. The 1951 Cultural Agreement and the exchange of letters of 1952 allowed a good number of instructors to come to their schools from Turkey, and instructors from Western Thrace went to Turkey for courses. Students from Western Thrace obtained scholarships to attend teacher-training schools in Turkey. Official permission was granted for the repair of minority schools in Western Thrace, with funds provided by the Turkish Consulate in Komotini to carry out the repairs. The Celal Bayar High School, which was opened by President Bayar during his visit to Greece, was the first Muslim-minority high school in Western Thrace. Law No. 3065/1954, also known as

the Papagos Law, referred to Turkish schools for the first time instead of using the customary "minority schools" formula.

In the 1950s, for the first time, the Turkish minority was allowed to elect Community Administrative Boards. Despite these positive developments in Western Thrace, the ill-famed Law No. 2185 was enacted in 1952. This was the law that provided the legal basis for the expropriations that would take place later and create problems in bilateral relations. Some people assert that the positive developments of 1954 were due to the Papagos government's decision to internationalize the question of Cyprus. They claim that the objective was to demonstrate to the Turkish Cypriots and to Turkey how well the Turks would fare when the island would unite with Greece. But these positive developments in Western Thrace cannot be due to tactical considerations within the framework of the Cypriot policy of the Greek government when viewed against the background of the improvements of the Greek minority's condition in Turkey and the flourishing friendship between Turkey and Greece, which was bound to have positive effects on the condition of minorities.

The softening of the policies of the Turkish and Greek governments toward their respective minorities was confined to the period from 1950 to 1954. Starting with the emergence of the Cyprus question, followed by the disputes in the Aegean, Greek-Turkish relations entered a period of disputes and disagreements. This situation had negative repercussions on the minorities, and neither government had any qualms about using them as a lever to gain advantage in a situation of strained relations.

# III. FRIENDSHIP UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION (1955–1960)

Two important developments in the postwar world helped reshape the international order as well as Turkish-Greek relations. These were the Cold War and the newly independent states that emerged from colonialism by exercising their right to self-determination (Box 4-12).

The Cold War and the consequent bipolar world were the basis of the closer friendship established between Turkey and Greece. Self-determination and the process of decolonization that followed placed the question of Cyprus firmly on the agenda and damaged that friendship.

From 1950 on, the public's interest in the question of Cyprus was rising; but the two governments, acting within the spirit of Turkish-Greek friendship, sought to keep the matter in the background. But when Turkey formally became a party to this question in 1955, the dispute

#### Box 4-12. Self-Determination/Self-Government

Self-government denotes autonomous political self-governance without full independence. Self-determination can be defined in three ways.

- 1. It can be defined as the ability of a people to decide on the political, economic, social, and cultural system within the country, which in practice is democracy. The first "pure" example of this is the French Revolution of 14 July 1789. We can call this the "internal" definition. (The American experience is mixed with the "external" aspect.)
- 2. After World War I and especially after World War II, the term also acquired an "external" definition. Although the concept was first embodied in points 6 and 7 of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the first explicit use of the term in international documents occurred in articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter. Since 1950 the term has meant colonies becoming independent states.
- 3. The right to secede from an independent state is another definition, but this definition does not receive general approval in international relations. Today there are about 600 to 3,000 living languages and 5,000 separate ethnic groups within the world's 184 independent states. Acceptance of this version of self-determination would lead to a chain reaction that could produce fragmentation down to the clan level and create chaos. At present the right of self-determination cannot be claimed against a sovereign and independent state, because the territorial integrity of states and their national unity must be upheld.

If there is a division in a country's territory, with the sea or the territory of another state coming in between, if the separate parts are ethnically and religiously very different, and if the country does not enjoy democratic freedom of expression, however, then the right of secession may find general acceptance and at least may not meet with strong opposition in the international arena. Of course, it all depends on the play of power politics. One trend developing in the West believes that external self-determination might be justified in a country without internal self-determination (that is, democracy).

At the same time, within the terms of the second definition, it is agreed that self-determination is not the right of minorities but the collective right of peoples. When the term "people" has been used in international documents since the 1980s, it usually means indigenous people who are very different culturally and otherwise from the groups that govern the country.

(B. ORAN)

started setting the course of Turkish-Greek relations. The U.S. intervened in the dispute in order to protect NATO's interests. Both countries identified their national interests with NATO's interests, so they decided to reach a mutually agreeable settlement of the question. Thus it became possible, in the first phase of the Cyprus question, to settle the matter within the framework of Turkish-Greek friendship through the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960. This proved not to be a lasting solution, however, and Cyprus became a stumbling block

once again in the 1960s. By then it was no longer Turkish-Greek relations that shaped developments in Cyprus, but the other way around, with developments in Cyprus determining the course of Turkish-Greek relations.

### A. Political Groupings in Cyprus

The first signs of what was to come in Cyprus appeared during the war years. When the Germans occupied Crete in May 1941, Britain's interest shifted to Cyprus because of its great strategic importance. Britain sent troop reinforcements there and sped up the construction of defensive infrastructure, in which 17,000 Cypriots were employed. The spending of British soldiers stationed in Cyprus, in addition to financial aid from Britain, helped revitalize the island's economy. German control of the Mediterranean made it difficult to import goods, which led to the development of small industries on the island. This too helped boost the economy. The buoyant economy in turn led to a livening up of political activity in Cyprus. The Cypriot Trade Unions Committee (PTUC), established in 1941, intensified its activities. The trade union movement and communism, two movements that would play a big role in the island's political life, got started in this period. All political activity on the island had been banned since the 1931 uprising. The social activism resulted in a loosening up of political life. The British colonial administration announced in 1941 that local elections would be held and decreed that political activities in connection with the elections would be allowed.

Political groups started getting established as a result of this relaxation. The Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) was formed in 1941. It would later become one of the strongest Communist parties in the region. The presence of AKEL and its activism led the Orthodox Church, the traditional leader of the island's Greek community, into action. The Cyprus National Party (KEK) came into being with the backing of the church. At the municipal elections held in March 1943, AKEL scored a success, with its candidates becoming mayors of Limassol and Famagusta. The Nationalist Front carried the cities of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Paphos.

The divisions within the Greek Cypriot community that appeared in the 1943 elections were ideologically based, while the divisions within the Turkish Cypriot community were based on personalities. For years Necati Özkan had led the progressive wing of the Turkish Cypriots. Now he was confronted by Fazil Küçük, who enjoyed the backing of the Turkish Consulate. Although Fazil Küçük was the winner in the election, it became necessary to attempt a political restructuring in order to overcome the

weakness arising from divisions within the community. The community's weakness was especially disturbing because both AKEL and the Orthodox Church were beginning to espouse enosis (union with Greece). On 18 April 1943 the Turkish Minority Association of the Island of Cyprus (KATAK) came into being, with the participation of both Özkan and Küçük. But the unity of KATAK did not last long. A group led by Küçük left the association, claiming that more rigorous action was necessary against the British administration and the demands for enosis. Fazıl Küçük and his group established the National Turkish Popular Party of Cyprus (KMTHP) on 23 April 1944. As a result of Küçük's increasing popularity within the Turkish community, KATAK and KMTHP merged on 6 November 1949. In 1955 the new entity would be renamed the Cyprus Is Turkish Party (KTP) to underline its opposition to enosis. On 21 June 1949 Necati Özkan established the Cypriot Turkish Unity-Independence Party. As the Cyprus question became more acute and started affecting Turkish-Greek relations, the DP administration in Turkey increased its support for Küçük against Özkan, who was known for his closeness to the opposition CHP in Turkey. The opposition voices among the Cypriot Turks were gradually suppressed, and Küçük emerged as the sole leader.

Toward the end of World War II, these organizations accelerated their activities. AKEL made rapid headway among the workers. In 1944 PTUC adopted a decision acknowledging AKEL's leadership role in the political, economic, and social struggle. Because of its trade-union links, AKEL also increased its activities among Turkish workers. This was causing uneasiness among both nationalist Greeks and the Turkish leadership. The nationalist Greeks established the Confederation of Cypriot workers (SEK) with church backing and thereby created the first split among the workers. There were several attempts at establishing trade unions among the Turks, but the most effective among these was the Turkish Workers' Association of Cyprus, established in 1945. Among its political objectives was to combat enosis and to neutralize the covert activities of AKEL among Turkish workers. It took on the Cypriot Turks who participated in events like general strikes organized by PTUC and AKEL and marginalized them within the Turkish community. It also prevented the spread of leftist movements among Turkish workers. The often tactical references to enosis in AKEL's program and the pressures applied by the Turkish leadership on Turks who happened to be members of AKEL or PTUC prevented the emergence of a leftist movement in Cyprus embracing both communities. Thus it never became

possible to establish the only platform that could have led both communities in a common struggle against the British colonial administration.

### B. Demands for Enosis after World War II and Turkey's Reaction

Since Britain took over the administration of Cyprus in 1878, the Greek Cypriots had never relented in pressing for enosis at every opportunity. These efforts gathered momentum during World War II and the postwar period. The movement had two separate leaders. AKEL, supported by the working class, was one of them and had gathered much strength during the war. The other was the Orthodox Church, the perennial standard bearer of the Greek people.

It was difficult for the postwar Labor government in Britain to ignore the demand for enosis completely. The rise of Arab nationalism, however, demonstrated that Britain would not be able to stay in Egypt much longer. To maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean, Britain had to hold onto the strategically important island of Cyprus. In these circumstances, the British government sought a compromise and, emphasizing the anti-enosis stance of the Turkish Cypriots, drew up a program of political and economic reforms for Cyprus, which was an nounced on 23 October 1946.

On 28 February 1947 the Greek parliament bowed to the pressure from Cyprus and adopted a resolution call ing for the union of Cyprus with Greece. This resolution had no effect on Britain. The new British governor, Reginald Fletcher, Lord Winster, who arrived on the island on 27 March 1947, launched the promised reform program. A Constituent Assembly was convened on 1 November 1947. Protesting the reforms, the Orthodox Church refused to send representatives. This resulted in the Right not being represented at the Assembly, which consisted of ten Greeks (eight of them from AKEL), seven Turks, one Maronite, and a British judge. Of the nineteen members, two were appointed directly by the British government. Differences emerged as soon as deliberations got underway. The AKEL representatives demanded selfgovernment, while the Turks were opposed to the idea. When Lord Winster introduced his draft Constitution, which made no provision for self-government, on 20 May 1948, the AKEL representatives walked out. It was impossible to continue work with the remainder of the representatives, and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved on 12 August.

After this, AKEL intensified its activities aimed at achieving immediate enosis. On 23 November 1949 it sub-

mitted a memorandum seeking self-determination to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, bearing the title "The Cypriot People Accuse Great Britain: A Petition to the United Nations." AKEL's initiative forced the Orthodox Church into action. The Council of the Archbishopric took a decision on 5 December, calling on Britain to arrange a referendum before 15 January 1950. Should Britain fail to do so, the church threatened to organize its own referendum. The referendum took place after Sunday mass on 15 January and, because of insufficient participation, continued the following Sunday. The referendum showed that 96% of the participants had voted for enosis. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Turks did not participate in this referendum. Despite this, the church went ahead and sent emissaries to different countries and organizations describing the results of the referendum as reflecting the will of the Cypriots. This placed the church ahead of its rival AKEL in its bid to lead the Greek Cypriots. When the bishop of Kition, Mihael Mouskos, was elected archbishop on 18 October 1950 and assumed his post as Makarios III, the church became even more politically active in the enosis campaign.

As Makarios intensified his agitation after 1950 in the quest for enosis and extended his activities to Greece, the Greek government was left in a quandary. It was feeling the increasing pressure of public opinion, which supported enosis, but at the same time felt that its national interest as a member of the Western alliance called for it to preserve good relations with Britain and Turkey. The Greek government's Cyprus policy up to 1954 can be described as a search for a solution to the question through bilateral negotiations with Britain. In November 1951 Britain was offered a lease on four bases in Greece for ninetynine years if it agreed to enosis, but it did not respond. The coming to power of Papagos after the election of 19 November 1952 raised the hopes of the champions of enosis.

As the Greek politician who was most concerned with Cyprus, Papagos had promised to take the issue to the UN if he came to power. But he did not deviate from the traditional policy and declared that he preferred to solve the question through bilateral talks with Britain. The opportunity for this came when Britain's foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, visited Greece in September 1953 to recover from an illness. On that occasion, Papagos and Eden held two informal meetings. When Papagos inquired about Britain's intentions, he was sharply rebuked by Eden. Britain did not accept that Cyprus was an issue either then or in the future. Eden told Papagos that he did not want to discuss the issue. He added sarcastically that more Greeks lived in New York and Alexandria than in

Cyprus and asked Papagos if Greece was going to claim these places too.

On 28 July 1954 the undersecretary of the Colonial Office, Henry Hopkinson, made a statement in the House of Commons, which constituted the last straw for Greece. He declared that some places in the British Commonwealth could never expect to be fully independent because of their special circumstances. It was clear that Hopkinson had Cyprus in mind when making his statement. At that time, Britain had reached an agreement with Egypt to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal zone. This agreement had been the result of U.S. prodding, and now Cyprus was Britain's only remaining possession in the Mediterranean, except for Malta. It is likely that Hopkinson was relying on U.S. backing in connection with Cyprus when he made his statement. In view of these developments, Greece abandoned its policy based on bilateral diplomacy and decided to shift to a policy of internationalizing the issue. One of the factors that facilitated this shift was the Turkish government's posture vis-à-vis the Cyprus question after World War II.

Between the two world wars, the Cypriot Turks closely followed the Kemalist reforms being carried out in Turkey, but Turkey kept its dealings with its Cypriot kin confined to the cultural sphere. As a matter of fact, when the Greek Cypriots intensified their activities in favor of enosis in the postwar period, they were met with opposition from the Turkish Cypriots who had studied in Turkey or who were settled there, rather than from the Turkish government. From 1948 on, they set up Cypriot Turkish Cultural Associations in Ankara and İstanbul and established contacts with the press. The newspapers Tasvir, Vatan, and particularly Hürriyet started publishing news and commentary on Cyprus, and the public's attention was increasingly drawn to the subject. The government maintained its cautious approach, however, to avoid harming relations with Britain and Greece. On 23 January 1950 the minister of foreign affairs, Necmettin Sadak, declared: "There is no such thing as a Cyprus question... The British government does not intend to transfer the island of Cyprus to another state. This being the case, there is no need for our youth to get excited. They need not exert themselves for nothing" (Ulus, 24 January 1950, quoted in Gürel 1985, p. 74). Despite this effort to appease public opinion, the arrival of a succession of delegations from Cyprus forced the government to take an interest in the matter. In March 1950 Sadak declared that all possible assistance would be provided to the Turkish Cypriots, and verbal support followed.

In the election campaign of 1950, the election mani-

festos of the CHP and the DP did not contain any reference to Cyprus. The minister of foreign affairs of the DP government, Fuat Köprülü, pursued the line of his predecessor and declared on 20 June 1950 in reply to a question in a press interview that there was no Cyprus question. The DP government maintained the same position in its international dealings. When the Greek prime minister Sophocles Venizelos visited Ankara in 1951, he responded to the pressure exerted on him by Greek and Greek Cypriot public opinion and raised the question of Cyprus. Menderes appeased his Greek counterpart by assuring him that a solution would be found within the framework of Turkish-Greek friendship. The rising passions in connection with Cyprus after 1950 did not result in any changes in Turkey's policy. Turkey was incapable of formulating a policy without reference to NATO and gave priority to friendship with Britain and Greece within the Western alliance. In these circumstances Ankara was left with no Cypriot policy, and all it could do was back Britain's stand on the issue. It announced that it wanted to see the status quo maintained on the island; but if there was to be a change, Turkey had to be consulted. This approach to the question, which encouraged the Greek government to press on, lasted until 1955, when British action made Turkey a party to the dispute.

# c. The Internationalization of the Question and the Beginning of EOKA Activities

As noted above, Hopkinson's speech produced a sharp reaction both in Greece and among the Greek Cypriots. Papagos applied to the UN Secretariat on 16 August 1954, calling for an item to be inserted in the agenda of the ninth session of the General Assembly entitled "The Implementation of the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination for the Inhabitants of the Island of Cyprus under the Aegis of the UN." The question of Cyprus had been internationalized and has remained on the international agenda to this day.

The General Assembly took up the question on 17 December 1954, with interventions from the interested parties stating their views. These views can be summarized as follows.

- 1. Britain and Turkey declared that British sovereignty over Cyprus was an internationally recognized fact. Consequently, it should be considered a question of domestic jurisdiction and therefore not susceptible to discussion in the UN. Greece claimed that the UN was competent to consider the issue.
- 2. Britain and Turkey pointed out that the transfer of sovereignty over Cyprus to Britain took place according

to the multilateral Treaty of Lausanne, also signed by Greece. For Greece to ignore the treaty and claim rights over a British territory and for the General Assembly to consider such a claim would set a very dangerous precedent from the point of view of international law. Greece claimed that it had signed the treaty at Lausanne as a witness of Turkey's recognition of the annexation of Cyprus by Britain, but its signing did not imply Greek recognition of the annexation.

- 3. Britain drew attention to the strategic importance of Cyprus and explained that it could not give up sovereignty. Greece accepted this reasoning but added that the strategic value of bases surrounded by an unfriendly population would be much diminished.
- 4. Britain and Turkey noted the presence of the Turks living on the island who were against enosis and whose views had not been taken into account. To consider this question in the General Assembly in these circumstances would bring about disturbances on the island. Greece stressed that if the principle of self-determination would be applied, the Turkish Cypriots would enjoy all the minority rights enjoyed by the Turkish minority in Western Thrace.
- 5. Britain and Turkey used the argument of geographic proximity, declaring that the island was closer to Turkey and Syria than it was to Greece. The Turkish representative Selim Sarper cited the example of the Aaland Islands and claimed that Cyprus formed part of Anatolia from the geographic, historical, economic, and ethnic points of view.
- Britain and Turkey pointed out that the island had never been under Greek sovereignty historically.

After long deliberations, the UN General Assembly resolved that it would not be appropriate to reach a decision on Cyprus at that time. The General Assembly thus refused to place Greece's application on its agenda. Britain had received the support of all NATO members, with the exception of Iceland, while Greece got the support of the Eastern Bloc, the Latin American states, and the newly independent states. Both sides had reasons for being satisfied with the result. In the view of Britain and Turkey, the General Assembly had not accepted the arguments for enosis, because it refused to consider the issue. Greece and the Cypriot Greeks noted that the decision not to consider the issue was taken with the proviso "for the time being." The door was left open to the possibility of taking up the question at another time in the future.

From 1950 on, Makarios was pushing Greece to internationalize the issue by taking it to the United Nations. At the same time, he was making preparations for resorting to

armed action to force Britain's hand, in case internationalization did not produce the desired results. To this end, he was in contact with Georgios Grivas, one of the leaders of the secret organization X, known as Chi in Greek. A native of Cyprus, he had moved to Greece, joined the army, lived in Greece after retirement, and returned to the island in 1951 to prepare for guerrilla warfare. In his contacts with Grivas, Makarios told him that he wanted armed action to be confined to acts of sabotage. He did not want Grivas, who would assume the command of an armed force, to break loose from his control and emerge as an alternative leader.

When the Greek Cypriots failed to obtain the result they were seeking from the UN, Makarios gave Grivas the green light, with the approval of the Greek government. Grivas set up the National Organization of the Cypriot Struggle (EOKA), which carried out its first acts of sabotage on 1 April 1955. The action was directed against British officers, policemen, and government officials. It also targeted civilian Greek Cypriot members of AKEL, who were regarded as traitors by EOKA.

With the eruption and intensification of violence, the opposition in Britain started criticizing the government's policies in Cyprus. This led the British government to revise its policies and adopt a three-stage plan for Cyprus:

- 1. A conference would be convened, to be attended by Britain, Greece, and Turkey.
- 2. Preparations would be made for a draft Constitution.
- 3. An economic development program for Cyprus would be introduced.

As Britain prepared for a conference in London on this issue, its plans were based on the assumption that Turkey would be turned into one of the parties in the dispute.

### D. The London Conference and the Events of 6–7 September

On 20 June 1955 the British government issued invitations to the Greek and Turkish governments to attend a conference in London that would take up the political and defense issues of the eastern Mediterranean. Although Cyprus was not specifically mentioned among the issues to be taken up at the conference, it was clear that the sole subject for discussion would be Cyprus. Britain was being careful not to upset Greece by including Cyprus explicitly among the issues to be taken up at a conference to which Turkey was also invited.

Turkey accepted the invitation right away. Greece also accepted the invitation, but after early hesitations.

The objection, as usual, came from the island. Makarios saw a trap in Britain's initiative and announced that Greece should accept the invitation only on condition that Britain agree to the principle of self-determination for the Cypriot people. Greece was caught in a dilemma, with public opinion pulling in one direction and its national interest in another. Finally, it accepted the invitation unconditionally, because it dared not risk impairing its relations with its allies.

The London Conference commenced its work on 29 August 1955. The first speaker was British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan, who declared that it was not enough for Britain to have bases in Cyprus to carry out its commitments under NATO and the Baghdad Pact. It must have full control of the entire island. His Greek counterpart, Stefanos Stefanopoulos, stressed that the island's inhabitants must be able to exercise their right of self-determination, but this did not require the removal of Britain's military presence from the island. The military bases located in Cyprus were adequate for defending Britain's strategic interests in the region. Finally, minister of foreign affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu spoke for Turkey. He started by reminding everyone of the island's proximity to Turkey, the presence of the Turkish community in Cyprus, and the island's historical, cultural, and economic links with Turkey. He then dwelt on the island's strategic significance for Turkey. If Cyprus was acquired by a state that already possessed the islands off Turkey's western coastline, it could effectively encircle Turkey. No country could totally leave its security to such an extent at the mercy of another country, no matter how friendly. Zorlu explained that Turkey was satisfied with the status quo and wanted to see it maintained. If there was to be any change in the status quo, however, the island must revert to its former owner, Turkey.

Britain's initiative had turned Turkey into a party to the dispute, and for the first time Turkey had formulated a Cyprus policy. Turkey had selected not Britain but Greece as its adversary and was conveying the message to all that Britain's departure from Cyprus would result in differences, and perhaps worse, not only between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots but also between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

On 6 September Macmillan submitted the reform package for Cyprus and stated that, with the new Constitution, Cyprus would become self-governing. Turkey rejected the British proposals because they went too far, while Greece rejected them because they did not adequately respond to the wishes of the Cypriots. The conference was deadlocked, but it was the events of 6–7 Septem-

ber 1955 that took place in Turkey (Box 4-13) that caused the conference to break up as a failure.

The events of 6–7 September had two important consequences. The first was a practice that Turkey would later resort to repeatedly: whenever Ankara felt under pressure in Cyprus, it would respond by exerting pressure on the minorities who were its own citizens. The second consequence was that the damage inflicted on Turkish-Greek friendship could never be fully repaired. The first victim of this state of affairs was the Balkan Pact, which turned out to be stillborn.

### E. Britain's Cyprus Proposals and Turkey's Espousal of the Partition Plan

Greece's second attempt to inscribe Cyprus in the UN General Assembly's agenda in 1955 was also rejected. The events of 6-7 September had brought relations between Athens and Ankara to the breaking point. Inevitably, these developments would have ugly repercussions in Cyprus. EOKA intensified its activities, while the Cypriot Turkish community, heartened by Turkey's involvement in the dispute, also went into action. The KMTHP, led by Küçük, turned itself into the Cyprus Is Turkish Party, and Volkan was established as the first Turkish resistance movement. Volkan distributed tracts declaring that EOKA would meet with an immediate response if it attacked the Turkish community or Turkish officials and policemen. The British administration tended to recruit Turks as policemen, and EOKA was prone to attacking them as the representatives of the British administration. In these circumstances, it was easy to conclude that intercommunal strife would spread and intensify.

Makarios was very intransigent in his dealings with the new governor, Marshal John Harding. He held that Britain had to accept the principle of self-determination before discussing the modalities of self-government. He was against the Turkish government's participation in the negotiations. Makarios also insisted on restricting the governor's area of competence and transferring some of the governor's responsibilities to the new government. Finally, Makarios wanted an amnesty for all EOKA activists. The British government started perceiving Makarios as the sole obstacle to constitutional reform and, citing his links to EOKA, exiled him to the Seychelles Islands on 9 March 1956.

After the exiling of Makarios, EOKA intensified its acts of violence. The Turkish community was beginning to perceive this violence as directed against it. In their visits to Ankara, the Turkish leaders were explaining the gravity of the situation on the island and seeking

#### Box 4-13. The Events of 6-7 September

Turkish public opinion about Cyprus was getting mobilized even before the Turkish delegation left for the London Conference. A group from the National Turkish Student Association, a nationalistic organization under the chairmanship of Hikmet Bil, had formed the Cyprus Is Turkish Society. The press, led by high-circulation Hürriyet, was taking a close interest in the Cyprus dispute. On 24 August 1955 Adnan Menderes made a speech highly critical of Greece.

At a time when tension was running high, the pro-government Istanbul Ekspres newspaper ran a second edition announcing that Atatürk's house in Salonica had been bombed on 6 September. The newspaper's editor, G. Sipahioğlu, would later claim that the semiofficial news agency Anadolu Ajansı had been the first to release the news of the bombing. The Cyprus Is Turkish Society then organized a demonstration in Istanbul. In a short time the demonstration degenerated into a mass melee in which the rabble attacked and pillaged properties, churches, and schools belonging mostly to the Greek minority. The police stood by passively as the burning and looting went on over several hours. Similar disturbances took place in Izmir, where the Greek Consulate and the Greek stand at the International Fair were burned down and the homes belonging to minorities and Levantines (foreign subjects settled in Turkey for centuries) were looted. When the news of these events reached Menderes, he cut short his journey to Ankara and returned to Istanbul. Martial law was declared in Istanbul and Izmir. In the course of the events of 6-7 September, a number of elderly Greeks were killed, thirty-five people were injured, and 5,622 buildings were destroyed. The material damage was estimated to run to \$300 million. But the worst damage was inflicted on Turkey's international image, with frequent references abroad to Turkish barbarism.

The Turkish government issued an official statement qualifying the events as a national calamity and expressing profound regrets. The Cyprus Is Turkish Society was closed down, and eighty seven of its members were arrested. Most of the three thousand people who were also arrested were known as leftists, because the government announced that the events were the work of Communists.

Greece sent a protest to the Turkish government, and the Greek press claimed that the events were planned by the authorities. To normalize the tense relations between the two countries, the Greek flag was hoisted on the building of the Greek Consulate in izmir in an official ceremony held on 24 October. With U.S. mediation, bilateral relations were repaired in a relatively short time.

It never became completely clear who was behind these events. The investigation conducted in Greece revealed that the sound bomb that went off in Atatürk's house was provided to an employee of the Turkish Consulate by a student from Western Thrace in the service of Turkish intelligence. Retired general Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu, however, speaking to a journalist about the events and obviously referring to the "deep state" (see Box 7-5 in Section 7), said: "6-7 September was a Special Warfare [Department] work and it achieved its purpose. Wasn't it a magnificent organization?" (Fatih Güllapoğlu, Tanksız Topsuz Harekat [İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991], p. 104).

At the trials conducted at Yassiada following the 27 May coup, the court concluded that Menderes and Fatin Rüstü Zorlu were responsible for planning the events. But given the politically motivated character of the court's verdicts and the inability of Zorlu to get a hearing for witnesses who might testify in his favor, it is difficult to claim that the trial was able to identify those who were responsible for the events. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Turkish government did at least encourage the events by remaining passive. The demonstrators were not even prevented from traveling to the neighboring islands of Islanbul to carry out their destruction.

(M. FIRAT)

help. Barriers were being set up in Nicosia between the neighborhoods where the two communities lived, dividing the city into two separate zones. Harding had decreed a state of emergency in the island under which measures were allowed to stem EOKA activities and violence. But they were not producing the desired results and were inviting criticism from the opposition in London, which wanted to know why the island was not granted self-determination. In justifying its actions, the British government cited Turkey as the obstacle to granting self-determination to Cyprus, whereas it was actually developments in Egypt that made it necessary for Britain to hold onto the island.

When Harding's strong measures proved fruitless, Britain shifted its policy. A constitutional expert, Lord C.J.R. Radcliffe, went to Cyprus in July 1956 to prepare a new Constitution but found no Greek Cypriot ready to discuss the issue. After the exiling of Makarios, the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community had passed to EOKA, which refused to talk to the British before Makarios.

rios was allowed to return. All contacts between the two sides had been severed, and the British administration continued to implement its repressive measures with the utmost severity. EOKA declared a unilateral cease-fire on 16 August 1956. It said that it wanted to test the sincerity of the British administration, which claimed that it was EOKA violence that was hindering the search for a solution. The cease-fire did not result in any change in Britain's policies. The 1956 Suez operation was being planned at that time, and Cyprus was of vital strategic importance. Consequently, EOKA resumed the violence. The international situation had altered significantly.

The 1956 Suez operation was a failure for Britain, which had profound effects on the fate of Cyprus. Britain ceased to be the paramount power in the region after this failure, and its role as the guardian of Western interests was taken over by the U.S. through the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. The island's strategic value for Britain had diminished. Britain could now manage with just military bases in Cyprus.

On 19 December 1956 Britain's colonial secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, paid a visit to Athens and Ankara, where he announced that Britain agreed to the implementation of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. He added that among the alternative solutions that would be put before the Cypriots was the partition of the island. Britain was resorting to its old practice of "divide and rule."

On the day when Lennox-Boyd was announcing Britain's plans, Lord Radcliffe disclosed the draft Constitution for Cyprus. The legislature would have thirty-six members. A quota of six members would be set aside for the Turks and the governor's appointees, with the majority of seats allocated to the Greeks. Defense, public order, and foreign relations would be the responsibility of the governor. There were also provisions allowing Britain to use Cyprus as a base to carry out its international commitments.

Makarios, who was still in exile, refused to consider this draft. Greece announced that the draft was formulated in a way that would maintain the colonial administration and, as such, was far from being a final solution to the problem. The colonial secretary's announcement that the island might have to be partitioned was received very positively by the Turkish government, which declared that Radcliffe's draft Constitution contained the elements that could lead to a final solution and that it would consider the proposals in that light. Turkey's positive approach reflected its changed Cyprus policy, which was now based on the thesis of partition.

The idea of partition—the division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece—was first advanced in the July 1955 issue of the journal *Forum* published in Ankara. Subsequently, Greek foreign minister Evangelos Averoff had broached the idea with the Turkish ambassador, Settar İlksel; but at that time the Turkish government did not look kindly upon an idea coming from the Greek government.

Although Turkey was cool toward the idea at first, it warmed up after Britain made its proposal of 19 December. On 28 December Prime Minister Menderes made a statement in the TGNA, explaining partition and declaring that this was now Turkey's official policy. İnönü, the leader of the opposition, also supported this thesis. The public took up the idea right away and replaced the old battle cry "Cyprus or death" with "Partition or death" at meetings and demonstrations. By the time the TGNA adopted a resolution in favor of partition on 16 June 1958, however, different formulas were being mooted in the diplomatic contacts on Cyprus.

While Britain was preparing draft Constitutions and

the pros and cons of the partition formula were being debated, Greece was pressing on with its policy of internationalizing the question. In 1956 Greece applied once again to the UN with the request that the granting of the right to self-determination to Cyprus be placed on the agenda. That year, Britain too resorted to the UN and accused Greece of supporting terrorism in Cyprus. The two applications were merged into one agenda item, which was taken up at the General Assembly on 18 February 1957. In the end, an Indian draft resolution was adopted with fifty-seven votes and one abstention. The resolution called for a peaceful, democratic, and just solution and expressed the hope that negotiations leading to such a solution would be undertaken in an atmosphere of peace and free expression.

The Turkish side welcomed the resolution as a positive step. Ankara saw the resolution as a formal acknowledgment by the UN of Turkey as a party and of the Turkish Cypriot community as an entity with equal rights. The resolution was also seen as a rejection of enosis. Greece saw things in a completely different light. Athens held that the negotiations aimed at a peaceful, democratic, and just solution had to take place between Britain and the Cypriot people. Thus Greece was changing its policy as a consequence of the resolution, which had not endorsed its previous policy. Greece now argued that it was not a party to the question, thereby hoping to remove Turkey as a party through this shift. For Greece, the question was now a dispute between Britain and the Cypriot people. By this argument, Greece abandoned its previous course of internationalizing the issue and now adopted the position that this was an internal issue.

Britain's position also had shifted and was now the mirror image of Greece's position. London had previously maintained that Cyprus was a domestic issue. Now it was stressing the issue's international character. Britain was now reconciled to maintaining some bases in Cyprus and was anxious to get rid of the problem, which was causing it political headaches at home as well as material and moral losses on the island. Britain's change, of course, was essentially due to the shifting balances in the Middle East. The U.S. announced that the question could be resolved within NATO.

After the Suez debacle, Prime Minister Eden resigned and was replaced by Harold Macmillan. In March 1957 the new government canceled the order exiling Makarios. After calming the atmosphere in Cyprus, steps were taken to start tripartite negotiations within NATO. The U.S. supported a policy that would grant Cyprus independence after guaranteeing the preservation of the British bases on the island. But Makarios was opposed to plans that

were conceived within the framework of any organization other than the UN and was able to influence the Greek government to support his stance.

Having adopted the partition thesis, Turkey and the Cypriot Turkish community were opposed to the U.S. formula based on independence. The 1957 election campaign was in full swing in Turkey. In this atmosphere, the subject of Cyprus was a recurring theme, and anti-Greek rhetoric was heard in all quarters. This negative environment was having its effect on the Greek minority in İstanbul. Patriarch Athenagoras felt obliged to make a statement on 30 November 1957 to refute his critics by declaring his attachment to the Turkish homeland and emphasizing that as a religious institution the patriarchate had no interest in the Cyprus issue, which was purely political. This statement failed to appease his critics, who blamed him for not condemning Makarios.

Meanwhile a Greek-sponsored draft resolution at the UN failed to get the requisite number of votes. Turkey noted that as it insisted on partition, however, it was losing ground to Greece at the UN.

Late in 1957 Britain came up with a succession of plans to resolve the question of Cyprus. The first of these was the Foot Plan, named after the new governor, Hugh Foot, who arrived in Cyprus on 3 December. The Foot Plan contained the following principles for resolving the question: (1) There was to be a transitional period of five to seven years before the final solution. (2) Assurances would be given to the parties that a solution would not be reached without the approval of the Cypriot Greeks and Turks. (3) The state of emergency would be lifted on the island, and Makarios would be allowed to return. (4) Negotiations would be undertaken with the leaders of the two communities to determine the system of selfgovernment. Turkey rejected the plan, because it was opposed to Makarios's return to the island and the lifting of the state of emergency. Greece was opposed to Turkey's becoming a party with equal rights. Athens also wanted to see the final solution right away. It was obvious that the Foot Plan would not be implemented.

Britain then proposed the Macmillan Plan on 19 June 1958. Under this plan, a new Constitution would be drafted in consultation with the two communities as well as Turkey and Greece. The new Constitution would have the following basic features. (1) Each community would have a separate assembly of representatives, which would be responsible for all matters concerning its community. (2) A council under the chairmanship of the governor would be set up, consisting of two members representing the governments of Turkey and Greece plus four Greek

and two Turkish Cypriot members. (3) The governor would be responsible for foreign relations, defense, and internal security. In exercising these responsibilities, the governor would consult with the representatives of Turkey and Greece. (4) The representatives of Turkey and Greece could have recourse to arbitrators if they considered a law to be discriminatory.

According to the Macmillan Plan, the status of the island would remain fixed for seven years, which meant that British sovereignty would be maintained during this interval. At the end of this period, Britain would be prepared to share sovereignty with its allies, Turkey and Greece, if Turkey and Greece would agree to continue their cooperation and if the British could continue using the military bases and facilities on the island.

The new plan was rejected by all of the parties. Makarios and Greece feared that the plan might lead to partition, while Küçük and Denktaş, along with Turkey, feared that the plan might pave the way for enosis. Meanwhile developments in Turkey and Cyprus were making it harder to reach a solution. "Partition or death" demonstrations were being organized in Turkey, and public opinion, which had been aroused by the government, was circumscribing the government's freedom of maneuver. As the solution became more elusive, the Greek Cypriot-British confrontation on the island was turning into a general Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot confrontation.

It must be said that the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), formed on 1 August 1958, was contributing to the deteriorating situation. The TMT was established with covert economic and military support from Turkey. It claimed that its purpose was to be the resistance organization of the Cypriot Turkish community in the face of EOKA aggression. But it also served another, unmentioned purpose. It fomented violence between Turks and Greeks in order to demonstrate that the two communities could not coexist. By this tactic, the TMT was striving to make partition acceptable as a solution (Hasgüler, pp. 125–26).

Macmillan revised his draft in August 1958, but this too was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and Greece because it provided for separate local administrations. Turkey accepted the revised version, however, even though it was less favorable from a Turkish point of view, and Ankara sent its representatives to Cyprus right away. Under U.S. pressure, Turkey was softening its uncompromising stand. Turkish-British cooperation in Cyprus triggered EOKA violence once again, this time directed against civilian targets. With TMT reacting in the same fashion, intercommunal strife escalated, as did the tough counter-

measures of the British administration. The question of Cyprus was now completely deadlocked.

### F. The Solution: Independent Cyprus.

The deadlock in Cyprus was causing concern in the U.S., the leader of the Western alliance during the Cold War. The escalating intercommunal violence was leading to a possible Turkish-Greek clash, which could weaken NATO's southeastern flank and strengthen the USSR in the region. When the Macmillan Plan failed to produce a solution, the U.S. started pressing Ankara and Athens to agree to the independence formula. Athens was successful in its efforts to persuade Grivas and Makarios, and the archbishop gave his consent to the independence formula in September 1958.

Makarios had assessed the situation realistically. He approved the independence solution in preference to partition or the granting of rights to Turks, which could not be subsequently withdrawn. According to Makarios, there would be a period of self-government, to be followed by an independent Cypriot state that would have no links with either Greece or Turkey. Cypriot independence was to be guaranteed by the UN. The new state would grant the Turks minority rights and would remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Turkey reacted sharply to Makarios's independence solution and declared that it would never accept a formula in which the Turkish community would have the status of a minority.

Eventually the First Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a conference with the participation of the interested three governments and the representatives of Cyprus. Zorlu and Averoff undertook to be helpful in the search for a solution. At the NATO meeting of December 1958, the parties declared that they had abandoned the enosis and partition solutions. This sudden reversal of policy by the Turkish government caused dismay among the Turkish public and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. To understand the reason for this change, we must assess the situation from a broader perspective.

The escalating armed struggle between the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus throughout the summer of 1958 was straining relations between Ankara and Athens and threatening to drag the two countries to the brink of war. A breach in the southeastern flank of NATO would serve the interests of Moscow, which had direct links with AKEL and was a backer of Makarios, who was a supporter of the nonaligned movement. At this point, the U.S. came into the picture and insisted on a solution, using its influ-

ence with the Menderes and Karamanlis governments. It was not easy to find a solution that would completely satisfy the Turkish and Greek people, who had been aroused over many years, as well as the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders. In the bipolar world, however, countries like Turkey and Greece, dependent on the West economically and militarily, were not in a position to put up much resistance. Both sides agreed to the independence formula. This outcome was seen as a surprise; but given the circumstances of the day and the situation of the two governments, it is easy to see why they would agree to this formula. The two governments had identified their national interests with NATO's interests; consequently, when NATO's interests were at stake, they were ready to abandon the national policies adopted by their respective parliaments.

### 1. The Zurich and London Conferences

Throughout January 1959 Turkish and Greek diplomats were engaged in the elaboration of the details concerning the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus. During this period Karamanlis was briefing Makarios and trying to keep him on his side. When the preparations were completed, Menderes, Karamanlis, Zorlu, and Averoff met in Zurich on 6 February 1959.

During the Zurich negotiations, the meeting reached a deadlock over Turkey's insistence on the establishment of a joint military headquarters and its demand for bases on the island and for a higher number of troops to be stationed there. Greece eventually agreed to a joint headquarters, and Turkey agreed to give up its demand for bases and a higher number of troops. A joint communiqué was issued on 11 February, announcing that Turkey and Greece were agreed on an overall plan for a solution.

At the Zurich meeting, Menderes and Karamanlis signed the following documents: (a) a gentlemen's agreement designed to clarify the contents and meaning of the documents signed in Zurich, including definitions that would facilitate their implementation; (b) a treaty that contained the constitutional framework of the independent Republic of Cyprus consisting of twenty-seven articles and an annex; and (c) a treaty of alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece.

In addition, the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, Britain, Turkey, and Greece was initialed.

The treaties signed and initialed by Turkey and Greece had to be signed also by Britain and the two Cypriot communities. As Zorlu and Averoff were proceeding to London on 11 February, Karamanlis returned to Athens and met with Makarios. At this meeting, Makarios raised

no objections to the Zurich documents; but when he was invited to London shortly afterward to sign the documents, he started having second thoughts.

Makarios's ambivalence was due to his being under two conflicting pressures. On the one hand, Grivas and the EOKA activists were against independence and were pressuring Makarios under their battle cry "Only enosis." The archbishop was fearful of losing the leadership of the Greek community to Grivas by appearing to be making concessions. On the other hand, after having exhausted all the means at its disposal to help the Cypriots, the government of Greece was insisting. Makarios talked to Karamanlis one last time to inform him that he was against the Treaty of Guarantee. Having failed to persuade Karamanlis, he agreed to go to London. After this, it would be Makarios's turn to seek to persuade Grivas.

The London Conference was scheduled to convene on 17 February. A day before the scheduled opening, Makarios made one last attempt to change the course of events. He declared that, having failed to persuade other Greek Cypriot leaders, he would not sign the documents approved in Zurich unless they were renegotiated and revised. Despite this negative development, the Turkish and Greek prime ministers decided to proceed to London as planned. On the evening of 17 February Karamanlis informed Makarios that he would go ahead and sign the treaties and that, if they chose, the Greek Cypriots could pursue their struggle without Greece's backing. When Makarios announced on 18 February that he had come to London to confer and not to sign any documents, British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd gave him until 9:45 the next morning to reach a final decision. Makarios declared that this was the longest and most difficult night of his life but relented on 19 February, allowing the signing ceremony to go ahead. Menderes signed in his hospital bed, where he was recovering after a plane crash. Thus the first phase of the question of Cyprus, which had been festering for fifteen years, was settled with the signing of the legal documents that established the independent Republic of Cyprus.

### 2. The London Treaties and the TGNA

The London Treaties were signed on 19 February by the prime ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey and by Makarios and Fazil Küçük on behalf of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, respectively. They consist of the following documents: (a) the Basic Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus; (b) the Treaty of Guarantee between Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus; (c) the Treaty of Alliance

between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey; (d) Britain's declaration of 17 February 1959 to the effect that the British government agreed to these documents on the condition that certain provisions regarding bases were inserted in them; (e) the declaration of the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, agreeing to the British Declaration; (f) Makarios's declaration that he agreed to the documents signed in London; (g) Küçük's declaration that he agreed to the documents signed in London; and (h) the convention containing the provisional measures to be taken in connection with the implementation of the Constitution of Cyprus and other relevant documents. The following documents were the most important.

### The Basic Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

According to this treaty, Cyprus was an independent republic under a presidential system of government. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, to be elected by their respective communities for a term of five years by universal suffrage. Whenever the president and vice-president were unable to carry out their responsibilities, the Greek Speaker and the Turkish Deputy Speaker would substitute for them. The official languages of the Republic would be Greek and Turkish, and all official documents would be written in these languages. The official flag of the state would be in a neutral color and design to be determined by the president and the vice-president. On national days of Greece and Turkey, however, the flags of both countries could be hoisted, along with the Cypriot flag, and these holidays could be celebrated in Cyprus.

The House of Representatives, consisting of fifty members to be elected separately by each community through universal suffrage for a term of five years, would exercise legislative power. The membership of this body would be 70% Greek-Cypriot and 30% Turkish-Cypriot. All questions not within the competence of the two Communal Assemblies would be dealt with by the House of Representatives. Differences over competence would be referred for a decision to the Supreme Constitutional Court, consisting of a Turkish and a Greek Cypriot judge to be selected by the president and vice-president in agreement and a third neutral judge. The House of Representatives would make its decisions by simple majority. Constitutional changes would require a two-thirds majority of the Greek representatives as well as of the Turkish representatives. Decisions concerning the holding of elections, municipalities, customs duties, and taxes would require separate voting by the Greek and Turkish members. Each community would have its own communal assembly and would decide on the size of the membership of its assembly. The communal assemblies would be responsible for matters dealing with religion, education, and personal status and would levy taxes on the members of their respective communities.

Executive power would be exercised by the president, vice-president, and Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers would consist of seven Greeks appointed by the president and three Turks appointed by the vice-president. One of the cabinet posts responsible for foreign affairs, defense, or finance would be assigned to a Turk. The president and vice-president could singly or conjointly veto any decision or legislation dealing with foreign affairs, defense, or security. This right of veto would not apply in the case of Cyprus joining an international organization or an alliance that included both Turkey and Greece.

At all levels of the public administration, all positions would be allotted to Greeks and Turks in the proportion of 70-30. This ratio would also apply to the police force and the gendarmerie, whose total personnel should not exceed 2,000.

Cyprus was to have a 2,000-man army, consisting of 60% Greek and 40% Turkish Cypriots. The commander and his deputy both in the army and in the police force/gendarmerie were to be from different communities and were to be appointed by the president and vice-president in agreement. One of the commanders was to be a Turk.

The Turks were to have separate municipalities in the five largest towns, where coordination committees would be set up to ensure cooperation between the two communities in carrying out joint activities. In four years' time, the president and vice-president were to decide whether the practice of separate municipalities would be continued.

In the area of judicial power, the following provisions applied. If both the plaintiff and the defendant were of the same community, a court consisting of judges from their community would handle their case. If the plaintiff and the defendant belonged to different communities, a mixed court appointed by the Supreme Court would be in charge. The Supreme Court would consist of two Greek-Cypriot judges and one Turkish-Cypriot judge selected by the president and vice-president plus a neutral judge who would preside and have two votes.

The Basic Treaty regulated every aspect of the Republic of Cyprus in great detail. The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance formed part of the Constitution of the new state. Enosis and partition were prohibited. In all

agreements that Cyprus entered into, Britain, Greece, and Turkey would enjoy most-favored-nation status. Greece and Turkey would have the rights to provide financial assistance to the educational, cultural, sports, and charitable organizations of their respective communities.

### b. The Treaty of Guarantee

Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee signed by the Republic of Cyprus with Britain, Turkey, and Greece contained the following provisions: "The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity, and security, as well a respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the island." In article 2 Britain, Turkey, and Greece recognized this undertaking and provided their guarantee. Article 3 guaranteed Britain's rights in Cyprus: "The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus." Article 4 concerned the measures to be taken in case of noncompliance: "In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. Insofar as the common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty." This last provision was the legal basis for Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974.

#### c. The Treaty of Alliance

Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Alliance signed by the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey describe the purpose of the treaty. "The High Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate for their common defense and to consult together on the problems raised by that defense." "The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus." Article 3 foresees the establishment of a Tripartite Headquarters to achieve the purpose of the treaty. The Additional Protocol provided for basing military contingents from Greece and Turkey in Cyprus. The Greek contingent would consist of 950 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men and the Turkish contingent of 650. These contingents

would participate in the Tripartite Headquarters and be responsible for the training of the Cypriot army.

### d. The British Government Declaration of 17 February 1959

With this declaration, the British government announced that it would retain sovereignty over two areas, with their military installations, after the Republic of Cyprus acquired its independence. The first area consisted of Akrotiri, Episkopi, and Parmali, while the second area consisted of Dikelia, Pergamos, Hagia Nicola, and Ksilofagu. Britain retained the right to make use of roads and ports, public services, and Nicosia Airport and to carry out military exercises outside the base areas. Britain would also have facilities in the port of Famagusta and exercise exclusive judicial competence over its military personnel.

When examining the formula used for granting independence to Cyprus, we note that the requirements of Turkey and Greece take precedence over the requirements of the two peoples of Cyprus and that the need for NATO's smooth internal functioning takes precedence over the new state's functioning. This was to be a sui generis state, unique in the world, which would be independent, sovereign, and unitary, according to its Treaty of Establishment.

Cyprus was not allowed to change its Constitution; should it attempt to do so, it would be subject to foreign intervention. It accepted that parts of the island would remain under British sovereignty. Although not based on territory, it had a system that could be described as a functional federation. Therefore the Republic of Cyprus was neither independent and sovereign nor unitary. There were so many rules hampering the functioning of the state that it could have functioned smoothly only if the treaties had been prepared by the communal leaders in good faith and full sincerity. The leaders had accepted the treaties grudgingly, however, under external pressure. The imposed system stressed and magnified communal differences to such an extent that it was impossible for these differences to be swept aside in good faith, allowing a common Cypriot identity to emerge that would lead to mutual confidence. These difficulties were compounded by the policies of Greece and Turkey, which developed the tendency to see the Republic of Cyprus not as an integral entity but as consisting of separate Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and fashioned their policies accordingly. All of this made it evident that the new state had little chance to be long lasting.

The London Treaties were submitted to the TGNA for consideration on 28 February 1959. The opposition

was critical of the government's decision to sign treaties that would allow Cyprus to become independent when the resolution of the TGNA dated 16 June 1958 called for partition, although the leader of the opposition CHP, İsmet İnönü, declared: "[W]e appreciate that the strong reasons that drove us to sign the treaties have to do with the general harmony and security of the alliances that we belong to. We can also imagine that the advice of strong friends had an important effect on our decision-making." With this statement he displayed his understanding of the motives that were behind the government's actions. Still, the opposition felt that the partition solution should not have been abandoned. This criticism was refuted by Zorlu, who declared that the sacrifice, if any, lay in abandoning the solution through which the whole island was to be absorbed. Abandoning partition was no sacrifice: instead of insisting on this solution and feuding with Greece over many years, a solution had been achieved that gave the Turkish Cypriots sovereignty while also ensuring Turkey's security.

After long deliberations, the treaties were ratified on 4 March 1959, with 347 votes for and 138 votes against and 2 abstentions. The next year would see the 27 May military coup, which replaced the architects of the solution with those who criticized it for abandoning the idea of partition. The implementation of the Cyprus solution would now be in the hands of its critics.

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### Relations with the Middle East

### L. RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

After 1923 Turkey turned its face westward, and its relations with the Middle East were at a negligible level, apart from the Mosul and Sanjak episodes. When examining Turkey's Middle Eastern policies after World War II, two important developments in the international sphere must be borne in mind, including how they were perceived by Turkey's decision-makers. To understand Turkey's active but unsuccessful policies vis-à-vis the Middle East after 1950, we must bear in mind the Cold War and the decolonization process ensuing from the right of self-determination. These developments had a considerable impact on Ankara.

After 1947 the Western states acknowledged the Cold War and adjusted their policies to this fact of life. Turkey had perceived a Soviet threat since 1945. It was also in need of external financial resources to overcome the negative impact of the war on its economy. In these circumstances, the new policies of the West provided Turkey with the opportunity it had been seeking. Turkey based its foreign policy exclusively on NATO, stressing its strategic importance and identifying the security of the West with Turkey's own security. Especially after 1950, when the DP came to power, Turkey's foreign policy was based on the view that Turkey's interests coincide with the West's, that is, America's interests. This view was also reflected in Turkey's Middle Eastern policies. Turkey started looking at events in the region from the logic of the Cold War and saw things from a Western point of view. As the "representative" of the West in the Middle East, it took on the duty to lead the new independent Arab countries and bring them closer to the West. Compared to the past, it started to take a close interest in regional developments and pursued an active policy.

In its relations with the Middle Eastern states, Turkey acted as the "spokesperson of the West" and (basing itself on the logic of the Cold War and the bipolar world) tended to ignore the yearning of the newly independent states to establish a third pole based on their own values. Turkey was eager to develop its relations with the Arab countries within the framework of regional defense organizations, which it sought to set up to further Western interests. These efforts were met with a frosty reaction from the Arab countries, which had won their independence after struggling against Western imperialism. They saw Turkey as the "spokesperson of imperialism." For these reasons, Turkey's postwar policies in the Middle East were unsuccessful and inflicted wounds on its relations with the Arab countries that would be difficult to heal over the years. During the 1960s Turkey would become aware of the negative results of its Arab policies of the 1950s and would have to revise them drastically.

# A. The Period of Rapprochement with Arab States (1945–1949)

At the end of World War II, Turkey paid the price of its wartime policy of staying out of the war and felt isolated and alone. Until the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the U.S. and Britain met Moscow's demands from Turkey with understanding. Turkey felt threatened from the north and sought close relations with its Arab neighbors in order to enhance its security and avoid problems on its southern borders.

At the end of World War II, there were seven independent Arab states: Yemen (1918), Egypt (1922), Saudi Arabia (1926), Iraq (1932), Lebanon (1945), Syria (1946), and Jordan (1946). On 2 March 1945 these states signed the pact establishing the Arab League. As the first country to have struggled against Western imperialism, Turkey welcomed this initiative coming from countries that had fought for their independence against Britain and France. The secretary-general of the Arab League made statements stressing the importance of Turkish-Arab friendship.

Subsequently Turkey did its best to establish cordial bilateral relations with Arab countries. On 15 September

1945 Abdulilah, the regent of Iraq, visited Ankara. The Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness was signed on 29 March 1946.

The establishment of friendly relations with Iraq had a positive effect on Turkey's other Arab neighbor, Syria. Turkish-Syrian relations had become strained because of the Hatay question. When Syria gained independence, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a circular note to all the foreign representatives in Damascus on 5 July 1944, declaring that it would be bound by all the international treaties and agreements concluded by France on its behalf. But when France left the region in 1946, Syria's position started to change. The statements coming out of Damascus announced that Turkey's sovereignty over Hatay was a violation of international law and that, like the Palestinian question, this was a matter that concerned the entire Arab world. Upon these statements, Turkey delayed its recognition of Syria's independence. It took the intercession of Iraq's prime minister Nuri Said Pasha to reach an understanding. Turkey would no longer insist that Syria formally acknowledge the annexation of Hatay by Turkey, and Syria would no longer formally raise the question. After this, Turkey recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon on 6 March 1946. This compromise, however, was short-lived. The question of Hatay, which was not allowed to get in the way of friendly relations during the rule of Col. Hosni Zaim, was revived when Col. Adib Chichakli took power in 1950, and bilateral relations suffered as a result.

On 20 June 1946 Lebanese president Bechara El Khoury paid a visit to Turkey. Bilateral relations followed a smooth course throughout the 1950s, even though they were confined to a narrow area. A Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness was signed with King Abdullah of Jordan on 8 January 1947 during his visit to Ankara. This coincided with the emergence of the Cold War and the Palestinian question, when the first signs of the split among Arab countries were becoming evident. In his speech on that occasion, King Abdullah said: "We are the good friends of Great Britain in the West and the great Turkish nation in the East." This statement was interpreted to mean that Britain was not about to abandon its interests in the region. It was also seen as the emergence of a London-Ankara-Amman block in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially Syria, where it gave rise to misgivings. The bipolar world was making its influence felt in the Middle East, and the paths of Turkey and the Arabs were beginning to diverge.

Nevertheless, when the question of Palestine came to the UN in 1947, Turkey acted with the Arab states and

voted against the partition of Palestine on 30 November. Both the U.S. and the USSR voted for partition. Despite the deteriorating relations, Turkey's vote against the resolution was received favorably by the Arabs. The president of Syria, Shukri al-Kuwatli, sent a telegram to Ankara to express Syria's appreciation.

The year 1948 marked the turning point in Turkey's relations with the Arab states. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine the previous year was a formal acknowledgment of the Cold War. In effect, the West was changing its position and abandoning its previous indifference to Turkey's security concerns. As Turkey was drawn toward the West, it also began to distance itself from the Arabs.

The sign that Turkey would follow a westward-oriented policy in the Middle East was seen in its handling of the Palestinian question. The Arab-Israeli War and the establishment of an Israeli state in Palestine on 14 May 1948 brought the question back to the UN. On 12 December 1948 the Arab states had voted against the establishment of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine by the UN General Assembly. Turkey voted in favor of the resolution, however, along with the Western countries. The U.S., France, and Turkey were elected members of the commission. On 28 March 1949 Turkey granted Israel diplomatic recognition. As the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, it drew sharp criticism from the Arab states.

Turkey's changed orientation in its Middle Eastern policy was not confined to the question of Palestine. It also took the initiative in the establishment of military pacts in the Middle East, a region that was a focal point of East-West rivalries because of its strategic importance and its vast petroleum reserves.

### B. From the Middle EastCommand Project to the Baghdad Pact (1950–1955)

When NATO was formed on 4 April 1949, Turkey's efforts to gain membership in this Western defense organization failed to yield positive results. Turkey and Greece had been in close cooperation with the West since 1947, but Britain and the Scandinavian countries were opposed to their membership in NATO. The Scandinavians saw these two countries as geographically distant and did not consider them to be really European. Britain's opposition was based on its desire to exclude the U.S. from the region. Britain controlled the Suez Canal, commanded the Arab Legion in Jordan, had military bases in Iraq, held the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf under its protection, and was firmly implanted in Cyprus. As such, it was the paramount power in the Mediterranean region and the Middle

East and was not ready to share power with anyone. Britain favored a defense organization in the eastern Mediterranean with Turkey, Greece, and some of the Arab states.

Turkey felt that a Mediterranean Pact would be difficult to set up without U.S. backing. Ankara was also aware that the Arab states would never perceive the Communist threat as a mortal danger as long as Israel existed and continued to receive military aid and the support of the Jewish lobby in America. For this, Western policy toward Israel would have to undergo a drastic change. When the U.S. declared openly that it did not favor regional pacts, Britain gave up the idea of a pact and decided to pursue its search for Middle East security within the framework of its bilateral agreements with Egypt. Now that the Mediterranean Pact had failed to materialize, Turkey resumed its efforts to gain NATO membership.

In 1950 the newly formed DP government wanted to accomplish something in the field of foreign policy that had eluded its predecessor, the CHP. The opportunity came with the Korean War, which the DP government saw as a means to gain admission to NATO. The government decided to send a military contingent to that country. The Korean War and the likelihood that communism would spread in Asia enhanced Turkey's strategic worth in U.S. eyes. In the fall of 1950 Turkey was invited to take part in NATO's Mediterranean defense planning. But there was still no word on NATO membership. This was because Britain was working on plans to set up a multinational Middle East Command that would replace the existing bilateral treaties with regional countries, while preserving the rights and privileges provided by these bilateral treaties. Britain held the view that Turkey should act in coordination with British headquarters in the region. The U.S. changed its position after the Korean War and decided to support the project for a Middle East Command to counter Soviet expansion.

Ankara became aware that it would not be possible for Turkey to join NATO without Britain's agreement. On 11 September 1951 minister of foreign affairs Fuat Köprülü informed the British ambassador in Ankara that Turkey was ready for a preliminary exchange of ideas on the defense of the Middle East with the British, U.S., and French governments. He added, however, that the exchange of ideas would lead nowhere unless these governments agreed to Turkey's accession to NATO.

On 20 September 1951 the NATO Council, meeting in Ottawa, unanimously decided to invite Turkey to join NATO. This paved the way for tangible steps to be taken on the subject of a Middle Eastern Command.

### 1. The Middle Eastern Command Project

Britain and the U.S. had already reached an agreement on the structure of a Middle Eastern Command by June 1951. According to this plan, the Middle Eastern Command would not be a NATO headquarters but would be closely linked to NATO.

Britain was the initiator of the project because of the special role its presence in the Suez Canal played in safeguarding its interests in the region. The project would allow Britain to overcome the differences that had emerged with Egypt after the war. The project would enable close partnership and cooperation with regional countries and thereby mitigate the resentment felt because of the presence of British bases. Turkey's participation was important from this point of view. With its army, the largest and most powerful in the Middle East, Turkey would be undertaking an important task in the defense of the region. As a Middle Eastern and Muslim country, Turkey's presence in the Middle Eastern Command would also help in allaying the impression that this was a purely Western project. When Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, sent a chargé d'affaires to Tel Aviv in January 1950, and signed its first trade agreement with Israel in July, however, its relations with the Arabs were seriously affected. Thus Turkey's policy to establish close relations with Arab states and to draw them into Western defense schemes against the USSR took a blow at the outset.

On 15 October 1951 Turkey announced that it considered the Middle Eastern Command to be useful, indeed essential, and that it was ready in principle to join it. The other important regional country was Egypt. The strategic Suez Canal was located on its territory. It also played host to the Arab League Headquarters and was highly influential among the Arab states. That is why a special effort was being made to draw Egypt into the project. In this way, Britain also expected to forestall the difficulties that would arise from the British military presence in Egypt if Cairo did not extend the British-Egyptian agreement of 1936. On 13 October Britain, the U.S., France, and Turkey had issued an invitation to Egypt to join the Middle Eastern Command. Egypt was told that it would have the same status as the founding members if it agreed to join. Furthermore, Britain would renounce the 1936 agreement and remove all of its military forces from Egypt except for the units that would be placed at the disposal of the Middle Eastern Command. Egypt rejected the invitation, however, announcing that it would ignore all proposals for cooperation as long as British troops remained on

its soil. It went one step further and denounced the 1936 agreement.

Turkey's decision to participate in the Middle East Command drew a sharp reaction. The Egyptian press was full of denunciations, while the USSR delivered a note on 24 November, expressing its concern at Turkey's participation in Western-inspired defense arrangements in the region. It was now clear that the Arabs were not ready to participate in Turkey's initiatives aimed at strengthening the Western position in the region. But Turkey continued to convey the message to the U.S., and others, that it was the sole power capable of leading efforts to safeguard Western interests in the region.

Upon Egypt's rejection of their offer, Britain, the U.S., France, and Turkey felt the need to issue a statement on 10 November 1951, in which they underlined the necessity for the free world to ensure the defense of the Middle East. The four countries also declared that they had not given up the project for setting up a Middle Eastern Command. Nevertheless, by that point it was clear to them that the project in its present form would not take off.

In June 1952 Britain and the U.S. decided to change the Middle Eastern Command from a military command into a planning organization and renamed it the Middle Eastern Defense Organization. The two countries were agreed on the objective but had differences over the means. Britain, with Turkey's backing, held the view that the organization should be established first, with the efforts to recruit Arab states to follow. Britain wanted to work on the Arab states other than Egypt, and especially Iraq and Jordan. Against this view, the U.S. held that the Arab states should be involved from the beginning and that Egypt should be given its justified place in the plan. Aware that regional projects without U.S. backing stood no chance of success, Britain undertook the negotiations with Egypt but failed to make progress.

The U.S. was conscious of Britain's waning influence in the region, a situation that was creating a gap in the defense of the Middle East. The Truman Administration was reluctant, however, to shoulder new military commitments. It was the Eisenhower Administration that eventually took over from Britain the task of leading the efforts to ensure the defense of the Middle East.

### 2. The Baghdad Pact

When Eisenhower became president in 1953, the U.S. felt the need to review its Middle Eastern policy. The new administration in Washington recognized that, in the new circumstances, neither the Middle Eastern Command nor the Middle Eastern Defense Organization was up to the job. The analyses that were conducted led to the following conclusions. (1) From the Arab perspective, the primary threat to the Arab world came not from the USSR but from Israel; therefore, Arab cooperation could not be obtained by dwelling only on the danger of communism. (2) The Arab states were extremely jealous of their newly won independence. The Arabs would remain cool to any initiative that might remind them of the imperialist past of Britain and France. (3) After having obtained their political independence, the priority for the Arab countries was to initiate their economic development process. From this point of view, they were more likely to feel attracted to the policies of the USSR after Stalin's death. (4) Egypt had a special place in the Arab world. It had assumed the leadership of Arab countries that were cool toward the West, notably Syria. Unless the disputes between Britain and Egypt, starting with the Suez Canal, were quickly sorted out, it would be impossible to cooperate with the Arab world.

Having come to these conclusions, the new U.S. administration decided to take the initiative in the Middle East. Between 11 and 28 May 1953 secretary of state John Foster Dulles visited Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, and Libya. Turkey was initially not included among the countries to be visited, because it was considered to be safely in the Western camp. At Menderes's request, Dulles came to Ankara and held talks with Turkish leaders on 26-27 May. Turkey's message was clear: the Arabs were unaware of the Soviet threat, so it would not be possible to cooperate with them in the defense of the Middle East. A new approach was required. The cornerstone of Middle Eastern defense was Turkey, but Pakistan should also be involved in the endeavor. Dulles agreed that Turkey was fundamental for Middle Eastern defense, but he added that the Arabs must not be totally ignored or alienated.

After his Middle Eastern tour, Dulles gave a speech at the National Security Council on 1 July 1953 and enunciated the concept of the Northern Tier (see Box 4-8 above). According to Dulles, the countries most keenly aware of the Soviet threat and those likely to be overrun in the event of a Soviet attack were in this Northern Tier: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. Consequently, the defense of the Middle East should be entrusted to these countries, because they felt directly threatened by the USSR, unlike the other Arab countries, living in fear of Israel. The new defense system should not be imposed by the West but should be the result of a regional initiative.

The new American policy in the Middle East gave Turkey its chance. With its economy deteriorating in 1954 and its need for new loans growing, the DP government stressed its geographical location, its loyalty to the West, and its historical links with the region to prove its indispensability for the defense of the West. In the process that led to the Baghdad Pact, Turkey was ready to carry out the policies created in Washington.

At this time, Turkey took on a leadership role in the defense arrangements for the Middle East. To play this role adequately, it should have used the advantage conferred by being a country belonging to the region. Ankara's policies after 1954, however, estranged most of the Arab countries. The estrangement with Egypt started with a diplomatic crisis in January 1954. The Turkish ambassador in Cairo, Hulusi Fuat Tugay, was related to the Egyptian royal family through his wife. When the royal family's properties were expropriated after the revolution, the ambassador criticized Nasser and had a nasty exchange with him at a party. Shortly afterward, Ambassador Tugay was declared persona non grata and deprived of his diplomatic immunity. Although this situation was the consequence of his own improper behavior, the lifting of his diplomatic immunity even before he left the country was in breach of diplomatic etiquette and reflected Egypt's negative attitude toward Turkey. Ankara decided not to make a major issue of this incident, because, in early 1954, it was intent on recruiting the Arab states into the Middle Eastern defense arrangement. Although it was the first time that a Turkish ambassador had been declared persona non grata, the incident was downplayed in a joint statement issued with Egypt, in which the incident was described as regrettable.

The strained relations with Egypt were really due to the struggle for political leadership, rather than a trifling diplomatic incident. Middle Eastern states were split into two camps. One camp consisted of pro-Western states led by Turkey. The other camp was made up of states under Egyptian leadership seeking to defend their political and economic independence against Western encroachment. Turkey and Egypt were involved in a leadership struggle that was to determine the political configuration of the Middle East. In this struggle, Turkey was in the vanguard of the effort to bring the Arab states within the Western defense structures. But Turkey went further and stood in the Western ranks in the UN even on the issue of Algerian independence throughout the years of struggle in that country from 1954 on. This earned it the sobriquet of "the representative of imperialism in the Middle East." In

these circumstances, the chances of Turkey being able to persuade the Arab states to join the Western defense arrangements were minimal.

## Treaty of Friendly Cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan (2 April 1954)

The first tangible evidence of a new defense arrangement appeared on 28 December 1953 when the U.S. and Pakistan signed a technical and economic aid treaty. Pakistan had problems with India and perceived a threat from the Soviet Union. By signing the treaty, it came under the Western guarantee. On 18 February 1954 Turkey and Pakistan issued a joint declaration of their intention to sign a defense treaty.

The first reaction came from Moscow. In notes sent to Turkey and Pakistan, the USSR declared that this treaty was the kernel of a larger grouping that would include other countries in the Middle East. The treaty could not be regarded as a defensive pact because there was no threat in the region. This was a NATO maneuver that would endanger the Middle East and Southeastern Asia. The Soviet notes were followed by an Egyptian statement, which claimed that the treaty was a threat to the regional states. Iraq was noncommittal, while Iran declared that it would not join the treaty.

Despite these negative reactions, Turkey and Pakistan went ahead and signed the Treaty of Friendly Cooperation on 2 April 1954. Also known as the Karachi Treaty, this compact was not of a military nature. The treaty provided for the parties to exchange views on international questions of common interest and to cooperate to the fullest extent in the cultural, economic, and technical fields. There were also some general references to cooperation in the field of defense. Article 6 stated that the treaty was also open to other countries. This indicated that the aim was to organize cooperation in the field of defense among a larger group of countries.

Soon after the Karachi Treaty, Prime Minister Menderes paid an official visit to the U.S. on 30 May. During this visit, he declared that "it is necessary for the Arab countries to recognize the reality of Israel's existence" (Ayın Tarihi 247 [June 1954]: 96). This pronouncement on a matter of utmost sensitivity for the Arabs had an adverse impact on Turkish-Arab relations. It revealed that Turkey framed its Middle Eastern policies not from the point of view of the Middle East but according to the logic of the Cold War. Egypt and the other anti-Western Arab states would later refer to this frame of mind and use it against Turkey.

### Turkey-Iraq Treaty of Mutual Cooperation (24 February 1955)

On 27 July 1954, shortly after Menderes's Washington visit, Britain and Egypt signed a treaty under which Britain would evacuate the Suez Canal zone. This revived hopes in Washington and Ankara that Arab states might participate in Middle East defense arrangements. Menderes made the first move toward repairing relations with Egypt and conveyed to Cairo his wish to meet with Nasser. Egypt rebuffed this request. It was obvious that as long as Menderes sought to establish a westward-leaning defense pact, he could not establish a dialogue with Nasser.

After this failure in Egypt, Turkey concentrated its efforts on Iraq. At that time, Iraq was a country under very strong British influence. Nuri Said Pasha, known as "Britain's man," ruled the country. Conversations had been conducted with Iraq for some time. In April 1954 Iraq signed a treaty with the U.S. and started receiving military aid. Iraq's noncommittal attitude toward the Karachi Treaty and its declaration that "for the time being" it did not intend to accede to the treaty were due to Iraq's wish to avoid antagonizing the other Arab states. The Iraqis welcomed the British-Egyptian Treaty and were relieved by its terms. When Nuri Said Pasha formed the Iraqi government in September 1954, Iraq's convergence with the West gained pace. On 9 October Nuri Said Pasha called on Menderes on his way back from London and took up questions of common defense. On that occasion, he declared that "if the questions of the Suez Canal and Palestine are resolved in a manner satisfactory to Arab nations, all Arab states are convinced that cooperation is possible with the West." His statement indicated that Iraq could move forward with greater ease now that one of the questions, namely Suez, had been resolved.

Between 6 and 12 January 1955 Menderes visited Baghdad. From the joint communiqué released after the visit, it was understood that a treaty with the following provisions would be concluded. (1) The treaty would provide for cooperation in the event of an attack from the region or from outside the region. It was obvious that the source of the attack from outside the region was the USSR. An attack from the region would be from Israel. This was inserted to encourage other Arab states to join the treaty. (2) Stability would be sought in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the UN. In other words, there would be compliance with UN resolutions on Palestine upholding Arab rights. (3) Countries that had displayed their determination to contribute to the peaceful aims of the treaty or those with the means to make such a contri-

bution would be welcome to join. In this way, the criteria for eligibility to join the treaty were extended beyond the region, paving the way for the U.S. and Britain to join.

Menderes's visit to Iraq was a success. To bring other Arab countries into the treaty, Menderes visited Syria on 14–15 January and Lebanon on 15–17 January. Both countries remained under Egyptian influence, however, and refused to join. Like Egypt, Israel too was displeased with the Turkish-Iraqi joint communiqué, fearing that Ankara might review its policy toward Israel as Turkey came closer to the Arab states.

Despite the negative reactions coming from the region, Turkey and Iraq could count on the support of the U.S. and Britain. On 24 February 1955 they went ahead and signed the Mutual Cooperation Treaty in Baghdad.

Also known as the Baghdad Pact, the treaty consisted of eight articles. Article 1 describes the purpose of the pact. "Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other." This wording gave governments wide latitude in implementing the pact. The treaties allowing Britain to accede to the pact were concluded on the basis of this article. When Iraq withdrew from the arrangement in 1958, the U.S. and the three regional members of CENTO also signed their bilateral treaties on the basis of this article. In article 3, the parties undertake not to interfere in one another's internal affairs and to settle all disputes between themselves through peaceful means. Article 4 reads: "The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them." This article ensured that the pact is not interpreted in a manner that would affect Turkey's obligations under NATO or the Balkan Pact. The same applies to Iraq's obligations within the framework of the Arab League and the Arab Treaty of Mutual Defense and Economic Cooperation of 1950. Article 5 states: "This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties." The wording of the article allows all the Arab states to accede to the pact in addition to Pakistan, Iran, Britain, and the U.S., while excluding Israel. Article 6 provides that, when at least four powers become parties to the pact, a Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the pact's purposes. Article 7 stipulates that the pact will remain in force for five years and will be renewable for further five-year periods.

Iraq was uneasy about possible negative reactions from the Arab states to its pact with Turkey and was anxious to reduce such reactions to a minimum. That is why a sentence was inserted in the joint communiqué released before the signing ceremony declaring that the UN's resolutions regarding the Middle East had been accepted. But Turkey was against such an insertion in the text of the pact, because Ankara wanted Britain and the U.S., which had strong links with Israel, in the Middle Eastern defense system. The question was settled in a manner that gave Iraq satisfaction by means of an exchange of letters carried out when the pact was signed. In a letter addressed to Menderes, Nuri Said Pasha declared: "In connection with the pact we have signed today, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that we have agreed to work in close cooperation to implement the resolutions of the United Nations regarding Palestine." In his reply, Menderes informed Nuri Said Pasha that he concurred with the contents of his letter. It looked like Nuri Said Pasha had obtained Turkey's cooperation in the event of an Israeli attack. The Iraqi leader was thus preempting Arab criticism by demonstrating that Iraq had not forgotten the Palestinian cause and that it had even imposed certain obligations on Turkey in connection with this issue. Although these letters were annexed to the pact, the Menderes government did not submit them to the TGNA at the time of the pact's ratification. Consequently, these letters imposed no legal obligation on Turkey but remained as mere expressions of intent by the two governments (Soysal 1991, p. 492).

The Baghdad Pact was badly received in Israel. In a statement issued on 26 February, the Israeli Foreign Ministry drew attention to the absence in this pact of the usual phrase where the parties foreswear the use of force or the threat of force. The statement added that the exchange of letters following the signing of the pact was an unfriendly act directed against Israel.

Britain acceded to the Baghdad Pact on 4 April 1955. On the same day, it signed a cooperation treaty with Iraq. This treaty ended the Britain-Iraq Alliance of 1930. Britain now undertook to help in training and equipping the Iraqi army and promised to assist in defending Iraq by force of arms in the event of an attack on Iraq and upon Baghdad's request. Britain's accession weakened the Baghdad Pact in the eyes of the Arabs. The new treaty signed with Iraq demonstrated that Britain maintained its influence and presence in Iraq and strengthened the impression that the

pact was designed to protect the interests of the West in the Middle East.

Pakistan, ever preoccupied with India, acceded to the pact on 23 July 1955 in order to obtain Western backing. After the U.S. overthrew the government of Mosaddeq, the shah moved closer to the West, and on 3 November 1955 Iran acceded to the Baghdad Pact. With the membership now reaching five states, the Permanent Council of the Baghdad Pact held its first meeting in Baghdad. The U.S. sent an observer delegation to that meeting and announced that it would maintain permanent military and political contact with the council. Washington stopped short of formally acceding to the pact, however, for the following reasons. (1) It did not want to disturb its relations with leading countries of the Arab League like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. (2) It did not want to provoke the USSR by giving the impression that a pact under U.S. leadership had been formed in the Middle East. (3) It was wary of raising Israeli concern by joining a grouping that had excluded Israel and had been badly received by Tel Aviv. (4) Accession would require U.S. Senate approval. In this process, Washington's Middle Eastern policy would be the subject of a debate and the issue might turn into a domestic policy question that could be used against the administration, something that Eisenhower wanted to avoid (OTDP, p. 267).

After the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Turkey made one more attempt to get other Arab states to join but failed again. At this time, Egypt and Syria decided to enter into a new political, economic, and military agreement that would exclude Iraq and replace the Arab League's defense pact. On 6 March Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia announced their intention to enter into an agreement to strengthen the Arab world's military, political, and economic structure and to stay away from the Baghdad Pact. Egypt's attitude came as no surprise to Turkey, but the same could not be said about Syria, which had remained noncommittal on the issue all along. Turkey's reaction to Syria's negative stance was sharp. On 7 March 1955 Syria received the following warning message from Turkey: "We expect that Syria's common position with Egypt is not final. Because if it is, Turkey will be forced to conclude that Syria has adopted a position hostile to Turkey under Egyptian pressure and will feel compelled to revise its present policy toward Syria... If Syria adopts an antagonistic position, Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this situation." Syria replied that the contemplated pact with Egypt would not be against the Baghdad Pact and added that Damascus could not join a pact that appeared to be pro-Israel.

When Turkish-Syrian relations became strained, Washington reminded Ankara that its tough position could only alienate the Arabs from the Baghdad Pact. This helped soften Ankara's subsequent diplomatic moves. The first overture was made to Jordan. In view of Jordan's close links with Iraq, it was considered that its likelihood of joining the Baghdad Pact was high. For this reason president Celal Bayar visited Amman on 3 and 4 November 1955. Turkey knew that the Israeli threat was paramount for Jordan, so it gave firm assurances that Turkey would stand by Jordan on the question of Palestine if Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact. A change of government took place in Amman, however, after Bayar's visit. With the coming to power of a group that was pro-Nasser, it became clear that Jordan would not join the Baghdad Pact.

There were a number of reasons why no Arab country other than Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, including Nasser's influence and the Israeli threat, which were of immediate importance to the Arab states. Furthermore, there was the conviction that the Baghdad Pact would help perpetuate Britain's regional presence. America's role must also not be forgotten. While Ankara was pursuing its diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing Egypt's influence among the Arab states, the U.S., in cooperation with Britain and the World Bank, offered to finance the Aswan Dam on 10 November 1955. This move was designed to prevent Egypt from moving close to Moscow. While the U.S. supported the Baghdad Pact, the offer of economic aid to Egypt also demonstrated to the radical Arab countries that not joining the Baghdad Pact need not affect relations with Washington.

The Baghdad Pact was designed to plug the gap between NATO and SEATO, but politically it can be qualified as a failure for a number of reasons:

- 1. The Baghdad Pact failed to live up to the expectation that it would facilitate the defense of the West and the Middle East. First, it never produced a credible defense force. Turkey was already a NATO member, and its armed forces were allocated to NATO. Ankara was not in a position to contribute anything more to the defense of the West within the framework of the Baghdad Pact. The military forces of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan were negligible. The chief reason for their participation in the pact was to secure U.S. aid rather than to ward off the Soviet threat. For Iraq, the principal threat was Israel; and for Pakistan, it was India.
- 2. The Baghdad Pact failed to produce cooperation against communism among the Arabs. It only helped to draw them into antagonistic camps. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia opposed the pact, while Jordan and Lebanon

preferred to maintain their distance. Iraq was condemned to isolation as the pact's sole Arab member.

- 3. Israel saw the pact as directed against it, fearing that, if the Arab states joined the organization, it would add to their strength and allow them to pursue tough anti-Israeli policies.
- 4. As the Arab states felt powerless against the West, they displayed a readiness to enter into cooperation with the USSR, which reiterated on every occasion that it would respect their independence and provide them with economic assistance. At the same time, the USSR had no history of imperial domination in the region. Although the Baghdad Pact was designed to stem communism, it ended up by facilitating the USSR's entry into the area (OTDP, p. 269).

The Baghdad Pact also failed to produce positive results for Turkey.

- 1. It did not help the Middle Eastern countries, and particularly the Arabs, to move closer to the West.
- 2. Not only did Turkey fail to play a leadership role in the Middle East, but it was also accused of pursuing imperialistic policies in the region, reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire. Its relations with the Arab countries became strained, especially with Egypt and Syria.
- Ankara was estranged from the nonaligned countries.
- 4. Turkey's relations with Israel suffered because of the Israeli perception of the Baghdad Pact as anti-Israel.
- 5. Turkey failed to receive the expected support even in the West. There was a substantial drop in U.S. economic aid to Turkey in 1955 and thereafter.

It took until 1960 for Turkey to assess the negative picture properly. The DP government was guided by the objectives of "protecting the Middle East against communism" and "defending Western interests" when it signed the Baghdad Pact. It remained attached to these objectives until its overthrow in 1960 and remained loyal to the Western alliance in all of the Middle Eastern crises.

### C. The Middle Eastern Crises and Turkey (1956–1960)

Starting in 1956, the Middle East went through a succession of crises and became one of the theaters of the Cold War. Turkey's policies during these crises helped accelerate its isolation.

#### 1. The 1956 Suez Crisis

After 1955 Egypt continued its drift toward the Eastern Bloc. In September 1955 Cairo signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the purchase of arms; in May 1956 it established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; and Nasser announced that he would be visiting Moscow in August. In reaction to this, on 15 July 1956 the U.S. withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam. Britain and the World Bank soon followed suit. Egypt reacted sharply and on 26 July announced that it had nationalized the Suez Canal. Three days later, Britain, the U.S., and France decided to convene a conference in London, to be held on 16 August. The signatories of the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 regulating passage through the canal were invited to attend, along with the principal users of the canal.

When the Suez crisis erupted, Nasser saw a similarity between the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits and asked Turkey to act as mediator in the dispute. But Ankara looked upon the question as a political rather than a legal issue. Ankara accepted the invitation to attend the London conference for the following reasons: (a) it was a party to the 1888 Convention; (b) Britain was a member of the Baghdad Pact; and (c) the British-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 provided that, in the event of an attack on Turkey, Britain would have the right to use the canal. Egypt's takeover of the operation of the canal would pose difficulties for Britain in its use of the canal.

The conference met on 16 August, with the participation of twenty-two states. The deliberations were conducted on the basis of a plan submitted by U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles. According to this plan, the canal would be operated by an international organization that would be attached to the UN and established through an international treaty. Egypt would participate in the organization, which would be dominated by no single country. The canal would be operated according to the 1888 Convention and would remain open to all states without restrictions or limitations. The canal was to provide a reasonable and just income to the Egyptian government, and the Suez Canal Company was to receive a fair compensation. Disputes arising over these two issues would be referred to tribunals to be set up by the International Court of Justice.

D. T. Shepilov, the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, was against the Dulles Plan because it had a "colonialist taint" (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955–1956*, pp. 15049–55, quoted in Kürkçüoğlu, p. 83). Shepilov proposed a wider conference in which all users of the canal would be represented. He held that the nationalization of the canal was consistent with Egypt's sovereign rights and that no state had a right to interfere with these rights. Finally, Shepilov argued that the question of navigation through the canal concerned all nations.

Turkey sided with the West at the conference. It declared that Egypt's sovereign rights should not be challenged and added that the Dulles Plan did not violate these rights. Turkey stated that, given the unique character of the canal, transit navigation must be ensured by an impartial international authority. By stressing the unique features of the canal, Ankara wanted to make sure that no analogy with the Turkish Straits was drawn and thus to avoid possible charges of inconsistency. Nevertheless, Turkey was also among the countries that proposed revisions in the Dulles Plan. Together with Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia, Turkey suggested that the principle of respect for Egyptian sovereignty be included as a separate article. With this amendment, the plan was approved by a majority of participants.

At the London Conference, a committee of five was formed to persuade the Egyptian government to accept the Dulles Plan. The talks took place from 3 to 9 September, but no progress was made. Nasser insisted that there was no way for Egypt to allow the Suez Canal to come under international supervision or to dilute Egyptian sovereignty over the canal. If these two points were granted, Egypt would make sure that all countries could freely use the canal.

When the Cairo talks ended in failure, the eighteen countries approving the Dulles Plan met for a second time in London on 19–21 September 1956. At the end of the Second London Conference, a joint communiqué was adopted, reiterating the decisions of the first conference. A Suez Canal Users' Association was formed, charged with the responsibility of working with the Egyptian government to seek a solution to the Suez question. At the second conference, Turkey continued to support the Western positions and was among the first countries to join the Suez Canal Users' Association.

After the Second London Conference, Britain and France took the issue to the UN on 23 September. When the UN Security Council failed to come up with a solution, Britain and France resorted to force. Even while the negotiations over Suez were proceeding, Britain and France started drawing up secret military plans with Israel. The U.S. was against any military action in the Middle East that might bring the regional countries closer to the USSR, so Britain and France were careful not to appear as the aggressors. They would use an Israeli attack on Egypt as a pretext for stepping in. When Israel attacked Egypt, British and French forces would intervene in the Canal Zone to separate the combatants and end the fighting.

Hostilities began on 29 October 1956 with Israel's attack on Egypt. The next day, Britain and France delivered

an ultimatum to both sides, giving them twelve hours to end the fighting and to remove their respective forces behind lines ten miles on either side of the canal. Israel accepted the ultimatum, but Egypt turned it down, whereupon British and French forces based in Cyprus attacked Egypt.

The Anglo-French attack on Egypt met with the general disapproval of the international community. Both the U.S. and the USSR accused the Britain and France of aggression. In the face of international censure, Britain and France announced their decision to withdraw from Egypt on 3 December. Israel evacuated the Sinai Peninsula. This completed the process of nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Turkey adopted a strange position in the face of these developments. Although it considered the Anglo-French attack to be a breach of international law, it accused Egypt of being responsible for these events. Ankara declared that the events had been to the advantage of the USSR and reiterated that it had been demonstrated that the security of the Middle Eastern nations would best be insured through participation in the Baghdad Pact.

When war broke out in the Middle East, the prime ministers of the Baghdad Pact member states met in Tehran without the participation of Britain. Iraq had requested that Britain refrain from attending Baghdad Pact meetings until the evacuation of Egypt was completed. In the joint communiqué adopted at the end of the meeting, the Israeli attack was condemned, Britain and France were asked to withdraw their troops, and an appeal was made to respect Egypt's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The communiqué expressed appreciation to the U.S. for promptly taking action at the UN. It was also announced that the UN's 1947 partition plan could serve as a basis for talks to settle the question of Palestine. Clearly, the text of the communiqué was carefully drafted to avoid upsetting the West. Neither Britain nor France was condemned, while the U.S. was praised for its conduct. The Arabs were far from satisfied by the language of the communiqué, because it characterized the 1947 UN partition plan, which had been rejected by the Arab states, as an appropriate basis for negotiations. On 10 November 1956 Menderes met with the British ambassador to inform him that Britain's not being invited to the Tehran meeting was due to temporary difficulties; he reassured the ambassador that no hostile stand had been taken against a Western ally. For Turkey, relations with the West were of paramount importance under all circumstances.

Although Turkey displayed a lenient attitude toward Britain and France, it had severe criticism for Israel. Turkey declared that the Israeli attack had created a serious danger in the Middle East. Moreover, by diverting the world's attention to the Middle East, it had allowed the events in Hungary to go unnoticed: this was a betrayal of the free world's cause. Sensitive to Arab and domestic public opinion, Turkey also recalled its envoy from Israel. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were not severed but were reduced to chargé d'affaires level. But this was a cosmetic affair, designed to appease public opinion. The recalled Turkish minister informed the Israeli Foreign Ministry that this action was not directed against Israel but was designed to strengthen the Baghdad Pact. Turkey had no intention of damaging its friendly relations and its trade links with Israel.

Turkish policy during the Suez Canal crisis dealt a new blow to Turkey's prestige among the Arab nations. Arab circles welcomed the withdrawal of the Turkish minister from Tel Aviv, but this limited gesture was far from satisfying the Arabs. In a situation where even the U.S. acted with the USSR in condemning Britain and France, Turkey's unusual consideration for these countries in its pronouncements demonstrated that Turkey was, as usual, looking at all situations from the perspective of the East-West struggle.

### 2. The Syrian Crisis of 1957

The outcome of the Suez crisis was that it ended the influence of Britain and France in the Middle East for good. The USSR quickly filled the vacuum with its anti-imperialistic rhetoric. This disturbing situation led the members of the Baghdad Pact to call on Washington to join the pact. Bearing in mind its relations with both Israel and the Arab countries that were not members of the pact, the U.S. did not accede to this request. It proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 January 1957, however, to demonstrate that it would be more active in the region. At the Karachi meeting of the Baghdad Pact held on 3–6 June 1957, it also formally joined the pact's military committee.

In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, the U.S. came closer to the member states of the Baghdad Pact, while the USSR came closer to the Arab countries struggling against Western influence in the region, notably Egypt and Syria. On 6 August 1957 Syria and the USSR signed an economic and technical aid agreement. On 13 August Syria ordered the deportation of three U.S. diplomats on the grounds that they were plotting to overthrow the regime in Damascus. The U.S. reacted sharply and declared the Syrian ambassador in Washington persona non grata. On 17 August Syria initiated a major purge in its army: the chief of the general staff, Gen. T. Nizameddin, was retired

and replaced by Col. Afif Bizri, an officer with Communist leanings.

Alarmed by the Syrian events, King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan came to Ankara. On 24 August the two kings, the Turkish president and prime minister, and the American official L. W. Henderson held a meeting. The subject of their deliberations was the events in Syria. Cairo issued a statement identifying Henderson as an expert in staging coups d'état and alleged that, having failed to overthrow the Syrian regime from within, the U.S. was now instigating the neighbors to act against Damascus.

Menderes conveyed his opinion to U.S. ambassador Fletcher Warren that Syria had become a Soviet satellite and added that they were awaiting a decision to take appropriate action. Turkish military spokesmen voiced Turkey's apprehension over the Soviet danger coming not just from the north but also from a possible second front in the south and claimed that Syria was creating the right conditions for such an attack with the huge stocks of Soviet munitions accumulating there.

The U.S. declared in September 1957 that it would be delivering arms to Syria's neighbors and would not tolerate an attack by Syria against any of them. Washington also sent messages to the governments of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, however, informing them that it did not intend to intervene militarily against Syria. It also warned Ankara not to take unilateral action against Syria.

The Menderes government realized that the U.S. and friendly Arab governments had no intention to intervene militarily against Syria, so it chose an intermediate form of action by concentrating troops on the Syrian frontier. According to U.S. sources, by 27 September Turkey had deployed a mobile force of 33,000 men, consisting of two infantry divisions and one armored division. By 10 October a further armored brigade had been moved close to the Syrian frontier, bringing the force up to 37,000 men (Sever, p. 191).

The first reaction to Turkey's concentration of forces on its Syrian border came from the USSR. On 10 September Prime Minister Bulganin sent Menderes a letter in which he voiced his concern over the concentration of forces on the Syrian border. He also warned that Turkey would be dragged into a catastrophic situation if it came under the influence of outsiders who had no interest in the preservation of peace in the Middle East. Bulganin added that it would be wrong to expect that a war caused by aggression could be confined to a local theater. In his reply, Menderes rejected the Soviet allegations and expressed his astonishment that the USSR would act on behalf of Syria in a situation where Syria had lodged no complaint.

Roughly a month after Bulganin's letter, Syria delivered a note to Turkey on 8 October. It accused Turkey of creating border incidents, violating Syrian airspace, and concentrating troops on the border. In its reply, Turkey stated that its military dispositions were related to its security and were a direct reaction to the present tension in the Middle East and that Syria's assessments of Turkish actions were an inadmissible interference in Turkey's sphere of sovereignty.

At this stage, the U.S. administration made statements supporting Turkey and declared that the real threat to peace came from Syria, with the backing of the USSR. The USSR blamed Turkey and the U.S. for pursuing aggressive policies in the Middle East. While two Soviet warships called in the Syrian port of Latakia, the U.S. 6th Fleet visited the port of İzmir.

When the crisis took on an international dimension, Saudi Arabia issued an official statement on 21 October 1957. It was announced that King Saud had offered to act as mediator and that both countries had accepted the mediation. Ankara confirmed this on the same day. Syria accepted the mediation at first but subsequently changed its mind. Egypt did not relish Saudi Arabia's rising prestige among the Arabs and was well aware of that country's influence over Syria. Cairo accused King Saud of acting like an American agent and claimed that the mediation offer had been made at the request of the U.S. State Department.

After rejecting the Saudi offer, Syria called on the UN to take up the question. In discussion of the question at the General Assembly on 22 October, recriminations came from both sides. When the time came to consider a number of draft resolutions that had been offered, the Indonesian representative proposed that none of the resolutions be put to a vote. Instead, he suggested that the question should be settled by the parties through negotiations. The majority, including Turkey and Syria, accepted this proposal, and on 30 October the question was dropped from the General Assembly's agenda.

At this point, the USSR had softened its position visa-vis Turkey. On 29 October Khrushchev, Bulganin, and A. I. Mikoyan attended the National Day reception at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. The following month Bulganin sent a politely worded letter to Menderes.

When Syria and Egypt decided to merge into the United Arab Republic (UAR) on 1 February 1958, a more businesslike relationship was established between Turkey and Syria. Turkey found a Syria united with another country less threatening to its security than a Syria drifting ever closer toward Moscow. Ankara recognized the UAR on 11 March 1958. Turkey also supported the federa-

tion that Iraq and Jordan decided to set up on 14 February 1958 to serve as a counterweight to Nasser, however.

The reason for Turkey's decision to escalate the tension with Syria into a full-blown international crisis cannot be explained in terms of the Cold War and the security concerns it engendered in the Middle East region. This was a totally artificial crisis, and the USSR made a strenuous effort to defuse it. The explanation lay in Turkey's domestic politics. Turkey was scheduled to hold a general election in 1957. The DP government was moving toward a critical election faced with serious economic problems and shaken by violent arguments over democracy and its implementation. By bringing about the Syrian crisis, it drew the public's attention away from economic woes to foreign policy. It also helped remind the Americans, who had been reducing their economic aid since 1955, of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East and the importance of the role played by Turkey in the region. The Syrian crisis caused Turkey's relations with the other Arab countries to deteriorate further.

## 3. The 1958 Iraqi Coup and the Establishment of CENTO

With the beginning of the Cold War, Iraq pursued a policy that diverged from the other Arab states and became the sole Arab member of the Baghdad Pact. The coup that occurred on 14 July 1958 under the leadership of Gen. Abdulkarim Kassem not only toppled the monarchy in Iraq but also led to important changes in the whole Middle East. The coup took place on the day when the Baghdad Pact was to hold a high-level meeting in Istanbul. The leaders of the Baghdad Pact members were shocked to learn that King Faisal, the regent Prince Abdulilah, and prime minister Nuri Said, whom they expected to see in İstanbul, had been murdered in Baghdad. At the İstanbul meeting held on 14-17 July, the events in Iraq were considered. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the meetings condemned the coup and described it as resulting from subversive activities directed from outside Iraq. The international community was curious to know if the member states would intervene in Iraq. The Baghdad Pact governments sent a message to the U.S. declaring that Nasser and the Communists instigated the coup and that Washington's reaction would be of vital importance. Their message concluded by calling on the U.S. to apply the Eisenhower Doctrine and intervene in Iraq.

Turkey's reaction to the coup was even tougher. In a press briefing held on 17 July, minister of foreign affairs F.R. Zorlu declared that Turkey did not recognize any new Iraqi government. The head of the Iraq-Jordan Federation was King Hussein and the only legitimate government was the government under his leadership. As a matter of fact, the federation to which Zorlu alluded had ceased to exist. Baghdad radio was appealing to the Jordanians to rise up against the rule of King Hussein. On 2 August King Hussein announced that the Arab federal union between Iraq and Jordan was at an end.

The Turkish government was highly disturbed by the events in Iraq and was seriously contemplating a military intervention. Zorlu's proposal to this end received the approval of Bayar and Menderes. The U.S. and Britain, however, warned Turkey against any hasty action on the grounds that an intervention would help bring the Iraqis solidly behind the new regime, drive the Iraqi government closer to Egypt and the USSR, and perhaps even lead to a Soviet intervention.

The mild policies of the U.S. and other Western states vis-à-vis the new administration in Iraq persuaded Turkey to moderate its stand. On 31 July 1958 Ankara recognized the new regime in Baghdad.

The most significant international consequence of the Iraqi coup was the transformation of the Baghdad Pact into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In its concern to prevent a possible intervention, the new Iraqi regime was careful not to strain its relations with Western states and decided to stay in the Baghdad Pact, although it remained passive as a member. For Baghdad, this was the organization that had alienated it from the rest of the Arab states.

On 28–29 July all the foreign ministers of the countries of the Baghdad Pact except Iraq, plus the U.S., met in London to reassess the situation in the Middle East. The communiqué issued after the meeting stated that the situation in the Middle East made the Baghdad Pact more essential than ever and asked the U.S. to join the pact. Although the U.S. turned down the call to join the pact once again, it did reinforce its bilateral ties with its members. The bilateral agreement signed by Turkey with the U.S. on 5 March 1959 was based on this London communiqué.

On 23 October 1958 the Council of the Baghdad Pact announced that the headquarters of the organization would temporarily be transferred to Ankara because of the current situation and in order to secure the continuation of the activities of the pact. Iraq failed to participate in the Karachi meeting held on 26 January 1959 and announced its withdrawal from the pact on 24 March 1959. In his speech delivered on that occasion, General Kassem declared that "membership in a military and aggressive pact is incompatible with Iraq's neutrality" (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959–1960, P. 16749, quoted in Kürkçüoğlu, p. 129). The pact's last link with the Arab world had thus been severed.

On 21 August 1959 it was announced that the name of the Baghdad Pact had been changed to CENTO and that its headquarters would henceforth be in Ankara. The first meeting of the CENTO Council was held in Washington on 7–9 October 1959 under the presidency of U.S. secretary of state Christian Herter. After the meeting, it was announced that the organization had been renamed the Central Treaty Organization because it was located between NATO and SEATO. CENTO became a part of the Western defense system in the Middle East and continued to function until the Iranian revolution in 1979.

### 4. Turkey and the Events of1958 in Lebanon and Jordan

In 1958 nationalist movements influenced by Nasser began to appear not just in Iraq but throughout the Middle East. They were opposed to the existing order and governments in power. Nasser instigated nationalist stirrings against the established order not just in Iraq but throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, there was fierce opposition to the pro-Western policies of the Maronite leader Camille Chamoun. Chamoun's term of office would expire in 1958, and according to the Constitution he could not be reelected. When he attempted to change the Constitution, the pro-Nasser nationalists took up arms; violence broke out.

As Lebanon was drawn into turmoil, Chamoun became alarmed by the 14 July coup in Iraq and called on the U.S. to back him. On 15 July U.S. marines landed on the tourist beaches of Beirut, ostensibly to protect the interests of Americans in Lebanon and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of a country of vital importance for U.S. interests and world peace. Thus the Eisenhower Doctrine was being implemented for the first time to help the Lebanese government.

Turkey expressed its satisfaction over the U.S. action in Lebanon, both in its collective statements with other Baghdad Pact members and in its own official pronouncements. It also allowed the U.S. to use the air base at İncirlik. As a precaution against emergencies, about five thousand American soldiers were sent there during the U.S. landing in Lebanon. But Turkey did more than allowing the use of İncirlik. Minister Zorlu informed the U.S. ambassador that the Turkish government was ready to support U.S. actions by placing its airforce in a state of alert. The U.S. informed Turkey, however, that this was not a NATO operation and that the Turkish Air Force, already allocated to NATO, would not be required.

In the TGNA, the opposition rebuked the government for its policies in connection with the Lebanese events. In his reply to the opposition, Zorlu admitted that the İncirlik base had been used for purposes outside Turkey's NATO commitments. He claimed that this had been done to support a friendly small country and dismissed the criticism as misguided.

The use of the İncirlik base also drew criticism from the USSR and the UAR. But the Turkish government was intent on demonstrating to the U.S. and the West that Turkey was a dependable ally at a time when the Turkish economy was in very great difficulty.

The Iraqi coup affected Jordan even more than Lebanon. According to the Constitution of the Arab federal union, all powers and responsibilities were transferred to Jordan's King Hussein when the king of Iraq, who also happened to be the head of the union, was overthrown. King Hussein feared that the events in Iraq would spread to Jordan. After the Lebanese intervention, he asked the U.S. and Britain on 16 July to help Jordan. Britain heeded this request, and some British units based in Cyprus were flown to Jordan. The U.S. provided support for this operation. Having secured Western support, Jordan went to the UN and accused the UAR of interfering in its internal affairs. On 20 July Jordan severed its diplomatic ties with that country.

Turkey sided with the West once again during the intervention in Jordan. Ankara described the British intervention as "defense of Jordan's independence against subversive activities with foreign roots" (Kürkçüoğlu, p. 135).

The Cold War was at its height in the 1950s, and Turkey's national policy then was to look at all events from a NATO perspective. It was this policy that led Turkey to be in the forefront in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. Turkey was slow to grasp the Arab countries' deep desire to pursue nationalist and independent policies. Such policies were invariably assessed as attempts by the Soviet Union to implant its influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, in its eagerness to maintain good relations with the West and demonstrate its dependability as an ally, Turkey adopted policies that were against independence movements in the region. The Turkish War of Liberation waged against imperialism had made a profound impression on the Third World. Against this background, the Menderes government's policy of supporting France in the Algerian struggle for independence, which started in 1954, came as a rude shock to the countries of the region and adversely affected Turkey's relations with them.

Despite the profound sympathy of the Turkish public for the Algerian struggle, Turkey voted against the Afro-Asian motion to place the issue on the UN's agenda in 1955. In 1957 and 1958 Turkey abstained on the Afro-Asian resolution on self-determination for Algeria. At that time, Greece was consistently voting with the Afro-Asian bloc. This should explain why Turkey was so isolated when the question of Cyprus came up for discussion at the United Nations in the 1960s. In the 1960s Turkey reviewed its Middle Eastern policies and sought to bring about a rapprochement with the Arab countries. But it was not so easy to live down the image that it had acquired as "the representative of imperialism in the Middle East."

Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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## II. THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE A. The Background of the Question

The thorny question of Palestine, which erupted after World War II, has its roots in the policies of the Western states, which were bent on dismembering the Ottoman state during World War I.

On 16 May 1916 Britain and France signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (see Box 1-23 in Section 1) regarding the allotment of Ottoman territories in the Middle East. According to this agreement, France would be allocated the entire Syrian coastline, starting in Acre and going north to include Beirut. In addition, France was to get Adana and Mersin. Britain would get the region between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers from Basra to Baghdad. There was no provision in the agreement about the disposition of Palestine.

After World War I, Britain engaged in intensive activities to ensure that Palestine came under its control. At that point, Britain's regional policies were heavily influenced by Lord Rothschild, who was president of the Federation of Zionist Associations of Britain. The declaration signed by the foreign secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, on 2 November 1917 was drafted by Lord Rothschild. This declaration had a determining influence in the unfolding of the question of Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration contained the following passage: "His Majesty's government approves the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewish people, and shall make every effort to make this possible." Although the declaration also made clear that the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities already living in Palestine would be fully protected, the political rights of Jews would have priority.

An effort was made at the San Remo Conference, held in April 1920, to settle the fate of Palestine. At this conference, Britain and France revised the Sykes-Picot Agreement and reapportioned the Ottoman Empire's Middle Eastern territories. They agreed that France would be given a mandate over Syria and Lebanon, while Britain would get a mandate over Palestine, Jordan (Trans-Jordan), and Iraq.

Under Britain's mandate administration, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased rapidly. From 1920 to 1922 twenty-five thousand Jews moved into the territory. This situation inevitably led to disputes and tensions, especially in urban centers like Jerusalem and Jaffa. There were a great number of Jewish organizations in Palestine whose activities exacerbated the tension.

On 3 June 1922 Britain sent the World Zionist Organization an explanatory note, stating that it was not the intention of the Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish Palestine but only a national homeland for the Jews. Furthermore, Britain was not prepared to share its sovereignty in the territory with any of the Jewish organizations operating there. Britain made clear that all those living in Palestine were Palestinian subjects. The Jews living there could only be described as a community within the larger Palestinian population. The Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution on Palestine on 24 July 1922, which confirmed Britain's understanding of the situation.

– s.e.c Kütümlesi Despite Britain's efforts to bring clarity to the Balfour Declaration's imprecise language and minimize misinterpretations and abuses, it could not prevent the erosion of its position in the region and a weakening of its influence. During the interwar years, there was a continuing struggle between the Jews, who were intent on turning a national homeland in Palestine into a Jewish state, and the Arabs, who wanted to foil this ambition.

On three occasions in 1920, 1921, and 1924, Arab and Jewish rivalries in Palestine degenerated into disturbances and clashes, which the British authorities proved incapable of subduing. As anti-Semitism gathered strength in Europe, the flow of Jewish settlers to Palestine grew, further upsetting the makeup of the population. All of these factors helped to make the problem insoluble in the 1930s. The Arab and especially the Jewish terror organizations that were established in the early 1930s targeted one another as well as the British and left scars that lasted for many years in the Palestinian landscape.

Britain sought to control the situation by resorting to military measures. It also proposed political solutions in White Books that it issued from time to time. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish community was satisfied with these British efforts to find a way out of the difficulties. The tension and the clashes continued during World War II. The UN inherited the LoN's problem after the war and had to grapple with it throughout the years.

# B. Israel's Independence and Turkey's Reaction

### 1. The Partition of Palestine and Turkey

When the British and American efforts to find a solution to the question after World War II proved fruitless, Britain placed the question on the UN's agenda on 2 April 1947. Britain was looking for a way to rid itself of a problem that had been plaguing it for too many years.

On 15 May 1947 the UN General Assembly decided to set up a working group to be known as the Ad Hoc United Nations Commission for Palestine. The members of the commission were to go to Palestine, examine the situation, and report back. The commission's report was submitted to the secretary-general of the UN on 1 September 1947. In their report, the members agreed unanimously on a package of principles. The report also contained a majority plan and a minority plan. According to the principles adopted unanimously, the mandate administration was to come to an end immediately and Palestine would become independent. According to the majority plan, the independent state of Palestine would be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states, joined in an economic union with

Jerusalem coming under an international administration. The minority plan called for a federal Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and consisting of Arab and Jewish federated entities.

The Arabs favored an independent Arab state in Palestine and were adamantly opposed to the idea of partition. The U.S. and the USSR announced on 10 November 1947, however, that they supported partition. Britain stated on 13 November that it would withdraw its troops from Palestine and end the mandate regime on 14 May 1948. The UN General Assembly decided on 29 November that Palestine would be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states.

In the course of the debates at the UN, Turkey sided with the Arab states that were opposed to partition and supported an independent Arab Palestine. This was in keeping with its traditional foreign policy, which lasted until the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine.

When the Ad Hoc United Nations Commission for Palestine's report was being considered in the General Assembly, Turkey continued to support the Arab position. Turkey was among the twelve countries that voted against the partition resolution, along with the six Arab states. At a time when even the USSR voted for partition, Turkey sided with the Arab states and earned their gratitude. The Western press saw this Turkish position as a manifestation of Muslim solidarity. Turkey's motives were not based on sympathy for the Arabs, however, but on the need to guard against the destabilization that partition would bring about in the region (Gruen 1997, p. 115).

### 2. The Establishment of the State of Israel

Soon after the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the partition of Palestine, clashes erupted between the Arab and Jewish communities of that country. The Arab League met four times in the interval between December 1947 and April 1948 and adopted a series of decisions opposing partition and threatening to resort to armed force to prevent it. During this period the Jewish terrorist organizations Haganah, Irgun, and Stern intensified their activities directed against the Arab population. This in turn led the Arabs to retaliate against Jewish civilians.

As a consequence of the clashes and the terrorist activities directed against them, the Arabs were forced to abandon many of their settlements to the Jews. On 14 May 1948 the Jewish National Council met in Tel Aviv, a few hours before the expiry of the British Mandate Administration, and declared an independent state of Israel in Palestine. David Ben Gurion formed the first Israeli cabinet on that day. The U.S. recognized the new state just

eleven minutes after it was established, while the USSR announced its recognition on 17 May.

The establishment of an Israeli state in Palestine, without a corresponding Arab state, was met with caution and apprehension in Turkey. The government was opposed to the establishment of the state of Israel for two fundamental reasons.

First, despite all the efforts by the LoN and the UN to resolve the issue of Palestine, the question had become ever more insoluble. To establish a Jewish state by overriding Arab opposition at a time when the question was most intractable would make peace in Palestine that much harder to achieve. Turkey had supported the Arabs in the UN debates from the very beginning and did not relish seeing a solution to which it was opposed.

Second, Turkey had misgivings about the future political orientation of Israel, located so close to its southern borders. The Jewish terror organizations that played such a large part in the creation of the state of Israel had close links with the USSR. Czechoslovak arms had been smuggled into the region after 1946 with the help of the USSR. The USSR had also given the green light to the process of transferring Jews from the countries under Communist domination in Eastern Europe to Palestine. The cooperative farms and workshops established in Jewish settlements during the years of the mandate were being run according to socialist precepts. All of this led Ankara to fear the creation of a Soviet satellite in the Middle East.

#### 3. The Arab-Israeli War and the Conciliation Commission for Palestine

Immediately after Israel's declaration of independence, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq invaded Palestine. Despite their numerical superiority, the inexperienced and uncoordinated Arab armies were unable to register any significant successes. On 22 May 1948 the UN Security Council called on the parties to end all military activities and observe a cease-fire. This resolution was followed by a further resolution on 29 May, calling on the parties to observe a four-week cease-fire. When Israel and the Arab states announced that they would observe the cease-fire, hostilities came to an end. But, starting in mid-October, clashes erupted once again in southern Palestine between Israeli and Egyptian forces. The Israeli forces established superiority over the Egyptian forces and even occupied some Egyptian territory. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire on 29 December. Egypt and Israel complied with this order in early January 1949. In the first half of 1949 Israel signed separate cease-fire agreements with Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Even as the war raged, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution establishing the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, made up of the representatives of the U.S., France, and Turkey. A balanced commission was sought by selecting a pro-Israel American, neutral French, and pro-Arab Turkish members. Turkey had already displayed the first signs of its change of policy vis-à-vis Israel's independence, however, by supporting the formation of the commission against Arab opposition and by accepting membership in it.

The reasons behind this change of policy were the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the launching of the Marshall Plan. The priorities of Turkish foreign policy would shift perceptibly after this and be more closely aligned with the West. Turkey's membership in the Conciliation Commission for Palestine marked the beginning of the long period of coolness in its relations with Arab countries. During its membership in the commission, Turkey departed from its pro-Arab line of opposing partition and shifted to a more neutral stance, while attempting to conciliate the two sides.

The Turkish member of the commission was Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a nationalist intellectual and a close friend of İsmet İnönü. Although he was a confirmed anti-Communist and therefore suspicious of the apparent close links between the USSR and Israel, he did nothing in the commission that would betray his neutrality. After a meeting with prime minister Ben Gurion in Israel, Yalçın was able to cast off his misgivings over Israel's links with the USSR. When he returned to Turkey, he recommended to İnönü that Turkey recognize Israel.

#### 4. Turkey's Recognition of Israel

On 30 June 1948, soon after Israel declared its independence, Turkey and Israel concluded a postal agreement. Despite Israel's pleas and the telegram sent to Ankara by Israel's foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, Turkey was not yet disposed to recognize Israel and preferred to follow a wait-and-see policy. When the Arab states protested the postal agreement signed by Turkey with Israel, Ankara pointed out that 10,000 of its citizens lived in Israel and that the agreement was concluded solely for humane reasons.

When hostilities broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Ankara maintained a neutral stance and took measures to restrict the travel of its citizens who wanted to go to Palestine to fight. But once the fighting lost its intensity in September 1948, Turkey lifted the travel ban imposed on those wishing to go to Palestine. Radio Ankara broadcast the announcement that Turkish citizens were free to travel to any country they chose. This was the green light for Turkish citizens of Jewish background who wanted to emigrate. From the latter part of 1948 on, thousands of Turkish Jews were transported to Israel through Ankara's cooperation with the Jewish Agency. This figure would reach 50,000 in the early 1950s (Gruen 1997, p. 116). It could be said that behind this liberal policy lurked the wish, perhaps subconscious, to see a homogeneous Turkish nation-state freed of all non-Muslim minorities. This was the policy advocated since the time of the Committee of Union and Progress, and these sentiments were present, if only subconsciously, in the cadres that helped the Jews to emigrate.

Turkey recognized Israel on 28 March 1949 while it was still on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. It was the first Muslim country to do so. Shortly before the recognition, minister of foreign affairs Necmettin Sadak declared that, in order to carry out its work in the commission with objectivity, Turkey had to do what thirty other countries had already done and recognize Israel. This was the justification for Turkey's action. But Turkey had three other basic reasons for recognizing Israel.

First, Turkey's pro-West foreign policy following World War II called for this recognition. Although the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe were among the thirty mentioned by Minister Sadak, the majority of countries recognizing Israel were Western. The preparations for creating NATO were underway at the time, and Turkey was eager to be a member. For this, Turkey had to bring its policies into line with those of its prospective allies. Furthermore, Sadak was due to travel to Washington in early April. Ankara was expecting more U.S. political and financial support and felt the need to make a friendly gesture toward Truman, who was totally committed to Israel.

A second reason was that the initial fears in Ankara that Israel might end up as a Soviet satellite turned out to be groundless. Israel established cordial relations with the U.S. and proved that it was not a covert ally of the USSR. Even a confirmed anti-Communist like Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın declared to the Turkish press that he had seen no indication that Israel was under the influence of any foreign power (Gruen 1997, p. 116). Finally, the intellectual establishment in Turkey was becoming increasingly critical of the government's pro-Arab policies. The psychological effects of the Arab revolt and betrayal of 1916 were still being felt in Turkey. The Turkish intellectuals considered events from the angle "my enemy's enemy is my friend," a

dictum that always had validity in the Middle East. From this perspective, Israel had been established in a struggle with the Ottoman State's enemies of World War I. Consequently, it was proper to establish warm relations with this new state. Furthermore, the process of ridding Turkish culture and society of Arab influences had created a negative predisposition toward Arab states among Turkish intellectuals. This was another factor in the decision to recognize Israel.

#### III. RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB STATES

#### Relations with Israel

#### Background of the Progressive Development of Relations with Israel

At the opening session of the TGNA on 1 November 1949, President İnönü delivered a speech in which he assessed relations with Israel in the following terms: "We have established political relations with the newly created state of Israel. We expect this state to be an element of stability and a force for peace in the Middle East."

Inönü's sympathy for Israel helped in accelerating the development of relations with that country. Approximately one year after Turkey's decision to recognize Israel, on 9 March 1950, diplomatic links were established with the opening of legations in Ankara and Tel Aviv. At the same time, there was a diversification in relations. This process was launched by the CHP government but continued when the DP came to power. The process gathered strength under the influence of four factors.

1. There were a number of similarities between the two countries. Both states were established in the Middle East on the model of a secular state in a region where religious elements were in the forefront. Although secularism, the defining feature of the Turkish Republic, did not figure explicitly in the documents establishing Israel, in practice the Israeli administration exercised its responsibilities without reference to religion.

Furthermore, both states were run according to Western models. Care was being taken to establish and maintain parliamentary democracy in the political sphere, while Western-type development models were being implemented in the economic sphere in both Turkey and Israel.

2. The U.S. had succeeded Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East and established cordial relations with Israel, which had its effect in Turkey. As Turkey established close political and economic ties with the U.S., Israel was following a parallel course. This inevitably brought Turkey and Israel closer together. The American-

inspired legislation for promoting foreign investments and for regulating the exploration and extraction of petroleum adopted by Turkey corresponded closely to Israel's laws adopted during that period. There was a striking similarity in the two countries' relations with the U.S.

The Turkish leaders were aware of the influence of the Jewish lobby on decision-makers in Washington. In their desire to pursue and develop their cooperation with the U.S., they consciously cultivated their relations with Israel.

3. Turkey was uncomfortable about the policies of the Arab states in relation to the Korean War. Turkey saw participation in the Korean War as an important opportunity for gaining entry into NATO. At the UN, the Arab states were against military intervention in Korea, while Israel was a firm supporter of the U.S. position in advocating military intervention. This helped in raising Israel's standing in Ankara.

4. The desire to develop bilateral relations was felt as strongly in Israel as it was in Turkey. Israel appointed one of its ablest diplomats, Elihu Sasson, to its legation in Ankara. It also appointed a military attaché, its fourth after Washington, Paris, and London. These were demonstrations of the importance that Israel attached to its relations with Turkey. Israel's leaders were convinced that their efforts to establish strong links with the West would be helped by having good relations with pro-Western Turkey (Nachmani 1987, pp. 3–40).

In addition, some Israeli leaders felt that Turkey might be helpful in resolving the problems between Israel and the Arab states.

#### 2. Economic and Cultural Relations

There were close trade relations with Palestine dating from the days of the British mandate. These relations continued in the postwar years. Turkey's exports to Palestine from 1946 to 1949 amounted to \$18 million. This made Palestine Turkey's third largest market.

After the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, priority was given to developing the existing trade relations. Trade negotiations were undertaken in February 1950, leading to the signature of a trade agreement as well as a payments agreement on 4 July. These agreements allowed Turkey to supply Israel with all of its cotton and half of its cereal requirements, amounting to 150,000 tons. This was in the 1950s, when Israel had not yet embarked on its agricultural revolution. During this period Turkey met an important part of Israel's needs for tobacco, wool, dried fruits, meat, and fish as well as minerals. Turkey's imports from Israel consisted of electrical tools, tires, con-

struction materials, pharmaceuticals, glass products, and chemicals. In addition, trucks, bulldozers, tractors, and steel products manufactured in Eastern European countries were imported via Israel, because Turkey had not yet established proper trade links with these countries. The two agreements also made possible direct payments between the Turkish Central Bank and the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which acted as Israel's central bank at that time.

In addition to the 1950 agreements, a provisional agreement was signed to regulate trade matters, pending the signing of a comprehensive agreement on trade and navigation. With this provisional agreement, the parties granted one another most-favored-nation status, although with certain reservations.

During this period Israeli firms undertook the construction of housing projects and military airbases in Turkey. The road linking Yeşilköy Airport with İstanbul was built by the Israeli firm Solel Boneh. An Israeli firm built the housing project in Ankara that was known as the "Israeli housing project."

When Israel accomplished its successful agricultural development and gained a large measure of self-sufficiency and even became an exporter of farm products, Turkey's exports to Israel started to shrink rapidly. After 1954 Israel began to register a surplus in its trade relations with Turkey. From then until the early 1990s Turkish-Israeli trade maintained a steady course.

In the first half of the 1950s there were lively cultural relations between the two countries. The president of the U.S.-based World Jewish Congress, Rabbi Maurice Perlzweig, met with foreign minister Fuat Köprülü in Ankara and expressed his satisfaction with the condition of Turkish Jews. Köprülü agreed to Perlzweig's request for the Turkish Jews to establish links with the World Jewish Congress. This was received very favorably in Israel. A year later, the 500th anniversary of İstanbul's conquest by the Turks was marked with various academic events in Israeli universities. Many Jewish migrants from Turkey were instrumental in organizing these events. These celebrations made a positive impact in Ankara.

A forest was established on Mount Carmel near Haifa and named after Atatürk. The foremost Israeli football team, Hapoel Tel Aviv, played its first international match in Turkey against Fenerbahçe. All of these activities helped in enriching the cultural dimension of relations (Nachmani 1992, pp. 15–16).

The close economic and cultural relationship between Turkey and Israel allowed political relations to follow a smooth course. But the events of the second half of the 1950s led to a cooling of these relations.

#### 3. Political Relations

#### Israel's Attitude to the Baghdad Pact

Israel followed the process leading to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact with close interest. At first Israel refrained from joining Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in their violent opposition to the new formation, because of the enthusiastic support of Washington and London for the pact. Three developments, however, led Israel to join the ranks of those who stood against the pact.

The first was the language employed by Turkey and Iraq in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Baghdad Pact. After the talks in Ankara between the parties, the joint communiqué adopted on 19 October 1954 contained the following sentence: "Turkey and Iraq are agreed that the only way to ensure world peace and security is for the nations that are sincerely attached to the ideals and principles of the UN Charter to be in full solidarity and united in a solid collective defense front against those who aim to oppress them and destroy their existence." It was also stressed in the text that "Turkey would consider it to be against its own interests to follow a course of action that ignored the legitimate interests of the Arab states." The joint communiqué issued on 12 January 1955 following Menderes's visit to Baghdad contained the following passage: "Turkey and Iraq will strive to ensure security by foiling all attempts to commit aggression in the Middle East in violation of the principles of the UN, as well as the resolutions in compliance with these principles aimed at achieving stability." Israel interpreted this language as Turkish support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The second development disturbing Israel was the speech of Iraq's prime minister on 26 February 1955, in which he interpreted article 5 of the pact as meaning that Israel would never be admitted to the pact.

The third development was Menderes's statement made in Damascus following his visit to Baghdad. To reassure his Syrian hosts about the Baghdad Pact, Menderes declared that Turkey stood ready to come to the assistance of the Arabs in the event of an Israeli attack.

Israel expressed its displeasure to Ankara over the proposed Baghdad Pact as well as the Turkish policies toward Israel. At the same time, it made demarches in Washington and London to foil the Baghdad Pact. The Israeli minister in Ankara voiced Israel's misgivings to Turkish deputy prime minister Zorlu on 7 January 1955 but failed to get a positive response.

Britain and the U.S. continued to provide full support for the Baghdad Pact; but at the same time, they suggested that the Turkish government might do something to soothe Israel. When he conferred with the British ambassador on 22 January 1955, Adnan Menderes declared that Turkey's policy toward Israel remained unchanged. He repeated these reassurances to the Israeli envoy in Ankara on 28 January. When the Israeli diplomat inquired whether Turkey would stand up against an Iraqi attempt to use the Baghdad Pact against Israel, Menderes replied that there was a 90% probability that Turkey would oppose such a move. Menderes also requested that the Israeli government not use these friendly assurances as propaganda material. He was concerned about attracting Arab hostility.

Menderes failed to ease Israel's concerns, however. In March 1955 Israel delivered a note to Ankara that recalled Ankara's past pronouncements favoring Israel and sought clarifications about whether there was any change in Turkey's position. Ankara replied that the Turkish position remained unchanged, but its credibility was suffering because of its pro-Arab policies aimed at winning over the Arab countries that remained outside the Baghdad Pact.

Israel should have been more sensitive about not upsetting its relationship with the only country in the region with which it had friendly relations. Instead Tel Aviv escalated the tension with Ankara by keeping up its criticism of the Baghdad Pact, to which Turkey attributed utmost importance. The Israeli government claimed that the Baghdad Pact was an anti-Israeli organization and that it would foment anti-Israeli feelings among the Arabs and encourage Arab aggression.

Israel's policies caused considerable displeasure in Ankara, which was enthusiastically pushing for the formation of the Baghdad Pact. As a result, Ankara reviewed its policies toward Israel. Starting in the summer of 1955, Turkey's diplomatic contacts with Israel were reduced to a minimum level. Turkish ministers started refusing to give appointments to Israel's minister in Ankara. As a consequence, Israel's legation lost its diplomatic function and was reduced to a mere observer mission.

The creation of the Baghdad Pact had cooled bilateral relations, but the events of 1956 created even greater tension.

### b. Turkey's Policy toward Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis

When Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. This was followed by the combined British and French attack the next day. The war and its aftermath were

followed closely in Turkey. Both Israel's aggression and British and French support for the aggressor received widespread criticism.

Although the Turkish government looked upon the events with disapproval, it refrained from taking a public stand against Britain and France, its allies in NATO. Zorlu, a prominent member of the DP leadership, declared: "Turkey regrets the use of force by Britain and France against Egypt. Whatever the motives, such action has to be seen as a violation of international law." He then softened his criticism by adding: "British and French intervention contributed to ending the war." Zorlu was making it clear that he did not want to confront these two allied countries.

Turkey's approach to Israel was different. The four regional members of the Baghdad Pact met in Tehran in November to discuss this question. Ankara gave the first tangible sign of its changed policy toward Israel by signing the statement condemning Israel that was adopted at this meeting. Ankara also gave serious consideration to the idea of recalling its minister in Tel Aviv. Turkey contemplated taking this course in order to deflect the criticism of the Arab countries directed at Iraq for entering into an alliance in the Baghdad Pact with Turkey, a country with diplomatic relations with Israel. Before recalling its minister, Ankara was making efforts to prevent Britain from interpreting this as a hostile attitude toward Israel.

In the days following the Tehran meeting, criticism of Israel continued to mount in Turkey, even as the Arab world's outrage kept growing. Turkey responded to these developments by recalling its minister in Tel Aviv, Şevkatî Istinyeli, on 26 November 1956. In doing this, Turkey was seeking to stem the tide of anti-Turkish criticism coming from Arab states, particularly Egypt. Despite Turkey's readiness to renounce its good relations with Israel in all fields, however, the Egyptian leadership continued its vilification of Turkey. This kept Turkey from severing its diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.

When Turkey recalled its minister from Tel Aviv and the Turkish mission in Israel was reduced to chargé d'affaires level, an anomalous situation emerged, because Israel failed to reciprocate Ankara's action. This created displeasure in Ankara, which started pressing Israel to recall its minister. Israel eventually complied and on 19 December 1956 recalled its minister back to Tel Aviv. Relations between the two countries remained at chargé d'affaires level until July 1980, when Israel declared Jerusalem to be its capital, whereupon Turkey retaliated by reducing its representation to second-secretary level.

#### c. The Peripheral Pact

The developments in the Middle East following the Suez crisis led to the idea of new machinery for regional cooperation under Israel's leadership. Israel's prime minister David Ben Gurion felt that the Pan-Arab currents unleashed by Nasser in Egypt and Cairo's close links with the USSR were a direct threat to Israel's security. Israel's feeling of insecurity was made worse when Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic in February 1958. Soviet military experts took up duties in the UAR, compounding Israel's fears.

Ben Gurion considered that the threat to Israel posed by the Arabs could only be neutralized by a pact consisting of the non-Arab countries of the region. The Israeli prime minister called this arrangement, designed to circumscribe the Arab states, the Peripheral Pact. The name was selected because its members would be the countries on the periphery of Arab states: Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey.

The U.S. was the chief supporter of the Peripheral Pact. Secretary Dulles considered that the pact would help reduce Soviet influence in the region, so he encouraged Israel to proceed with the formation of the pact on an urgent basis. He also briefed the leaders of the prospective members on the features of the pact. With U.S. backing, Ben Gurion signed cooperation agreements in the field of security with Ethiopia and Iran in early 1958. He was well aware, however, that such a pact would be a non-starter without the participation of one of the strongest countries in the region: Turkey.

On 28 August 1958 Ben Gurion and foreign minister Golda Meir visited Ankara secretly and conferred with Menderes and Zorlu. News of the visit was withheld from the press; and, in order to prevent leaks, diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs served as waiters at the meals (Nachmani 1987, pp. 74–76). Dulles had briefed Menderes and Zorlu on the pact. During the one-day visit of the Israeli leaders, the Turkish leaders accepted the proposal for Turkey to join the Peripheral Pact (Nachmani 1992, pp. 31–33). Three reasons can be advanced for Turkey's acceptance.

1. After the diplomatic row with Syria in 1957, the decision of Egypt and Syria to unite their two countries was not well received by Ankara. The Soviet decision to provide Syria with military aid was also a matter for concern in Turkey.

2. After the coup carried out by General Kassem in Baghdad in July 1958 and the end for all practical purposes of Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact, Turkey perceived a growing threat on its southern borders. The U.S. was eager to see Turkey within the Peripheral Pact.

Essentially, the Peripheral Pact was designed to secure joint action among its members to confront Pan-Arab and Communist currents. In addition, the members were expected to engage in increased scientific and economic cooperation. The pact's most effective action was the establishment of a network (known as Trident) among the intelligence services of the members. The intelligence services met twice a year to share information within the framework of this arrangement.

After the establishment of the Peripheral Pact, Turkish-Israeli relations improved and returned to their state prior to the Suez crisis. But the events of the second half of the 1960s brought this period of cooperation to an end.

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#### B. Relations with Iran

#### Overcoming the Wartime Interruption

From 1941, when the wartime Allies occupied Iran, until the end of 1947, Turkish-Iranian relations were at a stand-still. During these years, decisions relating to Iran were taken by the occupying powers rather than by the Iranian government. This was why Turkey made representations with Britain on the subject of two issues having to do with Iran.

The first issue was British ill-treatment of the Kashkai Turks living in Shiraz and the Persian Gulf region. Britain perceived the Kashkai Turks as pro-German and imposed strict controls on their confederation of tribes, which had always maintained a semiautonomous existence. Actually, Shah Reza had followed similar policies toward the Kashkai in the 1930s, but this had not affected Turkish-Iranian relations during the Atatürk era. Ankara felt the need to become interested in the fate of the Turkish peoples living beyond its borders during the war years, however, under the influence of racist and Pan-Turkic currents that were being stirred up by Nazi Germany.

The representation made by Ankara on behalf of the Kashkais was due to its interest in the fate of Turks outside its borders, even if this was at the cost of interfering in the internal affairs of another state. This was a significant departure from Turkey's traditional foreign policy. Once Germany lost the initiative in the war and enthusiasm for Pan-Turkic causes started waning, however, Turkey returned to its traditional policies.

The second issue was the probability that the Soviet occupation might continue after the war. Turkey feared that, as in the case of the Balkan states that became Soviet satellites toward the end of the war, Iran might also end up under Moscow's control. This would mean that the USSR

and its satellites would surround Turkey on three sides. Turkey was calling on Britain to be more sensitive to this probability.

At this time, Turkey's main concern was the Soviet threat, so it gave its fullest support to the preservation of Iran's territorial integrity and tried hard to prevent the Iranian government from coming under Soviet influence. Turkey's support for Tehran continued even as the shah's forces destroyed Azerbaijan's autonomy in 1946, whereas Turkey's main concern during the war had been the wellbeing of people with Turkish roots living in Iran.

After a ten-year hiatus during the war years and thereafter, Turkish-Iranian relations revived in 1948. That year, a new Iranian ambassador was assigned to Ankara, a post that had been vacant for a long time. In 1949 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu became Turkey's ambassador in Tehran.

In the new bipolar world order, both Turkey and Iran perceived a threat emanating from the USSR in 1945 and 1946. This led the two countries to come closer to the West and to adopt similar foreign policy courses, which helped bring their relations to the level attained during the era of Shah Reza. In the old days, relations were direct and on a bilateral basis. Now the relations were developing in a more indirect way through the U.S. These relations suffered a setback when Mosaddeq came to power in Tehran.

#### The Mosaddeg Period

The nationalistic tendencies that appeared in Iran in the early 1950s and prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq's attempt to nationalize the petroleum industry were not well received in Turkey. At this time, the defining feature of Turkey's foreign policy was its Western orientation: for Ankara, being anti-West or anti-U.S. was practically identical with being anti-Turkish. During Mosaddeq's period, not only was Iran drifting toward neutralism, but the Communist Tudeh Party was enjoying increasing popular support and gaining an effective place in the cabinet. Turkey feared that the Mosaddeq government would lead Iran to chaos and bring the country under Moscow's control. This led to a worsening of Turkish-Iranian relations in the years 1951 to 1953, when Mosaddeq held power.

When Iran's relations with Britain became strained because of the dispute over oil, Turkey gave its fullest support to Britain and joined the oil embargo imposed on Iran. Turkey even supported and encouraged a possible British-American operation against Iran, while Tehran accused Turkey of being the compliant tool of imperialism.

In August 1953 Mosaddeq was overthrown through a CIA coup, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi returned to

the throne. Relations immediately resumed their previous course, and the atmosphere of crisis was over. Henceforth, bilateral relations would revolve around the Baghdad Pact.

#### From the Sadabad Pact to CENTO

The Soviet threat that emerged after World War II forced Turkey and Iran to take a closer interest in collective security models. Turkey was seeking to join the European collective security system, while Iran wanted to revise the Sadabad Pact and turn it into a military alliance. With this mind, Iran proposed to Turkey in 1949 that Pakistan be invited to join the Sadabad Pact and that its text be revised. Turkey responded by noting that such an invitation would not be right before the Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute was resolved. Ankara added that, if the U.S. did not join the Sadabad Pact, such a move would serve no useful purpose and would needlessly provoke the USSR.

After Shah Mohammed Reza regained control of Iran following the 1953 coup, the influence of the U.S. over Iran became more pronounced. This made the Soviet threat the priority issue of Tehran's foreign policy. The Soviet threat was also Turkey's main concern, and Ankara was in the process of implementing the U.S. plan for establishing a "Northern Tier" to prevent the spread of communism. As we have already noted, the Baghdad Pact was established in 1955, and Iran became a member in November of that year.

Expecting Iran to join the pact from the beginning, Turkey was disturbed to note Iran's early hesitation. To persuade the shah to act, president Celal Bayar visited Iran in September. Bayar found out that Iran's hesitation was entirely due to its wish to secure the maximum amount of military aid from the U.S. before making a move. Bayar explained to his Iranian hosts that Turkey had received significantly more aid after its accession to NATO, and Iran joined the pact shortly after Bayar's visit. Actually, what caused the shah to proceed with caution was his wish not to stir up trouble with pro-Mosaddeq groups and leftists in his country. He did not raise this issue during Bayar's visit, however, in order to avoid giving the impression that there were undependable elements in Iranian society. And yet, in all of the Middle East, including Turkey, Iran was the only country that could generate mass movements capable of influencing the leadership. It would be incorrect to assume that Iran's socioeconomic fabric could not produce opposition. The shah's tendency to conceal the strength of the internal opposition to his policies until his overthrow in 1979 was an important factor in his loss of the throne.

In addition to the nationalist-leftist opposition and the desire to obtain more military aid, another factor caused the shah to proceed with caution in his approach to the pact: the wish not to provoke the USSR. In the 1940s it was Iran that wanted to revise the Sadabad Pact and Turkey that wanted to proceed cautiously in order not to provoke the USSR. Now, in the middle of the 1950s, the roles were reversed. Unlike Turkey, however, Iran did not have the luxury of feeling secure under NATO's umbrella and consequently wanted to see the active participation of the U.S. in the pact.

After the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, the U.S. became a member of the military committee of the Baghdad Pact. This helped in stiffening the pact, but not for long. When Iraq withdrew from the pact after the coup in July 1958, the pact became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and moved its head-quarters to Ankara in recognition of Turkey's pivotal role in the organization.

Fearing that Iran would be next in line after Iraq, the shah called for CENTO to become a more effective organization. CENTO's resources were limited, however. Turkey had the largest force among the CENTO countries, but its forces had been assigned to NATO. The coup that the shah feared might take place in Iran occurred in Turkey on 27 May 1960.

Far from affecting relations with Iran, the coup in Turkey actually helped improve relations between the two neighbors. The shah was apprehensive over prime minister Adnan Menderes's attempts to bring about a rapprochement with Moscow during the last few months of his rule. After the coup, he was reassured by the first official statement of the ruling junta (the National Unity Committee) that Turkey remained fully attached to NATO and CENTO. To demonstrate his trust and support, the shah stopped at İstanbul's Yeşilköy Airport for a few hours on his way back from a European trip on 29 May 1960, just two days after the coup, where he met with some of the members of the ruling junta.

The most important issue in the relationship of the Committee of National Unity with the shah during the early 1960s was stiffening CENTO's military capabilities.

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### SECTION 5

**1960–1980**Relative Autonomy—3

Table 5-1. The Administration of the Period 1960–1980 (until 12 September 1980)

| PRESIDENTS   | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                        | SECRETARIES-GENERAL<br>OF MFA  |
|--|--|--|--|
| Celal Bayar<br>(22 May 1950–27 May 1960)                         | 5th Adnan Menderes Government DP<br>(25 Nov. 1957–27 May 1960)                                     | Fatin Rüştü Zorlu<br>(25 Oct. 1957–27 May 1960)        | Melih Esenbel<br>(2 Apr. 1957–12 Mar. 1960)<br>Selim Rauf Sarper<br>(12 Mar. 1960–28 May 1960) |
|  | 1st Cemal Gürsel Government<br>(30 May 1960–5 Jan. 1961)   | Selim Rauf Sarper                                      | Zeki Kuneralp<br>(30 May 1960–16 Aug. 1960)  |
|  | 2nd C. Gürsel Government<br>(5 Jan. 1961–20 Nov. 1961)   | (30 May 1960–16 Feb. 1962)                             | Namık Yolga  |
| Cemal Gürsel<br>27 May 1960–26 Oct. 1961,<br>lead of the MBK and | 8th M. İ. İnönü Government CHP-AP<br>(20 Nov. 1961–25 June 1962)                                   |  | (16 Aug. 1960–28 Mar. 1963)  |
| of the state)<br>26 Oct. 1961–15 Mar. 1996,<br>president)        | 9th M. Ì. İnönü Government CHP-YTP<br>(25 June 1962–25 Dec. 1963)                                  | Feridun Cemal Erkin<br>(26 Mar. 1962–19 Feb. 1965)     | Fuat Bayramoğlu<br>(23 Mar. 1963–23 Oct. 1964)   |
| •  | 10th M. İ. İnönü Government CHP<br>(25 Dec. 1963–20 Feb. 1965)                                     |  | Ümit Haluk Bayülken  |
|  | Suat Hayri Ürgüplü Government AP-CKMP-YTP<br>(20 Feb. 1965–27 Oct. 1965)                           | Hasan Esat Işık<br>(23 Feb. 1965–22 Oct. 1965)         | (23 Oct. 1964–10 July 1966)  |
|  | 1st Süleyman Demirel Government AP<br>(27 Oct. 1965–3 Nov. 1969)                                   |  | Zeki Kuneralp<br>(10 July 1966–4 Aug. 1969)  |
| Cevdet Sunay<br>28 Mar. 1966–28 Mar. 1973)                       | 2nd S. Demirel Government AP<br>(3 Nov. 1969–6 Mar. 1970)  | İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil<br>(27 Oct. 1965–12 Mar. 1971) |  |
|  | 3rd S. Demirel Government AP<br>(6 Mar. 1970–26 Mar. 1971)   |  |  |
|  | 1st Nihat Erim Government<br>(26 Mar. 1971–11 Dec. 1971)   | Osman Olcay<br>(26 Mar. 1971–3 Dec. 1971)              | Orhan Eralp  |
|  | 2nd N. Erim Government<br>(11 Dec. 1971–22 May 1972)   |  | (4 Aug. 1969–25 Apr. 1972)   |
|  | Ferit Melen Government AP-CHP-MGP<br>(22 May 1972–15 Apr. 1973)                                    | Ümit Haluk Bayülken<br>(11 Dec. 1971–26 Jan. 1974)     | İsmail Erez  |
|  | Naim Talu Government AP-CGP-MGP<br>(15 Apr. 1973–26 Jan. 1974)                                     |  | (25 Apr. 1972–11 Sept. 1974)   |
| ahri Korutürk<br>6 Apr. 1973–6 Apr. 1980)                        | 1st Bülent Ecevit Government CHP-MSP<br>(26 Jan, 1974–17 Nov. 1974)                                | Turan Güneş<br>(26Jan. 1974–17 Nov. 1974)              |  |
|  | Sadi Irmak Government<br>(17 Nov. 1974–31 Mar. 1975)   | Melih Esenbel<br>(17 Nov. 1974–31 Mar. 1975)           |  |
|  | 4th S. Demirel Government AP-CGP-MSP-MHP<br>(1st Nationalist Front)<br>(31 Mar. 1975–21 June 1977) | İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil<br>(31 Mar. 1975–21 June 1977) | Şükrü Elekdağ<br>(11 Sept, 1974–6 July 1979)   |
|  | 2nd B. Ecevit Government CHP<br>(21 June 1977–21 July 1977)  | Gündüz Ökçün<br>(21 June 1977–21 July 1977)            |  |
|  | 5th S. Demirel Government AP-MSP-MHP<br>(2nd Nationalist Front)<br>(21 July 1977–5 Jan. 1978)      | İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil<br>(21 July 1977–5 Jan. 1978)  |  |
|  | 3rd B. Ecevit Government CHP-CGP-DP<br>(5 Jan. 1978–12 Nov 1979)                                   | Gündüz Ökçün<br>(5 Jan. 1978–12 Nov. 1979)             |  |
|  | 6th S. Demirel Government AP<br>(12 Nov. 1979–12 Sept. 1980)                                       | Hayrettin Erkmen<br>(12 Nov. 1979–5 Sept. 1980)        | Özdemir Yiğit<br>(6 July 1979–27 Aug. 1980)  |

AP (Adalet Partisi): Justice Party, CGP (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi): Republican Reliance Party, CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): Republican People's Party, CKMP (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi): Republican Peasant Nation Party, DP (Demokrat Parti): Democratic Party.

MGP (Milli Güven Partisi): National Reliance Party.
MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi): Nationalist Action Party.
MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi): National Salvation Party.
YTP (Yeni Türkiye Partisi): New Turkey Party.
MBK (Milli Bulık Komitesi): National Unity Committee.
(Table by Atay Akdevelioğlu)

### Appraisal of the Period

### I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

The atmosphere of the 1960s and the 1970s provided new opportunities for countries like Turkey to enjoy a substantial degree of relative autonomy.

#### The Slackening of the Cold War

The bipolar world continued to be the main feature of the period. Nonetheless, the rigidities of the system were beginning to break down and giving way to détente under the influence of factors such as the balance of terror brought on by nuclear weapons and an acceptance of the status quo by both sides. As a result of all this, the two blocs entered into negotiations to secure Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces and later got involved in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which culminated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, a document that embodied détente (Box 5-1).

Another factor that developed even before Helsinki was the tendency for centrifugal forces to appear in both blocs. This created a climate of competition between the leaders of the blocs, which proved to be to the benefit of the medium and small countries within the blocs as well as the nonaligned countries, by allowing them to exercise greater independence. As the leaders of the blocs found it harder to control their smaller countries, they improved their relations with the countries of the opposing bloc in order to undermine their opponents. To cite an example, because Moscow frowned on Romania's industrialization, that country started receiving economic support from Britain and France. The U.S. was providing loans to Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Turkey also would start reaping substantial political and economic benefits from this climate of competition in the latter part of the 1960s and thereafter.

In the Western Bloc, France led the centrifugal forces, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, a typical nationalist. In the Eastern Bloc, the centrifugal forces resulted in a dramatic development in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet tanks crushed the liberalization movement under prime minister Alexander Dubcek in that country. Unlike the suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 during the darkest period of the Cold War, the suppression of the "Prague spring" had deep repercussions, leading to splits in the world's leftist movements, including those in Turkey.

#### The U.S. Retreat

The U.S., as the leader of the Western Bloc, lost considerable strength during this period.

The Vietnam War had worn the U.S. down, especially after the Tet offensive of February 1968. Until then, the U.S. had always appeared to be militarily successful. Now it was deeply shaken, and world public opinion began to turn. The massacre of civilians at My Lai caused an uproar all over the world, especially in the U.S. itself. President Nixon was eventually forced to abandon Vietnam. In 1969 he announced that the U.S. would no longer be the policeman of the world and that each country must fend for itself in the struggle against communism (see Box 4-3 in Section 4).

A second factor was the plight of the U.S. currency. The hoard of U.S. currency accumulated by France and other European countries and the high cost of the Vietnam War led to the devaluation of the dollar in 1971. This amounted to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and shook international confidence in the U.S.

Third, Germany and Japan had been strengthening their economies following World War II and now were in a position to challenge the economic supremacy of the U.S.

Fourth, strong opposition to the government developed within American society itself. The Watergate scandal, in which one political party was eavesdropping on another; Nixon's lying, which forced him out of office;




Figure 5-1. Cartoon by Ali Ulvi depicting the exploitation of the Third World by Western powers (Cumhuriyet, date unknown).

and the public burning of draft cards by young men who refused to go to Vietnam all led to a serious internal weakening of the U.S.

Finally, in 1979 the U.S. lost Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. More importantly, it also lost Iran, a country in which it had invested much political capital and to which it had supplied vast quantities of arms.

#### The Growing Strength of the USSR and the Third World

Unlike the U.S., the USSR registered important gains in the 1970s. Until then the U.S. had been the main user of foreign aid as a tool to influence developing countries. Now the USSR was beginning to use the same method to further its influence, even if less effectively than the U.S. did. It acquired military bases in the Middle East. It built aircraft carriers and sailed them into the Mediterranean. At the request of the Afghan government, it sent its army into Afghanistan and came closer to the Indian Ocean. Such moves were common U.S. practices; but when coming from the USSR, they set alarm bells ringing in the West.

Then there were the events in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, when the oil-producing Arab states used the oil weapon against the West by jacking up the price to astronomical heights. The price of oil, which was three dollars per barrel in 1973, had risen to thirty dol-

#### Box 5-1. The CSCE (Up to 1990)

The proposal for the two blocs in Europe to seek reconciliation was first put forward by Molotov in 1954. At that time, however, the Cold War was at its peak. Under the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany was severing its relations with those countries that recognized East Germany. But West Germany's "reunification first, détente later" formula was a nonstarter. The attempt to force the USSR to submit by resorting to policies such as "containment" and "rollback" stood no chance of success. The rule of force, which characterized the Cold War, was gradually giving way to the establishment of norms through mutual compromises (Gerger 1980). When Willy Brandt became chancellor in West Germany, he pursued the policy known as Ostpolitik from 1970 to 1973. This policy also involved recognizing West Germany's eastern frontiers through bilateral agreements signed with neighbors. This created a propitious climate for the CSCE.

In 1969 the USSR renewed its proposal for holding a European security conference, because it wanted the West to recognize the status quo in Europe and its "acquisitions" following World War II. This proposal was strongly supported by Finland, which depended on reconciliation between the East and West to continue its peaceful existence, and Poland, which wanted to see its Oder-Neisse frontier in the west formally acknowledged. The West remained cool to the idea for a long time but finally assented in order to strike at the USSR where it was at its weakest: in the field of human rights.

The negotiations got underway in 1973 and were structured to reflect the positions of the two blocs. The first "basket" of the conference dealt with European security issues in line with the wishes of the USSR, while the third basket dealt with human rights issues in line with the wishes of the West. The second basket dealt with the issues of economic, scientific-technological, and environmental cooperation.

The Helsinki Final Act that emerged from the negotiations was a delicately balanced document, approved by acclamation without a vote. Its binding force was not legal but political and moral. The parties agreed to preserve the status quo (which, for the USSR, meant acquiescing to the status quo), refrain from actions likely to impair confidence, and increase ties in fields such as human rights, culture, and education, which were of benefit to the West.

From then on the CSCE led to developments mostly in the area of the third basket. When the second summit took place in Paris in 1990, on the eve of the disintegration of the USSR, it became institutionalized within the framework of the third basket.

(B. ORAN)

lars by 1980. The Arab states cut off oil deliveries to the U.S. and the Netherlands. The first oil shock and the second one that came in 1979 undermined the economic and political domination of the West for at least seven years after 1973. The West would eventually take its countermeasures and actually use the oil shocks to its advantage, thereby overcoming them in the 1980s. But the measures taken by the West were extremely detrimental to developing countries.

#### Box 5-2. The Nonaligned Movement: Its Rise and Fall

Nonalignment as a concept was first enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru of India in 1946. It entered the international vocabulary in the Afro-Asian congresses of 1947 and 1949. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India declared that they were nonaligned. The movement first came to life at the Bandung Conference in 1955, because of the split between those who were pro-West and pro-East.

The nonaligned movement went through four phases.

- 1. Formation (1960–65): in this phase the nonaligned movement profited from East-West rivalries and followed independent policies based on peaceful coexistence. They supported national liberation movements and gathered strength as new countries became independent. Splits appeared in the ranks of the nonaligned countries even during this period owing to their differing backgrounds.
- 2. Temporary setback (1965–70): the Cold War was going through a lull, and differences among the nonaligned countries were beginning to surface. Military coups were causing internal difficulties. Among the movement's leaders, Nehru died in 1964, President Sukarno of Indonesia was overthrown in 1965, and Kwarne Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown in 1966.
- 3. Development and maturity (1970–80). The first petroleum shock in 1973 brought nonalignment to the foreground. The colonies were by now independent, and the movement could no longer be based on decolonization. At the Algiers Conference of 1973, the main agenda item was economic development. At the 1961 Belgrade Conference, the concepts of fair terms of trade (meaning that the prices of raw materials and manufactured goods should not operate against developing countries), Stabex (Stabilization-Exports, a fund to stabilize the prices of raw materials), and the elimination of restrictions on the exports of the developing countries were introduced. Gradually, the rich-North and the poor-South divide would replace the East-West divide. The concept of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was elaborated and then developed within the United Nations Conference on Trade

and Development (UNCTAD). In an atmosphere in which the Arab-Israeli dispute was dormant and the Vietnam War had ended, the nonaligned countries forced the developed countries to convene a "North-South Dialogue" conference in Paris in 1975.

At the same time, however, the movement was being undermined from within. As a consequence of the 1973 oil shock, the movement was split between those that had oil and the rest, bringing about the concept of the "fourth world." More and more divisive disputes were emerging among the unaligned nations, such as the Ethiopia/Eritrea and the Vietnam/Khmer Rouge conflicts. There was also a big ideological argument over whether the movement should give priority to the anti-imperialist struggle or to attaining global peace. During this same period the emergence of the European Community and China was diluting the rigidity of the bipolar world.

4. The fall (1980 and thereafter): the West had overcome the oil shock and added the extra costs to the prices of the products that the developing countries had to produce from that source, The USSR was no longer in a position to provide generous aid. One of the leaders of the movement, Tito of Yugoslavia, was dead, and Egypt had joined the Pax Americana as a result of the Camp David agreement. New international developments such as the events in Poland and Afghanistan and the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa occurred without the involvement of the nonaligned countries. The nonaligned were gradually submitting to the IMF.

Nonalignment emerged as a result of the USSR's interruption of the second globalization stage (imperialism, beginning in the 1870s) for a period of roughly fifty years. At the stage when the nonaligned movement appeared strongest, the third globalization started, and the movement began crumbling (see Box Intro-7 in the Introduction).

(B. ORAN)

Finally, the nonaligned movement (Box 5-2) took advantage of the existence of two antagonistic blocs and allowed the former colonies to take their place in the international arena as a third force. This new force helped strengthen the Eastern Bloc, although the movement harbored no particular sympathy with its ideology, and weakened the Western Bloc. Furthermore, it brought a new dimension to international politics, which until then had consisted of two basic strategies: isolationism and military alliances. Now nonalignment became a subsystem and brought a new climate of greater equality and democracy to international relations.

# The World Economy and Social Developments

The 1960s and the early 1970s were years of rapid economic growth for the world, which was finally overcoming the setback of World War II. In Europe, West Ger-

many in particular achieved high rates of growth, which eliminated unemployment in that country. Germany now found itself in need of foreign unskilled labor to sustain its high growth rate.

There was a parallel loosening up in social mores. People began to shake off the collective conservatism that developed during the times of crisis. In the 1950s the U.S. was under the baneful influence of McCarthyism, and on U.S. beaches even two-piece bathing suits were frowned upon. Now the same U.S. introduced the world to the hippie culture and underwent a sexual revolution. The music of the Beatles became an international rage. The student revolution originated in French universities in May 1968. Under the slogan "It is forbidden to forbid," it upset all authoritarian values and helped spread an unrestrained version of freedom bordering on anarchism all over the world. It was impossible for this climate not to find its expression in international politics. This happened

Table 5-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1961–1980

| YEAR PI | WHOLESALE<br>PRICE INDEX (%) | TL/\$<br>RATE | GNP (MILLION \$) | EXPORTS (MILLION \$) | exports as<br>% of gnp | IMPORTS (MILLION \$) | IMPORTS AS<br>% OF GNP | FOREIGN<br>TRADEAS %<br>OF GNP | FOREIGN<br>DEBT<br>(MILLION \$) | FOREIGN<br>DEBT AS %<br>OF GNP | FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (MILLION \$) |
|---------|------------------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1961    | 2.9                          | 9.04          | 5,479.6          | 346.7                | 6.33                   | \$07.2               | 9.26                   | 15.58                          | ı                               | I                              | 1.2                                    |
| 1962    | 5.7                          | 9.04          | 6,370.9          | 381.2                | 86.5                   | 619.4                | 9.72                   | 15.71                          | 1                               | I                              | 4.2                                    |
| 1963    | 4.2                          | 9.04          | 7,389.5          | 368.1                | 4.98                   | 9.289                | 9.31                   | 14.29                          | ****                            | I                              | 4.5                                    |
| 1964    | 1.2                          | 80.6          | 7,853.8          | 410.8                | 5.23                   | 537.2                | 6.84                   | 12.07                          | 964.0                           | 12.27                          | 11.9                                   |
| 1965    | 8.1                          | 80.6          | 8,450.0          | 463.7                | 5.49                   | 572.0                | 6.77                   | 12.26                          | 1,051.0                         | 12.44                          | 11.6                                   |
| 1966    | 4.8                          | 80.6          | 10,068.2         | 490.5                | 4.87                   | 718.3                | 7.13                   | 12.01                          | 1,149.0                         | 11.41                          | 7.6                                    |
| 1967    | 7.6                          | 9.08          | 11,176.3         | 522.3                | 4.67                   | 684.7                | 6.13                   | 10.80                          | 1,286.0                         | 11.51                          | 9.6                                    |
| 1968    | 3.2                          | 80.6          | 18,049.9*        | 496.4                | 2.75                   | 763.7                | 4.23                   | 6.98                           | 1,502.0                         | 8.32                           | 13.9                                   |
| 1969    | 7.2                          | 80.6          | 20,193.4         | 536.8                | 2.66                   | 801.2                | 3.97                   | 6.63                           | 1,678.0                         | 8.31                           | 13.2                                   |
| 1970    | 6.7                          | 10.92         | 19,030.7         | 588.5                | 3.09                   | 947.6                | 4.98                   | 8.07                           | 1,891.0                         | 9.94                           | 9.0                                    |
| 1971    | 15.9                         | 15.14         | 17,243.9         | 676.6                | 3.92                   | 1,170.8              | 6.79                   | 10.71                          | 2,177.0                         | 12.64                          | 11.7                                   |
| 1972    | 18.0                         | 14.30         | 21,967.8         | 885.0                | 4.03                   | 1,562.6              | 7.11                   | 11.14                          | 2,291.0                         | 10.43                          | 12.8                                   |
| 1973    | 20.5                         | 14.28         | 27,947.4         | 1,317.1              | 4.71                   | 2,086.2              | 7.46                   | 12.18                          | 2,654.0                         | 9.50                           | 67.3                                   |
| 1974    | 29.9                         | 14.06         | 38,241.7         | 1,532.2              | 4.01                   | 3,777.6              | 9.88                   | 13.88                          | 2,901.0                         | 7.59                           | 7.7-                                   |
| 1975    | 10.1                         | 14.56         | 47,452.0         | 1,401.1              | 2.95                   | 4,738.6              | 66.6                   | 12.94                          | 4,291.0                         | 9.04                           | 15.1                                   |
| 1976    | 15.6                         | 16.17         | 53,683.7         | 1,960.2              | 3.65                   | 5,128.6              | 9.55                   | 13.20                          | 6,920.0                         | 12.89                          | 8.9                                    |
| 1977    | 24.1                         | 18.09         | 61,264.3         | 1,753.0              | 2.86                   | 5,796.3              | 9.46                   | 12.32                          | 10,935.0                        | 17.85                          | 9.2                                    |
| 1978    | 52.6                         | 24.63         | 66,827.8         | 2,288.2              | 3.42                   | 4,599.0              | 6.88                   | 10.31                          | 13,925.0                        | 20.84                          | 11.7                                   |
| 1979    | 63.9                         | 35.21         | 81,696.2         | 2,261.2              | 2.77                   | 5,069.4              | 6.21                   | 8.97                           | 13,439.0                        | 16.45                          | -6.4                                   |
| 1980    | 107.2                        | 77.54         | 68,390.6         | 2,910.1              | 4.26                   | 7,909.4              | 11.57                  | 15.82                          | 15,709.0                        | 22.97                          | 97.0                                   |

Sources: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİB), İstatistik Göstergeler, 1923-1998, pp. 404, 495, 588, and 589; Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 1983-85), vol. 2, p. 514; Developments in the foreign debt stock: various Treasury publications.

GNP: Gross National Product; TL = Turkish lira.

\*This year there was an unusual jump in GNP as expressed in dollars because of a change in series.

(Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

with détente and shook up the upholders of the status quo. After all, those who were responsible for conducting international affairs were themselves undergoing this experience.

# II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

#### A. The Economy

The following trends can be discerned in Uluğbay's table (Table 5-2; see Box 2-1 in Section 2).

- 1. The GNP registered a steady increase. Up to 1971, and especially up to 1969, this increase was not due to inflation, because the rate of inflation up to 1971 was fluctuating at relatively low levels. The inflation rate was 1.2% in 1964 and 3.2% in 1968. These low, single-digit rates were registered for the first time since World War II. The rise in the GDP reflected the buoyancy of the economy, resulting from the transition to a planned economy after the establishment of the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı: DPT). Turkey was growing and developing.
- 2. After 1970 there was a rising trend in all of the data due to increasing inflation. Inflation rose to double digits in 1971 and hit 107.2% in 1980. After this, the deficit in the balance of trade became substantial. During this period exports increased by a factor of 814, while imports increased by a factor of 15.6.

The ratio of foreign trade to GNP was high in the early part of the period but decreased steadily thereafter until 1969; it started increasing again and showed some fluctuations toward the end of the period. The exchange rate of 9 TL to the U.S. dollar was realistic until 1970 and helped boost exports, while imports increased due to the growing investment requirements of the planned economy. The average ratio of foreign trade to GNP for the whole period was 11.8%.

Another reason for increased imports was the high volume of weapons and defense equipment procured from foreign sources. During this period of the planned economy, a policy of industrialization through import substitution (IIS) was implemented. The IIS policy of the 1923–39 period was designed to induce the local manufacture of basic commodities such as sugar, textile, and appliances without resorting to foreign capital and using local inputs. In this period from 1961 to 1980, however, Turkey could no longer rely exclusively on its own resources. The IIS policies of this period were designed to secure the local manufacture of durable consumer goods such as refrigerators, which required cooperation with foreign capital and

was heavily dependent on foreign inputs (Gülalp, p. 36). In 1976 the ratio of foreign inputs in production amounted to 44% by value (Cem Alpar, *Çokuluslu Şirketler ve Ekonomik Kalkınma* [Ankara: İTİA, 1977], p. 155, mentioned in Gerger 1998, p. 118). Even before the oil crisis, 95% to 97% of Turkey's imports consisted of capital goods, intermediate goods, and raw materials (Keyder 1990, pp. 127–28).

The increase in foreign debts is more pronounced, rising by a factor of 16.3. Most of the debt was incurred to finance the import of defense needs and meet the external cost of investments. The foreign debt to GNP ratio varied between 7.6% and 23%, with the average for the whole period being 14.6%. By international standards, this was not a very heavy burden. Nevertheless, there were difficulties in servicing this debt toward the end of the period.

3. After 1970 came a sudden jump in the rate of inflation, in the exchange rate of the Turkish currency to the dollar, in imports, and in the foreign debt stock, even though the oil shock was some way off. These increases were a direct result of the populist policies of the day, which included hefty wage and salary raises, agricultural subsidies, and so forth. To this would be added the effects of the oil shock in 1973.

We can now examine the economic history of the period (unless otherwise specified, the following summary is drawn from Gürsel, vol. 2, pp. 479–85 and 494–506).

#### The Years of Growth

In the beginning of this period, the 27 May Administration (see Box 5-4 on page 401) established the State Planning Organization (DPT). As in other fields, this move was a reaction to the policies of the overthrown Democratic Party (DP), which were characterized by unplanned management of the economy. With the passage into the period of a planned economy, a carefully redesigned IIS policy would come into effect to replace the IIS policies that the DP government had been compelled to adopt because of the shortage of foreign exchange, the bottlenecks in foreign trade, and the resulting shortage of supplies and spare parts.

As explained above, the implementation of IIS policies required imports and considerable external financial resources. There was no question of giving up investments that were essential for development. The Second Five-Year Plan had foreseen reaching a stage whereby economic growth could be maintained beyond 1973 (which was the final year of that plan) without recourse to external borrowing.

This expectation failed to materialize. The trend in balance of payments during 1968 started irritating the

IMF. No belt tightening took place, however, because 1969 was an election year. Following the election, on 10 August 1970, the currency was devalued by 66%. The dollar was now worth 15 TL, and new measures like tax rebates were adopted to encourage exports. New taxes were imposed and existing taxes raised. This was like an exact replica of the devaluation of 1958.

The government was careful to avoid short-term borrowing, however. Most of the borrowing was by the public rather than the private sector. Also, most of the borrowing was from international organizations and governments on favorable terms, rather than from international money markets, where higher rates of interest prevailed. With the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement with the EEC on 1 December 1964, the European influence began to balance the U.S. influence on the Turkish economy. As the plan was being implemented effectively again, the borrowing terms improved. Furthermore, there was a spurt in exports after the devaluation of 1970.

At this stage, an element came into play that had not been foreseen in the First Five-Year Plan. Workers who had been going to work in Germany in increasing numbers after 1965 started remitting their savings to Turkey at levels that were of great significance for the economy. From a trickle consisting of only 2% of Turkey's export earnings, these remittances had reached a level of 50% by 1970-71 and attained 90% by 1973 (Sönmez, pp. 60 and 70). The foreign exchange derived from this source covered 154% of the deficit in foreign trade (Keyder 1990, p. 152). In these circumstances, the government was able to do what had not been possible in the course of IIS policies implemented from 1930 to 1939: to create a mass of consumers capable of absorbing the goods that were being produced by the new bourgeoisie, an essential ingredient of any successful IIS policy. This was achieved by providing high salaries and wages and generous social rights and benefits.

#### The Slump and Its Causes

After 1973 a string of negative developments took place.

First, there was the sudden oil shock, which had grievous effects on Turkey. While workers' remittances were falling, the price of oil increased four-fold, and Turkey's import bill soared. Remittances fell because Western European countries were heavily dependent on oil (90% of which was imported from the Middle East) and were obliged to adopt belt-tightening policies. Turkish labor was mainly located in these countries, which accounted for most of Turkey's foreign trade. As a consequence, workers' remittances were able to cover only 39% of the

trade deficit in 1975 and 24% in 1977 (Keyder 1990, p. 152). The country's foreign exchange reserves were exhausted in one year because of the oil bill. The level of the oil bill rose from 16.8% of export earnings to 49.1%.

A second negative development was the high cost of the Cyprus operation carried out in 1974.

The third development was the imposition by the U.S. of an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975 because of Cyprus. The ending of military aid inflicted considerable damage to the already reeling economy.

In the period from 1960 to 1973 Turkey had gotten used to enjoying the benefits conferred by remittances and cheap energy. The new developments shook the country, with the rate of growth in the manufacturing sector shrinking from 10.2% during those years to 8.3% in 1973–76 and then to 2.1% in 1976–79 (Keyder 1990, p. 165).

These were the external reasons for Turkey's economic deterioration after 1973. But the main reason for the collapse of the economic order was the contradiction that existed within the economy. After the shortages in the Turkish market registered in the second part of the 1950s, the DP government started supporting private enterprise and encouraged it to produce for the internal market to alleviate the shortages. When this policy was pursued in a planned manner and on a larger scale after 1960, the bourgeoisie reaped huge profils. Industry was operating without competition in a protected internal market, so it neglected quality while charging high prices. It was also benefiting from numerous incentives, so there was no need for it to strain itself in export markets. Turkish industry was importing voraciously and using up foreign exchange, while it failed to earn foreign exchange because of its unwillingness to export. It was able to keep going only thanks to the IIS policies and foreign borrowing.

Even if military aid is ignored, Turkey received foreign aid and loans that covered no less than 42% of its external deficit during the period from 1950 to 1980. This was due entirely to its geostrategic importance. The bourgeoisie, of course, had no reason for complaining. But this ability to spend unearned foreign exchange allowed Turkey the luxury of not developing an "export at all costs" mentality (Akat, p. 63), which inexorably led to the eventual economic collapse.

#### The Foreign Debt Spiral

The negative developments could not be allowed to interrupt the growth that had been taking place since 1960. Somehow Turkey had to find the foreign exchange needed for it to continue importing. It is true that Soviet external aid and loans became available after 1967, making it pos-

sible to carry out important industrial projects that the West had refused to finance. But, because of this Soviet aid, there was an extra bill approaching \$1 billion, which the IMF and the OECD could not be expected to finance. Turkey had no choice but to resort to international capital markets. It was in these circumstances that Turkey contracted its short-term debts, which raised its indebtedness to extraordinary heights and completely changed the structure of its debts. At that time, the petrodollars accumulated by oil-producing countries that were deposited in international banks were lent on a short-term basis and with high interest to indigent developing countries. Turkey got its share of these loans. This brought the IMF into the picture, because in these circumstances banks looked to that institution before lending to a country and awaited the IMF's green light before committing their funds (see Box 4-1 in Section 4).

The Demirel government, in power from 1975 to 1977, was formed with the aim of keeping the Left at bay. It was known as the Nationalist Front-1 government and was intent on consolidating its power by finding new sources of foreign exchange. To do this, it carried out thirteen minidevaluations of the currency in two years and resorted to risky formulas like the deposits convertible to foreign exchange (ACFE). By 31 December 1975 these accounts constituted 98.4% of the country's foreign exchange reserves (Yalçın Doğan, IMF Kıskacında Türkiye, 1946–1980, 3rd ed. [İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1987], p. 131, quoted in Gerger 1998, p. 125). The ACFE system enabled nonresident individuals and institutions to deposit their foreign exchange in Turkish bank accounts and to take the proceeds of these accounts out of the country. The owners of the accounts could also withdraw the funds in the ACFEs in the form of foreign exchange or TL at any time. These accounts resulted in an increase in the money supply and were a major cause of inflation. Because the IMF was not formally engaged in Turkey at the time, the extra funds were spent on populist causes. As a result, exports grew from \$1.3 billion in 1973 only to over \$1.7 billion in 1977, while the corresponding figures for imports were \$2 billion and \$5.8 billion. After a month-long government formed by Ecevit in 1977, Demirel formed the Nationalist Front-2 government. By then, the foreign trade deficit stood at \$4 billion and foreign debts exceeded \$11 billion. Almost \$1.5 billion was required to service this debt. It was in these circumstances that Demirel uttered his famous phrase: "Turkey doesn't have even seventy cents to spare." There was no way out, except to reschedule the foreign debt. In the meantime Ecevit was able to form a new government in January 1978, with the defection of a number

of deputies from the Justice Party. In order to demonstrate that he was acting independently of the IMF, his first action was to devalue the Turkish currency to 25  $\mathrm{TL}$ to the U.S. dollar and raise the prices of the products of state economic enterprises. In these circumstances, the IMF approved Turkey's new letter of intent, although with some U.S. prodding. Through informal channels, however, the IMF had given a negative message to banks, which led them to withhold new credits. In 1978 inflation reached 52.6%, and a black market emerged. Meanwhile the deficit in the state budget and the losses of state economic enterprises reached new peaks. There were shortages of staples such as salt, cooking oil, light bulbs, and cigarettes. Cooking gas and gasoline became scarce, and Ecevit and his ministers scurried from Germany to Libya, looking for relief.

When the Iranian revolution took place, Turkey's geostrategic importance increased once again. The West was ready to provide new aid, but it proved impossible to persuade the IMF to ignore its rules. Turkey went through the winter of 1978-79 short of petroleum. A new standby agreement was eventually signed on 10 June 1979, and the currency was devalued to 47 TL to the dollar. The rate for importing agricultural products and petroleum was set at 35 TL to the dollar. It was in these circumstances that Ecevit's party suffered a defeat in the partial election, forcing him to resign. Demirel formed a minority government and adopted the 24 January package of measures. He was now implementing policies favored by the IMF, which entailed abandoning the IIS strategy and adopting new export-led growth policies and integrating the country with the global economy (Box 5-3). This radical economic restructuring program, however, was based on shifting the burden to the lower-income groups. It was impossible to carry out such a radical program of economic and social measures within a parliamentary system.

These measures were implemented in the conditions created by the 12 September 1980 coup, designed to deal with the anarchy, which had reached extreme levels of violence. It now became possible to carry out the new economic program under the new conditions, which became known as the "24 + 12 formula" with reference to 24 January and 12 September.

#### B. Politics

The period from 1960 to 1980 witnessed some of the most important events in Turkey's history, including three military coups. The period was one of great diversity, including intervals of dictatorship and others of pluralism and freedom.

#### Box 5-3. The Package of Measures Adopted on 24 January 1980

The package of measures adopted on 24 January 1980 has a special place among the agreements that Turkey concluded with the IMF when it was in a situation of semibankruptcy due to its external debts and poor economic management. The poor management was reflected in the huge budget deficits, which were a result of the populist policies pursued by the government in a period of increasing domestic turmoil. The pegging of the Turkish currency to the dollar and the decision not to reflect increased oil prices in the internal market were both part of this poor economic management.

At first sight, the 24 January package appeared to be similar to past IMF programs. The Turkish lira was devalued from 47 to the dollar to 70. There were hefty price increases on the products of state economic enterprises. The price of fertilizer was raised sevenfold, and postal services fourfold. The price of sugar went up by 170%, petroleum products by 200%, electricity by 153%, and paper by 104%. It was announced that monetary policy would be tightened, agricultural support prices would be lowered to world levels, the state economic enterprises would set their prices for their products freely, all public spending (with the exception of public spending on infrastructure) would be cut, rates of interest would be raised, and wages would be frozen. The Turkish currency would be allowed to float, and an effort would be made to service the external debt on schedule. As a first step, interest rates were freed.

The importance of these measures was that they constituted a package with the economic measures adopted after the coup of 12 September 1980. The measures were designed to secure the management of the economy in accordance with the rules of the market and constituted a "structural adjustment" program that would bring fundamental changes in the economic, financial, institutional, social, and political fields. International capitalism was gaining strength (since 1970 under the banner of "globalization") and was demanding the changes known as structural adjustment.

From this point of view, the 24 January measures were a defining moment in the life of the Turkish Republic, with implications that went far beyond the strictly economic sphere. In one stroke, Turkey changed from the industrialization through import substitution (IIS) model, which had been in practice since the early days of the Republic, to an export-led industrialization model. The objective was to integrate Turkey with the global free market.

The architect of the project was Turgut Özal, undersecretary of the prime minister's office and acting undersecretary of the State Planning Organization. The package had been prepared without the knowledge of even the minister of finance. Its implementation caused much discontent among the people. In normal circumstances it should have drawn loud protests from the populace, but the military coup of 12 September prevented this, The perpetrators of the coup made sure that the measures could be fully implemented without a hitch by taking appropriate action, including the suspension of collective bargaining. The 24 January package of measures could not have been implemented without the coup of 12 September, and it has often been argued that one of the reasons for the coup was to make this implementation possible.

The structural adjustment program was implemented with great discipline and yielded good results in the early stages. But the new economy based on annuities ended up by squeezing the middle class and low-income groups. The dollar, which was worth 70 TL when the program was launched, was worth 14,000 TL when Özal died in 1993 and had reached 1,350,000 TL by the beginning of 2001. The Turkish economy had become completely dependent on the policies of international financial circles (see "Appraisal of the Period" in Sections 6 and 7).

(B. ORAN) (Source: Gürsel, vol. 2, pp. 504–6; AnaBritannica, vol. 22, pp. 412–13)

Paradoxically, the period of pluralism and freedom was inaugurated by the military coup of 27 May 1960 (Boxes 5-4 and 5-5).

At a time when Turkey had not gotten used to democracy, two dynamic new forces entered the scene: students and workers. They were capable of engaging in protest and resistance actions, which governments found difficult to handle (Özdemir, p. 225).

#### From Democracy to "Double 12"

The workers were seeking to become an effective pressure group by taking advantage of the rights conferred by the 1961 Constitution, including the right to strike. In this action, they were inspired by the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (DİSK). The factor that caused the overthrow of the DP government was student action in which the leftist groups critical of the system were particularly active. The Left lashed out at two targets: (1) "the feudal system" and "feudal landlords"; and (2) the re-

strictions on Turkey's sovereignty caused by U.S. influence, and especially the mining and petroleum laws (see "Politics" in "Appraisal of the Period" in Section 4). In the mid-1960s there was a strong craving for new ideas in the universities, which were going through a period of great vitality and vibrancy. In 1965 rightist students attacked a lecture being delivered by the leader of the Turkish Labor Party (TTP), Mehmet Ali Aybar, at the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University and destroyed the furniture in the hall. This event led to a period of confrontation and conflict between the two groups.

The slogans of the Left were anti-imperialism and antifascism. The Kemalist tradition was very strong at the time, and the Left was being fueled by a Kemalism with a strong social content, which can also be described as the nationalism of a developing country. In those days, it took real courage to criticize capitalism directly, so the young criticized the prevailing order indirectly by castigating the U.S. This was made easy by President Johnson's letter to

#### Box 5-4. The 27 May Coup

As the state of the economy worsened, the Democratic Party (DP) government adopted more repressive measures. When a committee was formed within the parliament to investigate the activities of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), student demonstrations broke out in Istanbul and Ankara. As the government's measures became more repressive, a bloodless coup took place on the night of 26–27 May 1960. The coup was engineered by a group of officers, organized under the name National Unity Committee (MBK). The MBK placed a ban on all political activities, dissolved the parliament, and sacked the government. It directed a group of professors to prepare a new Constitution, which was subsequently approved by a Constituent Assembly and by the citizens in a referendum. After the election of 1961, the MBK turned power over to the civilians.

Of the three coups that Turkey experienced, this one had unique features. It had no intellectual preparation, no leader (Gen. Cemal Gürsel was selected as leader later), and no cadres. Its structure was not hierarchical and consisted mostly of young officers. The coup was a reaction of Kemalist officers and was motivated by (1) disapproval of the DP's drift toward dictatorship; (2) dissatisfaction with the social, economic, and cultural ravages caused by the unplanned, haphazard policies of the DP (the excesses of the nouveaux riches, the lax approach to homosexuality in places of entertainment, Americanization, growth of squatter housing, and so on); (3) reaction against the loss of status of the bureaucracy and especially the military (e.g., the erosion of salaries due to inflation and the derision heaped on officers who could only afford soft drinks in restaurants, Menderes's remark that he could run the army with just reserve officers).

The most remarkable feature of the military coup was that it brought about the most democratic Constitution (the 1961 Constitution) that Turkey had ever seen and inaugurated the most democratic era in the country's political life. The universities experienced the only interlude of freedom from 1964 to 1968. Before that, they had been subjected to the pressures of the state and of society; and after that, they became victims of the anarchy that prevailed and the repression that was designed to deal with the anarchy.

This was the reason why the students of that period, known as the '68 Generation, were later lionized. They had sincerely believed that they could cure all of Turkey's and even the world's ills.

The CNU's members were far from being leftists. The only one among them who knew what he was doing because of his ideological leaning was Col. Alparslan Türkeş, who upon his retirement became the leader of the racist Right. But thanks to the free environment that the coup introduced, a left-leaning Kemalism developed that was severely critical of the established order. This tendency was well represented by the weekly Yôn, which revealed scandals such as the people who survived on food not fit for human consumption and the American colonel who went unpunished after killing a pedestrian while driving. Such stories shocked readers of the journal and especially the students. Yôn also probed the hardships caused by inequality by waving the statist/anticapitalism flag, which it did indirectly through its anti-American and anti-imperialist stand.

Yet the coup of 27 May was received without undue excitement by the industrial bourgeoisle and the U.S. The industrial bourgeoisle sought and obtained a larger share of scarce resources, which were being squandered in the name of populism. These resources would then be employed to carry out IIS policies that the bourgeoisle knew could not be carried out by the likes of Menderes. The U.S. was indifferent to the collapse of the regime. It may even have precipitated its demise; If only indirectly (see Box 5-5 below).

The heady atmosphere of freedom brought on by the coup of 27 May would lead first to anarchy in the late 1960s and then to the coups of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980. The reasons for this were the inability to carry out IIS policies at a time of economic collapse, the resort to arms by leftlist groups that were deluded about their actual strength, the violence of the right-ist movements, and, probably, the provocation of certain covert forces (see Box 7-5 in Section 7).

(B. ORAN)

Inönü in 1964 in connection with the Cyprus crisis. In the demonstrations and meetings, their target was the young politician Demirel, who had campaigned and won the 1965 election by distributing photographs of himself in the company of President Johnson. The students considered him the embodiment of American domination, and their slogan was "Sixth Fleet, go home." They also chanted his name as "Morrison Süleyman," a reference to the American contracting company that Demirel represented in Turkey before going into politics.

When fourteen members of the ruling junta that came to power on 27 May started advocating staying in power indefinitely, they were removed from the junta and sent to foreign assignments. Among these fourteen was Col. Alparslan Türkeş, whose real name was Hüseyin Feyzullah. When he returned to Turkey, he joined the Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) in March 1965

and was elected party leader in August. The party's name was changed to Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in 1969. Türkeş organized the youth group known as the Ülkücüler (Idealists), also known as Bozkurtlar (Gray Wolves) or Komandolar (Commandos), who started taking over the political scene, hitherto dominated by the Left, through the use of brute force.

At that time, the Left was drawing its strength from foreign events that weakened the established order: American influence on developments in Cyprus, the Tet offensive of 1968, and the student unrest in France. As the Left grew stronger, it was also becoming fragmented. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused a split between the more orthodox "socialist revolutionary" TIP and the "National Democratic Revolutionary" Dev-Genç (Devrimci Gençlik: Revolutionary Youth), which declared the USSR to be "social imperialist." The

#### Box 5-5. The 27 May Coup and the United States

Much has been said and written about the U.S. role in the 27 May coup. The most plausible information can be summarized as follows.

- 1. At a time when everybody was aware that student protests would lead nowhere and that a military coup was imminent, the U.S. failed to warn Menderes through the CIA and allowed events to follow their natural course. The U.S. even accelerated the regime's fall by cutting off credits at a time when it was in greatest need of financial support.
- 2. The U.S. action took place because the Western aid and loans furnished to Menderes for waving the anticommunism flag were being wasted and the regime had reached the end of the line. At some point Menderes realized that the economy could not be made to function without new industries. This led him to seek alternatives to the U.S., which was against Turkey's industrialization, and to appeal to the USSR for credits. The U.S. was not pleased to see Turkey seeking to produce and sell textiles in lieu of cotton; nor did it appreciate the forthcoming visit of Menderes to Moscow, which it considered divisive for the Western bloc (for Zorlu's role in the Moscow visit, see Yetkin, pp. 62–66). During this period no effort was made to stop dissident officers and officials working in U.S. and NATO offices in Turkey from printing and distributing antigovernment tracts or from participating in demonstrations.
- 3. In addition to failing to warn Menderes of the coup, the U.S. also failed, although indirectly, to exercise a right given to it by the bilateral agreements. The Turkish-American Security Cooperation Agreement of 5 March 1959 referred to the Eisenhower Doctrine of 5 January 1957, which declared that the U.S. would provide armed assistance in the event of a request from a Middle Eastern country, subject to an armed attack from international communism. Although the doctrine referred to "an armed attack," the

preamble and first article of the agreement stated that a "direct or indirect" attack on Turkey would lead the U.S. to take all the necessary measures, "including the use of armed force." This term "indirect attack" could lead, at the request of the government, to an American armed intervention even in cases of student unrest. It was this clause that led to sharp criticism of the opposition when the agreement came to the TGNA for ratification, as already mentioned. When the U.S. failed to warn Menderes of the coup, the possibility of a request for assistance was thus eliminated.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that "U.S. armed assistance would be forthcoming even in cases of indirect aggression, and that this also applied to covert and subversive" activities. Furthermore, according to one source, on 9 May 1960, eighteen days before the coup and at a time when antigovernment demonstrations were being held on a daily basis, an agreement had been signed that "authorized the Pentagon to Intervene in extraordinary circumstances" (STMA, p. 1968). This raises the question of why the U.S. would conclude such an agreement if it did not intend to intervene. It must not be forgotten that the decision to intervene rested ultimately with the U.S. Article 1 of the agreement of 5 January 1957 referred to "all necessary actions in conformity with the U.S. Constitution."

The coup-makers must have been aware of these agreements and fearful of a U.S. intervention, because they issued a declaration on the morning of the coup that was repeatedly broadcast on their behalf by Col. Alparsian Türkes. He stressed the following famous passage: "We remain faithful to all our alliances and commitments. We believe in and remain attached to NATO and CENTO" (Hürriyet, 27 May 1960).

(B. ORAN)

leftists were taking over universities. At the Middle East Technical University, they burned the limousine of U.S. ambassador Robert Komer on 6 January 1969. The rightist Ülkücüler and the religion-based Akıncılar (Raiders) movement came together under the umbrella of the Association of the Anti-Communist Struggle (Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri: KMD). These developments led to a violent Left-Right conflict after 1969, which brought the country to a state of anarchy. On 16 February 1969 groups belonging to the KMD left the mosque after prayers and were allowed by the police to enter Taksim Square in Istanbul, where a protest demonstration against the American Sixth Fleet was going on. In the resulting melee, known as "Bloody Sunday," a number of leftists were killed or injured.

In addition to the Left-Right confrontation among students, a workers' march was organized by the revolutionary union DİSK on 15–16 June 1970 in İstanbul to protest the law on labor unions. The 150,000 workers who took part in the demonstration inflicted damage to property and caused the industrial bourgeoisie to take

fright. These events led to the military memorandum of 12 March 1971 (Box 5-6).

The armed clashes did not come to an end with the restrictions on freedoms imposed by the 12 March memorandum. If anything, they increased during the Nationalist Front-1 government set up by S. Demirel with rightist parties that lasted from March 1975 to June 1977. The situation did not change with the formation of the Nationalist Front-2 government, from November 1977 to January 1978. The deputy prime minister, Türkeş, described the attacks of the Ülkücüler (who now came to be known as Komandolar) on leftists as "being helpful to the security forces" (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, term 4, vol. 11, meeting II, session 63 [9 April 1975], p. 368). By 1977 people's lives were in danger on the streets as well as at home. The economy was in a state of collapse mainly as a result of the oil shock of 1973. Three devaluations took place in 1977. The May Day celebrations that year were marred when unidentified assailants widely believed to belong to the "deep state" forces (see Box 7-5 in Section 7) opened fire on the crowd from rooftops, causing thirty-four deaths.

### Box 5-6. The Memorandum of 12 March and the Interim Regime

The memorandum bearing the signatures of the chief of the General Staff, Mernduh Tağmaç, and the commanders of the three services consisted of the following three paragraphs. (1) The parliament and the government have brought about a fratricidal conflict. The reforms foreseen in the Constitution have not been carried out. (2) The parliament must correct this situation in a nonpartisan way. (3) If this is not done, the armed forces will take over the administration.

The reference to reforms in the first paragraph led many to believe that the memorandum was a military coup by the progressives. In effect, the nonpartisan government of Nihat Erim, which was brought to power by the military after Demirel's resignation, had two aims: to put an end to anarchy and to carry out reforms. More than ten technocrats had been included in the cabinet for this reason. But the administration soon changed its nature and started to conform to a model that corresponded to the interesting warning that Tagmaç has been reported to have made about social awakening having gone far beyond the economic development (Yanki 1, 1 March 1971, p. 6). Martial law was decreed to deal with the bank robberies and abductions being carried out by illegal organizations. Wholesale arrests were made within the ranks of the military, the workers, and the students. As the rightist militants disappeared from the scene, those arrested consisted mostly of democrats and/or intellectuals, journalists, and academics known for their leftist leanings. Important restrictive amendments were made in the 1961 Constitution, and article in dealing with fundamental rights and freedoms was rewritten. Many lawyers interpreted these changes as amounting to the adoption of a new Constitution.

The interim regime undertook no reforms. This caused the eleven reformist ministers in the cabinet to resign on 3 December 1971. At this time, the three student leaders Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin Inan were executed for "violating the Constitution." This was interpreted as the 12 March regime's revenge for the three politicians executed by the 27 May regime for the same offense. Adnan Menderes, F. R. Zorlu, and Hasan Polatkan.

Eventually, the 12 March Memorandum sought to return the scope of new freedoms to their pre-27 May state. The memorandum was a sort of dress rehearsal for the much more dictatorial 12 September 1980 coup. The Interim regime went on, with the Ferit Melen government succeeding the Erim government. After Fahri Koruturk was elected president, Nalm Talu formed the government, and parliamentary elections were held in 1973. In January 1974 Bülent Ecevit emerged as the prime minister of the CHP and Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP: National Salvation Party (Islamist)) coalition government.

(B. ORAN)

The perpetrators were never apprehended. The assailants in a series of other murders also were never found. Although right-wing politicians like Gün Sazak and Hamit Fendoğlu were among those, killed, most of the victims were journalists and academics with democratic and/or leftist leanings. In 1978 seven youths belonging to TIP

were murdered in their home in Ankara. On 19 December 1978 the rumor that "Communist Alevis had bombed a cinema" triggered a string of events in the city of Kahramanmaraş in which 105 people, most of them Alevis, were killed. In the face of these events, the government was far from being neutral. Prime Minister Demirel was quoted as saying: "You can never make me say that rightists [and] nationalists are committing murders" (Cumhuriyet, 26 December 1978). These incidents dragged into 1979, and 26 people were killed in Çorum in violence reminiscent of the sort that took place in Kahramanmaraş. In the year preceding 12 September 1980 the number of people who lost their lives as a result of politically motivated crimes reached 3,000.

As noted earlier, this anarchy developed in an environment of utter economic chaos. Although martial law was in force, there seemed to be no way to stem the anarchy. And yet law and order was immediately restored on 12 September 1980, the very day the armed forces took power. The strange situation elicited many different interpretations and comments in the years that followed (Box 5-7).

# III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

The most noteworthy aspects of Uluğbay's table (Table 5-3) are the following.

- 1. During this period, exports increased by a factor of 8.4 while the share of Western countries, which were Turkey's major trading partners, dwindled from 68.8% in 1962 to 46.2%. The fall gathered pace, especially after 1974. The same trend is noticeable in Turkey's imports. After 1974 Turkey's imports increased by a factor of 15.6, while the share of Western countries decreased from 70.8% to 32.9%. This situation was a direct result of the rise in petroleum prices and the fall in the foreign aid and credits that Turkey received. As the price of oil increased, Turkey's imports from Western countries dwindled, while the share of oil-producing countries rose. The fall in foreign aid can be attributed first to the oil shock and then to the Cyprus operation. In addition to these two factors, the drop in foreign loans was due to Turkey's increasing difficulties in servicing its short-term commercial debts.
- 2. Imports from the U.S. fell steeply after 1974. The direct cause of this fall was the arms embargo imposed by the U.S. following the Cyprus operation.
- 3. The share of Turkey's principal trading partner, West Germany, showed a high degree of stability.

We can now turn our attention to foreign policy.

#### Box 5-7. Some Comments on the 12 September Coup

The violence and anarchy that had plagued Turkey until TI September 1980 abruptly ended on 13 September, when law and order was restored by the military coup of 12 September. This led some to conclude that anarchy had been artificially fomented in the country.

According to this theory, advanced by Uğur Mumcu, it was necessary to create a climate of anarchy in Turkey in order to be able to carry out the illegal arms and drug trade. There would be an outflow of drugs from Turkey, balanced by an inflow of arms. Those engaged in the struggle would need arms, so they not only would overlook the drug trade but would help those engaged in it. Even if martial law was declared, this trade could continue as long as the cash flowed. In fact, even official vehicles would be employed to carry on this illicit trafficking.

Another theory claimed that violence between the Left and Right was contrived and both sides were being used. Dark forces within the state that were determined to interrupt the democratic process and provoke the army to intervene deliberately instigated the events. This theory is supported by the large illegal flow of arms during those years, which were used to kill people both on the Left and on the Right (Cumhuriyetin 75. Yili, Vol. 2, p. 721). An example is cited from the trial of a leftist organization in the Istanbul Martial Law Command's Third Military Tribunal. In this trial, registered under the file number 1981/689, a Unique-brand handgun with the serial number 8477356 was used by that leftist organization to commit murder. The same gun was used by Nationalist Action Party (MHP) gangs in a shooting incident in a cafe on 27 August 1980 and was confiscated in the MHP headquarters in the district of Eyup in Istanbul on 6 October 1980 (Yetkin, p. 183; also see Uğur Mumcu, "Soru İşaretleri," Cumhuriyet, 15 November 1990). Another curious example is the parcel bomb that killed the rightist Hamit Fendoğlu (MHP), which led to Malatya being turned into a battleground. The same type of parcel bomb had been sent one day earlier to a former CHP county chairman of the Pazarcik district of Kahramanmaras, which exploded in the post office in the process of delivery (Cumhurlyetin 75. Yili, vol. 2, p. 758).

A concurring theory holds that the blame for the coup of 12 September can be laid on those who carried it out. According to this theory, at a time when the Kurdish nationalist ideology was on the ascendancy and the streets were taken over by thugs of the Left and Right, the only viable remedy for the situation would be a military takeover. For the coup to have any semblance of legitimacy, people had to be in a situation where they could not leave their homes. That is why anarchy was allowed to escalate in the two years of martial law prior to 12 September.

This theory is supported by statements of certain top political leaders. Demirel claimed that all of the government's orders and efforts to get the army unit stationed in Siverek (whose population had fallen from 50,000 to 25,000 because of terror and anarchy) to return to the town after the unit was withdrawn by its commander proved fruitless. Ecevit was even more explicit: "At the time, I called for martial law in a number of provinces in Central Anatolia that had become operational centers for rightist terrorists. Evren, the chief of the General Staff, turned my requests down, claiming that the forces at his disposal did not allow him to impose martial law on these extra provinces. Strangely enough, Evren concluded that it was possible to impose martial law in all the 67 provinces of Turkey on 12 September 1980" (Milliyet, 23 and 29 November 1990, quoted in Yetkin, pp. 173-74). When the coup took place, Gen. Bedrettin Demirel was commander of one of the four army groups. In 1988, when he was asked by the journalist. A. Kahraman why the coup had not occurred a year earlier, the general replied: "This could not be done before the public had been brought to the same focus and its tacit approval had been obtained. All of the citizens had to become fully conscious of the fact that there was no other road to salvation" (Milliyet, 15 September 1988)

These theories about 12 September would gain further credence after the traffic accident at Susurluk on 3 November 1996, when part of the intricate web of dark relationships between some officials and the mafia came to light (Boxes 7-5 and 7-6 in Section 7).

(B. ORAN)

#### The Years of Purposeful Foreign Policy

1. The years from 1960 to 1980 marked a period when important foreign policy decisions were made and implemented. For a strategic medium power like Turkey, these were truly years of relative autonomy.

At a time when the 27 May coup was still recent, and everything that the DP stood for in foreign policy was being rejected, Turkey voted in favor of self-determination for Algeria at the UN General Assembly. This was done even though the Cyprus question and its sequel of pursuing an autonomous foreign policy had not yet arisen. Turkey gave a firm reply to Johnson's letter in 1964. At the UN in September 1965 Turkey opposed the U.S. position on Vietnam. Again in 1965 Turkey refused to participate in the U.S. sponsored Multilateral Nuclear Force (MNF). In the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states, Turkey

supported the Arab side for the first time and distanced itself from Israel from then on. It also concluded a new bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 1968, revising the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in its favor. Turkey concluded a Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement (JDCA) in 1969, consolidating all the U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements and bringing them under proper control. It also prohibited the use of the bases for out-of-area operations (see Box 4-9 in Section 4 for the out-of-area concept).

Throughout the 1970s Turkey defied the U.S. and pursued its quarrel with Greece over the Aegean Sea. In 1971 it inaugurated a program of aid to the Third World. After the Memorandum of 12 March, the production of opium poppies in Turkey had been banned at America's request. In July 1974 the ban was lifted. In the same month, a successful operation was carried out in Cyprus. Ankara stood

Table 5-3. Share of Selected Countries in Turkey's Foreign Trade, 1961–1980 (%)

| ٠      | Þ                          | USA     | W. GER             | W. GERMANY | FRANCE  | NCE     | BRITAIN | AIN     | IT.     | ITALY   | SWITZERLAND | RLAND   | TOTAL FOR SIX<br>COUNTRIES | ORSIX   |
|--------|----------------------------|---------|--------------------|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|
| YEAR   | EXPORTS                    | IMPORTS | EXPORTS            | IMPORTS    | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS     | IMPORTS | EXPORTS                    | IMPORTS |
| 1961   | 18.8                       | 27.5    | 14.7               | 16.7       | 6.9     | 3.5     | 8.6     | 13.2    | 6.6     | 4.5     | 4.5         | 1.5     | 63.4                       | 70.8    |
| 1962   | 19.6                       | 29.1    | 17.7               | 17.1       | 3.7     | 4.6     | 9.4     | 11.3    | 13.5    | 5.4     | 4.9         | 1.1     | 68.8                       | 9.89    |
| 1963   | 13.5                       | 30.6    | 16.8               | 15.1       | 4,4     | 5.0     | 12.8    | 11.2    | 11.8    | 5.1     | 5.7         | 1.2     | 65.0                       | 68.2    |
| 1964   | 17.8                       | 28.8    | 15.1               | 14.9       | 6.1     | 3.8     | 10.9    | 10.4    | 7.0     | 5.9     | 5.7         | 1.7     | 62.6                       | 65.5    |
| 1965   | 17.8                       | 28.1    | 15.6               | 14.7       | 4.3     | 3.7     | 8.9     | 7.6     | 9.9     | 6.4     | 3.1         | 2.2     | 56.3                       | 64.8    |
| 1966   | 16.4                       | 24.0    | 15.6               | 15.7       | 5.0     | 6.0     | 9.5     | 11.0    | 6.5     | 7.5     | 4.0         | 2.6     | 57.0                       | . 8.99  |
| 1967   | 17.8                       | 17.9    | 16.1               | 19.5       | 5.5     | 4.0     | 9.9     | 12.9    | 6.9     | 7.3     | 5.2         | 5.8     | 58.1                       | 64.4    |
| 1968   | 14.6                       | 15.8    | 17.4               | 20.4       | 4.4     | 3.5     | 8.9     | 12.9    | 4.9     | 8.8     | 5.4         | 3.0     | 53.5                       | 64.4    |
| 1969   | 11.2                       | 19.3    | 20.9               | 18.4       | 5.2     | 3.3     | 5.6     | 11.8    | 8.0     | 4.6     | 5.3         | 4.      | 56.2                       | 9.99    |
| 1970   | 9.6                        | 21.7    | 19.9               | 18.6       | 6.7     | 3.4     | 5.7     | 9.6     | 9.9     | 7.8     | 7.5         | 4.7     | 56.0                       | 65.8    |
| 1971   | 10.2                       | 14.7    | 19.4               | 17.9       | 7.2     | 6.4     | 4.8     | 9.5     | 5.8     | 10.3    | 9.6         | 4.9     | 57.0                       | 63.7    |
| 1972   | 11.7                       | 12.3    | 21.1               | 19.3       | 5.7     | 6.7     | 5.2     | 10.9    | 0.9     | 10.6    | 8.6         | 4.7     | 58.3                       | 64.5    |
| 1973   | 6.6                        | 8.9     | 16.8               | 21.0       | 5.5     | 6.4     | 7.6     | 10.7    | 8.8     | 8.2     | 88          | 6.0     | 57.4                       | 61.2    |
| 1974   | 9.4                        | 9.3     | 22.4               | 18.0       | 4.3     | 6.5     | 5.3     | 7.1     | 5.9     | 7.2     | 6.1         | 5.5     | 53.4                       | 53.6    |
| 1975   | . 10.5                     | 9.0     | 21.8               | 22.3       | 4.4     | 5.9     | 5.0     | 7.3     | 5.9     | 7.6     | 6.8         | 5.9     | 54.4                       | 58.0    |
| 1976   | 8.6                        | 8.5     | 19.2               | 18.4       | 5.5     | 6.0     | 7.0     | 8.0     | 8.7     | 7.5     | 9.2         | 5.5     | 59.4                       | 53.9    |
| 1977   | 6-9                        | 8.7     | 22.2               | 16.3       | 5.4     | 5.7     | 5.4     | 6.9     | 9.3     | 7.8     | 6.2         | 5.8     | 55.4                       | 51.2    |
| 1978   | 6.7                        | 6.2     | 22.1               | 17.8       | 5.6     | 7.9     | 5.0     | 4.4     | 7.7     | 6.3     | 5.0         | 5.8     | 52.1                       | 48.4    |
| 1979   | 4.6                        | 7.4     | 21.9               | 13.1       | 6,1     | 6.4     | 4.6     | 4.7     | 9.4     | 9.1     | 5.0         | 5.0     | 51.6                       | 45.7    |
| 1980   | 4.4                        | 5.5     | 20.8               | 10.7       | 5.6     | 4.8     | 3.6     | 4.1     | 7.5     | 3.6     | 4.3         | 4.2     | 46.2                       | 32.9    |
| Commen | Daniel of Patentiately II. | 1       | min (Dit) then the |            |         |         |         |         |         |         |             | -       |                            |         |

Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİE), İstatisfik Göstergeler 1923-1998, pp. 419-31. (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay) up against the U.S. arms embargo imposed in 1975 as a consequence of the Cyprus landing. In July 1975 it abrogated the JDCA, because the arms embargo had not been rescinded. That same month, the use of the U.S. bases (officially called "joint defense installations") in Turkey was ended. In 1976 Ankara made a unilateral decision to freeze relations with the European Economic Community. Even though the question of Cyprus remained unresolved, the U.S. arms embargo was loosened in August 1977 and repealed in September 1978, as a direct result of Turkey's efforts. In 1978 and 1979 Turkey cooperated closely with the nonaligned countries, and Ecevit enunciated a "National Defense Doctrine" (Box 5-8). Turkey concluded a four-year, \$1 billion agreement with the U.S. in 1979 even though this did not conform to the policy practices of the U.S. administration. Despite strong U.S. pressure, Turkey continued to resist the return of Greece to the military structure of NATO in 1979. It refused to join the U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran as a consequence of the hostage crisis. As a result of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) of 29 March 1980 signed with the U.S., the basis for a local defense industry was established, the use of bases for out-of-area operations was prohibited, controls on the flow of supplies and materials into bases were imposed, and the right to suspend the status of bases in special circumstances was acknowledged. No U-2 flights were allowed throughout the period.

For a medium country like Turkey, these were difficult decisions. They were made at a time when the economy was a shambles and the country was going through a veritable civil war. In addition, even in situations where Turkey had to submit, it was able to stiffen its resolve and derive benefits. When, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Jupiter missiles at Çiğli, near İzmir, were dismantled without consulting Turkey, the realization took hold in Ankara that Turkey's national interests were being sacrificed for the interests of major powers (Hale, p. 136). Although Turkey lacked the means to carry out a landing in Cyprus in 1964, the idea that the U.S. had prevented it became prevalent. These events were the precursors of the subsequent anti-American sentiments that gripped the public and made it possible for the government to take firm stands in the field of foreign policy. In other words, in this period, even setbacks served a useful purpose by stiffening Turkey's resolution.

During this period Turkey took foreign policy initiatives that were intended to loosen its political and economic dependence on the West.

When the U.S. and the West refused to countenance the financing of certain industrial projects after 1967,

### Box 5-8. A New National Defense Doctrine for Turkey

When Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus in 1974, the U.S., acting under the influence of the powerful Greek lobby, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey that lasted three years. During this period Turkey could not take delivery of weapons that had already been bought and paid for. Even the delivery of spare parts was stopped. Although this action had negative effects on Turkish-American relations and weakened Turkey's defense capabilities, its consequences were similar to those of the famous Johnson letter and compelled Turkey to reconsider its U.S. and NATO-centered defense and foreign policies.

As a result of this, Turkey developed a new National Defense and Foreign Policy doctrine in 1978 when Ecevit was prime minister. The first pillar of this doctrine was the decision to free Turkey from depending on a single source for its arms. In conformity with this decision, Turkey looked into the possibility of producing arms jointly with countries such as Iran and Libya and even explored the possibility of procuring arms from the USSR. This was indeed a radical move in the period of the Cold War. Gen. Kenan Evren went to Moscow on behalf of the General Staff to hold talks on the subject of arms procurement.

The second pillar of the doctrine was the policy of establishing a security belt around Turkey. This approach was also known as the "region-oriented policy," which consisted of establishing cordial relations with neighbors to eliminate the need for expensive armament programs. In the framework of this policy, Turkey undertook to establish close relations with Balkan, Middle Eastern, and African countries as well as with the USSR

The third pillar of the doctrine placed Greece at the fore-front of threats confronting Turkey. The Cyprus operation and the Greek problems forced Turkey to reappraise its perception of threat. For Turkey, the main threat was no longer from the Soviet Union but from Greece. Western circles interpreted this new doctrine as "Turkey's Ostpolitik" (Turkey's new opening to the East). This new policy created apprehension in the U.S. Ecevit's resignation and the 1980 coup, however, prevented this policy from being implemented. Nevertheless, these developments allowed a new conceptual dimension to be introduced into the sphere of defense. The real breakthrough in the establishment of a defense industry occurred during the Özal era, even though it was dependent on the U.S. and consisted primarily of assembly work.

(İ. UZGEL)

Turkey's exports to and imports from the Soviet Union rose to 6%. This was how Prime Minister Demirel described the situation:

The West did not want Turkey to industrialize, or perhaps it considered this to be unfeasible. So the West recommended that we concentrate on agriculture...and light industry. It did not look kindly upon heavy industries and other sectors of

#### Box 5-9. The Nonaligned Movement and Turkey

Turkey's serious error at the 1955 Bandung Conference had completely alienated the emerging nonaligned movement. The negative effects of this alienation became especially noticeable in connection with the Cyprus issue at the UN. Most of these non-aligned countries had minority problems, and they tended to perceive the Turkish-Cypriot community as another minority. They were also hostile to Turkey.

Turkey's first positive contacts with the nonaligned countries occurred in 1964, when it applied to participate in the Cairo Conference as an observer. After its application was turned down, it sent two ambassadors to follow the proceedings from the sidelines. These ambassadors were seated in the spectators' gallery among the freedom fighters of those countries that had not yet won their independence, like Palestine and Oman. It is said that the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaika, declared that she would not sit under the same roof with the ambassadors of NATO member Turkey, even though she carried a locket with Atatürk's picture.

The second step was when Turkey, stung by the heavy defeat it had suffered in 1965 in the voting on Cyprus at the UN, sent goodwill missions mainly to Third World countries to explain its views on the Issue. These missions, consisting mostly of university professors, returned empty-handed from countries that they were visiting for the first time.

The third initiative was started by the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, during the 12 March period. This initiative involved a Turkish technical assistance program that lasted for three years. Forty-eight countries received aid within the framework of this program.

Finally, in 1978 and 1979, when Gündüz Ökçün Was minister of foreign affairs, strenuous efforts were made to get closer to

the nonaligned countries. Turkey became the first president of the UN's Namibia Council, which was set up to administer that country (then under South Africa's control). Turkey also provided generous financial support to the council and offered arms assistance to national liberation movements. The guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), which were fighting the white minority regime of Rhodesia in what is today Zimbabwe, each received a grant of \$300,000. Throughout the 1970s Turkey supported all resolutions dealing with Mozambique, as long as Portugal was not explicitly named in the resolution. When Ecevit formed his coalition government with the National Salvation Party, Turkey also lent its support to Eritrea (Ethiopia) and the Muslim Moro Liberation Front (the Philippines).

These initiatives did not become integral parts of Turkish foreign policy, which had a patchy look at the time. First, these policies lacked consistency and coherence, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs failed to support them. The aid was spread over so many countries that it became negligible in any particular country. After Zimbabwe gained its independence, there was no serious attempt to follow up previous policies. The same was true for Mozambique and Angola when these countries gained independence. All Turkey had achieved was to draw Portugal's anger, Helping Eritrea antagonized Ethiopia. Helping the Moro Liberation Front affected relations with the Philippines.

Nevertheless, the initiatives made an important contribution toward adding a new, non-Western, dimension to Turkey's foreign policy at that time

(B. Oran)

industry... When we negotiated with the Soviets and took steps to carry out our plans, the West was disturbed. In 1967 the U.S. ambassador visited me in my office. I remember the meeting vividly. He entered the room and even before he sat down, he shot the question, "Are you changing axis?" America was really disturbed by our improved relations with the Soviets. (Yetkin, p. 113)

By providing low-interest and long-term loans to finance high value-added metallurgical industries, the Soviet Union helped the Turkish economy and contributed to strengthening Turkey's autonomy vis-à-vis the West. This relationship also helped neutralize the USSR on the Cyprus issue even after Turkey landed troops on the island.

Turkey also strengthened its relations with the nonaligned countries (Box 5-9). Naturally, these relations could not be developed beyond a certain point, because of the Cyprus issue and Turkey's alignment with the West. Furthermore, the nonaligned were far from being a homogenous group, and it was not possible to satisfy them all. But during the 1970s Turkey tried, to a large extent, to repair the damage caused by all the mistakes it had committed since the time of the 1955 Bandung Conference. This led to improved relations with these countries. Turkey's efforts may not have provided too many direct benefits, but they did have the indirect benefit of allowing the elaboration of alternative policies without reference to the West.

3. These demonstrations of resolve took place at a time when Turkey was in a state of economic and social turmoil and utterly dependent on the IMF. The relative autonomy was strengthened by the IIS policies, and in essence all countries enjoyed a margin of relative autonomy in their foreign policies. But Turkey's action reflecting its relative autonomy could not be explained exclusively on this basis. There were two other major explanations.

First, and more importantly, the international correlation of forces at this juncture made this autonomy possible, including the new international balance that appeared in the 1960s, the petroleum crisis that preoccupied

the West, the gathering strength of the nonaligned movement, the events in Afghanistan and Iran, and the improvement and development of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. It was the auspicious atmosphere created by such circumstances that allowed a wise and cautious statesman like İsmet İnönü to observe: "A new international order will be established, and Turkey will find its place within this order" (Milliyet, 16 April 1964; for an eyewitness account of this famous remark, see M. Ali Kışlalı, Radikal, 12 January 2007). This remark created an atmosphere conveying the message that there was a better way outside the Western and Eastern Blocs.

In addition, the steady growth of the global economy during the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s created new possibilities. In its early years, the European Economic Community gave importance to Turkey. This presented opportunities for Ankara, although its negotiating position was constantly undermined by squabbles between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the DPT. There was also a lot of bureaucratic carelessness, like the time when the Turkish delegation's confidential negotiating brief was published in the Official Gazette or when import quotas were requested for items that were not among Turkey's exports (Keskin, pp. 61 and 67). Also, until the mid-1970s the U.S. was seeking to bring Turkey and Iran even closer to its side at a time when the Soviet Union had focused its interest on the Middle East. The U.S. did this by giving these two countries the opportunity to move into the semiperiphery by allowing them to develop (see Box Intro-5 in the Introduction). In this period Turkish industrialists engaged in business activities in Libya and Pakistan acted as the businessmen of a country that was a candidate to join the semiperiphery (Keyder 1976, pp. 131-32). Another reason was the climate of freedom that prevailed within Turkey. This climate of free discussion brought foreign policy issues into the daily lives of citizens. It also intensified anti-American sentiments. This environment made it relatively easier for governments to oppose U.S. policies. Incidents such as the U.S. Sixth Fleet sailors being thrown into the sea in Istanbul by leftist students and preventing the aircraft bringing Cyrus Vance, the mediator on Cyprus, from landing in Ankara's main airport in 1967 were used as arguments for resisting U.S. demands at the negotiating table. The anti-American sentiments prevalent among the public were pushing governments, whether they liked it or not, toward a certain degree of autonomy.

Against this, the right-wing movement remained solidly pro-American, both in its actions and in its ideology, notwithstanding its nationalistic rhetoric. When rightists, traditionally hard-line nationalists, beat up people pro-

testing the presence of the Sixth Fleet, they were driven strictly by their anti-communism. An example of their orientation can be found in Türkeş's remarks in connection with the lifting of the ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy. "The issue has been used as an open defiance of the USA. The press—and even official government publications—has committed every stupidity to inflict damage to Turkish-American relations. The first thing to do is to reestablish the old feeling of mutual trust and cooperation by rapidly entering into negotiations with America to deal with outstanding issues and, above all, the issue of opium poppy cultivation" (MHP Basın Bülteni, 17 July 1974, quoted in Oran, p. 31).

#### The Nature of Foreign Policy

In the prevailing circumstances of the period, Turkey's foreign policy gained a degree of relative autonomy vis-àvis the West but did not change fundamentally for a number of reasons.

The philosophical attraction of the West and the nature of relations kept Turkey aligned with the West. Turkey received Western aid and loans with relative ease up to the mid-1970s. Between 1960 and 1964 Turkey received an average of \$243 million and between 1965 and 1969 an average of \$284 million (through the OECD Consortium) in aid and loans each year. This represented more than half of Turkey's annual external earnings from trade and other sources (Hale, p. 152). If the dependence on spare parts for weapons from the West is added to this picture, it will become clear that Turkey could not leave the Western camp, even if it had the inclination to do so. And this book contends that Turkey never had such an inclination. Its relationship with the nonaligned was in the nature of an academic exercise. In any case, there was no question of the nonaligned showing a better way for Turkey. Whatever arguments there might have been to consider the option of leaving NATO after 1960, these were quickly hushed when the Soviet fleet sailed into the Mediterranean and Soviet tanks rolled into Prague. As a result, Turkey remained in NATO, did not drift toward the USSR, remained loyal to its basic tenets, maintained its links with Israel, and supported the Pax Americana in the Middle East. It did become more autonomous from the West, however, especially with respect to Cyprus and the Middle East.

The changes made in the tenor of Turkish foreign policy were aimed in essence to find allies on the Cyprus issue and to find alternative resources to alleviate economic problems. To aim for anything further was difficult. It is noteworthy that at this time Ecevit was able to talk about "crossing over to the other side of the wall" while at the same time reassuring everyone that "Turkey would fill any gap that might result from Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military structure" (Gerger 1998, p. 122).

#### IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

- 1. For the first time since before World War II, Turkey formulated a foreign policy without wearing ideologically tinted glasses. Even if it was forced to do this by the need to obtain new foreign resources, Turkey adopted a policy toward the USSR based on *Realpolitik*. This allowed it to differentiate between the USSR and communism and to derive substantial economic and political benefits.
- 2. As noted earlier, the lack of full freedom within the country and the suppression of the Left influenced Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's relative autonomy in this period was not as marked as in the period from 1930 to 1939. When the Left was suppressed during the 12 March period, Turkey bowed to U.S. pressure and imposed a ban on opium poppy cultivation. We shall see a similar development in the following period from 1980 to 1990, when the 12 September administration accepted the Rogers Plan.
- 3. Although this period was one of relative autonomy thanks to changes in the international political scene, there was also a dependence on foreign resources, which had its roots in the 1945 to 1960 period. This period contained the seeds of the dependence that would come in the 1980s. As the international political scene changed, the relative autonomy was lost. The weakening of democracy at home had a drastic effect on foreign policy. The economic basis for the relative autonomy enjoyed during this period was the IIS policy. The IIS policy depended on foreign resources, however, and this situation led to the submission to the global economy that occurred after 1980.
- 4. The most autonomous and important event during this period of purposeful foreign policy was the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. But this operation was undertaken without full knowledge of where it would lead. The second phase of the operation also violated "the rules" (see the Introduction), so it created a host of problems for Turkey. As a strategic medium power, it had engaged in a too radical form of a behavior not approved by the hegemonic power.

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### Relations with the USA and NATO

#### I. THE PERIOD FROM 1960 TO 1965

The 27 May Coup and the U.S.

The military officers who took over Turkey's administration on 27 May 1960 declared that the country would remain loyal to NATO and CENTO and would continue to carry out all of the responsibilities arising from these alliances. The reason for their hasty assurances was the officers' concern that the U.S. might take a stand against the coup.

When it became apparent that the National Unity Committee (MBK) was effectively in control of the country and would honor its international commitments, the U.S. recognized the newly formed government on 30 May.

The thing that preoccupied the Americans was the fate of the bilateral agreements that the U.S. had signed with Turkey during the Menderes era. Most of these had been put into effect without parliamentary approval. On I June the new minister of foreign affairs, Selim Sarper, confirmed that Turkey would honor all agreements entered into by the previous regime. This announcement was received with satisfaction in Washington.

Washington was also interested in whether Turkey would meet its debt obligations to the U.S. At a press conference held on 4 July, the leader of the military administration, Gen. Cemal Gürsel, stated that Turkey would never disavow its debts. But he added that in repaying its debts Turkey would be left weaker militarily and economically, which should be a matter of concern for NATO. He therefore requested additional aid from Europe and America. As in the Menderes era, Turkey had to continue to incur new debts in order to service its outstanding debts.

A. Relations during the Cuban Crisis

The Background of the Crisis and Its Evolution

Starting in the spring of 1962, the Soviet Union began installing medium-range missiles, similar to the Jupiter, in Cuba. On 16 October 1962 U.S. intelligence got word of

the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. To prevent the Soviet vessels bringing the launch mechanisms from arriving in Cuba, the U.S. declared on 22 October that it was imposing a blockade on its neighbor.

Actually, the U.S. already had started placing restrictions on merchant vessels bound for Cuba in September. In the framework of its economic sanctions on Cuba, the U.S. had turned back a number of vessels carrying goods to that country, including two Turkish vessels with cargos of wheat. The U.S. State Department announced on 27 September that U.S. ports would be closed to the shipping of countries transporting goods to Cuba.

When the U.S. started implementing its sanctions against Soviet ships, the crisis escalated. The USSR declared that it would defy the U.S. sanctions, while the U.S. announced that it would maintain the blockade. The world was at the threshold of a nuclear war.

On 22 October president John F. Kennedy declared that the U.S. would confront the Soviet defiance and sink any Soviet vessel entering Cuba's territorial waters. Although Khrushchev initially refused to recall the Soviet vessels already underway to Cuba, he agreed later on not to place missiles in Cuba when he received a U.S. undertaking to remove the Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. On 28 October Khrushchev announced to the world that the Soviet Union would not install missiles in Cuba, and the U.S. lifted its blockade.

#### Turkey's Stance in the Face of the Escalating Crisis

The Cuban crisis also affected Turkish-American relations. The installation of medium-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey was completed toward the end of 1960. But the launch mechanisms and warheads were installed only in the middle of 1962. As the assembly of the missiles was completed, the Soviet reaction started making itself felt. In May 1962 the Soviet leader Khrushchev paid a visit to Bulgaria, where he condemned the U.S. action in install-

ing missiles on Turkish soil and warned that it would be met with an appropriate response. On 11 September the Soviets condemned the Jupiter missiles once again and repeated the warning about an appropriate response.

The Soviet response consisted of installing Jupitertype missiles in Cuba. This led to serious tension between the U.S. and the USSR. With Jupiter missiles on its soil, Turkey was inevitably drawn into this crisis, because Moscow had openly declared that it would withdraw its missiles only on condition that the Jupiters were removed from Turkey. On 25 October the Soviet permanent representative at the UN, Nikita Ryzhov, met with minister of foreign affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin and called for the early removal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

Kennedy initially opposed the removal of the Jupiters as a quid pro quo for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, claiming that the Soviet missiles were installed for the purpose of attacking the U.S. while the Jupiters were defensive weapons. But Kennedy and his secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, faced a dilemma. If the U.S. removed the Jupiter missiles, it would lose standing among the NATO countries, especially Turkey and Italy. Refusing to remove the missiles, however, created the danger of unleashing a war with the USSR. The president and his men decided to seek the views of their NATO allies.

The U.S. ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare, informed the White House on 24 October that Turkey was absolutely against the removal of the Jupiters. On the same day, the U.S. representative at NATO reported that the Turks attributed great symbolic significance to the Jupiters. If these missiles had to be removed, he proposed that Polaris-launching submarines be shifted to the Mediterranean to reassure the Turks.

At this time, the concern felt in Turkey over the possible removal of Jupiters at Soviet insistence was reflected in the press as well as in the ranks of the opposition. Some pundits were claiming that the U.S. was ready to engage in bargaining with the USSR. Others accused the government of being "more royalist than the king" over the issue.

On 24 October president Cemal Gürsel declared that Turkey would stand behind its friend and ally the U.S. all the way in the Cuban crisis. Prime minister İsmet İnönü also announced that Turkey was in full solidarity with the U.S.

The minister of foreign affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin, met with the U.S. ambassador and told him about the concern of the Turkish public over the Soviet threat. After informing the ambassador that Turkey stood shoulder to shoulder with the U.S., he requested that the deliveries of

F-104s be accelerated and that spare parts for F-100s be delivered at an early date.

At the meetings held on 25 and 26 October at the White House, Kennedy proposed that the question of the removal of Jupiters be taken up by the NATO Council. This would allow the NATO countries to make their own decision, sparing the U.S. a possible loss of prestige. But undersecretary of state George Ball was against this idea. He reminded the president that NATO Council decisions were made by consensus; if Turkey said no, their hands would be tied, and the possibility of engaging in secret bargaining with the USSR would then be lost. In any case, the other NATO members had also informed the U.S. through informal channels that they were against secret bargaining.

Kennedy proposed that pressure be applied to get Ankara to ask for the removal of the Jupiters. This time, Secretary McNamara opposed the president. McNamara recalled that the U.S. had proposed to Turkey in 1961 that the Jupiters be replaced by Polaris-launching submarines, only to receive a firm negative reply. The Turkish military establishment, however, was by no means willing to give up completely its role in the deterrence (Harris, p. 94). Consequently, it would not be wise to insist on an issue about which the Turks were known to be adamant.

#### Agreement between the U.S. and the USSR

On 27 October Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter requesting that the Jupiters be removed from Turkey and declaring that the USSR had no intention to invade Turkey. He asked that Kennedy give a similar assurance about its intentions toward Cuba.

On that day, a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba. Under U.S. plans, such an incident would call for a U.S. military intervention. But the fear that a small clash could easily escalate to a nuclear exchange caused Kennedy to hold back.

At the meetings held in the White House, it was decided that the president's brother, attorney general Robert Kennedy, would meet with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrinin and inform him that the U.S. would refrain from invading Cuba if the USSR removed its missiles there. Robert Kennedy was also to inform the ambassador that the U.S. also agreed to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey at an early date. This part of the bargain would be kept confidential and would not be revealed to anyone not attending the White House meetings. Khrushchev would be asked to cooperate in keeping this information confidential.

Robert Kennedy conveyed the U.S. message to the Soviet ambassador on 27 October. Simultaneously, President Kennedy wrote a letter to Khrushchev, informing him that the blockade of Cuba would be lifted when the missiles were removed, but made no mention of the removal of Jupiter missiles. Dobrinin informed Khrushchev of this aspect of the bargain.

When the Soviet vessels turned back from a confrontation with the blockading U.S. navy, President Kennedy sent all heads of government of the NATO countries a letter informing them that the U.S. had not used Jupiters as a bargaining chip.

#### . The Dismantling of the Jupiters

When the crisis was over, the first reactions from Turkey came in the form of lavish praise for the U.S. Foreign minister F. C. Erkin expressed his admiration for the U.S. policies, which had averted a nuclear war, and especially stressed that Turkey had not been made part of the bargaining that had gone on.

When the U.S. proposed the dismantling of the Jupiters on 23 January 1963, the Turkish leaders evaluated this as a positive step in which a weapons system would be replaced by the more advanced Polaris system. Although the leadership failed to react to this development, the feeling was taking hold among the public that the Jupiters had been bargained away to end the Cuban missile crisis.

As the opposition in parliament sought clarifications from the government, Erkin's response was that Turkey's importance and role had increased within NATO through the replacement of Jupiters with Polaris missiles. He added that relations with the U.S. had never been better. Erkin reassured everyone that the Polaris-launching submarines would enhance Turkey's security and pointed out that NATO's new flexible response strategy did not lessen Turkey's importance. He added that, on the contrary, conventional warfare would now take a more prominent place; and with its large land forces, Turkey's strategic value would rise to new heights.

The dismantling of the Turkish Jupiters was completed in April 1963.

Prime minister İsmet İnönü had given his support to the U.S. during the crisis. Eight years later, however, in January 1970, İnönü would make the following statement in the TGNA: "The Americans told us that the Jupiters would be removed because they had become obsolete. These missiles would be replaced with Polaris missiles. It was only later that we learned that they had been bargaining with the Soviet Union. These events demonstrate that Turkish leaders must be careful and must not allow

the country to be dragged into crisis by the Americans" (*TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, 22 January 1970, session 1, vol. 2, pp. 291–92, quoted in Uslu, p. 165).

#### The Consequences of the Crisis

The crisis had important consequences for Turkish-American relations.

- 1. After the removal of the Jupiter missiles, the U.S. accelerated the delivery of F-104 and F-100 fighter aircraft to Turkey. In this manner, Turkey's ability to wage conventional warfare was enhanced at a time when NATO was changing its strategy from all-out nuclear retaliation to a flexible-response strategy (see Box 4-10 in Section 4).
- 2. The crisis demonstrated that decisions made in Washington might jeopardize Turkey's security and even its very existence. The belief that the U.S. was a sincere and faithful ally of Turkey was badly shaken. This helped stoke the fires of anti-Americanism in Turkey.
- 3. Turkey saw the shortcomings of pursuing a singledimension foreign policy. This led to accepting the need to establish relations with parts of the globe other than the U.S. The multidimensional foreign policy that gradually took shape in the 1960s received its first impulse from the Cuban crisis.
- 4. During the crisis Turkey noted from Kennedy's actions that in matters dealing with its national interest a good way to proceed was first to take unilateral action and then to consult allies. In the future, when taking bold steps like expanding cooperation with the USSR, lifting the ban on opium poppy growing, or intervening in Cyprus, Turkey would rely on this "national-interest-first" foreign policy model.

# B. The Question of Cyprus and the Johnson Letter

#### The U.S. Approach to the Question

Starting in December 1963, the Greek Cypriots, unwilling to abide by the provisions of the 1960 Constitution, stepped up their attacks on the Turkish Cypriots. After the Greek-Cypriot onslaught of 21 December 1963, which came to be known as "Bloody Christmas," Turkish president Cemal Gürsel wrote U.S. president Lyndon Johnson a letter asking the U.S. immediately to put pressure on the Greek Cypriots to stop the massacres taking place on the island.

In his reply Johnson expressed his "deep concern over the tragic events taking place in Cyprus" and stated that he had written to President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük on the subject. Johnson also said: "You may be sure that I will continue to do everything I can to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution" (*Department of State Bulletin*, vol. L, no. 1282, 20 January 1964, p. 90).

The language employed by Johnson in his letter to Gürsel revealed clearly that the U.S. president looked upon the question from a perspective that was quite different from Turkey's. Johnson wrote: "Dear Friends. My Christmas holiday hours, and those of my fellow Americans, are saddened by the thought that Cypriots of both communities whose hands I have pressed less than eighteen months ago are killing and wounding one another. I will not presume to judge the root causes, or rights and wrongs as between Cypriots of the two communities. This is, in any case, inappropriate when innocent human lives are at stake. I cannot believe that you and your fellow Cypriots will spare any efforts, and sacrifice, to end this terrible fraternal strife. I hope and trust that tomorrow will find all Cypriots living at peace with one another and with the three nations which have special treaty responsibilities for the security of Cyprus" (Department of State Bulletin, vol. L, no. 1282, 20 January 1964, p. 90).

Johnson preferred to remain passive in the dispute in order to avoid taking the Turkish side and because he did not want to lose the votes of 3 million organized Greek Americans in the 1964 presidential election. In the letter Johnson carefully avoided mentioning either Greeks or Turks, preferring to refer to them as "Cypriots belonging to the two communities" and "killing each other." This revealed his concern about losing votes in the coming election.

When Turkey failed to receive the support it was seeking from the U.S., it sent a message to the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, on 13 March 1964: if the attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not stop, Turkey would protect their rights, lives, and property. The intention was to convey the impression that Turkey was preparing for military intervention. It was expected that the U.S. would put pressure on the Greek Cypriots to forestall such an intervention. But the expectation was not fulfilled, and the U.S. continued to remain passive. Hence, at prime minister Ismet Inönü's request, the TGNA adopted a resolution on 16 March, authorizing the government to intervene militarily in Cyprus whenever it felt such action was warranted.

Based on this authorization, the government made three separate attempts to intervene. But these attempts proved fruitless for a number of reasons. In early June, at a time when preparations were going ahead for an intervention, Johnson sent Inönü a letter, which dissuaded Turkey from entertaining the notion to intervene for quite a long time.

#### Johnson's Letter

On 5 June 1964 President Johnson sent Prime Minister İnönü a comprehensive letter on the question of Cyprus. Although the Turkish public learned about the letter from a White House statement released on 6 June, nothing was said in the statement about the letter's content except that İnönü had been invited to Washington. The content of the letter was kept confidential for a long time, but the full text was eventually leaked to the newspaper *Hürriyet*, which published it on 13 January 1966, eighteen months after it had been delivered.

Johnson's letter contained the following introductory paragraph:

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views.

In his letter Johnson made the following points.

- 1. The U.S. has demonstrated staunch support for Turkey over the years. Turkey should not confront an ally with such a unilateral decision without prior consultation.
- 2. Turkey appears to believe that an intervention in Cyprus is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. But this intervention will be for effecting partition, which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey should not take action without consulting the other Guarantor Powers (Britain and Greece).
- 3. An intervention would lead to a military engagement between two NATO members, Turkey and Greece. This is something that NATO considers completely unacceptable. By adhering to NATO, both countries have accepted that they will not wage war on each other.
- 4. "Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not

had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies" (Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. 16, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Doc. No. 54, and Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister Inonu, Secret; Flash; Exdis, drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Bundy for the White House). In other words, in such a situation, the NATO countries might opt out of their responsibility to come to Turkey's defense.

- Turkey's unilateral intervention might also obstruct the UN's ongoing mediation effort.
- 6. "Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of equipment and material provided through military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished... The United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances."
- 7. Johnson would welcome the possibility of holding consultations in Washington with İnönü before any Turkish move was made.

The contents of the letter revealed clearly that the U.S. did not want Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. The U.S. had put forth all the necessary arguments to check a possible Turkish intervention and had even hinted that it might refuse to come to the assistance of its loyal ally if intervention resulted in a Soviet attack.

When President Johnson failed to get an answer to his letter a week after it had been sent, he decided to send undersecretary of state George Ball to Ankara on 11 June to dispel the frosty atmosphere. Meanwhile İnönü was making a brave effort to prevent the public from learning about the contents of the letter, in order to prevent Turkish-American relations from suffering a fatal blow while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was engaged in drafting a reply.

Inönü's reply was longer and more comprehensive than Johnson's letter and was delivered to Ambassador Hare on 13 June for onward transmission to Washington (Armaoğlu, pp. 270–76). In the introductory paragraph, Inönü made these remarks:

Both the tenor and the content of your letter addressed to an ally like Turkey that has always shown great concern for its relations of alliance with America have caused profound disappointment. There is a serious divergence of views between us on a number of aspects of our alliance relations. I sincerely hope that the divergence of views that has emerged and the general tone of your letter are the result of well-intentioned efforts based on views put together in great haste at a moment when time was of the essence.

İnönü's letter contained the following elements:

- 1. The statement that Turkey did not consult with the U.S. prior to making the decision to intervene does not correspond to the facts. On all four occasions when intervention was being contemplated after the events of December 1963, Turkish officials have informed their U.S. counterparts.
- 2. When Turkey drew attention to the need for outside intervention to restore calm on the island, the U.S. declared that Makarios would be taught a lesson and that a plan was being prepared that would secure the protection of the rights and interests of the Cypriot Turks. But the delays in the deployment of the UN force have increased the intensity of the Makarios administration's attacks and the destruction caused by the attacks.
- 3. Turkey is fully conscious of its responsibility to consult with the guarantors in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. It has carried out this responsibility on a number of occasions over the last six months. But one of the guarantors, namely Greece, has frustrated Turkey's efforts and has even claimed that the agreements it has signed are no longer valid:

When Turkey appealed to Greece jointly to seek solutions to the flagrant violation of international treaties by the leaders of the Greek Cypriots, not only did Greece turn this appeal down, it went further and defended the illegal and inhuman actions of these leaders and even gave them encouragement...

The U.S. Government has seen fit to remind Turkey of its duty to consult, something which it has faithfully done in full sincerity. Should it not also remind Greece, which has repudiated the treaties it has signed, that it should comply with the basis of international law, which is the principle of "pacta sunt servanda"?

4. "The statement in the letter that the purpose of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus is to bring about the partition of the island has led to astonishment as well as profound dismay... If Turkey is ever placed in the position where it must intervene militarily in Cyprus, this could

only be in full compliance with the provisions and purposes of international treaties."

- 5. A Turkish-Greek conflict that would cause concern for NATO members could only come about if Greece attacked Turkey. In the event of an intervention in Cyprus, the intention of the Turkish government would be to invite Greece and Britain, as guarantors, to engage in active cooperation in order to restore the constitutional order in Cyprus. "If Greece should attack Turkey in these circumstances, how could Turkey be held responsible for the consequences of this action?"
- 6. The passage in the letter stating that NATO allies would hesitate in coming to Turkey's assistance in the event of Soviet action arising from a possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus gives the impression that there is a vast discrepancy between U.S. and Turkish views about the nature of the NATO alliance and its fundamental principles. This is "a source of regret and apprehension. Any attack by an aggressor against one of the NATO allies will always be qualified as justified by the aggressor. If NATO's edifice is so flimsy that it would be swayed by the claims of an aggressor, then it appears to be in need of repair." The NATO Treaty requires its members to come to the immediate assistance of a member that finds itself under attack. "If the allies start debating whether the member that is under Soviet attack is justified or not and whether the member has brought the attack upon itself by its own actions and then decide on whether they will undertake their responsibilities to help the victim, then the main pillars of the NATO alliance will be undermined and the alliance will lose its raison d'être."
- 7. Turkey is respectful of the UN and its principles. But the activities of the UN on the island have not been able to stop the cruelty the Turkish Cypriots are being subjected to.
- 8. The present situation on the island is the consequence of the Cyprus Republic's repudiation of the treaties and abrogation of the Constitution. Security can only be restored through some authority imposing its will on the Cyprus government.
- 9. "Greece has the inclination to set the course of events in the question of Cyprus by all means until the treaties are completely invalidated... Turkey is finding it difficult to convey its righteous concerns to its allies... The question will be amenable to a solution if President Johnson makes himself helpful by using his authority to impose the sense of justice that is characteristic of the American nation."
- 10. Prime Minister İnönü agrees to go to Washington to discuss the issue with President Johnson.

#### İnönü's Talks in the U.S.

Inönü went to Washington, where he held talks with President Johnson and State Department officials on 22 and 23 June. While İnönü was still in Washington, another visitor was Greek prime minister Georgios Papandreou, who was also visiting at President Johnson's invitation. As President Johnson played host to both leaders at the same time, the impression spread that he was acting as mediator. Johnson met with the two leaders separately, however, and no three-party meeting took place.

In a joint communiqué released after the İnönü-Johnson meeting, the U.S. agreed that the London and Zurich agreements continued to be valid. There was also agreement on the need to find solutions to differences on the basis of talks.

In statements made by Prime Minister İnönü after the talks, he underlined that Johnson wanted a solution to the question and that the positions of Turkey and the U.S. on Cyprus were similar. But it was obvious that Johnson's letter had softened Turkey's original hard-line approach to military intervention in Cyprus. The letter would have far-reaching effects on Turkish-American relations.

#### The Consequences of Johnson's Letter

Johnson's letter had lasting effects on Turkish foreign policy as well as on Turkish-American relations.

- 1. The suggestion that Turkey might not be defended in the event of a Soviet attack led to a heated public debate over the extent to which NATO was ensuring Turkey's security. The view that Turkey should leave NATO began to get a better hearing than before.
- 2. The letter was an important milestone in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy as it became more multidimensional. After the letter, Turkey sought ways to develop economic and political relations with countries with which it previously had minimum contacts. Among these were especially the USSR and countries of the Third World.
- 3. Turkey stopped supporting all U.S. initiatives unquestioningly. Now it wanted to make sure that these initiatives were in conformity with the goals and principles of Turkish foreign policy. To cite an example, Turkey stopped supporting the U.S. policy on Vietnam. At the debate held in the UN General Assembly in September 1965, Turkey opposed the use of force by the U.S. in Vietnam.
- 4. The currents against the U.S. and its military presence in Turkey gained strength. At Turkey's request, the bilateral agreements were reviewed and in 1969 consolidated under the rubric "Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement."

5. Turkey initiated the policy of approaching the new military structures established within NATO at U.S. initiative with greater caution. As explained in greater detail below, it refused to participate in the Multilateral Force (MLF).

6. Johnson's letter revealed the drawback of having an army that was equipped predominantly with U.S. weapons. To overcome this, Turkey sought to diversify its sources of supply, while at the same time establishing a domestic defense industry. Efforts were intensified to give the navy the capability to carry out amphibious operations.

At this point it should be noted that there were those who argued that İnönü deliberately provoked the U.S. in order to ensure that it took action to prevent a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. In his book Gece Gelen Mektup (The Letter That Came at Night), Haluk Şahin claims that Turkey lacked the military capability at the time to intervene in Cyprus (no landing craft, no parachutes, etc.), so it feigned an intervention in the expectation that the U.S. would take the necessary preventive action.

If this claim is correct, then the withholding of the contents of Johnson's letter from the Turkish public and the sharp tone of the Turkish response demonstrate that İnönü did not expect such a far-reaching letter, containing dire threats that would cause so much apprehension in Turkey. If the prevention of an intervention in Cyprus was deliberately provoked by İnönü in order to lay the blame on the U.S. for any domestic criticism of the government's inaction, then this seasoned statesman unwittingly got Turkey involved in a foreign policy row, which he neither expected nor desired.

### The Multilateral Force (MLF)

### The Establishment of the

Multilateral Nuclear Force

In May 1961 President Kennedy announced that he would place five nuclear Polaris submarines at the disposal of NATO in order to ensure a more effective defense of Western Europe. He declared that the creation of a nuclear naval force, to be known as the Multilateral Force, would enhance NATO's deterrent power and invited all NATO members, especially France, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, to join the force.

The first positive response to Kennedy's proposal came from Britain. In an agreement signed by the U.S. and Britain on 21 December 1962, it was decided that Britain's Polaris submarines would be integrated with the force.

The main U.S. objective in proposing this force was to prevent France from becoming an independent nuclear power. After de Gaulle came to power, France accelerated its efforts to develop its own nuclear capabilities. The U.S., however, did not want to share its nuclear monopoly within NATO with any challenger. If France had independent nuclear forces, it would become harder for the U.S. to make decisions within NATO single-handedly. De Gaulle's wish to stoke French nationalism and develop an independent foreign policy that would challenge American policies was a direct threat to U.S. interests. In Kennedy's view, it would be easier to keep France's nuclear ambitions under control within the framework of the MLF.

The efforts to create the MLF continued under the Johnson administration. The U.S. wanted the MLF to consist of a fleet of surface vessels and submarines armed with nuclear weapons and under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). According to the estimate of the U.S. Department of Defense, the cost of this new fleet would amount to \$5 billion. This sum would be apportioned among NATO members according to their share in the force. The personnel of the force would be mixed and would come from different NATO countries.

#### Turkey's Approach to the MLF

This project offered few benefits for Turkey, but neither did it have any drawbacks. At first Turkey informed the U.S. that it would join in the MLF. By participating in the force, Turkish naval personnel would gain experience in the operation of vessels with nuclear capability.

The expenses arising from Turkish participation were expected to amount to about \$50 million. This was 1% of the total sum needed for the force and showed that Turkey's participation would be merely symbolic. Turkish personnel would serve primarily in support units. Furthermore, the minimum term of service would be three years. This would make it difficult to meet Turkey's goal of familiarizing as many men as possible with the operation of such vessels.

Nevertheless, in early 1964 Turkish naval personnel took up their posts on board the U.S. warship USS Ricketts. This meant that Turkey was taking part in the MLF even before it was formally established within NATO.

#### Turkey's Refusal and the End of the MLF

Turkey adopted a more cautious approach toward the U.S. after the Johnson letter and announced in January 1965 that it had changed its mind about joining the MLF. The men serving on board the USS Ricketts were recalled. It was clear that this decision was the result of the new approach toward the U.S. that became apparent among Turkish politicians and soldiers after the Johnson letter. Turkey was also taking into account the USSR, which had taken a negative stance toward the MLF from the very beginning. By abandoning a project to which the USSR was opposed, an obstacle was being removed from the path of improved economic and political relations with the Soviet Union over the medium term.

Another factor influencing Turkey's decision was that most European NATO members failed to support the new initiative. The Turkish General Staff conducted a new appraisal, concluded that Turkey had nothing to gain from participating in the MLF, and asked the government to withdraw from the force.

Having failed to obtain the support of its NATO allies, the U.S. gave up the project in 1965. This initiative would be replaced by a new project for joint control of the nuclear weapons of NATO countries. The MLF was finally stricken from the international agenda.

# THE PERIOD FROM 1965 TO 1971 Questions Arising in Connection with American Military Personnel

Increased Discontent over U.S. Military Personnel
The Cuban crisis and Johnson's letter had created a climate where anti-U.S. views and activities were on the increase in Turkey. The misbehavior of American personnel started drawing sharp criticism. The main cause of resentment among the public was the buying and selling of merchandise originating from a Post Exchange (PX) or Army Post Office (APO). A PX was a military shop established in American bases and installations, while the APO provided mail services for U.S. personnel.

Some American soldiers were violating Turkish laws by buying duty-free articles from PXs and reselling them for profit to Turkish citizens. The principal items traded in this fashion were alcoholic drinks and American cigarettes. The liquor in question was either unavailable on the market or extremely expensive because of high taxes and duties. In addition, American personnel were importing a wide range of items (from transistor radios to refrigerators) into the country without going through customs formalities. When the quantity of such illegally traded goods increased, shops started appearing in localities with American bases nearby. These shops were known as "American markets" and sold goods purchased from U.S. military personnel. As these shops grew in number, they began to harm the local economy.

After 1960 leftist currents were growing throughout the country, and their main activity was organizing antiAmerican demonstrations. These demonstrations gained in intensity when units of the American Sixth Fleet paid visits to the ports of İzmir and İstanbul. On one occasion, demonstrators hurled American sailors into the sea. This contrasted sharply with the cordial reception accorded to American sailors during similar visits in the 1950s and reflected the growing anti-American sentiments of the populace.

During this period problems also arose between Turkish personnel working in American installations and the commanders of the installations. The commanders did not allow the Turkish personnel to use the canteens, shops, and sports facilities on equal terms with American personnel. On military bases there were differences between the American and Turkish base commanders over whether the flag-raising ceremonies were to be carried out according to U.S. or Turkish regulations. Furthermore, the American base commanders did not always observe the customary courtesies when dealing with the senior Turkish officer of the district. All of this led to growing displeasure among the Turkish military.

Eventually the American government became aware of the growing discontent in Turkey and moved the installations away from urban centers to more isolated locations. Concurrently, the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey was reduced. From 1968 to 1970 their numbers fell from 24,000 to 16,000. All of this was designed to reduce the American military profile in Turkey. But these measures did not suffice to reduce the irritation in Turkey.

#### The Turkish-American Bilateral Agreement of 24 September 1968

When the government headed by Süleyman Demirel came to power on 27 October 1965, it felt the displeasure gripping the public as well as the armed forces and entered into negotiations with American officials for the purpose of both consolidating the large number of bilateral agreements into a single document and revising the status of U.S. military personnel so as to eliminate the causes of tension between them and the Turkish public. The Turkish side wanted the agreements concluded up to that date renewed and tidied up.

The first item taken up was the revision of the 1954 NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which had been a major source of difficulties in Turkey. SOFA was revised through the Agreement on Offenses Committed While Carrying Out Official Duties signed by Turkey and the U.S. on 24 September 1968, and the restrictions placed on the competence of Turkish authorities in connection

with the trial of American personnel were relaxed somewhat. It was agreed that the new system would function in the following manner.

The public prosecutor of the locality in which an offense was committed would inquire from the Turkish General Staff, through the Ministry of Justice, whether the offense was committed while carrying out official duties. This question would then be directed by the General Staff to the top officer of U.S. forces in Turkey. If the offender was in-

deed carrying out official duties, a document to this effect would be sent to the Turkish General Staff, with a copy to the commander of the offender's unit. If this document was found acceptable by the General Staff, it would forward it, by way of the Ministry of Justice, to the public prosecutor of the locality where the offense was committed, whereupon the judicial authorities would halt the proceedings and send the file of their investigation to the General Staff.

If the General Staff did not agree with the determination that the offender was carrying out official duties, and the U.S. side did not insist on its finding, the accused would be tried in a Turkish court. If the American side insisted on its original finding, the matter would be taken up by the two sides at a political level. If no agreement was reached within a period of two months after negotiations were undertaken, the defendant would then be tried according to U.S. legislation (Tunçkanat, pp. 243–48).

It should be noted that, in cases where the U.S. side insisted on its position, the defendant could not be tried in conformity with Turkish legislation. Nevertheless, the new procedure was a vast improvement over the original procedure foreseen in the 1954 agreement.

# B. The Public Perception of Relations with the U.S.

#### The Views on Turkey's NATO Membership

The leftist movements that began to gather strength in the mid-1960s started coming out against one of the main pillars of Turkish-American relations, which was Turkey's membership in NATO. The position of the Turkish Labor Party (TİP), which led this opposition, can be summarized as follows (Uslu, pp. 196–98).

1. All of the Turkish Armed Forces have been brought




Figure 5-2. Cartoon depicting the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Turhan Selçuk, Akşam, 23 December 1969).

under NATO control. They cannot operate independently. The most senior Turkish general is always under the orders of the NATO commander-in-chief.

- As demonstrated by the Cyprus episode, Turkey is unable to use NATO weapons and equipment to pursue its national interest outside the scope of NATO.
- 3. Because the Turkish army has been structured according to NATO defense strategies, it is incapable of meeting Turkey's own defense and foreign policy priorities.
- 4. Because the U.S. has supplied the entire weapons and equipment inventory of the army, Turkey has become politically and militarily dependent. The weapons acquired through American military aid programs are obsolete and are sold at prices above their true value. NATO does not allow Turkey to establish its own defense industry.
- NATO membership impairs Turkey's freedom, independence, and sovereignty. Turkey should develop its own strategies designed to achieve regional deterrence.
- 6. The Johnson letter has proved that in certain circumstances NATO will not protect Turkey from the USSR. Some articles of the North Atlantic Treaty are interpreted differently by Turkey and the other members.

While the TİP held these views and called for Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, other left-wing groups that were more moderate defended the view that Turkey should reduce the level of its involvement with NATO.

Liberal pro-Western groups, rightists, and extreme rightists wanted to develop Turkey's relations with NATO even further. Here is a sampling of their thinking (Uslu, pp. 196–98).

1. The USSR continues to be a threat for Turkey. The magnitude of the threat can be measured by Mos-

cow's growing interest in the Middle East and its everdeveloping relations with Egypt and Syria. In these circumstances, Turkey needs the protective shield of NATO.

- 2. Turkey is in a very strategic location and cannot opt to be neutral in Cold War conditions.
- 3. The benefits that NATO has brought to Turkey since 1952 far outweigh any burdens it has imposed.
- 4. Without the military and economic aid obtained by virtue of NATO membership, Turkey could never have established a modern army.
- 5. In the event of a withdrawal from NATO, Turkey would find itself weakened in the face of NATO member Greece. This would lead to the other NATO members supporting Greece in all sorts of questions, starting with Cyprus and the Aegean dispute (Uslu, pp. 198–200).

Even if there was a public debate over Turkey's membership in NATO, Turkish governments never considered leaving NATO. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the public heatedly debated the question, but even CHP governments never gave any thought to leaving the alliance.

#### The Peace Corps Issue

Starting in 1962, the Peace Corps, established at President Kennedy's initiative, started operating in a large number of countries. It was made up of young teachers and experts and was intended to help developing countries improve their educational facilities and living conditions in rural areas.

The agreement for sending Peace Corps volunteers to Turkey was concluded in August 1962 through an exchange of notes. The agreement allowed the Peace Corps volunteers some customs privileges and made provisions for them to work in urban and rural areas throughout Turkey, with the emphasis on eastern Anatolia. Following the agreement, large numbers of volunteers started working in Turkey. By the time the text of the agreement came to the TGNA for ratification, their numbers had reached 600.

In the parliamentary debate, the opposition criticized the government for taking three years to submit to the TGNA an agreement that gave aliens the right to work in Turkey. There were also complaints that the volunteers were carrying out missionary activities and were abusing their customs privileges. Despite all this, the TGNA ratified the agreement.

The activities of the Peace Corps began to attract a lot of negative comment in the media and among the public. Much of the criticism was directed at the concentration of volunteers in parts of eastern Anatolia inhabited by Kurds, where they appeared to be engaged in unspecified research activities. When the claims that the volunteers

were gathering intelligence on behalf of the CIA reached a high pitch, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took steps in late 1966 to end rural development activities by the Peace Corps in eastern Anatolia.

There were also complaints about volunteers teaching English in schools in large cities. They were accused of carrying out cultural imperialism and directing bright students toward an American education. On 25 November 1969 the Academic Board of the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University unanimously adopted a report prepared by Professor Fehmi Yavuz, in which the Peace Corps volunteers were described as people engaged in activities contrary to Turkey's interests. This was followed by a boycott of classes on the part of English teachers in secondary schools, who were demanding higher salaries and wanted the Peace Corps to leave Turkey.

#### The CIA Scare and the Incident with Ambassador Komer

Throughout the 1960s the alleged covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in Turkey were preoccupying the Turkish public. The left-wing press frequently carried stories about alleged CIA involvement in events. It was claimed that the CIA was behind the two unsuccessful coup attempts carried out in January and May 1963 by the commander of the War College, Col. Talat Aydemir. The intent of the CIA was to eliminate the Left in Turkey, which was then in the ascendancy. Leftist circles were also convinced that the rise of the conservative Justice Party was due to CIA backing.

This preoccupation with CIA activities was not confined to the press. Political parties were also in this mood. In July 1966 the secretary-general of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit, declared: "The CIA is involved affecting politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order to bring those it wants into power and to unseat those it does not want" (Harris, p. 136).

The leadership of those making claims against the CIA belonged to TÎP. In September 1965 the leader of TÎP, Mehmet Ali Aybar, called on everyone to unite against Anglo-American imperialism. He even claimed that some leaders of the Federation of Labor Unions (Türk-İş) were in the pay of the CIA.

The Johnson administration ignored the increasing sensitivity of Turkish public opinion over the CIA and in 1968 appointed the president's advisor for CIA affairs, Robert Komer, as ambassador to Turkey. This created further controversy in Turkey, because Komer was a former CIA official who had carried out covert operations in Vietnam.

After Ambassador Komer's appointment, anti-American student demonstrations began to increase. The favorite slogan in these demonstrations was "Turkey shall not become Vietnam." The demonstrators demanded that Komer leave Turkey. TİP and the left-wing press were claiming that the CIA had assigned Komer to Turkey with the mission of eliminating the leftist movement.

When Ambassador Komer visited the Middle East Technical University in January 1969, the students set his official limousine on fire. This incident in front of the rector's office led to tensions between left- and right-wing students, which quickly turned into violence. Student demonstrations demanding that Komer leave Turkey became more frequent.

These developments led Washington to recall Komer in May 1969, but this did not end the anti-American protests. In addition to demonstrations, there were attacks on U.S. installations and personnel that grew in intensity until the military intervention of 12 March 1971.

#### C. The Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement (JDCA) of 1969

Following negotiations between Turkish and American officials, all of the bilateral agreements concluded prior to 3 July 1969 were collected into a single agreement called the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement and signed on that date. In compliance with the Constitution of 1961, the text of the agreement remained classified. In January 1970 the National Assembly and the Senate held a joint closed session at which the text was submitted to the members of the TGNA. On 7 January 1970 prime minister Süleyman Demirel held a press conference at which he informed the nation about the main provisions of the agreement.

According to this information, the agreement stipulated that no operation would be conducted against a third country from U.S. bases without Turkey's prior consent. The U.S. agreed that Turkey owned the U.S. bases on Turkish soil and Turkish authorities had the right to oversee their activities. Turkey could place restrictions on the operation of U.S. bases for national security reasons.

These provisions failed to satisfy the left-wing opposition. The mainstream opposition, however, displayed a more positive attitude. The daily *Hürriyet* published the full text of the 1969 JDCA in its issues of 16 and 17 March 1975.

According to article 2 of this text, the number, location, facilities, and supplies at the disposal of U.S. bases in Turkey in time of peace, imminent attack, or war would be regulated according to implementation agreements

negotiated by the two governments. In times of national emergency, the Turkish government would have the right to take all necessary measures throughout the emergency to protect itself, bearing in mind the objectives of this agreement.

The provisions of the implementation agreements to be concluded within the framework of this article had to conform to the letter and the spirit of the agreement. If there were any differences of interpretation of the implementation agreements, the difference would be overcome through immediate consultations between the responsible officials. If the differences could not be overcome through this procedure, the question would be referred to the two governments for a solution.

Article 3 specifically stated that American bases could be used only for the purpose of carrying out defensive measures approved by NATO. In other words, these bases could no longer be used for out-of-area operations. The details of how this participation in defensive measures would take place were also specified. According to this provision, there would be a separate implementation agreement for each case when the U.S. was to participate in the defensive measures. Officials of the two governments would negotiate this implementation agreement. In other words, Turkey had preempted the use of the bases without its approval and in a manner that would be detrimental to Turkey's national interest.

The same article provided that the Turkish government would have to give prior approval to the purpose, nature, location, duration, and composition of joint defense installations, the composition of the permitted personnel, and the overall category and type of the equipment to be supplied by the U.S. There would be no addition to or deductions from the permitted personnel without first informing and obtaining the approval of the Turkish government in situations other than those that were in compliance with the purposes of the agreement or the related implementation agreement.

It also stipulated that the materials, equipment, and supplies needed to operate the joint defense installations established in compliance with the agreement could not be removed from Turkey without first holding consultation meetings between officials of the two parties. The reason why Turkey insisted on this provision was to prevent a repetition of the Jupiter missile episode. Turkey did not want to see American weapons systems, which it considered important for its strategic defense, removed from the country.

Article 5 regulated the question of the ownership of the bases and installations. According to this article, Turkey would have ownership of the land allocated for the purpose of setting up a base or installation. In addition, all buildings constructed by the U.S. or on its behalf on the allocated land, including equipment fixed to the ground, would become the property of the Turkish government from the time of their construction or installation. The cost of operating and maintaining joint defense installations, including those operated and used by Turkish personnel, would be shared by the two sides in accordance with the share of each side in the installation's use. This share would be determined by mutual agreement.

Article 13 concerned the supervision of the bases and installations, stating that the responsibility for the supervision of the joint defense installations would rest with the Turkish authorities. It also provided that the number, ranks, and duties of the military and civilian personnel, both Turkish and American, authorized to have access to the joint defense installations in the performance of their official duties would be determined by the officials of the two governments.

Another issue that had occasionally created problems in the past was the question of conflicts of competence between Turkish and American commanders. This question and the issue of which country's regulations would be applicable in flag-raising ceremonies were also addressed in the new agreement. Article 14 provided that the duties and responsibilities of Turkish and American commanders assigned to joint defense installations would be determined by officials of the Turkish and American governments in accordance with implementation agreements. Article 17 stipulated that the display of national flags and signs to be fixed at the entrances and perimeters of joint defense installations would be regulated by special rules established in accordance with Turkish legislation, bearing in mind the principle of mutual respect.

The agreement would be valid as long as Turkey and the U.S. were in NATO. If one of the parties wanted changes in the provisions of the agreement, it would notify the other party, and changes would be made through negotiations. If one of the parties wanted to end the agreement, bilateral negotiations lasting not more than six months would take place, after which the agreement would come to an end two years after serving notice of the intention to end it.

The agreement consolidated the bilateral agreements in one text and was designed to eliminate occasional sources of tension between the two countries caused by the previous agreements. But the agreement was short-lived. When the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975, the JDCA came under heavy criticism in

Turkey: when the U.S. maintained the embargo, Turkey denounced the JDCA on 25 July 1975.

### D. Economic and Military Aid *Economic Aid*

In the late 1950s the U.S. started cutting down foreign aid in an effort to cope with America's growing current account deficit. When John F. Kennedy became president, he proposed that the industrialized European countries and Japan share the burden of foreign aid with America. In 1961 the Federal Republic of Germany responded to this appeal by announcing that it would take over part of the economic aid being provided by the U.S. to Turkey.

At the proposal of the U.S., a Turkish Aid Consortium was established in 1962 to enable OECD countries to provide aid to Turkey. But the consortium got off to a slow start, disappointing Washington. In 1963 the U.S. decided to direct the aid that it was planning to give Turkey through the consortium. The U.S. provided \$66 million and requested that the remainder be provided by the other members of the consortium.

Europeans were not generous in their approach to aid. In 1964 the amount of aid to Turkey fell from \$237 million to \$147 million. When the consortium's aid failed to match its expectations, Ankara announced that it would not implement the consortium's stability package. Turkey was very displeased with the inadequacy of U.S. economic aid.

A development in 1963 led to further discord in Turkish-U.S. economic relations. When the USSR lowered its prices for chromium, U.S. companies switched from Turkish to Soviet chromium. This development tilted the balance of trade between the two countries against Turkey.

In 1965 the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) declared that U.S. economic aid to Turkey would be phased out by 1973. By making this announcement, the U.S. was seeking to prevent its aid from being used for purposes not foreseen in the five-year development plan. The U.S. felt that a period of eight years was sufficient for Turkey to attain its economic objectives.

But Turkish governments failed to heed the U.S. and continued their practice of using foreign aid to further their domestic political objectives. They assumed that if U.S. foreign aid did actually dry up one day, they could always plug the gap with aid from other sources. Foremost among these sources was the USSR, which had demonstrated in the 1960s that it was eager to develop its economic relations with Turkey. The general impression among the Turkish leadership was that the U.S. would

never cut off aid to Turkey, since it was fully aware that the USSR would gladly step in should it decide to take this course. In effect, despite reductions, the U.S. never did bring its aid to Turkey to a complete end.

The American aid provided during this period was designed to help the Turkish economy to make the transition from protectionism to a free market system. American economists were advising Turkey to privatize the state sector, encourage the growth of tourism, and promote exports. Left-leaning politicians and the intelligentsia perceived this advice as an effort to eliminate Turkey's national industry.

In 1968 the U.S. sharply revised its foreign aid policies. Bowing to public opinion, which wanted to see a reduction in foreign aid in order to help balance the budget, the U.S. administration made sharp cuts in its foreign aid programs. In 1968 the aid channeled to Turkey through the consortium was cut in half. Although this was partially compensated through increases in the Federal Republic of Germany's aid level, the total level of aid to Turkey fell from \$155.7 million in 1967 to \$106.6 million in 1968.

As the amount of aid decreased, the pressure on the Turkish government to devalue the currency was stepped up. The aid to Turkey consortium, the World Bank, and the IMF, led by the U.S., demanded that Turkey take urgent economic measures to redress the ailing economy. Prime minister Süleyman Demirel, concerned about his party's prospects in the general election due in 1969, resisted these demands for a while. But as the pressure on his government increased, devaluation took place in August 1970. The value of the lira went from 9 to 15 to the U.S. dollar. The U.S. provided an additional \$25 million to cushion the effects of the devaluation.

As in the 1950s, in the 1960s the development of the Turkish economy depended in large measure on the flow of U.S. aid. Economic policies not well suited to Turkey's conditions were frequently implemented in order to avoid a scaling down of foreign aid. This prevented the economy from ever regaining its health.

#### Military Aid

Unlike economic aid, U.S. military aid to Turkey never went through large fluctuations. But as in the case of economic aid, the U.S. was the decision-maker with respect to how the military aid would be utilized. In 1966 the U.S. wanted Turkey to use the aid to modernize its land forces. The air power that the U.S. maintained in Turkish bases ensured the air security of NATO's southern flank, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet ensured the security of the seas.

This U.S. policy was designed, in large measure, to

prevent Turkey from achieving the capability of carrying out an amphibious operation in Cyprus. Needless to say, the Turkish government and the General Staff were against this policy. In September 1966 the commander of the Turkish navy went to Washington to discuss the issue of modernizing the navy. Turkey's efforts paid off, and the U.S. had to relax its policies. Washington agreed to the sale of five destroyers to Turkey by 1969.

With the 1970 decision to sell new submarines to Turkey, it became clear that the U.S. effort to refashion the Turkish armed forces according to its own design had failed.

### III. THE PERIOD FROM 1971 TO 1980 A. The Opium Poppy Question

The Background of the Question

Following World War II, there was a large increase in the illicit use of narcotic drugs in the U.S. A particularly sharp rise in drug use in the early 1960s prompted the U.S. government to take drastic measures to deal with the scourge.

Measures such as education, rehabilitation, increasing awareness, and strengthening the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) did not suffice to curb the use of drugs or stem their flow into the U.S. Public alarm and pressure on the administration to do something increased when children under sixteen began to die in 1966 from drug overdoses.

Richard Nixon conducted his 1968 presidential campaign on two platforms: he would put an end to the Vietnam War and solve the problem of drug addiction.

When Nixon assumed power, he intensified the struggle against drugs and diversified the antidrug measures. The main strategy was to cut off the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. This naturally turned the attention of the administration and the DEA to countries producing narcotic substances. In 1968 there were around half a million U.S. heroin addicts. Opium, the raw material for this drug, was extracted from opium poppies that were produced legally in about ten countries, including Yugoslavia, India, and Turkey. The UN had sanctioned the growing of opium poppies in these countries in order to meet the global demand for opium used for scientific and pharmaceutical purposes. In addition to these countries, opium poppies were being produced illegally in a great number of regions. Much of the heroin entering the U.S. came from these areas. The chief among them was the so-called Golden Triangle (parts of Thailand, Burma, and Laos).

Starting in 1969, the Nixon administration launched a campaign to prove that Turkey was the main source of

the drugs entering the U.S. No attempt was made to determine with certainty where the main source of drugs lay. The DEA officials frequently alleged that Turkey was the source of 80% of the heroin entering the U.S. The press picked up these allegations and started publishing stories accusing Turkey.

The opium poppy had been in cultivation in Turkey's western and central regions for thousands of years. After signing the Geneva Opium Convention in 1931, Turkey had developed effective means to combat the illegal traffic of opium. The bulk of the opium produced by Turkish farmers was sold to the TMO, the government's agricultural purchasing agency. Some farmers, however, were seduced by the higher prices paid by drug dealers. But the amounts diverted were far below the figures being quoted by U.S. officials. According to one estimate, even if all the opium produced in Turkey had been diverted to smugglers, this would only meet the U.S. demand for heroin for a single month.

Despite this background, there was no letup in the Nixon administration's anti-Turkish campaign. The U.S. wanted a total ban on the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey. The campaign was focused on Turkey for three reasons.

- 1. The Golden Triangle, which was the real source of drugs, lay in regions outside government control, with cultivation mostly carried out by guerrillas. Obviously, the U.S. was in no position to press guerrilla leaders to stop the cultivation of opium poppies. In addition, the Nixon administration could not intervene to stop production there because the guerrillas fighting Communist administrations in the region were procuring their weapons with funds earned from the sale of opium.
- 2. For Nixon the important thing was that the American public should perceive the issue of drugs as solved rather than actually solving the question once and for all. Nixon was looking for a short-term success that would allow him a second term, rather than pursuing a long and difficult slog that would yield a tangible ultimate victory over the drug problem.
- 3. NATO member Turkey was economically and militarily dependent on the U.S. Therefore Turkey could be expected to carry out the American demands more willingly. The aid being provided to Turkey could be used as a lever to secure the banning of opium poppy cultivation.

The Banning of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Turkey
The U.S. pressure on Turkey started building up after
1970. Prime Minister Demirel knew that many of the votes
that went to his Justice Party came from farmers who

lived in regions that grew opium poppies. Consequently, he stood up against U.S. demands for quite a long while. After resigning on 11 February 1970, following the rejection of the government's budget at the TGNA, president Cevdet Sunay asked Demirel to form the government once again. By then, Demirel was really weakened in the face of mounting U.S. pressure.

When acting U.S. secretary of state Elliot Richardson repeated the allegation that 80% of the drugs entering the U.S. came from Turkish sources and threatened to consider suspending aid if opium production did not cease, the Turkish cabinet met in October 1970 and decided to put restrictions on opium poppy cultivation. But the U.S. was far from satisfied with a decision that did not impose an outright ban on poppy growing. The suspension of aid to Turkey became one of the main topics on the congressional agenda.

When Nihat Erim became prime minister after the military intervention of 12 March 1971, there was a change in the government's approach to poppies. Unlike Demirel, Erim did not have to worry about going to the people to solicit their votes. He was also aware that a government of an interim regime like his could not last for long without solid U.S. backing. Shortly after he took over the reins of government, negotiations between Turkey and the U.S. were undertaken to impose a total ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy.

The U.S. proposed to give \$30 million to compensate Turkish farmers for their loss of income when the ban came into effect. The Erim government accepted this proposal and imposed a total ban on the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium as of June 1971. The U.S. disbursed only one-third of the promised sum, however, which led to much hardship among the 100,000 families who were affected by the ban.

### The Lifting of the Ban and a Return to Tense Relations

After the election of 1973, Ecevit formed a coalition government composed of the CHP and the National Salvation Party. In order to cut the farmers' losses, this government lifted the ban on poppy growing on 1 July 1974.

The U.S. reacted sharply to this development. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives adopted a joint resolution on 2 July 1974, freezing all loans to Turkey and suspending economic and military aid. Other resolutions calling for the imposition of a total embargo on Turkey followed. The Turkish government responded by declaring that all the necessary measures were in place to prevent the illegal flow of opium and that the ban on production

would not be restored. This only increased the tension between the two countries.

The Nikos Sampson coup in Cyprus in mid-July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish intervention on the island helped in removing the opium issue from the agenda of Turkish-U.S. relations. From then on, the U.S. legislators who advocated the imposition of an embargo on Turkey would use the intervention in Cyprus as their justification rather than the issue of opium poppy production.

The opium issue was ultimately solved by the Turkish government by introducing in cooperation with UN a new opium extraction method known as straw processing. In earlier practice, the farmers incised the still fresh opium poppy sods, collected the oozing opium, and sold it to the authorized government agency (TMO). Some of this gum was diverted to the illegal market. In the new system, an alkaloid factory was set up to process the unlaced opium poppy pods to produce opiates necessary for the pharmaceuticals industry. A UN resolution declared this method an example to be followed by all countries that cultivated opium poppies.

#### B. The Arms Embargo and the 7:10 Ratio The Shaping of American Policy after the Cyprus Intervention

Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, large numbers of Greeks from Greece and the Ottoman Empire had migrated to the U.S. These migrants were able to exercise a considerable influence over the U.S. Congress and the country's leaders. Immediately after the 1974 Cyprus operation, the various Greek-American organizations intensified their efforts to have sanctions imposed on Turkey.

The organization that included the largest number of Greek-Americans among its membership was the American Greek Orthodox Church. In 1974 the church had 503 parishes in all of the states of the union. Through their information network, Greek-Americans were kept informed about developments in Cyprus after the Turkish intervention. Archbishop Iakovos called on all church members to pressure their local and national representatives to punish Turkey. This resulted in a flood of letters and telephone calls to members of Congress and the media.

There was also a campaign to help Greeks who had suffered material losses in Cyprus. This campaign netted a total of \$1 million. Greek-American families adopted Greek-Cypriot orphans.

Like the church, the American Hellenic Educational Progress Association (AHEPA) started lobbying the Congress. With its 50,000 members organized into 430 chapters, AHEPA's efforts proved extremely effective.

The campaign was also supported by the American Hellenic Institute, United Hellenic American Congress, and American Hellenic Council.

The influence of Greek organizations on the U.S. leadership proved to be even more effective than expected.

After Nixon resigned following the Watergate scandal, new president Gerald Ford and secretary of state Henry Kissinger invited Archbishop Iakovos to the White House and informed him that they considered the Greek-American reaction to be justified. President Ford also asked the archbishop to help in calming down his flock. The resounding success of the Greek-American lobby was also due to the approaching congressional election in November 1974. A large majority of the members of Congress did not want to antagonize their Greek-American constituents on the eve of an election.

On 15 August 1974 a congressional delegation consisting of Greek-Americans led by congressman John Brademas visited Kissinger to express their displeasure at the U.S. failure to prevent the Turkish intervention. According to Brademas, the use of American-supplied weapons in the Cyprus operation constituted a violation of bilateral agreements and U.S. laws. Kissinger informed the press that the source of the weapons and the legitimacy of both phases of the Cyprus operation would be investigated and a decision with respect to Turkey would be made after the investigation.

Without waiting for the conclusion of Kissinger's investigation, Congress started preparations for an embargo on Turkey. The views expressed by senators and congressional representatives in the course of the debate can be summarized as follows.

- 1. The first phase of the Turkish military operation could perhaps be regarded as serving the objective of rescuing the island's inhabitants. But the second phase in August had no legal justification.
- 2. In the course of its intervention, Turkey violated its agreements by using American weapons.
- 3. The most effective means of persuading Turkey to evacuate the territories it had occupied was to impose an arms embargo. If this stern measure was not applied, Turkey would have been rewarded for its unlawful behavior.

Because of the Watergate scandal, Congress had lost its confidence in the executive. This is why legislators refused to wait for the president and the Department of State to take action before proceeding on their own. Congress was under criticism for not being able to check the administration on the issues of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Chile, and this time it wanted to set the policy.

Kissinger and the other members of the administration found the congressional action too severe and defended their views in the following terms (Uslu, p. 200).

- 1. To punish just one of the parties would only make it harder to solve the question. To humiliate Turkey with an arms embargo would make it harder to find the peaceful solution being sought by the U.S.
- The embargo would needlessly alienate Turkey, a valuable member of NATO. The embargo would also jeopardize the continued existence of U.S. military bases in Turkey.
- 3. For Congress to take on the responsibility of the executive and impose an embargo on Turkey was an open violation of the principle of the separation of powers embodied in the U.S. Constitution. The intemperate actions of the Congress would limit the administration's freedom of action in its efforts to uphold U.S. interests.
- 4. An arms embargo imposed on Turkey could have harmful effects on U.S. relations with Israel, which had used U.S.-supplied weapons in its wars against the Arabs in 1967 and 1973.

#### The Decision to Impose an Arms Embargo

The decision on the Suspension of the Sale of Arms and the Provision of Military Loans to Turkey was adopted on 19 September 1974 in the Senate and on 24 September in the House. President Ford vetoed the decision on 15 October. In the voting that took place in the House of Representatives to override the veto, the majority voted for upholding it.

At this point the Library of Congress published the investigation carried out to determine the legality of the use of American weapons during the Cyprus operation. According to the investigation, Turkey had violated both bilateral agreements and American laws by employing U.S. arms in its Cyprus operation. Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Law of 1961 provided that "arms and defense services shall be used exclusively for legitimate self-defense and maintaining internal security." Section 505/d of the same law stipulated that "no further aid shall be provided to states that do not use the arms in the intended manner." Section 3/c of the Law on Foreign Military Sales of 1968 provided that "if the aid is used for a purpose other than legitimate self-defense or internal security, all aid shall be stopped."

Immediately after the publication of this investigation, the House of Representatives passed a bill on 16 October, which stipulated that "aid shall be stopped if a determination is made that American weapons have been used in Cyprus." President Ford also vetoed this bill on 17 October.

Despite the opposition of Ford and Kissinger, the Congress kept on pressing for an embargo. The administration could no longer keep defying the growing pressure of both Congress and public opinion. The Senate voted 49 to 43 on 17 December, and the House of Representatives voted 209 to 189 on 18 December in favor of a bill that called on the president to impose an embargo no later than 5 February. President Ford signed the bill on 30 December 1974.

With this law, a new paragraph was attached to section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Law of 1961:

All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus. (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981], p. 42)

With the passing of this law, the sale of U.S. weapons to Turkey came to an end on 5 February 1975. The disbursement of \$200 million in aid already earmarked for Turkey was also suspended.

#### Turkish Reaction to the Embargo

As the U.S. Congress was passing a bill calling for an embargo, the CHP-National Salvation Party (MSP) coalition government resigned on 19 September 1974 over disagreements between the partners on domestic issues. When Demirel and Ecevit failed to form a new coalition government, president Fahri Korutürk asked senator Sadi Irmak to form a government. The Irmak government of

technocrats lasted until Demirel formed his Nationalist Front—1 government on 31 March 1975. The confused situation in Turkey's internal political scene prevented Turkey from getting more fully involved in the congressional procedures that led to the embargo decision in Washington. It remained for the Turkish diplomats to try to influence the course of events by making the following points to their American interlocutors (Uslu, pp. 200–201):

- 1. The Cyprus intervention was carried out in conformity with international treaties and was based on legitimate reasons. It was unfair to impose an arms embargo in these circumstances.
- 2. The embargo decision would encourage the intransigence of the Greek-Cypriot side, while placing Turkey under psychological pressure. This would make it more difficult to start negotiations.
- 3. Turkish-American relations and the question of Cyprus were completely unrelated issues and should not be linked.
- 4. The provision of arms to Turkey by the U.S. was not done as a favor but as an obligation stemming from a defense alliance.
- 5. The embargo would lead to a weakening of the southeastern flank of NATO.

None of these arguments prevented the adoption of the embargo decision, so on 9 February 1975 the Turkish Ministry of Defense warned that Turkey might shut U.S. bases on Turkish soil if U.S. aid to Turkey stopped. When the Süleyman Demirel government came to power, it repeated the warning that the bases would be shut unless the embargo decision was rescinded.

Seeing that Turkey was serious about shutting U.S. bases, President Ford declared on 10 April 1975 in his State of the World speech that the Congress had gone beyond its duties and responsibilities in adopting the decision on the arms embargo. On 19 May the Senate decided to lift the embargo. But the House of Representatives stuck to its previous position. U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger traveled to Ankara on 21 May and asked Demirel not to proceed with the shutting of U.S. bases.

The Turkish opposition had been united by the embargo decision and was pressing the government hard. In response, the Demirel government made the decision on 25 July 1975 to unilaterally abrogate the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement and stop the activities of U.S. bases in Turkey. In the decision, it was stated that the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement of 3 July 1969 and the other related agreements had lost their legal validity. Consequently, the activities of all joint defense installations would cease as of 26 July 1975. Only the NATO responsi-

bilities of the İncirlik joint defense installation would be exempt from this decision. All the affected installations would now come under the full control of the Turkish Armed Forces.

This decision affected twenty-one U.S. bases and installations, including İncirlik. About five thousand U.S. personnel were serving in these facilities. Their privileges to import goods free of duty were canceled. All imported automobiles would henceforth be taxable. Communications facilities for the personnel, including the APO, would be restricted. Unrestricted flights of aircraft between bases in Turkey would cease.

The Turkish press was highly critical of the embargo decision. In particular the left-leaning press underlined that it had been confirmed once again that the U.S. was an unreliable ally. Some newspapers advanced the view that Turkey should assume full control of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. Maps were published showing the locations of these weapons. Demirel found himself obliged to declare that the seizure of U.S. nuclear weapons was not being contemplated.

The public reaction in Turkey and the government's determined actions led to urgent moves in the U.S. to lift the embargo.

#### The Process of Lifting the Embargo: The DECA of 1976 and the 7:10 Ratio

The U.S. administration wanted to conclude a new agreement to replace the defunct JDCA and thereby guarantee the operation of the bases and installations, before lifting the arms embargo.

The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was signed in Washington by Turkish minister of foreign affairs Çağlayangil and U.S. secretary of state Kissinger on 26 March 1976. According to article 2 of DECA, the defense cooperation within this agreement would be limited to the commitments undertaken within NATO. The installations could not be used for purposes not specifically approved by the Republic of Turkey. Unlike the JDCA, this provision allowed Turkey to stop the use of bases for purposes not serving its national interest.

Articles 3 and 4 contained provisions that were more detailed than those in the JDCA. According to these provisions, the Turkish government approved the U.S. government's carrying out defense measures at monitoring installations, at intelligence-gathering systems and networks to be mutually determined, and at the Kargaburun station and the İncirlik installation. It was specified that all of these facilities were Turkish military installations commanded by Turkish officers, where only the Turkish flag

would be displayed. Activities and technical operations at installations would be carried out for purposes approved by the Turkish Republic in accordance with mutually agreed programs.

Article 6 provided that personnel at bases could only perform those duties approved by the government of the Turkish Republic, that the areas where personnel would operate and the distribution of personnel would be determined jointly, bearing in mind the particular requirements, and that the level of the Turkish personnel at special installations would be established at around 50%, through mutual agreement of the parties.

Article 7 of DECA contained a provision that also existed in JDCA: the construction of new buildings, their demolition, and their modernization in order to modify their function at installations and related facilities located on bases could only be carried out after obtaining the authorization of the Turkish authorities. Article 8 stipulated that the weapons, ammunition, and essential materials necessary for carrying out activities in the bases could not be removed from Turkey without the agreement of the parties; nor could they be moved in a manner that would affect the fulfillment of NATO duties.

Unlike JDCA, DECA specified the amount of defense equipment that the U.S. would provide Turkey. Article 19 read as follows: "In the first four years of this agreement, the Government of the U.S. will transfer to Turkey defense materials in the amount of one billion dollars through grants, loans, and leases. This amount will be disbursed in equal, yearly programs that will be agreed upon by the officials of the two governments. Unless otherwise agreed, 25% of the total amount, the equivalent of \$250,000,000, shall be authorized four years in advance. In the first year the grant component will amount to \$75,000,000 and will not be below \$200,000,000 for the four-year period."

This article, which did not exist in the previous agreement, created difficulties in the U.S. Congress because it involved future financial commitments for the U.S. The U.S. budget is approved by the Congress on an annual basis before the beginning of the fiscal year. Congress can make additions or deductions in the budget for political reasons. If the government committed itself in advance to providing Turkey a certain amount of aid for a number of years, and Congress approved this commitment, it would not be possible, as in the case of the embargo decision, to suspend or to end the provision of aid to Turkey on political grounds.

In this context, two conditions had to be met before the agreement could come into effect. The U.S. Congress had to ratify the agreement and lift the embargo on Turkey. In January 1977 Congress refused to ratify the agreement, so DECA never came into effect (Armaoğlu, pp. 288–96).

In March 1976, when the DECA negotiations were still going on, the U.S. proposed the conclusion of a similar agreement with Greece. The U.S. contemplated giving Greece aid amounting to \$200 million over a four-year period, when Turkey had been offered \$1 billion under DECA. When the Greek government learned of the amount of aid on offer to Turkey, it refused to negotiate an agreement.

Prime Minister Karamanlis declared that the negotiations could not be resumed unless Greece was offered 70% of the aid that was being offered to Turkey. Karamanlis submitted the figures on U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey starting in 1947 and concluded that the ratio was 7:10. Consequently, he wanted at least \$700 million in military aid for Greece. President Ford accepted Karamanlis's argument and secured a defense cooperation agreement with Greece in July 1977. But this agreement also failed to get the ratification of Congress.

This 7:10 ratio that first appeared in the U.S.-Greek negotiations came up once again during the process of lifting the arms embargo on Turkey, and successive U.S. administrations consistently operated on the basis of this ratio.

#### The Lifting of the Embargo and Its Consequences

On 4 August 1977 the U.S. Congress adopted Public Law 95-384, by which it authorized \$175 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Turkey in fiscal 1978. This law stated:

[T]he President has determined and certified that resuming full, military cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United States and in the interest of NATO, and that the Turkish Government is making a sincere effort to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the Cyprus question and a peaceful and early return of the refugees to their homes and properties and to continue withdrawing the Turkish forces in Cyprus within the framework of a solution to the Cyprus question... Consequently, subsection x of section 620 of the foreign Assistance Law of 1961 will no longer be applicable.

But the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was of great importance to Turkey because it consisted of grant aid, was not restored.

Public Law 95-384 also contained provisions with respect to the basic principles of America's eastern Mediterranean policy. One of these was that there must be a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus question. Congress felt that the following conditions must be met in order to attain this objective.

- 1. A just solution in Cyprus calls for the establishment of a free and independent government on the island guaranteeing the full protection of the human rights of all the people of Cyprus.
- 2. A just solution must include the withdrawal of the Turkish forces on the island.
- 3. The principles established in February 1977 in Nicosia for the resumption of intercommunal talks and the UN resolutions on Cyprus constitute the basis for negotiations leading to a just solution in Cyprus.
- 4. U.S. policy toward Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey aims at establishing a stable and peaceful environment in the eastern Mediterranean.
- 5. The defense materials furnished by the U.S. to the countries of the eastern Mediterranean shall only be used in conformity with this law, the law on the control of arms exports, and the agreements concluded with respect to these defense materials.

Although it had lifted the embargo, Congress demonstrated that it continued to be sensitive on the Cyprus issue. The new law contained a provision declaring that care would be taken to ensure that the materials of the security assistance being provided to Greece and Turkey would only be used for defensive purposes. It was also emphasized that care would be taken to preserve the military balance among the regional countries, including Greece and Turkey. The balance referred to in this instance was the 7:10 ratio (Armaoğlu, pp. 297–99).

As the U.S. administration restored its influence over the Congress, the embargo was lifted completely on 12 September 1978. Although Ankara received this news with satisfaction, it added that the 7:10 ratio was unacceptable. The nonratification of the DECA of 1976 meant that there was no basic text on which to base the relations between the two countries in the military field. After the lifting of the embargo, the preparations for concluding a new DECA gathered pace.

By imposing an embargo, Congress intended to force Turkey to back down on the Cyprus issue. As a matter of fact, it had the opposite effect: on 13 February 1975 Turkey responded to the embargo by establishing the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. U.S. attempts to direct Turkish policies on Cyprus, both during and after the embargo, failed to yield any results.

Another objective pursued in particular by the legislators of Greek extraction was to punish Turkey because of its intervention in Cyprus. This objective was partially attained. American military aid, which was of vital importance for the modernization of the Turkish army, was interrupted for three years. Being deprived of spare parts for its existing weapons also harmed the Turkish army.

The embargo strengthened anti-American tendencies among the Turkish public. The standing of the U.S. in Turkey was badly shaken. The army in particular started demanding the development of a domestic defense industry in order to avoid a repetition of the embargo experience. (On the lifting of the embargo, also see "Relations with Iran" in "Relations with the Middle East" in this section.)

#### The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) of 1980

Problems That Emerged in the Course of Negotiations

When the U.S. arms embargo was lifted, negotiations were undertaken between Turkish and American officials in the winter of 1979 to conclude a new and comprehensive agreement that would replace the JDCA of 1969 and the DECA of 1976 that had never come into effect. When Prime Minister Ecevit resigned after his party's poor electoral performance in October 1979, Demirel became prime minister. His government was eager to conclude a new DECA as early as possible.

But a number of differences emerged between the parties that prolonged the negotiations.

- 1. Turkey wanted the agreement to specify the military and economic assistance that the U.S. would furnish Turkey over a number of years. It was expected that a large lump sum of aid would undo the damage done by the lack of aid during the embargo. But the U.S. side explained that, under the U.S. Constitution, Congress approved the budget (and with it the foreign aid bill) on an annual basis and that it was not possible to include a provision in the agreement that would specify the amount of aid over a number of years. At Turkey's insistence article 3 was included: "The Government of the United States shall use its best efforts to provide the Government of the Republic of Turkey with defense equipment, services, and training in accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon" (U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 9901 [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980], p. 3326).
- 2. It was foreseen that minister of foreign affairs Hayrettin Erkmen and U.S. ambassador James Spain

would sign DECA. But Turkey was insisting that a document be signed by president Jimmy Carter in order to give more weight to the commitment contained in article 3. Having suffered from the embargo, Turkey wanted to ensure that the president would not approve a similar decision in the future. The question was overcome by having the U.S. ambassador deliver to the Turkish side at the time of the DECA signing a side letter indicating that President Carter would make every effort to implement the provision in this article.

3. The two sides also disagreed over the quantity of arms and materials that would be delivered within DECA. The Turkish side wanted a detailed list of what was to be furnished attached to the agreement. The U.S. side contended that conditions might change and that it might become impossible to deliver some items in the future and opposed the idea of compiling a detailed list on these grounds. The question was overcome by agreeing to have Turkish and U.S. experts concur on the composition of the aid prior to the signing of DECA.

4. There was a further disagreement on the type and number of aircraft that the U.S. would be allowed to locate on Turkish bases under the terms of DECA. Turkey made it clear that it would not allow the aircraft located in Turkey to be used for purposes not related to NATO (see Box 4-9 in Section 4). The U.S. side had no choice but to agree with Turkey on this issue.

5. The manner in which the expenses of Turkish personnel at the bases would be met also created difficulties. The U.S. declared that Turkish personnel would have access to messes if they paid for their meals. The Turkish side eventually agreed to cover the costs of canteens and other places used exclusively by Turkish personnel and to meet the expenses of Turkish personnel.

Once these difficulties and differences were overcome, DECA was signed in Ankara on 29 March 1980. Because the TGNA was involved with electing the president of the Republic, it never got around to ratifying the agreement. After the military coup of 12 September 1980, it was approved by a decree of the Council of Ministers on 18 November 1980 and came into effect on 1 February 1981, when it was published in the Official Gazette (Armaoğlu, p. 300).

#### **DECA's Provisions**

DECA was the most comprehensive agreement between Turkey and the U.S. In addition to the main text consisting of nine articles, it contained three supplementary agreements and thirteen related implementation agreements (Armaoğlu, pp. 301–63).

Article 1 provided that "the parties shall maintain and develop close cooperation between them comprising economic, defense and related scientific and technical fields." Article 2 declared: "Recognizing the interrelationship of economic and defense matters and the fact that a sound defense rests on a sound economy and in order to assist each other to fulfill their mutual responsibilities as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Parties, as envisaged in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, will exert maximum efforts to develop economic cooperation, including commercial, economic, industrial, scientific and technological relations, between the two Countries." In this way, for the first time since the two countries engaged in intensified relations starting with the agreement of 12 July 1947, military and economic cooperation became subjects of the same agreement.

The subject of developing a domestic defense industry in Turkey was also taken up within the framework of DECA. Article 4 included a passage declaring that the U.S. government "shall assist the Government of the Republic of Turkey in mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing the production, maintenance, repair and modernization of defense material and equipment in Turkey and will encourage new defense production projects and two-way trade in defense material."

Like the JDCA, the DECA also contained provisions regulating the principles upon which activities at American bases and installations would rest. Article 5 stated: "The activities and technical operations of the installations shall be conducted in accordance with mutually agreed purposes and programs... The extent of the defense cooperation envisaged in this agreement shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty." This provision was intended to prevent the U.S. from using the bases and installations for non-NATO purposes, especially to support unilateral operations in the Middle East.

Article 7 provided that the agreement would be valid for a period of five years and would continue to be in effect for further one-year periods unless one of the parties notified the other of the termination three months before the end of this initial five-year period.

Supplementary Agreement Number 2 dealt with cooperation in the field of defense industries. Article 1 of the text provided that the parties "will cooperate in order to increase their defense equipment production and maintenance capabilities and to enable their armed forces to acquire more economically and efficiently modern armaments and equipment needed for self and common defense." Article 9 read: "Third party transfer of defense articles or technical data made available under this Supplementary Agreement and of defense articles produced with such data will be subject to the agreement of the Government that made available the defense articles or technical data, except as otherwise agreed." Under the terms of this agreement, Turkey exported F-16 combat aircraft made in Turkey to Egypt in the 1990s, after obtaining U.S. approval.

Article 4 stipulated that the U.S. would "provide to the Government of the Republic of Turkey or assist the Government of the Republic of Turkey in obtaining, wherever possible at no cost or at terms no less favorable than those extended by the Government of the United States to any other NATO country, industrial property rights for the purpose of promoting the defense equipment production and enhancing the rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of equipment and services of the NATO Alliance." In this framework, it was envisaged that the two sides would engage in cooperation for the production of antitank guns, fuses, gunpowder, explosives, and rockets in addition to enhancing aircraft-overhauling capabilities. Thus the U.S. agreed to apply to Turkey a sort of mostfavored-nation treatment in the field of defense. Despite this, especially after the mid-1980s, some members of the U.S. Congress, acting in unison with anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobbies, would seek to impose restrictions on cooperation with Turkey in the field of arms production and maintenance.

Supplementary Agreement No. 3 regulated the American bases and installations in Turkey. According to this agreement, Turkey allowed the U.S. to operate the following facilities: electromagnetic monitoring at Sinop; radar early warning and space monitoring at Pirinçlik; air operations and support at İncirlik; communications facilities at Yamanlar (İzmir), Şahintepe (Gemlik), Elmadağ (Ankara), Karataş (Adana), Mahmutdağ (Samsun), Alemdağ (İstanbul), and Kürecik (Malatya); seismic monitoring at Belbaşı; and radio navigation at Kargaburun.

According to article 2 of the supplementary agreement, technical activities and maintenance at facilities whose main function was to gather information and provide communication and radio-navigation services would be carried out jointly by Turkish and American personnel.

Article 3 provided that the bases and installations would be commanded by Turkish and American officers of the same rank, who would be responsible for jointly administering the facilities. All services dealing with security, however, including area security, would be the responsibility of the Turkish commander. The American

flag would be hoisted only at the headquarters building of the U.S. forces.

As in previous agreements, this agreement also provided that American personnel and their dependents would be free to import their personal equipment, food, supplies, and other goods. But this time it was specified that these items would be in reasonable amounts and would be listed in a manifest that would be presented to the Turkish authorities at the point of entry into the country or when they were being removed from the country. It was also provided that the arms, munitions, and main items of equipment needed for the operation of an installation could not be removed from Turkey without prior notification. This included equipment that was due to be replaced because of obsolescence.

The agreement stipulated that the land allotted to the U.S. and all structures built on this land would be the property of the Turkish Republic and be registered as such.

Finally, it was stated that in extraordinary circumstances it was the inherent right of the Turkish government to take, in conformity with international law, whatever restrictive measures were necessary to defend its national existence. This provision would allow Turkey, if it deemed it necessary, to suspend some articles of the agreement and impose certain restrictions on the U.S. bases, installations, and personnel in Turkey.

### D. The Effects of Iran's Revolution on Turkish-American Relations

The new administration that came to power in Iran following the overthrow of the shah in 1979 severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. U.S. citizens who sought refuge in their embassy were not allowed to return to the U.S., and shortly afterward the embassy compound was occupied by Iranian revolutionaries. This was the cause of the "hostage crisis" between the two countries.

In April 1980 President Carter appealed to the governments of friendly states to join the U.S. in imposing sanctions on Iran, including severance of diplomatic relations, banning trade, and denying visas to Iranians.

Turkey fully supported the U.S. in its efforts to get the hostages out of Iran. But it was reluctant to take measures against a country from which it imported a substantial part of its oil requirements. Furthermore, tough sanctions could easily push Tehran into Moscow's orbit, and Turkey did not want a pro-Soviet neighbor on its eastern border.

On 17 April the U.S. decided to ban the import of Iranian oil and forbade U.S. citizens from traveling to Iran. It also called on Turkey to do likewise. Turkey declined to

take such measures, citing its special circumstances. The Turkish government declared that the embassy of at least one NATO country should remain in Tehran to look after Western interests, and Turkey was the country best placed to take on this task.

At this point the newspaper *Hürriyet* revealed that the U.S. had delivered a note demanding that Ankara immediately sever diplomatic relations with Iran. This allegation was denied by the U.S. At the end of April, however, Ambassador Spain appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again for Turkey to apply sanctions to Iran.

Turkey stood firm in its decision not to join the sanctions. It refused to allow the use of İncirlik air base for the purpose of freeing the hostages, because this would be an "out-of-area" operation within the context of NATO. On 25 June the U.S. mounted a salvage operation with helicopters taking off from the Persian Gulf, but the operation ended in failure. Turkey thereupon informed the U.S. that, while not participating in the sanctions, it would be ready to act as mediator to resolve the hostage crisis.

The U.S. was seeking sanctions from Ankara, however, and not mediation. The Iranian administration released the hostages on 20 January 1981. After refueling in Turkey, the Algerian aircraft charged with this mission lifted the U.S. citizens out of Tehran and flew them to Ankara's Esenboğa Airport.

Turkey's stance in connection with the hostage crisis drew sharp criticism in the U.S. Doubts were expressed about the reliability of Turkey as an ally. Turkish public opinion in this period, however, took the position that Ankara should not jeopardize its national interest in order to defend the interests of another state. The hostage crisis was one of the few instances when Washington asked for Ankara's help and failed to get satisfaction.

Cağrı Erhan

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#### Relations with Greece

#### I. BACKGROUND OF THE PERIOD

Throughout the 1950s, when the Cold War was pervasive, the Menderes government in Turkey and the Papagos and Karamanlis governments in Greece tended to identify their national interest with Western interests. Starting with Cyprus, all differences between the two countries were perceived by Washington as weakening NATO's southeastern flank and therefore being to Moscow's advantage. As a result, these differences were resolved without turning into problems through Washington's intercession.

This era came to an end in the 1960s when international developments and developments within Turkey and Greece created a new situation and led to the poisoning of relations between the two countries by conflicts and disputes that have lasted to this day. The fundamental dispute in the 1960s was over Cyprus, with the additional disputes over the Aegean Sea in the 1970s. From time to time, these disputes threatened to get out of hand and turn into armed conflict. To understand how and why the era of friendship of the 1950s came to an end, we must examine the changes that came about in the 1960s.

In that decade the Cold War gradually started giving way to détente. The first signs of détente appeared with Stalin's death in 1953, developed after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and became institutionalized with the Helsinki Final Act of European Security and Cooperation in 1975. Détente affected not just relations between the two blocs but also relations within the blocs. Détente diminished the threat perceived as coming from the other bloc. This led to a more nationalistic and independent stance vis-à-vis the leading power in both camps. At the same time, disputes within blocs were able to resurface and attain dangerous proportions. In this new setup, the leadership of the U.S. and the USSR began to be challenged. France within the Western Bloc and Czechoslovakia and Romania within the Eastern Bloc started questioning

Washington's and Moscow's policies and steering more independent courses. As perceived threats and the influence of bloc leaders diminished, it became harder to prevent intrabloc differences from turning into conflicts. Within the Eastern Bloc, one such nationalistic conflict was seen in Moscow's relations with Peking; in the Western camp, Turkey and Greece confronted each other over Cyprus. The changed international situation, which allowed the Cyprus question to fester during the 1960s and led to a military operation in 1974, brought these two countries to the brink of war.

In the 1960s the political and economic structures of Turkey and Greece underwent significant changes. The economic aid provided mostly by the U.S. in the 1950s had led both agricultural countries in the direction of capitalism. Mechanization had been introduced to agriculture, and the rural sector became more integrated with the market due to investments in the road network. Without land reform, the surplus farm labor drifted into the cities. Because of the absence of industrialization, a mass of unemployed and uprooted lumpenproletariat arose in the cities. This phenomenon was observed in both countries and led to a strengthened opposition in the 1960s and a corresponding weakening of the political parties that had been in power throughout the 1950s.

The economic and social changes in Turkey led to even more sweeping consequences. On 27 May 1960 the armed forces, with the backing of the intelligentsia, took over the administration. The founders of Turkey's regime, the military and civilian bureaucracy, were reacting to the bourgeoisie, which had come to power in 1950 and was seeking to shift the balance in its own favor. The changes that had taken place in Turkey's social fabric, however, did not allow the bureaucracy to stay in power for long. The regime established on 27 May prepared the most democratic Constitution in Turkey's history, eliminated the DP from the political scene, and restored power to

the civilians in 1961. There was a transition period from 1961 to 1965, when coalition governments were formed by Ismet İnönü until the Justice Party came to power in 1965. The bourgeoisie was in charge of the country once again. The period from the coup of 27 May 1960 to the military's memorandum of 12 March 1971 was one in which democracy was allowed to function freely for the first time in Turkey's history. In the heady atmosphere of freedom introduced by the 1961 Constitution, all shades of political opinion found it possible to organize themselves and all political currents, from extreme Right to extreme Left, were able to voice their dissent.

This dissent was also felt in the area of foreign policy. Traditionally foreign policy in Turkey had been bipartisan, but now it was coming under critical scrutiny. Previous governments had been autonomous in this sphere, but now they were being held accountable, and their freedom of maneuver became more restricted. When the Cyprus crisis erupted in the 1960s, the government was operating under the pressure of strong public opinion. Student unrest gathered momentum toward the end of the 1960s, as did Kurdish nationalism. The regime's founders considered all of this to be a direct threat to the political regime. Finally, the armed forces submitted a memorandum to the government, which led to an interim regime lasting until 1973. After the election of 1973 came a period of unstable coalition governments that ended in 1980. The disputes over the Aegean between Greece and Turkey and the Cyprus operation took place during this period of instability in Turkey.

Like Turkey, Greece went through a similar process. During the 1950s Western aid allowed Greece to embark on the road to capitalism. But the process did not go hand in hand with structural adjustment. This led to an uneven distribution of income, unemployment, emigration, and inadequate funds for education and health. The resulting social discontent was suppressed, and critics, especially the Communists, were either imprisoned or forced to flee the country. When the Karamanlis government was pressed by the U.S. to reach an agreement with Turkey over Cyprus, the opposition was able to make political capital out of this in the 1961 election. The Union of the Center Party of Georgios Papandreou used the issue of Cyprus as a tool to give expression to widespread internal discontent. When it started looking like the government might lose the election, the mobilization of the army and, in particular, the pressure of the gendarmerie in the rural areas allowed the National Radical Union of Karamanlis to score another victory. Papandreou protested the election results, which he claimed were illegal, and launched his Anendotos (Struggle All the Way) campaign, which went on for two years. The campaign paid off: in the 1963 election, the Union of the Center emerged as the first party but failed to get an overall majority in the parliament. Another election was held in February 1964, and this time Papandreou won a landslide victory and formed a government. During his term, Papandreou sought to establish a fully functioning democracy in Greece. For this, he tried to introduce constitutional limitations on the king's powers and sought to loosen the army's links with the palace and turn it into an impartial institution detached from politics. When he tried to dismiss the promonarchy minister of defense, rumors began circulating that his son, Andreas Papandreou, was conspiring with young officers to carry out a coup. The elder Papandreou found himself confronting both the palace and the army and was forced to resign.

After two years of unstable coalition governments, a junta of colonels took power on 21 April 1967. The junta consisted of Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Makarezos, and Stylianos Pattakos and had the backing of the CIA. A military dictatorship was established after the coup and ran the country until 1974. As the junta progressively lost popular support, it became more repressive. In 1973 Dimitrios Ioannides carried out a coup against the coupmakers and concentrated all power in his own hands. The next year, Turkey's Cyprus operation led to the collapse of the military dictatorship. Karamanlis, who had been living in Paris in voluntary exile since 1963, was summoned to form the government. Karamanlis's second term in power was to last until 1981. In this period Greece carried out its democratization process peacefully. In foreign policy, it set new objectives under the slogan "Greece is European" and made substantial progress toward integrating itself with the European Community. Since the 1950s Turkey and Greece had been going through similar economic, social, and political processes and had been pursuing similar foreign policies. It was the sharp digression that occurred after 1974 that can explain the different relative positions of the two countries in the present-day political arena.

In the two decades from 1960 to 1980 both countries went through significant economic and social transformation and suffered from unstable coalition governments, political upheavals, and military coups. Their foreign policies and bilateral relations were also quite unstable. First the question of Cyprus and then the Aegean disputes marred bilateral relations and led to significant changes in the foreign policies of the two countries.

#### II. THE PERIOD WHEN THE CYPRUS QUESTION WAS THE DETERMINING FACTOR (1960–1974)

The first phase of the Cyprus question came to an end with the signing of the London Treaties in 1959. Turkey and Greece were engrossed in their internal affairs. Cyprus was trying to get used to independence, and relations between Greece and Turkey remained unruffled. The events of 1963 ushered in the second phase of the Cyprus question, which was to last until 1974 and differed markedly from the first phase (from 1945 to 1960). In the first phase the Cyprus question concerned only Turkey, Greece, and Britain. Now there was an independent and nonaligned Cyprus, with its Greek and Turkish communities. Turkey, Greece, and Britain continued to be parties through treaty rights. As leaders of the two blocs, the U.S. and the USSR were also involved. The question was on the UN agenda as well as on the agenda of the nonaligned movement. The issue had been thoroughly internationalized and therefore became more complex.

### A. The Independence of Cyprus and the Cyprus Policy of the 27 May Administration

Cyprus went through a preparatory stage from the time the London Treaties were signed up to independent statehood, which occurred on 16 August 1960. After an absence of three years, Makarios returned to the island on 1 March 1959. In his statements, he catered to the sensitivities of both communities. On the one hand, he paid homage to the EOKA martyrs and gave thanks to Grivas. On the other hand, he affirmed that freedom did not consist only of rights and privileges but also involved responsibilities and duties and that it was necessary to cooperate freely and sincerely with the Turkish community. Makarios said that Cyprus would be a bridge uniting opposing camps, rather than an element of discord. It would become a physical and moral bond between North and South and East and West.

In the election held on 13 December 1959, Archbishop Makarios was elected president and Dr. Fazıl Küçük vice-president. Although the provisional government approved the Constitution consisting of 199 articles on 6 April 1960, there were differences with Britain over the size of the British sovereign bases, which delayed the independence of Cyprus.

Once this question had been sorted out, the Republic of Cyprus proclaimed its independence on 16 August 1960. On the same day, the London Treaties, which had been signed by Turkey, Greece, and Britain but had only been adhered to through declarations made by the leaders

of the Greek and Turkish communities, were signed once again by the original signatories and this time also by the Republic of Cyprus. The treaties would now become the Nicosia Treaties. The British governor, Hugh Foot, left the island the next day, and Cyprus joined the UN on 24 August.

While these developments were taking place, the military administration of 27 May in Turkey was pursuing a policy of denigrating the policies of the DP, including its foreign policy. While the military leaders were giving assurances to the West by declaring their loyalty to NATO and CENTO, they were also criticizing the DP government for neglecting the nonaligned countries. The Committee of National Unity (the military junta) issued a statement on 28 May 1960, announcing that it stood by the London Treaties. The government program released on 11 July declared that Turkish-Greek relations were expected to develop now that the Cyprus question was solved. The program noted that the London Treaties were about to come into effect, which would allow the Turkish Cypriots to take their rightful place within the structure of the Republic of Cyprus. The program added that the Turkish Cypriots would always be able to rely on the support and affection of the Turkish people and government. Turkey's interest was directed mainly at the Cypriot Turks and Greece rather than at the Republic of Cyprus.

Two days after the Republic of Cyprus came into being on 16 August 1960, retired colonel Emin Dirvana presented his credentials to Makarios as Turkish ambassador. He was one of five foreign ambassadors accredited to Cyprus at that time. The first embassies established by Cyprus were located in Ankara, Athens, Washington, London, and Bonn. The administration of 27 May was taking great care to avoid any disagreement that might convey the impression that it was veering away from its traditional policies with Greece or one of its other allies. In this context, it was acting with particular circumspection vis-à-vis Cyprus. Ambassador Dirvana, who was himself originally from Cyprus, did his best during his tenure, which lasted until 26 September 1962, to maintain good relations. For the sake of good relations, he often found himself in disagreement with the Cypriot Turkish leadership. He never approved the moves for setting up the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) that was designed to protect the Turks against a possible Greek attack. He maintained his impartiality with respect to the Turkish-Cypriot opposition, which was seeking to form an alternative party to the Küçük-Denktaş duo.

Despite the policies of the 27 May administration and the conciliatory efforts of Ambassador Dirvana in

Cyprus, the nationalist hawks from both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities had entrenched themselves in key positions in the political structure of the new state. This would prevent the emergence of a collective sense of belonging to Cyprus and frustrate the functioning of the Republic of Cyprus in the manner foreseen in its Constitution.

# B. The 1964 Crisis and Its Consequences The Emergence of Disputes in Cyprus and Makarios's Proposal to Amend the Constitution A year after the intercommunal clashes erunted in Cyp

A year after the intercommunal clashes erupted in Cyprus in 1963, they led to a crisis between Turkey and Greece, within NATO, and between the two blocs. To understand how this came about, we must examine the process that led to these clashes in 1963 and their causes.

Immediately after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the first disputes emerged over the collection of taxes, the formation of the armed forces, the participation in public services, and the drawing of the limits of single-community municipalities.

To replace the tax laws taken over from the British administration, it was necessary to obtain majorities in both Communal Chambers. When it proved impossible to obtain a majority in the Turkish Communal Chamber, it was decided to extend the old legislation by three months, up to 31 March 1961. When this term expired, the Turkish Communal Chamber failed to pass the new legislation or to extend the old laws for a second term. To implement the five-year development plan, it was essential to collect taxes in an orderly fashion. This led Makarios to decree that taxes would be collected from all taxpayers according to the old tax laws starting from 1 April. Denktaş claimed that this decree was unconstitutional and called on Turkish-Cypriot taxpayers not to pay their taxes. He also went to the Constitutional Court to have the decree quashed.

The second dispute arose over the formation of the armed forces. The Turkish Cypriots wanted the Turkish-Cypriot units to be constituted as separate formations to be commanded by Turkish-Cypriot officers, while Makarios wanted the armed forces to reflect national unity and consist of units with Greek-Cypriot commanders and Turkish-Cypriot deputies. Fazil Küçük maintained that differences of language, religion, and habits would lead to a breakdown of discipline if mixed units were established and this in turn would lead to social turmoil. On 20 October 1962 he vetoed the bill, based on these arguments.

On the questions of participation in the public service and municipalities, it was the Greek-Cypriot side

that displayed intransigence. The Constitution provided that Turks would make up 30% of the public service, with the remaining 70% of posts assigned to Greek Cypriots. Makarios claimed that there were not enough qualified Turks to fill the allocated posts and declared that the constitutional provision could therefore not be implemented. The differences over municipalities were also very deep. In early 1962 Makarios declared that the separate municipalities foreseen for the five main cities imposed a heavy burden on the budget and called for amalgamating these municipalities. On 29 December 1962 the Turkish Communal Chamber voted for maintaining the separate municipalities. While the Greek-Cypriot members of the cabinet decided to disband the separate municipalities, the Turkish-Cypriot municipalities ignored the decision.

Makarios then declared that there was no way to make the state function with the existing Constitution and proposed changes in it. Küçük complained that Makarios was acting unconstitutionally by restricting his veto rights. These differences within the state were strengthening the hands of the hawks within the two communities who advocated enosis or partition. At the same time, acts of terror were adding to the tension. The perpetrators of the terror went undetected, with both sides blaming the other for these outrages. The first sign that it was becoming more difficult to resolve outstanding questions came with the resignation of the Turkish ambassador, Emin Dirvana, who had been ready to fall out with the Turkish-Cypriot leadership for the sake of intercommunal harmony and who said he would not tolerate any act of terrorism.

Makarios was convinced that the Constitution had to be amended. He also felt that the conditions were ripe for imposing his views on Turkey. The government in Ankara was an unstable coalition, there was discontent in the army, and Turkey's foreign policy had been shaken by the Cuban missile crisis. Makarios visited Ankara from 22 to 26 November 1962 to sound out the government but failed to obtain the results he was expecting. When he explained his position to Prime Minister İnönü, he was sharply rebuffed. Turkey would never agree to a unilateral amendment that would alter the relative balance established between the communities by the Cypriot Constitution.

Developments in Cyprus were also frustrating Makarios. The Constitutional Court reached a decision on taxation on 8 February 1963 and a decision on municipalities on 26 April 1963. Neither decision could overcome the deadlock. The court decided that the existing tax law remained valid but that there was no mechanism for collecting taxes in accordance with the law because Turkish members of the House of Representatives had been

applying a veto since 1961. With respect to the municipalities, the court ruled that the government's decision to unite all the municipalities was invalid, as was the decision of the Turkish Communal Chamber to maintain the separate municipalities. On 15 July 1963 the president of the Constitutional Court, the German professor Ernest Forsthoff, resigned, citing the pressure applied on the court as his reason.

At this point Makarios decided to carry out his intentions by relying on his country's political clout in the international arena. In a statement made on 5 August 1963, he made allusions to the utopian character of the Cyprus Constitution. He also held talks with Küçük about the constitutional impasse. When he saw that these talks were getting nowhere, on 30 November 1963 he made his proposal to amend thirteen provisions of the Constitution. His main proposals were as follows. (1) The president and vice-president must be stripped of their veto rights, and their election should take place in the House of Representatives by a joint ballot of all members. (2) The separate veto should be abolished in the case of certain taxation laws. (3) Separate municipalities should be abolished. (4) The judiciary should be consolidated with the police, the gendarmerie, and the security forces. (5) The numerical distribution of posts in the administration and army should be in proportion to the population. (6) The numerical distribution of posts in the police force and the army should be determined by law. (7) The Public Services Commission should be able to decide by a simple majority. (8) The Greek-Cypriot Communal Chamber should be abolished.

Makarios's proposals were not simple amendments of the Constitution. They were designed to get rid of the balance established in 1960. If these amendments could be carried through, the balanced partnership established on the basis of equality of the two communities would come to an end and be replaced by a unitary state with guaranteed rights for the minority.

The president's proposals were formally conveyed to Britain, Greece, and Turkey through diplomatic notes. Turkey replied on 6 December and categorically rejected the proposals. In response, Makarios declared that his purpose in sending the notes to the three states was just to inform them of his position and not to ascertain their positive or negative reactions.

#### The Events of 1964 and the London Conference

The tension between the two communities in Cyprus and between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey quickly degenerated into intercommunal violence. The Cypriot

Turks feared attacks from their neighbors, the Greek Cypriots, while the Greek Cypriots were fearful of a military intervention from Turkey.

The events were triggered by an incident on 21 December 1963, when a Greek-Cypriot policeman on duty in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia attempted to conduct a search in a car with Turkish-Cypriot occupants. The occupants of the car refused to submit to the search, and Turkish Cypriots quickly came to their aid. This led to clashes with the police, who resorted to firearms, resulting in the death of two Turkish Cypriots. A Greek-Cypriot police officer was injured when Turkish Cypriots fought the police with stones and sticks. The violence spread to all parts of the island where the two communities lived in close proximity and lasted until 31 December. Greek-Cypriot youths surrounded all Turkish villages and districts to isolate the inhabitants and prevent them from receiving outside aid. In response, the Turkish military force stationed on the island in accordance with the 1960 treaties took up positions on the Nicosia-Gönyeli line to prevent the Greek Cypriots from overrunning this district. This was the beginning of the green line, which divided Nicosia in two and led to the establishment of two separate de facto administrations in Cyprus. New steps followed in 1964. The Cypriot Turks established their own postal administration, Küçük removed the vice-presidential standard from his car, the Turkish ministers did not attend cabinet meetings, and the Turkish police officers removed the Republic of Cyprus insignia from their uniforms.

To grasp the true significance of the events of 1963, we should examine the Akritas plan, which was revealed in the Cypriot newspaper Patris on 21 April 1966. Akritas was the code name of the minister of the interior, Polikarpos Yorgacis, one of the EOKA leaders. The plan underlined the need to grant the right of self-determination to the Cypriot people and described the methods to be employed at home and abroad to bring this about. According to the plan, it was necessary to create the impression internationally that the Cyprus question had not been solved and had to be examined once again. The plan foresaw the elimination of the constitutional provisions that prevented the state from functioning. Also to be eliminated were the agreements preventing the Cypriot people from deciding their own future. In the event that the Turkish Cypriots resisted these demands, military measures would be taken against them. (This "top secret" plan was revealed in a newspaper because of the feud between Makarios and Grivas. Grivas was convinced that Makarios had abandoned the enosis ideal and was a traitor. Grivas ordered the ultranationalist newspaper Patris under his

control to publish the Akritas Plan in order to expose how the archbishop had betrayed the national cause.)

It is open to argument whether the 1963 events were the result of implementing the Akritas plan, as claimed by Turkey and the Cypriot Turks. But it is known that even in December 1963, when the plan still had not come to light, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership suspected that such a plan might exist and saw the violence as a manifestation of it. This would explain how the violence between the communities allowed the hawks to gain influence because of the mutual lack of confidence. As a result, it was not possible to restore calm, and the events led to a full-fledged international crisis.

When violence broke out in Cyprus, Prime Minister Inönü met with the army brass and diplomats to appraise the situation. İnönü ordered a flight of jets to overfly the island as a warning and to launch bombs if the violence did not cease. Military preparations got underway. The fleet was ordered to proceed from İstanbul to Mersin. Units from central Anatolia were redeployed to the Greek frontier. The next day, Turkish jets were flying over Cyprus. In accordance with a decision made at the meeting, Britain and Greece were handed notes, calling on their forces on the island to take action in conjunction with Turkish forces and interpose between the two sides. If this did not stop the violence, Turkey would intervene unilaterally. The message also went to NATO.

Greece proposed a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three guarantor states to consider the issue. Taking into account the gravity of the situation, Turkey proposed that the violence be stopped as a precondition for the meeting. For its part, Britain proposed that the situation be considered at a conference to be held in London, to which Turkey gave its assent.

The London Conference convened on 15 January 1964. Denktas articulated the Turkish side's proposals, which subsequently became Turkey's official position. He declared that the 1960 agreements failed to provide security to the island's Turks and that effective guarantees were needed. In this context, the only solution was the establishment of a federal state consisting of two communities. To achieve this end, the communities must be separated geographically through a transfer of populations.

In a way, this once again placed the thesis of partition on the agenda, but this time in a different guise. Supported by Greece, Glafkos Clerides set forth the Greek-Cypriot thesis, which was a new Constitution for Cyprus that would ensure the interests of the majority and would be easier to implement than the present one.

Turkey, Greece, and the Turkish Cypriots eventually

agreed to a NATO force of 10,000 men under the command of a British officer being stationed in Cyprus to restore order and security. But the U.S. undersecretary of state, George Ball, who traveled to the island, was unable to persuade Makarios to agree. The Cypriot president was determined to follow a nonaligned course in his foreign policy. He insisted on a solution that involved a UN force, in the knowledge that the nonaligned countries and the Soviet Union would make their weight felt in the world body.

#### The Cyprus Question and the UN

When it became clear that a solution within NATO was not feasible and intercommunal violence continued, Britain referred the question to the UN Security Council on 15 February 1964.

Initially the U.S. and Britain introduced a draft resolution, which provided for sending a peacekeeping force to Cyprus. The draft resolution kept in mind that the government of Cyprus consisted of two communities and in each reference to that government clearly stated that it was constituted with the participation of the Turkish-Cypriot and the Greek-Cypriot communities. This was a way of indicating that a government representing only one of the communities could not be regarded as the legitimate government of Cyprus. But it was Turkey's stand that prevented this draft resolution, which reflected Turkish views, from being adopted. Ankara insisted on including in the draft a paragraph condemning the cruelty inflicted on the Turkish community. As a result, Britain and the U.S. withdrew their draft, and the nonpermanent members prepared a new draft.

The new draft was adopted as resolution 186 on 4 March 1964. It provided for the setting up of a UN Peace Force, with the approval of the government of Cyprus, and asked the secretary-general to designate a mediator to help find a peaceful solution.

The dispatching of the UN force was being delayed. Upon Turkey's threat to intervene, the first units of the force (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, known as UNFICYP) arrived in Cyprus on 14 March. The force was fully deployed by 27 March. Secretary-general U Thant appointed the Indian general G. J. Gyani to command the force, and Sakari Tuomioja (a Finn) became mediator.

The arrival of UNFICYP did not bring violence on the island to an end. Turkey sent notes to London and Washington, reminding them that it was ready to intervene if it became necessary. On 16 March 1964 the TGNA authorized the government to intervene militarily in Cyprus if such action was needed.

#### U.S. Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Question

Even before UNFICYP arrived on the island, the members of EOKA in Cyprus got in touch with Grivas, who was in Athens at the time, and elected him president of the National Council of Cyprus. Through his efforts, Greek soldiers were being smuggled into Cyprus. In turn, the Turkish Cypriots were taking their countermeasures by reviving the TMT and introducing weapons from Anatolia. At a time when both sides were busy arming themselves, Makarios announced on 4 April 1964 that he was repudiating the Treaty of Alliance. The Turkish government declared that it did not recognize this decision, which it considered to be devoid of a legal basis.

The main reason for Makarios's tough stand was the support he was getting from Georgios Papandreou, whose Center Union Party had won a landslide victory at the election held in February 1964. In April Makarios went to Athens, where he reached an agreement with Papandreou. This agreement went a long way in explaining the policies of the Greek and Cypriot governments in the following months. It contained the following provisions. (1) The search for a solution in Cyprus would be conducted at the UN and not within NATO or through bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece. (2) The ultimate objective would be enosis. (3) All action that might provoke the Turks should be avoided so as not to lose the moral high ground and in order to achieve enosis without violence. (4) In the event of an attack from Turkey, Greece would come to the assistance of the government of Cyprus. In this framework, Greece sent 20,000 soldiers and arms clandestinely to Cyprus.

As the tension in Cyprus escalated, the pressure of Turkish public opinion on the government was also rising. On 16 April 1964 prime minister İsmet İnönü gave an interview to the correspondent of Time magazine in which he warned that the Western alliance might well come apart if the allies did not change their course. He concluded by remarking that "[a] new international order will be established, and Turkey will find its place within this order" (Milliyet, 16 April 1964). This signaled that a Turkish intervention could now be expected. But the army was not prepared for such an operation. Furthermore, İnönü was in favor of a cautious approach in foreign policy. He was fully aware of the existence of disgruntled elements in the army, despite the fact that the two coup attempts of Col. Talat Aydemir had been foiled. In addition, his coalition government had internal problems, and the international situation was not all that propitious.

But İnönü knew that these factors could not be cited as an excuse for inaction. On 4 June 1964 he decided to ig-

nore the opposition of minister of foreign affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin and notified the U.S. of his intentions. He expected that the U.S. would not allow a conflict among allies and would apply the necessary pressure on Greece and Cyprus and solve the problem. He was wrong. The letter that Johnson wrote on 5 June had the effect of a bombshell and led to significant changes not just in Turkey's Cyprus policy but also in its overall foreign policy.

Johnson's letter had two immediate effects. It provided the official pretext for Turkey's decision not to intervene in Cyprus. It also led the Turkish leadership to question the basic assumptions on which Turkey's foreign policy rested. Despite its tough tone, the Johnson-İnönü correspondence did not bring relations between the two allies to an end. On the contrary, İnönü accepted Johnson's invitation, and a new opportunity was found to consider the question in all of its ramifications.

The Washington visits of İnönü and Papandreou: Johnson's ultimate objective was to settle the Cyprus question through a U.S. initiative that would lead to an agreement between Turkey and Greece, as had been the case in 1959. That is why Georgios Papandreou had also been invited to Washington along with İnönü. What Johnson failed to note was that conditions had changed since 1959. With the thaw in the Cold War, the "Soviet threat" was no longer a factor drawing the two countries closer together. In fact, the opposite was true. Moscow was now seen in both countries as a possible counterweight to Western pressure. Unlike the 1950s, when there were strong governments based on comfortable majorities in both countries, political power was now in the hands of unstable governments in both Ankara and Athens. Finally, Cyprus had ceased to be a question concerning just the Ankara-Athens-London trio. Now there was a new factor in the equation: the government of Cyprus represented by Makarios. There was no way to ignore this: it was the principal element determining the course of events. By failing to take the new factor into account, Johnson was unable to achieve the expected result from the visit to Washington by the Turkish and Greek leaders.

The U.S. president wanted to take up Cyprus in a summit of three, but Georgios Papandreou refused to attend a meeting with İnönü. Consequently, Johnson received İnönü alone on 22 June 1964. At the meeting, an effort was made to dispel the negative effects of Johnson's letter on bilateral relations. A joint communiqué was released, which confirmed that the Zurich and London treaties continued to be legally binding. At these talks, Turkey made no mention of federation and got Washington to reject the Papandreou-Makarios thesis that these treaties

had lost their validity. Turkey also got Washington to agree to an attempt being made to seek a settlement of the Cyprus question through talks conducted within NATO rather than through the UN.

The Johnson-Papandreou meeting of 24 June 1964 did not go all that smoothly. Papandreou had become prime minister in spite of the U.S. He was against the notion that the Cyprus question was a question between Turkey and Greece and affirmed that he would not accept a search for a solution that excluded Makarios. A U.S. attempt to apply pressure on Papandreou failed to produce results. U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara told Papandreou that the Turkish air force was extremely powerful and capable of inflicting untold damage throughout Greece in case of an armed conflict and added that the U.S. would do nothing to stop Turkey in such a situation if Papandreou maintained his intransigence. Papandreou replied: "Mr. Secretary, thank you for providing Turkey with such a powerful air force. But if you will allow me, I shall remind you that Turkey borders on a country with an even more powerful air force. If Turkey attacked, the participation of this air force in the conflict would not remain a mere probability." He was demonstrating that Moscow could now be used as a tool in a possible dispute between NATO members. The joint communiqué released after the Johnson-Papandreou talks reaffirmed the mandate of the mediator and acknowledged the need to find a new form of settlement. Greece claimed that this joint communiqué dispelled the impression conveyed by the Turkish-U.S. joint communiqué that the 1959 London Treaties continued to be valid.

Although the Washington talks produced no settlement, the U.S., which was concerned that Cyprus would undermine the strategic balance in the eastern Mediterranean, got a chance to learn the views of its two allies and to determine the conditions under which the two sides could come together. Armed with this insight, the U.S. initiated preparations for new talks.

The Geneva Talks and the Acheson Plans: the U.S. devised a procedure that would allow negotiations among its allies over the Cyprus question to get underway. Turkey, Greece, and Britain would meet in Geneva. Former secretary of state Dean Acheson would participate in the meeting as mediator. The UN mediator, Tuomioja, would oversee the deliberations. The government of Cyprus was also invited, but Makarios refused to attend the meeting.

The Geneva talks got underway on 9 July 1964. At the insistence of Greece, the Turkish and Greek delegations did not sit around the same table. Acheson was conferring with each delegation separately and then conveying the

views of one delegation to the other. Nihat Erim led the Turkish delegation, with Gen. Turgut Sunalp as his military advisor. D. Nicolareisis headed the Greek delegation.

Acheson submitted his plan for a settlement on 14 July. It consisted of the following elements.

- 1. A certain amount of land would be set aside in the Karpas peninsula located in northeastern Cyprus where Turkey would enjoy sovereign rights. This land would be considered an integral part of Turkey. The limits of this territory would be determined through negotiations. Turkey would have the right to station troops there at its discretion, and in emergency situations Cypriot Turks would have free access to this territory as a safe haven.
- 2. The rest of Cyprus would be under the sovereignty of Greece or the Greek Cypriots. In two or three districts of this territory where the Turkish Cypriots were in a majority, they would enjoy full autonomy but would continue to be bound to and responsible to the central authority.
- 3. The Turks living on the island would enjoy the same rights granted in the Treaty of Lausanne to the Muslim minority in Greece. A commissioner to be appointed by the UN or the International Court of Justice would oversee the observance of these rights.
- 4. Greece would cede the island of Megisti (Kastellorizo) to Turkey in order to allow Turkey to defend itself against an attack coming from the Mediterranean.

The Acheson Plan satisfied the demands for both partition and enosis and met Turkey's strategic concerns. The island was brought under NATO's control, and the eastern Mediterranean was made safe for Western interests.

But a number of new developments had been ignored in formulating the plan. President Makarios had been distancing himself from enosis as he began to appreciate the benefits of being a head of state. Gradually, Cyprus was beginning to exert more pressure on Greece than the other way around. It was no longer possible to impose solutions on Makarios against his will, as his domestic and international standing kept steadily growing. Makarios was quick to detect the intent of the Acheson Plan, which was enosis by stealth, and rejected the plan. Thereupon Greece too rejected it.

After a few days, the Geneva talks were resumed on 20 July. Turkey had accepted the Acheson Plan as a basis for negotiation. Greece wanted the negotiations to be based on the 1959 treaties. When it became clear that the Geneva talks would not lead to a settlement, Makarios met with Papandreou in Athens. Greece made a new proposal in early August. An area covering thirty-two square kilometers at Cape El Greco would be leased to Turkey for a

period of twenty-five to thirty years for use exclusively as a naval and air base. Although the area was extended to fifty square kilometers and the lease prolonged to fifty years, Turkey rejected the offer because it would result in enosis. The Geneva Conference ended in failure on 31 August.

From Greece's point of view, the Acheson Plan was an important opportunity missed. This was the closest that Greece ever came to achieving enosis. Turkey was ready to go along with the plan. To reject it under the influence of Makarios was a serious blunder for Greek diplomacy.

These events and the Geneva Conference revealed that, even if Greece and Turkey were ready to agree under American prodding, it was no longer possible to find a settlement without the consent of the Republic of Cyprus, which pursued objectives that were quite different from the orientation of either Ankara or Athens. Makarios was determined not to allow his country to come under NATO control.

#### Turkey's First Intervention

Starting in March 1964, the two Cypriot communities especially the Greek Cypriots, who had the upper hand began to arm themselves and prepare for an eventual outbreak of violence. The breakdown of the first phase of the Geneva Conference increased the tension between the communities. The first clashes occurred in the district of Mansura (Erenköy) on the northern shores of Cyprus, which was under the control of the Turks or more precisely the TMT. The government of Cyprus suspected that the arms being sent to the Cypriot Turks from Anatolia were entering through the port of Erenköy and was seeking to segregate the Turkish Cypriots living in this district from the sea. Greek-Cypriot soldiers commanded by Grivas attempted to gain control of the road linking Erenköy with the port on 6 August. Fighting started when the TMT responded to the Greek-Cypriot attack with fire. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to retreat to Erenköy and were surrounded by government forces. With their lives in danger, the only hope of the Erenköy resistance was a Turkish intervention by air.

After Ankara applied to the UN and to NATO, Turkish planes flew over the island as a warning on 7 August. This warning went unheeded, and the National Guard under Grivas continued its operation and tightened the siege. On 8–9 August Turkish aircraft attacked the unit of the National Guard engaged at Erenköy. The operation was carried out by 64 jets and resulted in 33 dead and 230 wounded Greek-Cypriot fighters. Following this, Greek jets flew over Nicosia to reassure the Greek Cypriots. Makarios announced that he would comply with the Security

Council's call for a cease-fire and would lift the siege of Erenköy. Then Turkey also gave a positive reply to the Security Council. The clashes had come to an end but were replaced by the Greek-Cypriot economic embargo on the Turks.

### The Soviet Union's Policy vis-à-vis the 1964 Cyprus Crisis

The Soviet Union took a close interest in Cyprus from the day it became an independent state. Cyprus pursued a nonaligned policy in the eastern Mediterranean, kept reiterating that it would not join NATO, maintained good relations with the states of the Eastern Bloc, and allowed the activities of the Communist AKEL party. The existence of such a state in the eastern Mediterranean under the leadership of Makarios was extremely important for the USSR. In the 1964 crisis, the USSR pursued a two-track policy: supporting Makarios and thereby preventing the region from coming under the full control of NATO and developing relations with Greece and Turkey by taking advantage of the fissure in the southeastern flank of NATO.

When fighting broke out between the two communities in 1963, *Pravda* wrote that the explanation lay in the 1959 London Treaties, which had been imposed on Cyprus by NATO's leaders. According to *Pravda*, these treaties had created an artificial division between the Cypriot Turks and Greeks and constituted a serious violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus. *Pravda*'s opinion was important, because it reflected the official view. Immediately after this opinion appeared, the Soviet government handed the Turkish government a mildly worded note on 31 December 1963, protesting the flight of Turkish jets over Cyprus.

When the London Conference was convened to discuss what was considered to be an internal NATO issue, Moscow described this as an assault on the sovereignty, independence, and freedom of the Republic of Cyprus and declared that it would not allow this and would continue to support Makarios. When Turkish aircraft bombed Cyprus in August, Moscow declared on 9 August that this was part of the NATO plan and called on Turkey to put an end to its military action in an extremely threatening tone. On the same day, Khrushchev also sent Makarios a message and promised to assist Cyprus in the event of a foreign invasion. Moscow did not confine itself to tough rhetoric and posturing. On 1 October 1964 a military aid treaty was signed between Cyprus and the USSR. According to this treaty, Moscow would supply equipment to modernize the Cypriot army. This treaty did not yield the

results that were expected in Cyprus. On the contrary, it had negative effects and a caused a rift between Makarios and Papandreou. Although Papandreou was committed to rendering all possible assistance to Cyprus, he was also a committed anti-Communist and was not prepared to allow the rapprochement with Moscow to lead to practical cooperation on the ground.

Until late 1964 Soviet policy was to support the government of Cyprus and Makarios. The USSR portrayed the Cyprus question as an international issue involving the interests of the imperialists in the Mediterranean. After the visit of the minister of foreign affairs, Erkin, to Moscow from 30 October to 6 November 1964, Moscow started changing its tune. The joint communiqué issued after the talks mentioned the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus but also contained references to respect for the legitimate rights of the two national communities and recognition of the presence of two communities on the island. Moscow was beginning to reveal its desire to develop its relations with Turkey while deemphasizing its political support for Makarios. In recognizing the existence of two communities, it was also accepting the thesis of a federation.

In effect, after visiting Turkey from 4 to 13 January 1965, member of the Presidium N.V. Podgorny gave a statement to the news agency TASS in which he said that all possible solutions for Cyprus could be discussed, including federation. On 17–22 May 1965 Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Turkey, where he declared that Moscow was opposed to enosis and favored federation. When the next Cypriot crisis came in 1967 during the period of the Fascist junta in power in Greece, Moscow would appear even more distant from its rhetoric and policies of 1964 and decidedly closer to Turkey.

#### The 1964 Cyprus Crisis and the Nonaligned Countries

The approach of the nonaligned countries to the Cyprus question was shaped by two considerations. With many of these countries having multiethnic and multireligious populations, they felt a natural aversion to the Turkish thesis and its stress on the existence of two distinct communities in Cyprus: If Cyprus was divided as a result of the Turkish thesis finding general acceptance, this could set a dangerous precedent for these multiethnic societies. The second consideration had to do with the policies of Turkey and Cyprus toward the nonaligned countries up to 1964. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Turkey had declared it was against nonalignment and, adopting the position of representative of the Western Bloc, announced

that the policy of nonalignment would serve the interests of Moscow. Although Turkey softened its stand after 1960, it never formulated a coherent policy toward the nonaligned. But, from the very day he was elected archbishop and assumed the leadership of the Greek-Cypriot people, Makarios took his place in the nonaligned movement and applied its principles.

For these reasons, the nonaligned movement naturally supported Makarios throughout the dispute. In the resolutions adopted at the second Nonaligned Conference, there were calls for respecting the territorial integrity of Cyprus, for outsiders to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs, and for accepting the principle that the Cypriot people, as a whole, had the right to self-determination. This amounted to a rejection of the London Treaties of 1959 and Turkey's right of intervention. These resolutions were important, because they determined the way the nonaligned countries would vote when the issue was taken up at the UN. In fact, each time the matter was put to a vote at the General Assembly of the UN, the nonaligned countries supported Cyprus against Turkey.

The attitude of the nonaligned countries during the 1964 Cyprus crisis forced Turkey to appraise its foreign policy critically and revealed the need to engage in economic, financial, and technical cooperation with these countries to a greater degree than countenanced by NATO. Concrete steps were taken in this direction in 1965. Turkey sent goodwill missions to a number of Asian and African countries. But these initiatives failed to erase impressions of the past or produce results in the short term.

#### The Effect of the Cyprus Crisis on Minorities

The 1964 Cyprus crisis had negative effects on both the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and the Greek minority in Istanbul.

During the crisis, the İnönü government had adopted moderate and conciliatory policies in its international dealings but adopted very tough policies toward citizens of Greek origin living in Turkey.

When the events of Cyprus started occurring, the Turkish public's attention was drawn to the patriarchate, the Greek minority, and Greek nationals resident in Turkey. "Citizen! Speak Turkish!" campaigns and frequent articles in the press about the wealth of the Greek minority helped stir up hostile feelings among the Turkish public toward those of Greek origin.

When it became clear that there would be no physical intervention in Cyprus, the government began to examine the options at its disposal to force Greece to come to

terms on the question of Cyprus. The expulsion of the patriarchate was considered but dropped, because it would create a negative international reaction and Greece might even welcome it. Attention then became focused on the Greek nationals residing in Turkey.

In 1964 there were 12,724 Greek citizens living and working in Turkey, of which 2,990 were from Western Thrace. These Greek citizens had come to Turkey under the terms of the Treaty of Residence, Commerce, and Navigation signed on 30 October 1930. Turkey issued a decree unilaterally repealing this treaty on 16 September 1964. According to article 36 of the treaty, the act of repealing would take effect six months after the act. But Turkey decided to put this into effect immediately, based on article 16, which stated that the privileges granted reciprocally by the two countries to one another's exports and imports could be rescinded if defense and general security considerations made it imperative.

Turkey forthwith deported 997 individuals who were deemed to have been engaged in improper activities, without waiting for the six-month grace period. With the termination of the treaty, 7,603 Greek citizens whose residence permits were not extended were compelled to leave the country. Those among them who subsequently applied for a visa were turned down. Turkey allowed 1,134 Greek citizens to remain, due to old age, illness, or other humanitarian reasons.

As a result, 8,600 Greek citizens in all left Turkey. But many of these were married to Turkish citizens of Greek origin. Consequently, many members of the Greek minority in Turkey also left the country for family reasons or in order to get away from the anti-Greek atmosphere reigning in the country as well as the repressive measures in force. This general atmosphere even affected the Greek minority living in the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos). Land was expropriated in Gökçeada to construct a correctional facility and establish state farms. As a result of such measures, many of the island's Greek minority also joined the migration to Greece. In 2000 only 1,500 to 2,000 members of the Greek minority had remained in Turkey.

After the Greek citizens departed from Turkey, measures were taken against their property. Decree No. 6/8301 of 2 November 1964, which was not published in the *Official Gazette*, contained measures to prevent them from disposing of their real estate in Turkey and to freeze the income derived from their real estate. Those who continued to reside in Istanbul were allowed to use a portion of this blocked income that would be sufficient to meet their living expenses. Many Greeks were economically penal-

ized by these measures, which were lifted on 5 February 1988 after the thaw that started in Davos (see "Relations with Greece" in Section 6).

Turkey's measures against Greek citizens did not remain unanswered by Greece. Turkish citizens residing in the Dodecanese Islands were deported. When Turkey allowed 1,134 Greeks to remain on humanitarian grounds, Greece allowed about 500 Turks to remain in Rhodes.

The measures adopted by Turkey in 1964 also had more long-lasting negative effects. With the departure of the bulk of the Greek minority, the balance struck at Lausanne came to an end. After this, Greece had fewer qualms about applying repressive measures to the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace. When the colonels took power in Greece in 1967, they continued the general policy of repression and, especially after the fresh outbreak of violence in Cyprus, expropriated the lands of the minority. They repealed the Papagos Law (recognizing the identity of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace), the gendarmes became more abusive, and Turkish villages came under military siege after each Cyprus crisis.

The unchanging rule of Turkish-Greek relations was that the minorities were made to pay the price when these relations went sour, and this sad sequence was repeated once again in 1964.

### The Galo Plaza Report and the Resolution of the UN General Assembly

A "tacit cease-fire" was observed by the two sides in Cyprus after 1964, which helped reduce the tension somewhat. The Turkish Cypriots were still under economic blockade, but there was no fighting. Upon the death of the UN mediator Sakari Severi Tuomioja, Galo Plaza (whose report was to cause a new flare-up) replaced him.

In his report, Galo Plaza declared that the solution in Cyprus should come from the two communities in the island and should not be imposed by outsiders. The events that took place after 1963 made it psychologically and politically impossible to return to the status quo ante. The 1959 London Treaties could no longer be implemented. The solution was to set up a fully independent Cyprus, which would uphold the right to security of all segments of the island's population. According to Galo Plaza, the fully independent state of Cyprus would enjoy the right of self-determination but would commit itself not to unite with any other state.

Greece and the Greek-Cypriot leadership described the report as constructive and positive but questioned the attempt to place limitations on self-determination. The report created deep disappointment in Turkey. The statement that there could be no return to the 1959 London Treaties completely undermined Turkey's Cyprus policies.

After seeing the Galo Plaza report, Turkey understood the likely result of a debate on the question at the UN General Assembly and redoubled its efforts to influence the nonaligned countries. These last-minute efforts could not erase the impressions of the past, however, or alter their positions, which were largely determined by the sociopolitical conditions of these countries. The question was taken up on 16 December 1965, and the General Assembly approved resolution 2077 by forty-seven votes, with five against and fifty-four abstentions. The resolution stipulated that the General Assembly, bearing in mind the resolutions of the Cairo Conference of 10 October 1964 and the Galo Plaza report, acknowledged that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal member of the UN, had the right to enjoy full sovereignty and independence without any outside interference. It also called on all member states to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and refrain from any intervention against it.

With the resolution, the UN General Assembly declared the Republic of Cyprus to be a fully sovereign state and thereby rejected the right of intervention. In a sense, the resolution was denying the validity of the 1959 London Treaties. The resolution was also a full endorsement of the views of Makarios. It was the worst of all the resolutions adopted by the UN as far as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were concerned. The only countries, in addition to Turkey, that opposed the resolution were the U.S., Iran, Albania, and Pakistan. The U.S. was concerned about the growing confrontation between its two allies over Cyprus and by siding with Turkey was sending a message to Athens to tone down its intransigence. Iran, Albania, and Pakistan were attached to Turkey by historic ties of friendship and always stood with Turkey on the question of Cyprus.

#### C. The Thaw between the Demirel Government and the Greek Junta and the 1967 Cyprus Crisis

Important political developments occurred in both Turkey and Greece in 1965. The Justice Party (JP) came to power in Turkey after winning the election. The Greek government headed by Georgios Papandreou, a constant source of aggravation for the U.S. because of its hard line, resigned. This government was replaced by a succession of unstable coalitions. Although for different reasons, both countries depended on U.S. economic and military

aid. In order to continue receiving this aid, they needed to get together to resolve a conflict in the southeastern flank of NATO that was causing much concern to the U.S.

To this end, Ankara and Athens conducted secret talks in 1966 and 1967, while pursuing policies designed to reduce tensions in Cyprus. Ankara got the student members of the TMT, who had been armed since 1963, to lay down their arms and return to Turkey to resume their studies. Col. Kemal Coşkun, who had organized the TMT, was recalled. Athens helped by applying pressure on Makarios in 1966 to abandon his deal for the delivery of arms from Czechoslovakia. This deal had produced strong objections from both the U.S. and Turkey.

As a result of these developments, rifts appeared between the hawks led by Denktaş and Ankara as well as between Makarios and Athens. Denktaş objected to Ankara's decisions regarding the TMT and made statements to the effect that this amounted to a sellout of the Turkish Cypriots to the Greek Cypriots. This was a marked deviation from Küçük's policy of subservience to Ankara. Denktaş was seeking to influence Ankara's policies.

The rift between Makarios and Athens became more visible when the junta of colonels came to power in Greece on 21 April 1967. As noted earlier, the rift first became apparent when Makarios started perceiving the advantages of being a head of state. He was convinced that an independent and nonaligned Republic of Cyprus could not pursue the same policies as Athens, which depended on the U.S. and was therefore obliged to implement fully the NATO policies of the U.S. Makarios's first overt move was to ask for the removal of Grivas and the Greek forces under him from the island. He was seeking to reduce any potential Greek pressure in order to be ready to disown any diplomatic decision that Athens might reach without consulting him.

Ignoring the opposition of the hawks in their respective camps, the two countries' prime ministers decided to hold talks over Cyprus. They were motivated by the desire to eliminate the Cyprus question as a source of discord so that they could concentrate on development programs and return to harmonious foreign policies within NATO. The preparations for these talks had been going on since 1966, but the two sides had not yet been able to find common ground. It was clear from the start that the talks would not yield the expected results.

#### The Demirel-Kollias Talks

The junta of colonels, in power since 21 April 1967, needed a success in foreign policy to gain popular support. The colonels felt that a successful step on the question of Cyprus would bolster their popular support and give satisfaction to the U.S., their main supporter. But the junta gave no sign of having abandoned the goal of enosis. In fact, the government's program talked of achieving enosis in Cyprus by peaceful means, with due regard for minority rights, which meant in agreement with Turkey. This was the aim of the proposed summit. Athens would make certain concessions to Ankara, but these were not revealed until the Demirel-Kollias summit.

Prime ministers Süleyman Demirel and Konstantinos Kollias met at Keşan in Turkey on 9 September and at Alexandroupolis in Greece on 10 September. At the Keşan meeting, Kollias summarized the Greek views and argued that enosis could be achieved without jeopardizing Turkey's strategic requirements. If this could be achieved, the Cypriot Turks would enjoy full equality within the Greek state, and special emphasis would be given to their religious, linguistic, and cultural rights. The way of life of the Turks in Western Thrace could be considered the guarantee of this commitment. After his report, Kollias addressed the following questions to Demirel, based on the assumption that his proposals were acceptable. (1) Would Turkey accept enosis if it was awarded sovereignty over the Dikelia base, where NATO would be allowed to maintain a symbolic presence? (2) What guarantees would Turkey be ready to give that the Dikelia base would not be used against Cyprus?

Demirel was taken by surprise by this unexpected proposal. He replied that Turkey could not negotiate a settlement based on enosis and would therefore not reply to questions on how enosis might be achieved. Demirel declared that a solution had to be found that did not involve enosis and, in response to a Greek query, enumerated Turkey's conditions. (1) Cyprus could not be annexed by either one of the two sides. (2) Treaties could not be changed unilaterally. (3) Neither community could be placed under the sovereignty of the other. (4) The balance struck at Lausanne had to be maintained. When Kollias announced that the Turkish side had agreed to enosis in earlier talks under certain conditions and the Turkish delegation denied this, the talks became deadlocked. One of the junta members, Papadopoulos, instructed Kollias to suspend the talks for a day.

The two prime ministers and their delegations met the next day at Alexandroupolis. At this meeting, Demirel submitted proposals for an alternative solution. (1) Turkey's security requirements must be met. (2) The balance between the two countries as well as the two communities must not be upset. (3) The Turkish community must be given special guarantees. (4) The Turkish community must be able to participate in the administration on an equal footing. (5) Measures must be taken to ensure that the new settlement was not upset once again. (6) The economic future of the Turkish community must be safeguarded (see Tülümen, pp. 117–20, for the Demirel-Kollias talks).

It was now clear that the two sides would not be able to reach an agreement. The joint communiqué released after the talks sought to convey a hopeful message for the future. The two sides had agreed to continue the talks aimed at bringing their views closer. They would also take measures to prevent tension on the island from rising. But all hopes for the future were dashed when an outbreak of violence in November led to a new crisis.

#### The Cyprus Crisis of 1967: Clashes at Geçitkale and Boğaziçi

The failure of the summit stimulated the hawks on both sides into action. The Makarios administration had denied Rauf Denktaş the right to return to the island after attending the 1964 London Conference, and he was now living in Ankara. When he attempted to enter Cyprus illegally, the Greek-Cypriot police apprehended him on 31 October 1967. This incident escalated quickly into a diplomatic crisis. As his relations with Athens deteriorated, Makarios tried to lessen tensions with the Turkish Cyp riots. Now he was confronted with a dilemma. If he pu Denktaş on trial, he would anger the Turks; if he released him, he would upset the Greeks. A political rather than a legal solution to the dilemma was found through the intercession of Denktaş's friend Glafkos Clerides. Denktaş wrote attorney general Nikos Tornarides a letter in which he requested that he not be prosecuted. In return, Denktaş asked for his deportation to Turkey and gave an undertaking not to attempt another illegal entry into Cyprus. This request was granted, and Denktaş departed from the island twelve days after his arrival. The most significant outcome of this crisis was the surfacing of negative feelings vis-à-vis Turkey among the Turkish Cypriots. For the first time, they were openly criticizing Turkey's policies. The community had been under blockade since 1963 and was perpetually awaiting a Turkish intervention that never seemed to come. The Turkish Cypriots were getting impatient at what they perceived to be Ankara's passive stance. Those who considered Denktaş to be the leader of their cause took this opportunity to organize a demonstration in Nicosia in which they marched on the Turkish Embassy and shouted hostile slogans.

Although the Denktaş incident led to tension between the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara, it also brought about a thawing of relations between the two communities on the island. This angered Grivas, who went into action with the Greek-Cypriot National Guard and captured the villages of Geçitkale and Boğaziçi on 15 November. These villages with Turkish majorities were at highly strategic locations controlling the main road linking Limassol to Nicosia. In two days of clashes, the villages suffered heavy damage. In addition, twenty-two people were killed and nine injured, most of them Turks.

The Turkish cabinet held an emergency meeting that night. In 1964 the TGNA had authorized the government to intervene in Cyprus, and that authorization was still valid. Demirel announced the decision to intervene. At the cabinet meeting, however, it was revealed that the army had no plans for an intervention and did not possess the equipment to transport a force large enough to ensure a successful operation on the island. Once again, the government had no other choice than to solve the question by diplomatic means. The demarches made in Athens produced results, and Kollias ordered the National Guard to evacuate the villages. This order was duly carried out the next day. Turkish jets flew over the island throughout the week. On 17 November Çağlayangil delivered a note to Greece, containing the following demands: (1) removal from the island of Greek soldiers introduced in contravention of the Treaty of Alliance; (2) removal from the island of General Grivas; (3) disbanding of the National Guard; (4) full withdrawal of Greek-Cypriot forces from the districts where the clashes took place; (5) granting the Turkish community the right to establish its own local administration and law enforcement units in their districts; (6) compensating the Cypriot Turks for their losses in the recent events.

In its note of reply, the Greek government declared itself ready to engage in talks to examine the causes of the crisis. The Turkish government retorted that it was not prepared to negotiate with Greece until the threat directed at the Turkish community of Cyprus was removed.

When both sides rejected the measures proposed by NATO, it was announced in Washington on 22 November that President Johnson had appointed Cyrus Vance, his personal representative, as mediator.

After contacts with the three countries, Vance got the parties to agree on the following points.

- 1. Turkey and Greece will confirm that they will continue to honor their commitment to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
- Within a period of one and a half months, Turkey and Greece will progressively remove their troops stationed in Cyprus above the amount permitted in the trea-

ties. Greece will do so first, and in the shortest possible time.

- 3. The reinforced UNFICYP will be given a mandate to oversee the removal of these troops.
- 4. When these operations are completed, Turkey will lift its emergency military measures.
- 5. Compensation will be paid for damage done to property in the villages of Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. Payments will also be made to the families of those who died in the recent clashes.
- 6. A committee with the participation of the parties and under the supervision of UNFICYP will take charge of the illegal arms on the island.
- 7. Grivas will not return to the island under any circumstances.
- 8. The "national" forces established on the island by the two communities will be disbanded in stages.

Greece had accepted practically all of Turkey's demands. This was due to U.S. pressure on Greece, because the junta administration in Athens lacked popular support that might allow it to resist Washington's demands. At the same time, there was an increasingly effective anti-U.S. sentiment among the Turkish public. University students had blocked the runway at Ankara's main airport, forcing Cyrus Vance's plane to be diverted to the military base at Mürted. A second reason for Greece's compliance was that Makarios also wanted to be rid of Greek troops as well as Grivas. A third factor was the USSR. Compared to the 1964 crisis, this time the Soviet reaction was much milder. This was because Cyprus would come under the control of the fascist junta if enosis took place and would then really become a NATO base. Furthermore, the USSR now had considerable economic dealings with Turkey. Finally, Greece found itself excluded from Europe because of the colonels' junta. There was no Western nation from which it could seek backing other than the U.S.

#### The Establishment of the Provisional Turkish Administration of Cyprus (PTAC)

In the aftermath of the 1967 crisis, the Turkish Cypriots took advantage of the favorable circumstances and based their de facto separate existence since 1964 on a legal foundation by proclaiming the establishment of the Provisional Turkish Administration of Cyprus (PTAC) on 28 December 1967. This was the first step toward a federation. Fazil Küçük became the president of the PTAC, and his vice-president was Rauf Denktaş. A list of nineteen principles was proclaimed regarding the administration of the Turkish Cypriots. According to the nineteenth of these, the principles would apply until such time as the

1960 Constitution would begin to be implemented once again in its entirety. In other words, the principles introduced were of a provisional nature. Nevertheless, the legislative, executive, and judicial affairs of the Turkish community had been arranged in a manner that fully corresponded to those of a federated state. On 13 April 1968 Denktas returned to the island and assumed his new post.

Following these developments, the Turkish Cypriots understood that Ankara was not going to intervene militarily. They made the decision to start intercommunal talks in order to gain time and persuade the Greek-Cypriot administration that they were a separate entity. The Greek Cypriots were receptive to this initiative. Makarios's relations with Athens had taken a turn for the worse. If he should succeed in finding a solution to intercommunal problems within the island, he could burnish his international reputation. The intercommunal negotiations got underway on 24 June 1968 and went on, in four stages, until September 1971.

Putting aside technical details, eventually the Greek Cypriots arrived at a point where they agreed to a unitary state consisting of the two communities and their autonomous local administrations. The Turkish Cypriots agreed to make do with political autonomy for their community. Despite the mutual concessions made, one side or the other, and sometimes both, would recoil every time a solution appeared to be within grasp, and a comprehensive solution was never achieved. Both sides appeared to be playing for time.

#### D. Turkey's Military Operations in Cyprus in 1974 and Their Consequences

To get a full picture of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, we must bear in mind the U.S. position vis-à-vis developments in the Middle East after 1967, the Cyprus policy of the colonels' junta in Greece, and Turkey's internal developments.

#### The Circumstances That Led to the 1974 Operation

#### The U.S. Position

After the six-day war between Israel and the Arab states in 1967, the Middle East began to be perceived by the U.S. as a region of instability, and the movements of the Sixth Fleet in the region were restricted. Even the visits of the fleet to Turkish ports were causing mass demonstrations and serious crises. Meanwhile Soviet activities in the region after 1967 were on the increase. The Soviet fleet was using Syrian ports, and Egypt, Iraq, and Southern Yemen were following pro-Moscow policies. Muammar Khaddafi

had seized power in Libya. From a U.S. perspective, these developments increased the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece. But, because of the dispute over Cyprus, NATO's southeastern flank was being weakened. Furthermore, a Cyprus under Makarios's control was also posing a danger to NATO's regional interests. A solution based on partition, which would result in the elimination of Makarios, appeared to be highly desirable. The U.S. would view favorably a move against Makarios that would not lead to a Turkish-Greek confrontation.

#### The Cyprus Policy of the Colonels

The colonels had no popular backing. For internal political reasons, they were also on bad terms with King Constantine. After the 1967 crisis, the king tried to take advantage of the junta's failure and on 13 December encouraged the military units in northern Greece, who were loyal to him, to rebel. The rebellion was easily crushed and the king, stripped of his powers, was forced to flee to Rome with his family. With the royalists now joining the opposition, those against the junta had become stronger. Because relations with Europe were already strained, only the U.S. remained to support the junta.

As Greece's standing in the world diminished, the standing of Makarios and Cyprus grew. The first objective of the colonels was to bring about a Cyprus without Makarios, who had earned the sobriquet of "the eastern Mediterranean Castro."

After trying and failing to get rid of Makarios through political means, three assassination attempts were made to eliminate him. In the first attempt, on 8 March 1970, Makarios's helicopter was attacked and shot down, but he survived unhurt. Subsequently, on 28 August 1971, Grivas was smuggled back into Cyprus, where he undertook the formation of an armed organization known as EOKA-B. When Makarios started reinforcing the police force, which was loyal to him, with arms purchased from Czechoslovakia, Athens accelerated the arming of EOKA-B and the National Guard, which was loyal to Grivas.

At the instigation of the junta, the bishops of Kition, Paphos, and Kyrenia declared on 2 March 1972 that under church law a person could not carry out spiritual and temporal duties simultaneously and called on Makarios to resign as president. Subsequently they went further and announced on 8 March 1973 that he had been stripped of his position as archbishop. Makarios turned the tables on the bishops and convened the grand synod, which decided that it was the bishops who had violated church law. The synod found the Cypriot bishops to be guilty of insubordination and heresy and decided to defrock them.

In November 1973 General Ioannides displaced the Papadopoulos administration in a palace coup and took over the government in Athens. The justification for the coup, according to Ioannides, was that the previous administration was ineffective. Ioannides believed that the Cyprus question could be solved by eliminating Makarios and that Turkey would not be against his removal from the scene, Military aid to Grivas was stepped up. Grivas's death on 27 January 1974 did not change the Cyprus plans of Ioannides.

Makarios had the support of all the political parties in Cyprus without specific links to the EOKA-B. Because of his anti-junta stand, he also enjoyed great popularity in Greece. On 2 July 1974 he sent an open letter to the president of Greece, Gen. Phaedon Gizikis. He demanded the immediate disbanding of EOKA-B and the recall of Greek officers in Cyprus. Makarios held the Greek government responsible for undermining the state in Cyprus. He reaffirmed that he wanted to maintain his cooperation with Athens. He reminded Gizikis, however, that he was not a governor appointed by Greece but a leader elected by a large segment of "Hellenism" and called on Athens to fashion its policies to conform to this reality. Athens replied by pressing the button to bring the Aphrodite Plan into operation. The implementation of the plan led to the coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974.

### Developments in Turkey Up to 1974 and Their Effect on Cyprus

Turkey had drawn an important lesson from the November 1967 crisis. At the time, it lacked the means to intervene militarily in Cyprus. After this, it undertook serious military preparations to carry out a landing and took measures to overcome its deficiencies in equipment and know-how.

When the military delivered a memorandum to the government on 12 March 1971, Demirel was forced to resign. An interim regime lasting two and a half years followed. As in previous interim-regime periods, this one too resulted in deviations from Turkey's traditional foreign policy. Under the Demirel governments, economic realities and the pressure of anti-American public opinion had forced Ankara to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy. After 12 March there was a return to Western (U.S.)-oriented policies. During this period Turkey was unable to derive political advantage from the feud between Makarios and the colonels' junta. Ankara was unable to reappraise its policies or adopt a tough line toward the colonels, who had Washington's backing.

This interim period was followed by a return to dem-

ocratic life with the legislative election of 14 October 1973. The government formed by the CHP and the National Salvation Party (MSP) introduced new policies. With his left-of-center policies, Bülent Ecevit adopted the federation thesis in Cyprus. He counted on the support of the public, which was against imperialism and the U.S. Much of the rhetoric of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist MSP, was also anti-West and therefore anti-U.S. When the coup against Makarios took place on 15 July 1974, Prime Minister Ecevit was on his way to Afyon, where he intended to defy American pressure and announce the lifting of the ban on opium poppy cultivation. At the time of the coup in Cyprus, Turkey not only was prepared militarily but also had a government with the political will to intervene.

#### 2. The First Cyprus Operation

The Aphrodite Plan was set in motion on 15 July 1974, when soldiers of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, under the command of Greek officers, started bombing the presidential palace. Radio broadcasts announced that Makarios was dead and that everything was under control. The formation of a provisional government was also announced. Meanwhile it was emphasized that the move was in no way directed against the Cypriot Turks, in order to calm both the Turkish community and Turkey and soften any possible reaction. But the announcement that the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus had been established and that the head of state would be none other than Nikos Sampson was enough to rouse the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Sampson was known to favor enosis. He was a member of EOKA and the publisher of the ultrarightist magazine Mahi (Struggle).

In the course of the coup, Makarios succeeded in fleeing from his palace through a secret passage. He contacted the UN force, managed to reach his hometown of Paphos, made a radio announcement in which he informed Cypriots that he was alive, and called on them to resist the coup-makers. With the help of the UN, he proceeded to one of the British bases and from there flew to New York via Malta and London.

When news of the coup reached Ankara, the National Security Council convened and made the first announcement: "This is a Greek intervention. The constitutional order in the island has been overturned and an illegal military administration established. Turkey considers this to be a violation of the treaties and guarantees" (Sarıca, Teziç, and Eskiyurt, p. 180). The prime minister ordered the Turkish Armed Forces to prepare for a military intervention in Cyprus. The resolution of the TGNA adopted

in 1964 authorizing the government to intervene in Cyprus in case of need was still valid.

Meanwhile the European allies, and notably Britain, agreed that the constitutional order in Cyprus had broken down and condemned the Greek government for its action. Only the U.S. seemed to have a different attitude. Washington agreed that the constitutional order had collapsed and the status quo was upset but refrained from condemning the Greek government. Nor did it refuse to recognize the Sampson government. The reaction of the USSR and the Third World was highly critical, with nothing but condemnation for Greece. Turkey's expectations were fulfilled, and international public opinion had turned against Greece and the Sampson government that it supported.

As military preparations and plans were being reviewed on 17 July, Ecevit received Kissinger's message. Washington was proposing talks between Turkey and Greece to forestall war between the two countries. Ecevit replied that Turkey would consult with Britain under the terms of article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, that it would not talk with Greece, the other guarantor state, because it was in breach of its treaty commitments, that it would have recourse to all peaceful means to solve the problem, but that, if it failed to find a solution, Turkey would exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations arising from treaties. Immediately thereafter, Ecevit flew to London. When he returned on 19 July, all military preparations had been completed. The undersecretary of the U.S. State Department, Joseph Sisco, had been unable to convince the Greek government of the Turkish government's determination to act. When Sisco came to Ankara and was conferring with Ecevit, Turkey's landing force had already left Mersin on its way to Cyprus.

On Saturday, 20 July 1974, Ecevit announced to the world that Turkey had landed troops on Cyprus. The prime minister declared that Turkish soldiers were going to Cyprus not to wage war but to restore peace not just to the Turkish Cypriots but also to the Greek Cypriots.

The most serious losses suffered by Turkey during the two-day operation occurred when the Turkish Air Force mistook the Turkish destroyer *Kocatepe* for a Greek warship due to a breakdown in communications and sank it. Despite this setback, the first part of the operation was successful from a military point of view. Troops had been landed on the northern beaches and dropped from the air without serious losses, Greek counterattacks had been repulsed, and the Kyrenia-Gönyeli-Nicosia triangle had been occupied. When a cease-fire was declared on 22 July, however, the situation on the ground did not ap-

pear all that favorable. The Turkish army held only 7% of the island; and because of their dispersed condition, 65% of the Turkish Cypriots remained in areas under Greek control and in danger of being massacred by EOKA-B. Furthermore, approximately forty thousand soldiers were crammed in an area of 348 square kilometers with little room for maneuver in case of an attack.

As soon as Turkey landed its troops in Cyprus, the Security Council met on 20 July and adopted resolution 353. After calling for a cease-fire, the resolution also called for an immediate end to foreign interference in the Republic of Cyprus, demanded the immediate removal from the island of all foreign military personnel not allowed by international treaties, and asked Turkey, Greece, and Britain to enter into negotiations without delay for the purpose of bringing peace to the region and restoring the constitutional government in Cyprus.

Having remained passive in the face of the anti-Makarios coup engineered by the Greek junta, the U.S. refrained from reacting forcefully against the Turkish intervention. Kissinger, the architect of U.S. foreign policy, believed that a peaceful settlement of historic disputes could only be achieved after an armed conflict and considered Arab-Israeli relations to be a vindication of his belief. Furthermore, the U.S. government was engrossed with domestic politics at the time because of the Watergate scandal. The point that Washington kept stressing was that it would not permit developments to lead to a Turkish-Greek armed conflict.

At this point, Athens was in complete disarray. Sisco was unable to find a responsible person to talk to. Finally, Admiral Dimitris Arapakis informed Sisco on 22 July that they would accept a cease-fire. The next day, the Greek commanders held a meeting and made the decision to hand the government over to a civilian, despite the strong opposition of Ioannides. On the same day, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had been living in voluntary exile in Paris for eleven years, returned to Athens and took over the reins of government. Turkey's intervention had given Greece the chance to return to democracy. Greece was now ready for negotiations. The junta's fall from power also affected Cyprus: on 25 July Clerides replaced Sampson as head of state.

Turkey's acceptance of the UN's call for a cease-fire and refraining from extending the military operation were the subject of extended public debate in Turkey. In particular the MSP wing of the government started making extremist statements designed to inflame public opinion and use the Cyprus intervention to gain political advantage. Actually, the military situation on the ground was not all that favorable. Given the possibility of an armed conflict with Greece, the army had been compelled to disperse its forces. The force that landed in Cyprus had not been able to advance much and was concentrated within a limited perimeter. There was heavy international pressure for a cease-fire. Turkey considered the return of Karamanlis to be a favorable development and felt that it could extend the area under its control through political and diplomatic means, so it agreed to the cease-fire on 22 July and declared that it would participate in the Geneva Conference.

### 3. The Geneva Conference and the Geneva Protocol

The first Geneva Conference was held from 25 to 30 July 1974. It was attended by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece, and Britain: Turan Güneş, Georgios Mavros, and James Callaghan. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and the UN followed the proceedings with their observers.

Turkey made these proposals at the meeting. (1) A formal decision should be made regarding a cease-fire and a new setup in Cyprus. (2) A binding decision to achieve a federation was needed. (3) The security of the Cypriot Turks should be ensured by a police force consisting of Cypriot Turks. (4) No text should refer to a date for the withdrawal of Turkish forces. (5) The width of the buffer zone around the Turkish forces should be fixed at ten kilometers, and no UN forces should be stationed on its perimeter. (6) Denktaş should immediately resume his duties as vice-president. (7) A broader Cyprus conference should be convened within a week, with the participation of the Cypriot communities.

Greece made the following proposals at the conference. (1) The only subject to be discussed would be the implementation of the UN's cease-fire resolution. (2) All Turkish forces would be withdrawn from the island immediately. (3) Constitutional issues and the new setup in Cyprus would not be discussed; nor would there be any reference to the conference that would follow in a week's time.

The conference lasted five days, with the UN acting as secretariat. The Turkish delegation was anxious to keep the UN involvement at a minimum level and thus was opposed to the holding of records. The proceedings were taking place under difficult conditions. The Greek delegation was concerned about the way Turkish forces kept expanding the area under their control, while the Turkish delegation worried about the continuing danger of attacks on Turkish enclaves in areas under Greek control. The Turkish delegation drew its strength from the knowledge

that its intervention in Cyprus was right and legitimate and also from the Turkish military presence on the island. The Greek delegation was in a much weaker position, because it represented a government that had just come to power and still lived in fear of a new military coup. With the mediation of Britain, the Turkish delegation was able to include almost all of its proposals in the protocol that was adopted on 30 July 1974.

The Geneva Protocol, signed by Turkey, Greece, and Britain, cannot be described as just a cease-fire agreement. The protocol also laid the foundation for the new status of Cyprus. The Geneva Protocol consisted of six articles, which were related to three topics: (1) the present status; (2) urgent measures; and (3) the future status of Cyprus.

Article 1 of the protocol stated that "taking into consideration the international agreements signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 353, the Ministers accepted the importance of the urgent and sustainable implementation of measures that will rearrange the situation in Cyprus within an appropriate period of time. However, the Ministers agreed that certain urgent measures needed to be taken immediately." This article confirmed that the status of Cyprus and the 1960 treaties were still in effect and acknowledged the legitimacy of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus on the basis of the rights conferred by the treaties.

Articles 2 and 3 related to urgent measures that had to be taken in Cyprus. Article 2 declared: "The three Ministers stated that the armed forces that were in the island to stabilize the situation should not expand the regions under their control in the Republic of Cyprus at 22:00 (Geneva) hours on 30 July 1974. The Ministers called on all forces, including irregulars, to refrain from attacks and all other hostile action." What is noteworthy about this article is that it specified that the regions not to be expanded were not the regions controlled at the time the cease-fire was declared on 22 July 1974 but those controlled on 30 July 1974. In other words, the regions brought under Turkish control between 22 and 30 July would remain under Turkish control. Therefore the forces in this region and the Turkish population living there could be supplied without hindrance. Furthermore, under article 3, the ministers agreed on measures that should go into effect immediately:

(1) A security zone, the width of which is to be determined by the representatives of Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, shall be established in agreement with the United Nations Peace Force (UNFICYP). The zone shall start

from the region controlled by Turkish Armed Forces at the hour and date stated in the foregoing article 2. No forces shall be allowed into the current region between the two forces until the extent and makeup of the security zone is determined. (2) All Turkish-Cypriot regions invaded by Greek or Greek-Cypriot forces shall be evacuated immediately. The United Nations Peace Force will continue to protect these regions, and the regions shall revert to the previous security arrangements. Other Turkish regions that are not controlled by the Turkish armed forces shall continue to be protected by the United Nations Peace Force, and they shall maintain their own police and security forces as previously. (3) The United Nations Peace Force shall carry out security missions in mixed villages. (4) The military personnel and civilians arrested during the latest hostilities shall be swapped as soon as possible or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Articles 4 and 5 contained provisions regarding the future status of Cyprus. Article 4 regulated the withdrawal of foreign troops: "The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs... agreed on measures to phase out security forces, weapons, ammunition, and other combat equipment in the Republic of Cyprus as part of the plan to restore peace, security, and mutual confidence in the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of a fair and lasting solution acceptable to all relevant parties." This meant that the withdrawal of Turkish troops was conditional on a fair and lasting solution and required the establishment of peace, security, and mutual confidence. Furthermore, the withdrawal would be in stages. Article 5 contained provisions regarding the future status of the Cypriot state:

The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to continue talks as soon as possible in order to achieve the following: (a) Restoration of peace in the region; (b) Reestablishment of the constitutional government in Cyprus. They decided to continue their talks in Geneva on 8 August 1974. At the same time, the ministers agreed that the representatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities would participate in the negotiations on the Constitution at an early stage. The constitutional problems to be negotiated will include the immediate restoration of the constitutional legitimacy with the Vice-President

assuming the duties assigned to him by the 1960 Constitution. The ministers noted that there were actually two autonomous administrations, Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations, in the Republic of Cyprus. The ministers agreed to review the problems arising from the existence of these two administrations in future meetings.

This text confirmed that there were two autonomous administrations in the Republic of Cyprus. The guarantor states were confirming in an international document that the Turkish-Cypriot administration was autonomous. Article 6 called for sending the protocol to the UN secretary-general with a request that he take the necessary measures in the light of the protocol.

The Geneva Protocol adopted at the first Geneva Conference can be regarded as a brilliant success for Turkish diplomacy. Turkey had been able to obtain the confirmation of the lawfulness and legitimacy of its military intervention in Cyprus, the approval of the conditions for withdrawing its troops, the reaffirmation of the existence of two communities as the constitutional basis of Cyprus, and the acceptance of the autonomous character of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Nevertheless, in retrospect it was a mistake not to include a provision in the protocol to the effect that the government of Cyprus would be represented by the leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, Denktaş and Clerides, until the final settlement was reached. Turkey was in a very strong position at Geneva; if it had succeeded in inserting such a provision in the protocol, it could have minimized the difficulties created by the Security Council's resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, which acknowledged the Greek-Cypriot administration as the legitimate government of the island.

The second Geneva Conference was supposed to meet in order to discuss mainly the issues related to the constitutional status of Cyprus. Before going to the conference, Turkey finalized its preparations to press its case for a federation. In Turkey's formula, there would be a central government of limited power, with most responsibilities left to the two federated states. Before the Turkish delegation left for Geneva, Prime Minister Ecevit told the head of the delegation, Foreign Minister Güneş, that a second operation might become necessary if a satisfactory solution could not be obtained. As a matter of fact, the military leaders were pressing him for a second operation, because they feared it would be difficult for the Turkish forces, concentrated in a narrow strip of land, to withstand a resolute attack.

At the second Geneva Conference on 12 August, Rauf Denktas, as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, announced the Turkish plan: there would be a federal form of government based on geography in Cyprus. When determining the responsibilities of the central government, it should be kept in mind that the Cypriot state consisted of two nations. The Turkish Federated State would extend over 34% of the island's surface and be located north of a line running from Lefka in the west all the way to the port of Famagusta in the east. The Turkish quarters of Nicosia and Famagusta would remain within the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

Foreign Minister Güneş told his British counterpart Callaghan on the evening of 12 August that, although Turkey favored a geographically based federation, it did not insist on a federal state with two regions. His new proposal could be described as a solution based on cantons.

For Clerides, the aim of the conference was not a fundamental alteration of the existing status. It would be enough to revise the constitutional setup in a way that would inspire mutual trust in the two communities. On this basis, the Greek and Turkish villages and municipalities would be listed separately and all responsibilities and duties would be undertaken by their respective Greek and Turkish communal administrations. According to Clerides, the communal administration in mixed villages would be in the hands of whichever community happened to be in a majority.

It was clear that it would be difficult to reconcile these two proposals. To overcome the difficulty, Callaghan announced the "cantonal solution" that had been conveyed to him by Güneş the previous evening. According to this proposal, there would be an autonomous Turkish region consisting of six cantons within the Republic of Cyprus: one main canton plus five others located at Lefka, Poli, Paphos, Larnaca, and Rizokarpaso, with a total area of 34% of the island's territory. These cantons would be administered by the Turkish administration, and the Greek and Greek-Cypriot armed forces and police would withdraw from the main canton of the autonomous Turkish-Cypriot region within forty-eight hours of the signing of the declaration.

Mavros and Clerides requested a period of thirty-six hours to consult their capitals, but Güneş refused to agree to this request. He claimed that the representatives had full powers and were requesting this period as a delaying tactic. When Güneş received a coded message from Ecevit that the second operation was about to be launched, the conference broke up at 2:20 AM on 14 August without achieving any results.

#### 4. The Second Cyprus Operation

Turkey launched its second operation at 4:19 AM on 14 August. By 16 August the Turkish Armed Forces had reached their objective, which had been code-named the Attila Line. The line had been drawn between Famagusta and Lefka. Once it had been reached, a cease-fire was announced and the operation ended.

The second Cyprus operation was carried out more purposefully and quickly attained its military objectives. This time, however, the international reaction to the operation was very negative. First, whereas the first operation was considered a legitimate and justified reaction to the Greek junta's coup to overthrow Makarios and achieve enosis, the second operation was seen as an occupation. Now that the Karamanlis government had been installed in Greece and democracy had been restored, the prevailing view was that the new government should be supported rather than pushed into a corner. Second, Turkey had carried out the operation while negotiations were in progress. Finally, with the de facto division of the island in two, the Republic of Cyprus, as established in 1960 and a member of the UN, had been deprived of its very foundations.

For these reasons, those opposed to the second operation saw the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus as an "occupation." They argued that the Turkish army had landed on the island in compliance with article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. The article grants the guarantor powers the right to intervene to restore the constitutional order. But Turkey had continued its intervention even after the reason for intervention had ceased to exist and, instead of restoring the constitutional order, had established its own order.

Turkey responded to these legal objections with the following argument. With the Geneva Protocol of 30 July 1974, the parties had accepted the existence of two communities and two autonomous administrations. Consequently, the de facto situation created by Turkey could not be considered a unilateral act.

The international reaction came with the UN General Assembly's Resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974. This resolution called on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and nonalignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from actions and interference directed against this state. There was a call for all foreign military forces to be withdrawn and all military intervention to end. All refugees were to return to their homes in safety, and all interested parties were requested to take urgent measures to make this possible. Finally, there was a paragraph stating that the constitutional

system of the Republic of Cyprus was a matter that concerned the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and called upon these communities to undertake negotiations under the aegis of the UN secretary-general and on a footing of equality in order to be free to reach an acceptable political settlement that would be based on their fundamental and legitimate rights.

Ankara accepted this resolution with certain reservations. It could not agree with the provisions calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of refugees to their homes. Nevertheless, the resolution did not mention the government of Cyprus. It was also acknowledged that the Greek and Turkish communities had equal rights on the island. These were positive elements for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was a turning point in Turkish foreign policy, in Turkish-Greek relations, and in the question of Cyprus itself. Aside from Korea, this was the first time that the Turkish Republic engaged its troops beyond its frontiers. Soon it started getting negative reactions from its Western allies. Its relations with both the U.S. and the European countries came to be increasingly affected by the question of Cyprus. Cyprus took its place at the center of Turkish-Greek relations. Although the central issue between the two states from the viewpoint of their national interests was the question of how the Aegean Sea would be shared, after the 1974 operation Greece put forward Cyprus as the obstacle preventing the negotiation of the Aegean questions. Furthermore, Greece accelerated the militarization of the Aegean islands on the pretext that it was threatened from the east, while Turkey established the 4th Army with headquarters in İzmir, claiming that it was threatened from the west.

The 1974 operation was also the beginning of a new phase in the question of Cyprus. The de facto partition of the island meant that the question was settled from Turkey's perspective. But because there was no legal settlement, the subject of Cyprus continued to remain on the international agenda even as the world entered the new century. Nevertheless, the question had acquired a new character after 1974. Now the search was for a solution based not on the 1960 treaties but on the new de facto situation that emerged in 1974.

## III. THE PERIOD WHEN THE AEGEAN QUESTION CAME TO THE FOREFRONT (1975–1980)

Cyprus had been at the center of Turkish-Greek relations since the 1950s. In the second half of the 1970s Cyprus was displaced by the questions relating to the Aegean. The main reason for this was that in both Turkey and Greece internal developments after 1974 had a direct influence on their respective foreign policies.

Following the 1974 Cyprus operation, Ecevit's disagreements with his coalition partner Erbakan grew worse. Assuming that his Cyprus success would enable him to obtain an absolute majority in parliament and thus form a government without a coalition partner, Ecevit resigned on 16 September. This initiated a long period of political instability in Turkey. His resignation did not lead to early elections. Instead the Sadi Irmak, Nationalist Front, Ecevit, and Demirel governments followed.

At a time when everyone's attention was focused on domestic politics, Turkey was confronted with serious foreign policy issues. The U.S. had started implementing an arms embargo because of Cyprus. The USSR was concerned about Cyprus coming under NATO control, so it started applying serious pressure after the second operation to secure a return to the status quo ante in Cyprus. In applying this pressure, Moscow also had the backing of the nonaligned movement. As Greece's relations with the European countries steadily improved, these countries started raising the question of Cyprus in Turkey's negotiations to secure credit. At a time when Turkish governments were preoccupied with internal politics, they were unable to address critical foreign policy issues. In Greece, the Karamanlis government took maximum advantage of Turkey's domestic problems and its external isolation and brought the Aegean questions to the forefront.

The most significant effect in Greece of the 1974 Cyprus operation was that it allowed the restoration of democracy. Faced with a crisis of its own making, the junta came apart and left the scene to Karamanlis. After assuming the office of prime minister, Karamanlis considered declaring war on Turkey after the second operation but gave up the idea because of the poor state of preparation of the Greek army. Instead he withdrew from the military structure of NATO on 15 August to protest the U.S. failure to stop Turkey.

After this, Karamanlis undertook a revision of the Greek foreign policy to set apart the hitherto (since 1945) parallel tracks of the two countries in a way that would favor Greece. The foreign policy line of the New Democracy Party, which remained in power until 1981, can be summarized with the slogan "Greece belongs to the West." This meant not so much the U.S. but rather the EEC. In setting Greece's course toward full membership of the EEC, Karamanlis was seeking to prevent an attack from Turkey, while protecting the regime from another coup. Realizing that dangerous disputes with Turkey might obstruct full membership, he lowered tension with Ankara, held the

door open to a dialogue, and kept reiterating that Greece was ready to go to international adjudication on the Aegean issue.

While keeping tension with Turkey from turning into a crisis in order to permit relations with Europe to develop, Karamanlis took advantage of the political vacuum in Ankara and the U.S. arms embargo in his dealings with Turkey. The strategy of his relations with Turkey rested on the Aegean. His goal was to maintain the status quo, which was favorable to Greece and which Turkey was anxious to change. Ankara understood that the status quo would not be changed through talks, so it set out on the course of pressuring Greece by provoking a crisis. Karamanlis sought to maintain the status quo by preventing Ankara from precipitating a crisis.

What Karamanlis sought to change was the military balance, which favored Turkey in the Aegean. As long the U.S. embargo


lasted, Turkey would be prevented from making a move in the Aegean, while the Greek army could be built up. Karamanlis was keen to see the embargo maintained in order to neutralize Turkey's air superiority in the Aegean. He also pressed for the 7:10 ratio in U.S. military assistance and saw it adopted by the U.S. Because there was no stable government in Turkey that could accurately analyze and take adequate measures to counter Karamanlis's consistent and successful policies, Turkish policies tended to follow an erratic course from time to time.

### A. Questions Relating to the Sea Areas in the Aegean

In the 1970s Turkey and Greece were involved in a dispute over the sharing of the sea in the Aegean. This involved both territorial waters and the continental shelf.

#### 1. The Question of Territorial Waters

At the signing of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, the breadth of the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea was set by Turkey and Greece at three miles. In the atmosphere of



Map 5-1. Territorial Waters in the Aegean (Six- and Twelve-Mile Limits)

friendship prevailing in the 1930s, Turkey did not oppose the unilateral announcement by Greece in 1936 that it was extending its territorial waters to six miles. On 15 May 1964, at a time when relations between the two countries were tense due to events in Cyprus, Turkey enacted Law No. 476, which declared that in principle its territorial waters would be extended to six miles. A provision in article 2 of this law declared that the principle of reciprocity would apply in the case of countries that set a higher limit.

When the question of territorial waters and the question of the continental shelf became acute between the two countries in the 1970s and at a time when the tendency in international law was to extend territorial waters to twelve miles, Turkey delivered a note to Greece on 27 February 1974 that contained the following elements: The general rules did not apply in enclosed or semiclosed seas like the Aegean; when a state was determining the extent of its territorial waters, it could not and must not block a neighbor's access to the high seas.

Law No. 2674 enacted in 1982 specified that in principle Turkey's territorial waters extended six miles from

the shoreline. This general rule of six miles could be extended further by the Council of Ministers in specific seas, however, bearing in mind all the characteristics and circumstances of that sea and provided it was equitable. Consequently, Turkey's territorial waters in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were fixed at twelve miles, but Law No. 2674 led to no change in the Aegean Sea.

After 1982 Greek leaders made frequent statements claiming the right to extend their territorial waters in the Aegean to twelve miles. Such statements met with sharp responses from Turkey, which declared that this would be a violation of international law and that it would not be recognized and would be considered a *casus belli*. Although Greece continued to maintain from time to time that it had a right to extend its territorial waters to twelve miles, it did not put this claim into practice (Box 5-10).

#### 2. The Question of the Continental Shelf

In 1959 Greece granted petroleum exploration rights in areas of the Aegean continental shelf that it claimed belonged to Greece and published the law to this effect in its Official Gazette. When it was announced that there was a strong indication that oil would be found around the northern Aegean island of Thasos, Turkey took action and granted exploration rights to the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) in the continental shelf of the Aegean on 18 October 1973. The area covered in the Turkish concession included the zones lying off the Anatolian coast and outside of the territorial waters of the islands of Samothraki, Lemnos, Agios Efstratios, Lesbos, Khios, Psara, and Antipsara. These areas provided no continental shelf to these islands, with some of the areas located to the west of the islands. This led to a Greek protest on 7 February 1974. On 27 February 1974 Turkey rejected the protest, on the grounds that the concession areas were located on the natural prolongation of Turkey, and called for negotiations on the question of the continental shelf. On 25 May Greece replied that it was prepared to hold negotiations in conformity with international law as codified in the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Convention.

Turkey greeted the Greek reply as a positive step, while also sending the seismic research vessel *Çandarlı* to the Aegean. On 29 May 1974 the *Çandarlı*, escorted by Turkish warships, sailed into the concession area in the Aegean and conducted seismic explorations over six days. During this period Athens and Ankara exchanged notes, protesting the Turkish action and rejecting the Greek protest. On 18 July Turkey granted new concessions for oil exploration in the continental shelf claimed by Greece. Meanwhile developments in Cyprus temporarily pushed the Aegean tensions into the background.

### Box 5-10. The Turkish and Greek Theses on the Issue of Territorial Waters

#### The Greek Position

- 1. The width of twelve miles for territorial waters is confirmed by article 3 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It has been put into practice by the signatory states and has become an accepted norm in general international practice. As a signatory of UNCLOS, Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters to twelve miles.
- 2. The Greek islands and the Greek mainland constitute a territorial whole. Since the Islands are an Integral part of Greek territory, there are no grounds for applying an exceptional rule for them. Consequently, the twelve-mile rule also applies to the Islands.
- The determination of the width of the territorial waters is an attribute of sovereignty and cannot be restricted.

#### The Turkish Position

- 1. There cannot be a single rule with universal applicability for the width of the territorial waters. The twelve-mile measure contained in UNCLOS constitutes a maximum limit and cannot be applied automatically to all situations. Furthermore, as stipulated in article 300 of the convention, this right cannot be abused. Finally, the twelve-mile rule cannot be binding on Turkey, because Turkey opposed it during the negotiation of this issue at the Third Law of the Sea Conference.
- 2. In determining the width of the territorial waters, the special geographic features of the sea must be taken into account. At present, Greece and Turkey apply the six-mile rule to their territorial waters in the Aegean. Of the roughly 3,000 islands possessed by Greece, 2,383 are located in the Aegean. In these circumstances, 35% of the Aegean Sea consists of Greek territorial waters, 8.8% of Turkish territorial waters, with the remaining 56.2% being the high seas.
- If the twelve-mile rule applied in the Aegean Sea, Greek territorial waters would cover 63.9% of the Aegean, while Turkish territorial waters would rise to just 10%, and the high seas would be reduced to 26.1% of the sea's surface. In these circumstances a ship sailing from Istanbul to Izmir would have to sail in Greek territorial waters. Nor could Turkish ships leave Turkish ports to reach the high seas without sailing through Greek territorial waters. In these circumstances, Greece would have brought under its sovereignty, a substantial part of the Aegean's seabed and its subsoil.

(M. Firat) (Source: Wilson; Pazarci)

After the resignation of Ecevit, the Sadi Irmak government that followed did not enjoy much popular support. At a time when Turkey was facing strong international disapproval because of the second Cyprus operation, Greece was under the leadership of Karamanlis, who enjoyed both domestic and international backing. It was in these circumstances that Ecevit declared on 12 January 1975 that the government was neglecting the Aegean. The question of the continental shelf became a burning issue once again. The next day, Irmak announced that the seismic exploration ship *Longva*, chartered from Norway by

the CHP-MSP coalition government, would conduct explorations in the Aegean both in the Bay of Saros and off the coast of İzmir. He added that Turkey would defend its interests if there was any interference.

Upon this announcement, Athens arranged through a partner in the Norwegian company who was a Greek national to have the ship return to the port of Mersin. At the same time, on 28 January, Karamanlis proposed that the two countries apply to the International Court of Justice to arrive at a settlement of the question.

Irmak consulted party leaders on this proposal. Ecevit expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to hold bilateral talks before going to international adjudication. But Irmak gave a speech in which he asserted that, "since our position is just, we have no reason to fear going to the international tribunal" (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 10–16 March 1975, p. 27011). The U.S. wanted to see a Turkish-Greek rapprochement in the Aegean, and this was having an effect on the Turkish government's stand on the issue.

As on previous occasions of political instability in the country, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted a cautious approach and tried to prevent hasty steps from being taken in preparing Turkey's official response. On 6 February the ministry informed the Greek side that the Greek initiative was approved in principle, but it was necessary to have preliminary talks at ministerial level on matters of procedule. When the Irmak government failed to obtain a vote of confidence, it was replaced by the right-leaning Nationalist Front-1 government, consisting of the Justice Party, the National Salvation Party, the Republican Reliance Party, and the Nationalist Action Party. Both Prime Minister Demirel and the minister of foreign affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, continued the foreign ministry's line, returning to Turkey's traditional policy, and declared that Ankara sought a political and not a legal solution. Meanwhile the dialogue with Greece went on.

On 19 May 1975 the two foreign ministers, Dimitrios Bitsios and Çağlayangil, met in Rome. At the meeting, the Greek side sought the preparation of a compromise to refer the question of the continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, while the Turkish side maintained that the talks had priority and there was no question of preparing a compromise. The matter was referred to the Karamanlis-Demirel summit due to take place soon.

Demirel and Karamanlis met on 31 May 1975 on the occasion of the NATO summit held in Brussels. The American arms embargo imposed on Turkey was in effect, and the U.S. was pressing Ankara to make a conciliatory move. In the joint communiqué issued following the Demirel-Karamanlis talks, the following sentences

were inserted despite the efforts of Turkish diplomats to prevent it: "The Prime Ministers had occasion to review outstanding questions between their two countries. They agreed to settle these questions by peaceful negotiations and to refer the question of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice" (Milletlerarass Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı, p. 126).

When accusations started being hurled in Turkey, however, Ankara backtracked and delivered a note to Athens on 30 September, stating that the Aegean continental shelf should be solved primarily through bilateral talks and that the International Court of Justice should be resorted to only in case of need. In its reply of 2 October, Athens accused Turkey of reneging on the agreement made by the two prime ministers earlier in Brussels.

# Greece's Application to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice

Whenever the Turkish and Greek governments took a decision to engage in a dialogue, internal politics forced them to take extreme positions in the talks. Despite the fact that in 1975 Greece remilitarized the Aegean Islands and Turkey established the 4th Army in İzmir, Karamanlis delivered a speech in the Greek parliament on 17 April 1976 in which he made an offer to Turkey to abandon the arms race, sign a nonaggression pact, and settle all questions in a peaceful manner, which, as members of the NATO alliance, they were already supposed to be doing. Demirel responded to this offer by calling for talks to be undertaken at a technical level. He also proposed a meeting of foreign ministers. Just as a dialogue was about to start, Ecevit resorted to the same old game and accused the government of allowing Greece to tilt the balance in the Aegean against Turkey. Demirel could not afford to appear to be the politician who forfeited the gains achieved by Ecevit, so he announced that the Hora (which would later be renamed Sismik I) was being made ready to sail into the Aegean. Although this claim was made repeatedly, the ship remained tied up at the Maritime Bank's shipyard and lacked the technical equipment to set sail.

The *Hora* eventually sailed into the Aegean on 6 August 1976, escorted by eleven warships, and entered into the sector located between the islands of Lemnos and Lesbos. Greece considered this sector to be Greek, while Turkey claimed that it was part of the high seas. Greece delivered a strongly worded note, demanding an end to the violation and declining all responsibility for the consequences of Turkey's action. Turkey's reply was unequivocal. The exploration being conducted was of a scientific nature. If an attack took place against an unarmed ship, Greece would have to shoulder the responsibility.

Turkish-Greek relations had come to the brink of war. On 10 August the *Hora* returned to the port of Çanakkale; a few hours later Greece took the issue to the UN Security Council and referred the dispute unilaterally to the International Court of Justice.

When Greece applied to the UN Security Council, it argued that Turkey was endangering international peace and security by violating Greece's sovereignty over the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. In its resolution 395, dated 25 August 1976, the Security Council avoided going into the substance of the issue. Instead it called on the two sides to resume their talks on the question and consider taking the case to the International Court of Justice. Greece had failed to obtain what it was seeking from the council. Its application to the International Court of Justice also proved fruitless (Box 5-11).

After the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion, Turkey and Greece started negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf in 1976 but were unable to make any progress.

## The 1976 Bern Declaration and the Montreux Summit

The threat of armed conflict in the Aegean led the U.S. to intercede once again. As a result of the successful action of the Greek Lobby, the U.S. Congress maintained the embargo imposed on Turkey, notwithstanding the president's efforts, preventing the White House from effectively carrying out its regional policy.

Bitsios and Çağlayangil decided to start talks that led to the Bern Declaration of 11 November 1976. This declaration contained the principles that would apply in the demarcation of the continental shelf between the two countries (Box 5-12). It was a good first step. According to these principles, (1) the negotiations would be conducted in total secrecy; and (2) the parties would refrain from actions that would obstruct the talks or humiliate the other side.

The Bern Declaration resulted in a positive atmosphere in the relations of the two countries. But the question of the airspace of the Aegean, the military balance, and Cyprus, compounded by the problems with the U.S. over the embargo and the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, prevented relations from advancing much beyond the frosty stage.

When the Ecevit government was formed in 1978, an opportunity emerged to take fresh initiatives. For Karamanlis, Demirel had become a leader who could not be trusted because of his backtracking from the decision of the Brussels Declaration of 1975 to refer the question of the continental shelf to the International Court of Justice.

## Box 5-11. The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Continental Shelf of the Aegean Sea

In its unilateral application to the international Court of Justice concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, Greece made two requests. (1) In granting the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) exploration rights in the Aegean Sea, Turkey has inflicted irreparable damage to Greek rights on the continental shelf. This action is also damaging the friendship between the two countries. Consequently, the court should take preventive measures, pending an opinion on the substance. (2) The court should determine the rules by which the continental shelf between the Greek Islands and Turkey will be apportioned.

Upon this application, the court informed Turkey of the situation and sought its views on the issue. Although Greece appointed an ad hoc judge, Turkey refrained from doing so and did not participate in the proceedings of 25–27 August. On 26 August Ankara submitted a letter to the court in which it questioned the court's competence in the matter. In its decision of 11 September, the court ruled that Turkey's seismic exploration would not cause irreparable damage even if the area was assumed to be part of the Greek continental shelf, so no preventive measures were called for.

Immediately after this decision, the court addressed the question of its competence before taking up the substance of the case. Meanwhile talks were getting underway between the parties. In this phase of the proceedings, Turkey again refrained from participating. All it did was submit a letter on 10 October 1978 in which it challenged the Greek arguments that the court was competent to consider the case. Greece based its case on two arguments. (1) Turkey and Greece were both parties to the General Covenant on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of 1928. Article 17 of the covenant stated that the parties could submit a legal dispute to arbitration after the lapse of a certain period. (2) Turkey had agreed in the joint communique adopted after the Brussels talks between the two prime ministers on 31 May 1975 to refer the dispute over the continental shelf to the International Court.

On 19 December 1978 the court rendered its opinion that it was not competent to consider the dispute between Turkey and Greece over the continental shelf. It based this opinion on the following elements. (1) When Greece became a party to the General Agreement of 1928, it reserved its position regarding questions of territorial competence, which it specifically excluded. Since the delimitation of the continental shelf is a territorial question, the court is not competent to consider the case. (2) In the joint communique of 31 May 1975, Turkey did not grant Greece the right to refer the case unilaterally to the court. Therefore the International Court cannot consider the case.

(M. FIRAT)

Ecevit, however, enjoyed a completely different image in international as well as Greek circles. On 10–11 March 1978 the two prime ministers met in Montreux to bring about an atmosphere of trust. They decided that the secretariesgeneral of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would meet on 14 April.

But when it emerged that the new U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, would ask Congress to lift the embargo on Turkey, Greece was thrown into turmoil. The leader of

## Box 5-12. The Turkish and Greek Theses on the Continental Shelf

#### The Greek Thesis

1. The question of the demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean is a legal question, and the best method for resolving this is international adjudication. The basis for resolving the question should be the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, of which Greece is a signatory.

 Under these conventions, islands also have a continental shelf.

3. Greece is a state consisting of the mainland and its islands. Under the rule in international law of the territorial integrity and the indivisibility of the state, it cannot be accepted that a foreign marine environment intrudes between the Greek mainland and the islands making up the political and territorial integrity of the state. (With this argument, Athens was seeking to have Greece recognized as an archipelagic state, which would allow a line to be drawn around the outermost islands, with all areas within this perimeter becoming an inner sea. Inner waters enjoy the same status as a country's territory.)

4. The demarcation of the continental shelf should be along a line midway between Turkey and the easternmost Aegean Islands.

#### The Turkish Thesis

1. The demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean cannot be regarded as a purely legal question. In the context of Turkish-Greek relations and the balance in the entire Aegean region, it is primarily a political question. This situation calls for a solution through mutual agreement.

2. In the demarcation of the continental shelf, the most important criterion is natural prolongation. Islands located on the natural prolongation of Anatolia cannot have a continental shelf.

3. The demarcation of the continental shelf should also be based on the principle of equity. (a) The existence of islands in a region constitutes a special circumstance; consequently, there are special circumstances in the Aegean Sea. (b) The Aegean is a semienclosed sea with special circumstances.

4. At Lausanne, a balance was struck between Turkey and Greece in 1923, which came to be known as the Lausanne balance. It consists of demilitarized islands, equal territorial waters, an unallocated continental shelf, and broad areas of high seas. This balance should not be upset, and both countries should be allowed to benefit from the Aegean under equal conditions.

(M. FIRAT) (Source: Wilson; Pazarci)

the opposition, Andreas Papandreou, began to assail Karamanlis for starting a dialogue with Turkey. Karamanlis was forced to back off. He had been driven into the same corner in which Demirel had found himself in 1975. The result was the cancellation of the 14 April meeting.

The Ecevit-Karamanlis summit marked the end of the dialogue on the Aegean dispute. After this, Ecevit also hardened his position and came up with the New National Defense concept that declared Greece to be the primary threat to Turkey. Leaving aside the Davos process in the late 1980s, during the T. Özal administration, Turkish-Greek relations entered an extended period of crisis and no communication that was to last until the end of the 1990s.

# B. Questions Relating to the Airspace of the Aegean

The differences between Turkey and Greece were not confined to the maritime environment. They also had differences over the sharing of the airspace. The airspace claimed by Greece as well as the Flight Information Region (FIR) line also became sources of tension between the two countries after 1974.

### The Airspace

The airspace is the column of air above a state's territory and territorial waters. On 6 September 1931 Greece issued a presidential decree by which it extended its airspace from three miles from the shoreline to ten miles. Although the width of Greece's territorial waters at the time was only three miles, Turkey showed no reaction to this move. After 1974 Turkey came out against Greece's claim on the grounds that it violated the Chicago Conventions of 7 December 1944, of which both countries were signatories. Turkey would only recognize the Greek claim of national airspace up to a distance of six miles from the Greek coast, which overlapped the Greek territorial waters. To keep the issue permanently on the agenda, Turkish military aircraft systematically and periodically flew into the four miles of airspace that Turkey did not recognize. Each time this happened, Greece delivered a note protesting the violation of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft (Box 5-13).

#### The FIR Line

The Flight Information Region (FIR) is designed to ensure the security of civil aviation within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which sets its boundaries. Within these limits, the state in charge provides flight information and search and rescue services and operates warning systems.

At the meeting of the ICAO held in Istanbul on 23 May 1952, a decision was made, with the participation of Turkey, granting the responsibilities for providing FIR services in the Aegean to Greece starting from that date. According to this decision, the air traffic over the Aegean would be controlled from Athens, while Turkey would be responsible only for the traffic in the airspace over its territorial waters. In the atmosphere of Turkish-Greek cordiality reigning in the 1950s, Turkey agreed to this arrangement, bearing in mind that most of the traffic in

#### Box 5-13. The Turkish and Greek Theses on the Subject of Airspace

The Greek thesis on the ten-mile airspace rested on two premises.

- To declare an airspace of ten miles was in conformity with international law.
- 2. This was confirmed by the fact that from 1931 to the 1970s Turkey never complained about this issue.

Turkey was opposed to both of these views.

1. Turkey maintained that the differences of opinion regarding the legality of the ten-mile airspace were the result of different ways of interpreting articles 1 and 2 of the International Civil Aviation Convention of the Chicago Conventions of 1944. Article 1 states that signatories have full and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace over their territories. Article 2 states that (for the purposes of this convention) territory signifies the land under a state's control, sovereignty, protection, or mandate as well as the contiguous territorial waters.

Greece claimed that the Chicago Conventions contained provisions only in connection with matters pertaining to the subjects regulated by the conventions. They were not designed to define the airspace legally but only to indicate that states exercise sovereignty over their airspaces as well as their territories and territorial waters. Consequently, Greece's practice did not violate international law. Furthermore, as the tendency to extend the territorial waters to twelve miles became generalized, this question would become irrelevant.

Turkey claimed that the above-mentioned articles clearly defined the airspace and that this airspace corresponded directly to the territory of a state, including its territorial waters. According to this argument, the airspace could not extend beyond the territorial waters. Consequently, it was against international law for Greece to set its airspace at ten miles beyond its shoreline when its territorial seas extended to only six miles.

2. The Greek contention that Turkey's failure to react to a situation that had existed since 1931 was proof that Turkey accepted this situation was also rejected by Turkey. Turkey's first complaint against Greece's claim to ten miles came in 1975, because the first official notification to this effect made to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was on 2 June 1974, even though the extension occurred through a decree promulgated much earlier. Turkey reacted when Greece announced its practice internationally and sent a telex message to the ICAO on 15 April 1975, declaring the space beyond six miles from Greece's shores to be a dangerous area. Furthermore, it confirmed this position by notifying Greece on 5 May 1975 that it only recognized Greek airspace up to six miles from the Greek shoreline.

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the Aegean consisted of Greek aircraft and ships. It also meant avoiding substantial financial burdens by not having to purchase the technical equipment needed to carry out FIR responsibilities.

그는 항상 무슨 얼마를 가는 사람이라면 있다.

The deterioration in relations between Turkey and Greece in 1974 caused the FIR question to surface as one more source of tension. After the first Cyprus operation, Turkey issued Notam (Notice to Airmen) No. 714 in order to protect itself from possible threats coming from the Aegean and enhance its security. This notice required all aircraft, including military aircraft, crossing a line drawn halfway across the Aegean from north to south to inform Turkey in advance. In other words, Turkey had shifted the FIR line from the line separating Turkish and Greek territorial waters to the middle of the Aegean Sea.

In response, Greece issued Notam No. 1157 on 13 September, declaring that the air corridor between Greece and Turkey was unsafe. This forced all air traffic to use circuitous routes in order to avoid the Aegean corridors.

When the Demirel government finalized its defense arrangements with the U.S. on 22 February 1980, it unilaterally canceled Notam No. 714. Greece responded by canceling Notam No. 1157, and this question was resolved. Turkey had a number of reasons to take this step. First, as a result of the Turkish and Greek notices, international air traffic had to be rerouted, resulting in airfare hikes that gave rise to complaints from airlines. Second, because Greece's relations were overwhelmingly with the West, the closure

of its eastern air corridor did not affect it much. Turkey was the major loser, because it also was westward-looking in its international relations. Finally, the probability of an attack from Greece had by then practically disappeared.

At present, the major dispute between the two countries relates to military aircraft. Greece claims that the FIR arrangements encompass all aircraft, civilian and military, whereas Turkey claims that only civilian aircraft are obliged to provide information under the FIR arrangement, while the movements of military aircraft should be regulated by bilateral agreements.

## C. Questions Relating to the Military Balance in the Aegean

Following the 1974 Cyprus operation, Turkey and Greece took significant steps to change the military status quo in the Aegean. Greece considered Turkey a serious military threat after the Cyprus operation and accelerated the militarization of the islands lying closest to Anatolia. In addition, the Karamanlis government displayed its displeasure at the U.S. by leaving the military structure of NATO. In 1975 Turkey established the 4th Army, also known as the Aegean Army, with headquarters in İzmir. To indicate that it was intended to confront a threat emanating from the Aegean and as a reaction to the continuing U.S. arms embargo, the new army was kept under national control and not assigned to NATO.

These developments affected not only Turkish-Greek

#### Box 5-14. The Turkish and Greek Theses with Respect to the Militarization of the Aegean Islands

There are three categories of Aegean islands from the point of view of their demilitarized status. (1) The Islands off the entrance of the Turkish Straits, Lemnos and Samothraki, which were demilitarized under article 4 of the Lausanne Straits Convention. (2) The Islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, demilitarized under article 13 of the Treaty of Lausanne. (3) The Dodecanese Islands, which were transferred from Italy to Greece under the terms of the 1947 Parls Peace Treaty on condition that they remain demilitarized in accordance with article 14 of the treaty.

#### The Greek Thesis

Because the Montreux Straits Convention of 1936 replaced the Lausanne Straits Convention, the Islands of Lemnos and Samothraki in the first category gained the right to be remilitarized in the same manner as the Turkish Straits were remilitarized under the new regime. The Turkish foreign minister of the time, Tevfik Rüstü Aras, acknowledged this right in a speech delivered at the TGNA. Since Turkey acquired the right to remilitarize the Islands off the Dardanelles, Greece has an equal right to remilitarize the other Islands off the Straits under its sovereignty.

The Islands in the second category are faced with an actual threat and are being remilitarized for legitimate defense purposes. The principle of *rebus sic stantibus* applies in this case. The basic right of legitimate self-defense overrides any rights derived from treaties. Furthermore, Turkey too is failing to carry out its commitments under Lausanne. The circumstances are completely changed, and, having served their function, the provisions for the demilitarization of the islands no longer apply.

Finally, the Dodecanese Islands and the Island of Megisti were demilitarized under the 1947 Parls Peace Treaty. The freaty binds only those who are a party. Since Turkey is not a signatory, Turkey has no right to make any claim on the basis of this treaty.

#### The Turkish Thesis

None of the three Greek arguments with respect to Lemnos and Samothraki has any validity for Turkey. The preamble of the Montreux Straits Convention does state that this convention replaces the Lausanne Straits Convention. But the same convention declares that its purpose is to ensure Turkey's security. Therefore, those provisions of the Lausanne Straits Convention that do not conflict with the Montreux Straits Convention remain valid. Turkey does not deny that in his speech of 1936 Aras made positive comments on the remilitarization of Lemnos and Samothraki. For these comments to have legal validity, however, the interested parties must subsequently express their approval with their actions. But Turkey kept sending notes expressing opposition to the Greek action and made public statements in the same direction, Finally, the Greek and Turkish islands off the Dardanelles need not have the same regime. The preamble of the Montreux Straits Convention approved the rearming of the Turkish islands within the context of Turkish security.

As for the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, Greece bases its right to remilitarize these islands on the legitimate right of self-defense. In International law, this right can only be invoked in the event of an actual attack and cannot be claimed on the grounds of a threat. There is no threat to the islands originating from Turkey, but even if such a threat existed, that would still not give Greece the right to remilitarize the Islands.

On the subject of the Dodecanese Islands and Megisti, the view that Turkey cannot claim any rights under the 1947 Paris peace treaty is unacceptable. Any country of the region can demand the observance of the demilitarized status of these Islands, which constitutes an objective fact. Furthermore, the Dodecanese Islands are not devoid of any legal ties with Turkey. Article 16 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne recognizes that Turkey has rights with respect to the future status of these Islands. As a matter of fact, the text of this article was distributed as a conference paper at the Paris Feace Conference. This is proof of the validity of Turkey's claims to this effect.

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relations but also the regional policies of NATO and the U.S. Fundamental problems arose in connection with the Aegean military balance, which have persisted to this day despite the improvement in the relations of Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. These problems involve the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands, the NATO Early Warning Line (the area of responsibility for air defense), and NATO's command and control areas.

## The Question of the Militarization of the Aegean Islands

The issue of the militarization of the Aegean islands emerged in the 1960s when relations between Turkey and Greece became strained because of the Cyprus crisis. On 29 June 1964 Turkey delivered a note to Greece, calling for it to comply with treaty provisions and stop the construction of fortifications in Rhodes and Kos. Greece delivered a reply in which it claimed that no fortifications were being built and that it was in compliance with international trea-

ties. In April 1969 Turkey delivered a new note in which it asked for militarization activities in Lemnos to be ended. Greece claimed for the first time that the Montreux Straits Convention gave it the right to militarize Lemnos. After 1974 Greece announced that it was indeed militarizing the Aegean islands and developed various arguments to prove that it had the right to do so (Box 5-14).

Despite Turkey's objection, Greece continued to militarize the islands. In the 1990s the ownership of islets and rock formations in the Aegean emerged as a new dispute.

### The Question of the NATO Early Warning Line and Command and Control Areas

In the wake of the 1964 Cyprus crisis and at the request of Greece, the commander of Allied Forces in Europe released a message on 22 February, stating that the NATO Early Warning Line in the Aegean corresponded to the Istanbul-Athens FIR line. This implied that the defense of the Aegean was under Greek responsibility. When

Greece left NATO's military structure in 1974, provisional arrangements had to be made. After the implementation of the Rogers Plan (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 6) and the return of Greece to NATO's military structure in 1980, the subject was to emerge once again. Turkey announced that it would not accept the pre-1974 arrangement and demanded that areas of responsibility for air defense be redrawn to meet Turkish defense requirements. Specifically, Turkey wanted a notice time of ten minutes for eastbound flights in the international airspace over the Aegean.

The issue of the command and control areas within NATO is closely related to this Early Warning Line: which country will assume responsibility for command and control in the air defense area?

The question of command and control of naval forces in the Aegean first came up in NATO's Military Committee on 17 January 1957, when this task was entrusted to Greece with the concurrence of Turkey. Because this decision did not obtain the approval of the Defense Planning Committee, the higher political organ, it never became a NATO decision; nevertheless, Greece exercised this right until 1974. When Greece left NATO's military structure in that year, Turkey announced that it did not want to recognize the existing arrangement. After Turkey approved the Rogers Plan (and, with it, the return of Greece to the military structure), this dispute was supposed to be taken up in accordance with the Rogers Plan. Despite Turkey's friendly gesture in allowing Greece to return to NATO's military structure, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government that came to power in 1981 in Greece refused to discuss the command and control question.

The differences over military questions between the two allied Aegean countries would continue to plague NATO until the end of the 1990s.

#### IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS (1975-1980)

Turkey's international isolation increased after the second Cyprus operation. The U.S. arms embargo on Turkey and relations with the EEC were linked to Cyprus. There was mounting pressure for intercommunal talks to begin and for a return to the previous state of affairs with a withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. The Cypriot Turks and Turkey, however, had no intention to give up recently gained rights. They were pressing for a new arrangement, based on the decisions of the First Geneva Conference, that would reflect the new situation on the island. At first Turkey pursued this policy with some dif-

fidence. But after 5 February 1975, when the U.S. imposed its arms embargo, concrete steps began to be taken in Cyprus.

## A. Proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed on 13 February 1975. In a statement made on that day, Denktaş explained why it had become necessary to take this step and added that the ultimate goal was to unite once again with the Greek-Cypriot community, but within a bizonal federation. Resolution 367 of the UN Security Council, dated 12 March 1975, deplored this action and called on the sides to engage in talks under the aegis of the UN secretary-general.

The proclamation of the TFSC was actually a delayed decision. Turkey had been able to establish its military rule over Northern Cyprus but had not been able to legitimize the new status quo. Makarios had returned to the island. Now that the constitutional order was restored, Turkey was expected to withdraw its troops. The decisions made at the first Geneva Conference were gradually being forgotten.

Before the proclamation of the TFSC, there was a debate going on in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When it was decided to provide Northern Cyprus with a legal foundation, one of the proposals was to declare an independent state in the north. The Irmak government and some diplomats were unsure of the international reaction to such a move, however, so this option was discarded. The view that prevailed was that proclaiming a federated state would be more suitable.

The TFSC had been established, but it faced many difficulties. The original population of 234,000 in the north had fallen to 70,000, including 20,000 Greek Cypriots who had not fled their villages. The operation had caused considerable destruction, bringing the economy to a standstill. Farming and animal husbandry had come to an end, and all vital requirements were being secured from Turkey. A strong political authority that could revive the economy was missing. There were five separate administrations: the Turkish army; the Bayraktarlık, which has organized the irregular Turkish-Cypriot fighters; the Turkish Embassy; the Cyprus Coordination Council established in September 1974 under the chairmanship of Ziya Müezzinoğlu; and finally the TFSC.

The first action was to issue an ordinance on 2 May 1975 that would make up for the shortage of workers in Northern Cyprus with laborers brought over from Turkey. Although the intention was to bring over 100,000 workers, only 40,000 were admitted in the first stage. This decision would change the population composition of Cyprus and met with a negative reaction from the Greek Cypriots. It continues to attract criticism to this day, including from Turkish Cypriots.

#### B. The Intercommunal Talks

The two sides heeded the UN Security Council's resolution 367 and engaged in intercommunal talks in Vienna under the aegis of the secretary-general of the UN. The only tangible result of these talks, which lasted from 28 April 1975 to 21 February 1976, was the Population Exchange Agreement. According to the agreement, the Greek-Cypriot population in the north would move to the south, with the Turkish Cypriots moving from south to north. The transfer operation would be supervised by UNFICYP. The transfer of populations would be on a voluntary basis, and priority would be given to the reunification of families. In addition, the two sides took up the issue of the opening of Nicosia's international airport and the case of Városha (a large Greek-Cypriot neighborhood of Famagusta, which had been abandoned by its inhabitants fleeing the Turkish army), but nothing emerged from the talks because no progress was made on the question of maps and border adjustments. An agreement on maps would have entailed giving up territory, and Demirel could not afford the loss of political prestige that would result from being the politician who gave up what Ecevit had won.

On the Greek-Cypriot side, negotiations were being conducted by Clerides; but he was beginning to feel the pressure of Makarios, who was now back on the island. The U.S. had persuaded itself that Clerides was being conciliatory and supported him against Makarios, while Makarios saw Clerides as his chief rival and did everything to prevent an agreement. Makarios's tactic was to gain international support for the Greek Cypriots by presenting the Turkish side as intransigent. He was successful in depicting the Turks as the obstacle to a settlement.

By 1976 Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots found themselves quite isolated in the international arena. In his election campaign in 1976, President Carter had announced that the arms embargo against Turkey would not be lifted until the Cyprus question was settled to the satisfaction of the Greek Cypriots. Although the EEC made proposals for a solution that included a federal constitutional structure with two fairly autonomous zones, it also supported the right of refugees to return to their homes and freedom of circulation and settlement, plus the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. In practice, such

proposals would nullify any benefits the federal structure might provide for the Turkish Cypriots. When the Cyprus report by the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe condemning Turkey was submitted to the Ministerial Council, the council promptly adopted it on 20 August 1976.

The unfriendly attitude of the West was also evidenced by the Islamic countries. Although the Organization of the Islamic Conference made a decision to support the TFSC at its Islambul meeting held on 10 to 18 May 1976, the same Islamic countries endorsed a resolution strongly condemning Turkey that had been adopted by the Conference of Nonaligned States in Colombo on 2 August 1976.

In these circumstances, the Demirel government decided to take a new initiative. On 9 January 1977 Denktaş wrote Makarios a letter in which he proposed the resumption of talks. Contrary to expectations, Makarios agreed to the proposal in order to gain political advantage against his rival Clerides.

#### The Agreement on Four Principles between Denktaş and Makarios

On 12 February 1977 Denktaş and Makarios signed the Agreement on Four Principles.

- 1. A federal republic would be set up that was independent, nonaligned, and bizonal.
- 2. The amount of territory to be allocated to each community would be determined according to the criteria of economic viability, productivity, and land ownership.
- 3. The three freedoms (freedom of circulation, freedom of settlement, and freedom of property) and other questions of principle as well as other specific subjects would be open to discussion. But the basis of a bicommunal federal system and possible practical difficulties for the Turkish-Cypriot community would be borne in mind.
- 4. The responsibilities and functions of the central federal government would be established in a manner that would preserve the unity of the country, bearing in mind the bicommunal character of the state.

Denktaş agreed to this round of talks at Ankara's behest, but he felt that Makarios was the winner. The notion that the Cyprus question could not be solved with Makarios had been dispelled, and Makarios was now free from the fear that Turkey would declare an independent state as long as he kept the talks going. Makarios could also chip away at the Turkish demands for land and extra security within a federal structure. Finally, Makarios was free to stop the talks at any moment and accuse the Turkish side of intransigence.

The signing of the Agreement on Four Principles gave a new impetus to the Vienna talks. In the session lasting from 31 March to 7 April 1977, both sides submitted their proposals. For the first time, the Greek side prepared a map, which gave 20% of the land to the Turkish side.

As the two sides examined each other's proposals, Makarios died suddenly. When Spyros Kyprianou was elected president on 26 January 1978, there was another break in the negotiation process. Kyprianou did not have the charisma of Makarios and did not want to weaken his standing with the Greek-Cypriot public by accepting a federation, because he knew well that only a Makarios could induce the Greek Cypriots to come to terms with a federal solution.

Despite all this, 1978 saw important developments. The Carter administration was sensitive to the Soviet threat and favored lifting the arms embargo but wanted to see some prior steps from Turkey. When Ecevit became prime minister in 1978, he sought to accommodate the U.S. position. A group of experts, with the advice of Professor Mümtaz Soysal, prepared a draft constitution for Cyprus, consisting of 100 articles. It included a bicommunal, bizonal, federal state structure, territorial adjustments in six places, and reopening Varosha to settlement. These Turkish proposals, however, were rejected by the Greek-Cypriot delegation. Between 1974 and 1977 it had been the Turkish side that was trying to avoid negotiations and a settlement, but now this role had passed to the Greek side. As the economic condition of the Greek side improved and the economic and other difficulties of the Turkish side multiplied, the Greek side was quite prepared to live with a deadlocked situation.

# The Ten-Point Agreement between Denktaş and Kyprianou

The negotiations, which had been interrupted for a year, were resumed on 18–19 May 1979, when Denktaş and Kyprianou signed the Ten-Point Agreement. This was a reaffirmation of the 1977 agreement between Denktaş and Makarios. The negotiations would be conducted on the basis of both the principles agreed to by Denktaş and Makarios on 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions on Cyprus. All territorial and constitutional issues would be taken up. Agreement would be reached on reopening Varosha to settlement under the supervision of the UN, and this agreement would be implemented without delay. Questions regarding the final objective of a demilitarized Republic of Cyprus would be discussed. The discussion would also include measures to ensure the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonalignment of the

Republic. These measures would also ensure that Cyprus would not unite, partially or fully, with any other state or be partitioned or annexed.

The Ten-Point Agreement also failed to secure any tangible progress. Cyprus remained on the agenda of the UN as an unresolved question until 1983. The developments in Turkey and Greece after 1980 and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 would alter the nature of the question fundamentally.

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## Relations with the USSR

#### Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR

The USSR entered the 1960s with the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, which met from 17 to 31 October 1961. At the congress, it was announced that the transition to the communism stage had begun in the USSR. A determination was made that capitalism was in deep crisis. The U.S. would be overtaken in 1970, and communism would be established in the USSR in 1980.

According to theory, the difference between socialism and communism was that in the latter stage a prosperous society would be attained in which it would be possible to apply the principle "from each according to his means, and to each according to his needs." In reality, however, the USSR was far from reaching that stage. The "great leap forward" campaign in China had a great influence on the decision to enter the stage of transition to communism in the USSR. The USSR itself was making the greatest leap by announcing that it was entering the construction of communism stage. It was conveying the message to the other socialist states that had yet to reach this stage that they, naturally, had to follow its example.

When the plans failed to be fulfilled, especially in the agricultural sector, Khrushchev was dismissed on 14 October 1964. This was the only time in the history of the USSR that something like this had happened. By the time Gorbachev similarly left his post in 1991, the USSR experiment had already come to an end. After Khrushchev, Brezhnev took over as first secretary of the CPSU in October 1964. At the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, held from 29 March to 9 April 1966, Brezhnev assumed the title of general secretary of the party, which had been in disuse since Stalin's time, and became the "leader" of the USSR until his death in 1982.

Under Brezhnev's leadership, the USSR continued to be plagued by the problem of agricultural inadequacy and waste. Its industrial growth also began to falter. In the final stage of this period, there was a phase of stagnation before the onset of the crisis. Corruption and alcoholism were on the rise. Technological progress had come to an end. The USSR was unsuccessful because it could not keep pace with the scientific and technological revolution carried out by the U.S. in the 1960s. It was unable to adopt new production techniques like automation; nor was it able to adjust its social structure to new requirements. Economic growth fell from the level of 11.3% attained in 1951-55 to a miserable 3% in 1976-80. Central planning of the economy was no longer functioning properly. Quantity came before quality. The bureaucracy was an obstacle that prevented the system from functioning. Internal development came to depend on imported Western technology. The privileged and highly conservative leadership (consisting of bureaucrats and technocrats) was unable to make room for economic renewal. During Brezhnev's rule, the system gradually turned into a gerontocracy, with high-level bureaucrats holding onto their jobs up to their deaths.

In the sphere of relations among socialist states, the salient event was the split between the USSR and China, which had repercussions throughout the socialist bloc.

The split within the bloc led to its radical transformation. In 1953 the only maverick state not under Soviet influence was Yugoslavia. By the mid-1970s only six of the sixteen socialist regimes in the world remained on the Soviet side. The truth of the matter was that the USSR had lost its leadership position within the bloc. The Soviet Union was forced to intervene by force even in the countries that acknowledged its leadership, as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Box 5-15). The 1971 initiative to restore the cohesion of the bloc within the framework of the COMECON remained on paper because of the undue weight given to the USSR within this organization.

When it came to relations with nonaligned countries, the USSR was helping them economically and extending loans without demanding ideological allegiance in return. The USSR was motivated by the need to compete with

#### Box 5-15. The Brezhnev Doctrine

表表的表示。

Leonid Brezhnev's rule coincided with the period of détente in the Cold War. Détente allowed centrifugal forces to emerge in both camps. In January 1968 Alexander Dubcek came to power in Czechoslovakia and started questioning communism on the Soviet model. When he attempted to establish his version of socialism based on the democratic model, the armies of the Warsaw Pact overran the country on 21 August 1968. This was the end of the "Prague Spring." This event demonstrated that the USSR was not prepared to allow any of the Eastern European countries to slip out of the bloc. On 12 November 1968 Brezhnev enunciated the doctrine that Communist countries only enjoyed a limited sovereignty. If socialism came under threat, the USSR had a responsibility to intervene.

Under the conditions of détente, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a vehicle for the USSR to impose its leadership on Communist countries. The doctrine created a great commotion in Western European Communist circles and led to the appearance of "Euro Communism." The doctrine was dealt a great blow by Mikhail Gorbachev when he declared in 1987 that Moscow would look kindly upon "national" socialism. The doctrine was dealt a deathblow in August 1989, when the Kremlin remained silent after a non-Communist government came to power in Poland.

(E: Tellal) (Source: STMA, vol. 5, p. 1680)

the West and the desire to free developing countries from overdependence on the West, to increase its influence and gain new markets.

The USSR pursued the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West despite the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. These relations can be broken down into three interrelated parts: disarmament negotiations, good political relations both multilaterally within the CSCE and bilaterally, and expanding trade relations.

Despite all of this, the bipolar structure remained intact in the international system. In negotiating the SALT treaties, the USSR was motivated by the urgent need to relieve itself of the heavy burden of the arms race and had to override the opposition of the military-industrial complex.

In the U.S., defense industries were controlled by the private sector, which received contracts from the state. That is why the military-industrial complex was extremely powerful. Even as the disarmament talks went ahead, the two superstates kept up their research to develop more advanced arms. The USSR wanted to keep the situation from getting out of control, so Brezhnev, the author of détente, hardened his position. He intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 and imposed the Wojciech Jaruzelski regime in Poland in 1980.

To sum up, by the end of the 1970s there was a growing gap between the brave economic plans of the USSR and grim reality and a similar gap between the rhetoric and actions in political life. The role that the USSR played in the international system bore no relationship to its actual strength.

# II. FROM "NORMALIZATION" TO COOPERATION

### A. Factors Influencing Relations

During the twenty years examined in this chapter, relations between Turkey and the USSR were influenced by developments in the world as well as the region, as summarized in the following paragraphs.

The first development was the Cuban missile crisis. The American decision following the crisis to dismantle the Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey without consulting Ankara led Turkey to review its relations with the U.S., while removing an impediment to developing relations with the USSR.

A second factor was the changes taking place within NATO. These changes in NATO's military strategy during the 1960s were placing strains on relations among the allies. Compared to the massive retaliation strategy, the new strategy of flexible response allowed the allies more room for maneuver (see Box 4-10 in Section 4).

The third factor was the question of chromium. In 1963 the USSR lowered its price for the mineral, which led the U.S. to shift its purchases from Turkey to the USSR. As a leading exporter of chromium, Turkey was badly affected by this decision. This led Ankara to review its policies based on bloc solidarity.

The fourth factor was Cyprus. The Cyprus events of 1964 and 1974 and the Soviet response to these developments influenced bilateral relations to an important degree. The U.S. military embargo and Turkey's response of closing U.S. bases also contributed to the development of bilateral relations with Moscow.

The fifth development was détente. In the 1970s the intensity of the Cold War abated, with events such as the disarmament negotiations and the Helsinki process. This allowed for improved relations. The USSR's relations with the capitalist states began improving with détente, and the volume of trade expanded. Turkey shared in these developments. Soviet leaders repeatedly declared that the postwar demands for territory and bases in the Turkish Straits were misguided and blamed Stalin and Beria for this. This too helped improve bilateral relations. As Turkey's relations with Moscow improved through détente, this did

not happen at the expense of the Western alliance but in step with it.

Socioeconomic developments in Turkish society also played a role. There is a general impression in Turkey that no improvements in Turkish-Soviet relations occurred in the 1970s. Turkey's economic difficulties in the 1970s made it imperative to seek loans and aid from the USSR, however, and economic cooperation was the driving force behind the development of relations. Furthermore, it became evident that Moscow was not behind the leftist groups and those who resorted to arms in an atmosphere of anarchy in Turkey during the 1970s. As the suspicion that Moscow was responsible for Turkey's domestic troubles abated, this too had a positive effect on bilateral relations.

Finally, the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 had a negative effect on Turkish relations with the USSR, while helping to develop relations with the U.S.

#### B. Normalization (1960-1964)

Soon after the coup of 27 May, ambassador Nikita Ryzhov called on Gen. Cemal Gürsel, the new head of state, on 31 May 1960 to inform him that the USSR was recognizing the new government. He also expressed the hope that the new administration would have the strength to improve relations with the USSR. After this, the USSR went on the offensive to develop relations. Ryzhov made a major contribution toward this effort. He ask the Turkish government not to postpone the planned visit to Moscow by the prime minister. Cemal Gürsel made a statement on 28 May, however, announcing that he would be unable to carry out the planned visit to "our big neighbor who has made significant material progress" (PRO, FO 371/153041), but added that he would be glad to carry out the visit at a future date.

The USSR also took initiatives at a high level to improve relations with the new administration. On 28 June 1960 Khrushchev wrote Cemal Gürsel a letter in which he established a link between Turkey's situation and its alliances and expressed the wish to see Turkey pursuing a more independent line in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, he went on to say that "we have no desire to see Turkey's relations with America and the other Western states deteriorate. We would not harbor such feelings. We ourselves are seeking to establish good relations with all Western states, including the United States" (Tellal, p. 264). He was emphasizing that Turkey's alliance commitments need not prevent the development of relations with the USSR.

Gürsel replied on 8 July, stressing Turkey's attach-

ment to its alliances. He added that reductions in military spending could only come about through arms limitation agreements. Good relations depended on a display of goodwill by the USSR.

This suggested that no change had occurred in Turkey's foreign policy. But developments over the medium term were to lead to a normalization of relations between the two countries. One of these developments was the appointment of a new ambassador to Moscow. After the coup on 27 May, it was announced that the new minister of foreign affairs would be Fahri Korutürk; but this decision was subsequently changed when Selim Sarper accepted the post. The administration of the National Unity Committee appointed Korutürk to the Moscow Embassy, thus demonstrating the importance it attributed to relations with the Soviet Union. Selim Sarper was the ambassador in Moscow who conducted the ill-fated negotiation with Molotov on 19 March and 7 June 1945 (see Box 3-6 in Section 3). Korutürk took over his new post on 6 August 1960, when he presented his credentials to Brezhnev.

As minister of foreign affairs, Sarper met with Khrushchev in New York in October 1960. This was the first highlevel meeting since the Saracoğlu-Stalin meeting in 1939. The meeting in New York was at Khrushchev's request. He made a series of proposals ranging from economic aid to an invitation for Gürsel to visit Moscow. These proposals were all turned down by Sarper. The most noteworthy Soviet initiative was the offer to withdraw its military units "several hundred kilometers" (PRO, FO 371/153039, 371/153041) from the Turkish border. Turkey would be expected to withdraw its units only to a very limited extent, and the USSR was prepared to accept joint verification (PRO, FO 371/153039, 371/153041). Joint verification was of significance because the USSR had been rejecting this condition in the arms-limitation talks then in progress. This too was rejected by Sarper, however. Even if this meeting produced no tangible results, its significance cannot be discounted. Turkey was no longer shying away from high-level bilateral talks with the USSR.

Another development that contributed to improved bilateral relations was the signing of various technical agreements. On 27 April 1961 the two countries signed the agreement that allowed the establishment of direct railway links between the USSR and Turkey. The Agreement on the Establishment of the Cable Telephone Service was signed in 9 June 1962. This agreement extended Turkey's telephone link with Bulgaria and Romania all the way to Moscow. A protocol to build a joint irrigation dam on the Arpaçay River, which formed the border between the two countries, was signed on 25 April 1963.

There were also impediments in the course of normalization of relations. One of these was the "CENTO Documents Crisis" that occurred in August 1961, when the USSR published the secret CENTO documents that it had obtained by covert means in the past. These documents dated from 1958 and contained CENTO's war plans and the measures to be taken in the event of a nuclear exchange. The documents that the USSR published on 18 August had probably been obtained from Iraq after the coup in that country. There were various explanations as to why the USSR had chosen to publicize these documents after a lapse of three years. One explanation was that Khrushchev wanted to remind the Soviet public of the serious nuclear threat. Others claimed that it was designed to distract public opinion, which had focused on the Berlin crisis at that time. Just when it looked as if the matter had been forgotten, the Soviet consul-general in İstanbul, Volov, briefed the Turkish press on the subject of the documents, without obtaining permission from the authorities. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassador that the consul-general had exceeded his competence and his responsibility in publicizing documents on Turkish soil implicating Turkey and therefore violated international law and diplomatic etiquette. The crisis was eventually overcome without doing serious damage to bilateral relations, because the two sides acted in a positive manner and also because the incident involved the two blocs and only concerned bilateral relations indirectly.

The removal of the Jupiter missiles following the Cuban crisis removed an impediment to the development of relations. In 1963 a parliamentary delegation led by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, Speaker of the TGNA, went to the USSR from 29 May to 14 June 1963. This trip was significant, when it is borne in mind that all initiatives emanating from Moscow had been systematically rejected by Turkey since the 1950s. Otherwise the visit produced nothing concrete. As a matter of fact, Turkey was wary of receiving Soviet aid that might be accompanied by Soviet experts.

The minister of foreign affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin, paid an official visit from 30 October to 6 November 1964. This was the first visit by a Turkish foreign minister to the USSR after a lapse of twenty-five years and was regarded as a turning point in the relations between the two states.

Actually, the visit had been planned for 23 March 1964, but the Cyprus crisis brought about a postponement. After the intensification of the crisis in August, it was decided not to postpone the visit any further. Greece, the champion of enosis, enjoyed the support of both Brit-

ain and the U.S. Cyprus had just signed a trade agreement with the USSR. Turkey was confronted with a dangerous situation in which its allies had left it isolated, while Makarios was gaining the support of the USSR. Furthermore, Turkey was the only NATO member that had not yet improved its relations with the USSR. Two weeks before the visit, Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev, but both sides displayed their determination by not putting off the visit once again.

During the visit, Erkin had talks with Anastas Mikoyan (president of the Presidium), prime minister A. N. Kosygin, minister of foreign affairs A. A. Gromyko, and minister of foreign trade N. S. Patolichev. He was assured by Kosygin that the USSR was not supplying arms to Makarios. The Turkish-Soviet Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Agreement was signed on 5 November. The visit came to an end the next day with a joint communiqué. The agreement that was signed got stalled for a long time in the TGNA because of opposition from the Nation Party (Millet Partisi).

When he returned to Turkey Minister Erkin addressed the TGNA. First, he first gave a summary of the Turkish-Soviet relations since World War II and then outlined his talks in Moscow. The postwar problems between the two countries had their origins in the anti-NATO policy of the USSR as well as the policy it followed in the Middle East, where Turkey took initiatives to secure the defense of the region.

Second, Erkin touched upon the Cuban crisis, during which the USSR had tried to make a deal over the medium-range missiles in Turkey but had given up when the Turkish and U.S. governments resisted. Later on, when removal of the missiles became a matter to be considered, Turkey adopted a constructive approach that made a solution possible.

Third, Erkin reminded the TGNA of the letter sent by Khrushchev to President Gürsel on 28 June 1960, in which he declared for the first time that Turkish membership in NATO was not an obstacle for improved bilateral relations.

Fourth, as for the results of his visit to Moscow, Erkin pointed out that the agreement signed on cultural cooperation was less comprehensive than similar agreements concluded between other NATO countries and the USSR.

Finally, after mentioning the decision in principle made to increase bilateral trade during his talks with the minister of trade, Erkin came to the subject of Cyprus. He recalled that there were divergent views on this matter before the visit and added that differences had now been overcome. "A noteworthy similarity of views" (Tellal,

p. 224) was achieved, as reflected in this passage from the joint communique:

[A]s stated in the Charter of the United Nations, respect for commitments arising from agreements and the other sources of international law, recognition of the equality of the rights of nations large and small, and respect for basic human rights are essential for developing international cooperation and strengthening and preserving peace.

The Turkish side has provided the Soviet government with detailed information regarding the Turkish position with respect to the question of Cyprus. The two sides have declared that they favor a peaceful solution of the Cyprus question based on respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and for the legitimate rights of the two national communities and recognition of the existence of two national communities on the island. (Tellal, pp. 287–88)

For the first time since World War II, Turkey and the USSR were able to share the same view on a regional issue like the question of Cyprus as it presented itself in 1964. At least the two countries' positions were not opposed.

This visit proved very fruitful in a number of ways. Turkey had secured the backing of the USSR on the question of Cyprus. A cultural agreement had been signed by the two states. It also paved the way for other high-level visits that were to follow. The visit was an important turning point and indicated that relations were becoming normal and that cooperation could begin.

#### c. Cooperation (1965-1980)

From 1965 until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Turkish-Soviet relations included high-level visits in both directions, the conclusion of two important agreements, economic aid to Turkey from the USSR, and the opening of an era of broad-ranging cooperation.

#### 1. High-Level Visits

Following the visit to the USSR of the parliamentary delegation led by Urgüplü, a delegation of ten Soviet parliamentarians visited Turkey from 4 to 13 January 1965. The head of the delegation was N. V. Podgorny, a member of the Supreme Presidium of the Soviet Union, who addressed the TGNA on 5 January. During the course of the visit, Turkey announced that it was reversing its original decision and would not participate in NATO's multilateral

nuclear force (MLF). The U.S. nuclear-powered vessel Savannah was denied permission to visit İstanbul. In return, the USSR was asked to support a Cyprus solution based on federation. Following the visit, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko made a statement to the newspaper Izvestiya in which he announced that the USSR supported Turkey's thesis of federations. The USSR had revised its Cyprus policy.

The second visit, from 17 to 22 May 1965, was by Gromyko. This was the first visit by a Soviet foreign minister after Litvinov's visit in 1931. In April, prior to the visit, Ambassador Ryzhov proposed the renewal of the 1925 Treaty of Friendship. The offer was repeated during the visit, but Turkey did not look favorably on the proposal. The minister of foreign affairs, Hasan Esat Işık, informed the OECD aid consortium that Turkey could turn to other countries that were not members of the consortium for loans, including the USSR. The visit ended on 22 May with the release of a joint communiqué.

From 9 to 16 August 1965 Prime Minister Ürgüplü visited the USSR. Thus the visit that Menderes had been scheduled to make took place after a delay of five years. During this visit, the two sides discussed Soviet economic aid and the question of Cyprus and signed a cultural cooperation agreement. The decision to expand trade relations was reflected in the joint communiqué released on 16 August. "Furthermore, the parties have reached an understanding to maintain trade exchange between the two countries at a high level. The Turkish side shall procure from the Soviet Union machinery and equipment for the purpose of establishing industrial enterprises, while the Soviet side shall increase its purchase of commodities from Turkey" (Disisleri Belleteni 11 [August 1965]: 69).

On 30 September a Soviet delegation with twenty-two members came to Turkey to hold talks on the USSR's economic aid. On 7 December the preliminary agreement regarding Soviet aid was signed. When Demirel became prime minister after the elections of October 1965, he proceeded more cautiously in his relations with the USSR. The ratification of the cultural cooperation agreement was delayed. Demirel opposed the purchase of oil from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there was a significant development in relations during the Demirel-Çağlayangil era.

Kosygin's visit on 20 to 27 December 1966 was the first visit by a Soviet prime minister to Turkey. At the talks, Turkey raised the issue of Czechoslovak weapons being provided to the Makarios administration. Kosygin disclaimed any responsibility for Czechoslovakia's actions. He also disclaimed responsibility for the broadcast of Bizim Radyo (Our Radio), which was beaming Com-

munist propaganda to Turkey, because the radio stations were located in East Germany. The reference to the Vietnam War in the joint communiqué was considered to be a Soviet diplomatic success. Demirel rejected the Soviet offer to sell oil. Kosygin's visit demonstrated that the warming of bilateral relations was not dependent on the question of Cyprus but was rather based on long-term economic benefits for both countries.

The Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 25 March 1967 was an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. This was followed by Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Moscow from 19 to 29 September 1967. With the visit by Çağlayangil, the minister of foreign affairs, from 8 to 12 July 1968, high-level visits became a routine affair. Even though the visit to Moscow of the delegation headed by Senate president I.Ş. Atasagun was postponed after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Turkey's announcement of its participation in the Multilateral Force to be established in the Mediterranean and agreement to sign the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. on 3 July 1969, President Sunay proceeded with his visit to the USSR from 12 to 21 November 1969. This was the first time a Turkish head of state visited the USSR. He was accompanied by a delegation of thirty-four officials, including Minister Çağlayangil. With the release of the joint communiqué on 21 November 1969, it became clear that relations were developing on the basis of economic cooperation.

As relations with the USSR improved in the 1960s, relations with the U.S. took a turn for the worse. On the question of improved relations with the USSR, there was no difference between the policies of the Justice Party and the CHP. Several factors were responsible for the improved relations. One was détente, and the other was the diminished Soviet security concerns over the Straits after the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Another factor was the USSR's aloofness during the suppression of national leftist movements in countries like Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. The USSR did nothing while these groups were being suppressed because it was aware that any move on its part would spoil relations with these countries and possibly provoke a U.S. intervention. The most striking instance was the Soviet reaction to the 12 March 1971 memorandum in Turkey. After the memorandum, Nihat Erim formed two governments, one in March and the other in December. The minister of foreign affairs in his first government was Osman Olcay, deputy secretary-general of NATO. This was interpreted as a sign of the importance attached to relations with the U.S. The foreign minister in the second government was Haluk Bayülken, who pursued the same policies as his predecessor. As in 1960, Moscow followed a "wait and see" course. Although the Soviet press was critical of the persecution of leftists, this did not affect relations adversely. At a time when leftist movements were being hounded, Podgorny came to Turkey and signed a document with his Turkish hosts. This was an indication that in bilateral relations the USSR was really sticking to the policy of not interfering in domestic affairs.

# 2. The Declarations on the Principles of Good Neighborliness of 1972

On 11–17 April 1972 Podgorny, the president of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, visited Turkey. In the course of this visit, the Declaration on the Principles of Good Neighborliness was signed. Consisting of eight paragraphs, this document was one of the indications of the good relations between the two countries. One of the members of the Soviet delegation was Gen. V. G. Kulikov, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff. His presence caused some irritation in Turkey. The Soviet proposals for cooperation in the military field and the renewal of the 1925 treaty were considered premature by the Turkish side. The question of Bizim Radyo was raised once again, but the Soviets again denied responsibility.

The content of the declaration was drawn from the twelve-paragraph declaration of basic principles signed by the U.S. and the USSR during Nixon's visit to Moscow in June, as well as the articles contained in the CSCE. "They declare that the following principles will guide the bilateral and international relations of their countries... (4) Noninterference in the internal affair of states; (5) Respect for the inalienable right of all countries to choose and develop their own political, economic, social, and cultural systems; (6) Nonrecourse to force or to the threat of force and abstention from using one's territory for aggression or subversive activities directed at another state." Articles 4, 5, and 6 signified that the bases located on Turkish soil could not be used for aggressive purposes, while the USSR agreed not to support the Communist currents in Turkey. The disorder experienced in Turkey, especially during the 1970s, had always been attributed to the USSR, whereas now the USSR was rejecting these allegations by giving formal assurances through the declaration.

"(7) Respect for obligations arising from treaties and the other sources of international law; (8) Resolving international disputes through peaceful means." On 16 April Podgorny arranged a dinner in Nihat Erim's honor at which he declared that articles 7 and 8 should be understood to mean that the USSR supported Turkey on the question of Cyprus. The joint communiqué released following the visit contained references to the common position of two countries on Cyprus.

Further economic and political developments followed the declaration. Minister of state Zeyyad Baykara, who was in Moscow in December 1972 on the occasion of the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the USSR, signed an agreement for the expansion of the İskenderun Iron and Steelworks. This was followed by two Technical Protocols, one signed on 17 April 1973 to delineate the frontier between Turkish and Soviet territorial waters in the Black Sea and the other signed on 29 December to demarcate the border between the two countries better.

Although the Cyprus events of 1974 affected relations, they were not decisive. The USSR supported the first intervention but opposed the second. Moscow held the view that the question should be resolved within an international framework. The USSR took into consideration that Greece had left the military structure of NATO and the danger of Cyprus being partitioned that emerged after Turkey took possession of 35% of the island. Still, the USSR was very circumspect in its reaction to Turkey's Cyprus operation and avoided condemning it. Moscow stressed the independence, integrity, nonalignment, and the equal rights of the two peoples of the island. Turkey's military presence on the island was creating problems within NATO, so in a sense the USSR was benefiting by the question of Cyprus remaining unresolved. The question of Cyprus contained two important elements: Makarios and his nonalignment and the AKEL, the oldest Communist party in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Cyprus never had a decisive effect on relations with the USSR, because it was a source of discord between Turkey and its allies.

When the U.S. imposed its arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975, this created security concerns for Turkey. On 9 September 1975 ambassador A.A. Rodionov was received by President Korutürk. The two men noted with satisfaction the development of bilateral relations. During a visit to Denmark on 10 December, Ecevit, the leader of the CHP, had made a reference to the possibility of Turkey signing a nonaggression pact with some of its neighbors. This was followed by the visit of Prime Minister Kosygin to Turkey from 26 to 29 December 1975. Kosygin participated in the opening ceremony of the Iskenderun Iron and Steelworks on 28 December and made proposals for stepping up cooperation.

Starting in 1976, cooperation also extended into the

military field. Previously, permission had been given for Soviet planes bound for Egypt to fly through Turkish airspace during the October 1973 war. Now Turkish experts were invited to the military exercise code-named Caucasus, to be conducted from 25 January to 6 February 1976 by Soviet units on the territory of Georgia and Armenia. After observing the exercise, Turkish military personnel visited Moscow, where they met with Soviet minister of defense A.A. Grechko. This was followed by the visit in April 1976 of the deputy chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, to the USSR, accompanied by a large delegation. This military cooperation took place on the basis of the first basket of the CSCE's Final Act of Helsinki, which included "Confidence Building Measures and Documents Relating to Some Aspects of Security and Disarmament" (see Box 5-1 above). According to this document, signatories engaging in large military exercises were to inform the other signatories of the nature and content of the exercises and were to invite their military observers to attend. After 1976 both countries conformed to this arrangement. On 28 April 1979 Turkey allowed the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev to sail through the Straits, although this was not foreseen under the regime of the Turkish Straits (see "The Issue of the Turkish Straits" in Section 6).

When Çağlayangil, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, went to the USSR on 13–18 March 1977, the question of arms procurements from the Soviet Union also came up, but Ankara was not prepared to take this course. During this visit, the Agreement for the Development of Turkish-Soviet Economic Cooperation, the Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, and the Agreement for the Prevention of the Highjacking of Civilian Aircraft were signed. It was also decided to sign a political document that would determine the level of bilateral relations.

## The Political Document on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation of 1978

In the late 1970s the new perception was that the real threat to Turkey came not from the north but from the west. When the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affair was being debated in the TGNA on 23 February 1978, Haluk Ülman, speaking on behalf of the CHP, declared that the threat to Turkey came from Greece. In April 1978 Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, visited Turkey. The last time that such a visit had taken place was in 1920s. The first invitation had been issued in June 1977 by the Demirel government. The invitation was renewed by the Ecevit government in February 1978 at a time when the Carter administration was seeking to have

the U.S. Congress lift the arms embargo on Turkey. Ogarkov announced that the USSR was ready to provide arms aid to Turkey. The Justice Party was opposed to procuring Soviet arms, however. The JP's reasoning was: if Moscow is not a source of threat, what are we doing in NATO?

As these arguments went on, Prime Minister Ecevit went to the USSR on 21-25 June 1978. Before his visit to Moscow, Ecevit had been to Washington on 29 May, when Carter had indicated that the arms embargo would be lifted. Nevertheless, Ecevit did not postpone his visit to the Soviet Union and went ahead and signed three agreements on 23 June. The first was a political document that had been prepared in the final weeks of the Demirel government. It was based on the 1972 declaration of principles and also incorporated the principles of the CSCE's final act. The second instrument signed was a cultural protocol. Finally, there was the Agreement for the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Black Sea, which was traced along the median line, as proposed by Turkey. On 24 June a three-year economic and trade cooperation protocol was signed along with the joint communiqué. It provided for the conclusion of three-year protocols to regulate trade relations. The USSR was to sell Turkey 3 million tons of petroleum annually, amounting to a quarter of Turkey's import requirements. Therefore the political significance of this transaction was greater than its economic importance.

In the second half of the 1970s a greater rapprochement with the USSR might have been expected as a consequence of the U.S. arms embargo, but several factors prevented this from happening. The second Cyprus intervention had caused apprehension in the USSR. Another factor was the firmly anti-Soviet stance of the Nationalist Action Party, which was a coalition partner in both the Nationalist Front-1 and Nationalist Front-2 governments. Finally, the military bases in Turkey were reopened for American use following the rescinding of the U.S. arms embargo, two months after the signing of the political document. This was followed by the USSR's military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Turkey was among the countries that strongly condemned the intervention and gave sanctuary to thousands of Afghan refugees. The occupation of Afghanistan had an adverse effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and also caused serious concern in Turkey, leading to warmer relations with the U.S. after 1980.

To sum up, Turkey's relations with the USSR improved as a consequence of the Cyprus question and the cooling of relations with the U.S. and the EEC. They tended to worsen, however, as a result of Turkey's domestic politics. The turmoil in Turkey was being attributed to Soviet action. Many people made no attempt to differen-

tiate between the Turkish Communist Party, which was closely aligned to Moscow, and the other leftist groups. As a matter of fact, Turkey had several leftist organizations, antagonistic to one another; unlike the general public, the state was able to differentiate among them. One of the pillars of the modern Turkish state was anti-communism. To the extent that this was not equated with antagonism toward the Soviet Union, it was possible for bilateral relations to improve. Although Demirel initially proceeded with caution, there was no substantial difference between the policies of the CHP and the JP in regard to improved relations with the USSR. Among the governments in the 1970s, only the Ecevit administration's programs explicitly mentioned improvement of relations with the USSR. The Melen government formed in May 1972 and the Nationalist Front-2 government formed in July 1977 had programs stating that international communism was bent on overthrowing the regime in Turkey and that all the necessary measures would be taken to combat this menace. At the same time, the programs contained the view that good relations with the USSR benefited both countries and would contribute to the preservation of peace in the region. Relations were also developing with Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Albania. In view of this, it can be said that in the 1970s belated relations developed positively within the framework of the CSCE. Economic relations made a major contribution to this development.

### III. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Starting in the 1960s, trade relations between Turkey and the USSR were conducted on the basis of bilateral clearing agreements.

Another dimension of economic relations was the economic aid and credits being obtained from the USSR. The desire to establish links with the USSR originated from the Turkish commercial bourgeoisie, which was seeking new markets. The trade delegation that visited Moscow in October and November 1960 made a contribution to the development of trade ties. Starting in 1960, a Soviet enterprise was awarded the contract for the expansion of Sümerbank's Shoe and Leather Goods Factory at Beykoz. The plate-glass factory at Çayırova, which had given rise to controversy in 1957, was inaugurated on 23 May 1961.

The government of the National Unity Committee that was formed after the 27 May 1960 coup and the succeeding coalition government turned down the offers of aid and investment coming from the USSR. But the implementation of the First Five-Year Development Plan starting in 1963, the inadequacy of credits coming from

S.B.F. EUTUPHANESI the West, and the efforts to attain the targets set in the plan led once again to consideration of the idea of seeking loans from the USSR. The first time this had been considered was during the final phase of the Menderes government. In 1962 Coşkun Kırca, speaking on behalf of the CHP in the TGNA, drew attention to the fact that the USSR was providing loans to developing countries and the repayment of these loans was effected through the sale of agricultural products to the USSR. In an address to military cadets, Cemal Gürsel noted on 14 June 1962 that the USSR could also furnish aid to Turkey. These remarks appeared in the press on 20 July but led to no changes in Turkey's policies. Soviet offers of aid were renewed in 1963 during the visit of the Turkish parliamentary delegation and also by Ambassador Ryzhov. They also came up during Erkin's visit in 1964 and in subsequent visits.

In 1967 Turkey started accepting Soviet offers of credits and aid. The Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement signed on 25 March 1967 provided funds for the establishment of seven industrial plants. Among these were the petroleum refinery at Aliaga, the aluminum factory at Seydişehir, the sulphuric acid factory at Banduma, the lumber factory at Artvin, and the iron and steelworks at İskenderun. The development of economic relations contributed to the growth of the Turkish economy, which attained 6.4% in 1968 and 9% in 1969. These relations also helped in alleviating the deficit in Turkey's foreign accounts. The volume of trade with the USSR grew from \$17 million in 1964 to \$44.5 million in 1966. By the end of the 1960s the number of Soviet economic advisors in Turkey had reached 1,000, and Turkey became one of the largest recipients of Soviet aid among the developing countries.

The industrial plants established under the terms of the March 1967 agreement have been criticized on the grounds that their technology was obsolete. Even if true, this allegation is unjustified. To begin with, Turkey was not able to obtain these industrial plants from its allies. Second, the plants made an important contribution to Turkey's industrialization. It should also be borne in mind that this was the technology at the disposal of the USSR at that time. It was a case of doing the best with what was available, and it would be wrong to claim that the results were all bad.

Relations were maintained during the 1970s, when Turkey was in the throes of a serious economic crisis. On 10 August 1970 the Turkish lira was devalued from 9 TL to the dollar to 15. Starting in the second half of the 1960s, Turkey's foreign trade deficit grew to alarming proportions. This deficit could be managed up to 1974 thanks to workers' remittances. When these remittances could no longer cover the deficit after 1975, it became impossible to import even the most essential requirements. In addition to the trade deficit, the balance of payments had to contend with the rise in oil prices following the energy crisis of 1973, the financial burden imposed by the Cyprus crisis, and the arms embargo that resulted from this crisis.

As the projects foreseen in the March 1967 agreement were gradually completed, new projects were undertaken in the second half of the 1970s. After the second Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed on 9 June 1975, Prime Minister Kosygin visited Turkey in December. Under the terms of the agreement, \$700 million in industrial investment was to be carried out over a period of five years. Repayment would be effected over ten to twelve years, and the rate of interest was set at 3 to 4%. The capacity of the İskenderun steelworks would be raised from 1 million tons per annum to 4 million tons by 1980. The aluminum plant at Seydişehir would be expanded, and coal-fired power plants would be constructed at Çan and Orhaneli.

Until 1976 the economic and technical cooperation was carried out on the basis of individual projects. In 1976 a Joint Commission was set up to oversee the cooperation. In 1977 a ten-year economic aid agreement was signed in the amount of \$1.3 billion. In addition to the growing trade volume, by 1978 Turkey was the country that received the largest amount of Soviet aid among the developing countries. At the joint Turkish-Soviet Economic Cooperation Commission that held its third session in Moscow on 14 to 19 October 1978, a protocol was signed that provided for \$3.8 billion in external resources. With the agreement signed on 5 June 1979, Turkish-Soviet economic relations reached their peak. This agreement foresaw a package of aid and credits amounting to \$8 billion, which included the construction of a nuclear power plant and the expansion of existing refineries, steelworks, and aluminum plants.

The USSR provided Turkey only with project loans. Their rate of interest was more favorable than the rates of Western loans, and they were repaid with commodities. Since the aid went directly to industrialization projects, it contributed to long-term development. From 1967 to 1981 Soviet loans reached a total of \$972,610,000. Starting in the 1960s, Turkey became one of the few countries receiving aid from both superpowers.

EREL TELLAL

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## Relations with the Middle East

#### I. RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Turkey's relations with Arab states underwent great changes in the 1960s. Developments in Turkey's political situation and changes in the world forced Turkey to review its foreign policy. This in turn affected Turkey's ties with the Arab states. At this time, the Arab states were undergoing a structural transformation that led to drastic changes in Turkey's policies compared to the 1950s. Formerly, Turkey played an active role in the Middle East, acting as the spokesperson of the West. These policies were unsuccessful and yielded no results. Now there was a regional policy designed to develop bilateral relations with Arab states based on equality and mutual respect. Turkey had to expend efforts over a whole decade to overcome the bitterness of the Arab states occasioned by its policies during the 1950s.

The process of reviewing past policies started after the coup of 27 May 1960, when all aspects of the DP government's policies came under critical appraisal. In the atmosphere of freedom prevailing after the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the tradition of keeping foreign policy above partisan politics was abandoned; these issues began to be debated by the public. Another cause for change was the advent of détente. As the intensity of the Cold War began to abate, intrabloc differences emerged and the question of Cyprus flared up between Turkey and Greece once again. Turkey became aware of its isolation among the newly independent countries, which now made up the majority of the international community. To remedy this situation, priority was accorded to mending fences with neighboring Arab states.

The 1960s were years of structural change for the Arab states. The traditional order was being shaken by young officers who seized power in Iraq and Syria to modernize their backward societies. This process started in 1952 in Egypt and resulted in Nasser assuming a leadership role in the Arab world. In the 1950s Nasserism became the ideology of the modernizers of the regions. In the 1960s the

Baath movement, describing itself as socialist and Arabnationalist, came to the fore in Iraq and Syria and freed these countries from Nasser's influence (Box 5-16).

## A. A Different Way of Seeing the Arab States after the Coup of 27 May

The officers who seized power on 27 May 1960 worried that the U.S. might misinterpret the coup and intervene in Turkey on the basis of the 1959 agreement. To prevent such an intervention, the declaration issued on 27 May laid particular stress on loyalty to NATO and CENTO. It was obvious that the new administration had no intention of bringing radical change in Turkey's foreign policy. The new leadership was uncomfortable with the policies of its predecessors toward those countries carrying out national liberation struggles, however, bearing in mind that Turkey itself had emerged from a successful war of national liberation. It wanted to put Turkey's relations with the nonaligned countries, and the Third World in general, on a new basis.

The Turkish government's program of 11 July 1960 merely mentioned that development of relations with the Middle East would be given priority. But a clearer Middle Eastern policy on the issue of Algeria's war of independence, much different from that of the DP, was announced a short while later. On 16 September 1960 a group of members of the National Unity Committee (MBK) issued a declaration that in the future Turkey would support those nations waging wars of national liberation and in this context would support Algerians in their war against France. The next day, head of state Cemal Gürsel recalled that Turkey had emerged from a war of national survival, so it was only natural that it should support Algeria. He also offered to mediate between France and the Algerian nationalists. The Algerian side accepted the offer, but France refrained from giving a formal reply.

The new Turkish administration's approach to the Algerian question was well received in Arab capitals.

#### Box 5-16. The Baath Movement

The Baath Party was established in Damascus in 1940 by Michel Eflak, a Greek Orthodox Christian, and Selahaddin Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, "Baath" means rebirth in Arabic. Political parties that wished to bring about an Arab renaissance by pursuing the path of Arab socialism called themselves Baath. Following the slogan of "unity, freedom, socialism," the Baath movement wanted to establish an Arab society that was united, secular, and governed according to socialist tenets. The ideology could be described as nationalist and socialist, but with an Arab interpretation. The Baath ideology accepted Arab unity as its basic premise and concluded that the borders separating Arab nations had been imposed by colonialists and had to be eliminated.

The Baath movement rejected all religious and sectarian cleavages and developed an understanding of nationalism based on Arab unity, but it was not anti-Islamic. On the contrary, Baath Ideology accepted Islam as a fundamental and inseparable part of Arab culture. But contrary to Sunni Arab nationalists, the Baathists considered Islam to be not a national religion of the Arabs but an important component of their national cultural heritage. Islam was the essence of Arab nationalism, and when Christian Arabs fully assimilated nationalist sentiments, they would understand that the essence of Arabism is Islam.

Baath socialism was also laden with Arab motifs. It rejected Marxism and internationalism. According to the Baath Ideology, socialism had to be national: an individual could not be revolutionary without being nationalistic. According to Bitar, it was not the concept of class warfare that was going to mobilize the masses of Asia and Africa against colonialism but national unity. Bitar also accepted, however, that a national socialist revolution could not be carried out without applying Marxist principles to economic planning. Baathist socialism accepted private property and based its philosophy on the principles of fair distribution of income, the close control of internal and external trade, restrictions on land ownership for the public good, the nationalization of mines and natural resources, economic development through central planning, and workers' participation in the management of enterprises.

In 1963 the Baathists came to power in Iraq and Syria. The military took power in Syria in 1966. On 21 November 1970 Hafez Assad came to power in a coup and remained at the helm until his death. The Baathists carried out another coup in Iraq in 1968, when Gen. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr became head of state and Saddam Hussein vice-president. Another coup in 1979 brought Saddam Hussein to the top.

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But Turkey itself was in a dilemma. The members of the CNU felt that they had seized power to further Atatürk's reforms and used every opportunity to reiterate their support for the Algerian nationalists out of respect for Turkey's history and tradition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, was fully aware of the complications that would result from a confrontation with Turkey's NATO ally France, also bearing in mind Turkey's application for membership in the European Common Market. That is why no tangible action was taken on the Algerian issue, with support confined to the verbal level. But Turkey did support the UN resolutions of 20 December 1961 that called for self-determination for the Algerians. Turkey was formulating its foreign policy on the basis of a new approach compared to the policies of the DP government. The Turkish intelligentsia was also in favor of supporting wars of national liberation and developing relations with the nonaligned countries.

The change of approach to the Middle East that appeared after 27 May found its reflection in day-to-day relations only after a time lag. The administration that came to power in Syria following the coup of 29 September 1961 decided to break away from the United Arab Republic formed with Egypt in 1958. Turkey declared this to be Syria's internal affair and recognized the new administration in Damascus, in second place after Jordan. When this position is compared with the position taken by the DP

government that contemplated intervening in Iraq after the coup of 1958, the change in Turkey's Middle Eastern policy becomes very clear. Turkey's decision to recognize the new Syrian administration did not go well in Cairo, however, and Egypt broke diplomatic relations with Turkey on 30 September

Turkey was somewhat more apprehensive about developments in Iraq. Ankara was following closely Gen. Abdulkarim Kassem's efforts to reinforce his hold on power by seeking the support of Communists and Kurds and developing Iraq's relations with the USSR. Unlike the DP government, the regime set up in Turkey after 27 May had gone back to the tough Kurdish policies of the past. On 1 June 1960 it arrested 485 Kurds and sent them to a camp in Sivas. After being detained there for four months, fifty-five clan elders and chieftains were sent into exile in the western provinces under the terms of a law enacted on 19 October 1960. When Kassem made concessions to the Kurds of Iraq, Ankara grew concerned over the possibility that this might encourage the Kurds in Turkey to make demands for similar treatment.

In April 1962 there was a parting of ways between the Kurds of northern Iraq and the Kassem regime, when they resorted to arms under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The Kurds quickly took control of their region and declared their intention to establish an independent Kurdish Republic in northern Iraq. Turkey was pleased to

#### Box 5-17. The Kurdish Rebellion in Northern Iraq, 1962-1975

After Iraq gained independence in 1932, the Kurds of northern Iraq under their leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani started clamoring for an independent Kurdish state in their region. Barzani escaped from detention in Suleymaniyah in 1943, returned to his region, and went into action. When the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was established in 1946 in northern Iran, then under Soviet occupation, Barzani left Iraq with ten thousand armed tribesmen and crossed into Mahabad. After the USSR evacuated northern Iran the next year, the Tehran administration got rid of the Kurdish state, whereupon Barzani returned to Iraq. He was unable to hold on in his region, however, and took refuge in the USSR with five hundred of his peshmerga fighters. Barzani stayed there for eleven years and only returned to Iraq in 1958 following the coup in Baghdad, when Kassem improved his relations with the USSR. After Kassem failed to honor his pledge to give the Kurds autonomy, an uprising broke out under the leadership of Barzani, it continued until 1970. Moscow persuaded Saddam to grant the Kurds autonomy and, in return, promised to support Iraq. The autonomy plan was announced on 11 March 1970. (1) In the northern region of Iraq where the Kurds were concentrated, they would have an autonomous administration. (2) They would be represented in the central government, and one of the vice-presidents would be a Kurd. (3) The three oil fields in northern Iraq would be placed under the supervision of the Kurds as of 1974. Baghdad was signaling in a roundabout way that autonomy would come in four years.

After this announcement, the USSR and Iraq signed a fifteenyear Friendship and Good Neighborliness Treaty on 9 April 1972. Barzani was summoned to Moscow and told to end all rebellious antigovernment activities. This new situation in Iraq created some nervousness in Iran and Israel. When Moscow's aid to the Kurds dried up, Iran stepped in. With Washington's approval, Tehran established contacts with Barzani and gave promises of aid. Israel had already promised to provide him with weapons.

In 1972 the Kurds rebelled once again in northern Iraq. Iran entered into negotiations with Baghdad, which was ready to reach an agreement on condition that the aid given to the Kurds would cease to flow. The agreement of Algiers was signed on 6 March 1975. Iran would stop its aid to the Kurds and get border rectifications in its favor in return.

On 7 March Baghdad sent its army into action against the Kurds, giving rise to refugee problems. The fleeing Kurds began to amass on the Turkish and Iranian borders. When Iran closed its border, a massacre of Kurds by the Iraqi army took place. The fifteen-year-old rebellion was finally suppressed. Barzani had sought U.S. aid and led the rebellion in 1972, relying on Washington's promises; but now that the conditions had changed, he could no longer make himself heard in Washington. Mullah Mustafa Barzani dled in the U.S. in 1979 without having brought autonomy or independence to his people. He had been used first by the USSR and then by the U.S. and Iran. His son Masud Barzani would emerge under different circumstances in the 1990s as the leader of one of the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. He would rely on the U.S. and collaborate with Turkey from time to time against the PKK.

(M. Firat)

see the Iraqi regime in trouble but was fearful of a similar uprising by its own Kurdish population. The uprising in Iraq did not spill over into Turkey, however, as Ankara took no direct action; but the uprising and the efforts to suppress it gave rise to numerous incidents that strained bilateral relations (Box 5-17).

On 8 July 1962 two Iraqi aircraft entered Turkish airspace and bombed the town of Gerür in the vicinity of Hakkari. When Turkey protested, Iraq announced that this action was the result of an error and would not recur. But on 15 August a similar incident occurred when Iraqi aircraft carried out a further attack in the region of Hakkari, leading to the death of three Turkish soldiers. Iraq was having difficulty in fully suppressing the Kurdish uprising and accused Turkey of supporting the separatist Kurds. The next day, Turkish aircraft fired on the Iraqi aircraft that had intruded into Turkish airspace. These incidents caused tension between Ankara and Baghdad, but this did not last for long.

Turkey steered clear of the numerous attempted coups that took place in Iraq and Syria. At the time, Turkey was seeking to establish internal political stability by thwarting the coup attempts of Col. Talat Aydemir and pursued a cautious policy toward its Arab neighbors by not getting involved in their internal affairs. It was at this juncture that the Cyprus question flared up and drew Turkey's attention in that direction.

The question of Cyprus revealed to Ankara the consequences of its Arab policies of the 1950s. The Arab countries refused to side with Turkey either at the second conference of the nonaligned in October 1964 or at the Twentieth Session of the UN General Assembly when the issue was debated on 16 December 1965. They were solidly behind the government of Cyprus, headed by Makarios.

Before the voting in the General Assembly, Turkey had sent goodwill missions to explain the Turkish position on Cyprus to nonaligned countries, including Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Jordan. But it was too much to expect that a single such visit seeking support on Cyprus might bring the Arab countries to change their foreign policies. The vote in the General Assembly on 16 December 1965 was the most crushing defeat suffered by Turkey on the Cyprus question and clearly revealed the failure of Ankara's policies. After this, Turkey no longer confined itself to ineffective methods like the sending of goodwill missions

and undertook changes in its foreign policies designed to develop political, economic, and cultural relations with the Arab States.

## B. The Period of Rapprochement (1965–1971)

The Justice Party (JP), which came to power in the election held in 1965, clearly saw the international isolation of Turkey brought on by the DP governments in the 1950s when Ankara acted as the spokesperson of the West when dealing with the Arab states. The JP decided to pursue a new policy based on a sounder foundation. Its conservative constituency was also in favor of mending relations in this fashion. The Demirel government's program of 1965 announced that, starting with the "fraternal" Muslim and Arab countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb, a multifaceted foreign policy would be developed toward the countries of Asia and Africa. To get rid of Turkey's negative image in the nonaligned countries of the Third World, Ankara had to start with the Arab countries with many historical and cultural links. The Middle East policy of the IP government differed fundamentally from that of past governments, which saw their Middle East policy as a function of their Western policy. The JP government also developed close relations with so-called progressive countries. In this manner, the government gained the support of its conservative constituency by coming closer to regional states through the use of Arab and Islamic motifs, while deflecting the disapproval of its leftist critics by its positive approach to independence movements.

The first positive response to Ankara's new message to the Middle East came from Iraq. The Iraqi minister responsible for foreign affairs, Adnan Pachachi, visited Turkey on 7 to 11 February 1966 and declared that Baghdad also wanted to develop bilateral relations. He gave Iraq's support to Turkey on Cyprus by stating that Iraq considered the cause of the Turkish Cypriots to be just and that rights based on treaties had to be respected.

Turkey started the process of developing commercial and cultural ties with various Arab countries after this visit, and a succession of visits followed. When the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Haluk Bayülken, went to Egypt, he signed a trade agreement on 16 March 1966. On 15 April a parliamentary delegation visited Saudi Arabia and the minister of foreign affairs, Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, went to Iraq from 23 to 26 May. On 29 August King Faisal of Saudi Arabia came to Turkey, and Turkey's President Sunay visited Tunisia from 1 to 6 December.

Turkey's efforts to mend fences with Arab states coin-

cided with the initiative of King Faisal to set up an Islamic Pact or an Islamic Conference, which was the subject of an intense debate in the international community. Upon the invitation of the World Islamic Union, eighteen Muslim countries got together in May 1965 in Mecca, where the prime minister of Somalia proposed holding a summit conference and the king of Saudi Arabia agreed to make the necessary arrangements for such a meeting. At a time when the memory of the 1960 coup in Turkey was still fresh in people's minds, the reaction of the conservative JP government was arousing interest. On 17 February Demirel announced that Turkey might participate in an Islamic Conference that did not pursue political objectives and did not lead to the formation of rival groups. When the news started circulating that Turkey would join the Islamic conference and sever relations with Israel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official denial. Turkey's position was clear: secular Turkey was wary of getting involved with the Arab countries within a political organization. The policy of rapprochement with the Arab states had two objectives. One was to develop economic cooperation and trade, and the other was to break out of isolation when Cyprus and other questions affecting Turkey's national interests came up for discussion in international forums.

The Arab countries expected much more from Turkey, however. They wanted to see Turkey on their side on the question of Palestine. They were always uncomfortable with Turkey as a CENTO member that defended the interests of the West and of the U.S., the supporter of Israel. Without living up to Arab expectations, it would be difficult for Turkey to bring its relations with the Arab states to the desired level. This became even more obvious in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

Throughout 1967 relations between the Arab states and Israel were becoming tense. This was most noticeable in the case of Syria, and a new war appeared to be imminent. Between 22 and 24 May 1967 Ankara held a meeting of its ambassadors in the Middle East and reformulated its Middle Eastern policy. Three principles were established in this context. (1) Efforts would be made to develop bilateral relations in all fields with all of the Arab states. (2) Turkey would stay out of inter-Arab quarrels and would refrain from taking sides. (3) Turkey would also stay out of pacts designed to divide the Arabs.

When war broke out between the Arabs and Israel on 5 June 1967, Turkey followed a course that was markedly different from the course followed during the previous Arab-Israeli War of 1956. Çağlayangil declared that there would be no question of using the bases in Turkey against

the Arabs. When Israel emerged as the victor, he stated that Ankara was against acquiring territory and gaining the upper hand through the use of force. Ankara's actions were not confined to giving Arabs verbal support. It also sent Arab countries, starting with Syria, food, clothing, and medical supplies to alleviate their heavy war losses.

During the debates at the UN on 22 June, Turkey sided openly with the Arabs. In a speech delivered at the General Assembly, Çağlayangil expressed the friendly feeling of Turkey toward the Arabs and recalled that he had already declared Turkey's opposition to the acquisition of land by the use of force. He wanted the General Assembly to insist on Israel evacuating the Arab territories that it had conquered. Turkey joined the Arabs in supporting resolution 242, calling on Israel to evacuate Arab lands occupied after 5 June. The Arab countries, and especially Egypt and Syria, thanked Turkey for its stance during the 1967 war; subsequently, this signaled that relations were developing on a firm basis.

Turkey continued to pursue its pro-Arab polices after 1967. Each time there was an armed clash between the Arabs and Israel, Turkey protested Israel's action. When British forces evacuated the region east of Suez and left a military vacuum in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. proposed that Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait conclude a security agreement to remedy this situation. Turkey refused to go along with this proposal.

Turkey's policies based on common sense also included issues that were dividing the Arab states, such as the Jordanian crisis of 1970. After the war of 1967, the guerrillas who took refuge in Jordan were carrying out activities that the government did not approve. When the Jordanian government tried to bring these activities under control, bloody clashes erupted, and Syrian forces intervened on the side of the Palestinian guerrillas. Nevertheless, the Jordanian army mastered the situation. On 27 September 1970 King Hussein and Yasser Arafat signed an agreement bringing this inter-Arab conflict to an end in a ceremony witnessed by ten Arab heads of state. On 22 September Turkey issued a statement declaring that the events were Jordan's internal affair, that foreign intervention would make matters worse and make it harder to end the clashes and bring the affair to a peaceful conclusion. Turkey also withheld permission for the U.S. to intervene in the crisis from the Incirlik air base.

Turkey had demonstrated that it was no longer the unquestioning representative of the West's interests in the Middle East. It had interests of its own in the region and wanted to pursue policies corresponding to these interests even if its policies diverged from the policies of the

West. In formulating this new policy, the JP government was guided by the inclinations of the Turkish electorate as much as it was by the reactions of the Arab states. The Right in Turkey was favorably disposed toward the Arabs, while the Left saw the Palestinian cause as a struggle against imperialism and appraised the government's Middle Eastern policies in this light. On the issues of Arab-Israeli conflict and bilateral relations with Arab states, the government was able to count on the support of a broad spectrum of the public. On the issue of joining an organization like the Islamic Conference, however, the government had to proceed with caution, because some segments of the population harbored misgivings about this matter. Nevertheless, despite the initial arguments over the issue, Turkey's membership in the Islamic Conference made an imprint on Turkish relations with the Arab members of the organization throughout the 1970s.

## C. The Organization of the Islamic Conference and Turkey

When the al-Aqsa mosque, located in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem under Israeli occupation, was damaged by a fire on 21 August 1969, there was deep indignation in all Muslim countries, especially the Arab countries. Jordan's King Hussein sent a message to all Arab heads of state proposing a summit conference. Saudi Arabia and Morocco undertook to make the necessary arrangements for holding such a conference.

President Sunay also received an invitation to attend the conference. In his reply, he explained that Turkey was a secular state and that he would not participate in a conference with an Islamic label. He added that the issue came within the responsibility of his government. For the Turkish government, the decision to attend would have both domestic and international implications. Turkey's Constitution declared it to be a secular country, and attending a meeting with an Islamic common denominator would cause many reactions at home. In particular, the army was uneasy about the government's policy and was beginning to make its uneasiness felt more openly. Most of the countries seeking such a meeting were in the reactionary category; in addition to their intention of arranging a mass demonstration against Israel, they were also seeking to push Egypt and the revolutionary Arab states into the position of a minority. This would allow them to challenge Nasser, who aspired to lead the Arab world, and to turn the Arab League into an Islamic League. Turkey was aware that such a polarization in the Middle East would be against its interest. Eventually, Demirel announced that the Rabat meeting was of a political and not a religious nature and that the participation of Islamic states in the meeting would not make Turkey's participation a violation of the principle of secularism—to think otherwise would require the avoidance of anything associated with the words "Islamic" and "Muslim." Furthermore, participation in the Rabat meeting would not be inconsistent with the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic. Turkey made the decision to participate in the meeting as an observer and at the level of foreign minister.

At the Islamic Summit Conference of Rabat, two important decisions were made. A permanent secretariat would be established to secure Israel's evacuation of all the occupied territories; and a meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs would be held on an annual basis. This was the first step toward the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The proposal to sever diplomatic relations with Israel was not adopted, however, and the old divisions within the Arab world surfaced once again. At the conference, Cağlayangil declared that Turkey supported the contents of the joint communiqué to the extent that they were in conformity with the resolutions of the UN that it had approved. Like Iran, it refused to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Since no issue was discussed that conflicted with Turkey's secular status, Cağlayangil's reservations were confined to the area of foreign policy. Even so, Turkish participation in the meeting attracted criticism from opposition quarters in Turkey. The Arab countries also criticized Turkey for not cutting its diplomatic ties with Israel, and CENTO's Islamic member countries were accused of acting as the spokespersons of the West at the conference.

When the Islamic Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in March 1970 in Jedda, where the first steps were taken toward institutionalization, Turkey heeded past criticisms and participated at a lower level, sending the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ankara refrained from getting involved in the activities of the newly established secretariat. It also submitted a letter to the secretary-general of the Islamic Conference in which it declared that it would accept the decisions of the conference only to the extent that they were compatible with its Constitution and the principles of its foreign policy. Thus Turkey was stating that it would bear in mind its secular status and accept decisions only to the extent that they did not contradict this status. Despite this, the Islamic countries were satisfied with Turkey's presence at the conference.

In September 1970 Turkey reaped the first benefits of the policy of rapprochement with Arab countries that it had been pursuing since 1965. At the Lusaka meeting of the nonaligned, the Arab countries refused to accept Makarios's proposals on Cyprus and drew attention to the need to safeguard the rights of the Turkish Cypriots.

In the aftermath of the military intervention of 12 March 1971, there was a short pause in Turkey's efforts to develop closer ties with Arab and Islamic countries. When the Charter of the Islamic Conference came up for signature in Jedda in March 1972, Turkey failed to sign it. The charter contained no provision that could be construed as being incompatible with secularism, but the preamble did contain the following passage: "Believing that their common faith constitutes a powerful element to establish affinity and solidarity arming Islamic peoples; Determined to defend the spiritual, moral, social, and economic values of Islam, which shall remain an important factor in mankind's progress." These words were not in conformity with the principles of secularism. But nevertheless Turkey continued to participate as a de facto member of the OIC.

Whether Turkey is legally a member of the OIC remains a moot question to this day. Turkey has complied with none of the conditions for membership described in article 8 of the charter. Consequently, and despite Turkey's even closer relations with the OIC, it can be argued from the point of view of international law and domestic law that Turkey's situation was not based on a legal foundation (Alpkaya, pp. 59–66).

After the 12 March interlude, Turkey's relations with the OIC during the 1970s developed in line with the steady development of its relations with the Arab countries. At the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Jedda in 1975, Turkey attended at ministerial level for the first time, with Cagalayangil representing Turkey, rather than the secretary-general of the ministry. The conference responded by inviting the president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Rauf Denktas, minister of state Vedat Çelik, and the mufti of Cyprus to attend the conference as "guests." At the conference, Denktaş spoke about the problems and aspirations of the Cypriot Turks. The declaration adopted at the end of the conference contained a paragraph on Cyprus: "The conference expressed its sympathy for the striving of the Turkish community to defend its legitimate nights and its Islamic character within a bizonal, federal, independent, sovereign, neutral Republic of Cyprus free of foreign bases" (Cumhuriyet, 16 July 1975). At this meeting, Turkey proposed and the conference accepted that the Seventh Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be held in İstanbul.

The conference met in Istanbul on 12–15 May 1976. Whether to participate or not in the 1969 Rabat meeting had posed a grim dilemma for Turkey at that time. Now

the idea of developing relations with the Arab states had taken such a strong hold that the question of whether having the conference in Istanbul was contrary to the secular character of the state never came up. The Istanbul conference opened with the reading of a message from President Korutürk. Prime Minister Demirel addressed the conference. He reiterated that Turkey would proceed in step with the Arabs on the question of Palestine. At Turkey's initiative, it was decided to set up two centers to promote cultural and scientific cooperation. One was the Islamic Conference's Center for Historical, Cultural, and Artistic Studies, established in İstanbul in 1981; and the other was the Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Education Center of the Islamic Countries, located in Ankara. At this session, the Turkish government undertook preparations for acceding to the Charter of the Islamic Conference with a reservation. The bill to this effect went to the parliamentary committee for consideration; but early elections took place in 1977, and the bill did not come up for adoption by the TGNA.

There was a significant development at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Morocco in 1979. It was decided to upgrade the status of the Muslim Turkish community of Cyprus from guest to observer. Also, an appeal was made for providing assistance to the Turkish Cypriot community to alleviate the hardship inflicted by the Greek Cypriot embargo.

Turkey's relations with the OIC kept developing during the 1970s, and important changes were obtained in the Cyprus policies of the Islamic states. Turkey went on reiterating that it was a secular state, although less frequently than formerly. Starting in 1980, the 12 September military administration became a part of Washington's Green Belt Strategy (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 6), and the principle of secularism was gradually pushed well into the background. Even closer relations were established with the OIC and particularly with the "reactionary" regimes in the OIC, starting with Saudi Arabia. There were important and disturbing differences between the policies toward the OIC pursued in the 1970s and the 1980s.

#### D. Warm Relations (1973–1979)

The interim regime of 12 March 1971 abandoned the multifaceted policies being pursued by the JP government since 1965 and turned its face once again toward Washington, especially with its decision to ban the cultivation of the opium poppy. This caused Turkey to distance itself from the Arab countries. At this time, events took place that affected the existing balance in the Middle East. The Baathist regimes in neighboring Iraq and Syria were developing their relations with the USSR. In particular the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness concluded in 1972 between Iraq and the USSR gave rise to concern among America's allies Iran and Israel, as well as in Turkey. Another negative factor affecting relations with Syria was the flow of armed revolutionary youths from Turkey to Syria, who preceded from there to Lebanon, where they received military training in Palestinian camps before returning to Turkey. As relations soured, this allowed the questions of Hatay and sharing of water resources to resurface. These questions would remain on the agenda throughout the 1980 and 1990s (see "Relations with the Middle East" in Section 6).

As relations with Iraq and Syria deteriorated, important events were taking place in Egypt. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser upon his death, closed all Soviet military installations in Egypt on 18 July 1972 and asked Soviet military advisors to leave the country. These were the first signs that Egypt was improving its relations with the U.S. In September 1973 the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Haluk Bayülken, visited Egypt. Turkey's Middle Eastern policy was being revised. As Syria and Iraq improved their relations with the USSR, their place was being taken up by Egypt, which now pursued a more pro-Western policy.

When the 12 March interlude ended in October 1973, the policies that were abandoned in 1971 were resumed. The coalition governments headed by Ecevit and the Nationalist Front governments sought to maintain relations with the Arab countries at a reasonably good level. The reason for this was that Ankara's relations with the West cooled after the 1974 Cyprus operation. Another reason was that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo in 1973, forcing oil prices to triple and creating serious economic problems for Turkey. Ankara was eager to develop its relations with Arab countries in order to overcome the shortage of oil and promote trade relations with those countries.

Ankara had supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and pursued the same policy in the fourth war, which broke out on 6 October 1973. This war was different, because the Arab objective was no longer the destruction of the state of Israel but the recovery of occupied Arab lands. The war also destroyed Israel's myth of invincibility when Arab armies were able to score initial successes. In the 1973 war Turkey announced that Incirlik base could not be used by the U.S. to supply Israel,

while it allowed Soviet aircraft supplying the Arabs to overfly its territory. The reward came on 20 November, when members of OPEC announced that Turkey would be exempt from the oil embargo. On 25 August 1973 an agreement was signed by Turkey and Iraq to construct a pipeline from the Kirkuk oil field to a terminal to be located in Turkey's Mediterranean port of Yumurtalık. This oil pipeline went into operation on 3 January 1977, when it started supplying two-thirds of Turkey's oil requirements while also providing an income from the flow of oil. Another positive result of the development of relations with Arab countries occurred during the 1974 Cyprus operation, when Libyan leader Muammar Khaddafi supplied fuel and tires for the Turkish combat aircraft engaged in the operation.

On 10 November 1975 Turkey supported the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, declaring that Zionism was a form of racism. This was another demonstration of Turkish support for the Arabs in their struggle against Israel.

Turkey had remained at a distance from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since its establishment in 1964. Ankara knew that some of the people engaged in terrorist activities in Turkey had been trained in PLO camps. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1970s Ankara started developing its relations with the PLO. When the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in October 1974 recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and decided that the organization should be their representative at the UN, Ankara recognized the PLO in January 1975 and established relations with it through the Turkish Embassy in Cairo. In August the chairman of the Political Bureau of the PLO, Faruk Khaddumi, visited Turkey and discussed with Turkish officials the development of relations and the establishment of an office in Ankara. Turkey indicated that at the Seventh Conference of Islamic Ministers of Foreign Affairs it would be announced that the PLO would be granted permission to establish a political office in Ankara. When four Palestinian guerrillas occupied the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara on 10 July 1979, Ankara did not go back on its decision. The PLO's Ankara office was opened by Yasser Arafat on 5 October. As Turkey's relations with the Arabs developed during the 1980s and relations with Israel cooled, Ankara's relations with the PLO got closer.

Despite the rapprochement with the Arabs and the PLO, it must not be forgotten that Turkey never deviated significantly from its main foreign policy orientation. Ankara never severed relations with Israel. When the Camp

David agreement was signed in 1977 and the Arab world suspended relations with Egypt, Turkey announced that it supported the peace agreement.

After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the U.S. devised new plans to safeguard its interests in the Middle East, relying on Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. The coup of 12 September 1980 would enable Turkey to fit neatly into these plans and would also bring to an end the multifaceted foreign policy that it had been pursuing since 1965. Starting in 1980, Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Egypt—all good friends of the U.S.—would grow closer as its relations with Syria deteriorated.

Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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## II. RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB STATES

- A. Relations with Israel
- 1. Stagnating Relations
- a. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and Turkey Turkey sided openly with the Arabs during the period when tension was escalating prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, during the fighting, and at the UN debates over this issue.

The first reason for Turkey to adopt this position was Cyprus. When Turkey decided to exercise its right to intervene following the Cyprus events that erupted toward the end of 1963, it was rebuffed by the unexpected Johnson letter of 5 June 1964. From then on, Ankara decided to review its international relations and make the transition to a multifaceted foreign policy. When the question of Cyprus came up for discussion at the UN and other international forums, Turkey wanted to be able to count on the support of the Arabs. The best way to garner this support was by siding with the Arabs in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, some political parties in Turkey were attaching greater importance to carrying out closer relations with the Arab countries in order to generate an advantage in domestic politics. The Justice Party, which came to power in 1965, had the support of the conservative religious masses and favored closer ties with the Arab states, with which Turkey shared religious and cultural values. This policy was also supported by the Left and by the general public that held anti-American views.

A third reason was Turkey's expectation of economic benefits from closer ties with the Arab states. The energy crisis that resulted from the 1973 war drove Turkey closer to the Arabs, because it was almost completely dependent on imported petroleum. The energy crisis had induced a recession in the world economy, and Turkey was seeking new markets for its products, which were now in low demand in Europe and elsewhere. The new markets were in the now rich Arab oil-producing countries. This meant that Turkey had to deemphasize its relations with Israel.

The fourth reason was that leftist movements were in the ascendancy in the second half of the 1960s. These movements had an aversion to Israel, which they regarded as the unquestioning ally of the U.S. in the Middle East. Many segments of Turkish society shared these views. Both the legal leftist organizations and the illegal ones were pro-Arab in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The militants of illegal leftist organizations were heading for the Lebanese camps of Palestinian terrorist organizations, where they received training and then carried out attacks on Israeli targets in Turkey, especially during the 1970s.

The first signs of Turkey's pro-Arab policies appeared

in May 1967. A series of dangerous developments occurred in quick succession. The United Arab Republic (Egypt), Syria, and Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other started challenging one another and brought their armies to a high state of alert. At Nasser's request, the UN peacekeeping force was removed from the Sinai Peninsula on 19 May. Then Cairo closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, blocking off the Gulf of Aqaba on 23 May. These moves were interpreted as precursors of war in Ankara and elsewhere. After a conference of Turkish ambassadors posted in the Middle Eastern countries held in Ankara on 28 May 1967, the Turkish government issued a statement and emphasized that "the government of Turkey is also taking into consideration the existing close relations with Arab countries in the framework of its policy of friendly relations with its neighbors."

Turkey maintained the same course during the war. On 6 June 1967 Turkish minister of foreign affairs Çağla-yangil declared that it was out of the question for the bases on Turkish soil to be used against the Arabs. This was an unusual declaration: when the U.S. used these bases for an operation out of NATO's area during the landing in Lebanon in 1958, no one except the opposition questioned this action. But this time, in line with the multifaceted foreign policy, Ankara was forestalling the possibility of the use of the bases.

Furthermore, in the course of the war, the Turkish Red Crescent sent food aid worth \$100,000 to Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Following the war, a further \$500,000 in aid was dispatched, primarily to Syria (Armaoğlu, p. 273).

Turkey continued to display an anti-Israeli policy at UN meetings after the war. When the issue came before the UN General Assembly's special session, Minister Çağlayangil declared in his speech there: "Turkey's foreign policy rests on respect for political independence and territorial integrity and opposition to the acquisition of territory through the use of force" (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 35 [August 1967]: 47-49). He added: "The Turkish nation takes a close interest in the fate of the holy sites in Jerusalem and regards with displeasure Israel's attempts to carry out a fait accompli in that city." Çağlayangil also underlined that Turkey harbored feelings of deep friendship and sympathy for the peoples of the Arab countries and called on the General Assembly to demand Israel's immediate evacuation of the occupied territories. Turkey became a co-sponsor of the resolutions calling on Israel not to alter the status of Jerusalem and appealing to all countries to assist the Palestine Refugees Agency. Turkey also voted with the Arab countries on resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw to the prewar borders.

In all of the armed clashes that occurred between the Arab countries and Israel following the war, Turkey sided with the Arabs and protested Israel's actions.

Although there was a certain stagnation in Turkish-Israeli relations as a result of the war and subsequent developments, no radical change in these relations took place. Turkey gave general backing to the Arabs and voted for resolutions condemning Israel, but it did not sever diplomatic relations, which were maintained at chargé d'affaires level. The 1967 war gave Turkey the opportunity to display the changes in its perception of the Arab Middle East. The 1967 war should be seen not as a time when Turkish-Israel relations took a turn for the worse but as the beginning of a period when Turkish-Arab relations started improving.

## Turkey's Reactions to the Burning of the Masjid al-Aqsa

Another reason for the stagnation in Turkey's relations with Israel was the fire caused at the Masjid al-Aqsa on 21 August 1969. This was a holy site for Muslims, located in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem.

The burning of this mosque sharpened the hostility of the public toward Israel in all Islamic countries. On 22 August Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey stood with the other Muslim countries in the face of the disastrous fire at the Masjid al-Aqsa. The public reaction had its effect on Turkey's diplomacy. On 28 August 1969 twenty-five countries, including Turkey, called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. The council adopted resolution 271 on 15 September, in which Israel was asked to repeal all measures aimed at changing the status of Jerusalem.

Twenty-five countries subsequently decided to hold an Islamic Summit in Rabat, the capital of Morocco. The summit conference was held on 22–25 September and considered the issue of the fire. From the mid-1960s on, Turkey had been pursuing a policy of seeking international support for its Cyprus policies. With the expectation that it could gain the backing of the Muslim countries, Turkey participated in the Islamic Summit with a delegation led by Çağlayangil.

At the summit, Turkey adopted a position demonstrating that it did not want its relations with Israel, already stagnating because of the 1967 war, to deteriorate further. Although Turkey supported the resolution calling on Israel to evacuate East Jerusalem and the territories occupied after the 1967 war, it stood against the resolution that called on the participants of the summit that had recognized Israel to sever diplomatic relations with that country. In the document adopted at the end of the

summit, Çağlayangil inserted a phrase stating that his government supported the decisions of the summit "to the extent that they were in conformity with the resolutions approved at the UN" (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 60 [September 1969]: 45). This signaled that, although Turkey wanted to have close relations with the Islamic countries, it also wanted to keep its relations with Israel from cooling further.

#### 2. The Worsening of Relations

#### a. Turkey and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973

On 6 October 1973 the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a surprise attack on Israel. The resulting war and its aftermath led Turkish-Israeli relations, already frayed, to deteriorate further. As in the 1967 war, Turkey declared its neutrality in the conflict, but in practice it sided with the Arabs. While Turkey prevented the U.S. from using the İncirlik air base to assist Israel, it allowed Soviet aircraft to use its airspace to supply military equipment to the Arab countries engaged in the conflict. The Turkish position was based on the following considerations.

As in the 1967 conflict, Ankara expected the Arab countries to reward its pro-Arab stance in this conflict with support for Turkey on the question of Cyprus in international forums. A second consideration was the joint statement of the Arab countries at the beginning of the war that countries supporting Israel would be subjected to an oil embargo. As a country that procured 70% of its oil from Arab countries, Turkey wanted to insulate its economy from the global slump that such an oil embargo would produce. The third consideration was the close interest of the Turkish public in the struggle of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), starting in the late 1960s, to free the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. The Turkish government could not ignore the fact that public opinion linked the Arab-Israeli dispute directly with the Palestinian question.

After the cease-fire of 27 October, Turkey kept its relations with Israel at a low level because of the decision of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) at its meeting in Algiers on 26–28 November 1973 to impose an oil embargo on all countries supporting Israel. At the meeting, it was also decided to establish a committee consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs and petroleum of the OAPEC members to classify all countries as "friendly," "neutral," and "supporters of the enemy" and treat them accordingly in supplying them with oil.

At the meeting of OAPEC in Vienna in March 1974, the oil embargo was lifted, but this did not improve Turkey's relations with Israel. Turkey continued to follow a more pro-Arab foreign policy.

#### b. Turkey and the PLO

One of the reasons for the coolness in Turkish-Israeli relations during the 1970s was the closeness of Turkey's links with the PLO. The first contacts between Turkey and the PLO were established when the organization participated in the Islamic summit in 1969 as an observer. At Rabat in 1974, the Arab League declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This was followed by a similar decision of the Islamic Conference. Finally, on 22 November 1974, the UN General Assembly decided to allow the PLO to participate in the work of all UN organs as an observer. In parallel with these developments, Turkey changed its cautious approach toward the PLO.

In January 1975 Ankara announced its recognition of the PLO and established relations with the organization through the Turkish Embassy in Cairo. In August 1975 the chairman of the Political Bureau of the PLO, Faruk Khaddumi, visited Turkey. In the course of the visit, the possibilities for developing relations further were explored.

Turkey's improved relations with the PLO troubled Israel, which regarded the PLO as a terrorist organization. But Ankara was influenced by the pro-PLO atmosphere prevailing in the UN General Assembly and was in no mood to mend fences with Israel. Ankara went even further and, on 10 November 1975, voted for the resolution in the General Assembly that equated Zionism (the national policy of Israel) with racism. This resolution was to be rescinded by the General Assembly in 1991.

In May 1976 the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic countries met in İstanbul. On that occasion Ankara announced that the PLO would be allowed to set up a representative office in Ankara. When the vice-chairman of the Political Bureau of the PLO, Said Kamal, visited Ankara in early 1977, Ankara agreed to grant diplomatic status to the representative of the PLO in Ankara. The representative office of the PLO was officially opened by the organization's leader, Yasser Arafat, on 5 October 1979, when he came to Ankara upon the invitation of prime minister Bülent Ecevit.

Meanwhile Turkey followed closely the U.S. initiative that led to the conclusion of an agreement on 17 September 1978 between Egypt and Israel, following negotiations at Camp David. By this agreement, the two countries reached an understanding on resolving outstanding questions between them. This was followed by the Peace

Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed in Washington on 26 March 1979, which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the former enemies (see Box 7-57 in Section 7). After the signing of the Camp David agreement, the minister of foreign affairs, Gündüz Ökçün, made a statement on 3 October 1978 in which he said that it was still too early to make a full assessment of the event but that a just solution could not be achieved unless Israel pulled back its forces to its pre-1967 border and the PLO was included in a future settlement. This was an explicit reaffirmation of Turkey's support for the PLO.

After the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, Ankara issued a communiqué in which it declared that the Middle East question had to be settled by peaceful means, that peace could come to the region only through a comprehensive agreement, and that the precondition for this was Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and granting the Palestinians the right to establish their own state.

With these statements, Turkey indicated that it shared some of the concerns of the Arab countries other than Egypt, which claimed that the Camp David and Washington agreements could not, by themselves, solve the Middle East questions. But, unlike these Arab counties, Turkey did not sever its diplomatic links with Egypt for having made peace with Israel. Turkey's approach differed from that of the other Arab countries, because Egypt's recognition of Israel relieved Turkey of the stigma that it had carried since 1949 of being the sole Muslim country to recognize Israel. The U.S. backing for the Egyptian-Israeli peace process also affected Turkey's approach to this issue.

During the period from 1960 to 1980, Turkish-Israeli relations went from stagnation to frostiness, which lasted into the 1980s; but starting in the early 1990s these relations entered a period of restoration and improvement.

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#### B. Relations with Iran

In the final years of the Pahlavi dynasty, Turkish-Iranian relations were in a satisfactory state. The two countries were able to maintain generally good relations because both were allies of the U.S. and both were in the anti-Communist camp. Despite this, five basic questions remained unresolved and kept relations from developing beyond a certain point. During this period these questions constituted the agenda of Turkish-Iranian relations, and much time was spent in trying to resolve them. These issues are discussed here according to their order of importance.

1. Iran's support for dissident Kurdish groups in Iraq: when Turkey made the decision in the 1960s to relax its tough policy line toward its Arab neighbors, Iran was shifting to a policy of confrontation with Iraq. Just as Turkish-Iraqi relations started improving, Iraqi-Iranian relations deteriorated. This discordance led the shah to look upon Turkey with suspicion. But it was really Turkey that had reason to be suspicious. Turkey informed Tehran that it considered the shah's policy of supporting and even instigating the Iraqí Kurds in their efforts to set up

autonomous structures to be dangerous from the point of view of regional stability, but to no avail.

Actually, Turkey's concerns went beyond the worry that a Kurdish federated state in Iraq would constitute an undesirable precedent for its own Kurdish population. The shah was pursuing a general policy of "Persification" in his own country and was aspiring to be the protector of those with Persian roots in the Middle East. According to the shah, the Kurds were Persians who spoke a different dialect. This implied that he could claim the "right" to support Turkish Kurds just as he supported Iraqi Kurds. In fact, Turkey had some reasons to believe that the shah was already using this "right," especially in the first half of the 1970s. For this reason, Turkey became uncomfortable when the shah traveled to Turkey in an aircraft named Kurdistan, even though it was considered quite natural in Iran.

To overcome the differences arising from the shah's Kurdish policies and Turkey's efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Iraq, President Sunay undertook his first foreign visit to Iran in October 1966. Prime Minister Demirel subsequently went to Iran in May 1967 to convey Turkey's good wishes. At a time when the northern Iraq question was most acute, in 1973, the shah came to Turkey to discuss the effects of the Ramadan War on the regional balance of power. Two years later, President Korutürk returned this visit. As a result of these visits, the mutual suspicion in both countries was abated but never fully eliminated. The 1975 Algiers Agreement played an important role in improving not just Iran-Iraq relations but also Turkish-Iranian relations.

2. Iran's role as regional policeman: starting in the early 1960s, the shah established the objective for Iran to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and started to establish Iran's influence in the region. Supporting the Kurds in Iraq was part of this plan.

This was in conformity with the Nixon Doctrine. Until the first oil crisis in 1973, however, the shah did not have the resources necessary to achieve his objective. When the hike in oil prices provided him with the needed resources, the shah extended his goals and decided that Iran would become the regional superpower. For this, he undertook a rapid rearmament program and launched vast infrastructure projects.

At the time when the shah was undertaking these grandiose plans, Turkey was coping with extreme difficulties. Its army was losing strength because of the U.S. arms embargo, and its economy was in a chronic state of crisis. The balance between Iran and Turkey was tilting rapidly in Iran's favor. When the shah paid a visit to Ankara in

October 1975 to participate in the Republic Day festivities, Turkey's expectations of Iranian loans and oil sales with deferred payments remained unfulfilled.

Although Ankara was satisfied with the outcome of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, it continued to be uneasy about Iran's role as regional policeman, which prevented bilateral relations from developing to their full potential.

In 1978 street riots broke out in both Iran and Turkey. While the extremist and marginal groups were demonstrating and taking over the streets in Turkey, large masses dominated Iranian streets. This situation led the U.S. to change its policies in favor of Turkey and to lift the arms embargo. Turkey had responded to the embargo by closing U.S. installations in Turkey, and the U.S. had tried to compensate for this by setting up similar installations on Iran's Caspian Coast. But developments demonstrated that there were no satisfactory alternatives to installations located on Turkish soil. As Iran's relations with the U.S. went from bad to worse during the 1980s, Turkey's standing in the U.S. was steadily rising.

The shah left Iran in January 1979, never to return. This began a new era in Turkish-Iranian relations.

The impression that CENTO was not adequate to meet the Soviet threat: in the 1960s a series of meetings took place in order to erase the shah's impression that Turkey did not attach the necessary importance to CENTO. In 1961 Turkey informed Iran that it had no forces available to allocate to CENTO because all of its units were under NATO command. Ankara insisted that this did not weaken CENTO, however, since the two alliances shared the same objective of checking communism and that the Turkish command structure was also able to carry out joint activities within CENTO. In 1962 the minister of foreign affairs, F. C. Erkin, took up the issue of CENTO once again in Tehran. That year the shah traveled to Ankara to discuss the issue with president Cemal Gürsel. Despite these contacts, the shah remained unpersuaded. His misgivings about CENTO were not confined to Turkey's contribution to the alliance. He also complained about the inadequacy of U.S. military aid to Iran. The shah was convinced that the U.S. preferred Turkey to Iran as a partner.

The military adequacy of CENTO was not a topical issue anymore in the second half of the 1960s, because both Turkey and Iran were busy trying to develop their relations with the USSR. As relations with the Soviets mellowed, the military dimension of CENTO was pushed into the background, and the economic and cultural dimension of the organization came to the fore.

4. The discord between democracy and monarchy:

the Turkish public became much more sensitive about freedom after the coup of 27 May 1960. The authoritarian nature of the Iranian regime, which had been ignored in the past, now came under critical scrutiny in the Turkish press. In particular, the brutal suppression of protest demonstrations by the Iranian police after the White Revolution (Box 5-18) caused anger in Turkey. The anti-shah propaganda of Iranian exiles living in Turkey, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who lived for a while in Bursa) as well as Iranian students in Turkish universities, seriously damaged the shah's image.

The first hitch in bilateral relations occurred at the inaugural session of the TGNA in November 1965 when Iranian students carried out a demonstration against the shah. The shah asked Turkey to punish the demonstrations severely, but Ankara refused to comply, reminding him that the Turkish judiciary was independent and could not be given instructions. In 1966 the Turkish Labor Party gave its support to Iranian students in Turkey that Tehran wanted to have deported back to Iran. The matter was brought to the attention of parliament by Çetin Altan, a deputy of the Labor Party.

As opposition to the shah grew in his own country, so too did the criticism in Turkey directed at the Pahlavi dynasty. When the monarchy finally collapsed in 1979, the revolution enjoyed a great deal of sympathy among the Turkish public.

5. The failure of economic cooperation to yield tangible results: as the economic and cultural dimensions of CENTO gained in importance, it became apparent that a new organization to cater to these needs would be desirable. Also, mainly in response to Pakistan's request for an economic and cultural organization free from any need for nonregional countries, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan established the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in Istanbul on 21 July 1964. The new organization would have its headquarters in Tehran and would seek to accelerate economic development by engaging in cooperation in the fields of communications, transport, trade, petroleum production, tourism, banking, insurance, and culture. After this, RCD would displace CENTO as the principal vehicle for cooperation among the three regional countries until it was superseded by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985.

Although RCD brought the three countries closer in their cultural contacts and helped develop transport and communications, their trade volume did not grow significantly. After the oil crisis, this situation caused vexation in Turkey, because the rise in oil prices led to a growing imbalance in its trade with Iran. Turkey was not receiving

#### Box 5-18. Iran's Islamic Revolution

The basic reason for the Islamic Revolution was the shah's attempt to transform Iran into a nation-state under the protection of a U.S. umbrella. The shah felt that he would have trouble attaining his goal. First, the business community of shopkeepers/merchants (known as the bazaaris) and the large landowning class were determining forces in the economic life of the country. Second, the Shifte clergy, representing these two economic groups, wielded great social authority. So he started off by eliminating these two economic groups and the Shlite clergy. His first radical step in this direction was the White Revolution of 1962, when he launched a land reform program. Through this reform, the shah sought to direct the large landowners into agribusiness and manufacturing. This would turn Iran's agricultural economy into a capitalist structure in which the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie would be dominant. At the same time, the lands controlled by the Shilte clergy would be distributed, thus dealing a blow to both their economic independence and their standing in society.

The shah also saw the *bazaaris* as an impediment to his nation-building plans and sought to eliminate this group by encouraging foreign investments. He refused to take protectionist measures in favor of the *bazaaris*. On the contrary, he resorted to tactics of intimidation and harassment in order to break their

power. By breaking the back of the bazaaris, the shah hoped to cut off the funds that flowed from them to the Shirte clergy.

Toward the end, the modern bourgeoisie, which had begun to take shape as a consequence of the shah's measures in their favor, also turned against him because of their political disaffection. Finally, the growing numbers of industrial workers also joined the opposition, because the shah never allowed them to form independent organizations.

The White Revolution had triggered a large migration of farmers to the urban centers. The 1973 oil crisis provided Iran with vast amounts of oil revenue that worsened the uneven distribution of income. These developments led to the growth of new groups of malcontents: unemployed slum dwellers in urban centers.

The struggle undertaken by the shah in 1962 to attain his goals resulted in those that he dispossessed economically coalescing with those who opposed him politically. This coalition took to the streets in 1978 with hostile demonstrations against the shah's policies and in February 1979 drove out the imperial family along with the industrial bourgeoisie. In April 1979 a referendum transformed Iran into a constitutional theocracy, headed by the Ayatolah Khomeini, who had been living in exile in Paris.

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any contracts for the multitude of construction works in progress in Iran; nor was there much Iranian investment flowing into Turkey. During the second half of the 1970s the "eternal friendship" of former times had pretty much evaporated, and Turks complained that economic relations were stagnating. Turkish-Iranian trade would only reach satisfactory levels after the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq.

### The Islamic Republic

At first the declaration of the Republic in Iran was well received in Turkey, although Ankara later would have second thoughts. Turkey formally recognized the new regime on 13 February 1979, only two days after regime change had taken place, while the Republic was declared in April. Turkey was well disposed toward the new regime, in the expectation that the problems encountered with Shah M. Reza would be surmounted in the new era. Ankara had been concerned about the shah's policies toward the Kurds of the Middle East and was relieved that the nationalist ideology of the Pahlavi dynasty had come to an end. Furthermore, the CHP government in power at the time and its leader, Bülent Ecevit, did not approve of the shah's undemocratic regime and its disdain for human rights. If another party, such as the Justice Party, had been in power in Turkey at the time, it would not have looked with as much sympathy on the overthrow of the shah

through a popular uprising, given that he was a loyal ally of the U.S. and a totally committed anti-Communist.

The new regime in Iran was determined to get rid of all its Western entanglements. The provisional government in Tehran announced Iran's withdrawal from CENTO on 11 March 1974. Because CENTO could not survive geopolitically without Iran, Pakistan announced its withdrawal on 12 March, followed by Turkey's announcement on 16 March. This development did not disturb Turkey much, because it sought economic and not military cooperation with Iran. Although Iran was leaving CENTO, it announced that it would continue its membership in RCD. This was enough to satisfy Turkey.

Turkey looked upon the new anti-Western regime in Iran very favorably. In June 1979 the minister of foreign affairs, Gündüz Ökçün, paid an official visit, during which an oil-purchasing agreement was concluded and, more significantly, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, met with Ökçün. Another significant aspect of Ökçün's visit was that he also met with Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, who opposed the Iranian leadership and whose followers consisted almost entirely of Azerbaijanis. This visit stirred Iranian apprehension that henceforth Turkey might support Azerbaijani nationalism in its dealings with Tehran. Even as the struggle against pro-shah elements raged on in the streets, Khomeini's backers attacked and attempted

to burn down the Turkish Consulate General in Tabriz, in the fear that Turkey might wield too much influence in Iranian Azerbaijan and might decide to support Shariatmadari.

The early cordial relations were soon marred in November 1979, when the CHP government resigned and was replaced by the JP government led by S. Demirel. This coincided with the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants. Embassy personnel and U.S. citizens were taken hostage by the militants, consisting mostly of university students, and the hostage crisis, which was to last for 444 days, got underway. Demirel qualified this action as an "inhuman event rarely seen in history" (Çetinsaya, p. 150). Khomeini replied that "the Ankara government, like the former shah, could only maintain itself in power at the point of a bayonet." This started a verbal duel that would be a feature of the Turkish-Iranian relations for a while.

The worsening of relations was not only due to the differing views of the CHP and the JP regarding the Iranian regime. The real reason was that it soon became apparent that the new regime was not about to meet the expectations or hopes that were aroused in Turkey by the Islamic Revolution. At a time when Turkey continued to suffer from the oil crisis, however, Ankara still entertained some hopes of economic benefits from its relations with Iran. Therefore the JP government did not want to alienate the new regime too much. The U.S. was informed that the bases in Turkey could not be used to carry out an operation against Iran. Nor would Turkey participate in the U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran.

As Iran and Turkey entered the 1980s, their main concern was to achieve internal stability. The coup of 12 September 1980 in Turkey purportedly aimed to accomplish this objective, but it could have marred relations. The Iranian regime was convinced that the CIA was behind the coup and looked askance at the Kemalist tone of the military leaders who took over the administration. The coup, however, did not wreck the bilateral relations; on the contrary, they improved after 12 September. The reason was the Iraqi aggression against Iran, which occurred ten days after 12 September. It was clear that this would be a long war of attrition. In October Turkey declared its neutrality. The economic reform package of 24 January 1980 required Turkey to find new export markets, and the Iran-Iraq War presented many opportunities in this area.

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## Relations with the EEC

## I. THE ORIGIN OF THE TÜRKEY-EEC RELATIONSHIP

After World War II, there was a determination to ensure that Europe would never again become a battleground. To this end, leaders and nongovernmental organizations undertook efforts to achieve an integrated Europe that had overcome its political and economic problems. The first fruits of this effort began to appear in the early 1950s.

Actually, the origins of European integration date back to the thirteenth century. Even in the works of Dante Alighieri we can see references to a united Europe made up of Christian states. It only became possible to talk realistically about a Europe united economically and politically following World War II, however, when people started warming up to the subject. There were two reasons for this: the belief that enmity among the states of Europe could only be overcome through integration and the conviction that it would take a strong and united Europe to prevent the spreading Communist menace in Eastern Europe from also threatening Western Europe.

On 7 May 1948 a European Congress was held, with the participation of 750 delegates from a number of Western European countries. The European Movement was established at this Congress and did much to accelerate the tendencies toward integration. A new political organization to be known as the Council of Europe was set up on 5 May 1949. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was also established that year for the purpose of allocating Marshall Plan aid funds to recipients.

At a time when the European countries were pooling their efforts to overcome the ravages of war, the French minister of foreign affairs, Robert Schuman, issued the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950. This declaration provided for the establishment of a supranational organization bringing together a number of European countries to manage the coal and steel production of member states. It was hoped that bringing France and Germany together as members of the organization would overcome

the lengthy bloody rivalry between them and prevent the recurrence of internecine strife in Europe.

The Schuman plan was speedily implemented, and the institutions at the core of today's European Union were set up one by one. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg met in Paris and signed on 18 April 1951 the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. When the treaty became effective on 23 July 1953, these six countries pooled their coal and steel production. The European Defense Community of 1952 and the European Political Community of 1953 (other projects envisioned to promote European cooperation), however, failed to materialize. Acting on the conviction that political union could only be built upon an integrated infrastructure, Europe's leaders decided to concentrate on promoting economic cooperation and launched the European Initiative at their Messina meeting held in 1955. In this framework, a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Belgium's foreign minister, Paul Henri Spaak. The committee was charged with the task of drawing up a draft treaty that would secure the integration of all sectors of the European economy.

As a result of the committee's work, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were formed. The governing bodies of the European Coal and Steel Community, the EEC, and EURATOM were merged in two stages through the 1958 Treaty of Rome and the 1967 Merger Treaty. After this the three bodies came to be known as the European Communities (ECs) (Box 5-19). Before their fusion, each of these bodies had its own institutional structure, but after fusion they became bodies serving the overall requirements of the European Communities (boxes 5-20, 5-21, and 5-22).

From these purposeful beginnings, the European integration movement proceeded to success, even though it was occasionally beset by crises, and toward the end of the

#### Box 5-19. The Process of Deepening the EU

The term "deepening" is used within the context of European integration to denote the extension of the areas of competence and activities and the changes within the institutional structures of the integration process. In general, the deepening process has taken place through the amendments of the founding treaties and has occurred in five stages.

- The Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities (25 March 1957) was signed on the same date as the Rome Treaty in 1957, according to which the Assembly (which would develop into the European Parliament) and the Court of Justice of the three communities would be merged into single organs.
- 2. With the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (the Merger Treaty, which was signed in 1965 and entered into force in 1967), the councils and the commissions for all three communities would be merged into single organs.
- The Single European Act of 1987 was designed to turn Europe into a single internal market through institutional changes and a broadening of areas of competence.
- 4. The Maastricht Treaty (see Box 7-18 in Section 7) was signed in 1992 and came into force the following year. This treaty established the basis for a single and common monetary policy, extended the areas of competence and activities of the EU, changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Community, and laid the foundations for political integration (that is, a European Union) by extending cooperation into the fields of defense, security, justice, and home affairs.
- 5. The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999 (see Box 7-20 in Section 7). The institutional structure of the EU was revised in preparation for the enlargement of the union with the treaty. Some amendments were also introduced to the EU's competences, and the founding treaties were consolidated to avoid confusion.

Finally, the Nice Treaty was signed in December 2000 (see Box 7-21 in Section 7). This treaty introduced important institutional changes necessary for the enlargement of the EU. After completion of ratification procedures, this treaty came into force in February 2003.

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twentieth century turned into the supranational political organization known as the European Union (Box 5-23).

Turkey was going through a period of economic and political difficulty in the second half of the 1950s and for this reason initially remained aloof from the growth of the integration movement in Europe. Turkey had previously accorded the highest priority to joining the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and NATO. This time it remained somewhat indifferent to the new integration, because its future seemed uncertain.

Despite its internal difficulties and the somewhat uncertain future of the "Six," Turkey started seeking ways to establish some links with the EEC (the principal organi-

#### Box 5-20. The Institutional Structure of the EU

The institutional structure of the European Union is highly complex. As the process of European integration progressed, the structure underwent a series of changes through revisions in the founding treaties. The EU consists of three pillars. The first is made up of the European Coal and Steel Community. EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community), and the European Community, which are the elements of economic integration. The second and third pillars were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (see Box 7-18 in Section 7); a common foreign and security policy and cooperation in justice and home affairs. Within this structure of three pillars, the EU has a single institutional structure, as confirmed by treaties. The EU Treaty declares in article 3: "The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework, which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire." Article 5 states that the EU's institutions shall carry out their responsibilities within the framework and the terms of the treaties establishing the European Communities and the EU Treaty. The powers and duties of the EU's institutions will differ according to their area of responsibility.

The EU's institutional structure consists of the "basic structural institutions": the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Auditors (see Box 5-21 below). The "functional institutions" are the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions, the European Investment Bank, the European Ombudsman, and the European Central Bank (see Box 5-22 below)

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zation of European integration) from 1959 on, due to historical, ideological, economic, and political factors.

Ankara was interested solely in the EEC and not the other two organizations, because it was primarily motivated by the need to overcome its economic difficulties. Turkey made its application to the EEC on 31 July 1959, and the Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963. The following discussion examines this period when Turkey formalized its relations with the EEC and considers the factors that influenced Turkey's actions and the EEC's reactions. Then it analyzes the Ankara Agreement and the changes it brought to Turkey's relations with the EEC and how the association functioned.

## A. The Factors Influencing Turkey's View of the EEC

The Historical and Ideological Factors

Historically, all developments in Europe have tended to attract Turkey's attention. Turkey was eager to join both the Council of Europe and the OEEC. Although the Turkish approach to the EEC was more cautious, that or-

#### Box 5-21. The Basic Structural Institutions of the EU

The European Parliament is the democratic representative of the European peoples. It carries out the democratic supervision function in the EU and participates in various ways in the decision-making process. Its 785 members (as of 1 January 2007) are directly elected for five years by the people of the member states. The members of the parliament form groups according to their party affiliation. The parliament participates in the decision-making procedures, approves the budget, takes part in the appointment of the commission and dismisses this organ, approves the ratification of international agreements, and gives its assent to the accession of new members into the EU.

The European Commission is the institution where the EU's supranational character is most apparent. The commission identifies and pursues the common interest and promotes further integration. After being selected by the qualified majority of the member states and approved by the parliament, the twenty-seven members currently serve for a term of five years. They can be dismissed by a vote of censure in the European Parliament.

According to the treaty establishing the European Community, the commission is the body that initiates the decision-making process. The commission also investigates breaches of EU rules and regulations by member states and individuals and ensures the enforcement of EU legislation. As the executive organ, the commission makes the necessary arrangements for carrying out the decisions of the Council of Ministers. It represents the EU, negotiates international agreements, and implements the budget.

The EU's Council of Ministers is the institution that directly reflects the interests of the member states and provides the framework for their participation in the decision-making mechanisms of the European integration. While acting according to the instructions coming from member states, it also looks after the EU's goal

of advancing integration. Within the institutional structure, the council is the supreme decision-making organ and shares some of its powers with the European Parliament. Each state is represented in the council by a government minister empowered to enter into binding commitments on behalf of his or her government. The composition of the Council of Ministers changes according to the subject matter under discussion. The presidency of the council rotates among members and lasts for six months.

The European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance established by the Single European Act perform the Judiciary function. The Court of Justice currently has twenty-seven members, one Judge from each member state. Its duty is to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and implementation of the founding treaties. Within its function of judicial review, the Court of Justice is empowered to secure proper and effective implementation of community legislation. Within its function of interpretation, the Court of Justice ensures the uniformity in the interpretation and application of community legislation. It also has the functions of settling some legal disputes arising from community law and filling gaps in community legislation.

The European Court of Auditors has been included among the main structural institutions of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty. Its twenty-seven members examine the accounts of all revenues and expenditure of the EU to determine their legality and to ensure that they conform to regulations. The annual report of the commission can only be approved by the European Parliament after it has been cleared by the Court of Auditors.

(S. BAYKAL)

#### Box 5-22. The Functional Institutions of the EU

The Economic and Social Committee is an advisory body that assists the European Council and European Commission. The committee consists of interest groups from the member states. The treaty establishing the European Community contains provisions requiring the council and the commission to seek the opinions of the committee in specific situations.

The Committee of Regions is an advisory body consisting of the representatives of local and regional communities. It was established by the Maastricht Treaty. The council and the commission are required to consult this committee in specific situations.

The European Investment Bank was established to finance investments that contribute to the attainment of the EU's goals. The bank is a corporate body that enjoys financial autonomy. Its priority objective is to provide loans to projects that contribute to the balanced development of the EU.

The Ombudsman as an institution was established by the Maastricht Treaty. The Ombudsman is appointed by the European Parliament. The person who holds this position examines claims of maladministration regarding all EU institutions, with the exception of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. All citizens of the EU as well as persons and corporate bodies resident in the EU may apply to the Ombudsman. The results of the Ombudsman's investigations are submitted to the European Parliament.

The European Central Bank is responsible for formulating and implementing the monetary policies of the EU.

(S. BAYKAL)

ganization also appeared attractive to Turkey, like other organizations open to wider European participation. Ever since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has turned its face to the West and has been more interested in developments in Europe than in developments

in the East. This westward orientation developed into the objective of becoming Western and European toward the middle of the nineteenth century; "modernization" and "Europeanization" came to be synonymous for Turkey.

From the early years of the Republic, Turkey strove to

#### Box 5-23. Types of Economic Integration

Economic integration is a process that goes through phases, with its pace depending on the readiness of the members to unite and the time frame in which they want to come closer. In the final phase, it can end with political integration, when the different countries become a single political entity. Each phase can lead to further integration, but integration might also be arrested at a determined stage.

These phases can be classified as follows.

Preferential trade agreements: these agreements are designed to increase the volume of trade between the parties. Within the framework of such agreements the parties seek to reduce the obstacles to the flow of trade by customs tariff reductions on all or specific products and by increasing cooperation in the area of customs formalities. As a rule, such agreements are concluded bilaterally; but, like GATT, they can be concluded as a multilateral agreement. Preferential trade agreements do not attempt to change the structure of international trade because they are based on the existing volume of trade, which such agreements seek to expand. The level of economic integration among the parties of these agreements is minimal, although the agreements can be the first step toward further integration.

Free trade areas: the purpose of these arrangements is to secure the full liberalization of the exchanges of goods produced by the member countries. To this end, customs barriers and all similar barriers preventing or restricting trade among the members are removed. But the members have no obligation to apply uniform customs to countries outside the free trade area; nor do they have to apply harmonized trade policies toward nonmembers. Since the regime applying to goods originating in countries outside the free trade area will differ, the rules applying to origin are of some importance in this form of integration. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an example of this form of integration.

Customs unions: countries that enter into a customs union must eliminate all customs duties and duties with similar effects, quotas, import and export restrictions, and all other restraints on trade with their partners. They must also apply uniform customs barriers and common trade policies toward third countries. Customs unions constitute a more advanced stage of integration because the freedom of members to pursue independent trade policies is restricted. In such unions, common institutions are established.

Common market: this is the form of integration in which, in addition to goods, other factors of production are also allowed to circulate freely. That is, labor, services, and capital move without restrictions. Consequently, a common market can be described as a customs union plus factor mobility. An important feature of a common market is the removal of noncustoms barriers to trade. In a common market, licenses, border controls, customs formalities, differing standards and arrangements regarding public security, health, and the environment, differing tax structures, state aid, competition policies, and other trade impediments have been removed. The making and the implementation of common policies require a developed institutional structure. European integration was originally designed to achieve a common market, but at present it has advanced beyond that stage.

Economic and monetary union: In this form of integration, the members move on from a customs union to achieve integration in their monetary and macroeconomic policies. This kind of integration, requiring a highly developed institutional structure, can also lead to political union. The European Union is a monetary union. It is not yet a full economic union, but a very important step in that direction has been taken.

BAYKAL)

establish close relations with the nations at the vanguard of Western civilization and turned its back on Asian nations, even though most of its territory lay in Asia. After World War II, Turkey failed to participate in the 1949 conference of Asian states; although it did participate in the Bandung Conference in 1955, it took a pro-Western stand. Turkey took part in European sports tournaments rather than Asian tournaments and displayed interest in Western initiatives. These were all signs of the Turkish bias toward things Western and European.

#### The Economic Factor

Turkey's perception of the EEC was also colored by the belief that association with the group might provide additional means to overcome the bottlenecks plaguing its economy. The years when European integration accelerated and the EEC started turning into the European Common Market were precisely the time when Turkey's relations with the U.S. started becoming strained, even though Ankara was completely dependent on the U.S.

economically. As U.S. aid, Turkey's main source, started to slacken and became conditional, Turkey found itself forced to seek new sources for long-term loans. In these circumstances, Turkey saw the EEC as a lifesaver that could help to pull it out of its economic difficulties.

In addition, three lesser factors should be kept in mind.

- 1. The concepts of economic integration and a common market were getting broader acceptance throughout the world, and the idea that such initiatives would be successful was gaining ground.
- 2. The members of the EEC were traditionally Turkey's principal trading partners. Turkey was familiar with their markets and their trading practices.
- 3. Turkey's geographical location vis-à-vis the EEC countries could allow it to serve as a transshipment center for European products headed for the Middle East and Africa. The prospective profits to be derived from this trade also influenced Turkey's decision to seek a partnership with the EEC.

#### The Political Factor

A group within the DP believed that the acceptance of Turkey by the EEC, made up of advanced European countries, could be presented as a foreign policy success of the ruling party. Although Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar were cognizant of the political benefits that EEC membership might confer, they were also aware that membership would increase economic dependence, which might in turn strengthen the hand of the opposition. A group led by the minister of foreign affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, however, was in favor of applying immediately for membership. Members of this group felt that membership in the Common Market would enhance Turkey's position economically and politically and thereby strengthen the DP government domestically.

The hesitations within the DP ended with the victory of the pro-EEC group when Greece applied for membership.

This was a turning point in the process of Turkey's application for membership of the EEC. Although Turkey had been able to set aside the differences over Cyprus with its NATO ally through the Zurich and London agreements of 1959, it did not want to see Greece joining groups in which it was not represented for fear of finding its position weakened economically and politically. In this context, it was following Greece's policies toward the EEC with close interest.

In any case, Turkey and Greece had been following similar courses toward European integration all along. Both countries approached the activities of the Six with some caution. They also stayed out of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), led by Britain, after that country was kept out of the EEC by France's opposition (Box 5-24). In a joint communiqué issued after the Zurich and London agreements, the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey declared that the two countries would closely examine developments in connection with the establishment of the EEC with a view to following similar courses whenever necessary.

Greece took radical steps to reform its economy and made its currency (the drachma) convertible. Having succeeded in improving its economic position, Greece realized that participating in European economic integration would help its economic restructuring efforts. At a time when the question of joining the Six or the Seven was being debated within the Greek government, a meeting was convened in London to consider the establishment of EFTA, to which Greece was not invited. This left Athens no alternative other than the EEC. On 15 July 1959 Greece applied for membership in the EEC, which was seen as

#### Box 5-24. EFTA

In 1958 some members of the OEEC proposed the establishment of a free trade area among the countries that did not want to join the EEC. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established through the Stockholm Convention signed in 1959 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It became a practice to refer to these countries as the Seven, just as the EEC members were known as the Six. EFTA came into effect in May 1960. Finland (in July 1961) and Iceland (in March 1970) Joined the group as associate members.

EFTA was purely a economic organization with no supranational features. Two of the founder members of EFTA, Britain and Denmark, left the group in 1973 to join the EEC Within the process of European integration, the EEC called on EFTA members to join the EEC. As a result of these appeals and the negotiations that followed, the Agreement on the European Economic Area was signed at Porto on 2 May 1992. At first the members of EFTA expected certain gains from creation of the European Economic Area; but when they saw that the European Community was pushing strongly toward full economic integration, they decided to apply for membership in the community, to avoid being left out of what was becoming "Fortress Europe." By 2000 all EFTA countries with the exception of Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein had become members of the EU. Although EFTA has lost its effectiveness, it still exists legally.

(C. ERHAN)

the first victory of the Six over the Seven. The news of Greece's application created a stir in Turkey for a number of reasons.

- 1. Although the Greek prime minister had undertaken to act in concert with Turkey, Athens submitted its application to the EEC without consulting or even informing Ankara. It could not have acted in this way unless it expected substantial benefits.
- 2. Greece's principal export products were similar to Turkey's. Greece's unilateral application to join the EEC could result in its capturing some of Turkey's traditional markets, causing an important setback in Ankara's trade with Europe.
- 3. Through a possible membership in the EEC, Greece might strengthen its economy and its political structure. This would place Greece at an advantage vis-àvis Turkey in all international forums and particularly in NATO.
- 4. Although the Cyprus question had been resolved in a friendly manner, the Turkish public still looked upon Greece with suspicion. There was a widely held belief that a strengthening of Greece implied a weakening of Turkey. The ruling party would have difficulty in explaining to its

electorate how Greece all by itself had become a member of an organization that contributed to the economic development of its members.

5. If Turkey was to derive any benefit from being a member of the EEC, its application for membership had to be made right away. As in the case of membership in the Council of Europe and NATO, it was correct to assume that the same criteria for admission to the EEC would apply to both Greece and Turkey. By delaying its application for membership, Turkey would be missing a great opportunity.

As a result of these considerations, Turkey submitted its application for membership sixteen days after Greece did so. Before examining the circumstances of this application, it is useful to see how the EEC members appraised Turkey in the late 1950s.

# B. The Factors Shaping the EEC's Perception of Turkey

## The Historical and Ideological Factors

The EEC's ideological approach to Turkey in the late 1950s can be examined on two different planes. On a formal plane, in those years European leaders and political parties did not dwell much on the factor of religious and cultural differences that weighed on Turkish-EEC relations after the 1980s. At that time, the EEC as an organization and its members tended to emphasize similarities rather than differences among countries. Some circles would have Western Europe constructed on the basis of the cultural heritage of the Holy Roman Empire. For them, Muslim Turkey and Orthodox Greece were equally alien. But, in consideration of economic and political factors, this dissimilarity was downplayed and not formally voiced. At a time when the Cold War was at its height, Turkey was seen as a country confronting the Soviet menace within the Western alliance, and its Western credentials were brought to the fore.

This was a time when Europe was still struggling to overcome the economic, political, and social damage wrought by World War II. Concepts such as human rights, democracy, and pluralism—the core of the arguments used against Turkish membership in later years—were not yet the main concern of the European public. As a result, such arguments were not formally advanced against Turkey.

On an informal and social level, the situation was quite different. When Turkey started showing an interest in the EEC, Turks and Europeans had been interacting for nine hundred years. Over a large part of this long period, the two sides had been engaged in conflict. This

process started when the Turks became neighbors with Europeans when they entered Baghdad in 1048 to save the Islamic caliph and developed further when they first set foot in Europe in 1353. During the ensuing period, all European countries and most notably the papacy (the symbol of Christian Europe's religious and occasionally political unity) had occasion to confront Turkey. This long confrontation naturally colored the European view of the Turks, who were perceived in the popular culture as heathen, plundering, lazy, foul-mouthed, opium-growing, lecherous, ignorant, despotic, cruel, barbaric, and so forth.

Historically, four basic factors shaped the European view of the Turks (Güvenç, pp. 79–81).

- 1. The widely held belief among the European public that the Turks disparaged and spurned Christianity as they converted to Islam.
- 2. The feeling of superiority developed by European states vis-à-vis Eastern peoples, including Turks, as a result of acquiring a dominant economic and political position in the world through the commercial and industrial revolutions.
- 3. The anti-Turkish feelings that emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the national uprisings of Christian peoples living under Ottoman domination.
- 4. The European displeasure at seeing the emergence of the Turkish Republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, which had been dismembered following World War I.

In the context of these factors, the negative Turkish image was still fresh in European minds in the 1950s. This did not turn into an ideological opposition, however, and did not extend from the popular plane to a political plane until after the 1980s, under the influence of other factors.

#### The Economic Factor

The Turkish economy was weaker and more unstable than the economies of the EEC members. This negative factor led the economist of the EEC to conclude that the Turkish economy could not meet the challenge of increased competition that EEC membership would bring. The statist structure of industry made it difficult for this sector to compete, even behind protectionist walls. Stateowned banks were providing loans without proper supervision or planning. Despite the Cold War, 20% of Turkey's exports were going to the countries in the socialist bloc. The economy was constantly threatened with upheaval due to political instability. All of these factors conspired to diminish Turkey's attractiveness.

Others, however, saw Turkey (with its large popula-

tion, its geographic location, and its growing economy) as an attractive market. The defenders of this view felt that Turkey's EEC membership need not be accomplished in one stroke. Furthermore, the Common Market was in its early stages, and its institutions were not yet in place. In these circumstances, relations with Turkey could be established at a privileged level but short of full membership. Within this relationship, the Turkish economy could be groomed to attain acceptable EEC standards within a process to be mutually accepted. Even if the pursued objective was not met, the EEC would have nothing to lose. The ultimate decision-maker in the community was the council, at which each EEC member had an equal say.

In spite of the arguments of those who looked upon Turkey's closer association with the EEC with benevolence, all the member countries felt considerable unease over the parlous state of the Turkish economy. In these conditions, the decision to maintain relations with Turkey at a gradual, controlled pace was made under the influence of political rather than economic factors.

#### The Political Factor

Despite the difficulties caused by cultural differences and the worries about possible economic incompatibilities, these concerns, although not completely forgotten, were pushed into the background in the political approach of the EEC countries to Turkey. This positive approach was based on three fundamental reasons.

- 1. Turkey was a country with a Western orientation, whose policies of modernization and becoming more European led it to pursue goals that were parallel to the goals of the EEC countries. This was clearly demonstrated in its activities within the Council of Europe and NATO. In all questions that involved European states, Turkey invariably took a pro-European stand. Turkey's strategic location had been a factor in its admission to NATO. In the future, the Six were contemplating a degree of integration that went beyond mere economic integration, and Turkey's strategic location also carried weight for these countries.
- 2. The biggest rival of the economic integration that the Six were intent on achieving was EFTA, led by Britain. No matter how different its cultural components were and how weak its economic infrastructure was, a European country's choice of the EEC rather than EFTA was seen as a victory over EFTA by the Six.
- 3. If Greece, whose economy was not all that much better than Turkey's, was accepted as an associate and Turkey was kept out, this might lead other European countries to lose their trust in the ideals of the EEC and

drift away from it. Actually, the application of both Greece and Turkey to the EEC in quick succession had left the Six in a quandary. If both were turned away, they might seek to join EFTA. If only one was accepted, this might raise doubts about the EEC's objectivity at a time when the detailed criteria for membership had not yet been fully spelled out. If both were accepted, their weak economies would impose an undue burden on the EEC.

At that point it was decided to give equal treatment to Greece and Turkey and to establish closer relations with both countries by stages, as they met the conditions set by the EEC.

# II. THE ASSOCIATION PERIOD

#### A. Toward Association

The Environment in Which Turkey Applied to the EEC

Greece's application for membership in the EEC on 15 July 1959 pushed Turkey into making a similar move. The minister of foreign affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was the sole member of the cabinet who was following these developments at the time. When the news reached Ankara of Greece's application, Zorlu contacted Bayar and Menderes and persuaded them that Turkey must not be left out of a group that could bring great economic benefits to Greece. With the exception of a few diplomats in the ministry, no one in Turkey had a clear idea of the EEC, how it functioned, and how application for membership was made. Despite the lack of technical information, swift action was taken: the documents of application were prepared.

Zorlu was seeking to get Turkey's application for membership submitted as soon as possible after the Greek application, while trying to dispel the doubts in the minds of Bayar and Menderes. The DP leadership had two major concerns. First, would membership in the EEC, about which little was known, be of benefit to the Turkish economy or would it result in a return to the old regime of the capitulations? Second, how would the U.S., with which Turkey had close political, economic, and military links, look upon Turkish membership in the EEC?

To allay such fears, Zorlu went about persuading Bayar and Menderes directly, without wasting time trying to convince his fellow cabinet members. As a result of these contacts, the two leaders were able to agree that Turkey could not remain indifferent to the Greek application in view of the possible negative consequences of the Greek move for Turkey. In any case, an application did not imply Turkey's membership in the EEC. When the

accession agreement was being negotiated, Turkey's economic and political interest would be duly taken into account. In the event of the application being turned down, however, the opposition would be able to use this to hurt the government, so it was decided to keep the application as concealed as possible from public opinion.

After receiving the green light from the president and the prime minister, Zorlu sought to determine the U.S. position on the matter. Washington had no objections to such a move by Turkey.

With these hurdles cleared, Turkey made its bid on 31 July 1959, two weeks after the Greek application. The application was made without notifying the Turkish public. The newspaper Akşam had a news item claiming that Turkey was not being admitted to the Common Market. One day before the application, this claim was officially denied, with the argument that no application had been made. In any case, at that time the Turkish public was more interested in the news about Western loans than in Turkey's application for EEC membership. When the news of Turkey's application started appearing in the press, the semiofficial mouthpiece of the DP, the newspaper Zafer, was forced to reveal the "secret" to the public on 3 August, with a news item entitled "Our Application" (Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 1, pp. 127–28).

As Ankara awaited the reaction of the EEC Council of Ministers to Turkey's and Greece's applications, two positive developments occurred.

The European press, with one or two exceptions, looked upon Turkey's application favorably and did not consider it strange or misguided. In fact, the Europeans were gratified that two southeastern European countries had applied to join the EEC and not EFTA.

The minister of economics of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ludwig Erhard, came to Turkey at the end of August 1959. He declared that his country considered it essential for Turkey to join the EEC. He also promised that Germany would intercede in European quarters and exert effort to secure Turkey's admission to the EEC.

These two developments heartened Menderes and Zorlu. On 11 August the cabinet, presided over by Celal Bayar, took up the issue of Turkey's application for membership in the EEC. Some ministers pointed out that the question had been decided upon without a broad-ranging debate over its implications and that a negative outcome would create difficulties for the government. Menderes replied emphatically that the application decision would not be reviewed and that Turkey would not be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Greece.

The decision from the EEC was quick in coming.

On 11 September 1959 the EEC's Council of Ministers accepted Greece's and Turkey's applications. This would be followed by a long and tortuous process of negotiations to determine the nature of the cooperation between Turkey and the EEC.

# The Initial Contacts

Following Turkey's application, the first negotiation took place in Brussels on 28 to 30 September 1959. The EEC participated with the negotiating team that had met with the Greeks, while Turkey's negotiating team was led by Semih Günver, head of the Department of International Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and composed of representatives of different ministries.

As the application had come without much notice, both sides were somewhat unprepared for the negotiation. Consequently, the first encounter was more in the nature of a consultation, where each side tried to understand the position of the other side.

The Turkish side submitted a memorandum indicating that Turkey's ultimate goal was a speedy accession to the Common Market and that Turkey understood association with the EEC to mean a customs union. It was clear that for Turkey the priority was the establishment of a customs union.

In the first negotiating session, Turkey indicated the privileges and concessions that it was seeking during the association process.

Turkey was asking for five basic privileges. (1) The Treaty of Rome had fixed the span of time to be given to candidates for accession to the customs union. But since the state of Turkey's economy did not allow it rapidly to join a customs union, Ankara wanted this span to be extended to twenty-two to twenty-five years. The first six years would be the preparatory stage, and the remainder would be the transition stage. (2) The Treaty of Rome had also fixed the responsibilities of candidates during the preparatory stage. Turkey, however, wanted to limit its responsibilities to harmonizing its tariffs with the common tariff and removing quotas. (3) Ankara wanted to sign long-term agreements with the EEC in connection with some of its traditional exports like tobacco and cotton. (4) Turkey wanted long-term and low-interest loans and incentives to European investors to invest in Turkey. (5) Ankara wanted to be represented in the organs of the EEC and participate in its decision-making process.

The Turkish delegation was asking for much more than it was ready to grant at the negotiations. The delegation was unprepared and failed to make a clear and forceful case. The EEC delegation was disappointed with the Turkish stand and indicated that Ankara's request for a term of twenty-two to twenty-five years was much too long. After this first consultation, the EEC prepared an appraisal report in October in which the Greek and Turkish negotiating positions were compared. According to the report, Turkey wanted the same privileges as Greece, but the commitments it was ready to make were few and vague as compared to those that Greece was willing to accept. Ankara was also seeking an accession period that was much longer than Greece's. The report insisted on the need to have commitments that were commensurate with the privileges being sought.

The findings of the report corresponded to the views of the EEC capitals, so it was to be expected that the negotiations being conducted with Turkey and Greece would differ in their form, content, and duration. The EEC took action in this direction and decided to end the preliminary talks with Greece and move on to the formal association negotiations, while it would prolong the preliminary talks with Turkey.

The second preliminary get-together with Turkey took place in Brussels on 2-4 December 1959. Although the Turkish side continued to defend the position it had adopted at the first meeting, it put forward proposals that were more detailed and precise, especially in connection with tariff cuts. Turkey was now prepared to make a 10% cut in tariffs during the preparatory stage and in addition two extra cuts of 5% each. This proposal received a positive reaction from the EEC, which insisted on the cuts being linked to a firm calendar. Turkey was reluctant to provide this right away. It pleaded that it was engaged in harmonizing its tariff schedules and customs structure with those of the EEC. It was also seeking to determine which products and sectors would need extra protection, and all of this would take some time. At this meeting, the subjects of the protection to be provided for Turkish export products like cotton and tobacco, the aid to be furnished to Ankara, and Turkey's representation in the governing organs of the EEC were also on the agenda. Although no definite position was adopted by the EEC on the first two subjects, Turkey's wish to be represented in the Council of Ministers of the Common Market before membership was firmly rejected. The request of the head of the Turkish delegation, Semih Günver, at least to allow a Turkish minister to participate as an observer was also turned down. The EEC agreed to set up a council of association and association committees, however, in which the EEC and Turkey would participate on an equal footing. The Council of Association eventually was established and came into operation.

## Problems Slowing Down the Negotiations

The second meeting had once again failed to define the nature of the future association. While preparing for the third meeting, Turkey held a meeting with Greece, at the recommendation of the EEC, at which their problems with the EEC were discussed and compared. At a meeting held in Athens on 7–9 January 1960, the two sides exchanged views on their respective approaches to the EEC.

As a result, it became apparent that the two countries approach differed in three ways.

- 1. In the preparatory stage Greece divided the products to which it would apply tariff reductions into two main categories. The first category consisted of raw materials, capital goods, and transport vehicles. The tariffs on these products would be reduced over twelve years to conform to the Treaty of Rome. The products in the second category would also have their tariffs eliminated over twelve years, with the exception of a long list of products that would be protected. In contrast, Turkey was asking for a period of twenty-two to twenty-five years to eliminate tariffs.
- 2. Greece had made important strides toward harmonizing its tariffs with those of the EEC and had entered into talks with the GATT to complete this process by May 1960. Turkey had done nothing in the way of tariff reductions.
- 3. Greece had asked the EEC to eliminate tariffs on olives, dried figs, raisins, and citrus fruits immediately and requested generous quotas for tobacco and cotton. Turkey was seeking long-term trade agreements with the EEC for its traditional export products.

Although Greece was as demanding as Turkey with respect to its export products, it was moving toward accepting the EEC's demands in other areas. After the Athens talks, the Turkish side came to the conclusion that Turkey's demands were more comprehensive than Greece's, which would give the Turkish side more room for maneuver in the negotiations. What Turkey considered to be more room for maneuver in the negotiations, however, was an approach that was full of ambiguities and unacceptable demands and unlikely to lead to common ground. In the light of the preparatory meeting with Greece and Turkey, the EEC concluded that Greece was more accommodating and engaged in serious negotiations with Greece while remaining distant to Turkey.

#### The EEC's Decision to Go Slowly

With the first two meetings yielding scant results, it was to be expected that further meetings would occur. But the EEC was taking its time in holding a third meeting. There were two explanations for the EEC's reluctance to move.

The EEC had become aware that Turkey was being dragged into a period of instability as a result of internal events. The tough and repressive measures adopted by the DP government to deal with political and social developments were in conflict with the principles of the EEC countries. The Turkish government exercised tight control over the press, prevented trade unions from engaging in international contacts, banned strikes, and repressed the opposition. This was causing concern in the EEC, which feared that political and social upheaval in Turkey might spread into the EEC. As a result, the Six decided to follow a "wait and see" policy vis-à-vis Turkey and slowed the pace of the preliminary negotiations.

Another explanation was that the different organs of the EEC had not yet adopted a common stand with respect to Turkey. This was also slowing down the preliminary negotiations.

The commercial attachés of the Six in Ankara prepared a joint report on 19 December 1959 in which they argued that the weak Turkish economy would be unable to shoulder the burdens that an association with the EEC would impose. Turkish industry was operating only thanks to protectionist barriers and had no chance of survival in the competitive environment that would come about as a result of association with the EEC. Instead of rushing into an association, it would be in the EEC's interest to follow developments for a few years to see how things unfolded.

Furthermore, the EEC Commission prepared a report, dated 23 November 1959, in which similar views were expressed. The commission stressed that Turkey, with its population of 25 million, was more likely to create serious problems for the EEC than Greece was. The heavy debt burden threatened economic stability, and it was difficult to be optimistic about the future, because the government's economic policies did not conform to any rational pattern.

Against these two reports, the decision-making organ of the EEC, the Council of Ministers, stressed the political interests of the Six rather than the economic problems that might be created by Turkey's membership. The council's report of 8 September 1959, which was the basis for approval of Turkey's application, was still valid. The EEC held a very important place in Turkey's foreign trade. Despite shortcomings, the country was carrying out its essential investments. Membership in the Common Market would be an important factor in anchoring Turkey in the Western camp. A Turkey within the EEC

and with a viable economy could provide major benefits to EEC counties.

Despite the council's positive approach, the events in Turkey seemed to confirm the warnings of the trade attachés and the commission. At the council's meeting held on 1–2 March 1960, the ministers appraised the preliminary meetings held with Turkey and Greece. In the light of the developments up to that point and the positions adopted at the preliminary negotiations, they decided to conclude the preliminary negotiations with Greece and move on to the formal association negotiations. Preliminary negotiations with Turkey would continue. Having started negotiations at the same time, Greece had overtaken Turkey at a crucial juncture.

#### Turkey's Concern over EEC-Greek Relations

The council's decision was very badly received in Ankara. The president of the EEC made a statement declaring that "our preliminary negotiations with Ankara have not advanced to the point where we can reach a decision; but I can tell you right away that our association with Greece will differ from our association with Turkey" (Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 1, p. 143). This soured Turkey's attitude even more.

Ankara had always held that the EEC should treat Turkey and Greece even-handedly. Turkey's application to the EEC had been made in order not to be left behind by Greece. But now Turkey had indeed been left behind, and the gap was going to widen.

Turkish minister of foreign affairs Zorlu was among the first to realize that things were not going well for Turkey in its relations with the EEC. On 17 March 1960 he met with the ambassadors of the Six individually to convey Turkey's displeasure. Zorlu placed the responsibility for the failure of the formal negotiations between Turkey and the EEC to get underway squarely on the attitude of the Six, accusing them of wanting to alienate Turkey from the West and force it to tighten its economic relations with the Eastern Bloc. Zorlu wanted the EEC countries to declare openly whether they were ready to help Turkey in achieving its political and economic goals. Finally, he declared that it was unacceptable for the EEC to be granting priority to Greece.

All six EEC countries found it necessary to review their positions in the face of this sharp Turkish reaction. The Federal Republic of Germany was at the forefront of those who felt that Turkey should not be antagonized and Ankara's sensitivities should be heeded. In this context, Germany's proposal was accepted at the meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)

held on 22 March 1960. According to this decision, the preparations for the negotiations with Turkey would be accelerated with a view to undertaking formal negotiations, as was done with Greece.

Following this, on 21 April 1960, the committee considered the nature of the proposed association with Turkey, being fully aware of the Turkish sensitivity over Greece. The COREPER decided that the agreement with Turkey would be known as an association agreement, as in the Greek case, but the content of this agreement would depend on the outcome of the negotiations.

# The Effect of the 27 May Coup on Relations

The EEC's Council of Ministers met on 10 May 1960 to consider the Turkish issue once again. It discussed the question of whether the process of Turkey's association would be identical with that of Greece or not. Developments in Turkey and the precarious situation of the Menderes government were on everyone's mind. Rumors were circulating about a possible military intervention. In these circumstances, ministers found it difficult to reach a decision. Either the Greek example could be followed (whereby formal negotiations with Turkey would be undertaken, with a customs union to be achieved in twelve years) or formal negotiations would lead to a customs union in twenty-two to twenty-four years, as Turkey was requesting.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Dutch ministers took a pro-Turkish stand. They stressed that it was important for the EEC to be even-handed when dealing with Greece and Turkey; an EEC approach favoring Greece was likely to produce very negative reactions in Turkey's collective psyche. The other ministers agreed with this appraisal. To start formal negotiations immediately, it was necessary for the EEC to reach an agreement with Turkey about the length of the transitional period leading to a customs union. The council decided that the preliminary negotiations would be considered completed and the commission would be authorized to enter into talks with Turkey to determine the possible nature of the association.

Turkey's efforts to stay abreast of Greece had been successful. The date for the beginning of the formal negotiations for accession to the customs union was set for 7 June 1960. But the coup of 27 May prevented this meeting from taking place.

The coup would be followed by a period of uncertainty in relations with the EEC. Upon instructions from Ankara, Turkey's representative in Brussels, Tevfik Saraçoğlu, informed EEC officials on 1 June 1960 that the

new government would not act in haste with respect to Turkey's relations with the EEC. Ankara would follow developments in Greece's relations with the community and would formulate its policy in the light of these developments. This meant that Turkey was suspending its relations with the EEC. True, the declaration of the Committee of National Unity broadcast over the radio on the day of the coup had announced that Turkey would honor all of its commitments and be bound by its alliances. But it was difficult to see to what extent this promise would apply to the negotiations with the EEC, which had not yet resulted in any agreement.

During this period of uncertainty that followed the coup, the new government in Turkey released its program on 11 July, which stated that, in order to facilitate Turkey's entry into the Common Market, new economic, trade, and financial policies would be pursued and broadranging reforms would be undertaken. The declaration contained this sentence: "An effort will be made to determine, together with the members of the Common Market, the means for carrying out our rapid economic development and the protection of our infant industries, while at the same time securing own gradual adaptation to the obligations arising from the Common Market agreement" (Öztürk, p. 476). This demonstrated that Turkey stood ready to pursue the negotiations with the EEC initiated during the DP period. But the approach for the Six to Turkey during the summer continued to remain cool for three reasons.

- 1. The members of the EEC, which all had democratic regimes, were deeply disturbed by the coup that had taken place in a country with which they were about to enter into formal association negotiations. Furthermore, a large number of individuals, including the prime minister, the minister in charge of relations with the EEC, and officials, had been taken to a remote island to face a special court. European capitals were also disturbed by rumors of possible death sentences being handed down by this special court
- 2. The nature of the relationship that Turkey wanted to establish with the EEC was not very clear. The government's program made reference to both liberal reforms and protectionist measures. In addition, the new government was undecided about the authority that would be in charge of relations with the EEC. The Department of International Economic Cooperation, which had been conducting the negotiations with the EEC, was detached from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attached to the Ministry of Finance, but its mandate to conduct negotiations with the EEC was transferred to the new minister of

trade, Cihat İrem. There was a great deal of ambivalence, both institutional and substantive.

3. The EEC was also worried about the "new approach" to Turkish-EEC relations being elaborated by the interministerial Common Market Committee in Ankara under the coordination of the Ministry of Trade during the summer of 1960. Although no final decision was reached in the two preliminary meetings conducted with Turkey, there had been a decision in principle to eliminate all tariff barriers after a predetermined period. Those who were charged with the elaboration of the "new approach" in Ankara, however, included officials who were not well disposed toward the EEC. These officials insisted on maintaining tariff barriers to protect domestic production. Even if Turkey's new approach turned out to be quite moderate thanks to the minister of trade's moderate stand, the EEC continued to view Ankara with suspicion.

Ankara wanted to overcome this suspicion and, with this in mind, appealed to the EEC to hold a third meeting.

#### The New Turkish Thesis

Turkey and the Six met once again from 12 to 21 October 1960. This meeting was quite different from the previous two meetings. When the Turkish government indicated its desire to hold a meeting with the EEC without delay, Brussels agreed but declared that the meeting would be of a consultative nature and only for the purpose of hearing Turkey's views. The formal meeting originally scheduled for 7 June had been postponed indefinitely due to the coup of 27 May. Fully aware that Turkey was in a state of flux, the EEC was wary of entering into any firm commitments without knowing where Ankara stood and what obligations it was ready to assume.

When the talks got underway in Brussels on 14 October, the EEC noted that its cautious approach to Turkey was fully justified. Contrary to its previous stand, the Turkish delegation stated that it was ready to enter into an early customs union with the EEC within the terms of the Treaty of Rome. There was no mention of the twenty-two to twenty-four years of transition requested earlier. The Turkish delegation declared that the twelve-year transition period would suffice for Turkey to enter the customs union, with only very few conditions. This sudden switch in the Turkish position surprised the representatives of the Six.

Ankara was aware that the EEC's negotiations with Greece were making rapid progress and would result in an agreement within a relatively short time, so it developed a new position, which was conveyed to the EEC negotiators under the heading "New Turkish Thesis" (Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 1, pp. 147–48).

- 1. The Turkey-EEC association would conform to the principles of the customs union foreseen in the Treaty of Rome.
- 2. In the case of the EEC's agricultural exports, Turkey would gradually remove all tariffs and duties over a period of twelve years, on condition of reciprocity.
- 3. In the case of industrial products, Turkey would accept a composite system under which 30% of these products would be protected for periods exceeding twelve years, depending on the development of their local production. Tariffs on the remaining 70% of industrial products would be gradually reduced and in the end completely eliminated.
- 4. In the case of agricultural products, 75% would be completely liberalized, with no quantitative restrictions. This ratio would amount to 40% in the case of manufactured products.
- 5. The harmonization with the Common Customs Tariff would be carried out gradually over twelve years in cases where the Turkish duties were close to those of the EEC. Where they diverged by a wide margin, as in the case of the bulk of products, harmonization would commence after twelve years.

Unlike 'Turkey's previous commitments, these were comprehensive and detailed. Turkey also conveyed to the EEC its previous requests that it considered fundamental.

- 1. Turkish exports to the EEC would be subject to the customs regime that applied to trade among EEC members.
- 2. A loan of \$100 to \$120 million would be provided to Turkey to support the implementation of its development plan.

This time the EEC delegation found itself confronted with a Turkish delegation that had done its homework and came with a new position involving specific commitments. The EEC would have to review its position fundamentally, which could only be done by the Council of Ministers. The EEC delegation reacted in a preliminary way to the New Turkish Thesis, however, and provided some clues to the attitude of the EEC.

- 1. The tariff reductions that Turkey contemplated making for manufactured products were insufficient both in their amount and in their time schedule. Furthermore, it was inadmissible that almost one-third of manufactured goods would be protected.
- 2. The quantitative restrictions contemplated by Turkey were not in compliance with GATT requirements and therefore did not conform to the expectations of the EEC.
- The EEC could not apply its internal customs regime to all Turkish agricultural products, although it was

ready to apply this regime selectively to specific agricultural products.

4. The EEC was not against providing financial assistance to Turkey. But the amount of aid and its timing would be geared to the development plan, which had not yet been completed.

Following the Turkey-EEC meeting, the EEC's Council of Ministers met on 26 October and took up the issue of the level at which relations with Turkey would be conducted. Despite certain inadequacies, Turkey appeared to be ready to undertake substantial commitments. The Federal Republic of Germany called for an early engagement in formal negotiations with Turkey in view of the size of the country's current account deficit and the possibility that Ankara might intensify its economic relations with the Soviet Union. The other members of the council pointed to the need for the situation in Turkey to be clarified and asked for the extension of the preliminary negotiations.

## The Greek Factor Once Again

The fourth meeting with the EEC was scheduled to take place on 27 February 1961. At that meeting Turkey expected to get the official reaction to Turkey's new thesis submitted at the third meeting. The EEC Commission postponed this meeting, however, on the grounds that the formal negotiations with Greece were about to be finalized and the workload of the commission did not allow for another meeting at that stage. The British application for accession had just been vetoed by France, and the EEC was anxious not to give the impression that it was closed to new applicants. This had led the EEC to be generous in granting the Greeks most of their demands. Turkey was following these developments closely and was getting ready to seek all the concessions that the EEC had granted to Greece.

The agreement signed in Athens on 10 July 1961 contained the following provisions (İKV, pp. 1–30; Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 1, pp. 150–54; Birand, pp. 74–76).

- 1. At first there would be a customs union with Greece, to be followed by full membership in the EEC. The transition to a customs union would last twelve years, and questions still pending after twelve years would be resolved before the end of twenty-two years.
- 2. The preparatory and transition stages foreseen prior to the establishment of the customs union would expire automatically without requiring a decision of the Council of Association.
- 3. The Six would apply the customs regime applicable to EEC countries to all Greek agricultural products, apart from certain products considered sensitive, and to all

manufactured goods. All quantitative restrictions would be removed.

- 4. Greece would remove customs barriers and quantitative restrictions on practically all agricultural and industrial goods produced in EEC countries within twelve years, with certain exceptions where the removal of restrictions would extend to twenty-two years.
- 5. If the sides found themselves in disagreement over the implementation of the agreement or if a situation emerged that was damaging to their economies, they would be free to take unilateral measures to remedy the situation.
- 6. Workers with Greek citizenship would enjoy the right of free circulation within EEC countries after twelve years.
- 7. The EEC countries would grant a 50% reduction in customs duties to Greek basic export products as soon as the agreement came into force.
- 8. Over a period of five years the EEC would extend loans in the amount of \$125 million to Greece to carry out projects.

Turkey's path to integration with the EEC was blocked when Greece reached an agreement with the Six on the principles of its association with the EEC. The vast majority of the political and economic experts in the EEC countries were of the opinion that the concessions made to Greece under unusual circumstances could not be granted to any other state. The next country in line was Turkey, and the Turkish authorities considered the agreement reached with Greece to be a good precedent for Turkey. But the EEC was in no mood to grant the same concession to Turkey. Brussels demonstrated this by postponing the fourth meeting from 21 February 1961 to 10 April and also issued reports probing the different options for a possible association with Turkey.

According to the EEC Commission, the economic conditions in Greece and Turkey were quite different (Birand, pp. 75–78). The commission was proposing that Turkey be given a five-year preparatory stage, with negotiations for a customs union to follow if progress was made during this stage. This five-year stage was to be flexible, with the possibility of shortening or extending it, depending on the circumstances.

This proposal demonstrated that the commission wanted to proceed with utmost caution toward a possible customs union with Turkey. But the commission also submitted another report to the council, which contained an alternative approach. According to this alternative, a close association would be established with Turkey without entering into a full customs union. The commission proposed that Turkey's development efforts be supported

with economic and financial aid and indicated that it favored this second alternative (Birand, pp. 78–80).

Eventually, the Six agreed to hold the fourth meeting on 10 April. They also proposed that the meeting be held at a high level and that the nature of the association be placed on the agenda for detailed discussion.

#### The Beginning of Normalization

The fourth meeting took place from 10 to 21 April 1961. The EEC declared that Turkey could extricate itself from its economic difficulties through a preparatory stage, during which it would receive economic and financial aid from the EEC. The Turkish side put forward three concrete demands. (1) The agreement to be reached between Turkey and the EEC must bear the heading "association agreement." (2) The agreement must clearly state that the priority aim was a customs union. (3) In the course of determining the length of the preparatory stage and the conditions for entering the subsequent stage, flexible formulas should be devised for reconciling the provisions of the Treaty of Rome with the condition of the Turkish economy.

In the course of the fourth meeting, the parties merely took note of their respective positions, as in the case of the preceding meetings. But two things emerged from this meeting. First, Turkey considered a customs union to be the principal goal of an association. Ankara would not be satisfied with just economic and financial aid. Second, Turkey wanted equal treatment with Greece.

After the meeting, the interministerial body in Ankara in charge of accelerating and coordinating economic decisions called for a continuation of the talks with the EEC on condition that the principle of a customs union be kept in sight. Ankara had decided that its long-term interests called for compromise and a flexible approach (Tekeli and Ilkin 1993, p. 161; Saraçoğlu, vol. 1, p. 20).

# Negative and Positive Factors Affecting the Negotiations

The Association Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963. During the process of negotiation, various negative and positive developments affected the course of relations between Turkey and the EEC. Ankara was determined to be conciliatory, and all of the negative developments were overcome in a spirit of compromise.

Three negative elements affected the negotiations in 1961 and 1962.

The high regard for the EEC among the Turkish public was diminished when the association agreement between Greece and the EEC was signed in Athens on 9 July 1961. A mood of pessimism set in when it became clear that Turkey had been left behind by Greece. A second element was the British decision to apply for membership on 31 July 1961. This raised the possibility that the agreement that Turkey contemplated signing might be postponed by the EEC. Furthermore, Turkey's trade was likely to suffer if the members of EFTA, to which Turkey did not belong, joined the EEC. A third negative element was the National Unity Committee's decision on 15 September 1961 to confirm three of the fifteen death sentences imposed by the special court set up to try the leaders of the Democratic Party. Within a few days, former prime minister Menderes, minister of foreign affairs Zorlu, and minister of finance Polatkan were executed. This led to very negative reactions in EEC countries and notably in France. The EEC was unable to reach a common decision on how to proceed, but it was agreed that relations with Turkey would be allowed to cool considerably (Birand, pp. 100-102).

Three positive developments also occurred during this same period. First, Turkey undertook the preparation of a document containing the commitments that Turkey was ready to make and what it expected to receive from the EEC. This document was prepared in the light of the deliberations at the fourth meeting and was submitted to the EEC on 24 August 1961. The document confirmed that Turkey wanted full integration with the EEC, while underlining Turkey's concern that the process of integration must not hinder Turkey's planned development model.

Turkey and the EEC would enter into a customs union in two stages (Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 1, pp. 165–66).

In the first stage, the necessary measures would be taken to prepare the Turkish economy for the extra competition that would come with the customs union. After five years, this stage might be extended, if necessary, by another two years. The Council of Association would decide on passing into the second stage.

The second stage would last no longer than twenty-two years, including the first stage. At the end of this stage, all tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions would be eliminated. As in the case of the Greek agreement, however, Turkey wanted to maintain protective barriers for specified products for a certain period even after the customs union came into force. An annex to the document referred to Turkey's importance to the West and to NATO and emphasized the need to integrate Turkey with the EEC on political grounds. While Turkey was admitting its economic weakness, it was also stressing its political importance. This argument would be used again when the 1987 application for memberships was made, at the time

when Turkey entered the customs union, and when Turkey became a candidate for EU membership in 1999. With this document, containing the Turkish thesis, it became possible to accelerate the negotiations that led to the association agreement.

A second positive development was the holding of a general election in Turkey on 15 October 1961, which allowed a return to multiparty democracy after the interlude of military rule. The responsibility for relations with the EEC was entrusted to the minister of state and deputy prime minister, Turhan Feyzioğlu, who gave the task of coordinating relations with the Six to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Interministerial Committee for Foreign Economic Relations was set up, and Kamuran Gürün, a diplomat specializing in EEC affairs, became its secretary-general (Birand, p. 112).

The third element was the meeting held by F.C. Erkin on 20 March 1962 with French president Charles de Gaulle. Erkin made a special effort to persuade de Gaulle to restart the EEC-Turkey dialogue, which had been blocked by France for political reasons. Erkin reminded de Gaulle that an EEC snub of Turkey could lead Turkey to redirect its trade to the USSR and the Eastern Bloc countries, which would have undesirable political consequences in Turkey. De Gaulle was sensitive to this argument, and Paris softened its stance.

#### Toward a Solution

The process of negotiation, which had been blocked by France, was restarted with the fifth meeting held from 18 to 22 June 1962. This time the EEC held that integration could be pushed forward without the need for a full customs union and placed emphasis on financial and economic aid. Following the meeting, the Turkish government launched a diplomatic offensive in the capitals of the Six, which yielded positive results. In this framework, Turkey recognized the provisional Algerian government under the tutelage of Paris, while France moderated its stand vis-à-vis Turkey.

In July 1962 the Council of Ministers authorized the commission to undertake formal negotiations with Turkey within specific parameters: the association agreement would conform to article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, would be open ended, and would include a Council of Association on the model of the Athens Agreement; the Council of Association would have to approve the transitions from the preparatory stage to a customs union; and rules applicable during the preparatory stage would be compatible with GATT rules (Tekeli and Ilkin 1993, vol. 1, p. 164).

The council's decision to take the Athens Agreement

as a model gave Ankara much satisfaction. After an interval of two years, Turkey was able to look forward once again to the possibility of a customs union on equal terms with Greece. During the twelve months that elapsed before the signing of the Association Agreement, there would be five tough negotiating sessions in which the terms of association were thrashed out.

After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, Turkey's ties with the U.S. began to be questioned at different political levels in Ankara, as the need to strengthen links with other groups, including the EEC, became more apparent. Ankara took firm action to accelerate the negotiations. The text of the draft agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 by the foreign ministers of Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg and by the president of the council on behalf of the EEC. The agreement came into force on 1 December 1964.

### B. The Ankara Agreement

The agreement signed in Ankara consisted of thirty-three articles and annexes, which included a Provisional Protocol, a Financial Protocol, and a Final Act, plus four Declarations of Intent and Interpretation and a letter.

#### The Main Text

The preamble of the agreement stated that the parties "[h]ave decided to conclude an Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey in accordance with Article 238 of the [Treaty of Rome]." Article 1 declared: "By this Agreement an Association is established between the European Economic Community and Turkey."

Article 2 stated: "The aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people." This sentence confirmed that the association was not a customs union.

Paragraph 2 of article 1 declared: "In order to attain the objectives set out in paragraph l, a customs union shall be progressively established." Paragraph 3 indicated that the association was to include "a preparatory, a transitional, and a final stage."

The nature of the preparatory stage was described in article 3. "During the preparatory stage Turkey shall, with aid from the Community, strengthen its economy so as to enable it to fulfill the obligations that will devolve upon it

during the transitional and final stages... The preparatory stage shall last five years, unless it should be extended in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Provisional Protocol."

Article 4 dealt with the nature of the transitional stage, during which the parties would "establish progressively a customs union between Turkey and the Community...[and] align the economic policies of Turkey and the Community more closely...this stage shall last not more than twelve years, subject to such exceptions as may be made by mutual agreement. The exceptions must not impede the final establishment of the customs union within a reasonable period."

Article 5 provided that "[t]he final stage shall be based on the customs union." No time frame was given for this stage, and its duration was left to the agreement of the parties.

The subject of the customs union was dealt with in article 10, which indicated that the customs union would cover all trade in goods and declared that it would involve "the prohibition, between member States of the Community and Turkey, of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, quantitative restrictions, and all other measures having equivalent effect that are designed to protect national production in a manner contrary to the objectives of this Agreement." It also provided that Turkey would adopt the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the EEC in its trade with third countries.

One of the subjects to which Turkey attributed importance in the preliminary negotiations was the free circulation of workers. This subject was covered by article 12: "The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by articles 48, 49, and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers." There was no definite provision on this subject or any clear obligation assumed by the EEC, which would lead to serious differences later on.

Article 13 regulated the freedom of establishment. "The Parties agree to be guided by articles 52 to 56 and article 58 of the Treaty...for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment." Similarly, under article 14, the "Parties agree to be guided by articles 55, 56, and 58 to 65 of the Treaty...for abolishing restrictions on freedom to provide services."

Article 19 contained the following provision: "The Member States of the Community and Turkey undertake to authorize, in the currency of the country in which the creditor or the beneficiary resides, any payments or transfers connected with the movement of goods, services, or

capital, and any transfers of capital and earnings, to the extent that the movement of goods, services, capital, and persons between them has been liberalized."

Article 20 provided for consultations "with a view to facilitating movements of capital between Member States...and Turkey that will further the objectives of [the] Agreement. They shall actively seek all means of promoting the investment in Turkey of capital from countries of the Community that can contribute to Turkish economic development... Residents of all Member States shall be entitled to all the advantages, in particular as regards currency and taxation, which Turkey accords to any other Member State or to a third country."

Article 28 contained a provision regarding Turkey's accession to the EEC. In subsequent years, Turkey's applications to the community would be based on this article. "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community." Although this was not a binding commitment, it did impose a responsibility on the parties when the time was right and the necessary conditions had materialized. The parties were under the obligation not to hinder the development of the appropriate measures to facilitate their coming into existence.

The provision in article 28 did not exist in any other association agreement signed by the EEC, with the exception of the Athens Agreement signed with Greece. Unlike the other agreements, the Athens and Ankara agreements were designed to prepare the associated countries, through gradual economic integration, for full membership (Arat 1995 ["Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye Arasındaki İlişkiler ve Gümrük Birliği"], pp. 588–92).

#### The Provisional Protocol

The Provisional Protocol annexed to the main text consisted of eleven articles. This text outlined the trade policies of the parties during the preparatory stage. A passage had been inserted in the preamble at Turkey's request: "Recognizing the importance to the Turkish economy, particularly in the preparatory stage, of exports in tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and hazelnuts."

Paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Provisional Protocol read as follows: "Four years after the entry into force of this agreement, the Council of Association shall consider whether, taking into account the economic situation of Turkey, it is able to lay down, in the form of an Additional Protocol, the provisions relating to the con-

ditions, detailed rules, and timetables for implementing the transitional stage." In other words, it would require an Additional Protocol to pass from the preparatory stage to the transitional stage. Paragraph 2 provided that "[i]f the Additional Protocol has not been adopted by the end of the fifth year, the procedure laid down in paragraph 1 shall be set in motion again after a period that shall be fixed by the Council of Association and that shall not exceed three years."

In article 2 of the Provisional Protocol, the members undertake to establish specific annual tariff quotas for their imports of tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and hazelnuts from Turkey. The Common Customs Tariff would apply to the remainder of Turkey's exports to the EEC.

#### The Financial Protocol

The Financial Protocol annexed to the agreement described the financial aid that the EEC would provide to Turkey in order to alleviate some of the economic difficulties that Turkey might encounter because of its association with the EEC. Article I provided that the Turkish state and Turkish private companies could submit requests for the financing of investment projects to the European Investment Bank. Article 2 declared that the financing would be through loans and added that "these loans may be contracted up to a total of 175 million units of account, which may be committed in the five years following the entry into force of this Agreement."

The value of the unit of account was described in the interpretative declaration as 0.88867088 grams of fine gold. Paragraph 2 of the interpretative declaration stated: "The parity of the currency of a member state...in relation to the unit of account defined in paragraph I shall be the relation between the weight of fine gold contained in the unit of account and weight of fine gold corresponding to the par value of that currency communicated to the IMF." Paragraph 3 declared: "The unit of account...shall remain unchanged throughout the period in which the Financial Protocol is in force."

# The Organs Established by the Agreement

## The Council of Association

To implement the measures foreseen in the agreement, a Council of Association was set up to consider relations between the parties and make all decisions. This was the only body established by the agreement. Article 23 declared: "The Council of Association shall consist of members of the Governments of the Member States and members of the Council and of the Commission of the

Community on the one hand and members of the Turkish Government on the other." By providing that the council would act by unanimous agreement, the agreement gave both sides the right of veto.

Article 24 provided that "[t]he office of President of the Council...shall be held for a term of six months by a representative of the Community and a representative of Turkey alternately." The Council of Association had the following responsibilities.

"The council shall determine all the protective rules foreseen in the Treaty of Rome" (article 8).

"The Council of Association shall periodically review the functioning of the Association in the light of the objectives of this Agreement" (article 22/2).

"The Council of Association shall adopt appropriate decisions where attainment of an objective of this Agreement calls for joint actions by the...Parties but the requisite powers are not granted in this Agreement" (article 22/3).

"The Council of Association may settle [a dispute submitted to it] by decisions; it may also decide to submit the dispute to the Court of Justice of the European Communities or to any exiting court or tribunal" (article 25/2).

"Where the dispute cannot be settled [in accordance with article 25/2], the Council...shall determine...the detailed rules for arbitration or for any other judicial procedure to which the Contracting Parties may resort during the transitional and final stages of this Agreement" (article 25/4).

# The Committee of Association

The Council of Association established the Committee of Association in accordance with article 24 of the Ankara Agreement, consisting of the permanent representatives of the parties or their deputies. The committee's principal task was to be of assistance to the Council of Association and provide for continuity in the business of the council.

## The Joint Parliamentary Committee

This body consisted of thirty members of parliament, of which fifteen belonged to the TGNA and fifteen to the European Parliament. The protocol establishing this body stated that the committee would deliberate on all issues arising from Turkey's relations with the EEC.

# 2. Appraisal of the Agreement The Legal Aspect

The Ankara Agreement will remain topical as long as the process of Turkey's membership in the EU remains on the agenda. From time to time theoretical discussions take

place about the length of the term during which the agreement remains in force and the manner of its expiration. International law has general rules that determine the expiration of an agreement. If there is a specific provision regarding the expiration of an agreement, that provision will naturally determine the manner of expiration. The Ankara Agreement, however, contains no such provision. Consequently, the agreement will not come to an end unless one of the general rules of international law should apply. From this point of view, the Treaty of Rome and the Ankara Agreement are similar. Both represent a first step in an irreversible process of integration (Arat 1995 ["Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye Arasındaki İlişkiler ve Gümrük Birliği"], pp. 591–92).

If interpreted broadly, however, article 28 (referred to earlier) can give an indication of how the agreement might come to an end. This is because the article provides the basis for Turkey's accession to the European Community when the conditions are ripe. On this basis, it could be argued that the Ankara Agreement will come to an end upon the entry into force of the accession treaty leading to Turkey's full membership.

The association established between the parties by the Ankara Agreement is designed to provide the conditions leading to Turkey's full membership. In this process, the customs union is a preliminary stage (transitional stage). The establishment of the customs union cannot be interpreted as the coming to an end of the Ankara Agreement.

Furthermore, references are made to the Ankara Agreement in decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in documents signed by Turkey and by the European Community, in the customs union document of 1995, and in the 1999 Helsinki document. In addition, the Council of Association established by the Ankara Agreement continues to meet in order to oversee Turkish-EU relations. All of this demonstrates that the Ankara Agreement remains in force (Arat 1995 ["Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye Arasındaki İlişkiler ve Gümrük Birliği"], pp. 594–95).

#### The Political Aspect

When Turkey first made its application to the EEC and entered into negotiations with the European Community, it had not considered this question very thoroughly and had not formulated an EEC policy to guide its actions. Only a few politicians and officials were interested in this issue. As a consequence, when the draft agreement was initialed and came before the Turkish government for approval, it appeared to be coming out of the blue.

The only agency that was interested in and involved

with the negotiations was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Planning Organization (SPO) remained distant toward both the agreement and the EEC's tendency to reorder the Turkish economy. It chose to remain silent, however, rather than actively opposing the association. The universities and the media also remained silent on the issue.

When the agreement was submitted to Prime Minister İnönü, he arranged a cabinet meeting to consider the issue. This would be the only time that the cabinet discussed the subject. At the meeting İnönü voiced his concern that the agreement might revive the capitulations, which had been removed after a long struggle four decades earlier. The minister of foreign affairs, F. C. Erkin, succeeded in persuading İnönü, who only agreed to sign when he was given assurances that Turkey could withdraw from the agreement whenever it chose (Birand, pp. 155–58).

At the time, Turkey did not expect much from the agreement. Ankara pursued two basic goals in the course of the negotiations. One goal was to secure a document that would institutionalize its relations with the EEC and place them on a formal basis. The other was to benefit from the possibilities that the EEC was able to offer and not to remain behind Greece in the process of European integration. With such modest goals, it is easy to understand why Turkey did not make the necessary effort to carry out its obligations during the preparatory stage in order to reach the transitional and final stages quickly. Turkey's lax approach to the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s would be repeated during the 1990s when it resisted taking the necessary economic measures in connection with the customs union and refrained from making the economic, political, and legal reforms that would lead to full membership.

The EEC was exceptionally generous to Turkey in the Ankara Agreement. The EEC was aware that, with the agreement, it had entered into an integration process with Turkey that was to all intents and purposes irreversible. As a matter of fact, when relations became strained from 1976 to 1989, the European Community made repeated moves, formally and informally, to secure Turkey's consent to replace the Ankara Agreement with a free trade agreement. It was Turkey's firm stand against this pressure that induced the European Community to change its course after 1989.

#### The Institutional Aspect

The most glaring shortcoming of the Ankara Agreement was that the institutional aspect had not been elaborated in detail. The architects of the agreement felt that it needed to cover no more than the bare essentials in regard to the

institutional structure, because the parties would become more closely integrated as time went by. According to forecasts made at the time, if everything went according to plan Turkey would become a full member within a few years after 1995. Developments after 1976 and especially the military coup of 12 September 1980, however, would seriously disrupt the envisaged timetable.

The agreement established no organ other than the Council of Association and was more in the nature of a framework agreement. But the Council of Association was empowered to set up the organs it considered necessary. The agreement contained the aims, the targets, the basic rules, and the stages. In other words, the agreement contained the general program for the integration of Turkey and the European Community. Matters such as the program's implementation, the required subprograms and arrangements, the measures that had to be taken at each stage, and their timing were left to the legal texts that would be annexed to the agreement and the decisions by the Council of Association (Arat 1995 ["Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye Arasındaki İlişkiler ve Gümrük Birliği"], p. 594).

The Ankara Agreement was a flexible model that indicated the general direction and nature of the relations but left the details to the decisions by the Council of Association.

- The Course of the Association
- The Preparatory Stage
- a. Turkey's Position

## The Economic Background

Instead of looking upon the preparatory stage as a time for building the necessary infrastructure to make the transition to the next stage possible, Turkey saw this stage as just a period that it had to go through before passing on to the next stage. From I December 1964, when the Ankara Agreement came into force, to 16 May 1967, when Turkey asked the European Community to commence the work for entering the transitional stage, not a single one of the structural changes foreseen in the agreement to strengthen the Turkish economy was carried out (Arat 1990, p. 169).

One of the main reasons for this was that the First Five-Year Development Plan, prepared before the Ankara Agreement came into force, was based an on inward-looking development strategy. The plan made provisions for eliminating the gap in income between Turkey and the OECD countries by setting a higher target for the rise in per-capita income than that prevailing in the rest of the OECD. The plan also aimed to achieve a balance in external accounts over a period of fifteen years. It would increase exports while replacing imports with

local products. Because the plan was inward-looking, the yearly implementation programs only made general references to the agreement with the EEC and subjects dealing with the Common Market. The plan contained only one reference to relations with the EEC, noting that "the economic effects of the Common Market on the Turkish economy have been taken into account in the preparation of the plan and will also be carefully taken into account in preparation of the annual implementation programs" (*Kalkınma Plânı* 1963, p. 510).

During the preparatory stage, the shape of Turkey's relationship with the EEC was determined by the priorities of the plan as described above. In order to achieve the plan's goal of increasing exports, efforts were deployed to increase the quotas set for Turkey's traditional export products in the Provisional Protocol signed along with the Ankara Agreement: tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and hazelnuts. Under article 4, the provisional protocol had made provision for an increase in the tariff quotas from the second year after the entry into force of the agreement. From 1966 on, the quotas on the four products were increased in line with Turkey's request. Because of soaring demand in some EEC countries, Turkey's exports of hazelnuts exceeded the allocated quota by a wide margin.

In 1967 Turkey took advantage of the provision in article 6 to request quotas also for grapes, citrus fruit, olive oil, wine, textiles, and handwoven carpets. The request was granted, and the quotas went into effect on 1 December 1967.

The sending of workers abroad was seen as one of the means for reducing the deficit in the balance of payments. After 1965 the yearly programs began to attribute increasing importance to this issue. Although there was no direct link between this subject and the Ankara Agreement, the yearly programs contained provisions about the conditions of settlement of workers going abroad, their social rights, and the transfer to Turkey of their savings. In this context, Turkey brought the issue to the agenda of the Council of Association. But the EEC wanted this subject to be taken up after the preparatory stage and only agreed to give special importance to the social conditions of Turkish workers and their professional training.

In the Second Five-Year Development Plan, covering the period from 1968 to 1972, the basic strategy of the first plan was maintained in its general form. References to the EEC in the second plan were vague and without any concrete content. It pointed out that the regime that applied to industrial and agricultural products made it necessary to increase the efforts to strengthen the Turkish economy during the preparatory stage. The plan added that, to do this, the preparatory work would have to be followed

through and effective measures would have to be taken to secure development within the general framework of the economy (*Kalkınma Plânı* 1967, p. 123).

Ankara attributed special importance to the EEC's commitment to provide Turkey with loans amounting to 175 million ECUs during the preparatory stage. During the period up to 1967 the EEC committed a total of 103 million ECUs to help finance twenty-two projects submitted by Turkey. Because the number of projects submitted by the Turkish public and private sectors remained inadequate, however, only 29,160,000 ECUs of the sum committed by the EEC could be utilized (Saraçoğlu, vol. 2, pp. 99–109; Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 2, p. 29).

#### The Haste of Governments

The government of Süleyman Demirel that came to power in 1965 started approaching the EEC capitals to secure the transition to the next stage without having completed the reforms that were supposed to take place in the preparatory stage. Demirel was in a hurry because he wanted integration with the EEC, which had been on Turkey's agenda for years, to take place during his tenure as prime minister. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also pressing for quick action. Officials in the ministry felt that with the signing of the Ankara Agreement the customs union and eventually full membership in the EEC were as good as assured. The necessary institutions had been established, and there was no need to prolong the preparatory stage any further.

Indeed, the Council of Association, the Committee of Association, and the joint Parliamentary Committee were carrying out useful work. In addition, in March 1964 the Central Bureau of the Common Market was established in Ankara, composed of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Customs and Monopolies, Finance and Tourism, and Trade. Officials representing the Ministries of Industry and Labor plus the State Planning Organization and the Union of Chambers of Commerce would also join the bureau later. The private sector led by the Istanbul Chambers of Commence and Industry set up the Economic Development Foundation in late 1965. The foundation was commissioned to create the conditions for optimizing Turkey's relations with the EEC.

Despite this institutional underpinning, Turkey had not carried out the necessary structural reforms foreseen in the Ankara Agreement. Nevertheless, Ankara wanted to move into the transitional stage.

There were two reasons for Turkey's haste. The first was the possibility that Britain might join the EEC (even though its application had been turned down by

de Gaulle) and oppose Turkey's membership. Ankara was anxious to cover as much ground as possible on the path to integration before Britain's accession to the EEC. The second reason was Ankara's desire to take advantage of the freeze in relations between Greece and the EEC because of the military takeover in Athens and close the gap between Greece and Turkey in the field of relations with the EEC. At the meeting of the Council of Association held in Brussels on 16 May 1967, Turkey asked for the necessary steps to be taken to enter the transitional stage.

Although the EEC understood Turkey's motives for wanting to move swiftly, it felt that it was still too early to pass into the second stage. The EEC avoided giving Turkey a definite answer at the Brussels meeting and left the issue in abeyance for the time being (Birand, pp. 210–12; Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 2, p. 34).

#### Bureaucratic Objections: Planners vs. Diplomats

Gradually relations with the EEC started becoming a recurring issue among the general public. A group led by Demirel's Justice Party strongly supported closer ties with the EEC. Big business also favored such an approach. Those who felt that EEC membership would turn Turkey into a country with an industry that consisted merely of assembly plants came from the ranks of the CHP and the Turkish Labor Party. The majority of university faculty members defended the view that the EEC provided an economic structure suitable for industrialized countries and would lead to arrangements that would run counter to Turkey's efforts to develop its economy.

While the debate on this issue went on among different segments of society, a big controversy arose within the administration over the question of which government agency would be responsible for conducting relations with the EEC. On one side stood the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had guided Turkey's relations with the EEC from the beginning. On the other side was the State Planning Organization, established in accordance with the 1961 Constitution. The SPO enjoyed enormous prestige and quickly became the platform for dealing with all of Turkey's economic problems.

Turgut Özal was the SPO's undersecretary in 1967. The personnel of the SPO included two distinct camps: those who held left-leaning views and those who were of a religious bent. Members of both camps were opposed to integration with the West, however, while favoring a policy of industrialization based on national resources. On the basis of this consensus, the SPO adopted policies designed to delay all developments that might lead to closer integration with the EEC.

This tendency of the SPO was clearly reflected in the agency's reports published after early 1968. In these reports the SPO underlined the need for Turkey to raise its economic level to the level of the EEC countries and industrialize without delay before entering the Common Market. A Turkey that was not industrialized and was facing economic difficulties would create problems both for itself and for the EEC. To overcome its problems, Turkey would have to raise its GNP at an annual rate of 7% and its industrial production by 11 to 12%.

All of this led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the SPO to adopt differing positions over the years. These differences came to a head in March 1968, when Turgut Özal got the government to sign a decree that transferred responsibility for Turkey's relations with the EEC and RCD from the MFA to the SPO. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this action divesting it of the responsibility for conducting relations with the EEC. Minister Çağlayangil retracted his signature from the decree. Eventually, a compromise was found by arranging for responsibility to be shared by both agencies. According to the arrangement, the technical aspects of the question that would be handled with the participation of the public and private sector would be the SPO's responsibility, while foreign representation, negotiations, and their coordination would be the responsibility of the MFA.

This redistribution of responsibilities did not end the feuding between the two agencies. During the negotiations in connection with the Additional Protocol, the planners and the diplomats would be arrayed in opposing camps.

# b. The EEC's Policy of Delay

#### The Economic Reasons

While Turkey wanted to finalize the Additional Protocol and pass into the transitional stage as soon as possible, the EEC considered this to be premature, because Turkey had not profited from the preparatory stage to put its economy in order. Turkey had not carried out structural reforms and had made efforts only to secure increases in quotas. The transitional stage would provide Turkey with fewer advantages than the preparatory stage but would impose greater burdens. It was unlikely that a Turkey that was weak and unprepared could assume the responsibilities of the transitional stage and move on to the customs union.

### The Political Reasons

In addition to the economic objections, the EEC also demurred for political reasons. One reason was the EEC's

internal difficulties at that juncture. The EEC countries were more interested in establishing closer relations with industrialized countries of Europe that could keep pace with them rather than with countries like Greece and Turkey with which they had association agreements. Britain, Ireland, and Denmark topped the list of countries that the EEC was eyeing. De Gaulle's objections kept these countries from becoming members. Brussels wanted to keep Turkey at the preparatory stage in order to avoid overloading its already crowded agenda.

A second political reason was that the EEC had been formulating a new policy toward Mediterranean countries since the 1960s. The EEC signed agreements with Israel in 1964, Lebanon in 1965, and Morocco and Tunisia in 1969. With the preferential trade agreements signed with these countries, the EEC tended to see the Mediterranean basin as its own backyard. Greece and Turkey also had a place within this Mediterranean policy. But voices were being heard that these countries should be seen not as potential full members but as partners, along with the other Mediterranean nations. Consequently, Turkey had to be prevented from proceeding too rapidly in the process of becoming a full member.

# c. The Process Leading to the Additional Protocol

Turkey's request to launch the preparations for the transition to the second stage remained unheeded at the meeting of the Council of Association held on 11 May 1967. At the sixth meeting of the Council of Association, held on 9 October 1967, however, the EEC did not object to the decision to undertake the preparatory work to determine the substance of the transitional stage.

The EEC report of April 1968 declared that Turkey's performance in the course of the preparatory stage did not allow for the commencement of the transitional stage. Lowering the prevailing tariffs on imports by Turkey would take longer than the original estimates. Unless substantial additional foreign resources were found, Turkey could not eliminate the existing restrictions on imports (Birand, pp. 234–35).

The report made it clear that Turkey was not ready to enter the transitional stage. But it also pointed out that Turkey had repeatedly requested a rapid transition to the second stage, that Ankara saw this as the only way to catch up with Greece, and that denying Turkey's request would have negative political and psychological consequences—something that should not be allowed to happen. If the transitional stage was postponed, the report foresaw a danger that the present economic situation would continue as

before. In view of all this, the EEC would do well to approve passage into the transitional stage.

Hence both sides undertook the preparation of the Additional Protocol, which would allow the transition to the next stage. As in the case of the negotiation of the Ankara Agreement, the negotiations over the Additional Protocol were arduous. Compared to the previous negotiations, however, Turkey's hand was much weaker this time. Still, Turkey tried to improve its negotiating position by setting its initial demands at the highest possible level.

Ankara was seeking to get the EEC to agree to three things (Birand, pp. 249–52). First, Ankara wanted to delay for as long as possible the time when it had to reduce the tariffs on its imports from the EEC to zero. But it sought an early elimination by the EEC of tariff barriers on Turkey's exports of agricultural products.

Turkey's second demand had to do with the movement of its citizens. The EEC was being asked to fix the conditions under which Turkish workers could freely circulate and work.

The steps that the two sides would have to take to harmonize the economic and trade policies that would lead to full membership should be specified. In view of the losses that Turkey would incur in this process, it would have to receive high levels of financial aid. In this framework, a new financial protocol would have to be prepared along with the additional protocol.

In any case, under the Ankara Agreement, all three subjects were bound to be discussed in the course of the negotiations. Ankara was seeking to keep its obligations at a low level while obtaining maximum concessions from the EEC. On 3 January 1969 Ankara raised the guarantees required on imports by 20%, imposed a 25% stamp tax on liberalized imports, and banned the import of a great number products under the allocated category (Birand, p. 264). This was done to minimize possible losses. At the same time, a working group within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a list of products for which protection would be sought for a period of twenty-two years. This list constituted the backbone of Turkey's negotiating position. On 15 March 1969 the main briefing note that would be handed to the Turkish negotiating team was adopted by the Council of Ministers and given the status of a government decree. In the briefing note, the concessions that Turkey would be able to make were specified in great detail. This important and obviously classified document was declassified and published in the Official Gazette on 27 March. The public revelation of Turkey's negotiating position in this fashion caused a great commotion in Ankara. The State Planning Organization, which was against integration with the EEC and constantly feuding with the MFA, was accused of being responsible for this, but that was never proven (Birand, p. 261).

The Additional Protocol negotiations between Turkey and the EEC got underway in March 1969. By the Council of Association meeting in Brussels on 9 December 1969, the negotiations had revealed the positions of both sides. The EEC side was giving signs that it had reached the limit and was seeking to force Turkey to accept its conditions. When the council met, the positions of the sides were still divergent. Although both sides made certain concessions, agreement could not be reached. Çağlayangil returned to Ankara to consult the government.

The Turkish government had commissioned two reports to guide it through the negotiations with the EEC. One report, prepared by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, defended the view that the commission's proposals put before the Council of Association should be accepted, thus paving the way for entry into the transitional stage. The other report, prepared by the undersecretary of the SPO, Turgut Özal, and submitted directly to prime minister Süleyman Demirel, claimed that Turkey was not getting enough for the heavy obligations that the commission wanted Ankara to accept and that there was no advantage for Turkey in moving into the second stage.

This was a time when Demirel's position was weakened by opposition from within his own party and the CHP was in the ascendancy. Relations with Washington were tense because of increasing anti-Americanism among the public and because of the row over the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey. Demirel felt that he could gain political advantage by presenting the transition to the second stage as a success for his government. In addition, the frayed relations with the U.S. could be compensated by closer ties to the EEC. So Demirel gave instructions to the negotiators to do whatever was necessary to start the transitional stage while seeking improvements in some of the economic conditions (Birand, pp. 314–18).

Aside from raising the amount of the loans to be granted to Turkey from \$185 to \$195 million, the EEC maintained its previous position in the Council of Association. In line with the prime minister's instructions, the Turkish negotiators were forced to accept the EEC's terms.

The agreed text was signed in Brussels on 23 November 1970. Aside from the Additional Protocol, the parties signed a Financial Protocol and the Agreement on Products Relating to the Area of Competence of the European Coal and Steel Community. While a parliamentary com-

mittee was considering the agreements signed in Brussels, the military intervention of 12 March 1971 took place, and the Demirel government was forced to resign.

The newly formed Nihat Erim cabinet was in favor of pursuing the previous course toward the EEC. After going through the various parliamentary committees, the agreements were approved by the TGNA in July 1971. A Provisional Agreement was concluded between Turkey and the EEC in Brussels, containing the trade regulations that would apply pending the coming into force of the Additional Protocol. On 1 September 1971, when the Provisional Agreement was scheduled to come into effect, Turkey raised its tariffs by 120%. By setting its tariffs at a high level, Turkey would be able to carry out its tariff cuts from these high levels (Birand, p. 347). The EEC considered this sleight-of-hand to be a sign of Turkey's bad faith. But in order to safeguard the new trade regime, which was the result of long negotiations, the EEC Council chose to remain silent over Ankara's action. The Additional Protocol came into force on 1 January 1973, following the completion of the ratification procedures in the member countries.

# 2. The Transitional Stage

# a. The Documents of the Transitional Stage The Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol consists of sixty-four articles covering nine separate subjects: (1) free circulation of goods (reciprocal elimination of customs duties, Turkey's adoption of the Common Customs Tariff of the EEC, elimination of quantitative restrictions), (2) alignment of Turkey's policies with the common agricultural policy, (3) the arrangements regarding the products subject to special procedures for import into the EEC, (4) free circulation of people, (5) free circulation of services, (6) right of establishment, (7) alignment of transport policies, (8) alignment of economic policies, (9) alignment of trade policies.

The preamble of the protocol declared that "the contracting parties shall, during the transitional stage, on the basis of mutual and balanced obligations, undertake joint measures to align the economic policies of Turkey and the Community with a view to establishing progressively a Customs Union between Turkey and the Community and ensuring the proper functioning of the Association." From this, it can be understood that the Additional Protocol established the conditions that would lead to the objective of a customs union.

The Additional Protocol contained detailed technical arrangements in three areas.

- 1. The Additional Protocol contained the calendar of the transitional stage. Article 1 stated that the methods, order, and duration of the conditions for carrying out the transitional stage as set out in article 4 of the Ankara Agreement would be regulated by this protocol. Article 61 declared that, unless otherwise specified in the protocol, the duration of the transitional stage would be twelve years. During this period Turkey would gradually lift internal restrictions and introduce, step by step, the common customs tariff. The EEC, however, would carry out its obligations in one step. In fact, it carried out these obligations in 1971, before the Additional Protocol came into force. Articles 7 to 30 of the protocol contained the measures regulating foreign trade that Turkey and the EEC would adopt.
- 2. The protocol introduced a new regime that transformed the structure of Turkish foreign trade. Turkey was committing itself to carry out reductions and adopt measures according to a predetermined calendar. Customs duties would be reduced step by step so that Turkey would conform to the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) by 1985. Starting at 35% in 1971, the proportion of products in the freely imported list would gradually rise to 60% in 1984. Turkey was slated to join the customs union in 1985. But sensitive products would continue to be protected for twenty-two years, until 1995. The full alignment of legislation would also occur in 1995.
- 3. The protocol also imposed substantial financial, economic, and social obligations on Turkey and the EEC. The Financial Protocol regulated the aid that the EEC would extend to Turkey in order to help it meet its considerable obligations during the transitional stage.

#### The Financial Protocol

The Financial Protocol consisted of thirteen articles. Article 3 provided that Turkey would receive by 23 May 1976 a maximum of 195 million units of account in loans. Article 9 declared that the EEC would examine the possibility of increasing this amount by 25 million units of account.

Article 5 specified that the rate of interest of the loans would be not less than 2.5% for long-term investments with low profitability and not less than 4.5% for investments with normal profitability.

#### The Features of the Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol imposed a whole array of obligations on Turkey, while committing the EEC only to eliminate customs duties on Turkish products. When seen from this perspective, the protocol would appear to

be lacking in balance. If Turkey had prepared itself adequately during the preparatory stage, however, the obligations of the transitional stage could easily have been carried out. Aware that it was still unprepared, Ankara sought to obtain the maximum financial aid from the EEC to alleviate the economic burdens of the transitional stage.

At the time when the Additional Protocol was signed, the new arrangements evoked much politically motivated opposition. The opposition was led by the SPO, which had displayed a negative attitude toward the EEC from the very beginning (Tekeli and İlkin 1993, vol. 2, pp. 117 and 130).

The SPO published a five-volume report in March and April 1971, entitled "The Preparatory Work of the EEC-Turkey Additional Protocol." This was done shortly before the TGNA started its consideration of the protocol in July 1971, at which time the SPO published a report entitled "The Question of the European Economic Community." The gist of these reports was that the agreement removed the means for protecting national industry and therefore Turkey could not sustain a high rate of growth without large-scale foreign investments. The SPO claimed that the new economic environment that was being created would make it impossible to carry out economic planning as foreseen in the Constitution and that the SPO would be reduced to following the business cycle in the EEC Common Market. The report also asserted that, in the new economic order, investments would be made not according to a plan based on national priorities and interest but according to the decisions of large corporations in the Common Market. By accepting the Additional Protocol, Turkey would be abandoning the development strategy of the last few years and the goal of establishing a national industry.

Unlike the first two five-year plans, the Third Five-Year Development Plan was based on a model that took account of the developing relations with the EEC.

The haste with which the Additional Protocol was prepared and the consequent shortcomings would give rise to many interagency squabbles in Ankara and widespread discontent among the public. The differences that led to the freezing of relations in 1976 can be traced to the mistakes that were made when the Additional Protocol was being rushed through.

# Questions Arising during the Transitional Stage and the Freezing of Relations Economic Questions

In addition to the problems arising strictly from the manner in which the Additional Protocol was prepared, other difficulties in the period from 1971 to 1973 led Turkey to call on the EEC to agree to changes in the protocol. These developments can be grouped in four categories.

1. As Turkey was negotiating the Additional Protocol, the EEC increased its membership from six to ten. With the completion of the negotiations in 1971, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland joined the EEC. It became necessary for Turkey to conclude agreements with these countries to include them in the association (subsequently Norway's membership in the EEC was rejected in a referendum, so the Six became the Nine instead of the Ten). Ankara was expecting to obtain certain advantages with these agreements that it had not been able to obtain with the Additional Protocol.

With the expanded membership, Turkey would get increased quotas for fish and wine. Against this, Turkey would suffer disadvantages in manufactured and agricultural products. For example, Turkey was able to send its agricultural products to Britain with very low customs duties. When the new members adjusted their low tariffs to the common customs tariff of the EEC, Turkish exports would be penalized, and the market for these products would shrink.

There was a similar situation with respect to manufactured goods. Whereas Turkey had a trade deficit of \$73 million with the Six, the deficit rose to \$135 million with the expanded EEC. Furthermore, whereas 16.7% of Turkish manufactured products enjoyed preferential treatment from the former EEC, this ratio would fall to 9% for the expanded EEC. To compensate for this loss, the two sides came up with proposals that proved difficult to reconcile. There would be much tension in the negotiations, which lasted two years, until the Additional Protocol was finally concluded. The Additional Protocol took care of the adjustment that became necessary after expansion.

- 2. As the EEC expanded, it was also concluding free-trade agreements with EFTA members like Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Norway. In these circumstances, Turkey's exports of manufactured goods benefiting from the special clauses of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol were losing their privileged status in the face of powerful competition.
- 3. By a decision made on 30 March 1971, the EEC granted ninety-one countries belonging to the Group of Seventy-seven within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) tariff reductions under the Generalized System of Preferences. The beneficiaries were all developing countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In addition the EEC signed the Lomé Convention with a good number of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, establishing a special association with them, and was in the process of extending this con-



vention to other areas of cooperation. To the extent that this arrangement included products that were among Turkey's export products benefiting from its agreements with the EEC, Turkey's advantages were being eroded.

At its meeting of 13 December 1973, the Council of Association found Turkey's demands for a rectification of this situation justified. Any disadvantage to Turkey caused by the application of the Generalized System of Preferences in the sphere of agricultural products would be gradually corrected.

4. Turkey was also disturbed by the comprehensive trade agreements concluded by the EEC with countries of the Mediterranean basin within the EEC's Mediterranean policy. These countries were mostly exporters of the same products as Turkey. Ankara used the argument that these new competitors were harming Turkey's exports to justify its demand for revising the Additional Protocol.

#### **Political Questions**

The most serious political question between the EEC and Turkey following the signing of the Additional Protocol arose over the military intervention of 12 March 1971. About one month prior to the intervention, Emile Noel, the secretary-general of the commission, visited Turkey at the invitation of the Economic Development Foundation. He reminded his hosts that relations between Athens and Brussels remained suspended because of the military government in Greece and that a similar procedure would apply to Turkey in the event of a military takeover. Noel emphasized that there could be no room for a nondemocratic regime within an EEC based on democratic values.

But Turkish-EEC relations were not frozen as a consequence of the memorandum of 12 March, because the intervention did not take the form of a direct military coup. Furthermore, the civilian Nihat Erim government, which succeeded the outgoing Demirel government, steered the Additional Protocol easily through the parliamentary ratification procedure and demonstrated its attachment to good relations with the EEC. As the antidemocratic actions of the 12 March administration began to emerge, however, the EEC started raising the tone of its voice.

All of the practices that were incompatible with democracy and respect for human rights came under harsh criticism. For the first time, there were interventions in the European Parliament on the subject of human rights abuses in Turkey. The meeting of the European Parliament held on 3 December 1971 brought calls for the EEC to review its relations with Turkey. Around this time, the king of Belgium canceled his planned visit to Turkey in protest against the death sentences passed by Turkish courts (Birand, p. 510).

Relations were able to weather the storm of 12 March without too much damage, but Turkey had become a subject associated with human rights abuses in European minds. This would cause many headaches for Turkey in the years to come.

# Turkey's Request for Revisions in the Additional Protocol

After mid-1971 the Turkish efforts to obtain revisions in the Additional Protocol started gathering pace. The economic justification for the revisions has already been described. The revisions were to be included in the Additional Protocol, which had become necessary after accession of new members to the EEC. To secure the desired revisions, the minister of foreign affairs, Haluk Bayülken, and the undersecretary of the SPO, Memduh Aytür, visited the EEC members but made no headway. A memorandum was delivered to the EEC, requesting that tariff reductions on chemical products, metal goods, and machine tools be suspended and quantitative restrictions be introduced. If these measures failed to make up for Turkey's losses, Ankara wanted to resort to additional measures. But the Council of Ministers rejected these requests at its meeting held in June 1972. All that the EEC was ready to grant to support the development of Turkish industry was to allow for some flexibility in the Association Agreement. The Additional Protocol between Turkey and the EEC was signed on 30 June 1973, based on this understanding.

## The Straining of Relations and the 1976 Crisis

The signing of the Additional Protocol helped ease relations somewhat, but this did not last very long. The tensions brewing between Turkey and the EEC had not been eliminated but merely placed on ice. New developments taking place in mid-1974 and later created new tensions and caused old problems that were dormant to resurface in even greater intensity. In the period from 1974 to 1976 relations reached the highest level of tension ever for five reasons.

1. At first Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 did not affect Ankara's relations with Brussels the way it affected relations with Washington. But Turkey's second intervention in August led to the overthrow of the colonels' regime in Greece and its replacement by the Karamanlis government, which effected a change in the EEC's perception of Greece and Turkey. The restoration of democracy in Greece was warmly welcomed by the EEC, while Turkey was condemned for its Cyprus operation at the EEC's Paris summit in October 1974. Despite all of Turkey's protestations and efforts, this anti-Turkish

and pro-Greek attitude persisted. If anything, it got worse. In June 1975 the EEC held a Council of Association meeting with (Greek) Cyprus. Relations between Brussels and Ankara kept getting frostier.

2. The flexibility in trade matters introduced by the Additional Protocol was considered insufficient by Ankara. Turkey had suffered grievous economic losses because of the global oil crisis of 1973. This came at a time when the EEC was allowing new competition to emerge in its markets for Turkish export products. These events made revision of the Additional Protocol the priority issue for Turkey during the 1970s.

Throughout 1975 Turkey's trade with the EEC continued to be in deficit. The deficit of \$991 million in 1974 had grown to \$1.722 billion in 1975. Ankara wanted to deal with the growing deficit by seeking further concessions in agricultural products and textiles. The EEC's resistance to Ankara's demands would bring relations to the breaking point at the Council of Association in March 1976.

3. The uncertainty over the free circulation of Turkish workers was also casting a shadow on Ankara's relations with Brussels. According to article 36 of the Additional Protocol, free circulation would be introduced in the period between 1 December 1976 and 1 December 1986. But in 1975 Germany asked the commission to have this article removed, demonstrating openly that it was against free movement. The change that Germany was seeking depended on Turkey's approval, which Ankara would not grant. The article also contained a provision requiring the conclusion of an agreement before the end of 1973 giving Turkish workers enhanced social benefits. On this issue too, there was no identity of views.

4. Turkey's exports to the EEC were already facing difficulties because of both unfavorable world conditions and the restrictive clauses of the Additional Protocol. In March 1975 Britain imposed further restrictions on the import of cotton yarn from Turkey. Turkey wanted to retaliate by imposing restrictions on the import of certain British products, but Turkish industrialists who depended on these goods for their own production opposed the measure. The unresolved question continued to poison relations (Birand, p. 403).

5. On 12 June 1975 Greece announced that it was seeking full membership in the EEC. This move put Turkey in a spot, because Ankara had always pursued a policy visà-vis Brussels based on the objective of not being left behind by Greece. Now Athens was making its bold move at a time when Ankara's relations with Brussels were at their worst because of unresolved political and economic questions. With Greece's move, Turkey not only was being

left behind but was facing the danger of Brussels getting directly involved with the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean.

To deal with this dangerous development, Ankara considered three possible courses of action. One was to try to prevent Greece's full membership. This option was dropped as impractical, however, in view of Ankara's poor standing in Brussels. A second option was for Turkey also to apply for full membership, but this idea too was dropped. Turkey's economic situation was too precarious, and Ankara had not met the conditions for the transitional stage. Furthermore, Demirel did not want to alienate his coalition partner in the Nationalist Front Coalition, the Nationalist Action Party, which was against the EEC. The last remaining option was to demand more concessions and guarantees from the EEC to prevent Greece's full membership from damaging Turkey's interest. In practical terms this amounted to a wait-and-see policy, the only course that Ankara could take, given its weak hand. After following parallel courses over many tears, the EEC policies of Greece and Turkey diverged for good in 1975.

Turkish-EEC relations were already tense because of the five issues described above. These relations would receive a further blow at the Council of Association meeting in Luxembourg in March 1976. Since 1974 the Council of Association meetings had become routine affairs, which took place only because they were scheduled. As a rule, the EEC turned down Turkey's proposals at these meetings, while Turkey raised the same issues over and over again, knowing full well that they were unacceptable. For some time, Turkey had made no concrete, reasonable proposals at these meetings. But the parties had never said openly that the meetings were futile and of no use. They had always left the door open to a compromise at the next meeting. This tradition was broken at the Luxembourg meeting.

Çağlayangil dwelled on Turkey's difficulties and asked for revisions in the current regime. Gaston Thorn, the president of the council and minister of foreign affairs of Luxembourg, declared that this matter had already been discussed in the council of the EEC and that no new concessions to Turkey were being contemplated. Çağlayangil then declared that the meeting should be postponed and left the table.

The EEC sought to placate Turkey by offering more financial aid instead of providing concessions in the area of agricultural products. A new financial protocol amounting to \$372 million was prepared. But the package of EEC proposals that would be submitted to Turkey contained no concessions in agriculture because of Italy's

opposition and no concessions on the free movement of labor because of Germany's opposition. These two areas, however, constituted the backbone of Turkey's demands. Ankara considered the EEC's package to be nothing but an empty shell, and the Council of Association meeting scheduled for 23 July 1976 never took place. The meeting that was postponed to October was also canceled.

When the Council of Association eventually did meet in Brussels on 20 December 1976, after a break of eight months, the frosty atmosphere prevailing in March had begun to dissipate with the passage of time. The decision of the parties to be more constructive contributed to the thaw. The EEC decided to grant Turkey small concessions on thirty-three agricultural products from a list of sixty-five products submitted by Turkey. In addition, it guaranteed that no new restrictions would be placed on the regime that applied to Turkish workers in Europe. Finally, Turkey would receive loans amounting to \$380 million. But no concessions were made in connection with Turkish workers, one of Ankara's main demands.

#### The Turkish Freeze in Relations

Just five days after the agreement reached in Brussels, Turkey made a unilateral decision and announced that it was suspending for one year all of its commitments arising from the Additional Protocol, under the terms of article 60. This meant that the 10% reduction in tariffs on the products contained in the so-called twelve-year list due to enter into force on 1 January 1977 would be suspended for a year. The adjustment of Turkey's tariffs to the EEC's Common Customs Tariff would also be postponed for a year. This came as a surprise to the EEC, even though the protocol contained the following provision: "If serious economic difficulties arise that endanger a particular sector of the Turkish economy or affect the balance of its foreign payments, or if these difficulties cause economic difficulties in a particular region of Turkey, Turkey may resort to the necessary protectionist measures."

While relations with the EEC went through their usual ups and downs, they were also being affected, directly or indirectly, by Turkey's internal political upheavals.

The first signs of this were reflected in the Ecevit government's program when it came to power in 1978. The program declared that the protocols regulating the transitional stage of Turkey's association contained certain rules that posed serious obstacles to Turkey's efforts to develop and industrialize. The following passage in the program clearly stated that the new government would address new requests to the EEC: "Our government will insist on

placing our relations with the Community on a new basis, so as to ensure that these relations serve the interest of our country and our economy. But, beyond that, our government will strive to build up the Turkish economy so that it will not be handicapped in its dealings with the Common Market and will shore up Turkey's independence" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri* 1960–1978, p. 476).

Ecevit displayed his determination in this respect when he visited Brussels in May 1978. Prior to this visit, the Supreme Planning Board decided to request comprehensive concessions (particularly for agricultural products) and additional financial support from the EEC. Ecevit conveyed these requests to the president of the EEC Commission. The prime minister returned to Ankara in a hopeful mood, because the EEC had agreed to give due consideration to Turkey's concrete proposals.

When Turkey's proposals were forwarded to the commission on 9 October 1978, the reception was not very favorable. Turkey made the following requests.

- 1. Turkey should be allowed to suspend its obligations to the EEC for five years (that is, for the duration of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan). In addition, Turkey should be given the right to amend the twelveyear and twenty-two-year lists of protected products.
- 2. All restrictions on Turkey's exports of manufactured goods, including textiles, to the EEC should be removed. Turkey should be included among the beneficiaries of the Generalized System of Preferences in regard to agricultural products and should be granted the right of free circulation of workers and the social security benefits enjoyed by Turkish workers in EEC countries.
- 3. The EEC should provide Turkey with \$8 billion in the form of grants and loans to support the implementation of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan.

The EEC promised to consider these requests and give its reaction at an early date. No response came during 1978, however; nor did the Council of Association hold a meeting for the second year in a row. In view of Turkey's deteriorating economic position, the Ecevit government was unable to await the EEC's response any longer. On 28 December 1978 the Official Gazette published the decree of the Council of Ministers by which Ankara suspended the implementation of Turkey's obligations to the EEC. When the Justice Party's minority government took office in November 1979, it would try to remedy this situation; but the military coup of 12 September 1980 would end all efforts to restore Turkey's good relations with the EEC.

The EEC's response to the Ecevit government finally came on 21 May 1979. Brussels accepted the Turkish request for a five-year grace period. But it also proposed

changes that did not correspond to some of the other Turkish requests.

- 1. Turkey was to drop its request for concessions for textile products.
- 2. The right of free circulation could not be granted, but workers would get additional rights in the fields of language and professional training.
- 3. A six-year calendar would be introduced that would grant Turkey automatic tariff reductions for its agricultural products. The modalities of this arrangement would be determined in 1982, however, and implemented in 1983. All nontariff barriers applying to agricultural products would be lifted.
- 4. Turkey's request for financial assistance would be met with a \$600 million financial protocol.

The EEC's counterproposals fell far short of satisfying Turkey. A meeting was held in Ankara in September 1979, with the participation of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, at which it was decided to press on with Turkey's request. But before a meeting of the Council of Association could be held where a decision might have been reached, the Ecevit government was forced to resign as a result of the partial election of October 1979. A new period of uncertainty had set in.

# The Intention to Seek Full Membership That Was Never Formalized

The minority government that Demirel formed in November 1979 was supported by the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party. The new government's program did not contain a single phrase about relations with the EEC. Unlike Ecevit, however, Demirel intended to mend fences with the EEC. Hayrettin Erkmen, the minister of foreign affairs who participated in the meeting of the Council of Association held in February 1980, gave proof of the new government's good intentions.

Erkmen declared that Turkey was no longer seeking a grace period but wanted concessions from the EEC in the fields of agricultural products, free movement of workers, and further loans. According to Erkmen, the main problem between Brussels and Ankara was the lack of political will. If Brussels demonstrated its political will, all difficulties would be swiftly overcome.

At the Council of Association, the Turkish side dwelled at length on Greece's application for full membership. The treaty of accession providing for full membership had been signed by the EEC and Greece on 25 May 1979. But the document had not yet been ratified by Greece and the members of the EEC. Ankara feared that, if Greece became a full member while Turkey remained

outside the EEC, Athens could veto Turkey's request. Erkmen sought and obtained the insertion of a sentence in the council's final report to the effect that Turkey would soon accede to the EEC within the context of the rights deriving from the Ankara Agreement.

Turkey made no application for full membership to the Council of Association, however, at either the February or June 1980 meeting. Nevertheless, Erkmen kept the issue on the agenda and gave assurances that Turkey looked upon full membership with favor. As indicated, Turkey did not raise the issue of full membership at the June 1980 meeting of the council. But Ankara did accept the EEC's package of proposals made in connection with Turkey's request for changes in the Additional Protocol, including the following items.

- 1. All customs duties on agricultural products would be removed by 1987, but nontariff barriers like quotas would remain.
- 2. Although free movement of workers would not be granted, broad-ranging improvements would be made in the workers' social rights.
- 3. A five-year financial protocol would provide Turkey with \$600 million in loans and \$75 million in grants.

Although Turkey had not formally applied for full membership, this did not imply that it had given up its goal. Erkmen was striving to convince Demirel to make the formal application with minimum delay. Erkmen was dismissed on 5 September 1980, however, following a censure vote in parliament. A few days later, the coup of 12 September 1980 caused the formal application for membership to be postponed indefinitely.

ÇAĞRI ERHAN AND TUĞRUL ARAT

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SECTION 6

1980-1990

Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc—2

 $^{\rm f}$  Table 6-1. The Administration of the Period 1980–1990

| PRESIDENTS  | GOVERNMENTS  | ministers of<br>Foreign affairs                   | SECRETARIES-GENERAL<br>OF MFA                   |  |  |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| Fahri Korutürk<br>(6 Apr. 1973–6 Apr. 1980)   | 6th S. Demirel Government AP<br>(12 Nov. 1979–12 Sept. 1980)   | Hayrettin Erkmen<br>(12 Nov. 1979–5 Sept. 1980)   | Özdemir Yiğit<br>(6 July 1979–27 Aug. 1980)     |  |  |
|   | ,<br>Bülend Ulusu Government                                   | İlter Türkmen                                     | İlter Türkmen<br>(27 Aug. 1980–20 Sept. 1980    |  |  |
| Kenan Evren<br>(13 Sept. 1980–7 Nov. 1982, head of<br>the MGK and of the state)<br>(7 Nov. 1982–9 Nov. 1989, president) | (20 Sept. 1980–13 Dec. 1983)                                   | (20 Sept. 1980–13 Dec. 1983)                      | Kamuran Gürün<br>(20 Sept. 1980–1 Mar. 1982)    |  |  |
|   | 1st Turgut Özal Government ANAP                                |   | Ercüment Yavuzalp<br>(1 Oct. 1982–18 Jan. 1985) |  |  |
|   | (13 Dec. 1983–21 Dec. 1987)                                    | Vahit Halefoğlu<br>(13 Dec. 1983–21 Dec. 1987)    | Necdet Tezel<br>(18 Jan. 1985–9 Jan. 1987)      |  |  |
|   | 2nd T. Özal Government ANAP<br>(21 Dec. 1987–9 Nov. 1989)      |   | Nüzhet Kandemir<br>(9 Jan. 1987–27 July 1989)   |  |  |
| Turgut Özal<br>(9 Nov 1989–17 Apr. 1993)  | Yıldırım Akbulut Government ANAP<br>(9 Nov. 1989–23 June 1991) | Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz<br>(21 Dec. 1987–20 Feb, 1990) | - Tugay Özçeri<br>(27 July 1989–1 July 1991)    |  |  |

ANAP (Anavatan Partisi): Motherland Party.
AP (Adalet Partisi): Justice Party.
MGK (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi): National Security Council.
(Table by Atay Akdevelioğlu)

# Appraisal of the Period

# I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

# A. International Developments

# 1. Globalization and Its Effects

As we have already seen, globalization is the result of the spread of the infrastructure (international capitalism) and the superstructure (rationalism, democracy, human and minority rights, etc.) of the West throughout the globe (see Box Intro-7 in the Introduction).

The spread of the capitalistic model of production (i.e., production for the market based on private property and maximization of profits) occurred in two waves between the end of the fifteenth century and mid-nineteenth century. Then globalization was interrupted for half a century. This interruption was due to the exhaustion caused by World War I and the split between democracies and fascism, followed by the challenge of the USSR after World War II. The spread of globalization resumed in the 1980s, this being the third wave (Oran 2001, pp. 1–26).

The economic underpinning of this resumption of globalization was the coming into being of the multinational companies in the early 1970s. These companies were spread throughout the world, and their production, management, distribution, and marketing systems were so organized as to maximize profits. Above all, the shareholders in these companies were individuals from different countries. All of this led naturally to production and sales on a multinational scale as these companies came into being and consolidated their positions in the market. The need to produce and sell on a global scale called for the relaxation of tariff barriers and other impediments under the banner of "free trade." All of this resulted in an increased mobility of goods and capital. This increased mobility inevitably had its political consequences. Unable to control the new situation adequately, the nation-state went into decline, at first effectively and then juridically.

The technological underpinning of the new era was

the development of the microchip, optic cable, and computer in the 1980s, which started the communications revolution. The first industrial revolution had appeared in Britain in the eighteenth century and was based on steam power. The second industrial revolution occurred in the U.S. in the nineteenth century. This revolution was based on "Taylorism," which relied on the assembly line and mass production. These two revolutions strengthened, in the long run, the factors of both capital (supply) and labor (demand).

The third industrial revolution led to the "information society," based on information technologies. The new revolution had a significant impact in the social and political spheres. First, the mobility and productivity of capital increased. Production and distribution spread beyond national borders and rapidly acquired global dimensions. As the market expanded, capital (supply) gained strength at the expense of the consumer (demand). Second, as the nature of production changed, the need for labor, and especially unskilled manual labor, progressively declined. While the bargaining power of labor decreased, its mobility was hampered by methods like the imposition of visas. The use of robots also increased rapidly. As production spread outside traditional factories, the class consciousness of labor went into decline.

In these circumstances, the demand aspect of the economy was neglected, while the supply side became all important. Keynesian policies (J.M. Keynes, Cambridge School), which stressed the social welfare state with full employment, were gradually abandoned. These were replaced by monetarist policies that advocated lower wage increases and later retirement to make companies more competitive internationally. These policies, which squeezed the consumer, were formulated by Milton Friedman of the Chicago School.

These developments made the major capitalist states even more powerful. The disintegration of the USSR in

the beginning of the 1990s constituted the political dimension of the third globalization, which left the West unrivaled and deeply affected the world order.

# 2. The Rise of the West and of the U.S.

As a major oil producer, the U.S. was not as badly affected by the oil shock as Europe was, even though American oil reserves were expected to last for only about ten years and Washington was intent on keeping these as a strategic reserve. Europe began to recover from the shock by 1980, with measures such as conservation, new technologies (solar energy, natural gas, etc.), and allowing the prices of its products to reflect the additional cost of oil. In fact, it could even be argued that the oil shock had a salutary effect on the West.

Meanwhile the oil producers had few clues on how to spend their bloated petrodollar income. In addition to lavish spending, buying hotels and retail chains, they deposited their funds in Western banks or bought shares in Western companies. As a result, these companies grew stronger, and the banks recycled their petrodollar deposits by extending loans to countries that were impoverished by the high cost of oil.

# Human Rights, the "Green Belt," and the Carter Doctrine

When Jimmy Carter was president from 1977 to 1981, he took advantage of the third basket of the Helsinki Final Act (see Box 5-1 in Section 5) to launch an international campaign in favor of human rights to hit the USSR where it was weakest. This was done even as Washington failed to notice the torture chambers in some developing countries that happened to be within the U.S. camp.

Subsequently a "Green Belt," consisting of moderate Islamic countries, was formed around the USSR. This idea was inspired by Carter's advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. A man of strong religious beliefs, Carter was forming an Islamic shield against the USSR. It was hoped that moderate Islam would also be useful in circumscribing radical movements like Hezbollah as well as Iran. The implementation of this new strategy would take place as the 12 September military regime was being established in Turkey.

In January 1980 the U.S. president proclaimed the Carter Doctrine. This was a new version of the Truman Doctrine, but adjusted to suit the conditions of the Persian Gulf. According to the Carter Doctrine, an attack on the oil fields of the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the U.S.

A U.S. intervention in the Gulf would be carried out in accordance with the so-called Wohlstetter Doctrine. To

prevent the Soviet Union from reaching the Gulf via eastern Anatolia, the plan envisaged the construction of new air bases in this region. These air bases would also be used to strike at the Caucasus if it became necessary.

#### The Reagan Doctrine and the "Second Cold War"

During the McCarthy era, Ronald Reagan had actively taken part in the persecution of actors and other artists. Along with John Wayne, he was among the most conservative figures in Hollywood. When he became president in 1981, he went far beyond the Carter Doctrine, by declaring that the U.S. would lend its full support to all anti-Communist movements everywhere on the globe. Reagan was reversing the U.S. retreat symbolized by the 1969 Nixon Doctrine.

The Reagan Doctrine did not just remain on paper. It was given a powerful impulse by the events in Iran and Afghanistan in 1979 and was implemented in countries such as Afghanistan in Asia, Nicaragua in Latin America, Angola in Africa, and Cambodia in the Far East. The pro-American regimes in these countries were given armed assistance, while the opposition groups in countries with anti-American regimes were furnished with aid and arms. In this context, the U.S. got involved in the sale of weapons through Israel to its archenemy, the Khomeini regime, to secure funds for the rightist Contras fighting the government in Nicaragua, in a region that the U.S. considered to be its own backyard (see Box 6-7 below).

At a time when Iran and Afghanistan were beyond U.S. control, when Soviet missiles were installed in Syria, and when Andreas Papandreou was blatantly displaying his hostility toward the U.S. in Greece, Reagan was waging the "Second Cold War" against the USSR. Reagan's most significant move in this period was the launching of the multi-billion-dollar "Star Wars" project without regard to the ABM treaty that had been concluded in 1972 (see Box 6-5 below). This project would be an important factor in bankrupting the USSR and represented the resumption of the U.S. role as global sheriff.

#### 3. The Collapse of the USSR

As a major producer of oil, the USSR was not affected by the oil shock. On the contrary, it stood to gain from the rise in oil prices. The windfall profits led the USSR into complacency, however. The extra income was diverted to armaments and space research; because of the inherent weaknesses in the Soviet system, the by-products of such research did not improve the daily lives of its citizens. This was in marked contrast to the West, where space research led to many civilian applications like Teflon-coated pans,

derived from materials used as heat-shields for spacecraft reentering the earth's atmosphere.

Three elderly Soviet leaders (Leonid Brezhnev, Konstantin Chernenko, and Yury Andropov) died at the helm at the advanced ages of seventy-six, seventy-four, and seventy, respectively. They were succeeded in April 1985 by an energetic leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was only fifty-four years old. His first task was to reduce tensions with the West so that he could concentrate his efforts on domestic questions. In August he came up with a proposal that took the West by surprise: both sides would agree to end nuclear testing. When the West failed to respond, Gorbachev declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. At first a skeptical Western press started referring to the Soviet leader as "Gorba-show." Gorbachev then came up with a four-point program.

- 1. Gorbachev introduced the concept of the "Common European home," designed to achieve integration with Europe in the realm of ideas (see Box 6-22 below).
- 2. To reduce the drain caused by military expenditures, Gorbachev signed an agreement with the U.S. in November 1987 on limiting medium-range missiles. This was followed by a similar agreement for short-range missiles. In March 1988 he announced that Soviet forces would evacuate Afghanistan. In December came the decision to reduce Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by 50,000 soldiers. This decision shook the regimes of Eastern Europe by creating the impression that the USSR was withdrawing its support and abandoning the regimes to their fates. With the demobilization of 500,000 military personnel in April 1989, the minister of foreign affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, would declare that the Iron Curtain had begun to rust.
- 3. Gorbachev gave the green light to national forms of socialism and reforms in Eastern Europe. With this decision, the Brezhnev Doctrine had come to an end (see Box 5-15 in Section 5).
- 4. Gorbachev launched a policy of liberalization within the USSR. After a lapse of forty-seven years, a Party Conference was held in July 1988. In December 1989 the foremost dissident, Andrey Sakharov, was released from detention. In March 1990 private ownership rights over the means of production other than land were recognized.

These were momentous changes for the Communist superpower. While carrying out these reforms, Gorbachev was also battling three different crises that had been plaguing the USSR over the years (see Box 6-1).

As Gorbachev wrestled with these crises, the crisis of nationalities broke out unexpectedly in 1987 (Box 6-21 below). As a result of the reforms and the unstoppable cultural influence of the West as a consequence of the

Box 6-1. The Political, Structural, and Cyclical Crises in the USSR

The most pervasive and profound crisis in the USSR was political and resulted directly from the lack of democracy. Due to this, there was no popular participation in the rule of the Communist Party. As a result of the inbreeding that this created, the USSR rotted from within.

The structural crisis was due to the inability of the USSR to make the transition from the "Extensive Development" model based on the utilization of surplus labor to an "Intensive Growth" stage based on raising efficiency of resource allocation and technical progress, The first model was used in the early years of the USSR, and industry was spread throughout the land in order to reduce unemployment. Once this aim was achieved, the country should have been able to pass into the second stage, where economic efficiency would be the guiding criterion. This was never achieved, however, Meanwhile capitalism had been able to pass through both stages and had entered the stage of the third industrial revolution: the information revolution.

The cyclical crises were experienced sporadically. The socialist state had met the citizens' basic needs by providing education, health care, employment, housing, and so forth. In these circumstances, savings were channeled to consumption, creating a shortage of goods that was compounded by the inability to increase production. To eliminate the disparity between supply and demand, Stalin had resorted to monetary operations from time to time through which savings in banks were reduced.

To overcome these crises, Mikhail Gorbachev felt the need to carry out far-reaching structural reforms in the economy. He came up with the concept of *perestrolka* (restructuring) (see Box 6-79 below). This required eliminating the privileges of countless individuals and institutions, however, and Gorbachev could not count on the support of any particular institution or group. To gain popular support for his reforms, he resorted to the concept of *glasnost* (transparency) (see Box 6-20 below).

To carry out *perestrolka*, it was necessary for Gorbachev to cut down demand. Doing this by means of monetary measures would have led the rich to transfer their savings abroad and perhaps even to seek the dismissal of Gorbachev. Another way to cut demand would have been to seek the IMF's help. But this course would hurt the people and negate *glasnost*. As the USSR vacillated between difficult alternative courses, production was plunging.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Interview with Korkut Boratay)

communications revolution, incidents broke out in Kazakhstan in January 1987, which spread to Lithuania in August and to Nagorno Karabakh in February 1988 (see Box 7-30 in Section 7). This was followed by incidents in Crimea in March, Estonia in November, and Moldavia in August 1989, followed by Georgia. The refusal of Georgia to provide athletes for the Soviet national team was highly significant.

In August 1989 the Kremlin remained silent when a non-Communist government came to power in Poland. This signified the effective end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In October 1989 there was a wave of East German migrants fleeing to the West via Hungary. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall came down. In February 1990 the USSR was obliged to agree to the reunification of Germany. In July the USSR felt the need to seek the IMF's help. Gorbachev was powerless to prevent any of these events. When he felt that the USSR's existence was at stake, his forceful actions led to bloodshed, as when he ordered the invasion of Azerbaijan in January 1990 and Lithuania in March. Lithuania's oil supplies were cut off, and in March 1991 all strikes and demonstrations throughout the USSR were banned. In March of that year a referendum was held in which the citizens voted for maintaining the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the superpower USSR disintegrated only seventy-four years after coming into existence. Before this disintegration the USSR surrendered to the Third Basket of the second OSCE summit meeting, held in 1990 in Paris.

The U.S. now remained unchallenged as the global hegemon, and the West became the unrivaled system. From then on, the world would be solely shaped by models based on the infrastructure, international capitalism, and the superstructure (in particular the Western values concerning human rights) of the U.S. and the West.

# B. Developments in the Balkans and the Middle East

Regional developments of special interest to Turkey were taking place in the Balkans and the Middle East.

In the Balkans, the most significant development was the campaign of repression directed at the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria in 1984. This bizarre action by the Todor Zhivkov regime caused much tension in that country and led to the migration of ethnic Turks to Turkey in successive waves. This question would also have an effect on the Kurdish question in Turkey.

One of the fundamental requirements of Turkey is the need to keep at least one of the two Balkan routes leading to Europe through Bulgaria and Greece open at all times (as noted in the Introduction). Throughout this period Turkey was at odds with Greece under Papandreou. When relations with Bulgaria became strained, not only did the second route to Europe come under threat, but there was also the danger of relations with the USSR being soured.

Between 1980 and 1988 Iraq and Iran were at war in the Middle East. Throughout the war Turkey observed strict neutrality, which allowed it to develop its trade with both belligerents. At the same time, the war caused a power vacuum to develop in northern Iraq. This allowed the PKK, Turkey's major concern in the latter part of the 1980s, to become entrenched in this region. The Palestinian Intifada, which broke out in this period, would also aggravate the Kurdish question in Turkey.

# II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

#### A. The Economy

The following observations can be can be made after examining Uluğbay's table (Table 6-2; see Box 2-1 in Section 2).

1. During this period GNP increased by a factor of 2.1, imports by 2.5, exports by 2.75, and foreign debts by 3. All of these figures represented very high rates of growth.

The average ratio of foreign trade to GNP during the period was 25.14. This ratio had been 11.8 for the period from 1961 to 1980 and 15.8 in 1980. The average ratio of foreign debt to GNP during the period was 35.6, while the corresponding figure had been 10.7 for the period from 1961 to 1980 and 23.0 for 1980. This meant that the external dependency of the economy was rapidly increasing during this period.

- 2. While Turkey's trade deficit was \$5 billion in 1980, the deficit doubled to over \$9 billion in 1990. This huge deficit would progressively rise in the subsequent period.
- 3. In 1981 the U.S. dollar was worth TL 110. At the end of the period in 1990 this figure had reached TL 2,606. The rate of inflation increased from 36.8% at the beginning of the period to 54.8% at the end, with the average for the period standing at 44%.

With the economic restructuring package of 24 January 1980, the currency was devalued from TL 35 to TL 70 to the U.S. dollar. This step induced large-scale price increases. Despite the introduction of a large-scale restructuring measures, the economic program failed to achieve its objectives.

4. In the 1980–90 period there was a considerable increase in the inflow of direct foreign capital, especially after 1984. This came about as a result of several factors. Turkey restructured its foreign debts as a complementary measure to the 24 January economic package. In this context, commercial debts not guaranteed by the state were also rescheduled. This led creditors, eager to recover their unguaranteed loans as early as possible, to market their stocks below their real value. At the same time, the new foreign investment legislation in Turkey allowed foreign

investors to meet 50% of their capital through unguaranteed commercial loans if they obtained the other half in foreign exchange in cash. This arrangement was attractive to foreign investors. They would thus get an opportunity to own large registered capital by using less foreign exchange. When this practice started, it was possible to buy unguaranteed commercial stock worth one U.S. dollar for twenty-five cents. Commercial stocks later began selling at a premium. Other factors contributing to increased direct foreign investment were the improvements made in the foreign investment legislation and the policy introduced for privatization of state-owned companies.

Furthermore, rules relating to inward capital movements were eased. Foreign banks allowed to establish subsidiaries and to open branch offices also contributed to the inflow of foreign direct investment.

# The Implementation of the 24 January Package of Measures from 1980 to 1987

The regime that took over on 12 September 1980 allowed Turgut Özal, who had been a candidate of the National Salvation Party (which was Islamist in nature) in the election of 1977, to take charge of the economy. His appointment was proof that the 12 September regime wanted to integrate the Turkish economy with the global economy, since Özal was the architect of the 24 January package, which was designed to achieve this objective (see Box 5-3 in Section 5).

Özal pursued two basic strategies to open up the economy. The first strategy was to cut down demand by raising prices. Imports were made more expensive through devaluation. Real wages were allowed to fall, so that by 1983 they stood at roughly one-half of their 1977 level. The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (DİSK) was shut down, labor leaders were placed under arrest, and the political power of labor was crippled. In practice, collective bargaining ceased to function. The cap on the rate of interest was removed so that people would be encouraged to save with the lure of high nominal interests, thus cutting down on demand. Dubious bankers were allowed to attract savings with offers of high interest rates.

The second strategy was to encourage exports. This was done with continuous devaluations to keep the price of exports competitive. Monetary incentives and tax rebates were offered to exporters to allow them to hold down prices. This led to a boom in exports. The ratio of exports to GNP, which stood at 2.77% in 1979, rose steadily until 1989, when it reached 10.7%. The value of exports climbed from \$4.7 billion in 1981 to over \$12.9 billion in 1990.

Table 6-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1981–1990

|                         | 1                       |           |           |           |           |            |           |           |           | $-\frac{\epsilon}{2}$ |            |   |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|------------|---|
| FOREIGN<br>DIRECT       | INVESTMENT (MILLION \$) | . 141     | 103       | 87        | 162       | 158        | 170       | 239       | 488       | 855                   | 1,005      |   |
| FOREIGN                 | AS % OF<br>GNP          | . 22.75   | 27.07     | 30.22     | 34.29     | 37.72      | 42.10     | 45.96     | 44.81     | 38.43                 | 32.18      |   |
| FOREIGN                 | DEBT<br>(MILLION \$)    | 16,559.00 | 17,857.00 | 18,814.00 | 20,823.00 | 25,660.00  | 32,206.00 | 40,326.00 | 40,722.00 | 42,751.00             | 49,035.00  |   |
| FOREIGN<br>TRADE        | AS % OF<br>GNP          | 18.74     | 22.12     | 24.04     | 29.18     | 28.37      | 24.27     | 27.75     | 28.60     | 25.23                 | 23.14      |   |
|                         |                         | * , :<br> |           |           |           | ** *.<br>* |           |           | 11        |                       |            |   |
| IMPORTS                 | AS % OF<br>GNP          | 12.28     | 13.41     | 14.84     | 17.72     | 16.67      | 14.52     | 16.14     | 15.77     | 14.53                 | 14.64      | : |
|                         | IMPORTS<br>(MILLION \$) | 8,933.40  | 8,842.70  | 9,235.00  | 10,756.90 | 11,343.40  | 11,104.80 | 14,157.80 | 14,335.40 | 15,792.10             | 22,302.10  |   |
| EXPORTS                 | AS % OF<br>GNP          | 6.46      | 8.71      | 9.20      | 11.75     | 11.70      | 9.75      | 11.61     | 12.83     | 10.70                 | 8.50       | . |
|                         | EXPORTS (MILLION \$)    | 4,702.90  | 5,746.00  | 5,727.80  | 7,133.60  | 7,958.00   | 7,456.70  | 10,190.00 | 11,662.00 | 11,624.70             | 12,959.30  |   |
| ·                       | GNP (MILLION \$)        | 72,775.30 | 65,957.20 | 62,251.00 | 60,720.20 | 68,032.40  | 76,504.80 | 87,737.90 | 90,879.40 | 108,652.30            | 152,387.80 |   |
|                         | TL/\$<br>RATE           | 110.24    | 160.89    | 223.82    | 365.08    | 519.61     | 669.04    | 855.04    | 1,421.39  | 2,120.25              | 2,606.36   |   |
| INFLATION<br>(WHOLESALE | PRICES) (%)             | 36.8      | 25.2      | 30.5      | 50.3      | 43.2       | 29.6      | 32.0      | 68.3      | 9.69                  | 54.8       |   |
|                         | YEAR                    | 1981      | 1982      | 1983      | 1984      | 1985       | 1986      | 1987      | 1988      | 1989                  | 1990       |   |

Sources: Devlet Isratistik Enstitüsü (DİB), İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-1998, pp. 404, 495, and 588; Hazine Müsteşarlığı, Hazine İstatistikleri 1980-1998 pp. 74 and 161.

These improvements were accompanied by other developments, however, that were not so positive. Imports were rising faster than exports, with the trade gap growing ever wider. While exports stood at \$4.7 billion and \$12.9 billion in 1981 and 1990, imports reached \$8.9 billion and \$22.3 billion in the same years.

Furthermore, the opening of the economy had come about with the support of the IMF and the major powers. Success for the IMF in Turkey would be a welcome reference for the institution in other developing countries. At a time when the world had experienced the setbacks in Iran and Afghanistan, the U.S. could not afford to lose a forward outpost like Turkey. As a consequence, Turkey's foreign debts rose from \$16.6 billion in 1981 to \$49 billion in 1990. At the same time, the IMF allowed Turkey to restructure and reschedule its foreign debts to ease the burden of servicing the debt.

As explained earlier, the Turkish economy became overly exposed to the influence of foreign financial institutions.

During this period the economic programs that were implemented could be described as conforming to the model of "wild capitalism." The economy was being managed through monetary policies that weakened labor while strengthening capital. The system of taxation was regressive, and competition was unfair. The chief objective was to achieve high accumulation of capital in the shortest possible time through this model of capitalism. With this objective in mind, no effort was made to make the tax system progressive, and the weak were allowed to succumb to the powerful. The tax rebate system intended to stimulate exports led the way for abuses by which the treasury was fraudulently milked by a method known as "imaginary exports." In the previous period, the slogan had been "industrialization at any price." Now it had become "earn foreign exchange at any price" (Kepenek, p. 235). Abuses were prosecuted only in instances when the media made a big fuss over a particularly egregious case.

Turgut Özal favored the building of motorways, claiming that motorways meant democracy while railroads were the choice of communism. A program of privatization was undertaken in order to free the budget of the deficits incurred by publicly owned enterprises. This resulted in the abandonment of the government's industrial programs. Industry's share in the government's investments fell from 20.7% in 1978 to 4.5% in 1990 (Sönmez, p. 16). In June 1986 the government's monopoly over the manufacture, sale, and import of tobacco was abolished. This meant that the tobacco monopoly was handed over to the major international producers.

At first the results of restructuring or joining in the

process of globalization were positive. With massive devaluation and price hikes, both inflation and internal demand were substantially cut. Import restrictions and limitations were curbed, leading to an abundance of goods in the market for those who could afford to buy them. As a consequence of the government's incentives, entrepreneurs raised exports to record levels. Exports jumped by 61% in 1981. Contractors started undertaking construction projects in foreign countries. Inflation fell from a high of 107% to 26%, and the economy grew by 4%. Idle industrial capacity came back into use. Instead of the usual one-year agreements, the IMF concluded a three-year agreement for the first time, allowing Turkey to incur massive debts. For the IMF, Turkey had become a model country.

But this positive trend could not be maintained for long. To cope with the rising cost of living, pensioners and many others with limited incomes placed their savings in pyramid schemes that promised returns of up to 140% on their savings. When the bankers who operated these schemes were unable to honor their extravagant promises, tens of thousands of victims found their savings wiped out. This became known as the Bankers' Scandal. As agricultural subsidies were cut, farm production declined. By 1983 alarm bells started ringing as the budget deficit soared, inflation jumped to 30%, and the growth in exports came to an end. As purchasing power started accumulating in the hands of a relatively small group of people, a leisure class living off unearned income came into being. The growth in industrial capacity was falling, and investments in new industries were in decline. As a consequence of the rigid implementation of the restructuring program, the value of the Turkish currency had fallen from TL 70 to the dollar in 1980 to TL 14,000 to the dollar in 1993, when Turgut Özal died. By 2001 the dollar was worth TL 1,630,000, and Turkey had become utterly dependent on international financial institutions.

#### The Economy after 1987

Two significant events occurred after 1987: the economy took a turn for the worse and politicians who had been proscribed returned to politics.

By 1987 the package of measures launched on 24 January 1980 had been drained of any effectiveness. With IMF support, large amounts of external resources had been used and high levels of exports achieved. In preparation for the 1987 legislative election, agricultural subsidies were raised, public service salaries were increased, and infrastructure projects were undertaken to reduce unemployment, causing the budget deficit to soar. These measures were not able to prevent the Motherland Party's votes from falling from 41 to 36%. To deal with the budget

deficit, the government started borrowing from the public by issuing treasury bills and state bonds. This practice grew from year to year and by the 1990s made up a substantial part of the government's revenues. As poverty spread, support for Islamists increased to the extent that they were able to share power in the coalition government. The failure of the 24 January package became manifest with the problems encountered in the 1990s.

#### **B.** Politics

The coup of 12 September brought about a wave of liberalization and privatization in the economy. It was the other way around in politics, where rules and norms similar to those of a garrison were imposed.

#### The Efforts to Stem Anarchy

The five-member National Security Council (NSC; this junta, called Milli Güvenlik Konseyi in Turkish, should not be confused with the National Security Council called Milli Güvenlik Kurulu in Turkish, a constitutional body composed of the president, prime minister, certain cabinet ministers, and the five top military leaders) that carried out the 12 September coup (see Box 6-29 below) assumed full executive and legislative powers and declared martial law almost everywhere in the country. This was followed by a wave of arrests. According to a publication put out by the office of the chief of the General Staff in May 1982, 17,374 individuals belonging to 167 different organizations were brought to trial. Of these 14,086 were "leftists," 2,941 were "separatists," and 347 were "rightists." The Association for Human Rights (established later) arrived at the following tally for this period: 650,000 people were detained, 210,000 cases were brought to the courts, 230,000 individuals were tried in court, and 1,683,000 individuals were registered by security services and police (Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı, p. 812).

The news of the death of the publisher Ilhan Erdost on 10 November 1980 as a result of a beating by soldiers as he was being taken to Ankara's Mamak military prison drew attention to "unnatural deaths under custody." It was determined by courts that 17 of these deaths were directly caused by torture. The authorities claimed that 43 deaths were suicides, 16 occurred while attempting to flee, 74 as a result of shootouts, 14 as a result of hunger strikes, 2 from indeterminate causes, and 144 were of a suspicious nature. Only 73 deaths were due to natural causes.

Between 1980 and 1984 prosecutors sought the death penalty against 5,000 defendants; 517 received a death sentence, 124 of which were confirmed. Of these, 18 leftists, 8 rightists, 1 ASALA member (see Box 7-33 in Section 7), and 23 common criminals were executed. In one case

Erdal Eren, a minor, was declared to be older and fit for execution on the basis of bone X-rays. In a speech delivered in Muş on 3 October 1984, the head of state, Kenan Evren, remarked: "Why should we have to keep feeding these traitors instead of just hanging them?" These events would leave a deep mark in the collective psyche of Turks (*Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı*, pp. 791–92).

As unrest in the country was being suppressed in this fashion, the regime also went about changing the legal system, demonstrating that it was determined to alter the country's complexion permanently. The NSC operated on the premise that it was the basic freedoms, labor rights, and autonomous universities of the 1961 Constitution that were at the root of the anarchy reigning in the country. As soon as it seized power, it directed its attention at associations, labor unions, and university students and faculty. Political parties, the parliament, and associations were shut down, labor leaders were arrested, and the activities of the labor union DISK were suppressed. All universities were brought under the control of YÖK, the newly established Council for Higher Education, which ran the universities according to a unified model. Under this model, the democratic election system was put aside and the university administrators were appointed by YÖK. Martial law commanders were empowered to remove from public office and from private business those individuals, including university professors, deemed inconvenient or unreliable (Box 6-2).

The provisional Constitution approved on 27 October 1980 but made retroactively effective as of 12 September 1980 established the legal framework for the country. All of the powers and responsibilities of the TGNA would be vested in the five-man NSC, and the powers of the head of state would be held by the NSC's president, General Evren. The constitutionality of the legislation to be approved by the NSC could not be contested. The military administration would not be held accountable for its decisions: those affected by its actions would not be able to seek legal redress.

The new Constitution came into effect after it was approved by a majority of 91.3% in a referendum on 7 November 1982. It was based on the principle of protecting the state and the administration from society and the individual. The principle of "inviolability of the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms" embodied in the Constitution of 1961 was eliminated, and the powers of the executive and the police were reinforced at the expense of those of the judiciary. In particular, restrictions were placed on collective rights such as the right of association, and the powers of administrative tribunals and the constitutional court were trimmed.

#### Box 6-2. The Implementation of Law No. 1402

Martial Law No. 1402 reflects perfectly the philosophy of the 12 September regime. Its article 2 was amended on 19 September 1980 to allow the martial law commanders to request the immediate dismissal of any public or private-sector employee without having to show any cause. This sweeping power was used to get rid of a good number of people working in agencies and institutions and mainly at the universities. The law was amended again on 28 December 1982, to forbid those removed in this way from ever holding a public job.

When rumors spread that Dicle University faculty members in Diyarbakir had voted against the 1982 Constitution in the referendum, the prime minister's office issued a circular containing the following passage. "Some members of the faculty got involved in various activities in the past without leaving any incriminating evidence. They could not be prosecuted because of lack of evidence" (Özen, pp. 49–50). After this circular dated 4 February 1983, members of university faculties began to be dismissed on the basis of Law No. 1402. Among these was Server Tanilli, who was already retired from the University of Istanbul.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) declared this practice to be discriminatory. Because of the provision that such individuals could never hold public jobs again, there was a general impression that the victims of Law No. 1402 could not reapply for jobs in universities. Dr. Metin Günday, however, a public administration lawyer, claimed that this provision was valid only during the state of emergency and did not apply in normal times. Hence a number of faculty members of Ankara University applied for reemployment in July 1985 after martial law was lifted in Ankara. When their application was turned down by the university, they went to the administrative court for a ruling.

After four years of legal proceedings, the Council of State (administrative high court) annulled the ruling of the University of Ankara on 7 February 1989, allowing the victims of Law No. 1402 to return to their former university positions and thus bringing to an end one of the more objectionable features of the 12 September regime.

(B. ORAN) (Source: Haldun Özen, Entellektüelin Drami: 12 Eylül'ün Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2002))

#### The 12 September Coup and Islam

Although the memory of Atatürk was constantly invoked during this period, the Turkish Language Council and the Turkish Historical Council were merged as the Atatürk High Council of Culture, Language, and History (AKDTYK). This ended the autonomy of the two institutions and violated Atatürk's testament. Atatürk had willed that the income derived from his personal shares in Türkiye İş Bankası be allocated to these two institutions that he founded. When the bank increased its capital in 1981, the secretary-general of President Evren refused to

allow the two institutions to acquire new shares, so that Atatürk's ownership in the bank fell from 27.57% to 0.03% (Oran 1999, p. 146).

The newly created merged institution (AKDTYK) was given the task of instilling the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in society (Box 6-3). Although this course was contrary to the precepts of Kemalism, the core of the ideology of the armed forces, it fitted neatly into the prevailing conditions at the time. The economic policies of the day were impoverishing the masses, who, having lost all hope of improving their lot in the foreseeable future, were turning to religion for solace. At the same time, the new regime was using religion as a means to strengthen its legitimacy. Furthermore, this synthesis was considered to be a useful social cement against communism and Kurdish separatism. The synthesis was also in full conformity with U.S. president Jimmy Carter's anti-USSR strategy of creating a "Green Belt." It was natural for Turkey to move closer to the U.S. as friction increased with Europe over human rights abuses.

The idea of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis found its reflection in the Constitution (article 134) as well as in daily life as it permeated all segments of society. The real impact of this orientation toward Islam, however, was to come to fruition in the early 1990s.

On 28 August 1982 the Ministry of Education made religious instruction compulsory in primary and junior high schools and decreed the saying of grace before meals in state boarding schools. At the proposal of the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Associations and the Union of Chambers of Agricultural Engineers, article 24 of the 1982 Constitution was amended to make Islamic religious instruction compulsory in high schools for the first time in Turkey. Religious instruction was also introduced into prisons. The head of state, Kenan Evren, peppered his speeches with quotations from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet and even used this method to advocate the education of girls (Oran 1989, pp. 161-63, 188-90, 197, 202, 209, 221, 242). The budget of the Religious Affairs Directorate grew to unprecedented levels toward the end of this period, reaching a level 1.5 times higher than the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 7 times that of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In one year 1,500 mosques were built, representing a new mosque every six hours. The Religious Affairs Directorate started publishing books containing religious edicts on all sorts of subjects, ranging from dietary rules and sexual practices to banks and interest rates. It established a religious foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı) that developed into a group of eight enterprises engaged in business activi-

#### Box 6-3. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

The so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis appeared in the 1970s. It brought together the two main streams of the Turkish Right, the Islamic and the ultranationalist. By uniting its forces, the Right felt that it could deal more effectively with leftist tendencies that had been gathering strength since the 1960s. The chief proponent of the concept was the association known as the Aydınlar Ocağı (Hearth of the Intellectuals [aydınlar; enlightened]), set up in 1970. The association defended this concept as the appropriate cultural framework for Turkey.

At a time when the U.S. was seeking to form a "Green Belt" and the authors of the 12 September coup were seeking to gain popular support, the concept came as a handy tool. While the Aydinlar Ocagi supported the 12 September regime, the 12 September military regime was putting its ideas into practice. Its members were planted in key positions in the Council for Higher Education, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Culture. The National Culture Committee of the State Planning Organization prepared a report in 1983 outlining a "national culture" framework for Turkish society.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis continued to remain topical during Turgut Özal's term in office. This was reflected in appointments and other practices. The most striking example of these practices was the report adopted in June 1986 by the Ataturk High Council of Culture, Language, and History, an institution created by the 12 September administration. The report established a national culture policy and was entitled "The Methods and Responsibilities in the Elaboration of the Elements and Policies of Culture." Those who attended the meeting that adopted the report included President Evren, Prime Minister Özal, Gen. Necdet Üruğ (chief of the General Staff), Ihsan Doğramacı (president of the Council for Higher Education), and the other council members.

The basis of this approach was the notion that the national culture drew sustenance from two main sources, Turkish and Islamic culture. It was presumed that Turkey was under the assault of foreign and especially imperialist culture and that the best safeguard against this assault was the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The presumption rested on the belief that Turks would lose their identity without Islam and that Islam was the religion that was most suited to Turks. According to the proponents of this idea, the notion that a culture developed within a historical time frame under the influence of economic and social developments was not valid. There was an immutable cultural essence that had to be protected, come what may. This was the duty of the state, which had to disseminate "national culture."

Although the system was originally based on two pillars, more weight gradually was given to Islam, under the influence of the internal and external conditions of the day. An effort was made to reconcile all this with Ataturk's teachings and to use his image to bring Islam to the fore. It was claimed that the aim of Ataturk's precepts was to advance this synthesis. This approach was bound to dilute the principle of secularism.

Both the state and society had to struggle in the 1990s and 2000s with the grim consequences of these policies that stressed Islam during the 1980s, including the proliferating religious preacher schools and other manifestations. It would take the army's "postmodern" intervention of 28 February 1997 to rid the state of this vestige of the 12 September regime.

(İ. UZGEL) (Source: Bozkurt Güvenç, Gençay Şaylan, İlhan Tekeli, and Şerafettin Turan, Türk-İslam Sentezi İlstanbul: Sarmal Yayınlan, 1994l)

ties, including publishing, tourism, education, insurance, film-making, and food processing, and owning over seven thousand real-estate properties throughout the country. From 1980 to 1982 twenty-three faculties of theology were established in different universities (Oran 1999, pp. 145–47). A Saudi Arabian institution known as Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami started paying the salaries of Turkish religious instructors sent abroad on official duty. This fact was exposed by the journalist Uğur Mumcu in March 1987. The administration at first tried to deny this but was forced to admit later that there was indeed a decree dated 28 April 1981 allowing this practice (Cumhuriyet, 19 March 1987).

This official approach to Islam also had its effect on society at large. The minister of education, Vehbi Dincerler, sent a circular to schools in March 1985, ordering that Charles Darwin's theory of evolution not be taught as an accepted truth. The prefect of the district of Banaz ordered a 10% cut in the salary of a teacher who explained the theory in class (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 1985). Again, it was Dincerler who decided that non-Muslim students would

also attend courses on religion (Milliyet, 10 August 1985). This practice, which was implemented by the undersecretary of the ministry, Professor Cemil Kıvanç, would be rescinded in January 1987 upon objections coming from Germany. Toward the end of the period Professor Cemal Mıhçıoğlu published the information that 40% of the students attending the courses of the Public Administration Department in the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University in the 1987–88 academic year were graduates of high schools that trained religious preachers and clerics. These students would later go on to become district administrators and provincial governors (because this faculty is the main source of high civil servants in the country) (Cumhuriyet, 9 January 1989).

The 12 September Coup and the Kurdish Question
After 1984 the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis began to be used
by the state against the stirrings of Kurdish nationalism,
just as it had been used as a tool against communism. Military aircraft dropped tracts bearing verses of the Quran

#### Box 6-4. Law No. 2932 on Publications/ Broadcasting in Languages Other Than Turkish

Article 26 of the Constitution of 1982 stated that "in the expression and dissemination of thoughts, no language can be used that is proscribed by law." Article 28 stipulated that "no publication/broadcasting is allowed in a language that is proscribed by law."

The law referred to in these provisions was enacted one year later, in October 1983. Law No. 2932 declares in article 2 that "it is forbidden to express, disseminate, or publish thoughts in any language other than the official first language of the states recognized by the Turkish state."

This convoluted language was carefully devised to mean Kurdish without using the term, bearing in mind that Kurdish was the second official language of Iraq. Introduction of the phrase "state recognized by the Turkish state" foresaw a possible independent Kurdish state in Iraq and took the necessary precaution. Article 3 declared that "the mother tongue of Turkish citizens is Turkish."

Law No. 2932, a direct violation of Article 39/4 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, was repealed by the Turgut Özal administration on 12 April 1991. At this time the state broadcasting system, TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu), was broadcasting news in four different languages and Kurdish publications were constantly appearing in Turkey. But the provisions to this effect remained in the Constitution until they were removed in October 2001.

(B. ORAN)

and sayings of the Prophet calling for respect and obedience to elders and to the state over Kurdish-populated areas.

Following the Tunceli operation of 1937–38 (see Box 2-3 in Section 2), Kurdish nationalism had been dormant. The first signs of reawakening came in the 1960s with various kinds of publications. This was followed by the establishment of the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (DDKO) in 1969, when the Kurds broke away from the mainstream Left and became autonomous. In the 1970s there was intensive publishing activity at a time when the Kurdish nationalist movement was getting organized. Some Kurdish nationalists were taking action aimed at Kurdish tribes in the southeast. After 12 September most of these nationalists fled to Arab countries to escape capture.

In the 1980s the Turkish state considered the Kurds to be a "Turkish clan," and the Kurdish question was reduced to "PKK terror." After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the terrorists moved to bases outside the country. This allowed the regime to claim that this growing problem was the result of foreign meddling. The state was reluctant to admit that it had anything more than a security and socioeconomic problem arising from the underdevelopment of the regions populated by the Kurds. Consequently, the measures it took were inadequate to the task at hand. All it did was to seek to repress the terror and forbid the use of the Kurdish language (Box 6-4).

While the state attempted to deal with the Kurdish question by resorting to the system of Village Guards (apparently modeled on the Hamidiye Regiments established in 1890 by Sultan Abdulhamid), the PKK established its political base in foreign countries with the ERNK (National Defense Front of Kurdistan), its political bureau founded in 1985. At this time, even uttering the word "Kurd" was considered very risky in Turkey. When Prime Minister Özal wanted to refer to the Iraqi Kurds, he used the formula "the kinsmen in northern Iraq of our citizens in the southeast." In 1988 Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, who fled in large numbers to Turkey to save their lives. The chief of the Turkish General Staff used the term "Kurd" for the first time at that point, and the ban on the use of the word was effectively lifted.

The methods used to deal with the question would stain Turkey's reputation in the field of human rights and become Turkey's chief internal and external concern in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the attempt to deal with the Kurdish question by using Islam as a tool was to backfire and create the problem of Hezbollah in the late 1990s.

After the adoption of the new Constitution, an election was held in 1983. The regime wanted to ensure continuity by backing the Nationalist Democratic Party led by retired general Turgut Sunalp in the election. But the victor in the election was the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal. Despite this, the regime of 12 September did secure a measure of continuity through the presidency of Kenan Evren until 1989.

After Evren, Özal was elected president in October 1989 and ran the government from the presidency when Yıldırım Akbulut was prime minister. The Motherland Party lost power at the election in 1991, and Özal died in April 1993 while serving as president. Özal, the innovator, while in power was able to change many aspects of public life that had ceased to serve any useful purpose but could not be eliminated because they had become ossified. But he will also be remembered as the man who unheedingly opened up Turkey to rapacious international capital. The concept of public good was replaced with blatant private greed. Instead of encouraging participatory democracy, the masses were depoliticized. Culture and aesthetics gave way to kitsch.

### III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

Before taking up this subject, two tables should be examined (Tables 6-3 and 6-4; see also Box 2-1 in Section 2).

1. Table 6-3 includes seven countries, although previous tables contained only five or six. Nevertheless, Turkey's volume of trade with its seven main trading partners accounted for only less than 60% of its trade, whereas Turkey's trade with only five countries in previous periods comfortably exceeded 60%. This demonstrates that Turkey had succeeded in diversifying its trading partners.

2. In 1990 the EEC countries' share in Turkey's trade was 53.3% for exports and 44.1% for imports. In other words, the EEC countries continued to be Turkey's major

trading partner.

Table 6-4 is included in this analysis because there was a substantial jump in Turkey's domestic and external debts during this period, which led to the economic bottlenecks in the latter part of the 1990s. The following observations can be made in connection with this table.

1. During this period external debts increased by a factor of almost 3. Short-term external debts increased even faster, by almost 4.4 times. The short maturity of external debt is as important as the level of debt in increasing a country's dependency.

2. The level of internal debt increased by a factor of 21

during this period.

3. The ratio of the interest payments from the budget to service the domestic and foreign debt to tax revenues reached 35% during this period. This high ratio was bound to have a snowball effect in subsequent years and required immediate remedial action, which was never taken. As no effort was made to restructure the budget by increasing revenues and the pursuit of populist measures got progressively worse, it was inevitable that this would all end up in the form of a serious economic crisis.

With this economic background in mind, we can now examine foreign policy developments.

### A. Factors Affecting Foreign Policy

International developments, the nature of the 12 September coup regime, and the Özal factor affected Turkish foreign policy during this period.

#### The International Environment

This was the period of globalization, which was forcing all countries to conform to the rules of international capitalism and to connect with it. This development increased U.S. power even while it gathered its strength from U.S.

influence and actions. At this time, Turkey was much affected by the Green Belt policy of the U.S., because the 12 September regime was already predisposed to follow such a course, with its own policy overlapping that of the U.S. Reagan's "Second Cold War" policies did not have much effect in Turkey, however, and Ankara was not called upon to take an active role in this endeavor. First, this was the Özal period, and Turkey's trade with the USSR was growing. More importantly, after Gorbachev came to power in 1984, the USSR turned inward, and his policies led to a more restrained Soviet foreign policy, which also made things easier for Turkey. As we shall see later, the USSR proved unexpectedly cooperative in the negotiation of the Conventional Forces Agreement in Europe in the early part of the next period. Turkey's task was also made easier because the European partners did not show much enthusiasm for Reagan's new Cold War.

The events of 1979 in Iran and Afghanistan increased Turkey's geostrategic importance and created an advantageous position for Turkey in the early part of this period. As the USSR gradually withdrew into its own shell in the middle of the period, however, this advantage for Turkey would quickly disappear.

At a time when the Papandreou administration in Greece was causing problems for Turkey in the Aegean and Western Thrace, Bulgaria created a new problem by ordering the changing of Turkish names in that country. This situation threatened to block Turkey's important access routes to Europe through the Balkans. The row with Bulgaria coincided with the Second Cold War, which meant that Bulgaria cut Turkey off from Europe. Despite this, Turkey resorted to all means to expose Bulgaria's actions in the international arena. The matter was eventually resolved through the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

Another international development affecting Turkey was the terrorist activity of ASALA, the Armenian nationalist organization. Although thirty-four Turkish diplomats perished and seventeen were wounded as a result of ASALA action, this did not directly affect the course of Turkish diplomacy, because this type of terrorism was not able to attract the backing of the West. After ASALA ceased its terrorist activities, the Armenian bills introduced in Western legislatures during the 1990s, however, would affect Turkish foreign policy.

Similarly, the terrorist activities of the Kurdish nationalist organization PKK would have much less effect on Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s but did have an effect in the 1990s. PKK terror, which emerged in 1984, was ineffective and did not have Western backing. Moreover,

Table 6-3. Share of Selected Countries in Turkey's Foreign Trade, 1981~1990 (%)

|             | Þ          | USA                  | W. GERMANY  | MANY         | FRA     | NCE     | BRIT    | BRITAIN |         | ITALX                   |             | IRAN    | TOTAL FOR SEVEN COUNTRIES | L FOR<br>UNTRIES |
|-------------|------------|----------------------|---|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------------|-------------|---------|---------------------------|------------------|
| YEAR I      | EXPORTS    | YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS | EXPORTS IMPORTS   | IMPORTS      | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS | IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS | RIS EXPORTS | IMPORTS | EXPORTS                   | IMPORTS          |
| 1981        | 5.7        | 9.9                  | 13.7  | 10.7         | 4.6     | 4.5     | 3.1     | 4.9     | 5.2     | 4.2                     | 8 5.0       | 5.8     | 41.4                      | 37.5             |
| 1982        | 4.4        | 9.3                  | 12.3  | 11.4         | 3.4     | 3.0     | 3.3     | 4.9     | 5.7     | 4.7                     | 2 13.8      | 8.5     | 45.1                      | 42.9             |
| 1983        | 4.0        | 2.7                  | 14.6  | 11.4         | 3.2     | 2.4     | 4.3     | 4.8     | 7.4     | 5.5 1.5 2.6             | 5 19.0      | 13.2    | 54.0                      | 47.4             |
| 1984        | 5.2        | 10.0                 | 17.9  | 10.9         | 2.8     | 2.3     | 3.7     | 4.1     | 7.0     | 5.9                     | 9. 10.5     | 14.6    | 49.0                      | 50.7             |
| 1985        | 6.4        | 10.1                 | 17.5  | 12.1         | 2.7     | 4.5     | 6.8     | 4.1     | 6.3     | -5.8 2.4                | 13.6        | 11.1    | 55.7                      | 59.6             |
| 1986        | 7.4        | 10.6                 | 19.4  | 16.0         | 4.0     | 4.9     | 4.5     | 4.7     | 7.8     | 7.8                     | 2 7.6       | 2.0     | 52.6                      | 49.2             |
| 1987        | 7.0        | 5.7                  | 21.4  | 14.9         | 4.9     | 4.3     | 5.3     | 4.9     | 8.3     | 7.6                     | 2 4.3       | 6.7     | 52.9                      | 50.3             |
| 1988        | 6.5        | 10.6                 | 18.4  | 14.3         | 4.3     | 5.8     | 4.9     | 5.2     | 8.2     | 7.0                     | 1 4.7       | 4.6     | 49.3                      | 50.6             |
| 1989        | 8.4        | 13.3                 | 18.7  | 14.0         | 5.1     | 4.7     | 5.3     | 4.6     | 8.4     | 6.8 6.1 4.0             | 0 4.8       | 1.5     | 57.3                      | 48.9             |
| 1990        | 7.5        | 10.2                 | 23.6  | 15.7         | 5.7     | 0.9     | 5.7     | 4.5     | 8.5     | 7.7                     | 6 3.8       | 2.2     | 58.9                      | 51.9             |
| Courses Day | matetetich | Tr Dractifice (1     | Courses. Dowlet I that to the Bucktis (DID) I that the Carterial was seen | Cortownal ne | 1       | 25 917  |         |         |         |                         |             |         |                           |                  |

Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİE), İstatistik Görtergeler, 1923–1998, pp. 419–33. (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

Table 6-4. Structure of External and Domestic Debt, 1981–1990

| TENTE OF THE | Tactar of paterns                     | Table of the decision of partition and possesses problem 1770 | 0//                             |   |   |                              |   |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|---|------------------------------|---|
| YEAR         | TOTAL<br>FOREIGN DEBT<br>(MILLION \$) | MEDIUM- AND<br>LONG-TERM DEBT<br>(MILLION \$)                 | SHORT-TERM DEBT<br>(MILLION \$) | SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT AS % OF TOTAL DEBT | TOTAL DOMESTIC DEBT (BILLION TL) (MILLION \$) | DOMESTIC DEBT<br>AS % OF GNP | INTEREST<br>PAYMENTS AS %<br>OF TAX REVENUE |
| 1981         | 16,627.0                              | 14,448.0  | 2,179.0                         | 13.11                                       | 990.9   | 12.35                        | 6.30  |
| 1982         | 17,858.0                              | 16,094.0  | 1,764.0                         | 9.88  | 1,340.8                                       | 12.63                        | 6.67  |
| 1983         | 18,814.0                              | 16,533.0  | 2,281.0                         | 12.12                                       | 3,177.2                                       | 22.80                        | 10.91                                       |
| 1984         | 20,823.0                              | 17,643.0  | 3,180.0                         | 15.27                                       | 4,639.1                                       | 20.93                        | 18.59                                       |
| 1985         | 25,660.0                              | 20,901.0  | 4,759.0                         | 18.55                                       | 6,977.3                                       | 19.74                        | 17.60                                       |
| 1986         | 32,206.0                              | 25,857.0  | 6,349.0                         | 19.71                                       | 10,519.1                                      | 20.55                        | 25.04                                       |
| 1987         | 40,326.0                              | 32,703.0  | 7,623.0                         | 18.90                                       | 5,999.9*                                      | 8.00                         | 25.04                                       |
| 1988         | 40,722.0                              | 34,305.0  | 6,417.0                         | 15.76                                       | 8,931.1                                       | 6.91                         | 34.98                                       |
| 1989         | 41,751.0                              | 36,006.0  | 5,745.0                         | 13.76                                       | 16,617.7                                      | 7.21                         | 32.32                                       |
| 1990         | 49,035.0                              | 39,535.0  | 9,500.0                         | 19.37                                       | 20,901.1                                      | 5.26                         | 30.76                                       |
|              |                                       |   |                                 |   |   |                              |   |

Source: Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, Monthly Treasury Indicators, March 1989, p. 12.
\* In 1987 there is an important reduction in domestic debt. This is because that year accounts were subdivided into bills and bonds and new series were established.
(Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Ulugbay)

Turkey's abortive application in the latter part of the period to join the European Communities as a full member had not yet created the concerns among members of the European Communities that Turkey's application would evoke in the subsequent period.

In the case of both ASALA and PKK teror, there was a feeling in the West that the circumstances in Turkey in the early 1980s were unusual and a certain measure of understanding was necessary for Turkey's predicament as it wrestled with these twin problems. This wait-and-see policy in the West was to disappear, however, particularly when it became apparent that Turkey was not about to make any reforms to deal with the Kurdish question. This would lead to strong Western reactions against Turkey, which would be exploited to the hilt by both Kurdish and Armenian nationalists.

#### The Nature of the 12 September Regime

At first the international reaction to the repression, arrests, and executions was muted because the military coup was seen as a result of the anarchy when it reached an intolerable level, even though the identities and motives of those responsible for the anarchy were unclear.

But when it became obvious that the concept of a Constitution (which had been designed to protect the individual against the state since the Magna Carta of 1215) was perverted to cast all associations, labor unions, and universities in a single mold, the international pressure began to build and reached a peak in the 1990s.

Naturally, this reaction came from Europe. For the U.S., it was another story. American public opinion was not concerned with such "details," so Washington continued with its usual diplomacy based on *Realpolitik*, which pursued the U.S. national interest without being too fussy about democracy or dictatorship. But for European public opinion, human rights were a major issue. Influenced by Turkish political dissidents, ASALA, and the PKK, Europe gradually began to distance itself from Turkey. This left Turkey pretty well internationally isolated, with only the U.S. to turn to.

With the 12 September regime stamping out even the most innocent criticism, public opinion became irrelevant. In an environment where the only influence was that of the U.S., Turkish diplomats could no longer draw strength from Turkish public opinion. During the period from 1960 to 1980 Turkey's autonomy in its foreign policy had increased in step with increasing freedoms in the country. The process was reversed in the period from 1980 to 1990, and repression at home constricted Turkey's diplomacy.

#### The Özal Factor

Özal had a negative effect on Turkish foreign policy in three ways.

- 1. As explained above, unlike the situation in Korea and Singapore, Özal opened up the Turkish economy without taking the necessary precautionary measures, making the country dependent and thus indirectly weakening its ability to conduct an active foreign policy.
- 2. Özal held the belief that increased trade with a given country would help overcome problems in bilateral relations. In the case of Greece and some countries of the Middle East where the problems were long-standing and ossified, however, this approach did not work.
- 3. Özal had the habit of bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conducting diplomacy. Occasionally he would ignore the traditional and tested guiding principles of Turkish foreign policy going back seventy-five years and commit serious errors, causing much embarrassment to the foreign policy establishment. Examples of this behavior are cited in the chapter "The Implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy" in the Introduction. Some other prominent examples of the manner in which Özal conducted foreign policy are given below.

President Özal allowed some nonresponsible members of the Akbulut government to make official statements on foreign policy and conduct international negotiations. A minister conducted negotiations on ethnic Turks in foreign countries without informing the MFA. Three ministers negotiated the delivery of medicines to Iraq without the knowledge of the MFA. Ozal embarrassed the MFA by describing the bills in the U.S. Congress in connection with the Armenian events of 1915 as a one-off thing. This led the U.S. authorities to downplay the official Turkish demarches in connection with the issue. Özal used undiplomatic language toward Bulgaria and precipitated a mass migration of ethnic Turks, for which Turkey was totally unprepared. He remarked: "If Bulgaria expelled a million Turks, we will admit them all... They can't do a shit... Mr. Zhivkov himself can also come; I'll take him to see the GAP Project" (Cumhuriyet, 22 August 1989). The open border was suddenly closed in August 1989 when the inflow reached 300,000, causing a crisis. Foreign minister Mesut Yılmaz was made a scapegoat for this. At a time when Turkey was not prepared for it, Özal announced that the free movement of persons between Northern and Southern Cyprus would facilitate the solution of the Cyprus question. This contradicted Ankara's policy on Cyprus and embarrassed Denktaş.

Through the undersecretary of the MFA, Özal proposed the conclusion of a free trade agreement to the U.S.

government. This created a shock in the MFA, where it was known that this proposal was incompatible with Turkey's commitments to the European Community. The ministry was forced to deny having any knowledge of the proposal. With reference to Azerbaijan, Özal declared: "The Azerbaijanis are Shiites and therefore more attracted to Iran than to Turkey." When he was forced to rectify what he had said, this in turn created misunderstandings with Moscow. At a time when the MFA was trying to avoid a situation similar to that of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria reappearing in Western Thrace, Prime Minister Akbulut remarked: "Let them come over, we shall share our soup with them" (Cumhuriyet, 9 February 1990, quoted in Oran 1991, p. 303). The "peace water pipeline" project for the Middle East was unveiled by Özal with much fanfare, but it later emerged that no serious technical feasibility study had been made. Furthermore, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab states wondered why Turkey was denying them water if it had surplus water to sell. The rapprochement with Greece, launched in 1987 at Davos, was conducted without the involvement of the MFA. The lifting of the visa requirement for Greek visitors was also done without consulting the MFA. When Özal was conducting negotiations with the U.S., he did not admit the minister of foreign affairs, Ali Bozer, into the room, even though U.S. secretary of state James Baker was present. This snub forced Bozer to resign.

The most serious criticism of Özal's style of conducting foreign policy came during the first Gulf crisis and the subsequent war. As in the case of the 1988 Iraqi-Kurdish refugee crisis, when he concocted scenarios for occupying Kirkuk and Mosul, Özal wanted to join the war "in order to obtain a slice of the Middle Eastern cake." This approach was in direct conflict with one of the two basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy, which was to maintain the status quo. The minister of foreign affairs and the ministry's spokesman learned of Turkey's (i.e., Özal's) decision to cut the flow of oil in the Iraq-Mediterranean pipeline in compliance with UN sanctions from the press. Turkey was prevented from joining the conflict by an alert media and the resignation of the chief of the General Staff, Necip Torumtay.

Furthermore, when Özal became president, he often bypassed the MFA and dealt with other ministries when conducting foreign policy. He also had the habit of dealing directly with specific diplomats in the MFA without regard to the ministry's hierarchy. Özal undermined the Ministry of the Interior by introducing political Islam in that institution. He neutralized the Ministry of Finance by removing the treasury division from the ministry and

turning it into an autonomous body. He did the same to the MFA by sidelining it. These three ministries had always been in the forefront in upholding the public interest, the traditions of the state, and the concepts of legality and respect for hierarchy. Their cadres consisted of graduates of the Faculty of Political Science (Mülkiye), whom Özal regarded as obstacles to his initiatives.

# B. The Conduct of Foreign Policy Relations with the Hegemonic Power

It would have been surprising if Turkey had conducted a relatively autonomous foreign policy during this period, when it was internationally isolated, when the domestic public opinion that might have supported such a course had been neutralized, and when it was economically dependent on other powers.

As a matter of fact, during this period Turkish foreign policy was in retreat on all the fronts that it had been able to hold against the U.S. in the previous period.

1. Within the framework of NATO, Kenan Evren accepted the Rogers Plan, which involved agreeing to the return of Greece to the military structure of NATO without obtaining any countervailing concession for his cooperation. In defending his action, Evren used the argument that, by doing so, Turkey had eased the pressure that was being exerted against it. This was reminiscent of the argument of those who used the glib phrase "give it up and be done with it" with respect to the Kurdish question in the early 1990s.

2. In October 1982 a NATO exercise was held in Turkey with the participation of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (Box 6-6). As part of the implementation of the Wohlstetter Doctrine, the building of air bases in eastern Anatolia was undertaken in November 1982. In 1984 transit facilities were granted to the Rapid Deployment Force with the Host Country Support Agreement (Gerger, p. 157).

In 1987 the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. was extended for a further five years through a side letter. The Congress was a stumbling block once again, and the U.S. did not sign the agreement. Although part of the FMS debts of Egypt and Israel had been written off, Turkey's debts were not forgiven. The U.S. administration would only agree to promise to do its best to persuade Congress. Congress relented in the end but reduced the amount promised by the administration by 45%. All that Turkey could do was attempt to suspend the side letter and the secret protocol. But after eleven months Ankara had to relent and gave its consent in Feb-

ruary 1988. At the time, Özal had not informed the MFA when giving this consent.

When the U.S. intervention in Panama was condemned in the UN by a wide margin in 1989, Turkey voted with the U.S. (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 December 1989, mentioned in Gerger, p. 148).

In 1983 the U.S. condemned the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Washington dissuaded Pakistan and Bangladesh from recognizing the TRNC. By proclaiming 24 April "Man's Inhumanity to Man Day" in September 1984, the U.S. gave a moral boost to the Armenian lobby. Nevertheless, Turkey remained the third largest recipient of American aid during this period, after Israel and Egypt.

Turkey was able to stand up to the U.S. on just two issues. By saying no to the deployment in Turkey of Cruise and Pershing missiles in January 1985, Ankara refused to undertake new nuclear obligations. It could do this because Europe did not agree with the U.S. on this issue and on the initiation of the Second Cold War. The second issue was the Armenian bill on the congressional agenda. As long as the bill remained on the agenda, Turkey would not agree to U.S. flights from its bases or visits to its ports by the Sixth Fleet.

#### The Diversification of Relations

Turkey developed its relations with the Islamic countries during this period and entered into trade relations with more countries. As we have already seen in the tables on Turkey's foreign trade, whereas previously five Western countries accounted for more than 60% of Turkey's trade, in this period the first seven countries accounted for less than 60%. There was a marked shift from the EEC countries to the Middle East in Turkey's trade. Between 1979 and 1984 Turkey's exports to the EEC countries fell from 48.5% to 38.3% and its imports from 36.1% to 27.6%. In the same period Turkey's exports to Islamic countries rose from 18.1% to 40.6% and its imports from 22.2% to 35%.

This situation arose not because of Turkey's autonomous foreign policy but from the pressure of events. The steadily increasing oil prices starting in the mid-1970s and Turkey's foreign exchange shortages forced Ankara to develop its trade with oil-producing countries. The U.S. arms embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus operation compelled Turkey to seek alternative sources for its arms and spare parts. After the package of measures adopted on 24 January 1980, the currency was devalued and export incentives were introduced, which helped develop new export markets for additional Turkish export products. This

was a consequence of the international isolation brought on by the 12 September coup and the implementation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis ideals (see Box 6-3 above). The Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 brought about new opportunities for Turkish traders, especially up to 1984, before the warring sides began to experience payments difficulties. After 1980 there were few growth opportunities other than the Middle East. Consumers in Arab countries were not very quality conscious and did not question Turkey on its human rights record.

### The Internationalization of the Armenian and Kurdish Questions

The ASALA nationalist terror campaign of assassinations began with the killing of two Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles in 1973 and ended in 1983 when a bomb exploded at Orly Airport in Paris. The deaths of two Turks and six non-Turks in this incident brought on a sharp Western reaction, which ended the ASALA (and also JCGA) terror campaign. This was replaced by the Armenian bills in legislative bodies of various countries, which proved more effective than assassinations.

Turkey's reaction to these moves was to reassert its traditional stand of negating the existence of a genocide without attempting to devise a new stand to deal with the issue. The only exception to this was that Özal introduced the new method of using the awarding of lucrative international contracts to counteract the bills. The firms of countries that adopted the Armenian bills were denied contracts in Turkey. But this method lost its effectiveness when the countries that were affected started issuing warnings. Furthermore, the exclusion of certain firms was proving counterproductive on economic and technical grounds. The Armenian bills issue would really begin to sting in the 1990s.

Unlike the ASALA organization, the PKK would not be subdued during this period. On the contrary, its effectiveness increased toward the end of the period throughout the southeastern region of Turkey, until it reached the level of an undeclared civil war or, to use the military jargon, a "low-intensity conflict." The vast funds that were needed to deal with this conflict were another important cause of the budget deficits during this period. These expenditures would reach an annual level of around \$10 billion at the beginning of the subsequent period.

During this period several international developments nurtured Kurdish nationalism: the self-immolation of Buddhist priests in Vietnam; the Palestinian Intifada, where children and women hurled stones at Israeli soldiers; the effects of the CSCE, which brought human rights to the fore; the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq; intense efforts by Turkey to render Turkish Cypriots autonomous; and, finally, Turkey's strong reaction to Bulgarian attempts to change Turkish names. This last event had a profound effect on the Kurds, who were not allowed to register their own Kurdish names on birth certificates.

From these beginnings, the Armenian and Kurdish questions would turn into major issues in the subsequent period.

#### IV. OVERALL APPRAISAL

1. A number of foreign-policy lessons could be learned in the aftermath of the 12 September coup.

The first lesson was that a regime without the backing of public opinion and, most notably, leftist public opinion in a country like Turkey could easily end up by having to make concessions in its foreign policy. This was seen in connection with the ban on the cultivation of opium poppies after the 12 March 1971 military intervention and also in connection with the Rogers Plan in this period.

The second lesson was that a regime that was at odds with its own population would end up by damaging the credibility and reputation of the state in the international arena. The practice of humiliating travelers bearing Turkish passports began after 12 September 1980. This treatment was subsequently extended to those bearing special and diplomatic passports when it became apparent that mafia members employed by the state for covert operations also held such passports.

The third lesson concerned the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis espoused by the 12 September regime. This resulted in Turkey's alienation from the European Communities. It also prepared the ground for the pompous rhetoric of "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China," which was to cause serious complications in the subsequent period.

Important lessons could also be learned from the implementation of foreign policy during the Özal period.

It became obvious that newfangled practices such as bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or operating on the notion that an increased trade relationship by itself would resolve foreign policy questions could be dangerous. An active foreign policy did not necessarily mean correct foreign policy.

It also became apparent that diverging from Turkey's traditional foreign policy was not a realistic option. In the First Gulf War, Turkey abandoned its policy of supporting the status quo as well as the principle of preserving a balance between opposing sides. This brought Turkey to the brink of war and caused it to incur great economic losses after the war. Countries like Jordan that did not side so openly with the U.S. suffered less than Turkey.

Another lesson was that excessive reliance on the U.S. administration could bring about disappointments, because Congress also wielded power in foreign policy. Furthermore, the more a country yielded to the U.S., the harder it became to obtain concessions and favors from it, other than loans.

In an environment where torture was a common occurrence, it was not possible to enjoy a good international standing merely by signing conventions designed to protect human rights. Even as Özal agreed to the principle of Turkish citizens applying to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to redress grievances in order to strengthen Turkey's hand in connection with Ankara's application for accession to the EU, Turkey's Court of Cassation ruled that to reach a verdict of torture it was necessary to obtain a medical report certifying that a victim had been incapacitated for at least ten days. Adhering to such conventions, however, did gradually bring Turkey to conform with international norms in the subsequent period.

In summary, this period's foreign policy was similar to the Menderes foreign policy from 1950 to 1960. It was active but also highly risky and very much dependent on the U.S.

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### Relations with the USA and NATO

Toward the end of the 1970s Turkey's internal turmoil and economic difficulties were compounded by a number of problems in relations with the U.S. In the 1980s, and especially after the 12 September coup, relations improved markedly and Turkey became a close ally of the U.S. again.

These developments had a political as well as an economic basis. Politically, Turkey's strategic value increased as a result of developments in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan later that year. In the 1980s Turkey not only was a barrier to the spread of radical Islam in the Middle East but also had an important role in the intensifying struggle between the USSR and the U.S.

Economically, Turkey entered the process of closer integration with the world of capitalism after it began implementing the 24 January 1980 package of economic reforms. In this context, Ankara's relations with the U.S. acquired greater importance.

### BASIC FACTORS AFFECTING RELATIONS U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy in the 1980s

The Carter administration that came to power in 1976 pursued a foreign policy that laid particular stress on respect for human rights. The feeling in Washington was that the threat of the USSR and of communism had been exaggerated, and the prevailing tendency tilted toward more disarmament. This was a reaction to the preceding foreign policy conducted by the Nixon-Kissinger team, based exclusively on *Realpolitik*. There was a certain continuity in U.S. policy, however, because Carter's stress on human rights was designed to weaken the Eastern Bloc. During Carter's term, a division was set up at the State Department to deal with human rights, and observance of human rights became a criterion when providing aid. This practice would be maintained in subsequent years

and would constitute one of the problems between the U.S. and Turkey.

U.S. foreign policy had to face numerous challenges during Carter's presidency. The use of human rights to undermine the USSR in an area where it was most vulnerable created problems for the U.S. itself. When Washington withheld its support from Nicaragua's dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1978, the left-leaning Sandinista guerrillas took power in 1979. In February 1979 there was an Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, a country that had been one of the principal allies of the U.S. in the Middle East. The USSR was able to extend its influence in the Middle East and occupied Afghanistan in December 1979.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the U.\$. Congress refused to ratify the SALT II agreement, which was designed to secure the limitation of nuclear arms. All of this demonstrated that the Carter administration's foreign policy was passive and ineffective, and it received much criticism for this.

The U.S. economy went through a recession in the second half of the 1970s. By 1980 the economy had ceased to grow. At the same time, the annual rate of inflation reached 10% and unemployment stood at 7.5%. The effects of the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the oil shock, and Japanese competition, plus the usual dip in the U.S. business cycle, had all conspired to bring about this recession.

At this time, the combination of adverse political and economic developments raised concerns that the U.S. had entered a period of decline and would lose its dominance in world affairs. While the U.S. GNP accounted for 40% of global production in 1950, this share had fallen to 20% in 1980.

By 1980 the combined effect of domestic economic problems, the loss of ground to the USSR, allies drifting away, and diminished influence in the world created

#### Box 6-5. Star Wars (The Strategic Defense Initiative)

U.S. president Ronald Reagan advocated a bolder policy in the ideological and technological struggle with the USSR, in this context, he initiated the National Space Program in July 1982 and launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which came to be known popularly as "Star Wars," in March 1983. The use of space for military purposes actually had started much earlier, and both the U.S. and the USSR had orbited numerous military satellites. Reagan's initiative, however, would greatly accelerate the arms race in its space dimension. The intention of the U.S. was to deploy a system in space that would destroy incoming Soviet ballistic missiles and thereby enhance America's deterrent capability. But this system would eliminate the balance of terror, which rested on the ability of both parties to achieve each other's destruction. This was one reason why the initiative met with opposition. Furthermore, it was claimed that the initiative would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) agreement concluded in 1972

Even if the initiative was seen as a phase of the ongoing arms race, SDI was also designed to hasten the economic collapse of the USSR by forcing it to undertake a similar scheme at a time when it was already facing serious economic challenges. SDI was also important because the huge project would generate many innovations with military and civillan applications. That is why SDI, which was abandoned when the Cold War came to an end, was resurrected by president george W. Bush under the guise of the National Missile Defense System (Missile Shield).

(I. Uzgel)

a reaction that led to Reagan's electoral victory. The new president's priority was to restore the international standing of the U.S.

Reagan represented the "New Right." He espoused the economic policies of Milton Friedman and his fellow academics from the University of Chicago, whose supply-side economics stood for cutting public spending, tight monetary policies, and lower taxes. The champion of these policies in Europe was British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, while Turgut Özal followed the same course in Turkey.

The New Right's political agenda included restoring U.S. power, the destruction of the USSR, which Reagan described as the "Evil Empire," a firm stand against anti-American regimes, and increased defense spending.

This increase in defense spending had three main objectives. The first (political) objective was to allow the U.S. to stiffen its stand vis-à-vis the USSR and increase America's international influence. The second objective was to strengthen the U.S. economy with new military projects through "Military Keynesianism." The third objective was to force the USSR to engage in an arms race that would exhaust it economically. This new arms race consisted of

technologically advanced and extremely costly projects like the Strategic Defense Initiative (Box 6-5).

These policies resulted in hefty increases in defense spending from 1981 to 1989. The neutron bomb, which would kill people but spare buildings, was launched in August 1981. Other projects dating from this period were the Stealth and B-1 bombers, which were invisible to radar, as well as increases in the CIA's budget.

The U.S. administration also pursued an active policy toward the countries of the Third World, with a view to restoring its dwindling influence there. Known as the Reagan Doctrine, this policy was designed to eliminate Soviet influence in these countries. This was done by helping groups that were in opposition to leftist or pro-USSR administrations. In this context, the U.S. supported the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua, the UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) in Angola, and the opposition in Ethiopia. The U.S. sent the marines to Lebanon in 1982, intervened in Grenada in 1983, and conducted an aerial strike against Muammar Khaddafi in 1986. After arresting Panamanian president Manuel Noriega in his own country, Washington tried and convicted him in the U.S. for drug dealing. The U.S. supported repressive regimes like the white minority South African government and the Ferdinand Marcos government in the Philippines so long as they pursued a pro-U.S. course.

During this period, also known as the Second Cold War, Turkey's importance increased, due to its involvement in some of the developments cited above.

# B. The U.S., Islam, and the Policy of the Green Belt

Historically, the U.S. relationship with Islam and Islamic movements underwent numerous ups and downs. Depending on the circumstances, Islam was seen as an ally or perceived as a threat. As a superpower, the U.S. viewed Islam as a tool of its foreign policy to sustain its international influence, maintain friendly regimes in power, and undermine rival countries.

The U.S. interest in Islam and its propensity to use it as a tool of foreign policy go back to the days following World War II. The U.S. had become a world power after the war, and Washington realized that Islam could be of use in its growing rivalry with the USSR. The U.S. began to take an interest in Islam in the Middle East, starting in the 1960s, given the political and social influence of this religion in the region. During this period the dominant current in the Middle East was anti-Western nationalism, also known as Pan-Arabism, under the leadership of

Egypt. To undermine this trend, the U.S. supported Islamic movements.

Islam's place in U.S. foreign policy became even more important toward the end of the 1970s within the context of relations with the USSR and the continuing rivalry with socialism. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the well-known strategist and Carter's national security advisor, held the view that Islam could serve as a shield against communism. This view of moderate Islam was quite prevalent in the U.S. during this period. The U.S. looked upon radical Islam as a threat to its interests, however, and kept its distance from groups like Hezbollah, Amal, and Hamas. The only exceptions were the Afghan Mujahidin groups who were engaged in fighting the USSR.

The U.S. strategy was to try to infiltrate the Turkic republics located in the southern regions of the USSR by using Islam while preventing radical Islam, which was violently anti-American, from implanting itself in this region in the Iranian manner. At the same time, Islam was seen as a counterweight to leftist movements in countries like Turkey. To put it in a nutshell, the "red" danger would be countered with a "green" antidote. Furthermore, rising Islam would be used as a buffer against Soviet encroachment into the Gulf region while providing legitimacy to the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich countries, thus ensuring their stability.

In summary, the U.S. policy was to support moderate and controllable Islam and use it against the USSR and communism and seek to temper radical Islam and turn it moderate, or—where this proved impossible—to suppress or isolate it.

In the 1980s this U.S. policy would affect Turkey in two ways. In the field of foreign policy, Turkey would develop its relations with Arab countries that could be considered moderate. In domestic politics, the effects would be more far reaching. Economically, Turkey would undergo a structural transformation that would help it to become integrated with the global capitalist system. Politically, the repressive 12 September regime would be set up to prevent a social reaction to the ongoing structural transformation. The 12 September regime would resort to the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, as described earlier (see Box 6-3 above).

# II. THE 12 SEPTEMBER PERIOD (1980–1982) A. The 12 September Coup and the U.S.

In the third coup since 1960, there was more talk about the U.S. connection than in the two previous ones. This can be explained by developments in Turkish-U.S.

relations before and after 12 September 1980 and international political and economic developments.

There is a widely held belief among both political observers and the Turkish public that the U.S. was involved in the 12 September coup. This should not be understood to mean a coup directly planned and carried out by the U.S. The U.S. role concerned preparing the conditions that led to the coup and getting in touch with the coup-makers in advance and promising them political and economic support in return for favors that civilian governments were not in a position to grant. The suspicion of U.S. involvement in the coup is based on the following evidence.

The U.S. record of involvement in coups in Iran in 1953, in Greece in 1967, and in Chile in 1973 naturally led people to look to Washington after the 12 September coup in Turkey.

Suspicions were also strengthened by international developments at this time. The loss of Iran in 1979 and the occupation of Afghanistan, which brought the USSR closer to the Persian Gulf, plus Moscow's growing military links with Syria, increased Washington's need for a stable and reliable Turkey.

In addition, developments related directly to Turkey pointed to a U.S. involvement. In 1979 and 1980 Turkey turned down a number of U.S. requests. Ankara refused to allow Turkish bases to be used for U-2 flights over the USSR and to station the U.S. rapid deployment force in Turkey. Ankara also vetoed the Greek request to return to NATO's military structure. Ankara was quick to recognize the new revolutionary regime in Iran. After 12 September Ankara's position on all of these issues shifted noticeably.

Before the military intervention of 1971, the commander of the air force, Muhsin Batur, had gone to the U.S. Likewise, prior to 12 September, the commander of the air force, Tahsin Şahinkaya, visited the U.S. In fact, he returned to Turkey just one day before the coup.

Washington's reaction to the coup also helped feed the suspicion of U.S. involvement. Carter received the news of the Turkish coup when he was at an opera performance. Paul Henze of the CIA broke the news to the president with the words "Our boys have done it" (Hürriyet, 16 March 2003) to put Carter at ease.

There were also those who supported their view that Washington was aware of what was going on in Ankara by noting that U.S. news agencies gave the news of the coup on the evening of 11 September. This can be explained by the fact that it was still 8:00 PM on 11 September in Washington and New York when the coup was announced in Ankara at 4:00 AM on 12 September 1980. Notwithstand-

ing this explanation, it is understood that the U.S. authorities knew about the coup at least two hours before the event. The Turkish general staff informed the head of the U.S. military mission in Turkey two hours before the coup was announced that the lives and properties of U.S. citizens in Turkey would be protected and that Turkey would remain within the Western alliance.

The official U.S. reaction to the event came in a statement issued by the State Department on the day of the coup. The statement expressed concern at the overthrowing of a democratically elected government but added that the new administration that had seized power was intent on restoring the democratic system that had broken down. Turkey had been struggling with political terrorism and economic difficulties for a number of years, and the U.S. and the other NATO allies would continue to aid Turkey to secure economic stability. The statement concluded that the expectation was that democracy would be restored and economic and political stability ensured as early as possible.

In the days following 12 September the U.S., on the advice of its Ankara embassy, kept stressing the need to restore democracy at an early date. It was also decided that the Sixth Fleet would stay away from Turkish ports for a while in order not to give the impression that the U.S. might be involved in the coup in any way.

To sum up, the suspicion of a U.S. involvement was never proven by fact. But there was no doubt that the coup provided a huge strategic advantage to the U.S., and Turkish-U.S. relations were excellent after the coup.

### B. Developments during the Period of Military Administration

American policy-makers were pleased that Turkey had a military administration well disposed toward the U.S. at a time when an Islamist regime had taken over in Iran and the USSR was in possession of Afghanistan. From then on, relations between Turkey and the U.S. would be very close. Turkey's importance for the U.S. had grown at a time when the domestic policies of the military regime were driving a wedge between Ankara and Western Europe.

Following the coup, the four armed forces commanders formed the National Security Council (NSC) under the presidency of the chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren. In a statement to the press on the day of the coup, Evren followed the example of the 27 May 1960 coupmakers and announced that Turkey remained attached to all its alliances and agreements, including NATO.

The NSC decided to appoint a government headed

by the former commander of the navy, Bülend Ulusu. The new government was formed on 21 September, with Turgut Özal as deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. Gen. Haydar Saltık, an officer in the General Staff in charge of relations with NATO and therefore close to both NATO and U.S. officials, became secretary-general of the NSC.

The most significant development in Turkish-U.S. relations after the coup was the ratification of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement on 18 November 1980 by the Ulusu government. Turkey previously had withheld ratification of the agreement in order to use it as a bargaining chip. With the ratification, the legal framework was established between the two countries, covering the use of Turkish bases by the U.S., defense cooperation, and economic and military aid until 1985.

The military regime was able to find external financing, which allowed Turkey to service its debts and increase its imports. This made it possible to overcome the acute shortage of consumer goods. As the flow of imported raw materials and intermediate goods increased, industrial production picked up and empty shelves in stores began to fill, boosting popular support for the regime.

The NSC had selected retired admiral Ulusu as prime minister because he was perceived as a moderate. But the real holders of all executive and legislative power and the makers of foreign and domestic policies were Evren and the four force commanders. This became obvious with Greece's return to the military structure of NATO.

# 1. The Rogers Plan and Greece's Return to the Military Structure of NATO

When Turkey launched its second Cyprus operation on 14 August 1974, Greece left the military structure of NATO to protest the organization's unwillingness to stop Turkey, even though it remained a member of the alliance. The Greek withdrawal added a new dimension to the Turkish-Greek disputes over the Aegean and also affected Turkey's relations with the U.S. and NATO.

It will be recalled that the question dates back to 1957, when the NATO military committee adopted document MC 38/4, which determined the command and control regions of the Aegean that would be allocated to Turkey and Greece (Soysal, p. 467). When the Southeastern Europe Land Forces Command (Comlandsoutheast) and the Sixth Tactical Air Force Command (CONSIXATAF) were established in İzmir, the control of the sea and airspace in the Aegean was allocated to Greece all the way up to Turkey's territorial waters. This could be done because there was no serious dispute between the two countries

at the time. When Greece left the military structure of NATO, Turkey assumed responsibility for the control of the Aegean. Furthermore, Turkey issued Notam (Notification to Airmen) No. 714 in July 1974, which declared that all flights within fifty miles of its Aegean coastline had to be cleared in advance.

Having lost its command and control responsibilities in the Aegean, Greece sought to return to the military structure of NATO in 1976. It was also important that Prime Minister Karamanlis had consolidated his position and democracy in the country in the meantime. Turkey replied that it would agree to this on condition that command and control responsibilities in the Aegean be reallocated on a new basis.

The question remained dormant for a few years until the USSR started becoming more active in the Mediterranean. The developments in Iran and Afghanistan further increased the security concerns of Western nations over Greece's absence from NATO's military structure.

After 1978 new initiatives emerged in connection with this issue. NATO's supreme commander in Europe, Alexander Haig, and his successor, Bernard Rogers, appealed in vain to both Ecevit and Demirel. Turkey maintained that circumstances had changed since Greece left the military structure and that it could not return under the same conditions. Command and control areas had to be redesignated in accordance with Turkey's requirements.

In the run-up to the Greek election scheduled to take place in late 1980, Andreas Papandreou conducted a campaign with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO themes. He declared that, when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) came to power, Greece might withdraw from NATO altogether (see "Relations with Greece" in Section 5). This made it imperative for NATO to resolve the question of Greece's return to NATO's military structure before the Greek election.

After the 12 September coup, U.S. and NATO officials redoubled their efforts to resolve the question. Some weeks after the coup, U.S. ambassador in Ankara James Spain met with Evren on 6 October and delivered a message from President Carter in which the president drew attention to NATO's state of disarray in its southeastern region and declared that it would be a tragedy for all concerned to prolong this state of affairs.

Finally, Rogers arrived in Ankara on 17 October and told Evren that Greece might be lost as an ally if the socialists emerged victorious in the approaching Greek election. When Evren voiced his concern about Greece's likely response to a goodwill gesture from Turkey, General Rogers replied that he was giving his "word as a soldier"

(Güldemir 1985, p. 84). Eventually Rogers persuaded Evren and returned to Brussels. Concerned that Turkey might reconsider its decision, NATO officials hastily convened NATO's Defense Planning Committee on 20 October 1980 and approved Greece's return to the military structure.

The title of the Rogers Plan was "Interim Arrangement concerning NATO Command and Control in the Aegean." The plan consisted of four paragraphs and was written in a language that was not easy to understand. Its most important paragraph was the first, which read as follows: "The arrangement concerns the return of Greece to NATO's military structure and does not concern other aspects of Turkish-Greek relations. This is an interim military-technical arrangement designed to allow the Greek armed forces to rejoin the Allied Command Structure."

Paragraph 3 provided that the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force Command and the Seventh Tactical Air Force Command to be established in Greece would make interim arrangements that would enable their subordinate units to exchange information derived from NATO's combined air defense radar systems. The interim arrangements would be formulated in consultation with the Southern Europe Allied Air Force located in Naples.

Paragraph 4 dealt with naval forces and contained the following provision. Until questions of command and control at sea were resolved in accordance with NATO rules and procedures, the commander of Allied Forces in Southern Europe and the commander of Allied Naval Forces in Southern Europe would determine whether the control of operations of forces allocated to them would be delegated to the concerned NATO subcommand's naval commander (Soysal, pp. 467–68).

Thus the text of the agreement consisted of complicated provisions that did not have much practical significance, because the important thing was that Greece was able to rejoin the military structure through a verbal agreement of the two commanding officers.

Turkey had abandoned its basic stand, which had been that there must be a reallocation of the command and control regions of the Aegean before Greece would be allowed to rejoin the military structure of NATO.

From a technical angle, the classified plan's most important feature was its "interim" nature. The final agreement was to be concluded later. Once Greece had rejoined the military structure, however, it was impossible to go back on the agreement or to persuade Greece to agree to a new and final agreement on the Aegean.

Another feature of the agreement from the angle of

international law was that it did not have validity because it had been concluded between NATO and Turkey in the absence of the representative of the other interested party. When Turkey made a commitment to lift its veto, it relied only on the word of General Rogers "as a soldier." As a matter of fact, after the Papandreou government came to power in early 1981, it announced on 8 December 1981 that it did not recognize the agreement. It refused to set up the headquarters of the land forces and the Seventh Air Force. The forces that would be allocated to NATO under the arrangement were kept within Greece's national defense system. General Rogers, who had sponsored the agreement, was unable to find anyone in the Greek government who would talk to him on this subject.

Two years later, when Rogers met Evren, the American general expressed his "regrets" over the outcome of the issue. This was the only satisfaction that Turkish diplomacy was able to obtain in this episode.

From the point of view of diplomatic practice, the agreement was also unusual. After 12 September both Evren and General Rogers excluded civilians from the negotiating process. On the Turkish side, only Evren and his entourage were involved in the negotiations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was totally out of the picture. When the question came up for discussion at the NATO Defense Planning Committee, the Turkish permanent representative, ambassador Osman Olcay, was not aware that Turkey had agreed to lift its veto and had to consult Ankara to ascertain the true situation. The U.S. ambassador in Ankara was also excluded from the negotiations. It was clear that the U.S. wanted to settle the issue within the military and easily achieved its aim. It was obvious that military administrations were more amenable to foreign pressure than elected governments, which felt the need to heed public opinion when making concessions in the field of foreign affairs. The U.S. had obtained what it was seeking by intensifying its pressure at a time when the military administration was at its weakest, following its international isolation as a result of the coup.

When General Rogers came to Turkey five years after the adoption of the Rogers Plan, he told reporters in an interview that he had not deceived Turkey on the subject. He claimed that Turkey would have become fodder for the Soviets if it had not consented to the plan.

In his memoirs (Evren, vol. 2, p. 98) General Evren would claim that Turkey gained by agreeing to Rogers's proposals based on the assurances of his "word as a soldier." With the agreement, according to Evren, Greece was deprived of the command and control areas of the Aegean that it had held prior to 1974 and Turkey was freed of the

pressures that it was subjected to within NATO, thus improving its standing within the alliance.

Although it is true that Greece was deprived of command and control responsibilities, these responsibilities were not reallocated in accordance with Turkey's demands but were merely turned over to NATO.

Evren was probably warned that Greece would leave NATO to obtain his assent. It is significant, however, that the scare tactic used against Evren had not worked on Demirel, although he was also known to be a good friend of the U.S.

### Developments in the Middle East and Their Effects on Turkish-U.S. Relations

Developments in the Middle East at the end of 1979 and in early 1980 made it necessary for the U.S. to pursue a more active policy in the region to make up for its losses. The military leaders who took power in Turkey on 12 September 1980 were reinforcing their ties with the U.S., while pursuing a policy of export-led growth that turned their attention to the Middle East. U.S. official reports were speaking of Turkey as a country redefining its Middle Eastern identity, while the State Department was considering the transfer of responsibility for Turkey from the European to the Middle Eastern division, which was not realized.

Aside from its reluctance to allow the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force to use Turkish facilities, Turkey was convinced that its interests in the Middle East were convergent with those of the U.S. and considered it necessary to cooperate with Washington. Like the U.S., Turkey was concerned about the rising influence of the USSR in the Middle East, the establishment of pro-Iranian regimes, and the possibility that Iran might emerge victorious from the conflict. Like the U.S. and other Western countries, Turkey was worried about a possible interruption in the flow of oil from the Middle East.

A number of developments in the Middle East were causing apprehension in Washington.

- 1. The threatening posture of the radical Iranian regime toward the Gulf countries following the Islamic revolution posed a danger both to the regimes of these countries and to the smooth flow of oil.
- 2. At a time when the Iranian crisis was at its height, Babrak Karmal seized power in Kabul in December 1979. Upon his invitation, the USSR invaded Afghanistan with a force of 85,000 soldiers. This placed the USSR within 500 kilometers of the Gulf. U.S. president Jimmy Carter described this development as "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War" ("Remarks at White House

Briefing for Members of Congress, January 8, 1980," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 16 [14 January 1980], p. 40).

- 3. At this time, the USSR strengthened its position in the region by developing its relations with Southern Yemen, Ethiopia, and Syria. Moscow even proposed a European Conference that excluded the U.S., designed to ensure the security of access routes to the Persian Gulf.
- 4. There was a fear that the USSR, having lost much of its international standing because of its intervention in Afghanistan, might take advantage of the turmoil in Iran to intervene in that country too, with the backing of the Communist Tudeh Party.
- 5. Egypt, one of the key players in Washington's Middle East policy at the time, had signed the Camp David accords and was ostracized by the Arab countries.

All of these developments and events made an imprint on the regional policies of the U.S. and helped change their course. Formerly the U.S. had based its policies on the Nixon Doctrine (see Box 4-3 in Section 4), which relied on the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region. Iran, in particular, was receiving large quantities of arms from the U.S. and had acquired a special place in regional security commensurate with its vast potential. The loss of Iran made it necessary to reconfigure the Middle East policy of the U.S.

In the face of these developments, the Carter administration adopted certain measures, which were continued by the Reagan administration. The Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean were strengthened, the Middle Eastern Command known as Mideastfor (Middle East Force) was reinforced, and a new policy was devised for the Middle East, which became known as the Carter Doctrine. Washington also secured the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council in May 1981.

In this framework, the U.S. abandoned the policy of relying solely on the countries of the region and adopted the policy of relying on and strengthening its own ability and capacity for action in the region. After Carter, Reagan pushed this policy further: claiming that the Middle East was a theater for interbloc rivalry, he devised the concept of "strategic consensus," under which cooperation among Turkey, Pakistan, and the countries of the Horn of Africa would be developed.

In the Middle East, the U.S. also sought to extend NATO's area of responsibility (see Box 4-9 in Section 4), formulated the Reagan plan through which the Israeli-Arab dispute would be settled, and searched for ways of further developing relations between Turkey and Israel.

Turkey occupied a central place in many of these policies. When the U.S. sought to contain the influence of the USSR with the Northern Tier (see Box 4-8 in Section 4), NATO's commander-in-chief, Alexander Haig, strove to establish strategic cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan in the early part of the 1980s. The U.S. also established closer ties with China, which disapproved of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, relations between Turkey and China grew stronger, with an increase in high-level visits between the two countries. Turkey also had a role in seeking to alleviate Egypt's isolation when it made an effort to secure that country's return to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at its meeting held in January 1981. The 12 September administration was attending the OIC for the first time at the level of prime minister. Turkey also stepped up its economic, political, and military cooperation with the Gulf countries.

The American objective of acquiring the ability to react promptly to regional developments led to the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for the region. This figured prominently in relations between the two countries in the early 1980s.

#### The Issue of the Rapid Deployment Force

This issue was to cause Turkey much trouble in its relations with the U.S. (Box 6-6). The U.S. was attaching great importance to the Rapid Deployment Force and in 1980 had concluded agreements for facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. The latter two countries were located relatively far from the Gulf, however, and their infrastructure was inadequate. The U.S. administration considered Turkey to be more suitable because of its NATO membership, developed infrastructure, and more favorable geographical location. The U.S. approached Turkey for the first time before 12 September when the Demirel government was in power, and his government took a negative position on providing facilities to the RDF in Turkey.

After 12 September it became politically harder for Turkey to say no to such proposals, and the U.S. stepped up its pressure on Ankara. But even the military government found it difficult to agree to the use of Turkish bases by the RDF.

Turkey's views on the matter were expressed by the minister of defense, Haluk Bayülken, in June 1981 during a visit to Washington and by the minister of foreign affairs, Ilter Türkmen, in September 1981 when he declared that "the defense of the Gulf is the responsibility of the countries of the Gulf" (Güldemir 1987, p. 134). It should be recalled that Evren had the last word in matters of foreign policy, and U.S. officials usually preferred to deal with

#### Box 6-6. The Rapid Deployment Force

In the 1970s, as a result of the Arab-Israell War, the subsequent oil embargo, and Soviet-American tensions, the U.S. was increasingly forced to focus its attention on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. To protect its vital interests, mainly the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West, the U.S. started contemplating military intervention in the region through a rapidly deployable mobile force. In August 1977 President Carter signed a presidential directive for the establishment of such a force. For reasons of U.S. domestic politics, the work on this plan was slow until 1979, when, first, Iran was taken over by anti-Western fundamentalists and, second, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This led to the declaration of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, warning that an attempt by a foreign power to control the Persian Gulf region would be considered an attack against American vital interests and be met by military force.

The Joint Rapid Deployment Force was established on 1 March 1980. It consisted of 200,000 men and was based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.

The Reagan administration maintained this policy, strengthened the force further, and changed its name to U.S. Central Command (Centcom) on 1 January 1983. By 1985 the force consisted of 300,000 troops.

At this time, the U.S. was not seeking new bases in a region contiguous to the Middle East and the Caucasus. What it wanted was facilities to store equipment and provide logistic support. The U.S. had given up on its search for new bases because they were proving to be a political liability and very expensive. The force would be stationed on U.S. soil in Florida and in the event of intervention would be deployed to the region, where the required water, animunition, fuel, and supplies would be pre-positioned to enable the force to go into action without delay. Although this approach appeared practical, there were difficulties in its implementation.

At one stage, the possible use of the force in the event of internal disturbance had also been discussed, leading to some concern among the countries of the region.

When the RDF was first established, it was outside NATO's defense plans. But the Reagan administration moved the head quarters of the force from Florida and attached it in January 1981, to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). With this step, the U.S. was making an important move toward placing a future U.S. out of area intervention within the framework of NATO, even if it would not be supported by other NATO allies.

The countries of the Gulf region were ambivalent in their approach to these developments. They wanted U.S. protection against possible threats but worried about the domestic effects of the U.S. protective umbrella and remained cool to the project in their public utterances.

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him because of his greater "flexibility." But in this instance even Evren was unable to give the U.S. full satisfaction. He declared that, if NATO members jointly decided to intervene in the Middle East, Turkey would go along with the decision; otherwise it would not assume any role in an out-of-area operation. In contacts with U.S. officials, the

Turkish side pointed out that any Turkish involvement with a unilateral out-of-area U.S. military action would create problems for Turkey both domestically and internationally and would end up by doing harm to the alliance itself.

In formal and informal contacts, U.S. officials made a major effort to persuade Turkey to be more pliant on this issue. In October 1982 the head of the CIA visited Turkey for the first time. The renowned U.S. strategist Albert Wohlstetter and Paul Henze, a member of the National Security Council, also came to Turkey and sought to create awareness among the Turkish public through lectures and speeches about the Soviet threat and the role of Turkey in the region. Henze even claimed that the intensifying ASALA terror was linked to the USSR's effort to detach eastern Anatolia from Turkey.

This was a period when the strategic dimension of Turkey's relations with the U.S. carried great weight. Despite this, the 12 September regime was highly reluctant to commit itself on the RDF for a number of reasons.

- 1. Turkey was just emerging from a period when the Left had been very influential, and the regime worried about possible adverse domestic reaction.
- 2. Turkey was not all that well informed about the political objectives of the U.S. in the region and the sort of mission that the RDF might be involved in. For instance, an involvement of the RDF in a future Arab-Israeli conflict operating from Turkish bases would completely undermine Turkey's standing in the region.
- 3. Turkey was in the process of intensifying its economic links with the Middle East and did not want to jeopardize its growing commercial and economic ties with countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
- 4. The RDF was regarded with utmost suspicion in the region, and even the Gulf States were reluctant to get involved with the project in a time of peace.

Despite its own misgivings and its opposition to the project in official pronouncements, Turkey eventually agreed to provide storage facilities and installations for the RDF under certain conditions and concluded an agreement to this effect.

4. The 1982 Memorandum of Understanding Two factors primarily made this agreement possible. One was the compromise reached over Turkey's possible contribution to RDF, as explained above; and the other was the need to upgrade the defense infrastructure of Turkey.

In the early 1980s U.S. officials and strategists like Richard Perle and Albert Wohlstetter were claiming that there was a defense gap in eastern Turkey and were urging Ankara to rectify this situation. The balance of conventional forces in the Caucasus was tilted in favor of the USSR, with nineteen Soviet divisions confronting eight Turkish divisions. Furthermore, NATO officials were suffering from the "Central Front Syndrome," according to this view. This led them to accord high priority to the defense of central Europe, which they claimed was more important for NATO defense, while neglecting eastern Anatolia.

Negotiations were undertaken with U.S. officials in order to plug the defense gap in eastern Anatolia while also providing facilities to the RDF for emergency interventions. In this framework, U.S. secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger visited Ankara in December 1981. On that occasion, a high-level Defense Council was set up, which would look into Turkey's defense requirements and the state of the bases on its soil. Gen. Necdet Öztorun and Richard Perle signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Brussels on 29 November 1982. According to the press release, the agreement provided for the modernization of ten air bases in Turkey and the construction of two additional air bases in Muş and Batman equipped with new technology. Because it was a military agreement, its contents were never made public. The newspaper Milliyet revealed its main provisions, however, in its issue of 26 April 1983.

Article 1 stated that the obligations under the agreement would be limited to the obligations undertaken within NATO. Article 2/3 declared that, should the need arise to intervene in a Middle Eastern country lying outside the area of responsibility of NATO, support for the operation could not be provided from Turkish airspace. This reflected Turkey's reluctance to allow the use of Turkish bases for a possible out of area intervention in the Middle East. Article 3/2 provided that U.S. equipment, arms, ammunition, and fuel stored in Turkey could only be removed with Ankara's consent. Article 4/3-2 made it clear that prepositioning would take place but, again, only with Turkey's consent. Article 6 provided that air operations from Turkish bases had to be in support or in implementation of NATO-approved plans. This meant that operations could be mounted only with Turkey's and NATO's approval. Article 3/1 declared that base commanders would be Turkish officers, while article 5/3 stipulated that expenses would be covered by the U.S. Finally, article 9/1 stated that the agreement would be valid for ten years, after which it would be automatically extended for one year, unless notice of expiration was given ninety days in advance.

In official statements and in the press, emphasis was

placed on the fact that the bases were to be used only for NATO missions. This would require the approval of other NATO members, so the use of the bases for out-of-area missions would be difficult. Inclusion of restrictive provisions in the agreement reflected Turkey's uneasiness concerning the contribution it was making to the RDF, although official pronouncements declared that it had nothing to do with the RDF. But the agreement had been signed by the U.S. assistant secretary of defense and the U.S. would meet expenses amounting to roughly \$200 million, which indicated that the U.S. rather than NATO would utilize the bases.

Turkey had succeeded in incorporating in the agreement its reservations with respect to the use of the bases to intervene in the Middle East. The bases could not be used without Turkey's consent, and Ankara would be able to make its own judgment in each specific case. The air bases, however, would be capable of handling long-range bombers and cargo aircraft. This would make it easier for the U.S. to reach the Persian Gulf and give it an advantage over the USSR. With the new bases, the Caucasus would come within the range of the U.S. air force. Located less than five hundred miles from the Gulf, the new bases would be the closest military bases from which the U.S. could operate. The bases would later come in very handy during the 1991 Gulf war, when U.S. aircraft operating out of the İncirlik air base refueled at Batman, Muş, or Diyarbakır before going on combat missions over Iraq.

The U.S. scored a number of successes in the region during this period. After the military coup, political stability was restored in Turkey, Greece returned to NATO's military structure in October 1980, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was approved in November 1980, the RDF was set up, the bases in Turkey were upgraded, cooperation with Pakistan was strengthened in order to reinforce the Northern Tier, and the Islamic factor was used to weaken the USSR.

#### III. THE OZAL PERIOD (1983-1991)

The first legislative election in Turkey after the coup took place on 6 November 1983. The Motherland Party, established by Turgut Özal, won a resounding victory and emerged as the first party in the election, from which many candidates had been excluded by the military administration. The Nationalist Democratic Party led by retired general Turgut Sunalp, which enjoyed the support of the National Security Council, failed to live up to the expectations of its sponsors, while the Motherland Party was able to attract the votes of the masses, who did

not want to return to the sterile political bickering of the pre-1980 period. By waging a campaign stressing its moderation, the party had been able to attract the votes of the center-right, center-left, and far-right groups and the religious groups.

This was the beginning of a new era in Turkey's political development. Helped by international developments and internal conditions, the economic liberalism and political pragmatism of Özal and his party had a determining effect on Turkey's domestic and foreign policies.

The Motherland Party, which was able to form a government without coalition partners, brought about significant changes, especially in Turkey's economic and social structures and in the way foreign policy was made. From this point of view, the Özal period was a turning point in Turkey's development.

# A. The U.S. View of the Özal Administration

Özal enjoyed the support of big business domestically and the backing of the U.S. internationally. Both the administration and U.S. financial circles supported Özal's policies.

Özal had long-standing links with the U.S. He had been at the helm of the Union of Manufacturers of Metal Products, a powerful employers' association in Turkey, worked for the World Bank in Washington, and designed and carried out the package of stabilization measures of 24 January 1980 in conjunction with the IMF. After the scandal of the pyramid schemes in 1982, he resigned from the Ulusu government and went to the U.S., where he spent a month and a half, ostensibly "to lose weight," during which time he held talks with U.S. officials.

Two and a half months prior to the legislative election in Turkey, the Wall Street Journal (26 August 1983), reflecting the views of U.S. business, published an article praising Özal's economic performance and declaring that it was essential for him to win the election for democracy to take root in Turkey. The article described Turkey's economic successes and added that the U.S. wanted to see the same policies pursued in the future. Although U.S. quarters declared that it was essential to allow the Motherland Party to contest the election for the sake of democracy, it was significant that there was no reaction from these quarters when the candidacies of the leader of the Social Democracy Party (SODEP; Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi), Erdal İnönü, and twenty-one founding members of that party were vetoed by the generals of the military administration, as a result of which the party was unable to enter the legislative elections of 1983.

U.S. officials were aware of Özal's religious orientation but were not bothered by it. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the U.S. was pursuing policies at the time that were designed to establish a belt based on moderate Islam to contain communism. Özal belonged to the Nakshibendi sect of Islam. He wanted to develop Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries and was eager to implement liberal economic policies at home. He seemed to possess all the attributes that the U.S. would want in a politician in that position. Özal had attended a conference in Paris on 15 November 1985 with the theme "The Contribution of Islam and the West to a New Economic Order." At the conference Özal submitted a paper in which he drew parallels between Islam and capitalism, stated that both relied on the market to set prices, and claimed that the two were not divergent.

#### **B.** Political Relations

When Turgut Özal was prime minister, from 1983 to 1989, relations between Turkey and the U.S. were generally excellent. In fact, these relations went through a golden age during the period. Developments in the Middle East and Turkey's transformation helped make both countries more mutually dependent.

Özal's approach to relations with the U.S. was based on the assumption that, if Turkey pursued pro-American policies, the U.S. would reciprocate by being more friendly to Turkey. In Özal's view, if Turkey followed confrontational policies and became intransigent in the manner of Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou, this would only result in strengthening the anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobbies in the U.S., causing much harm to Turkey's interests. Özal was also fully conscious of Turkey's economic constraints.

Özal's first task or priority was to clear away the difficulties in bilateral relations. This is why his approach to questions like the Armenian bills in the U.S. Congress, Turkish-Greek relations, and the Cyprus question gave the impression that he either underestimated their gravity or was about to make concessions on these issues. Özal also strove to develop economic relations. In the early part of his tenure, Özal pursued the traditional Turkish policy of seeking additional aid by stressing Turkey's strategic contribution to the West's defense. The emphasis would later shift from aid to trade.

Despite the cordiality in relations, Turkey was disappointed by the level of U.S. aid. Furthermore, relations with the U.S. continued to be marred by numerous questions, including the Armenian issue, Cyprus, and tense Turkish-Greek relations.

#### 1. Turkey, the Middle East, and the U.S.

Aware of the importance that the U.S. attributed to stability in the Middle East, Özal wanted to turn Turkey into a key actor in the region, enjoying full U.S. backing. During his visit to the U.S. in March 1985, Özal declared that, if Turkey was strong in the Middle East, its influence in the region would grow and that this would be in the interest of the U.S. Turkey was to develop its relations with Middle Eastern countries, boost its exports to the region, play an active role there, and thereby secure additional American aid.

In the meantime U.S. pressure was growing, aimed at securing permission to use Turkish bases, especially Incirlik. The Özal government pursued the policies of its predecessors and concluded nine implementation agreements on 26 April 1985, regulating the technical aspects of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 1982. These covered support, air bases, access, communications, installations, purchases, labor, and construction. In this framework, air bases were to be constructed at Muş and Batman and the base at Malatya would be expanded.

While the government was publicly conveying the message that American demands with respect to the RDF were not being met, the press was reporting that the İncirlik base was being expanded, which was the sort of infrastructure upgrading being requested from Turkey to meet the needs of the RDF. The U.S. also wanted to replace its F-4 aircraft based at İncirlik with newer F-16 aircraft. When former president Nixon visited Turkey in September 1985, he declared that Turkey should fill the void left by Iran in the Middle East. This remark was not well received in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At this stage, the attitude of the Gulf countries to the RDF was still unchanged. Özal believed that the RDF could only receive the green light if there was agreement among the regional countries on the issue, because proceeding without such an agreement would undermine Turkey's position in the region.

Such an agreement between the U.S. and the Gulf countries never became possible during the 1980s. This was to change after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990.

The U.S. wanted Turkey to contribute to the stability of the Middle East and tighten its links with Israel. By bringing its two allies closer together, the U.S. would thereby strengthen its position in the region. After Camp David, Egypt had been ostracized by the Arab world. The plan was to free Egypt from its isolation by bringing Turkey, Israel, and Egypt closer together. U.S. officials and strategists were advising Ankara to strengthen

Turkey's ties to Israel in order to secure the backing of the U.S. Congress on issues such as aid and the Armenian Genocide.

Being of a pragmatic bent, Özal sought to expand trade links with the Middle East countries and encouraged Turkish contractors to undertake projects in the region, while at the same time cementing ties with Israel. During his visit to the U.S. in 1985, he held secret talks with the leaders of the Jewish lobby and the Israeli ambassador in Washington. The Jewish lobby promised that it would give its backing to Turkey in the U.S. Congress if Ankara developed its relations with Israel. Israel's actions, however, such as its attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and its attack on the PLO's headquarters in Tunisia in 1987, had angered the Islamic world. In the face of this antagonism, it was difficult for Turkey to improve its relations with Israel. It would be necessary to wait for the Middle East Peace Process that was launched in the 1990s for the U.S.-backed rapprochement between Turkey and Israel to be consummated (see Box 7-57 in Section 7).

Turkish and American policies in relation to the Iran-Iraq conflict were in general concordant. Neither country wanted either of the combatants to emerge victorious from the war. That is why the U.S. found itself selling arms to Iran and to Iraq, depending on the progress of the war. There were reports in both the Turkish and the U.S. media that the sale of arms to Iran to finance the Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua was effected through Turkey (Box 6-7). Özal attempted to act as mediator between Iran and the U.S., but his efforts came to naught because of Tehran's opposition.

When Iran threatened to overrun Mosul and Kirkuk at the end of 1986, alarm bells rang in both Ankara and Washington. In that event, Iran would acquire the oil wealth of the region, which would help it in spreading its religious influence there. U.S.-based think tanks started issuing statements to the press, reminding people that Turkey had dominated the region for four hundred years and that Ankara should not fail to recall this past association. There were pundits in the Turkish press like former ambassador Coşkun Kırca, who wrote that in such an event Turkey should preempt Iran and take appropriate action. The Iranian push was halted, however, and the issue disappeared from the agenda until it resurfaced in 1991 under different circumstances (see Box 7-11 in Section 7).

Both the Turkish press and the opposition were highly critical of Turkey's U.S. and Middle East-oriented foreign policy, which started under the 12 September administration and continued under Özal. The shift in

#### Box 6-7. The Irangate Affair

U.S.-Iranian relations were strained because of the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In September 1980 war broke out between Iran and Iraq. Having equipped its army with U.S. arms in the days of the shah, Iran was seeking both new weapons and spare parts for its existing armory. It transpired that the Khomeini regime had secretly acquired weapons to meet its needs from the U.S. via Israel and that Lt. Col. Oliver North, a member of the U.S. National Security Council, played a key role in this transaction. The U.S. had sold weapons to its archenemy Iran to secure funds to finance the "Contra" guerrillas that were fighting the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. This roundabout approach had been devised by the administration because Congress would not provide funds for these activities in Nicaragua in other words, the affair consisted of more than one scandal.

The Turkish and foreign press alleged that there was also Turkish involvement in the Irangate affair, claiming that the airline set up in November 1984 by Kemal Horzum, a businessman in Prime Minister Ozal's entourage, had been used to

ferry the arms to Iran.

This affair was dubbed Irangate because it reminded people of the Watergate scandal. In the investigation conducted in 1986, Oliver North was found guilty of obstructing the work of Congress and destroying documents of the National Security Council, but President Reagan was absolved of any wrongdoing.

This event demonstrated that the U.S. was capable of selling weapons even to Iran in order to carry out illegal activities in Central America, while Iran was ready to purchase arms from the country that it kept calling the "Great Satan."

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Turkey's foreign policy was also noted by the international media. There were articles in the Turkish press to the effect that Özal was deliberately shifting the emphasis of Turkish foreign policy from Europe to the U.S. and the Middle East in order to allow Turkey to take over the role of Iran in the region. Bülent Ecevit, who was barred from engaging in political activity at the time, wrote that Turkey was drifting away from the democratic principles and values of Western Europe and turning itself into a forward operating base of the U.S. in the region. As a matter of fact, the process of drifting away from Europe that started under the 12 September administration continued during the early part of the Özal government. Özal himself adopted a dismissive attitude toward Western Europe and the European Community. He once declared that the authors of a report critical of Turkey's human rights were hypocrites. In a speech delivered on 21 November 1984 and reported in the newspaper Cumhuriyet, he declared that Turkey had no need for the \$600 million that the EEC was to provide under the Second Financial Protocol, which was being blocked by a Greek veto.

When the Middle East market lost its luster starting in the mid-1980s, however, Özal was forced to redirect his attention to the ECs. Furthermore, because of Turkey's open-door development model, its need for foreign aid was inescapable. This subject was always on the agenda in dealings not just with the ECs but also with the U.S.

#### 2. U.S. Aid

Although U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey during the 1980s was substantial, Turkey was not satisfied with either its level or its terms. This cast a shadow on bilateral relations. We shall first examine the general features of U.S. aid.

The U.S. Military Assistance Program, which covered grants, was being implemented within the framework of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as was the International Military Training Program, under which many Turkish officers and military personnel received training. All kinds of surplus U.S. arms and military equipment were being transferred to Turkey under the Military Assistance Program, which came to an end in 1989. Other channels were found to continue with this type of aid throughout the 1990s. In addition, there was the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, under which the cost of the supplies had to be repaid along with interest, as well as aid within the Southern Regional Amendment (SRA) program. Finally, economic aid provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) was occasionally used by Turkey to procure arms. That is why the ESF program was also referred to as security aid.

The bulk of the military assistance within this framework, which lasted throughout the 1980s, came through the FMS. The FMS credits, which Turkey started receiving in 1972, consisted of short- and long-term credits, which had grace periods of one to three years or ten years depending on the type of credit. The rate of interest ranged from 5 to 14%. One of the features of FMS credits was that part consisted of grants. Until the grant component was abolished altogether in 1993, Turkey received \$7:5 billion in FMS credits: 60% as repayable loans and 40% as grants. These U.S. credits could be referred to as aid because of the grant component. (For developments in the 1990s, see "The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement [DECA]" and "U.S. Military and Economic Aid" in "Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 7.)

The procurement formalities of the weapons systems that Turkey purchased, whether through credits or through grants, were (and are) conducted on behalf of Turkey by U.S. agencies through discussions with the manufacturers of the systems. The costs of training, spare

parts, and support equipment that the systems necessitated were not included in the aid programs. In other words, Turkey had to procure these against cash payments (Atalay, pp. 238–47).

Under U.S. law, the administration must obtain congressional approval for all foreign military credits and sales in excess of \$14 million. That is why the congressional factor was always present in matters concerning military procurement, giving rise to problems in relations from time to time. The level of aid recommended by the administration goes through a long process, passing from the House of Representatives and Senate's subcommittees on appropriations, after which the Foreign Aid Bill is enacted for the following fiscal year. During this process, the level recommended by the administration for Turkey was usually trimmed.

U.S. aid to Turkey during this period had the following features.

First, the aid was mostly military aid. During this period and especially during the early part of the period, the U.S. and the other Western states were providing the economic assistance that Turkey urgently required through the channels of the IMF and the OECD. During the early 1980s U.S. economic aid was at a high level, because the U.S. was supporting Turkey's economic restructuring and transformation. Economic aid later decreased, while military aid reached a high level in the mid-1980s. Toward the end of the 1980s especially the grant portion of FMS credits fell to low levels.

Second, the U.S. used the aid as a lever in its relations with Turkey and attached conditions to the aid that were unrelated to military or economic relations. The most glaring instance was when the U.S. linked aid to the question of Cyprus. The Greek lobby intensified its activities in the U.S. Congress in November 1983 after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. As a result, an amendment was introduced in the Senate that would make all aid to Turkey conditional on the return of the district of Varosha in Cyprus to Greek Cypriots. Although the amendment was rejected, the administration's request for \$930 million in aid for Turkey for 1984 was trimmed by \$200 million in the subcommittees of the House and the Senate as a result of the lobby's efforts. As the Congress approved the aid, it asked the administration to work toward the ending of the division of the island and called on Turkey not to engage in activities in Varosha that would make a settlement more difficult. This phraseology meant that Varosha was not to be opened to settlement by Turkish Cypriots. The following year the president was asked to report on progress toward a settlement in Cyprus. The president then started submitting yearly reports to Congress on the question of Cyprus. During the process, Turkey sought to improve the terms and raise the level of the aid by using the extension and approval of the agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation as a negotiating card.

In September 1986 the House Committee on Appropriations cut the level of aid to Turkey and recommended that Turkish troops be withdrawn from Cyprus. Notwithstanding the Reagan administration's opposition, the House of Representatives introduced an amendment to a bill in February 1987 by which it trimmed military aid by \$200 million and forbade Turkey to use this aid in Cyprus.

During the 1980s the U.S. maintained the practice (introduced toward the end of the 1970s) by which the level of aid to Greece and Turkey was apportioned in the 7:10 ratio. The Reagan administration, being fully aware of the role and the strategic importance of Turkey in the Middle East, was opposed to this ratio. The administration pointed out the difficulties in determining the exact value of a piece of equipment and the apportionment of the aid in this ratio to the two countries. Furthermore, the ratio reduced flexibility and caused delays. The administration had been unable to determine the level of aid to Turkey because the Papandreou government was late in submitting its list of requirements to Washington. Finally, the ratio was not contributing to the solution of the disputes between the two countries. Despite all this, the ratio remained, and Turkey reproached the administration for not doing enough to rectify this situation.

Third, in the late 1980s the conditions under which U.S. aid was provided became progressively less favorable, because Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* reduced international tensions after 1985.

In 1988 the House Foreign Relations Committee recommended that aid be provided according to the recipient country's standard of living and that Foreign Military Sales to Turkey and Greece be on a cash basis. This recommendation was not adopted, and the grant component of FMS credits was maintained until 1993. From that date on, the interest on FMS credits was raised to the prevailing market rates, which then hovered around 10 to 14%. In any case, economic aid in the 1990s dropped to negligible levels, and the aid that came tied to conditions was turned down by Turkey.

The Özal administration was uneasy over the fall in the level of U.S. aid in the mid-1980s as well as the terms attached to this aid, which were becoming more onerous. In October 1987 Özal declared that Turkey was getting promises from the U.S. rather than aid and called on Washington to raise the level of its assistance. He also asked that Turkey's FMS debts be written off, just as Israel and Egypt had benefited from a forgiveness clause, but this request remained unheeded in Washington.

Turkey remained dependent on U.S. aid throughout the 1980s both for its economic development and for the modernization of its armed forces. Although the level of American aid was the highest since the Menderes era, its volume and conditions were not up to Özal's expectations. The U.S. kept up the practice of tying aid to political conditions and used the lobbies and the Congress as an excuse for cutting down its level.

### 3. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1985

The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) that came into effect in 1980 was due to expire on 18 December 1985. Unless it was denounced by one of the parties, it would automatically be extended for another year. Turkey was unhappy with some of the provisions of the agreement, so it submitted a note to Washington three months before the date of expiration, seeking changes in the agreement.

Turkey was not trying to distance itself from the U.S. or to create difficulties. Ankara wanted to use the agreement to ensure the development of its economic relations, raise the level of aid, and improve its terms. In the early years of his term in office, Prime Minister Özal was following the traditional course of Turkish foreign policy: "If we are providing bases, we have every right to seek expanded trade" (Hürriyet, 28 October 1985) (meaning more U.S. purchases from Turkey).

In the negotiations with the U.S., Turkey pointed out that imbalances had emerged over the last five years in the military and strategic components as well as the economic component of bilateral relations and submitted a wish list to the American side consisting of ten items. Most importantly, the U.S. should accelerate the modernization of the Turkish army; it should tie aid to Turkey to a treaty (in order to eliminate the Congress factor); aid should not be tied to unrelated issues (like Cyprus and the 7:10 ratio); debts arising from FMS should be written off; the U.S. should engage in cooperation in the field of defense production in Turkey; the U.S. administration should support Turkey's lobbying activities in the U.S.; and, in the economic field, relations should be diversified and obstacles to Turkish exports should be removed.

The U.S. administration approached some of these requests favorably, while it rejected some others. Washington would make every effort to help in modernizing the army; it agreed with Turkey on the Cyprus condition but could find no solution to this because it concerned the

Congress; and Turkey had to handle the issue of lobbying on its own. Washington was in favor of diversifying economic relations but could do nothing about existing trade barriers.

Turkey was unhappy about Washington's negative approach to aid and trade issues during this "golden age" in political relations. At a time when there was a marked coolness in Turkey's relations with Europe, Ankara relied on its cordial relations with the U.S. and was much chagrined at the difficulties it faced in obtaining the amount of aid it was seeking. In these circumstances, Turkey agreed to only a one-year extension of the agreement.

The lack of balance bothered Turkey: while Turkey was committed to carrying out the terms of the agreement as a state, the U.S. administration was able to evade its responsibility to comply with the agreement by hiding behind the Congress factor when trimming the level of aid. That is why Ankara was seeking a formula to deal directly with the administration and bypass Congress. Actually, the administration was using Congress as an alibi and was not prepared to change its system to accommodate Turkey.

The American system was based on the principle of checks and balances between an executive with sweeping powers and a Congress that limited these powers by holding the purse strings. Given this background, Turkey understood that its requests could not be fully met and dropped its political demands, confining itself to technical and economic requests: allowing Turkey to bid for Pentagon contracts; supplying the requirements of U.S. personnel in Turkey from the local market; having Turkey undertake the maintenance and repair work of units of the Sixth Fleet and of U.S. aircraft in Europe; and practical cooperation in defense matters.

It was at this point that the House Subcommittee on Appropriations unexpectedly trimmed by one-third the grants and credits proposed by the administration for the fiscal year 1987. It also recommended that Turkish troops be withdrawn from Cyprus. Meanwhile the administration was seeking to establish a radio station in Turkey that would beam its broadcasts to the Central Asian region.

The Turkish attempt to improve the terms of the aid and obtain economic advantages by using the DECA card had backfired. The U.S. was annoyed by the Turkish maneuver to change the structure of bilateral relations and reacted by raising the stakes and making more onerous counterproposals. In regard to beaming broadcasts to Central Asia, Turkey had always been careful not to disturb its relation with the USSR needlessly and consequently rejected the U.S. request.

The negotiations eventually were completed. The foreign ministers of both countries exchanged side letters

on 16 March 1987, by which they extended the validity of DECA for a further five years as of 18 December 1985.

The U.S. side letter contained the following provisions:

The Administration is resolved to and will, in accordance with the purposes of the DECA, and consistent with the U.S. Constitutional procedures, propose annually to the U.S. Congress a high level of support for Turkey, based on mutually agreed recommendations, commensurate with Turkey's important contribution to the common defense. In this context, the U.S. Administration commits to pursue the realization of its full request with vigor and determination no less than it accords to any assistance request. It is also our determination to seek to extend, to the maximum extent possible, the concessional, and especially the grant aid, component of U.S. security assistance. We will extend through all other appropriate means the maximum possible support for the modernization of the equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces. In recognition of the need to alleviate the burden of the FMS debt on the Turkish economy under current conditions, we will search for approaches to debt relief and continue to seek to provide economic assistance to Turkey...

The United States reaffirms its determination to cooperate with the Government of Turkey in the struggle against terrorism and to oppose all actions that sponsor, support or assist terrorist activity...

It is our understanding that both governments will, in this spirit, make their best efforts to remove obstacles to reciprocal trade between the U.S. and Turkey.

Thus the U.S. administration did not conclude a "treaty," did not exclude the Congress factor from the process of providing aid, and did not write off FMS debts.

In addition to the letter, a secret protocol was attached (Güldemir 1991, pp. 152–66) by which Turkey provided certain facilities to the U.S. The U.S. F-4 aircraft based at Incirlik would be replaced with a greater number of F-16 aircraft. U.S. combat aircraft would be able to use the Konya base for training flights, and the modernization of bases would go forward. Pending the production of F-16 aircraft in Turkey, the U.S. would transfer to Turkey, free of charge, forty F-4 aircraft to meet operational requirements. Some of the supplies and equipment required for

U.S. military activities in Turkey would be procured locally. The secret protocol also provided that all of the U.S. economic aid, amounting to \$100 million, would be in the form of a grant. The grant component of military aid in the amount of \$490 million would attain \$320 million.

Immediately after the exchange of side letters, Congress made a cut of 45% in the aid to be provided to Turkey. In addition, the House Committee on Foreign Relations attached conditions to the aid, calling for a reduction of Turkish troops in Cyprus and forbidding the transfer of U.S.-delivered arms to Cyprus.

The cuts imposed by Congress, immediately after an agreement had been reached, naturally caused a sharp reaction in Turkey. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made statements to the press suggesting that the agreement might be ended. The government's approach, however, was more measured. Özal declared that the document extending the validity of the agreement and not the agreement itself would be approved by the cabinet. At the same time, the defense contractors that did business with Turkey were informed about Turkey's uncertainties in order to get them to prod the administration and lobby the Congress.

The Özal government eventually announced that the side letter extending DECA would not be approved by the cabinet until the position of the Congress in relation to aid became clear. In the meantime additional facilities in bases would not be provided and the servicing of \$400 million in debts arising from FMS would be slowed. As the side letter did not come into force, the secret protocol also remained in abeyance, which strengthened the government's hand.

Özal did not want to extend this standoff for too long, however; overriding the objections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he secured the cabinet's approval of the side letter and the secret protocol on 21 February 1988. As was now becoming his practice, Özal kept the MFA out of the picture, and the cabinet's approval took place without the ministry being informed. The press and the opposition were highly critical of the government for having approved the agreement at a time when the Congress had made its terms more onerous for Turkey. Politicians like former minister of defense Hasan Esat Işık and the leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti), Bülent Ecevit, criticized both the content of the agreement and the manner in which it was approved. While Turkey was engaged as a state, the U.S. was engaged only as a government, and the Congress was allowed to impose its decisions on Turkey.

In these circumstances, it was proposed that (as in the U.S.) the TGNA should have a say in the approval of DECA. Ecevit was critical of Özal's foreign policy, with its emphasis on economic relations, while Demirel struck a more realistic note by pointing out that the approval had come under the pressure of Turkey's heavy foreign debt burden.

Turkey's actions should be assessed against this background. The export-led growth model that had been implemented since 1980 had vastly increased Turkey's foreign debts by the end of the decade. To sustain economic growth and remain in power the Özal administration had to be on good terms with the U.S., and American officials were well aware of this. The U.S. also took advantage of other factors in its dealings with Turkey. In August 1987 the Turkish press reported that Turkey had increased the number of its troops in Cyprus and had sent new tanks to the island, apparently without the knowledge of the government. This kind of spat between the military and the government occurred frequently during the Özal period. The U.S. embarrassed the government by calling for the removal of the tanks. During this period bills dealing with the Armenian events of 1915 were introduced in the Congress, and the Kurds were referred to as a minority in the annual human-rights reports prepared by the State Department. It is of some interest that there were discussions in NATO quarters at this time about the growing Soviet threat against Turkey and speculations about whether NATO members would endanger their security to defend Turkey in the event of an attack. This was unsettling, even if official clarifications were subsequently issued.

During the Özal period Turkey had sought to establish a new basis for its relations with the U.S. by removing the Congress factor but failed in this effort even though Ankara was a close political and military ally of Washington and implemented economic policies that closely corresponded to U.S. wishes. It failed because the relationship was not one among equals but one in which the U.S. was always calling the shots. The process of negotiating and approving DECA in the 1980s demonstrated that the unequal relationship could not be changed by unilateral steps.

# 4. Turkish-Greek Relations and the U.S. Factor in the Question of Cyprus

One of the distinguishing features of the Özal government was that (unlike its predecessors and, in a way, its successors) it tried to isolate Turkish-U.S. relations from the shadow of Greek-Turkish questions and Cyprus. But this was not easy to achieve because of developments in Greece and Cyprus and the nature of Turkey's internal structure. We shall first examine the U.S. approach to these questions.

# The U.S. Position and Role in Turkish-Greek Relations

The U.S. attributed a certain importance to Greece, although to a lesser extent than it did to Turkey. In addition, both the U.S. administration and the public nurtured a deep sympathy for Greece based on historical factors. Furthermore, the Greek lobby wielded considerable influence in America. The U.S. view of Greece was always colored by these factors.

The PASOK party under Papandreou's leadership, which came to power in Greece in early 1981, alarmed U.S. officials when it promised to pull Greece out of NATO and shut down NATO bases. Throughout Papandreou's tenure of power, Greece's relations with the U.S. would remain strained. In the early 1980s anti-Americanism was rife in Greece because of the resentment felt over U.S. support for the Greek military junta from 1967 to 1974 and for allegedly not preventing the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. In his dealings with Washington, Papandreou made full use of the public antipathy for the U.S.

In his first term in office in the 1980s, Papandreou created problems for the U.S. over a good number of issues, many of which related to Turkey. One of these was his opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons in his country. Ignoring U.S. and NATO objections, he aligned himself with the Eastern Bloc and campaigned for the removal of nuclear weapons from the Balkans. He refused to participate in NATO exercises in the Aegean, citing problems with Turkey as an excuse. Papandreou maintained his threat to shut down NATO bases until the mid-1980s. He built up Greek relations with the USSR and refused to participate in sanctions against that country following its occupation of Afghanistan and the coup in Poland. Athens signed a nonaggression pact with the Warsaw Pact member Bulgaria, condemned the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, and did not go along with the sanctions imposed on Libya. Finally, Greece did not participate wholeheartedly in the fight against terrorism, forcing the U.S. to reclassify Athens airport in the "risky" category.

From the U.S. perspective, Greece and Turkey were in remarkably contradictory positions in the 1980s. The Papandreou administration's domestic policies were populist and favored public ownership of enterprises, while its foreign policy was highly nationalistic, even reckless vis-à-vis Turkey and the question of Cyprus, and markedly anti-U.S. On the other shore of the Aegean, there was a Turkish leader who was liberal and pro-privatization in his economic policies and pro-U.S. and conciliatory in his foreign policy. His approach to Greece and the Cyprus question was pragmatic. In these circumstances, Turkey

expected to count on the full support of the U.S., but in practice this support was not forthcoming.

One of the reasons for this paradox was that Papandreou allowed Greece's relations with the U.S. to pursue their normal course despite his anti-American rhetoric. Papandreou's policy was not seeking to mar relations with the U.S. but rather trying to improve his bargaining position by adopting the role of a difficult ally and to extract more aid by using the issues of bases and NATO.

Another reason was the existence of the Greek lobby, which helped maintain the links with the U.S. by serving as a healer.

A third reason was that, when confronted with situations that required finding solutions, U.S. policy tended to seek a way out by trying to give satisfaction to the intransigent side that was creating difficulties. As a member of the ECs and relying on the Greek lobby, Greece could afford to confront the U.S., while Turkey was becoming ever more alienated from the ECs because of its human rights record in particular. This alienation would get even worse in the 1990s.

Despite the Papandreou administration's anti-U.S. rhetoric and actions, Washington remained silent in the face of Greece's noncompliance with the Rogers Plan in 1981. The U.S. also adhered strictly to the 7:10 ratio in the allocation of aid to the two countries. In fact, a provision was inserted in article 7 of the U.S.-Greek bases agreement that ensured the maintenance of the ratio. Nor did the U.S. object to the inclusion of the island of Lemnos in NATO plans, even though the island had a demilitarized status under international treaties. Although Washington felt uneasy about Greece's nonaggression pact with Bulgaria, there was no official reaction.

In summary, Özal's policy of trying to draw the U.S. to its side by following convergent policies failed to yield the desired result in Washington's approach to Turkish-Greek relations.

In some instances the U.S. intervened directly in Turkish-Greek relations, such as during the Aegean crisis in March 1987. As in the case of the Kardak (Imia) crisis in 1996, when the tension reached a peak, the U.S. interceded and called on both sides to exercise restraint, putting the question on hold.

#### The Question of Cyprus and the U.S.

The U.S. attributed importance to Cyprus because this question had a negative effect on the relations between two of its allies, Turkey and Greece, and also because the island had great strategic value due to its location in the eastern Mediterranean. From the U.S. perspective, the im-

portant thing was not who owned or controlled the island as long as the island's status conformed to its strategic interests and Cyprus remained within its own sphere.

The U.S. used the British bases in Cyprus on a number of occasions to support its activities in the Middle East, including the time when the multinational force was being withdrawn from Lebanon in 1983. For the U.S., Cyprus was a stepping stone to the Middle East and was seen as a natural aircraft carrier when dealing with the questions of the region.

But the problems that Cyprus caused for U.S. diplomacy often outweighed the advantages conferred by the island. Occasionally Cyprus was capable of putting Washington in the spot, as it did in 1974, when American policy after the Turkish intervention caused anger in both Turkey and Greece. This led Greece to withdraw from NATO's military structure, while Turkey reacted to the three-year arms embargo by seeking ways to develop a new defense strategy.

During the 1980s every U.S. action in connection with Cyprus caused resentment in either Greece or Turkey and occasionally in both countries, even though Washington took care to pursue a balanced policy between the two rivals.

First, it has to be noted that there was a difference between the approaches of the U.S. administration and Congress on the issues of Turkish-Greek relations as well as Cyprus, similar to the differences in matters of aid. Under the influence of lobbies, Congress was more critical toward Turkey, whereas the administration, being guided by strategic concerns, tended to show more consideration for it, in particular until the late 1980s. The Reagan administration was in favor of persuading Turkey to be more conciliatory through a constructive approach rather than by threatening punishment.

Because it saw the Cyprus question as one between two of its allies, Washington wanted a solution of its own making or a solution that did not affect its interests. The USSR was getting more involved with the question on international platforms, however, which could lead to growing Soviet influence in the strategic island.

There were several U.S. initiatives at this time. In November 1983 the U.S. condemned the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and applied pressure on countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh to keep them from recognizing the new state. But the U.S. took no tangible steps to force the Turkish side to rescind its decision, confining its action to a cut of \$120 million in Turkish aid to appease the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks.

Another U.S. initiative came on 8 May 1984, when

the U.S. announced a "Peace and Reconstruction Fund" of \$250 million for Cyprus. The Turkish side responded to this initiative with approval, but the Greek Cypriots and Greece raised objections. Reagan announced that the aim was to find a solution by helping finance projects that would bring the two sides closer, rather than by seeking to punish Turkey. The U.S. wanted 19% of the aid to be disbursed through this scheme to be set aside for the Turkish Cypriots, who made up that proportion of the total population of Cyprus.

Toward the end of the 1980s the U.S. took a stand against Denktaş, insisting that a solution to the question could not be found while he was in charge. It is alleged that the U.S. gave its backing to the project of replacing Denktaş with Asil Nadir (a prominent Turkish-Cypriot businessman), who was expected to be more conciliatory (Yalçın Doğan, "Interview with Asil Nadir," Hürriyet, 24 July 2005). Özal also backed this formula, but the project came to naught when Asil Nadir refused to cooperate.

To sum up, the U.S. saw to it that outstanding questions did not assume acute crisis proportions. The pressures to curtail aid or remove troops from Cyprus were never fully implemented. At a time when the U.S. needed Turkey for strategic reasons, the administration made sure that the question of Cyprus did not get in the way.

### 5. The Question of the Armenian Bills

Although the question of the Armenian bills arose from the actions of the Senate and the House of Representatives, it did have negative effects on bilateral relations.

This question revealed, once again, the division in Turkey's leadership over foreign policy issues in the 1980s. Özal felt that this was a card that the U.S. used to torment Turkey and was irked that it was being used so frequently. What really bothered Özal was not the significance or possible consequences of the bills but rather their negative effects on Turkish public opinion and the opportunity that the bills gave to the opposition to snipe at the government. For Özal, the Armenian bills were a "one-off thing" that could not hurt Turkey and, once passed, would completely lose their nuisance value. From this dismissive point of view, their adoption might even have a salutary effect.

But the other decision-makers in the administration (like the MFA and the Armed Forces) attached far more importance to this matter and kept up the pressure that restricted Özal's room for maneuver.

The U.S. administration supported Turkey and sought to check Congress until about the mid-1980s. Then the administration's support slackened. As a conse-

quence, the Armenian lobby made a major effort to have the bills approved in the committees so that they could reach the floor.

From the beginning of the 1980s, the Armenian community in the U.S. and the Armenian lobby made every effort to have the administration recognize the Armenian Genocide. In August 1982 the State Department issued a report on ASALA terror that contained the following sentence: "The Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish Government committed a genocide against the Armenian people" (Laipson 1985, p. 33). The Armenians were deeply angered by this report and fought hard to have the offending sentence deleted. When the Armenians failed to achieve their aim after two years of trying, they were able to get two bills introduced in Congress in 1984.

The first bill was introduced in the House on 10 September 1984, when nine representatives took the floor and supported the bill. The bill, which proclaimed 24 April as "Man's Inhumanity to Man Day," was adopted by the House by a show of hands.

At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted a bill that called for "the prevention of events similar to the Armenian genocide in the making and implementation of American foreign policy."

The adoption of these bills caused a sharp reaction in Turkey at the level of the government, the opposition, and the general public. Commenting on the U.S. action, Özal declared that this was done for internal political reasons prior to an election and that he expected the error to be rectified after the election. If no correction was made, he declared that relations would have to be reappraised in a sober-minded way. He added in another speech that the U.S. action could be interpreted as moral support for future ASALA outrages.

The Armenian bill was introduced in the House of Representatives about a year later and was submitted to a vote on the floor on 4 June 1985. The bill was voted down in the House, with the backing of sixty-nine historians and experts on Turkish affairs, who issued a joint statement warning that a historic error was about to be committed. Still, Turkey was upset that the bill had received the support of 231 representatives (to be adopted, the bill needed 274 votes), and the minister of foreign affairs, Vahit Halefoğlu, gave expression to these feelings.

The Armenian lobby kept up its efforts and on 23 April 1987 succeeded in having the bill adopted in the Postal and Civil Service Subcommittee, which sent it to the floor of the House. Turkey reacted by recalling its ambassador in Washington, Sükrü Elekdağ, to Ankara for

consultations. Özal sent President Reagan a message expressing his disapproval. President Evren's reaction was stronger: he announced that he would postpone his visit to the U.S., scheduled to take place in May 1987.

At about this time, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 18 June 1987, asserting: "2—Believes that the tragic events in 1915—1917 involving the Armenians living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire constitute genocide within the meaning of the convention on the prevention and the punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948."

The resolution continued: "Recognizes, however, that the present Turkey cannot be held responsible for the tragedy experienced by the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and stresses that neither political nor legal or material claims against present-day Turkey can be derived from the recognition of this historical event as an act of genocide" (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/European\_Parliament\_Resolution\_on\_Armenian\_Genocide). Nonetheless, this increased Turkey's apprehension and forced the Özal government to intensify its efforts with the U.S. administration to forestall a similar resolution being adopted by the House of Representatives. The House voted against debating the bill on procedural grounds on 8 August 1987.

The question of the Armenian bills came up once again in 1989 under different circumstances (Güldemir 1991, pp. 274–93). In the U.S., Reagan had been succeeded by George Bush, who had promised ethnic Armenians during his election campaign that he would secure the passage of the genocide bill when in office. Meanwhile Özal had become president and would now conduct foreign policy directly, without having to cater to the voters' wishes. The Cold War had come to an end, and Turkey's former strategic importance was being questioned. After their failure in the House of Representatives in 1985, the ethnic Armenians were ready to redouble their efforts to achieve their aim at last.

A bill that would mark 24 April as the day to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was adopted by the Senate's Judiciary Committee on 17 October by eight votes to six. Although the bill had not reached the Senate floor, the way had been cleared. Özal had taken a nonchalant approach to the issue that year in his talks with Bush, which led the administration to adopt a more relaxed stand in its dealings with the members of the Senate committee.

The Turkish MFA and the armed forces were very disturbed by these developments. If the legislature of a

superpower and an ally of Turkey could pass such a bill, this could constitute a precedent that would lead other parliaments to pass similar bills. A similar resolution already had been adopted by the European Parliament two years earlier, on 18 June 1987. Consequently, a number of provisional measures were taken as a warning to the U.S. U.S. naval units would be barred from making visits to Turkish ports, and the meeting of the Turkish-U.S. Defense Council would be postponed indefinitely. The message was also conveyed that, if the Senate adopted such a resolution, a new agreement would be negotiated when DECA expired in 1990. Military contacts were suspended, and U.S. F-16 flights from İncirlik were stopped. The MFA sought to get the Jewish lobby to intervene on Turkey's behalf. The Jewish lobby was known to maintain that the Jews were the only people who had suffered a genocide and wanted to see no competition in this area. The lobby also wanted to draw Turkey to Israel's side, so it intervened in the affair. American lobbying firms, some of them with business interests in Turkey, were also hired to defend Ankara's position.

When Özal visited Washington in January 1990, he took up the issue of the Armenian bills when he met Robert Dole, the Senate majority leader, and President Bush. He described to the president the effects of President Johnson's letter to İnönü in 1964 and, with reference to the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes that erupted during his visit, pointed out that the adoption of such a bill at this time would only encourage the Armenians to further aggression.

The Bush administration was seeking a text that would not damage relations with Turkey and also give satisfaction to the Armenian community, while not employing the term "genocide." At the time of the second vote on the bill in the Senate in February 1990, Robert Byrd, a prominent and respected Democratic senator and leader who supported Turkey, had to filibuster for four-teen hours in three days to prevent the bill from coming to a vote.

While struggling with this question, Turkey used the status of the bases to gain additional leverage, as it had done in the case of the arms embargo in 1975. But this time Turkey's action consisted of temporary measures commensurate with its discomfort and displeasure, such as halting flights from bases and suspending the visit of U.S. warships to Turkish ports. Another difference from the action taken in the 1970s was that this time the public did not hear about the measures that had been taken, because the government did not want to give the impression that relations with the U.S. were strained. When the bill

#### Box 6-8. The United States and the Kurdish Movement in Northern Iraq Prior to 1990

Historically the U.S. Kurdish policy has been focused on northern Iraq. This region is important because it is populated predominantly by Kurds and produces one-third of Iraq's oil.

Although the U.S. relationship with the Kurds goes back to the time of President Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918, real contacts started only in the 1960s under Cold War conditions and developed into involvement with the Kurdish question from 1972 onward. That year President Nixon visited Tehran and concluded a secret agreement with the shah to provide arms and financial support to the rebellious Kurds of northern Iraq. At this time, the U.S. used the Kurds to weaken the Iraqi regime, which was developing its ties with the USSR, and keep Iraq out of the fray in the Arabsraeli confrontation, while hiding behind Iran. Kurdish leader Mullah Barzani was extremely close to the U.S. and received millions of dollars' worth of U.S. arms and medical supplies by way of Iran. At one point he expressed his gratitude by remarking that his people were ready to become America's fifty-first state.

At this time, Israel also provided assistance to Mullah Barzani, in the form of arms and military training. During the Cold War, Israel's objective was to relieve the pressure on it by creating a problem that would keep the Muslim countries of the Middle East preoccupied and bring about discord among them. As a result, until the mid-1970s, there was close cooperation by the CIA, SAVAK (the Iranian National Organization for Intelligence and Security), and Mossad (the Israeli Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) in northern Iraq.

in 1975 Iran signed the Algiers agreement with Iraq. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran-obtained territorial concessions in the Shatt al-Arab region and in return cut off the aid that it was providing to the Kurds. Deprived of this aid, the Kurds fell back in the face of the Iraqi army and were forced to seek refuge in Iran and Turkey. Kissinger, the author of America's Kurdish policy, was oblivious to Barzani's appeals for U.S. assistance. He reminded Barzani that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work" (Village Voice, 16 February 1976).

The Iraqi Kurds rebelled once again during the Iran-Iraq War that broke out in 1980, taking advantage of the weakness of the Baghdad regime. At first the U.S. remained aloof from this rebellion. Toward the end of the war, however, in 1988, it established direct contacts with the Kurdish leadership and made ready to fill any vacuum that might emerge in northern Iraq. Within this framework, Jalai Talabani, another Kurdish leader, went to Washington in April 1988; where he met with U.S. officials. After a cease-fire was signed with Iran, Baghdad redirected its forces to the North, where the Kurdish forces, lacking U.S. support, were quickly dispersed. As a result, 50,000 Iraqi Kurds were compelled to take refuge in Turkey.

The lesson that emerged at the end of the 1980s was that the U.S. was prepared to use the Kurds as pawns in its foreign policy but could readily abandon them to their fate when conditions changed. The Kurds could be used against different countries depending on the circumstances, the situation of the country, and its policy toward the U.S. or the requirements of U.S. regional policies at that particular time.

(I. Uzgel)

was removed from the Senate's agenda, Turkey lifted the temporary measures on 1 March 1990.

Shortly after Turkey lifted the measures, however, President Bush issued a written statement on 24 April 1990 in which he declared that "on the 75th anniversary of the massacre in which more than one million Armenians perished, I want to join those who want to mark this day as a day of remembrance" (Güldemir 1991, p. 282). Until that time, the administration had always supported Turkey in trying to dissuade Congress from passing a hostile resolution. Consequently, the president's statement caused keen disappointment in Turkey. It is probable that Bush was seeking to console the Armenians, who had failed to achieve their aim in Congress. Turkey's hasty lifting of the measures before the critical date of 24 April may also have contributed to the president's action.

#### 6. The Kurdish Question and the U.S.

The Kurdish question came to the fore as a factor in Turkish-U.S. relations during the 1980s (see Box 7-11 in Section 7). There were two aspects to this issue. The first was the policy of the U.S. toward the Iraqi Kurds (Box 6-8), going all the way back to the 1950s, and the second was the U.S. policy toward the Kurdish question in Tur-

key itself. Both aspects of the U.S. approach were deeply disturbing for Turkey and caused problems in bilateral relations, but the second aspect was the most troublesome for Ankara.

The U.S. started taking an interest in Turkey's Kurds starting in the 1950s. The American Peace Corps volunteers concentrated their attention on Turkey's eastern and southeastern region, causing much debate among the Turkish public as well as in the TGNA. The resulting public pressure led to the curtailment of the activities of the Peace Corps.

The U.S. backed the Iraqi Kurds until the mid-1970s. But Washington also worried about the possibility that their separatist tendencies might spill over into the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. This could lead to the destabilization of the two allies and create opportunities for the USSR. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept up its close interest in the affairs of Turkish Kurds. In his book ABD'nin Kürt Kartı (The Kurdish Card of the USA), Turan Yavuz (pp. 82–87) quotes a CIA report dated 1979, which stated that Turkey kept the Kurdish regions underdeveloped and that the Kurds were not able to enjoy greater autonomy because of their internal squabbles and their lack of strong leadership.

Starting in the mid-1980s, changes began to emerge in the American perception of the Kurdish question. Washington was forced to take a stand and formulate a new Kurdish policy, especially toward Turkey, as a consequence of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the actions of the PKK in Turkey.

At this stage the main elements of the U.S. approach to the Kurdish problem in Turkey were as follows.

PKK activities emerged in the summer of 1984 in southeastern Turkey and spread to different parts of the region. When it became clear that these actions could not be quickly suppressed, the U.S. interest in the question grew. It began to be perceived as an element that could be used in bilateral relations.

While taking a close interest in the Kurdish question, the U.S. was careful in all its official pronouncements to balance this by stressing the need to maintain Turkey's territorial integrity in order to ease its ally's concerns.

A sign of growing interest in the Kurdish question during the 1980s was the appointment in September 1984 of William Eagleton as U.S. ambassador in Damascus. Eagleton was a career diplomat and an expert on Kurdish issues. His appointment coincided with the resurgence of PKK activities in Turkey. During his term in Damascus, Eagleton allegedly maintained his links with the PKK and made frequent visits to Turkey, where he had contacts (Yavuz, p. 61). All of this caused apprehension in Ankara about U.S. policy toward the PKK and the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Clues about U.S. policy can be found in the annual reports on human rights prepared by the State Department. These reports showed a perceptible rise in the level of criticism directed at Ankara during the 1980s. In 1982 there were just two sentences devoted to the Kurds in the report. In 1987, however, the report spoke of a "rebellion" in southeastern Turkey. In the February 1988 report it was possible to discern a change in U.S. policy. The report stated that it had always been the aim of Turkish governments to assimilate within the fabric of Turkish society those elements that came from non-Turkish ethnic roots. In this report, the Kurds were referred to as a minority for the first time. If the Kurds continued to be denied their linguistic and cultural rights, the report claimed, they would create more problems, and their rebellion would spread (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, Department of State, Washington, D.C., February 1989, p. 1208).

In addition to these reports, the pronouncements of U.S. officials were also disturbing Turkey. For example, the counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara declared that the PKK should be treated according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Rules of War (Box 6-9). In its contacts with the Turkish government on the subject of human rights, the U.S. State Department referred to the need for the Kurds to enjoy the rights of minorities contained in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Previously Turkey had also been irked by Jalal Talabani's contacts with State Department officials in April 1988. The reason why the U.S. showed an increased interest in the Kurdish question was the approaching end of the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. wanted to fill the power vacuum that would emerge in northern Iraq. But this renewed U.S. interest in the Kurdish question did not go unnoticed in Ankara.

Turkish public opinion was incensed over the growing U.S. interest in the general Kurdish question and especially in the Kurdish question within Turkey. The tenor of official Turkish statements, however, was more moderate. The MFA merely declared that the contents of the February 1988 report, coming from an ally, were found to be disturbing. But undisclosed sources made statements to the press that were much harsher, saying that the report was prepared in Turkey and bitterly criticizing the U.S. stance.

At this time the Armenian bills were also on the agenda of U.S.-Turkish relations, so bilateral relations clearly were going through a period of severe turbulence.

The question of whether the U.S. had a policy toward the Kurds of Turkey in the 1980s should be considered in the context of the international conditions of that day. At a time when the USSR maintained its existence, it would be illogical to conclude that the U.S. would pursue policies that might lead to the breakup of Turkey. The policy of the U.S. was not to set up an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East but to use the Kurds as pawns to help it control developments in the region.

U.S. policy on this issue was to become clearer in the 1990s as a consequence of international and regional developments.

#### c. Economic Relations

Economic and especially trade relations between Turkey and the U.S. during the 1980s did not correspond to the close political relations. The export-led growth model launched on 24 January 1980 with the backing of the U.S. and other Western countries and their financial institutions allowed Turkey to seek new markets for its growing exports.

In this framework, Turkey rediscovered the Middle East as an outlet for its exports. Turkey signed a trade agreement with the USSR, providing for the import of

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#### Box 6-9. The Geneva Conventions on the Rules of War (1949) and the PKK

The 1949 Geneva Conventions contain the rules that must be observed by combatants in time of armed conflicts. The first three relate to the protection of the wounded or III on land and sea as well as the protection of prisoners of war, while the fourth relates to the protection of civilians. All four conventions have a common article 2, which declares that these rules shall apply in all declared wars and armed conflicts among two or more states that are parties to the conventions.

There are also two annexed protocols concluded in 1977. The second annexed protocol extended these rules to internal armed conflicts. Turkey is a party to the four Geneva Conventions concluded in 1949 but is not a signatory of the 1977 annexes.

The 1949 conventions did not cover internal armed conflicts but specified that the humanitarian rules contained in article 3 common to all conventions would also apply in internal conflicts. Article 3 contains the following provisions. "In armed conflicts arising within a contracting party and not having an international character, the parties to the conflict shall observe these rules as a minimum. Those who have laid down their arms and those who are no longer able to fight because of illness or injuries or detention or for any other reason, as well as those who are not directly involved in hostilities, shall-be accorded humane treatment in all circumstances without regard to their race, color, or creed, to their sex, background, or wealth, or to any other similar criterion." Accordingly, the following actions were proscribed: violence directed at an individual's person or life, cruel treatment, torture, holding for ransom, attacks against a person's dignity, humiliating or degrading treatment, or the imposition of any punishment not decreed by a properly constituted court. The minimum protection to be accorded by a contracting party in whose territory there was an armed conflict not of an international nature would be at the level specified in this article.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) claimed until the end of 1990s that it should enjoy the status of combatant in accordance with the 1949 Conventions. This claim was based on two premises:

first, that there was an ongoing armed conflict, and second, that PKK cadres were treated as enemies (www.kurdish\_info.net/modules.php?name\_News&file=article&sid=2344). Turkey never accepted this claim, however, and kept its struggle in the framework of combat against terrorism.

The most important development concerning the definition of an armed conflict was during the Tadic Case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1995. The ICTY stipulated that there is an armed conflict.

whenever, there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached, or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. (Decision of 2 October 1995 in Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 35 ILM [1996] 32)

Because there is no combatant status in noninternational armed conflicts, the applicable international humanitarian law consists of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions where applicable, and customary international humanitarian law, as well as applicable domestic and international human rights law providing for rights of detainees in relation to treatment conditions, and due process.

(F. Keskin)

Soviet natural gas against the sale of Turkish products and contracting services. Turkey also sought to take advantage of the vast possibilities of the U.S. market by placing trade relations with that country on a new basis that would also allow more American capital to flow to Turkey and make it possible to develop joint ventures.

As of the mid-1980s the Özal government sought to change the nature of relations with the U.S. With the backing of the business community, it pursued a policy that sought to replace aid with trade. The approach consisted of reducing U.S. aid and compensating for this reduction with a greater volume of trade. Turkey wanted to take advantage of the huge capacity of the U.S. market to absorb a vast range of goods. Turkey wanted to balance its trade with the U.S., which was consistently showing a deficit. Finally, Turkey also wanted to diversify its relations with the U.S. by introducing a new dimension to the essentially political-strategic character of its relations.

As Turkey expanded its trade with the U.S., it would require less aid from that source and from international institutions. This policy of greater international interaction and building up of exports also enjoyed the support of the U.S.

Özal visited the U.S. in March 1985 in the company of a large number of businessmen. This visit had economic as well as political significance. It was on this occasion that the Turkish-American Business Council was established. During the talks, the U.S. administration proposed that the two countries work toward granting each other an open-market status, similar to the existing arrangement between the U.S. and Israel. This kind of relationship with the U.S. would have damaged Turkey's relations with the ECs, however, which had no such arrangement with the U.S. The U.S. initiative produced no results because of reasons such as the MFA's opposition, based on the initiative's failure to meet Turkey's expectations and its

Table 6-5. Turkish-American Trade, 1980–1989 (in million \$)

|         | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984  | 1985  | 1986  | 1987  | 1988  | 1989 . |
|---------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Imports | 442  | 589  | 813  | 695  | 1,073 | 1,150 | 1,176 | 1,365 | 1,519 | 2,094  |
| Exports | 127  | 267  | 251  | 231  | 368   | 506   | 549   | 713   | 760   | 971    |

Source: Deviet Planlama Teşkilatı, Temel Ekonomik Göstergeler (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı): bimonthly reports for May 1981, November 1984, December 1987, and May 1990.
(Table by İlhan Uzgel)

possible harmful effects on Turkey's process of integration with the ECs.

In this process, Turkey was confronted with serious problems in connection with its textile exports to the U.S. This was due to the strong competitive position of Turkish textiles in the U.S. market and the effectiveness of the U.S. textile lobby. Although U.S. officials assured Turkey that they were flexible on all issues other than textiles, the administration launched antidumping proceedings against Turkish iron and steel products and maintained quotas on certain food items, such as pasta.

In applying quotas to Turkish products, the U.S. was basing itself on legislation that placed a ceiling of an annual increase of 30% in the import of a given product from a specific country. Although Turkish products accounted for only 1% of America's imports, they were limited by quotas because there were annual increases in excess of 30% in their sales in the U.S. market. This made Turkey the sole NATO country to which the U.S. applied quota restrictions, even as Turkey imported twice as much from the U.S. as it sold to that country.

Özal had set a target to bring Turkey's trade relations with the U.S. to the level of its trade with the Middle East or the EEC countries. He considered it anomalous that Turkey's export to the U.S. should amount to only 10% of its exports to the EEC market even though the populations of the two were roughly similar and that, while South Korea exported \$10 billion worth of goods to the U.S., Turkey's exports amounting to only \$400 million should be restricted by quotas. Özal even tried to use political cards in the negotiations over trade. For instance, he proposed at the negotiations for the extension of the DECA that Turkey be accorded most-favored-nation status and that its products should enjoy unrestricted access to the U.S. market. In addition, Özal suggested at the NATO summit in Brussels in March 1986 that the alliance implement article 2 of the treaty, which read: "member states shall endeavor to eliminate conflicts in their economic policies and encourage economic cooperation with one another."

Not only was Turkey unable to achieve a breakthrough in its trade relations with the U.S. in the 1980s, but it also had difficulty in attracting U.S. investments. In July 1985 the Turkish-U.S. Investments Agreement was signed. This agreement was designed to facilitate U.S. investments by guaranteeing that there would be no expropriation, that bureaucratic formalities would be reduced, and that new taxes would not be imposed. Despite Özal's personal appeals and the assurances of the business community and the favorable legislation introduced, U.S. capital was reluctant to invest in Turkey apart from some investments in the defense sector. Nevertheless, the U.S. was the largest foreign investor in Turkey during the 1980s in terms of the capital involved.

In summary, in its economic relations with Turkey the U.S. was inconsistent with its promotion of free trade policies. On the one hand it was urging Turkey to liberalize its economy and lower its customs barriers, while on the other hand it was applying quotas to Turkey's exports and violating its own principles when importing Turkish goods. As a consequence, the more Turkey opened up its economy, the more its trade deficit with the U.S. grew (Table 6-5).

The reason why the U.S., with its dynamic economy, would apply restrictions on Turkey's export products was political rather than economic. The U.S. was reluctant to change the nature of its bilateral relations based on strategic cooperation, which had been established following World War II, even if this contradicted the principles of economic liberalization that it defended. That is why the formula of "less aid, more trade" adopted by Özal and the Turkish business community was not found acceptable by the U.S. If bilateral trade increased and U.S. aid decreased, U.S. leverage over Turkey would decrease and perhaps lose its effectiveness altogether. The U.S. preferred to see Turkey, located in the Middle East and a neighbor of the USSR, as a strategic ally rather than as an equal trading partner. For this reason, Özal was unable to carry out his project of diversifying Turkey's relations with the U.S.

#### Box 6-10. Developments in NATO's Strategy in the 1980s

The strategic environment of the 1980s included two salient features. First, the USSR had a superiority in conventional weapons and appeared to have the strategic initiative. Second was the concern that NATO's nuclear deterrent might have lost some of its credibility. Tensions in a bipolar world were also increased by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its increased military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. All of these developments made it necessary to review NATO's strategies (see Box 4-10 in Section 4).

The main issues of the day were the following.

1. Increased military spending and discord between Europe and the U.S.: the Reagan administration pursued a tougher policy line toward the USSR and intensified its defense buildup efforts at a time when the forces in Europe against heavy spending on arms and especially against nuclear weapons were gaining in Strength. The Reagan administration was urging the European allies to shoulder their fair share of the burden, with a target of 3% of each nation's GNP to be devoted to defense spending. At the same time, U.S. moves to develop the neutron bomb and SDI were facing increasing European opposition. These U.S. actions had been taken without consulting Europe and would diminish or eliminate U.S. vulnerability to surprise attack, thereby decoupling the U.S. from Europe. The Western Europeans distanced themselves from U.S. policies that they considered to be harmful to their interests.

 The deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe: in response to the development of SS-20 nuclear missiles by the USSR in the 1970s, MATO undertook the deployment of 572 Pershing II and Cruise nuclear missiles in Europe starting in 1983. Notwithstanding the strong protests of the antinuclear lobbies, each outmoded nuclear warhead that was dismantled was replaced with one of the newer weapons.

3. Changes in NATO's flexible-response strategy: as a result of advances in technology, it became possible to inflict substantial damage on military targets without resorting to nuclear weapons at an early stage. As a consequence, NATO developed a new strategy, starting in the 1980s, that emphasized greater flexibility. In the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact, there would be more emphasis on defense with conventional weapons and nuclear weapons would be resorted to at a later stage. This doctrine was developed for the U.S. army by Gen. Bernard W. Rogers as Airland Battle 2000 and adopted by the NATO defense ministers in November 1984. This doctrine almed at pushing the battle front into Warsaw Pact territory to a depth of 150 to 300 kilometers by destroying enemy backup forces. The plan was known as FOFA (Follow on Forces Attack).

Europeans were not very happy with these decisions made within the framework of NATO, although they had given their consent. Increased flexibility meant that the nuclear threshold would be reached at a later stage by the U.S. Hence a conventional war would be waged on European soil for a longer time. Furthermore, forward defense and its derivative FOFA meant that NATO's strategy, which had been based on defense, was acquiring a more aggressive character.

(İ. UZGEL)

# IV. NATO, TURKEY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN THE 1980S

# A. Changes in NATO's Strategy during the 1980s and Their Effects on Turkey

Turkey's cordial relations with the U.S. during the 1980s had an effect on its position within NATO. On strategic matters, relations were conducted bilaterally without having to go through NATO. The first example of this was the handling of the Rogers Plan. During Özal's term in office, however, despite the closeness of relations with the U.S. and Turkey's improved strategic position as a result of the developments in Iran and Afghanistan, there were disagreements in matters relating to relations with NATO. During this period, when Washington was pursuing a policy of applying increasing pressure on the USSR, NATO's priorities, based on developments in defense strategy, did not always correspond to Turkey's expectations. In fact these priorities often conflicted with Turkey's foreign policy and its strategic objectives.

Relations with NATO during this period revolved around issues such as new approaches to NATO strategies, the nuclear weapons threatening Turkey, NATO's attitude to the problems in the Aegean between Turkey

and Greece, the Mersin crisis, and the doubts about the security that NATO provided to Turkey.

In its dealings with NATO, Turkey took advantage of the fact that decisions in the alliance were made by consensus. It was this procedure that allowed Turkey to block Greece's return to the military structure of NATO until the time of the 12 September coup. Obviously, this advantage could not be used in the case of every issue. Although Turkey had the power of veto on all decisions, the U.S. and NATO had more and effective countervailing political and economic tools at their disposal.

NATO strategies in the 1980s needed to be revised due to developments in the international system, technological progress, the policies of the Reagan administration, and the emplacement of Soviet missiles in the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Box 6-10). These revisions directly affected Turkey, as the member with the longest border with the USSR.

#### Flexible Response and Turkey

The first development affecting Turkey within this framework was the increased options of "flexible response." In this context, delay in resorting to nuclear weapons by NATO was a development that would work against the

interests of a flank country like Turkey. The new strategy would lead Thrace, the Black Sea region, and eastern Anatolia to become battlegrounds of conventional forces. A limited aggression from NATO's perspective would be total war for Turkey, which did not have the capacity to push the front forward onto Bulgarian or Soviet soil. Because Thrace was flat and its territory was limited, there was a danger that the fighting would quickly spread all the way to the Turkish Straits.

For the new strategies to be applicable, Turkey's conventional force would need to be reinforced and modernized. But Turkey's expectations in this respect were not adequately met by either NATO or the U.S. in the 1980s.

### The Question of Turkey Assuming Additional Nuclear Obligations

The second question affecting Turkey was the NATO decision regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons. In October 1983 NATO defense ministers decided in their meeting at Montebello unilaterally to remove 1,400 short-range missiles from the central front in Europe and to make up for this by reinforcing the flanks. This would be done by deploying medium-range missiles along the flanks and replacing existing short-range missiles with newer versions.

Starting in the mid-1980s, U.S. and NATO officials began to press Turkey to assume additional nuclear obligations. NATO's supreme commander Rogers came to Turkey in April 1985 and proposed that, in accordance with the Montebello decision, the short-range Honest John missiles in Turkey be replaced by Lance II missiles with a range of 400 kilometers. Furthermore, he called for increasing the nuclear capability of combat aircraft in Turkey. Rogers also wanted to increase the 200 or so nuclear warheads that were already deployed in Turkey.

The justification for the Rogers proposals was that the signing of the INF Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in 1987 made it necessary to fill the void created by the agreement by deploying short-range missiles and nuclear artillery in a flank country like Turkey.

But Ankara refused to undertake additional nuclear responsibilities. General Rogers's proposals were turned down on five grounds.

- 1. Since 1970 Turkey had favored maintaining the status quo with respect to the nuclear weapons on its soil and would not contemplate a change in their number.
- 2. Turkey did not want to provoke the USSR. To replace the nuclear missiles already on its soil with more modern versions or to increase their quantity would only draw more Soviet pressure on Ankara.

- 3. The Özal government was eager to develop economic relations with the USSR. Turkish contractors had undertaken projects in the Soviet Union, and the agreement for the import of Soviet natural gas in return for the sale of Turkish goods had been concluded.
- 4. With the proposed additional nuclear obligations, Turkey would be more likely to become a nuclear battle-field in the event of war.
- 5. The deployment of new missiles in Turkey would enhance Turkey's nuclear capability, which could lead NATO members to lose interest in the modernization of the Turkish army. For Turkey, however, the threat to its security was not confined to the Warsaw Pact. Ankara was anxious to have conventional forces that were modern and effective.

# The Reduction in International Tension and the Question of the Reliability of NATO

Another problem in Turkish relations with NATO arose when reports started to circulate concerning Turkey's position and status in the alliance. Arguments centered around the question of the extent to which NATO would help defend Turkey in the event of an attack. In an interview with Sedat Ergin of the newspaper Hürriyet on 29 November 1987, the former supreme commander of NATO forces, General Rogers, expressed his doubts about whether some northern European member countries would come to Turkey's aid in the event of a Soviet attack in eastern Anatolia. At about the same time, the Turkish press reported that about five to ten Soviet SS-20 missiles were locked onto targets in Turkey. The Long-Term Strategy Report submitted to Reagan in January 1988 stated that some NATO allies were reluctant to come to Turkey's aid in case of need. True, NATO's new supreme commander, John Galvin, announced that NATO would come to Turkey's defense, but this reassurance was not enough to dissipate the existing apprehension. These arguments came at a time when Turkey was being asked to assume additional nuclear burdens and the ratification of DECA was being held up. This created the suspicion in Turkey that "they are trying to scare us into accepting their demands." The perception was gaining ground that NATO membership was not a means to protect Turkey but rather an instrument to coerce Turkey. This was a time (1987) when pressure on Turkey over the Cyprus question was on the increase and the Armenian bills were being resurrected.

An overall assessment shows that, for a long time, Turkey's defense policy was being formulated within the framework of NATO. In this planning framework, even tactical changes were difficult to carry out. Turkey was a flank country and shared a border with the USSR. Geographically, it did not constitute a strategic whole with other NATO members. In the context of NATO's changing strategic approach, it was expected that Turkey would be engaged in a more intense conventional-type war. Given the flexible response strategy and the higher threshold for nuclear engagement, this meant the Turkish army would bear the brunt of an attack; "forward defense" would not work in this theater, which would result in Thrace and eastern Anatolia becoming battlefields and being devastated. At a time when Turkey was having to consider these possibilities, NATO was not being helpful in modernizing the Turkish army and the U.S. was attaching political strings to its aid.

#### B. The Out-of-Area Issue and Turkey

The out-of-area issue arises from the need for NATO to take measures with respect to events taking place outside NATO's area of defense responsibility because the events in question directly affect the interests of member countries (see Box 4-9 in Section 4).

After the developments in Afghanistan and Iran, the U.S. declared that security questions could not be confined to a specific area and that the security risks originating in the Middle East posed a serious threat to the vital interests of the West. The U.S. wanted NATO to include these regions within its defense planning and called on its European allies to share the financial and military burdens arising from this extension.

This question was taken up in the Defense Planning Committee at the level of defense ministers with the participation of foreign ministers on May 1980. At the Bonn summit in June 1982, it was decided that the allies would consult, help, and compensate one another in connection with out-of-area issues.

But the U.S. approach never received full acceptance from the allies. The Europeans favored defining their security in narrower terms and were against extending their commitments to questions beyond Europe.

The countries of Western Europe were concerned that, if NATO extended its area of responsibility beyond Europe, the resources needed to defend central Europe might be reallocated to these new areas. This would also entail increases in defense spending. That is why decisions on this issue were left to the discretion of individual countries. Contributions to out-of-area operations would not be based on prior commitments, as proposed by the U.S., but would be left to the discretion of individual allies, which would make their decisions on a case-by-case basis.

The out-of-area issue, especially as it related to the Middle East, was of crucial importance for Turkey. This

question had come up in connection with the facilities that would be accorded to the U.S. RDF, and Turkey adopted a line that conformed to the approach of its European allies. Turkey was ready to consult and provide facilities as foreseen in NATO decisions and agreed to by the Europeans but was not ready to enter into specific commitments in advance. It adopted this line because, unlike the other allies, it was located in the Middle East. Turkey also emphasized the need for increased Western deterrence in the region through the modernization of the Turkish armed forces.

This subject would be overtaken by events when NATO reappraised its role following the developments of the 1990s. NATO decided that it would intervene in regional crises located outside the territories of its members.

#### C. The Question of Lemnos

The question of the Greek island of Lemnos posed a dilemma for NATO. The organization's approach to Turkish-Greek relations in the 1980s and its strategic interests were in conflict.

The question arose when Greece gave notice that it would assign a brigade to NATO and, along with units of its air force, deploy this force in Lemnos in the event of war. This meant that Greece was militarizing Lemnos (which had been demilitarized by international treaties) and, furthermore, was seeking to get NATO sanction for its action. This caused an angry reaction in Turkey.

Naturally, NATO's action became crucial in this situation. Turkey insisted that treaties be respected. But, although it was not stated openly, NATO favored including Lemnos in defense plans designed to contain the USSR. Accordingly, pressure was applied on Turkey to make concessions. The U.S. also had designated Lemnos as one of the centers for deploying reinforcements that would be brought in from across the ocean in the event of war and was counseling flexibility to Turkey. Turkey stood its ground, however, and warned that it would veto the proposed plan if the issue appeared on NATO's agenda.

NATO's secretary-general, Lord Peter Carrington, declared on 29 November 1984 that NATO must remain neutral on the issue of Lemnos. By not opposing a course that was a violation of international treaties, however, the secretary-general of NATO was revealing his partiality on this issue.

The question of Lemnos was on the agenda of NATO's Defense Planning Committee when it met in Brussels on 3 to 5 December 1984. At the meeting, the report on the alliance's defense plans for 1985 and the attached country chapters was adopted, but without the chapters for Greece and Turkey. The force levels of the

two countries were also not included in the report. Turkey announced that its national responsibilities would be honored and that it would continue to participate in NATO exercises, but Greece declared that it would stay away from exercises. The press release issued after the meeting made no mention of Lemnos, which, from the Turkish point of view, was a positive outcome.

In May 1986 Greece reversed its position on NATO's decision to resume the production of chemical weapons and declared that it would lift its reservation if, in turn, Turkey lifted its reservation on the subject of Lemnos. The program was considered important by U.S. and NATO officials, who once again pressed Turkey rather than Greece to show flexibility.

As a compromise, Lord Carrington proposed that Lemnos not be mentioned in the document on force goals. Instead there would only be a sentence in the NATO decision document declaring that "the views of the Turkish and Greek representatives on the subject of Lemnos were heard" (Güldemir 1991, p. 132). This paved the way for Lemnos to appear in a NATO document, even if only indirectly.

While U.S. officials were pursuing their contacts on the subject in Ankara, Greece lifted its reservation on chemical weapons. In view of Ankara's rigid position, the U.S. sought an alternative course and reached an agreement with Greece on allowing American aircraft to use Lemnos in the event of a crisis. In this way, the U.S. overcame Turkey's opposition and got its way on an issue on which Turkey had the right of veto within NATO.

## The Negotiations on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe and the Mersin Crisis

Throughout the 1980s the twenty-three members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were engaged in negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Toward the end of the 1980s considerable progress had been made in the negotiations, thanks to the changes occurring in the Eastern Bloc and the reduction of international tensions. Turkey wanted to make sure that the reduction of forces by the USSR in central Europe would not lead to the redeployment of these forces to its border. Furthermore, Turkey wanted to exempt the region of southeastern Anatolia, including Mersin, from force reductions because this region was bordering Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors that would not be reducing their conventional forces. Turkey had obtained the consent of the USSR on this matter, and the other NATO allies raised no objections.

In January 1989 the draft agreement prepared by the sixteen NATO members was ready for submission to the Warsaw Pact when Greece claimed that Mersin should be left out of the region that would be exempt from force reductions because the military forces in Mersin constituted a threat to Cyprus and the port was being used as a supply base for the Turkish forces in Cyprus. At this time, the U.S. was negotiating an agreement on bases with Greece, and Athens wanted to have a provision inserted by which the U.S. would give Greece a guarantee against Turkey. The objection to Mersin was raised in order to strike a bargain on the guarantee.

The U.S. was eager to have the force agreement concluded and was aware of the difficulty of persuading Papandreou, so secretary of state George Shultz bypassed the minister of foreign affairs and tried to solve the question directly with Özal. The Turkish MFA proposed a formula by which Mersin would be removed from the draft agreement and replaced with the phrase "a line descending from Gözne to the sea" on the understanding that the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France, and Germany would send a letter to Turkey stating that by this formula they understood "a line joining the sea at Erdemli" and therefore including the port of Mersin. This formula was eventually agreed to, but in March 1989 the U.S. gave this phrase a more flexible interpretation by stating that the question would be solved later in a manner that would give both sides satisfaction.

Meanwhile the Greek DECA was concluded, with the preamble containing the following provision: "The USA and Greece guarantee to defend one another's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity against armed attacks and threats endangering peace." This caused a sharp Turkish reaction, so President Bush sent a letter to Ankara declaring that the guarantee given to Greece did not encompass Turkey. But as a result of all this the U.S. had agreed to the insertion of a phrase in the agreement indirectly suggesting a Turkish threat, when it was already committed to defending Greece by virtue of its obligations within NATO.

### E. The Modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Development of Defense Industries

The subject of the modernization of the Turkish armed forces has always been dealt with in the context of relations with the U.S., because the armed forces were using mostly American equipment. U.S. officials were convinced that Turkey must have a strong army in the conditions of the Cold War. The interests of Turkey, located

Table 6-6. Turkey's Defense Expenditures, 1980-1989 (as percentage of GNP)

| 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 1989 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------|
| 4.3  | 4.9  | 5.2  | 4.8  | 4.4  | 4.5  | 4.8  | 4.2  | 3.8       |

Source: Sipri Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). (Table by İlhan Uzgel)

in an unstable region, and those of the U.S. were convergent. A Joint Defense Industries Steering Committee had been set up to develop defense cooperation. According to a Pentagon study conducted in 1983, it would require \$18 billion and roughly ten years to bring the Turkish armed forces up to NATO standards.

The main issue was finding the necessary resources for this modernization. Turkey held the view that an effective Turkish army would contribute directly to NATO's security and called on its allies, and especially the U.S., to contribute to the effort. Although this was a technical question, it also had political overtones because of the obstacles placed by the U.S. Congress.

At the time, there were two possible courses for the modernization of the Turkish army. One was for the U.S., and to a lesser extent Germany, to transfer to Turkey their surplus weapons systems without demanding payment or to provide loans to Turkey so that it could purchase these weapons. The other course was for Turkey to set up its own defense industries. During the 1980s the U.S. helped Turkey in both respects, even if Ankara viewed this as insufficient. We have already examined direct U.S. military assistance, so at this point we shall only consider the U.S. contribution to the development of Turkey's defense industries and its effects on bilateral relations.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Turkey was among the NATO countries with the highest defense spending as a proportion of national income and was one of the five largest purchasers of arms (Table 6-6).

Turkey's defense spending during the 1980s reached an average of less than 5% of its GNP. This level of spending placed it in third position after the U.S. and Greece. This of course had very negative effects on the Turkish economy, which was chronically short of resources.

The reasons for this heavy spending were the military operations that Turkey had to conduct in its southeastern region as well as from time to time in northern Iraq and especially the arms race with Greece.

Turkey had a number of reasons for wanting to develop domestic defense industries. The main reason was the need to achieve a measure of self-sufficiency. The U.S. arms embargo from 1975 to 1978 had taught Ankara a good lesson. Even if the likelihood of Turkey being subjected

to a similar long-term embargo was remote, difficulties in arms procurement on account of Cyprus and the Kurdish question and conditions placed on their sale made it essential to develop national capabilities. Turkey's periodic foreign exchange shortages also compelled Ankara to move in a direction that would allow arms procurement without having recourse to foreign exchange. If the products of defense industries could find foreign buyers, this would also allow Turkey to earn foreign exchange. In addition to these reasons, the development of defense industries would accelerate the introduction of advanced technologies.

The first attempt at creating a national defense industry goes back to the period between the two world wars when the short-lived Kayseri Airplane Factory was established. After 1945 there were some small steps like the establishment of the Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKE: Machinery and Chemicals Industries Enterprise), but the effort faltered once the delivery of arms from the U.S. started in a big way after membership in NATO. The effort was resumed after the U.S. arms embargd. The "National Defense Doctrine" formulated in 1978 by the Ecevit government had, as one of its main pillars, the development of a national defense industry (see Box 5-8 in Section 5). But Turkey's political and economic instability in the late 1970s prevented the implementation of the new approach. The matter was taken up once again after the coup of 12 September 1980, and the General Directorate of Ordnance was established within the Ministry of National Defense in April 1983. At the end of 1985 this office became the Agency for Developing and Supporting Defense Industries, which in turn became the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries in 1989.

Previously, foundations had been set up to strengthen the three services through public fundraising. In 1987 these three foundations were merged to become the Foundation for Developing the Turkish Armed Forces. In addition, a Fund for Supporting Defense Industries was also set up in that year. A ten-year defense program was launched in 1985.

There were three important aspects to Turkey's efforts to develop a defense industry. One was the joint production undertaken in the early 1980s with financial

backing from certain Middle Eastern countries and technological support from the U.S. A second was the bold effort to produce the F-16 combat aircraft. Finally, an effort was made to involve the fast-developing Turkish private sector to a greater extent in the establishment of defense industries.

#### Defense Industries and the Middle East

At a time when defense industries were being built up, it was important for Turkey to gain export markets in oilrich countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. This policy of developing new markets was actively supported by the U.S. Under this scheme, the U.S. would be indirectly helping these countries in their rearmament efforts while at the same time contributing to Turkey's efforts to establish closer ties with them. Turkey knew that industries whose products could only be sold to the Turkish armed forces would not be economically viable. In the early 1980s agreements were signed with these countries under which MKE would sell them ammunition. This cooperation was not confined to the sale of military equipment. Starting in 1984, a Turkish military mission that included air force pilots undertook the training of military personnel in Saudi Arabia. During this time there was a sharp increase in military contacts with Saudi Arabia. As political and economic relations with Middle Eastern countries expanded, a similar expansion occurred in military cooperation.

#### The F-16 Project

This \$8 billion project, which got underway in 1983, was the main pillar of Turkey's effort to create a defense industry. The aim of the project was to equip the air force with F-16-type combat aircraft while establishing an aerospace industry in Turkey. This work was entrusted to Tusaş (Turkish Aeronautical Industry Corporation), which had been operating in the field since 1973. In this framework, an agreement was signed on 2 May 1984 by the minister of defense and the representative of the U.S. firm General Dynamics to establish TAI (Tusaş Aerospace Industry). Turkey was to own 51% of TAI's shares and General Dynamics 49%. To manufacture the engines for these aircraft, a partnership, TEI (Tusaș Engine Industries), was set up with General Electric and became a partner of TAI. In the first phase of the project, known as Peace Onyx I, 160 aircraft would be built. Production started in February 1987 with the assembly of aircraft at the TAI factory, and the first delivery was made to the Turkish Air Force in November 1987.

Actual manufacturing began in 1989. In addition,

under a direct offset program, TAI began to manufacture F-16 parts for the U.S. Air Force and for an assembly plant located in Belgium. This production run went on until 1995, when a total of 152 F-16s had been produced.

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Turkey's main problem in establishing a national defense industry was obtaining the transfer of technology and securing the financial resources. Turkey had acquired considerable experience in this field with the operations of MKE and the existing munitions factories and shipyards. To produce high-tech equipment, however, Turkey needed joint production ventures with the U.S. and others and/or financial aid and technical know-how from abroad.

The degree to which these efforts led to a national industry remained moot. Turkey was able to carry out an important project like the manufacture of the F-16, but the old dependency on the U.S. for arms was replaced with the dependency for essential aircraft parts, which had to be procured from the U.S. This was vividly demonstrated when the U.S. created difficulties in connection with the adjustments of the avionics that went into the F-16s and the delivery of their radars.

Another problem was high cost. Although the American sale price of an F-16 was \$17 million, it cost \$25 million to produce the same aircraft in Turkey. This price would go even higher for the aircraft models equipped with advanced technology and combat systems that were manufactured in the second production run.

Despite these drawbacks, major projects like the F-16 did make it possible to acquire advanced skills and technological know-how.

### The Turkish Private Sector and Defense Industries

Özal was in contact with leading U.S. defense industries and seeking to induce foreign investors to invest in Turkey at a time when they displayed scant interest in civilian industries in the country. He declared that the government should not interfere in the operations of such investors. The U.S. administration had stated that it supported such collaboration in principle. U.S. defense industries were seeking an eight-year guarantee for their investments and said that they had no assurance that their operations would be able to continue when the Özal government left office. But the real snag was that the U.S. was not all that interested in engaging in joint production, with all of the attendant political and economic risks, in a country to which it was already selling large quantities of arms.

Despite this, the Koç group, as well as Alarko, Profilo, Nurol, and Tekfen (all big Turkish companies), displayed interest in this sector. These activities also attracted the attention of European defense producers. In May 1986 the representatives of the French firm Aérospatial visited Turkey and met with Özal. This was followed by the visits of a British delegation and of the French minister of defense.

Özal's efforts to replace state enterprises in this sector with private industries did not bear fruit. Led by Tusaş-TAI, enterprises like Aselsan (Askeri Elektronik Sanayii: Military Electronics Industries), MKE, PETLAS, and the Gölcük and Taşkızak shipyards with their increased capacities constituted tangible evidence that the bulk of defense industries in Turkey remained publicly owned.

Throughout the 1980s the U.S. remained the dominant factor in Turkey in the field of defense.

To sum up, in the 1980s Turkish-U.S. relations were flourishing, but only on the surface. The two allies had many differences in their political, military-strategic, economic, and trade relations. The questions of Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus, the Armenian bills, the Kurdish question, and aid were fields in which both sides were seeking to extract major concessions from their partner. The two countries had a complete identity of views on some issues, such as the Iranian revolution, but this was the exception rather than the rule.

As a superpower, the U.S. had much more leverage vis-à-vis Turkey and, when necessary, did not hesitate to use this leverage. It would be wrong to qualify Turkey as a country under the influence of the U.S., however, with Turkish foreign and domestic policy dictated by Washington. To cite some examples, despite the pressure it applied, the U.S. was not able to persuade Turkey to allow it to install additional nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. The U.S. was not able to resolve the question of Cyprus even though it was able to count on Özal's support. On the out-of-area question and the Rapid Deployment Force, the U.S. was not able to secure all that it sought from Turkey. This was because the U.S. did not want to lose an important ally like Turkey; nor did it want to alienate the Turkish public completely. So there was a certain balance in the relations between the two countries, with mutual concessions made to allow for sensitivities. A relationship where only the U.S. had its way would not have been in the interest of the U.S. itself.

In the early 1980s the relations of the U.S. with the military junta were very close, and this situation continued during the Özal period. More problems started emerging toward the end of the 1980s, however. Starting in 1985 and especially after the signing of the INF agreement in 1987, international tension began to ease off. In addition, Turkey's economic performance lost its luster, and by 1988 there was a payments crisis brought on by exces-

sive foreign indebtedness. This allowed the U.S. to wield greater influence in its bilateral relations with Turkey.

Numerous developments indicated that the U.S. position had shifted. Until after the mid-1980s the U.S. administration had lobbied to prevent the Armenian bills from being adopted by Congress. At the end of the decade it adopted a passive stance and even made statements supporting the bills. A more critical approach to Turkey became apparent on issues like the Kurdish question and human rights. The amount of U.S. military and economic aid diminished, while its terms became more onerous. The U.S. was applying more pressure on both Turkey and Denktaş over the question of Cyprus. While early in the decade the U.S. did not agree with Papandreou's contention that Turkey threatened Greece, toward the end of the decade it acceded to the Greek request to include a guarantee with regard to Turkey in the Greek DECA. Concern began to grow after 1989 that Turkey's place and importance for the U.S. and the West in general were waning.

İlhan Uzgel

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# Relations with the European Communities (ECs)

#### THE DIFFICULT PERIOD

# A. The Military Administration's Efforts to Maintain Ties with the West

Initial European Reaction to the 12 September Coup The coup of 12 September 1980 introduced a period of uncertainty in relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) (Box 6-11). Immediately after the coup, Gen. Kenan Evren declared that relations with the EEC, the Council of Europe, and the other institutions set up by democratic countries would be pursued in conformity with existing agreements. The program of the government of Admiral Ulusu contained the following sentence: "Our relations with the EEC will be directed toward the goal of the Ankara Agreement, which foresees Turkey eventually taking its place within the Community" (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, p. 10). There were three basic reasons for these overtures toward the ECs by the 12 September regime.

- 1. The coup-makers were well aware that their takeover would only be approved by the international community without too much fuss if it enjoyed Western endorsement. The U.S. stance toward 12 September was not negative. Because it put an end to internal turmoil and strife in an allied country, NATO supported 12 September from the very beginning. But the West for Ankara meant above all Europe, and its attitude was uncertain. An ECs declaration of support for the coup would be a huge relief.
- 2. The coup-makers also needed the economic support of the ECs as much as its political support. The ECs was important for Turkey from the viewpoint of both investments and trade. The new government knew well that the root cause of Turkey's turmoil had been the deteriorating economy. That is why one of the posts of deputy prime minister was assigned to Turgut Özal, the author of the 12 January package of economic measures. The government wanted to reinforce the institutions and implement the rules of the market economy and thereby gain

#### Box 6-11. Name Changes in the European Economic and Political Integration Process

The main organs of the European Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, and the European Economic Community were consolidated as of 1 July 1967. After this consolidation, which was termed as "fusion" or "merger," the three communities became the European Communities. The European Economic Community became the European Community under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty Signed on 7 February 1992. The Maastricht Treaty set the goal of political integration in addition to the existing goal of economic integration. The term "European Union (EU)" started being used to denote political integration and all the other dimensions of integration.

In this book, the acronym "EC" is used to denote the European Community, which was called the European Economic Community (EEC) before the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the acronym "ECS" is used to denote the European Communities, which became known as the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty. In order to remain falthful to sources, no changes have been made to original texts. The reader must bear in mind that all governing bodies of the European Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, and the European Economic Community were merged in 1967, when the three institutions became known as the European Communities. In 1958, their assemblies were merged into the European Parliament. Also merged were the Council of Justice and, after 1967, the Councils of Ministers and Commission's. At present, the Council of Ministers is the EU Council of Ministers and the Commission is the European Commission (or EU Commission). Summits are called the European Council.

(C. ERHAN)

the support of the West, and in particular the U.S. and the ECs.

3. One of the main elements of Turkey's relations with the ECs was Greece. After the collapse of the junta of colonels in 1974, Greece took important strides in its democratization process and mended its fences with the ECs. After signing the treaty of accession in 1979, Greece had overtaken Turkey once again. In its concern over being left behind by Greece, Turkey needed to maintain

good relations with the ECs and take steps to minimize the problems that Greek membership would pose for Turkey. Evren agreed to let Greece return to NATO's military structure within the framework of the Rogers Plan in the expectation that Greece would be more constructive in its bilateral relations and be helpful in allowing Turkey's relations with the ECs to develop.

Although there was no single viewpoint in the ECs regarding the military takeover in Turkey, Ankara was relieved that the statements coming from the members of the ECs were not particularly harsh. Actually, the organization was divided on this issue. One camp led by France, the Netherlands, and Denmark wanted to follow the Greek precedent of 1967 and suspend relations with Turkey. Another group led by Britain and Germany stressed that the democratic system had ceased to function prior to 12 September and that the military had taken power to restore democracy and called for relations with Turkey to continue as usual. This latter view prevailed at the Council of Ministers meeting of the ECs held on 16 September. In the statement issued following the meeting, it was noted that the military had given assurances that democratic institutions would be rapidly restored, human rights would be respected, and politicians under detention would not be mistreated. The ECs stressed that it wanted to see this undertaking carried out. This indicated that the ECs supported the 12 September operation.

A similar division appeared in the European Parliament. When the parliament met on 17 September to consider the situation in Turkey following the coup, the socialist and Communist members called for the immediate suspension of relations with Turkey, while the conservatives and liberals were against this course. The parliament followed the Council of Ministers of the ECs and decided to call for a swift transition to democracy in Turkey.

Public opinion in the ECs took a different view, however: it was overwhelmingly against 12 September and condemned the suspension of multiparty democracy in Turkey. Although this reaction was not taken too seriously by European governments at first, gradually public opinion started making itself felt as the failings of the coup-makers became manifest in the fields of human rights, political rights, and freedoms.

### The First Council of Association Meeting after 12 September

Those who carried out the 12 September operation in Turkey were highly satisfied by the moderate reaction of the ECs. But within weeks difficulties began to emerge. The most significant reaction was the decision of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to impose visas on Turkish citizens in October 1980. These countries were in any case ready to impose visas to keep Turkish workers out but were hesitant because of possible Turkish reaction to what Ankara might consider a violation of the Association Agreement. After 12 September Turkey needed European support and was therefore no longer in a position to protest. Some ECs members took advantage of this new situation to impose visas. This would also serve the purpose of blocking the entry of political refugees fleeing from the repression of the 12 September administration.

In early October Ankara requested a meeting of the Council of Association. One of the organs of the Turkey-EEC association was the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which had been scheduled to meet in İzmir on 22 October 1980. This meeting could not be held, however, because of the dissolution of the TGNA.

When the Council of Association met on 3 December 1980, it did so at the level of ambassadors rather than ministers. This level of representation was not adequate for addressing the question of visas, to which Turkey attributed great importance. Turkey's arguments to the effect that its rights had been violated got a frosty reception. The members of the ECs argued that introducing the visa requirement was in keeping with international law and was not intended to harm Turkey's interests. Turkey returned empty-handed from the first Council of Association meeting after 12 September.

### The Consequences of Greek Membership in the ECs for Turkey

When Greece became a full member of the ECs on 1 January 1981, the race between Turkey and Greece, which had been going on since the late 1950s, was settled decisively in Greece's favor. In the years following the signing of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, three new members had been admitted to the ECs (the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland). The mostly economic questions of adjustment arising from this expansion were settled through negotiations with these countries and the ECs. The membership of Greece, however, not only posed minor economic questions of adjustment but signaled the beginning of a new era, when the problems would be of a completely different order of magnitude to be tackled on the basis of different parameters. Greek membership affected Turkey's relations with the ECs in four fundamental ways.

1. Turkey felt that it had been overtaken and the race was lost. There were two alternative paths for Ankara to follow. In the face of anti-Turkish positions that the ECs

might adopt with Greece as a member, Turkey could distance itself from the ECs and embark on a new course. Or it could apply for full membership before Greece became fully integrated within the ECs. In the period from 1981 to 1987 Turkey vacillated between these two alternative courses.

- 2. Greece was Turkey's rival not just politically but also commercially. The two countries' export products were in large measure similar. Greece would now enjoy customs-free and quota-free access to the EEC market, which would be to the detriment of Turkey's exports. Furthermore, Greece could now steer the European Communities to take decisions detrimental to Turkey's interests and could block financial cooperation and the provision of loans and grants.
- 3. Greece could now bring contentious issues like Cyprus, minorities, Aegean territorial waters, the continental shelf, airspace, and FIR (Flight Information Region) responsibilities to the agenda of the ECs. As a result, the ECs might apply political or economic pressures on Turkey to secure the settlement of some of these questions.
- 4. With the admission of Greece, an Orthodox country, certain quarters in Western Europe became uncomfortable because of their deep-seated belief that the ECs would group together the countries of the former Holy Roman Empire and that there was no place in this grouping for the Eastern churches. The membership of Greece had made it even more unpalatable for these groups to envisage the membership of Muslim Turkey.

As in the case of previous accessions, it was now necessary for Greece to go through a harmonization procedure in order for it to become a party to the legal undertakings contained in Turkey's agreements with the EEC. The harmonization negotiations began in Brussels on 21 January 1981.

At the negotiations, Turkey's request for additional preferences for its agricultural products got a cool reception from the ECs. Turkey's quotas for certain categories of textile products were raised, however. In addition, on 19 June 1981 the Fourth Financial Protocol, by which Turkey would receive 650 million ECUs (European Currency Units) in aid, was initialed.

In view of Greece's accession to the ECs, the military administration undertook the necessary preparations for Turkey to apply for full membership. Evren and the members of the National Security Council wanted Turkey to catch up with Greece without any delay. Although the veteran Turkish diplomats who had been conducting the negotiations shared this ambition, the State Planning Organization (DPT) raised objections. The administra-

tion wanted the MFA to steer the negotiations, and the DPT found itself sidetracked. On 25 March 1981 the NSC decided to undertake the preparations for full membership and gave instructions to carry out a restructuring that would leave the DPT outside the decision-making process (Tekeli and Ilkin, pp. 42–43).

At the meeting of the Council of Association held in Brussels on 5 June 1981, Turkey informed the ECs that it would formally apply for full membership as soon as democracy was restored in the country. The ECs did not respond negatively to this bid because it felt that to do so would only delay a return to democracy. But there was a widely held belief in the capitals of the ECs that an early application without adequate preparation could lead to developments detrimental to Turkey's relations with the ECs.

By the end of 1981 the restructuring ordered by Evren in March had been carried out; but contrary to his instructions, the DPT was assigned a central role in the new structure. A decree was promulgated on 25 December by which the coordination of Turkey's relations with the ECs was entrusted to a committee to be chaired by the DPT. A division responsible for ECs affairs was set up in the DPT. Even the military administration had not been able to overcome the long-standing rivalry arising from turf wars between the MFA and the DPT.

While efforts were being made to end squabbling between institutions, the necessary legislation was being adopted to enable Turkey to gain full membership. The draft Constitution contained the phrase "[s]overeignty belongs to the Turkish nation unconditionally," which had been borrowed directly from the 1961 Constitution.

To this was added the phrase "[t]his principle shall not apply to the provisions of agreements foreseeing membership in organizations with supranational competence." But the NSC removed this second phrase from the draft. The inability to settle the differences between the MFA and the DPT and the failure to establish the legislative basis for membership revealed that Turkey was still not ready to take decisive steps in this direction.

# B. Increasing Strains in Relations with the ECs

The relatively lenient approach of the ECs to the coup following 12 September gradually gave way to a much more critical stance in the second half of 1981. This new stance was a reaction to the growing repression of individuals, unions, political parties, associations, and NGOs in Turkey. But in addition to this repression, three other factors would continue to affect Turkey's relations with the ECs

in the following years: (1) the policies of Athens toward Ankara after PASOK came to power; (2) the activities of political refugees from Turkey who formed lobbies in Europe; (3) the Jewish lobbies in Europe that withheld their support for Turkey as a result of the military administration's growing rapprochement with Arab countries and Ankara's distancing itself from Israel.

On 10 April 1981 the European Parliament adopted a resolution introduced by the Socialist Group. With this resolution, the EP called on the military administration in Turkey to respect freedoms and to come up with a detailed calendar for restoring democracy. The EP also asked the Council of the ECs to suspend the association established by the Ankara Agreement if the democratic institutions that existed in Turkey were not restored within two months. This last radical point had been introduced by the Communist group, which wanted to apply this sanction on Turkey based on the precedent established by the organization when it applied this measure to Greece after the coup of the colonels' junta. As the violation of human rights of the military administration became more flagrant, the conservative and liberal groups also began to tilt in this direction. The resolution of the EP was interpreted by the Turkish government as the "actions of those who would like to see a return to the terror and the instability of the pre-12 September period" (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 52).

Despite the remonstrations of different organs of the ECs, the military administration maintained its repressive policies. Evren and his companions were aware that Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S. and NATO had grown after the events in Iran and Afghanistan. They were confident that, as the U.S. supported the military administration, it would also apply pressure on the ECs on behalf of Turkey. Developments proved that they were correct in their assumption. The U.S. repeatedly approached members of the ECs and called for a measured approach toward Turkey. Despite this, Brussels hardened its policy toward Turkey in reaction to the military administration's arbitrary and undemocratic practices.

When the NSC dissolved all political parties and confiscated their assets in October 1981 and when the Peace Association was closed down and its leaders were arrested, the European Parliament adopted a decision in the course of its budgetary debate on 4 November 1981 and suspended the Fourth Financial Protocol, which had been initialed on 19 June 1981. True, the Council of the ECs did not formally endorse this decision. But the loan of 600 million ECUs foreseen in the Fourth Financial Protocol, which came into effect on 1 November 1981,

was never approved. Thus, even if it remained formally in effect, in practice the Fourth Financial Protocol had been suspended. It must be noted that Greece was in large measure responsible for the council's stand on this issue. These developments caused deep concern in many circles in Turkey and most notably in the MFA. Prime Minister Ulusu, however, reacted to the EP's decision with the remark: "We don't want those who don't want us" (Evren, p. 474).

A good number of ECs members, led by France, wanted to freeze relations with Turkey, but they were met with the opposition of the Federal Republic of Germany. In taking this stand, Germany was motivated by the need to do something about the free circulation of workers. The FRG wanted to extract concessions from the Military Administration, which did not have to be worried about public opinion. When the customs union foreseen in the Additional Protocol of 1971 was due to come into effect in 1985, the FRG was planning to seek measures that would restrict the free circulation of Turkish workers in the ECs that was due to come into force in 1986. When the German foreign minister, H.D. Genscher, visited Ankara in November 1982, this subject was high on his agenda. Genscher bluntly told Evren that he was seeking an agreement that would prevent the free circulation of workers. During 1983 Bonn took a number of measures that encouraged foreign workers to return to their home countries.

As political relations between Turkey and the ECs deteriorated, there was a similar trend in economic relations. Starting in the latter part of 1981, the ECs started restricting the import of Turkish cotton yarn, claiming that it was being dumped. Throughout 1982 new restrictions and quota limitations were imposed on all of Turkey's textile products, which made up the bulk of its exports. The main reason for this was the crisis facing the textile industries in the countries of the ECs, where almost 1 million textile workers were jobless. To keep the situation from getting worse, the ECs felt compelled to take protectionist measures. Under the terms of the Additional Protocol, it should not have been so easy to take such measures. But in view of the negative political developments in Turkey and the anti-Turkish sentiments prevailing in the EP, the ECs found it expedient to follow this course.

On 17 November 1982 the new Turkish Constitution was approved by a large majority in a referendum. Some quarters in Europe, however, considered it undemocratic for the referendum to be held under martial law with strict measures in force. There were also negative reactions in Western Europe to the closing of political parties in 1983 and the NSC's vetoing of the leaders of some political par-

ties. On 13 October 1983 the EP adopted a resolution condemning Turkey for its antidemocratic practices (Tekeli and Ilkin, p. 61).

Following the election on 6 November 1983 and the restoration of civilian rule, relations between Ankara and Brussels would enter a new phase.

## The Road Leading to the Application for Full Membership

Özal and Relations with the ECs

The military regime was striving to improve relations with the ECs, but without success. As a consequence, it drew closer to the U.S. and to the Muslim countries, which were usually referred to as "friends and brothers." When the leader of the Motherland Party, Turgut Özal, became prime minister, he maintained the close links with the U.S. and the countries of the Middle East. But he also intended to improve Turkey's relations with the ECs, which had been neglected for three years. It would be difficult to talk about a consistent ECs strategy pursued by the Motherland Party, however. After a hesitant initial phase, relations grew closer from 1983 to 1987, when they reached a climax with Turkey's application for full membership (Tekeli and Ilkin, pp. 71–92).

The Motherland Party's program stressed that Turkey's eventual goal was full membership in the ECs. But it also stated that the process of integration would entail the balancing of the interests of both sides. Özal was not ready to accede to the ECs with his eyes shut and without a process of tough bargaining. He confirmed this by declaring that Turkey would forgo membership if the price to pay was too high.

Such declarations did not make much of an impact on the attitude of Brussels toward Turkey. Brussels insisted that relations must first be normalized before they could develop, and this could not happen before Ankara improved its performance in the field of democratic freedoms and human rights.

The reforms that Brussels demanded could not take place in an environment in which the military still exercised control over elected politicians. Two other developments hindered the process of normalization with Brussels. After PASOK came to power in Greece, Athens carried its disputes with Turkey to the ECs platforms, effectively blocking progress in Turkey's relations with the ECs. Greece was preventing the meeting of the Council of Association from taking place, even though the council had not met for a very long time. The second development in the path of progress was the dispute with the Federal Republic of Germany over the free circulation of workers.

According to the agreements, Turkish workers were due to acquire the right freely to enter and work in the countries of the ECs as of 1986. Germany claimed that this freedom would harm its interests, however, and called for a postponement. It was obvious that the Federal Republic would not allow Turkey's relations with the ECs to develop without first settling this dispute to its satisfaction.

In his first year as prime minister, Özal realized that the process of normalization would not be easy. Starting in December 1984, Özal decided to approach the ECs through a new strategy, as recommended in a report prepared by his chief advisor, Adnan Kahveci (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 72). Özal held that, since relations with the ECs were going from bad to worse, there must be a drastic change in policy to put things right. The moribund relations could only be restored with shock treatment. The shock treatment recommended by Kahveci and fully endorsed by Özal was application for full membership. Turgut Özal announced on 1 December 1984 that the time had come for Turkey to apply for full membership.

#### The Main Points of Discord

At the time when Özal was hinting that the application for membership would be coming soon, three basic issues separated Ankara and Brussels.

1. The timing of Turkey's application was creating difficulties. Although Turkey had not yet submitted a formal application, even the suggestion of an application had sent tremors through the ECs. Senior officials of the organization declared that neither Turkey nor the ECs was ready for Turkey's full membership and stressed that the chance that a Turkish application would be accepted was very remote. Even Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Belgium, whose friendship and support Turkey was counting on, found the talk about full membership premature. This was the time when the negotiations with Spain and Portugal had been concluded, and the decision had been made to admit these countries in 1986. The industrialized members had accepted the membership of two relatively poor countries, coming on top of Greek membership, only on condition that no other expansion take place for the next ten years. These ten years would allow for the poor to be assimilated by the rich. At this stage there was no room in the ECs for another poor country.

2. The Council of Association had not met at the ministerial level since 1980, and no decisions had been made on important questions. The date of the next council meeting and its agenda had become pressing issues. Özal considered a meeting of the council at an early date to be an indicator of normalization of relations with the ECs, so

he made every effort to secure a meeting at the ministerial level. Only Greece and Denmark among the members appeared to be against such a meeting. The reason for Denmark's opposition was the human rights issue in Turkey. The pressure of other members, headed by the FRG, succeeded in persuading Denmark to agree.

Athens would only agree to a meeting on condition that Turkey made certain concessions to Greece on issues of contention between the two countries, even though the holding of the meeting of the Council of Association was required under the Ankara Agreement. Athens was demanding an undertaking from Turkey that it would respect Greece's territorial integrity and respect Greece's rights in the Aegean and that it would withdraw its troops from Cyprus and lift the restrictions placed on the properties of the Greek minority in Turkey. The Greek conditions aroused anger in Turkey. According to a generally held belief in Turkey, Athens had broken its promise made in 1981 when joining the ECs that bilateral questions with Turkey would not be brought up within the framework of the organization. But no such promise had been registered formally in any document signed by Greece. It was perhaps an informal undertaking, like Rogers's "word as a soldier" in connection with the Rogers Plan, and was later forgotten and dropped from the agenda.

Özal believed that the Greek obduracy could be overcome with outside pressure and for this purpose established close personal links with the prime ministers of France, Britain, Italy, and the FRG. These countries felt that it would be expedient to develop relations with Turkey within the existing structure in order to prevent Turkey from pressing for full membership. This approach allowed the Council of Association to meet on 16 September 1986.

This was the first time since the coup of 12 September 1980 that the council was meeting at the ministerial level, which was an important indication that relations were on the way to becoming normalized. But the meeting failed to tackle important issues like the free circulation of workers or the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol, which remained suspended. Athens had demonstrated once again that Ankara should not expect normalization of relations with the ECs before it mended its relations with Greece.

3. A third area of fundamental disagreement between Turkey and the EEC was the question of free circulation of workers. At the meeting of the Council of Association held on 2 December 1976, Turkey had already agreed to a lengthy postponement of the implementation of free circulation. At the meeting held on 30 June 1980, Turkey

had further agreed that free circulation would come into force gradually and in stages and was satisfied with improvements in the social and legal condition of its workers already in the EEC countries. The Association Council's decision number 1/80, which contained arrangements on these issues, would be the basis on which the European Court of Justice would subsequently adopt far-reaching decisions on Turkey's relations with the EEC.

During the visit of Özal to the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1984 and the talks held in Ankara by German chancellor Helmut Kohl in July 1985, this issue was continually on the agenda. It became clear even then that Bonn had made its mind up on the issue. The German side was approaching the issue from the perspective of its interests, ignoring the legal angle. According to Bonn, the social and legal conditions of Turkish workers had been improved, and in return Turkey should stop insisting on free circulation. Furthermore, countries like France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which hosted fairly large numbers of Turkish workers, were also opposed to free circulation.

At this point it became apparent that Turkey might agree to postpone free circulation, which was due to come into force in December 1986, and await the outcome of its application for full membership. Ankara would decide on its next step in the light of the outcome of its application. In the meantime bilateral talks would be held with the Germans to secure some sort of monetary compensation for losses arising from the postponement of free circulation. Ankara's flexibility on the issue was received with satisfaction in the capitals of ECs members.

Ankara's flexibility was not of its own choosing, however. Bonn had made it plain that it would not countenance free circulation. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol was not being implemented. As the membership of the EEC expanded, Ankara's trade privileges were being steadily eroded. This was especially true in the case of countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and Turkey's nonmembership was bound to become a growing economic handicap. The Greek veto was preventing the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol. The European Parliament had failed to relax its tough line toward Turkey adopted during the time of the military regime. In these circumstances, it was unthinkable for Ankara to drive a hard bargain on the issues of free circulation and at the same time contemplate making an application for full membership. In any case, for free circulation of labor to come into force, it was necessary for the customs union to come into effect in 1985 for all industrial products other than those items considered sensitive. It was also neces-

sary for Ankara to make concessions to members of the EEC on the issue of free circulation in order to overcome their resistance to Turkey's application for membership. Following this logic, Özal decided not to insist on the issue of free circulation before the application for membership had been acted upon. At the same time, Özal did not want to give the impression that Turkey had given up on its treaty-based rights, so the minister of state in charge of ECs affairs, Ali Bozer, applied to the EEC in November 1986 to remove the barriers against the free movement of workers.

In response to this application, the Council of Ministers of the ECs declared on 24 November 1986 that the legal requirements for starting free circulation had not yet been fulfilled and added that the question of implementation had to be decided by the Council of Association following careful preparations carried out in closed session. It was also stressed that at the preparatory talks only the Turkish workers who had been living and working in the EEC countries for at least five years would be considered eligible to benefit from free circulation.

This decision came as no surprise to Ankara. The rights derived from international treaties had been suspended with a unilateral decision of the EEC. This spurred Özal to press on with his decision to apply for full membership.

# Moves to Prepare the ECs for the Upcoming Application

Throughout 1986 Özal and his entourage had begun to receive the signs that the reaction of the ECs to an application would be unfavorable and strong. There was no question of Turkey retreating from an application, however, which Ankara saw as a sort of "shock treatment" to put its relations with the organization back on track. The Motherland Party had introduced the European Communities membership issue in domestic politics for the first time and used it in the by-election held in September 1986. This practice would be followed by all subsequent governments. To step backward at this point would allow the opposition to depict it as a major setback and would lead to the Motherland Party losing votes. Consequently, a systematic plan was put into operation to soften the reaction of Brussels to the application, now scheduled to take place on 14 April 1987. The plan consisted of six main elements (Tekeli and Ilkin, pp. 78-79).

1. Although not directly related to the ECs, Turkey granted its citizens the right to make personal applications to the European Commission on Human Rights in early 1987. This was an issue to which all Western European Commission of Human Rights in early 1987.

pean countries attached utmost importance. ECs circles, in particular the European Parliament (which had frequently admonished Turkey on the issues of democratization and respect for human rights), received the news with satisfaction. Turkey's move was followed by changes in its internal legislation to allow for the exercise of this right. This bold move earned much praise for Ankara from the ECs.

- 2. Greece was creating problems in Turkey's relations with the ECs on every occasion. Ankara decided to accede to a Greek request that it had been rejecting and in February 1988 announced that the decree of 1964 forbidding the sale of Greek-owned property in Turkey would be rescinded. After Greece joined the ECs, the agreement with the organization that Turkey had to conclude to make the necessary adjustments for Greek membership had to be approved first by the ECs Council of Ministers without running into a Greek veto. Then it had to be ratified by the Greek parliament. Turkey's decision to rescind the decree would help overcome its image as a trouble-maker and eliminate the possibility of a Greek veto, while Brussels would interpret this as a conciliatory gesture on the eve of the application.
- 3. Concrete signs began to be given in 1986 that Turkey would not insist on the right of free circulation. Özal, his senior advisor Kahveci, and other officials made statements that new employment opportunities would emerge in Turkey as foreign investments increased and that it would not be necessary for Turkish workers to move to Europe to find jobs.
- 4. The Turkish government sought to take advantage of the influence that big business wielded over their governments and steered the contracts for large construction projects to firms of the ECs countries. Many leading firms were invited to participate in tenders for large construction projects like motorways, dams, and bridges in 1986 and 1987.
- 5. Ankara began to stress Turkey's political as well as economic importance for the ECs. NATO member Turkey kept on carrying out the job of helping defend Western Europe at a time when the Cold War was still making itself felt, notwithstanding Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies.
- 6. Another element related to the menace of political Islam. From the first application in 1987 until 1999, when Turkey was formally accepted as a candidate for accession at the EU Helsinki Summit, all Turkish prime ministers except Necmettin Erbakan used the argument that to exclude Turkey from Europe would strengthen radical Islamic currents in the country, with dire consequences for

European interests in the region. Özal and his aides were the first to use this argument in their conversations with Europeans.

As Ankara accelerated its activities in all of these six areas in the early months of 1987, the signals coming from ECs embassies in Ankara were hardly encouraging. The member countries were busy trying to gauge the impact of the Single European Act on the ECs. In these circumstances, Özal cut short the campaign to prepare ECs capitals for Turkey's application in order to avoid damaging heated public debates among the Europeans. Özal instructed Ali Bozer to submit Turkey's application for membership on 14 April 1987.

# II. THE APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP AND ITS AFTERMATH A. The Reasons for Applying

The minister of state, Ali Bozer, delivered Turkey's letter of application for full membership to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Leo Tindemans, who was the president of the ECs Council of Ministers at the time. The application was to the European Coal and Steel Community under article 98 of the Treaty of Paris, to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) under article 209 of the EURATOM Treaty, and to the European Economic Community under article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Bozer met the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, on the same day and delivered a copy of Turkey's letter of application. According to the procedures, the letter's original was to be transmitted to the commission after a preliminary examination by the council. Turkey was keen to see this stage of the procedure carried out without a hitch. Tindemans informed Bozer that the usual procedure would be followed and gave assurances that there would be no procedural difficulties.

With the application of 14 April, Ankara had taken the first formal step toward realizing the goal of full membership at an early date, which Turkey had been pursuing since 1985. This was a milestone in Turkey's bumpy relations with the European integration. There were important economic and political reasons for Turkey to apply at a time when the attitude of the ECs was aloof and distant.

#### The Economic Reasons

Because of the 12 September coup and developments like the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, Turkey's relations with the ECs were in limbo. Furthermore, the customs union had not been realized, the Fourth Financial Protocol was not being implemented, and the free circulation of workers, which had been scheduled to commence in 1986, remained suspended. The difficulties created by this situation could only be overcome by breathing new life into relations.

In addition to these reasons stemming from Ankara's relations with the ECs, it was also necessary for Turkey to achieve closer integration with the organization because of its macroeconomic policies. Özal's policies of opening Turkey to the outside world and the structural adjustments that this entailed could only be carried out with foreign credits. Turkey wanted to capitalize on its application to increase confidence in foreign markets and thereby accelerate the flow of funds into the country. At the same time, Turkey wanted to be able to draw on the funds that would be available once the full membership process started. The ECs, however, was reluctant to grant Turkey what it had furnished to Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Ankara was hoping that by making a bid for membership it would also check the demand by Brussels for a customs union prior to membership.

#### The Political Reasons

Two political considerations had remained unchanged from the time when Turkey had applied for associate membership in the EEC in 1959 to the time when it applied for full membership in the ECs.

The first of these was that Turkey regarded its participation in the European integration process as a natural and necessary outcome of its process of Westernization and modernization. There was a strongly held belief in the country that, after the damage inflicted by the three military interventions on the democratic and pluralistic regime from the end of the 1950s to the middle of the 1980s, integration with the ECs would contribute greatly to the strengthening of political stability and democracy in Turkey.

The second constant consideration was Greece. After joining the ECs as a full member in 1981, Greece had overtaken Turkey once again. Now that it had a say in the decision-making of the ECs, Greece was dragging the organization into all the contentious issues in Turkish-Greek relations. To attain parity with Greece, Turkey would have to seek full membership. This had become much harder, however, now that Greece held the power of veto in the ECs decision-making process.

Another political reason for Turkey's application was that Turkey remained, along with Norway and Iceland, one of the few European members of NATO that was not within the ECs after the expansions of 1981 and 1986. Given that Norway and Iceland had opted to stay out of the organization, Turkey was the sole European NATO

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member that had been excluded. This situation was causing frustration in Turkey: as Europe developed its political integration, the ECs would also start assuming responsibilities for the defense of Western Europe by acquiring effective military capabilities. If the defense organization known as the Western European Union assumed NATO's role, Turkey would find itself deprived of a valuable defense umbrella. As a member of the ECs, Turkey would also want to belong to the WEU.

# B. Domestic and International Reactions to the Application

The Reaction of the ECs

Much to Ankara's surprise, Turkey's application for membership got a very negative reaction from the European public. Without exception, the European media were agreed that Turkey's application was an untimely and hopeless move. The European Trade Unions Confederation operating in ECs countries and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and other NGOs shared the views of the media on this issue (Tekeli and Ilkin, p. 91).

Reactions of ECs member countries varied. The strongest reaction came from Greece, which declared unequivocally that it would oppose Turkey's application. Luxembourg took a similar position. Germany characterized the Turkish move as an attempt to revitalize relations with the ECs, which had approached the breaking point. Bonn was opposed to full membership and favored a relationship between the ECs and Turkey through a customs union. This caused concern in Ankara, for Germany's negative stand could lead to rejection of the Turkish application in the ECs Council without it being sent to and considered by the commission.

Özal wrote a letter to Chancellor Kohl in which he appealed for understanding. He declared that Bonn's approach would be interpreted in Turkey as xenophobia, which would greatly damage Turkish-German friendship. Realizing that the perception of xenophobia would do harm to Germany's international standing, Kohl decided to adopt a more positive approach at least when the issue came up for consideration at the ECs Council (Tekeli and Ilkin, p. 92).

Unlike some other members, Belgium and Britain were more measured in their reactions to Turkey's application. As president of the council, Tindemans insisted on giving Turkey's application the same treatment as previous applications; as a consequence, the council decided to refer Turkey's application to the commission for an opinion. At that stage, this was exactly what Ankara had been hoping to obtain.

#### **Domestic Reactions**

The application was well received by the Turkish public. The media gave the impression that Turkey's membership was a sure thing, however, which gave rise to unwarranted optimism and high expectations. There was a sharp rise in public support for full membership because of the biased reporting of the media. The press indulged in the same excesses in 1995 in connection with the customs union and in 1999 when Turkey was declared a full candidate for accession at the Helsinki Summit. On all of these occasions the cry was "Turkey is now European."

Professional associations like the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), and the Federation of Labor Unions (Türk-İş) adopted a more sober approach. These organizations supported the application, which they considered to be overdue. They started giving advice to the government on how Turkey should approach the negotiations from the perspective of their sector's interests. But they too probably had been influenced by the public mood and, ignoring the fact that the application had to be considered by the commission first, started thinking about the accession negotiations.

All of the major parties, with the exception of the Welfare Party, the successor of the banned National Salvation Party, were in favor of the application. The True Path Party (DYP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) held the view that the application would enhance Turkey's prestige in Europe. They also felt that this was a step that would facilitate the restoration of the political rights of their natural leaders, Demirel and Ecevit, which were still restricted. The Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) believed that it would be necessary to carry out radical reforms in the area of democratization before the commission would entertain Turkey's application.

# C. The Suspension of the Application Turkey's Efforts to Secure the Acceptance of Its Application

Shortly after its application was referred to the commission by the council, Ankara began to understand that this was not very significant and that it was the subsequent procedure that was critical.

From the middle of 1987 to the time when the commission submitted its opinion in 1989, Turkey made strenuous efforts to make sure that the application did not get sidetracked. Bilateral contacts with ECs members were intensified in order to persuade governments. Efforts were also made to secure a meeting of the Council of Association.

Special emphasis was given to bilateral relations with Greece. Ankara assumed that a reduction of tension in relations with that country would go a long way toward improving relations with the ECs. Özal hoped that Papandreou could be persuaded to shift his position on Turkey through close personal contacts. In this framework, Özal met with his Greek opposite number on two occasions in February and March 1988. The first contact took place on the occasion of the World Economic Forum's meeting in Davos, where it was claimed that a new atmosphere of understanding and dialogue had emerged. This came to be known as the "spirit of Davos." But Greece failed to take concrete steps that would indicate that it had softened its hard-line anti-Turkish attitude in ECs organs. It was because of Greek opposition that the meeting of the Council of Association scheduled for 1988 failed to take place.

Nevertheless, Özal continued to court Greece, which was due to take over the presidency of the ECs on 1 July 1988, and paid a visit to Athens in June of that year. Even this failed to budge the Greeks.

Although Ankara was unhappy with the unbending Greek stance, it maintained its bilateral contacts with other ECs capitals in the expectation that they might influence Athens. These capitals shared the negative Greek views with respect to Turkey's application, albeit for different reasons, although they did not declare it as openly as Greece. The entire Turkish leadership (consisting of Evren, Özal, Bozer, and Yılmaz) visited the European capitals, starting with Bonn, London, and Paris, but got little encouragement other than vague expressions of goodwill.

Parallel to the bilateral contacts, Turkey was seeking a meeting of the Council of Association in order to secure the implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol and secure the clarification of the issue of free circulation of workers. But Greece indicated that it was opposed to such a meeting unless the agenda included the question of Cyprus and the issue of human rights. This Greek attitude, at a time when the spirit of Davos was still fresh, demonstrated to Ankara the difficulty of its task. Furthermore, Greece was supported by the Federal Republic of Germany, which readily declared that the question of Cyprus cast a dark shadow on Turkey's relations with the ECs. Ankara replied that the question of Cyprus would not be made a subject for bargaining. Turkey's hopes for early membership were dealt a hard blow in May 1988 when the members of the European Commission considered the issue of Europe's enlargement and agreed that no new members would be admitted before 1992. They also agreed that Turkey's membership could only come long

after 1992 (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 118; "Membership in the EC Is a Dream," Cumhuriyet, 7 May 1988).

In the face of these setbacks, Ankara resorted to its old policies vis-à-vis the ECs, which had become classic by now. Starting in mid-1988, Ankara started emphasizing that the ECs was not Turkey's sole option, while also suggesting that Turkey might start drifting eastward if not admitted to the organization. At different forums, Bozer declared that, if Turkey failed to establish a satisfactory relationship with the ECs, it would tighten its relations with the U.S. and Canada, with the USSR, with the EFTA countries, and with Islamic countries. During his visit to the FRG in October 1988, Evren asserted that by rejecting Turkey the ECs would be pushing it toward an Islamic union. In addition, views were expressed that a Turkey excluded from the ECs might review its membership in NATO.

Concurrently, Turkey sought to use the awarding of large public contracts, made possible by its growing economy, to secure advantages in its dealings with the ECs. It tried to influence countries like Spain and France with enticing defense contracts. But these tactics failed to yield the expected results.

# The Commission's Report and the Council's Decision

The European Commission submitted its opinion on Turkey's application on 18 December 1989. The recommendation to the council was that for the time being Turkey's application should be suspended (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 159; State Planning Organization, unpublished internal document dated 18 December 1989 entitled "The Commission's Opinion on Turkey's Application for Full Membership").

The main reason for the commission's opinion was that the ECs did not want to engage in further enlargement before 1993. But the commission also cited reasons directly related to Turkey's application. According to the commission, accession negotiations could be undertaken with an applicant only if there was a possibility or a probability that the negotiations could be concluded within a reasonable period. This was dependent on the applicant's ability to undertake the obligations stemming from membership without delaying the ECs progress as well as the organization's ability to cope with the problems that would come about with the accession of the applicant. After reviewing the case from both the economic and political angles, the commission concluded that it was unlikely that Turkey would be able to meet these criteria in the short term. Despite the measures taken since 1980, the Turkish

economy had not reached a sufficient level of economic development. The structural differences in the economic indicators of Turkey and the ECs, the various measures still in force in Turkey to protect national industries, the low income of workers and the inadequacy of their social welfare, and chronic problems like inflation and unemployment rendered full membership impossible.

The commission held that Turkey's political situation also prevented full membership. Although the steps taken to restore democracy after the 12 September interlude were welcome, they were still considered inadequate. Political limitations and restrictions on labor unions needed to be lifted. Turkey was still considerably behind European democracies in areas such as human rights and respect for minorities. Finally, the differences with Greece over Cyprus were preventing Turkey's relations with the ECs from developing satisfactorily.

After enumerating Turkey's shortcomings that constituted obstacles to full membership, the commission also made a reference to the burden that Turkish membership would impose on the ECs. This burden would be greater than that of all the other new members because of the poor condition of the Turkish economy. Because of the free circulation of Turkish workers, unemployment rates would rise in the EEC.

In view of the elements contained in the commission's opinion, the conclusion was that it would not be useful to either Turkey or the ECs to begin accession negotiations. The commission's recommendation to the council was to take no action in connection with Ankara's application. In making this recommendation, the commission stressed that "it wanted to cast no doubt on Turkey's eligibility for membership in the Community" (Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, SEC [89] 2290 final/2, 20 December 1989, paragraph 13 [unpublished paper]). This was designed to preempt a sharp reaction from Ankara if it should get the impression that it had been excluded from the ECs for good.

Treating Turkey's application in a manner that differed from all previous applications, the commission recommended that Turkey's relations with the ECs should develop along four distinct paths. The customs union should come into effect, financial cooperation should be revived, industrial and technological cooperation should be developed, and political dialogue and cultural cooperation should be promoted. These recommendations revealed that, in the commission's view, for the time being Turkey's relations with the ECs should be based on "ties of association."

The opinion of the commission was endorsed by the

Council of Ministers on 5 February 1990. It should be noted that in doing this the Council of Ministers did not make any "formal decision" in connection with Turkey's application but merely indicated that the commission's opinion had been endorsed "as the conclusion of the meeting." The council asked the commission to prepare a report on how relations with Turkey could be furthered in the context of association. The report was duly prepared by the commission's president, Abel Matutes, but never got inserted in the council's agenda because of Greece's obstruction.

### The Unstated Reasons for the Suspension of Turkey's Application

Although the reasons given in the opinion submitted by the commission and endorsed by the council were perfectly valid from the ECs perspective, two other reasons affecting the course of Turkey's relations with the organization were not stated in the opinion.

The first of these was the change occurring in Europe. After Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985, the accelerating process of transformation in Europe came to a climax with the demolition of the Berlin Wall in the fall of 1989. The countries of Eastern Europe were suddenly liberated from the economic and political models of the past forty years and, with their new orientations, became the priority and main focus of interest for the ECs. The ECs could be instrumental in securing the smooth integration of these countries with the West only if it directed its financial resources generously to them. To be able to manage this, it was necessary for the ECs not to assume inordinately heavy burdens elsewhere.

Furthermore, as the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe ceased to be a threat to the West, Turkey was beginning to lose its trump card of being a shield against communism, which had served it well ever since the 1950s.

The second reason related to "cultural differences." This was never mentioned or even implied in ECs organs. This concept was beginning to take hold in certain quarters in Europe, however, and was having a damaging effect on Turkey's relations with the ECs. Toward the end of the 1980s these quarters were getting far more extreme and vocal than their counterparts of the 1960s. When they said "cultural differences," they understood historical and religious differences.

These reasons continued to be the determining factors behind the scene in Turkey's relations with integration in Europe during the 1990s.

ÇAĞRI ERHAN AND TUĞRUL ARAT

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# Relations with Greece

#### I. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PERIOD

In the 1980s two parties and two leaders left an imprint on both Turkey and Greece: the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Özal, in Turkey and PASOK, led by Andreas Papandreou, in Greece. To be able to appraise Turkish-Greek relations in this period, we must understand the philosophies and roles assumed by these two parties and their respective leaders in the changing international scene.

The détente that started developing in the second half of the 1970s came to an abrupt end with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran, which transformed the Middle Eastern scene.

With the victory of the Republicans in the U.S. election and the coming of Ronald Reagan to the White House, the armaments race gained a new impetus, while moderate Islam began to be promoted within the framework of the doctrine of the Green Belt. The 12 September regime regarded Islam as an ally in its struggle with leftist and Kurdish movements and was ready to participate in the implementation of Washington's new doctrine.

The close ties between the U.S. and Turkey in the political and military spheres were also reflected in the economic sphere. The neo-liberal currents in vogue in the Anglo-American world were also being felt in Turkey. The economic reform package of 24 January 1980 was followed by the 12 September coup, which provided the conditions for the implementation of the package. The neo-liberal policies reached their climax during the Özal administration, when policies of export-led growth were vigorously pursued. These policies aligned Ankara with the administrations of Reagan and Bush in the U.S., of Thatcher in Britain, and of Kohl in the Federal Republic of Germany. As such, they made Turkey's foreign policy indexed to the economy and started a process that could dismantle the traditional foreign policy patterns and structure.

Although distant from foreign policy at first, Özal

gradually warmed to foreign affairs and became convinced that the foreign policy conducted by the MFA with the close cooperation of the armed forces had to be restructured. Özal believed that foreign policy had to be formulated with economic considerations in mind. In this context, he favored a reassessment of problems that had been troubling Turkey's foreign relations over the years in the light of this philosophy. Top on the list of problems came Cyprus and Turkish-Greek disputes. For Özal, the chronic problem of Cyprus and disagreements with Greece had remained insoluble because of a lack of clear vision. These problems also prevented Turkey's relations with the West from developing smoothly. If economic subjects were given priority, political questions would recede to the background and become easier to resolve.

Özal's approach failed to produce the expected results because of the opposition of traditional foreign policy institutions in Turkey and the lack of a positive response from Greece. The PASOK government in Athens was looking at the world and Turkish-Greek relations from a completely different perspective.

After Greece returned to democracy in 1974, the New Democracy Party under Karamanlis had succeeded during its term in office, which lasted until 1981, in placing Greece's domestic and foreign policies on a sound basis. In the domestic field, political parties of all shades, including the Greek Communist Party (Komunistiki Koma Elladas: KKE), were incorporated within the system. With a referendum held in 1974, the monarchy was abolished. The elections of 1974 and 1977 were held in a free and democratic manner. Despite these important steps, the traditional system of patronage remained a feature of Greece's political life. Those who were close to the New Democracy Party continued to enjoy their political and economic privileges.

The most important development during the tenure of Karamanlis occurred in the field of foreign relations. The decision of the Karamanlis government to withdraw

from NATO's military structure did not imply a break with the West. This was merely an expression of displeasure with Washington. The watchword of the Karamanlis foreign policy was "Greece belongs to the West." Relations with the ECs were developed in this framework, and soon Greece applied for membership. Having broken free of the U.S., Greece filled the ensuing void by working toward full membership in the ECs. Deviating from his policies of the 1950s, Karamanlis also developed relations with the socialist countries of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The most striking change was in relations with the USSR. Karamanlis was the first Greek prime minister to pay a visit to Moscow. His foreign policy can be described as multifaceted, but with an overall European orientation. Despite the ongoing dispute over Cyprus, he sought a dialogue with Turkey. Although nothing emerged from these contacts, the communication channels were kept open and the crises did not degenerate into clashes. In 1980 Karamanlis was elected president and Greece's membership in the ECs was assured. This was an important development. In the relations with the West, which had developed in parallel, Greece for the first time gained an advantage over Turkey that it has maintained to this day.

At a time when Greece was setting off on an independent, multifaceted foreign policy course, on 3 September 1974, Andreas Papandreou founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under his authoritarian leadership. In the 1977 elections, PASOK doubled the number of its votes and, after gaining the support of 25% of the electors, became the main opposition party. With its slogan of alagi (change), the party responded to the yearnings of the electorate and took good advantage of the gaps in the political spectrum. Historically, the only party on the left had been the Greek Communist Party, which was unable to become a mass, mainstream party because of the Greek civil war. Aware of this, PASOK used the campaign issues of the KKE to fill a gap that its rival was incapable of filling. PASOK maintained that it was possible to pass on to socialism within the capitalist system and called this the third way. It also rejected the Marxist-Leninist line. It adopted a populist rhetoric and claimed that there were no class distinctions in Greek society, but only a privileged minority and an underprivileged majority. PASOK was the spokesperson of this majority, with its slogan "PASOK to the government, the people to power."

PASOK had no class base; therefore it adopted a populist approach, which inevitably consisted of a strategy based on criticizing everything that the government did. This was true for domestic as well as foreign policy. Against the Karamanlis slogan "Greece belongs to the

West," Papandreou developed the nationalistic counterslogan "Greece belongs to the Greeks." This led him to adopt a stridently anti-Western rhetoric: for PASOK, Greece had to get out of NATO and close all U.S. bases in the country. Relations with the ECs were to be suspended, and a referendum would be held on the issue of ECs membership. Papandreou characterized Washington as the citadel of imperialism. He defended the view that Greece must develop close ties with Moscow, the socialist countries, and the nonaligned countries. In the election held on 18 October 1981, PASOK came to power after gaining 48% of the votes. The party controlled 172 out of the 300 seats in the parliament.

PASOK carried out important reforms during its tenure of power. Among these were the introduction of civil marriages outside the church, decriminalization of adultery, the ending of the dowry, greater empowerment of local authorities, a national health scheme, and increased salaries for civil servants. But economic reforms were not based on increased production and were financed through ECs funds. This quickly led to economic difficulties. Under these circumstances the ECs intervened and imposed its economic program on Greece, which had become a full member since 1 January 1981. PASOK was to govern Greece until 1989; but by its second term (starting in 1985), populist policies had been abandoned.

During its years in power from 1981 to 1989, PASOK's rhetoric and its foreign policy diverged significantly. Notwithstanding its left-leaning rhetoric, PASOK's policies on basic issues did not differ markedly from the right-leaning policies of the New Democracy Party. The PASOK government pursued the negotiations on bases and signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the U.S., did not leave NATO, and did not hold a referendum on ECs membership. PASOK maintained its radical rhetoric on secondary issues, cultivated its relations with the USSR and countries of the Third World, but maintained traditional policies on important issues, without regard to the criticism that this attracted.

The dichotomy between Papandreou's rhetoric when he was in opposition and his actions when he was in the government was explained to the Greek electorate by one simple reason: the threat from Turkey. Papandreou blamed Karamanlis for making too many concessions to Turkey and, when he came to power, based his foreign policy on the premise that the threat to Greece came not from the north but from the east. This allowed him permanently to keep on the agenda an issue over which the Greek public was extremely sensitive and find an excuse

for maintaining relations with the West on a steady course. Papandreou claimed that, by remaining in NATO and the ECs and by continuing its military cooperation with the U.S., Greece was able to gain a diplomatic advantage over Turkey and also check Turkey's expansionist ambitions in the Aegean. When examining relations between Greece and Turkey during the Papandreou years, we must not lose sight of this background.

## II. BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING THE 12 SEPTEMBER PERIOD AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS (1980–1983)

Starting in early 1980, U.S. mediation began yielding results, creating a thaw in Turkish-Greek relations. The notams were rescinded, and air traffic was resumed over the Aegean Sea. But the main U.S. goal remained the lifting of the Turkish veto, to allow Greece to return to the military structure of NATO. This would happen after the military seized power in Turkey on 12 September 1980.

#### A. Bilateral Relations

Whenever the military engages in political intervention in Turkey, deviations appear in Turkey's traditional foreign policy of seeing the West as a single entity. The reason for this is the tendency of the military leaders to push the MFA and its bureaucracy into the background and start making their own decisions. When Europe started snubbing the 12 September administration, Turkey's foreign policy shifted toward Washington. Acting in the spirit of the Cold War (which had taken a turn for the worse after 1979), Turkey became one of the most ardent implementers of the Green Belt doctrine both at home and in the Middle East. At this point Washington made an accurate assessment of Ankara's mood and took a new initiative in the field of Turkish-Greek relations.

NATO's new American supreme commander, General Rogers, met with General Evren and got him to accept the Rogers Plan, whereby Turkey would lift its veto that was preventing Greece from returning to NATO's military structure. Once Greece was back, the two countries would settle the issues of command and control in the Aegean Sea through bilateral negotiations. After Evren approved the plan on 20 October 1980, relying on General Rogers's "word as a soldier," Greece was able to overcome a major hurdle without giving anything in return, and Turkey lost its sole bargaining chip against Greece.

When Greece returned to NATO's military structure without Turkey obtaining any concessions or receiving any guarantees, the negotiations foreseen in the Rogers Plan in connection with command and control areas in the Aegean were undertaken in Athens on 3 December 1980. The secretaries-general of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries met in Ankara on 16 March 1981 to sort out technical questions. With the formation of the PASOK government at the end of the year, relations between the two countries took a turn for the worse. The new prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, claimed that questions of sovereignty in the Aegean could not be negotiated with a country that threatened Greece. The only issue to take up with Turkey might be the preparation of a compromise to allow the International Court of Justice to draw the boundary between the Greek and Turkish sectors of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Anything else having to do with Greece's territorial integrity would remain non-negotiable.

This being the basic approach of the PASOK government, it introduced the question of Cyprus into what were essentially bilateral talks on technical issues by saying that nothing could be discussed until Turkey removed its forces from the island. Cyprus was an issue on which Turkey was unable to count on international support. Athens took the position that there would be no negotiations with Turkey unless it agreed to remove its forces from Cyprus. The new government also claimed that the agreement within the framework of the Rogers Plan concerned the previous government and said that it did not consider itself bound by this agreement. Greece not only refused to negotiate the Aegean control and command issue but also insisted on including the demilitarized Greek eastern Aegean islands, notably Lemnos, in NATO's defense plans. Unless its demands were met, it declared it would refrain from participating in NATO's regional exercises. Athens also stated its intention to extend its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles but was unable to implement this in the face of Turkey's warning that such a move would be regarded as casus belli by Ankara. In the negotiations with Washington over the reactivation of U.S. bases in Greece, Athens insisted on having the military balance between Greece and Turkey maintained. In fact, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed by Greece and the U.S. in 1983 provided for the maintenance of the 7:10 ratio between the two Aegean neighbors.

As usual, the main sufferers from the tension in relations were the minorities of the two countries. In March 1982 about one hundred Turkish Muslim farmers in Western Thrace lost their lands as a consequence of a dispute over ownership with the state. This led them to engage in a protest demonstration in Xanthi. This incident was known as the Inhanli land dispute and received

widespread coverage in the Turkish press. This press coverage, at a time when relations with Greece were already tense, drove the repressive 12 September administration to take action. As a response to the practices of the Greek government concerning the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, a law was prepared on 26 March 1982, authorizing the Turkish government to take over the properties of the Greek minority in Turkey. This proposed law never came into effect, however. But on 12 June 1982 the Court of Appeals decided that the properties of Greek citizens in Turkey that remained frozen in accordance with the decree of 1964 could not be transferred to another party.

#### B. The Proclamation of the TRNC

On 9 August 1980 the two communities in Cyprus resumed their negotiations. The Turkish community wanted to see a federal state consisting of two regions and two communities. The Greek-Cypriot side was ready to accept two communities but balked at two zones. There were also differences between the two sides over the powers that would devolve to the federated states. The negotiations ended in failure at a time when there was political turmoil on the island.

In the Turkish section 1981 was an election year. Criticism directed at Denktaş (president since 1976) and at the ruling party he supported, the National Unity Party (UBP), was mounting. The economy was being propped up with aid from Turkey. Investments were at a standstill; and agricultural production was falling while unemployment was rising. There were serious differences between the local Cypriots and the immigrants from Turkey who had been encouraged to move to Cyprus for political reasons. In June 1981 Denktaş was reelected president, but none of the parties was able to obtain a clear majority. The three parties of the left, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), Communal Salvation Party (TKP), and Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), decided to form a coalition against the UBP, which was close to Denktaş. The minister of foreign affairs of the 12 September administration, İlter Türkmen, traveled to Cyprus and informed the leaders of the three parties that Ankara was opposed to their coalition. A broader coalition was then set up, with the UBP as the senior partner. In this way, the possibility of a shift in the Turkish position in the intercommunal talks was forestalled.

In the election held by the Greek-Cypriot community on 13 February 1983, Spyros Kyprianou was elected president. With the backing of Papandreou, the new president decided to end the intercommunal talks and internationalize the Cyprus question. This had been the

Cyprus policy of the Papandreou government since 1981. In 1982 Papandreou went to Cyprus and became the first Greek prime minister to visit the island. Papandreou asserted that Cyprus was an inseparable part of Hellenism. Although Cyprus affected Turkish-Greek relations, it was not a Turkish-Greek question or a NATO question. For Papandreou, the question of Cyprus had to be taken up within the framework of UN resolutions at an international conference.

Feeling itself under pressure in international forums, the Turkish side hardened its stand. At its meeting of 17 June 1983, the Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus adopted a resolution declaring that the Turkish community had the right of self-determination and that this right was inalienable

Realizing that this type of action could damage the prospects for intercommunal talks, the secretary-general of the UN, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, submitted a new plan to the two sides on 8 August. The plan was promptly rejected by Kyprianou, which led to the resignation of his foreign minister, Nicos Rolandis, who declared that the president was not ready to countenance the continuation of the talks. Those wanting a solution sought to keep the talks going in order to prevent the Turkish side from declaring its independence. Those who preferred to see the deadlock continue were practically goading the Turkish side to declare its independence.

Meanwhile in Turkey the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal won in the election held on 6 November 1983. Before the new government assumed power in Ankara, the assembly of the TFSC was convened on 15 November 1983 to proclaim the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an independent state. The proclamation affirmed that the assembly continued to hold the view that "the two peoples, who were destined to live side by side on the same island, could and should reach a peaceful, just, and lasting solution to all their problems through negotiations conducted on a footing of equality" (İsmail 1992, p. 162). The proclamation went on to say that the TRNC would "facilitate rather than hinder the reestablishment of the partnership of two equal peoples within a federation and the resolution of outstanding questions" (ibid.). The proclamation also declared that the TRNC would be bound by the principles of the UN, pursue a nonaligned course, join no military bloc, and remain loyal to the treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus as well as the treaties of guarantee and alliance. As soon as the independence of the TRNC was proclaimed, a constituent assembly was convened to prepare a new Constitution, which came into force in 1985.

On the day of its proclamation, the TRNC was recognized by Turkey. Although Pakistan decided to recognize the new state, it later changed its mind under U.S. pressure. The proclamation of the TRNC was the legalization of a de facto situation and constituted a turning point in the development of the question of Cyprus. The issue ceased to be one between two communities and became a question between two states, although one of these remained unrecognized. This is why the issue caused widespread international reactions and was the subject of intense debates in Turkey as well as in the TRNC itself (Box 6-12).

At the end of the day, the legacy of the 12 September administration to the Özal government was twofold: (1) a tense relationship with Greece with no dialogue after Turkey had lifted its veto on Greece's rejoining NATO's military structure without obtaining anything in return, and (2) an independent TRNC, which meant a qualitative change in the question of Cyprus, with sharp reactions from the international community.

# III. RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS BY THE ÖZAL GOVERNMENTS AND OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS (1983–1989)

The Özal government's program read out at the TGNA on 13 January 1984 contained indications of how the new government approached the question of relations with Greece. Among the phrases in the program were "extending the hand of friendship to Greece," "the two countries' long-term common interests," and "establishing good relations in the fields of trade, the economy, and tourism" (www.yerelsecim.com/45\_hukumet.htm). Özal's gestures to Greece remained unreciprocated, however. One of these gestures was the lifting of the visa requirement for Greek travelers, designed to promote economic and trade relations and also to expose Papandreou's inflexible stand to international public opinion. The goodwill gestures in the field of economic relations failed to resolve or eliminate deep-seated historical questions or to make a contribution to the establishment of good relations.

#### A. The Question of Lemnos

The question of Lemnos came up in September 1983 in connection with NATO's combined exercise Display Determination-83, which was scheduled to take place from 3 to 5 October 1983. In the course of the preparations for the exercise at NATO's regional headquarters in Naples, the Greek government proposed that one of the operation centers of the exercise be located on the island of Lemnos. This was opposed by the Turkish government,

# Box 6-12. The Proclamation of the TRNC: Reactions and Debates

The first reactions to the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) came from the Greek part of Cyprus and Greece, Both characterized the action as "illegal" and "unacceptable." On 16 November 1983, Greece delivered a protest note to Turkey. The UN Security Council met on 18 November and adopted resolution 541 with thirteen votes, with Pakistan voting against and Jordan abstaining. According to the resolution, the declaration of independence of the TRNC was legally null and void and had to be rescinded. Turkey declared that it did not recognize the resolution. Denktas pointed out that the Security Council had refused to recognize the existence of China for thirty years and that of East Germany for twenty-five years, and yet both were now members of the UN. He refused to go back on the decision to declare independence.

The proclamation of the TRNC also created a stir in Turkey. The decision made a few days before the new civilian government took office had irritated Ozal. The leading figures in the 12 September administration and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not look kindly upon the proclamation. The decision was seen as a fall accompli sprung upon Turkey by Denktas. President Evren explained America's acceptance of the decision in the following terms. The Communists were gaining strength among the Turkish Cypriots. If this trend continued, the Left would take power at the next election. This would lead the Communists in the Greek sector to form an alliance with the Communists in the Turkish sector to create a situation in the Mediterranean that could only serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

Although the Turkish Cypriot assembly adopted the proclamation unanimously, the decision was the subject of heated debates. There was a widespread feeling that the decision was made to ensure that Denktas and the UBP would maintain their positions of power. Furthermore, under the 1976 Constitution of the Federated State, Denktas could not seek a third term as head of state. The declaration of independence would result in both the Constitution and the electoral system being replaced. This would prolong Denktas's tenure of power and that of the UBP. In addition to these political considerations, legal considerations were also advanced in criticizing the decision. Whatever the disclaimers, the thesis of federation that the Turkish side had espoused was being abandoned. From the original basis of a two-community solution, the transition had now been made to a two-state solution. This implied moving on from federation to confederation, which contravened UN resolutions to which Turkey had subscribed as well as the 1977 and 1979 agreements.

(M. FIRAT)

which claimed that the inclusion of Lemnos in the NATO exercise was an attempt to militarize the island in violation of existing treaties. As a consequence, the Turkish government insisted that military elements not be introduced to the island and that it not be turned into a military operation zone. When NATO turned down the Greek proposal, Athens announced on 17 September that

henceforth the Greek armed forces would not participate in NATO exercises.

Starting with the Lemnos dispute, Turkish-Greek differences within NATO continued during the term of the Özal government. On 17 May 1984 Greece registered its reservation about the NATO decision to deploy harpoon missiles along the Turkish Straits and around Turkish naval bases, while Turkey did the same in regard to the militarization of Crete and its approaches. In international law and organizations, states can register a reserve when they do not agree with a decision.

In the course of the preparations for NATO's exercise Display Determination-84, scheduled to take place from 17 to 24 October 1984, the events of the previous year were played out all over again. Greece sought to include Lemnos in NATO plans once more. On 4 September Greece issued a statement: if the plans and the area of the exercise were not changed, it reserved the right to take all the necessary measures to defend its interests in the region and ensure the safety of international air traffic within the Athens FIR, which came under its exclusive responsibility. Greece further announced that it would conduct large-scale air and naval exercises between 2 and 12 October over an area including Lemnos.

On 11 September Turkey declared that military aircraft were not obliged to divulge their flight plans when entering the FIR; consequently, if Greece took measures in conformity with its statement, Turkey would take appropriate countermeasures. Greece then shut down the air corridor G-18 (Green-18) over the Aegean Sea to civilian aircraft. Turkey responded to this by issuing a notam (notification to airmen) on 24 September, which described its area of operational responsibility in the context of exercise Display Determination-84. This area of responsibility was a line starting at the Greek-Yugoslav border and going on to the Aegean, passing over Lemnos and extending to the south of Rhodes. This area included portions of the G-18 corridor and the Athens FIR.

Shortly after the question of Lemnos had flared up, during the annual review of NATO force plans held on 17 November, the Greek government issued a document in which some forces located on Lemnos were shown as assigned to NATO. The Turkish government pointed out that this was a violation of the demilitarized status of Lemnos and signaled its intention to use its veto in NATO forums to prevent the Greek proposal from being accepted. The efforts by NATO officials to find a way to overcome the differences between the two countries proved fruitless. In the Defense Planning Committee, Turkey exercised its veto against not just the forces located in Lemnos but all the Greek forces assigned to NATO. Greece then

vetoed the Turkish forces assigned to NATO. This double veto prevented the Defense Planning Committee from approving the Greek and Turkish country chapters of allied forces for the year 1984. The action of the Papandreou government in dragging its disputes with Turkey into NATO and thereby disrupting NATO's plans was beginning to anger the U.S.

Although it never got as serious as in 1983 and 1984, the question of the inclusion of Lemnos in NATO's operational plans kept cropping up as a dispute between the two countries until the end of the 1990s.

### B. Growing Tensions in Relations with Greece and the Attempts to Initiate a Dialogue

We have already noted that Papandreou sought to bridge the gap between his rhetoric when he was in opposition and his actions when he assumed power by constantly harping on the "Turkish threat." He kept this up in 1984: at the PASOK convention held on 10 May, he accused the Turkish leadership of chauvinism and expansionism. Ankara responded to these attacks with restraint. Özal was convinced that these outbursts were designed to impress Greek domestic opinion and proposed that outstanding questions be frozen. After declaring that Turkey had no ambitions on Greek territory, he renewed the call for a dialogue. But Papandleou was getting ready for the election due in 1985 and kept up his attacks to escalate the tension. He also introduced the New Defense Doctrine. Operating from the premise that the real threat to Greece came not from the north but from the east, he announced that the Greek armed forces would be redeployed to conform to the New Defense Doctrine. When the Greek units stationed on the Bulgarian frontier were shifted to the Turkish frontier on 17 December, the Turkish MFA announced that this move was in conflict with the basic philosophy of NATO and that Turkey would take appropriate steps to counter the Greek action. It has to be remembered that at this point Turkey's relations with Bulgaria were very strained because of the campaign to force the Turkish Bulgarians to change their names.

In preparation for the approaching election, the Greek government kept up its tough line toward Turkey in 1985 on all the questions at issue between the two countries, starting with the dispute over territorial waters. This forced Özal to reassess his position and make a statement on 21 March 1985 in which he declared that Turkey would not accept a *fait accompli* on the issue of territorial waters and an appropriate response would be forthcoming even if it led to a clash.

In the election held on 2 June 1985, PASOK managed

to hold onto power, although with a diminished majority. But conditions had changed as the second PASOK term began. As indicated earlier, the economy was in trouble because of the populist policies that had been pursued. The ECs reacted to this by forcing the PASOK government to implement a belt-tightening program prepared in Brussels. To carry this program out, PASOK had to shift funds that had been earmarked for defense, ostensibly to fend off the Turkish threat, and redirect the funds to meet economic requirements. This called for a reduction of tension with Turkey. Until then, Papandreou had been against any dialogue with Turkey on Aegean questions, other than preparing a compromise as a preliminary to referring the issue of the territorial waters to the International Court of Justice. He had been asserting that a dialogue would violate Greece's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now he began to show signs that he was prepared to engage in a dialogue with Özal, who had been pressing for this ever since he assumed power in 1983.

The preparations for the Papandreou-Özal talks were being conducted by the two foreign ministries under the strictest secrecy. There was concern that the press might find out about the preparations, which would lead to a public uproar that, in turn, might torpedo the talks. It was planned for the two prime ministers to attend a meeting at Davos, to be arranged by Dr. Klaus Schwab, the president of the World Economic Forum. The meeting would be used to engage the two men in a dialogue, without emphasizing any particular issue. Prime Minister Özal traveled to Davos on 30 January 1986. The two prime ministers were scheduled to have breakfast together on 2 February; but when a Turkish newspaper announced the meeting in a headline, Papandreou canceled the breakfast appointment. Although the intervention of Dr. Schwab allowed a breakfast to be held that was attended by all three men, the effort to start a dialogue had failed.

After the first Davos encounter, incidents that heightened tension between the two countries continued to occur in the Aegean. In April 1986 the Turkish navy carried out an exercise code-named Sea Wolf in the northern Aegean. This was followed by the Greek navy's exercise Sea God, carried out between the islands of Lesbos and Chios. On 2 June Greece opened a new air corridor for civilian aircraft located west of Lemnos and hence very close to the Dardanelles Strait in Turkey.

While such reciprocal harassments continued in the Aegean, Papandreou stepped up his efforts to develop Greece's relations with other Balkan states. On 10 September he paid an official visit to Romania. This was followed by a visit to Bulgaria on 11–12 September, when he met Zhivkov. The two leaders issued a Declaration of Friend-

ship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation. According to this declaration, the two countries undertook not to engage in unfriendly actions aimed at one another and to prevent their territories from being used by others for such actions. Papandreou not only was creating tension with Turkey but also was using the other Balkan countries (and especially Bulgaria, which was in open confrontation with Ankara) to isolate Turkey in the region. Greece harvested the fruits of this policy during the March 1987 Aegean crisis when the two countries came closest to an open clash in the 1980s.

#### C. The Aegean Crisis of March 1987

Although the 1987 Aegean crisis appeared to flare up over the issue of oil exploration in the Aegean, in reality it was a contrived situation. Greece had been exploring for oil since the early 1980s, but Özal chose to keep quiet about this in order not to arouse anger in Turkey in the expectation of improving relations.

Greece probably wanted to escalate tension in 1987 in order to frustrate Turkey just before it applied to the ECs for membership. But the question had been festering for years, and it flared up into a full-blown crisis only in March 1987. At the time Özal was out of the country for a heart operation and policy was being made by the MFA, in cooperation with the army's high command. The bureaucracy was unhappy with Özal's conciliatory policies in the face of Greek actions that heightened tensions. Certain analysts claim that, by taking advantage of the opportunity thus provided by Greece, the bureaucracy adopted a firm stand against Greek encroachments and reversed the course.

This is how the crisis unfolded. On 27 February 1987 the deputy foreign minister of Greece informed Turkey's ambassador in Athens, Nazmi Akıman, that Greece would no longer be bound by the Bern Declaration and would be free to explore for oil in the Aegean seabed. After consulting the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a diplomatic note to Greece on 1 March, warning Athens that Turkey would take retaliatory action if Greece went ahead with plans to violate the 1976 Bern Declaration and proceed with the search for oil in the disputed continental shelf of the Aegean. Ignoring this warning, Athens proceeded with its plans and also announced that an exercise would be held in the Aegean on 19 March with the full participation of all three services. On 25 March Turkey's National Security Council recommended to the government that the seismic survey vessel Sismik I sail into the Aegean. With the approval of the cabinet, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) was awarded a license to search for oil in the Aegean.

On the evening of 26 March, after a lapse of eleven years, *Sismik I* left Turkish territorial waters to protest Greece's unlawful actions. The next day, the armed forces of both Greece and Turkey were placed in a state of alert. Papandreou called on Bulgarian president Zhivkov to provide political backing. This request was unlikely to be heeded, however, because it would bring about a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, Zhivkov did not shirk from giving Papandreou assurances about the Bulgarian border.

NATO members and above all Washington were alarmed at the prospect of the possibility of a clash between two allies in the Aegean. Britain took on the task of mediation. When Özal indicated that Turkey would not step back unless Greece made the first move, Athens softened its stand with an announcement stating that Turkey had misinterpreted Greece's intentions. With this de-escalation, the crisis was defused. On 28 March both countries announced that, unless there was a provocation, they would not send their research ships beyond their territorial waters.

The crisis had been overcome, but both sides maintained their positions. Submitting to pressures to overcome the situation arising from the lack of dialogue between the two sides, Papandreou indicated on 6 April 1987 that he was ready to engage in talks with Özal but added that he would insist on a decision after the talks to refer the question of the continental shelf to the International Court of Justice.

Turkey's reply came on 8 April. Ankara maintained its position that the question of the continental shelf should be resolved not by going to the ICJ but through bilateral negotiations. Özal was in a bind. On the one hand, he was to apply for membership in the ECs on 14 April and was anxious to avoid a Greek veto. On the other hand, legislative elections in Turkey were scheduled for November, and he could not afford to allow the opposition to brand him as an appeaser. As a matter of fact, it was only after the elections that Özal was able to realize his aim of starting a process of dialogue with Greece and thereby sidestepping the toughest obstacle to Turkish membership: the Greek veto. This would open up new political and economic prospects for Turkey.

It had become a tradition in Turkish-Greek relations to start a process of dialogue soon after overcoming a crisis. The crisis of March 1987 was no exception. In the course of overcoming the crisis, the two prime ministers exchanged letters; but the content of the correspondence was not revealed. This correspondence allowed direct contact to be established. When Özal was reelected in November 1987, Papandreou sent him a congratulatory message, demonstrating that he had given up his previous hard line, given the green light to the process that led to the Davos meeting and spirit, and signaled his readiness to enter into negotiations without a set agenda.

#### D. The Davos Process

The media referred to this process of dialogue as the "spirit of Davos." Some of the media took it lightly and referred to the dialogue as chimerical. Instead of taking up the contentious and long-standing political issues between the two countries, the two sides studiously avoided them. It had been arranged by private individuals without the benefit of any technical preparatory work conducted by the MFA. Consequently, despite the expectations that were aroused, it produced nothing tangible and even began to draw criticism in both countries after a while. It was significant, however, because the process of negotiations, cut off since 1982, had been resumed.

#### The Summits of Davos and Brussels

Özal and Papandreou met on 30 and 31 January 1988 on the occasion of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The joint press release issued after their meeting stated that the leaders had taken up subjects of interest to both sides in a spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill. It went on to make the following points. Outstanding problems between the two countries arising from different approaches must not be exploited. Time, goodwill, and strenuous efforts would be required to overcome differences. The two sides must redouble their efforts to avoid a repetition of the recent Aegean crisis and to build a peaceful and lasting relationship. Rigid attitudes in all segments of both nations were made worse by the tone of school textbooks and official pronouncements. These contributed nothing to improve relations. It was necessary to promote mutual trust.

In addition to these abstract and general conclusions and declarations of good intentions, there were also concrete decisions. Two committees would be established, one political and the other economic. The economic committee was to be known as the Joint Cooperation Committee and would seek ways of promoting cooperation in the fields of joint ventures, trade, tourism, communications, and cultural exchanges. The political committee would identify problems, seek ways of bridging the gap between conflicting views, and search for lasting solutions. The progress to be achieved by these committees would then be reviewed by the prime ministers. Furthermore, contacts would be established between civilian and

military officials, business leaders, and journalists of the two countries and would be expanded and intensified progressively. A business council or a joint chamber of commerce and industry would be set up. It was also decided that the prime ministers would meet at least once a year and pay visits to the other country. A direct telephone line would be established, and the representatives of the two countries in international organizations would increase their contacts with one another.

The first positive outcome of the Davos process appeared in Turkey on 5 February 1988 when the decree of 2 November 1964 freezing the rights of Greek nationals over their real estate in Turkey was rescinded.

Immediately after this development, Özal and Papandreou met in Brussels on 3–4 March and issued a joint communiqué in the spirit of the Davos process. The communiqué reflected the agreement to continue with the process of rapprochement and to avoid all actions and statements not in keeping with the spirit of Davos. The communiqué contained the following decisions.

- 1. The conduct of military exercises and questions arising from military flights would be taken up in talks.
- The work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus would be resumed.
- 3. After the rescinding of the 1964 decree, the Turkish government would, in accordance with Turkish legislation, take all necessary measures to restore the rights of Greek nationals in full.
- 4. Taking into account this positive development, Greece would approve the signing of the adjustment protocol of the 1964 Ankara Agreement along with the supplementary protocol prior to the meeting of the EEC-Turkey Council of Association scheduled for 25 April 1988.
- 5. The committees set up at Davos would meet on 26 May 1988 in Ankara and Athens. Upon the invitation of the Greek prime minister, the Turkish prime minister would pay an official visit to Athens from 13 to 15 June 1988.

Nothing substantial emerged from the meetings of the committees set up in Davos. Expectations were high with respect to Özal's Athens visit, however, which took place, as planned, on 13–15 June 1988. He was accompanied by a delegation of 170 people, most of them businessmen. The main purpose of the visit was to help develop trade and economic relations and thereby provide a basis that would facilitate the resolution of political problems between the two countries. The necessary preparatory work had not been thoroughly conducted, however, and the visit did not yield much more than press headlines.

Despite all the efforts and goodwill, the spirit of

Davos remained a cosmetic affair. It became clear once again that the personal wishes and initiatives of leaders could not achieve results unless the political will was backed by adequate technical preparation on the part of the bureaucracy. The dialogue between the leaders continued through 1988 but was interrupted by Papandreou's heart condition as well as his love affair with Dimitra Liani and the banking scandal involving George Koskotas. All of this led the PASOK leader to lose stature not just among the Greek public but also among his own party followers. In 1989 PASOK lost the election, while Özal was elected president. The process set in motion by the two leaders would remain uncompleted.

# The Effect of the Davos Process on the Minority in Western Thrace

Starting in 1980, the question of the rights of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace began to draw increasing public attention. This was a consequence of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which placed human rights, and within this context minority rights, squarely on the international agenda. In addition, after Greece's accession to the ECs in 1981, Greece came under European scrutiny and began to be bound by European standards. Finally, the migration of Western Thracians to the Federal Republic of Germany as workers ended the community's isolation and helped bring it into closer contact with the outside world.

When the Turks of Western Thrace took action to defend their rights, PASOK did nothing to soften its tough policy toward the minority, ignoring its obligations as a socialist party. On 4 November 1987 the Greek High Court of Appeals upheld the court decision to close the Komotini Turkish Youth Association (established in 1938), the Xanthi Turkish Union (established in 1946), and the Turkish Teachers' Union of Western Thrace (established in 1966) because the adjective "Turkish" was used in their titles. The High Court determined that there were no Turks in Western Thrace. When the minority's lawyers learned of the decision of the High Court on 5 January 1988, they organized a demonstration scheduled for 29 January 1988, just before the holding of the Davos talks, in defiance of an official ban. This was the largest demonstration ever held in Western Thrace, with ten thousand participants. Some of the demonstrators had come from remote mountain villages. The action of the police resulted in twenty injuries, three of them serious.

The demonstration was a protest directed at the policies of the Greek government. But it was also a protest directed at the lack of interest in the minority on the part of Ankara. Özal approached the Davos talks with great enthusiasm and was careful to avoid all controversial subjects, such as the minority in Western Thrace. Özal's lack of concern at a time when the closing of the associations was causing much agitation in Western Thrace demonstrated the Turkish leader's determination to prevent any issue from getting in the way of a successful outcome of the Davos talks. The Western Thracians saw that they had been sacrificed for the success of the Davos process. As a last resort, they sent cables to the two leaders, expressing the hope that the outstanding problems of the Muslim-Turkish minority of Western Thrace would also be addressed at the talks.

These hopes remained unfulfilled, and the question of Western Thrace was not taken up at the talks. In fact, the prime ministers described the recent events there as a provocation. This showed how far Özal was ready to go in making concessions. In his conversations with journalists, even Papandreou expressed his surprise over Özal's approach to the question of minorities. He admitted that prior to the meeting he had no inkling about the Turkish prime minister's "sincerity and open mindedness" (Oran, p. 190).

Although the Özal government's position at the Davos meeting and afterward caused disappointment in Western Thrace, it did not halt the struggle to uphold minority rights in the region. The movement gained strength among the Turks of Western Thrace under the leadership of Sadık Ahmet and earned the widespread support of the Turkish public in the 1990s.

### IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS DURING THE TIME OF THE ÖZAL GOVERNMENTS (1983–1989)

When the Özal government assumed power with the support of the Turkish bourgeoisie following the 12 September regime, it based its foreign policy on the goal of integrating Turkey with the global economy. For this it was necessary to resolve quickly all problems preventing the achievement of this goal. The government saw the question of Cyprus as the greatest obstacle to Turkey's membership of the ECs and the main cause of the reductions in the flow of foreign aid. As a consequence, the Özal government wanted to see progress in the Cyprus negotiations so that there could be an early resolution of the question.

The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) even before the Özal government

#### Box 6-13. Varosha

Varosha is the modern quarter of the city of Famagusta and has developed as a district catering to holiday-makers. After the 1974 operation, the Greek-Cypriot residents of Varosha fled the district. It was fenced in to keep civilians out and became a ghost town. It has been the subject of several-Security Council resolutions. Resolution 550/84 declared that it was unacceptable for Varosha to be settled by people other than its original inhabitants and called for the district to be placed under UN administration. Resolution 789/92 called for the extension of the area of responsibility of UNFICYP (the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) to include Varosha. On 19 July 1990. Turkey transferred the administration of the district to the Turkish-Cypriot Security Force. After this, the reports of the UN secretary-general began to stress that the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha was the responsibility of the Turkish government. Although the transfer of the administration of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots was mooted in 1993 as a goodwill gesture, contacts falled to yield concrete results. No one is allowed to settle in the district.

(F. KESKIN)

took over the reins of power, however, demonstrated that it could not easily achieve its objectives in Cyprus. Both the Turkish bureaucracy and Denktaş staunchly defended Turkey's traditional policy and stood up against Özal's policies, which were perceived by the public as an easy way out to be achieved by abandoning the cause.

Denktaş was highly disturbed by these conflicting currents within Turkey. At first, he was unable to determine how far the government was ready to go in its policies and proceeded with extreme caution in order to forestall a *fait accompli* that might come from Ankara. This led him to be more accommodating in the UN-sponsored intercommunal negotiations during the 1980s. Denktaş wanted to avoid a solution reached without his participation, so he tried not to lose the initiative and formulated different proposals. Meanwhile Kyprianou, who enjoyed the full backing of Papandreou, took up an intransigent stand and showed himself to be the side blocking a solution.

#### The Beginning of Intercommunal Negotiations

Following the interruption of the intercommunal negotiations upon the proclamation of the TRNC, Denktaş submitted to the UN secretary-general Pérez de Cuéllar a series of goodwill proposals on 2 January 1984, designed to revive the talks. These proposals were meant to establish trust between the two sides and included initiatives with respect to Varosha (Box 6-13), opening Nicosia's in-

ternational airport to traffic, reviving the Committee on Missing Persons, and identifying fields of cooperation between the two communities.

Denktaş's proposals covered a broad field, but the secretary-general submitted a plan dealing only with Varosha. This district was to be placed under temporary UN control pending a final solution of the Cyprus question. The district's limits would be those contained in the Turkish proposal of 5 August 1981. In addition, the Turkish side would refrain from action designed to reinforce its independence. Kyprianou rejected Denktaş's proposals and had an equally negative attitude toward de Cuéllar's plan.

As the de Cuéllar/Denktaş/Kyprianou contacts were still in progress, with the Greek-Cypriot side participating reluctantly, Turkey and the TRNC raised the level of their missions in the two capitals to full embassy status on 17 April 1984. This drew a negative response from the Security Council and interrupted the ongoing intercommunal contacts. But de Cuéllar would keep up his efforts to find a solution.

Contacts were resumed on 10 September in the form of proximity talks. The secretary-general was talking with the two sides one at a time, because Kyprianou refused to meet directly with the Turkish side so long as the TRNC's declaration of independence was not reversed. A draft of an agreement eventually emerged from the proximity talks. According to the draft, the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be an independent, nonaligned, bizonal, bicommunal state with two official languages: Turkish and Greek. In addition to a federal state with its flag and its Constitution, there would be two federated states with their respective flags and Constitutions. The parliament would have two houses. The Turkish Cypriots would have 50% of the seats in the upper house and 30% of the seats in the lower house. The Turkish federated state would cover 29% of the island's territory. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot. All non-Cypriot forces would withdraw from the island.

The two sides went to New York to sign the draft agreement on 17 January 1985. The two community leaders would be meeting for the first time in six years. Denktaş had come to New York to sign the draft agreement that had emerged from the talks. Kyprianou went to Athens after the proximity talks, however, where he met with Papandreou, who warned him not to sign any agreement before the "Turkish occupation" came to an end. In New York, Kyprianou declared that he came to the meeting not to sign the draft agreement but to finalize it. He wanted to renegotiate some of the points on which agreement had

been reached. In response to these stalling tactics, Denktas replied that either the draft agreement would be signed or the meeting would come to an end. He firmly refused to reopen negotiations over points that had already been agreed to. When Kyprianou insisted on not signing the draft agreement, the New York meeting ended in failure.

In New York, Denktaş had reached his limit on the concessions he could make. He had agreed to go below the floor of 30% for the territory that would be retained under Turkish-Cypriot sovereignty. He had agreed to give up on insisting that the presidency rotate between the two communities. Most significantly, he had agreed to replace the Turkish guarantee with an international guarantee. These concessions and the draft agreement later would be sharply criticized in certain Turkish quarters.

To understand what really induced Denktaş to agree to these concessions, we have to consider his predicament at that time. First of all, 1985 was an election year, and the steadily strengthening left-leaning parties were criticizing him for being intransigent in order to remain at the helm. There was a feeling among the public that the economic difficulties were the direct result of the inability to find a solution to the question, which meant that the ruling UBP was steadily losing popular support. Furthermore, the Özal government in Turkey was strongly in favor of reaching an early solution. Denktas feared that, if things were left to Turkey, he might be compelled to make even bigger sacrifices. Finally, as an experienced actor on the Cypriot political scene, Denktaş knew the Greek Cypriots well and felt that they were not prepared to come to terms with the Turkish Cypriots. That is why he chose not to be difficult, so that he could expose the Greek Cypriots as the intransigent party.

After the unsuccessful New York meeting, the TRNC conducted a referendum on 5 May 1985 in which the new Constitution was approved. This was followed by elections on 9 June, when Denktaş was reelected president. Prior to the election, the settlers from Turkey were granted citizenship, resulting in a change in the composition of the electorate. This change enabled the UBP to form the new government. Having strengthened his position after the 1985 elections, Denktaş could now return to his previous uncompromising policies.

### The TRNC Policy of the Özal Governments

The proclamation of the TRNC on 15 November 1983 came as a nasty surprise to Özal, who was bent on integrating the Turkish economy with the global economy and urgently needed foreign credits to carry out his plans.

Özal was under constant international pressure because of the Cyprus question, which confronted him in all of his economic initiatives. In order to reduce this pressure, Özal announced on 3 January 1984 that the level of Turkish forces in Cyprus would be reduced by 1,500 men. This did not lead to the expected increase in the flow of foreign loans, however. For Özal, Cyprus appeared to be an insurmountable obstacle that stood in the path of an active foreign policy.

The economic embargo imposed on the unrecognized TRNC by the international community had left the Turkish Cypriots completely dependent on Turkey. The economy was kept going through Turkish handouts and was easily affected by developments in Turkey. Consequently, the neo-liberal economic policies that Özal implemented in Turkey starting in 1983 began to influence the northern part of the island.

Özal started by declaring Northern Cyprus a free zone that would attract foreign investments. The Lebanese civil war and the destruction of Beirut had deprived the Eastern Mediterranean of its commercial center. Özal's dream was for the TRNC to fill the void left by Lebanon. He hoped that the multinational companies that would be established in Cyprus would exert their influence on both sides and make possible a political settlement of the question. As a first step in this direction, in July 1984 the banks in Northern Cyprus were allowed to open foreign exchange accounts. But it became apparent very soon that it would not be possible to carry out Özal's plans under the prevailing conditions. Political pressure and the many uncertainties kept international capital away.

With the failure of the free-zone plan, a second plan was adopted. This would restructure the TRNC's economy along the lines of the Turkish economy. The plan was put into effect when Özal paid an official visit to the TRNC on 2 July 1986. His visit was primarily economic, and he was accompanied by prominent businessmen like Sakıp Sabancı, Halit Narin, Ali Koçman, and Şarık Tara. It was intended that these leaders of the Turkish bourgeoisie would invest in the TRNC. The state would stand ready to guarantee their investments.

In December 1986 the Economic Cooperation Protocol was signed by Turkey and the TRNC. The protocol provided a legal framework for the economic relations between the two countries. On the basis of the protocol, all restrictions on currency transfers between the two countries would be lifted, the TRNC's foreign exchange regulations would be revised, customs levies would be reduced by 30%, public expenditures would be curbed, and the age of retirement would be raised. Although Denktas and the

UBP approved these terms, they met with strong resistance from the opposition in Cyprus, and especially the labor unions. The resistance was on economic grounds, but the TKP and the CTP also objected on political grounds. As Turkey and the TRNC became more closely integrated, the gulf between the two Cypriot communities was growing, making it harder to find a solution for the division of the island.

Despite all the efforts, Turkish business leaders could not be induced to invest in Cyprus. They cited the bureaucracy and internal squabbles as reasons for staying away. The desire to help the TRNC could not override the profit motive. Investments could not be made merely to further the national interest. The only exception to this rule was Asil Nadir, a Cypriot tycoon whose investments helped boost the economy of the TRNC in the short term. The real beneficiary of these investments, however, was Asil Nadir himself, who profited from the incentives provided by the state.

In addition to strengthening his hand economically in the TRNC, Özal also wanted to strengthen his hand politically. In order to be able to intervene directly in the TRNC's internal politics, he got the settlers from Turkey to set up their own political party, which was known as the Rebirth Party (YDP). Even though this party had no long-term impact on the political life of the country, the manner of its coming into being met with serious disapproval in Turkish-Cypriot circles.

Although Özal formulated economic and political plans for Cyprus during his term in office, it cannot be said that he made a special effort to get international recognition for the TRNC. In fact, such an effort would be in conflict with his goal of finding an early solution to the question of Cyprus. There was one success during this period, however: the admission of the TRNC to the Organization of the Islamic Conference with the status of observer.

### Georgios Vassiliou and Renewed Hope for a Settlement of the Cyprus Question

When Georgios Vassiliou bested his seasoned political opponents, Kyprianou and Glafcos Clerides, to become president on 21 February 1988 by obtaining more than 50% of the votes in the Greek-Cypriot zone, he gave the impression that the question of Cyprus was entering a new phase.

Vassiliou had been an outsider in politics. He was a businessman who was also considered to be a "leftist," and throughout his campaign he declared his readiness to talk to the Turkish-Cypriot side. The election of a moderate who gave priority to economic matters as president immediately after Davos was welcomed in most quarters, especially in the U.S.

The election of an apparently conciliatory candidate as president was a source of concern for Denktaş. With Özal, a man of similar inclination, at the helm in Ankara, it is easy to understand why Denktaş kept dwelling on security concerns as of 1988. The first move to resume talks came from Denktaş. On 3 March 1988 he proposed a series of goodwill confidence-building measures involving cooperation in the fields of trade, tourism, the environment, local government, sports, and culture. Declaring that Denktaş was not his counterpart and that he would only speak to Özal and not Denktaş, Vassiliou rejected this offer. But his call for talks directly with Özal went unheeded.

After the intervention and mediation efforts of the UN secretary-general, a round of talks totaling 100 hours took place between the two community leaders from September 1988 to the summer of 1989. Denktaş and Vassiliou held two summits, one in Geneva in September and one in New York in November 1988. Denktaş agreed to free circulation of people but accepted freedom of settlement and acquisition of property only within certain limits. He indicated that he would be flexible on questions of military balance only to the extent that his counterpart would be flexible on the Constitution and proposed a federal system on the Swiss model. Vassiliou called for the demilitarization of Cyprus, which would come under the UN Security Council's guarantee. He also wanted the prospective federal state to be closely linked to the European Community. It proved impossible to reconcile the differing views of the two sides.

On 25 July 1989 the secretary-general submitted a new plan, which came to be known as de Cuéllar's "Set of Ideas." According to this plan, the Federal Republic of Cyprus would consist of two states and would have a constitutional structure made up of two zones and two communities. There would be a numerically balanced force of Greek and Turkish Cypriot units, and the existing level of soldiers would be cut down. The plan had been prepared without consulting Denktas, who rejected it as unacceptable. The opposition was highly critical of this outright rejection of a plan that had come so close to meeting the concerns of the Turkish side. Denktas was openly accused of adopting the position "deadlock is the solution" to further his selfish political interests.

When the negotiations became deadlocked, Denktas submitted a document to the secretary-general on 11 October 1989, asking for an acknowledgment of the right of both Cypriot communities to separate self-determination and an acceptance of the distinct cultural, religious, and national identities of the communities in order to make meaningful negotiations possible. When Vassiliou refused to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriots' right of self-determination, the negotiations came to an end.

Whatever similarities may have existed between the views of Vassiliou and Özal, it was not easy to overcome the entrenched positions of the two sides in Cyprus. There was a feeling that those who were ready to deviate from the established position with radical ideas would be doomed to lose their positions of power. Both Özal in Turkey and Vassiliou in the Greek sector put forth new ideas and different approaches and made pronouncements not heard before; but at the end of the day they were unable to change established policies.

The difficulties associated with the question of Cyprus did not remain confined to the island. They had a very negative effect on Turkish-Greek relations and also affected strategic negotiations within NATO near the end of the 1980s. A typical example of this was the Mersin crisis.

The changes in the USSR after 1989, Papandreou's loss of power in Greece, and Özal's presidency in Turkey ended the Davos process and halted the search for a solution in Cyprus. When the Greek-Cypriot government applied to the European Communities for membership, the question entered a totally new phase.

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# Relations with the Middle East

#### I. RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

To understand Turkey's policies in the Middle East during the 1980s, we must look at the changes occurring on the world scene and the policies pursued by the U.S. in the light of these changes.

With the oil shocks of 1973 and 1978, the West had a better grasp of the importance of the Middle East in international affairs. This called for a revision of NATO strategies, which were geared to fend off an attack directed at Europe, and forced the U.S. to redirect its attention to the Middle East in its military strategies developed to deal with the USSR. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR multiplied Washington's anxieties. The Islamic revolution had not only changed the regime in Iran but, by pursuing the aim of exporting revolution to its neighbors, upset the regional balance in a fundamental way.

When Washington lost an important ally in the region and the USSR took advantage of the void thus created and invaded Afghanistan, the U.S. quickly developed a new policy for a region that was vital for it not only because of its oil resources but also because of its strategic location. This policy was designated the "Green Belt." It was aimed at countering the "radical Islam" ideology of Iran through support for those countries that adopted the "moderate Islam" line centered around Saudi Arabia, an archenemy of communism and ready to help finance the project with its oil money. The policy was designed to contain the USSR with a Green Belt while preventing radical Islam from making inroads into the Middle East.

The countries that formed part of the Green Belt were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt: Turkey's strategic importance was further enhanced by the Green Belt project because the U.S. intended to use the Turkish bases in the event of disturbances within the region. The decision-makers in Turkey, however, had not forgotten the U.S. arms embargo in force until 1978. Neither had they forgotten the lessons of the 1950s; and they were not

ready to abandon the policies that had been implemented since the 1960s. According to these policies, the defense of the Gulf was the responsibility of the Gulf countries and the bases located in Turkey could not be used to intervene in that region. Above all, Washington had always wanted the countries of the region to be loyal and to have stable administrations. Whether they were democratically governed or not was of secondary importance. The 12 September 1980 military coup in Turkey would create a better atmosphere for U.S. expectations.

When examining the causes of the military coup of 12 September 1980, it must not be forgotten that international factors were as important as internal factors. As a matter of fact, during the three years of military administration as well as during the Motherland Party government that came to power in 1983 under Özal, who was the coup's civilian representative, a manageable version of moderate Islam was allowed to develop and was even promoted (see Box 6-3 above). Turkey drifted away from Europe and became more dependent on the U.S., while relations with other countries of the Green Belt were tightened. Turkey reverted to its role of the 1950s and, with the support of the U.S., took over the duty of defender of the West's interests in the region and above all its oil interests. To carry out this task, Ankara pursued an active policy in the Middle East. The main difference between the Middle East policy of the 1980s and the policies of the Democratic Party governments in the 1950s was that, especially after 1983, there was an emphasis on developing economic relations, which reflected Özal's approach to foreign policy. As tighter political and economic relations were forged with conservative Gulf countries during the 1990s, this led to a rise in political Islam and Kurdish nationalism within Turkey.

#### A. Relations with the Gulf States

As Turkey drifted away from Europe in the wake of the military coup of 12 September 1980, its relations with the Middle East and especially the Gulf States grew closer.

This tightening of relations was not confined to the political field but also included the military and economic fields. Along with the U.S., Saudi Arabia was among the countries that gave support to the new administration established on 12 September. Saudi Arabia remained silent after the banning of the Islamist-oriented National Salvation Party and arrest of its leader, Necmettin Erbakan. King Khalid was among the first heads of state to congratulate Kenan Evren on 12 September. The ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah, visited Turkey on 8–10 September 1981, and Evren visited Kuwait on 20–22 March 1982. Thus Turkey was becoming interested in the Gulf region for the first time in the Republican era and in an intense manner.

The political rapprochement that began with the 12 September coup was designed to underpin military cooperation in order to enhance the security of the Gulf. It became clear during the subsequent Özal administration that these developments were hatched in Washington.

Both the USSR and the radical Islamic currents emanating from Iran posed a direct threat to the Gulf States. But these states lacked modern and effective armies to ward off these threats. If Washington intervened directly to bolster their defense capabilities, it was likely to provoke the reaction of both Moscow and Tehran. That is why Turkey was included in Washington's plans to ensure the defense of the Gulf. The bases in Turkey would be developed and placed at the disposal of U.S. forces. NATO member Turkey would train and help bolster the armies of the Gulf States to reinforce the security of the Gulf without giving rise to serious reactions. The Turkish leaders who for "selfish national reasons" prevented the use of Turkish bases by the U.S. on the ground that the Gulf region's security had to be the responsibility of the Gulf countries had been driven out. They had been replaced by "dependable, down-to-earth soldiers who understood well the need to protect the interests of the alliance." This greatly facilitated the task of the U.S. (Güldemir, p. 31). From 1980 to 1983 Turkey was able to conclude cooperation agreements in three specific fields with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: military training, sale of military equipment, and joint investments.

After President Evren's visit to Saudi Arabia on 21–24 February 1984, defense cooperation between Ankara and Riyadh grew closer. The two countries concluded a Cooperation in Military Training and Education and Temporary Assignments Agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the signatories would assist each other in training military cadets and officers, in the assignment of Turkish officers to Saudi Arabia to learn foreign lan-

guages, in training Saudi Arabian officers in Turkish military schools, and in Turkey's response to Saudi requests for military experts and assistance in building and modernizing military installations. During Evren's visit, the finance ministers of the two countries reached an agreement in principle for the governments to support the Turkish-Saudi Joint Investment and Trading Company. In addition, the head of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and his Saudi counterparts discussed eighteen separate investment projects, the establishment of an investments financing company, the expansion of trade, and various construction projects. In a statement following the visit, Evren declared that Turkey and Saudi Arabia were two active members of the Islamic community, that the Arab-Islamic unity that Turkey wished to see had not yet been fully realized, and that Turkey attributed importance to the Islamic world, to its Arab brothers, and to its relations with Middle Eastern countries. This signaled Turkey's departure from its traditional foreign policy line.

In July 1984 a group of Turkish officers, including F-5 and F-104 pilots, proceeded to Khamis Mushait air base in Saudi Arabia to train Saudi personnel stationed there. This base was located close to the Yemeni border and was assigned the task of defending the oil fields of the region. When the minister of defense, Zeki Yavuztürk, visited Saudi Arabia on 15 July, he also went to Khamis Mushait, where King Khalid praised the work of Turkish military advisors and asked the minister to convey his thanks to Evren.

In September 1984 a Saudi military delegation visited Turkey. Shortly after this visit, the foreign press reported that the Turkish enterprise MKE and Saudi Arabia would undertake the joint production of chemical products in 1985, with the participation of the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany.

At about the same time, Turkey and Kuwait got involved in similar military cooperation, with the backing of Saudi Arabia. Turkish officers were sent to Kuwait to help train the army.

The military cooperation of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait soon began to worry the USSR, Iran, and Greece. The USSR made diplomatic representations in Riyadh in which it claimed that the Turkish military mission in Saudi Arabia was part of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. The Greek press began to carry reports about Turkey's activities in the Gulf region. Tehran considered Turkey's military cooperation with Gulf States to be directed against itself and kept this cooperation under close scrutiny.

Turkey's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia after 12 September was not confined to foreign policy. This rapprochement also had long-term repercussions in Turkey's domestic politics and raised hackles in many quarters. From 1982 to 1984 the salaries of religious officials sent abroad by Turkey's Administration for Religious Affairs Directorate were being paid by the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami, an organization set up in Mecca in 1963. This was done in compliance with a decree of the Turkish cabinet. Although Kenan Evren denied the existence of any link to the Rabitat, the investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu revealed not only that was there such a link but that the Rabitat had also been funding numerous religious foundations in Turkey. Saudi Arabia's growing activities in Turkey were not limited to the 12 September period; nor were they confined to the Rabitat's actions.

When the Özal government was formed after the election in November 1983, Vahit Halefoğlu was appointed minister of foreign affairs. He was born in Hatay and spoke fluent Arabic. This was another sign, albeit symbolic, that the new government would pursue the Middle East-oriented policies of its predecessor. During the Özal period the influence of Saudi Arabia in Turkey's economic life grew steadily stronger. When the Özal government obtained a vote of confidence in the parliament on 14 December 1983, its first action was to enact the law allowing foreigners to acquire real estate in Turkey and to promulgate the decree permitting the establishment of special financial institutions that operated without giving or charging interest, because paying and receiving interest on money deposited in banks is not allowed under strict Islamic law. The Constitutional Court of Turkey would later annul the law on the acquisition of real estate, but by then the oil-rich Arabs had profited from the law to purchase choice properties on the Bosphorus.

This became a favorite subject for the Turkish press at the time, but it was overshadowed by Decree No. 83-7506, signed on 16 December, just two days after the Özal government obtained a vote of confidence in the TGNA. This decree regulated the establishment, structure, activities, and liquidation of special financial institutions. Article 13 of the decree stated that the provisions of the Turkish Commercial Law and the Law on Mandatory Payments and Bankruptcy would not apply in the liquidation of these institutions (Mumcu, pp. 137-46). This decree has to be considered along with the decree published in the Official Gazette of 5 August 1984 regarding the establishment in Turkey of the Faisal Finance Corporation and Al Baraka Türk. When Saudis provided capital to establish these special financial institutions in Turkey, they made

sure that their capital would be free of legal impediments. Some of the shareholders in these institutions were Arabs, while others were from the close entourage of the prime minister, including his brother Korkut Özal. Saudi capital had begun to influence not only Turkey's economic life but also its political life.

# B. Relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Turkey's relations with the OIC developed in step with the development of its relations with the Gulf States. Turkey attended the Third Islamic Summit held at Mecca and Taif on 25-28 January 1981 at the level of head of government for the first time. Its delegation was led by Prime Minister Ulusu. The report adopted by the conference contained references to the "Islamic Ummah" (Community). It also declared that "the best shield to protect Muslims from the dangers confronting them is strict adherence to Islam and Islamic values as a way of life" (http://www.oic-oic .org/oicnew/French/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum.htm). These expressions were in clear conflict with Turkey's secular principles. The Turkish delegation claimed that the difficulty had been overcome, however, when Ulusu declared in his speech at the conference that Turkey was a secular state and that its foreign policy would be guided by this principle. Turkey referred to its general reservation made at the time it joined the organization in relation to the conference's resolutions calling on members to sever relations with Israel and recommending the establishment of an Islamic Court of Justice.

The most noteworthy event in the Mecca Conference had to do with Cyprus. Until then, the Cypriot Turkish delegation headed by Denktaş had been participating as an observer at meetings of the OIC. Its nameplate bore the inscription "Muslim-Turkish Community of Cyprus." At this conference, the Turkish-Cypriot delegation's nameplate read "Federated State of Cyprus," and this formulation was inserted in the conference's report. At the Dacca meeting of the OIC held from 5 to 11 December 1983, there was a reference to the existence of two separate communities in Cyprus. Although this was an indication of the positive approach of the OIC to the Turkish thesis, none of the conference members recognized the TRNC, causing much disappointment in Ankara (Soysal, p. 738).

Turkey participated at the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference held in Casablanca from 16 to 18 October 1984 at the level of president. This was a sign of the importance that Turkey attributed to the organization. The Islamic countries were quick to respond to Turkey's gesture. President Evren was elected vice-president of the conference

and chairman of the Permanent Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation. The first meeting of the committee was held on 14 November in İstanbul under Evren's chairmanship.

As Turkey developed its relations with Arab states and became more active within the OIC, it sought to use the organization as a platform that would support its foreign policy objectives. At all the summits and ministerial meetings, Turkey introduced the question of Cyprus and appealed to members to recognize the TRNC. After 1986 Turkey also sought action from the OIC in support of the Turks of Bulgaria, but it was disappointed on both of these issues.

# The Question of Palestine and Turkey

Turkey's developing relations with the Arab states in the 1980s led to a worsening of relations with Israel. When Israel formally annexed Jerusalem on 31 July 1980, Turkey announced that it did not recognize this fait accompli. On 4 December the Turkish chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv was recalled to Ankara for consultations. The mission in Tel Aviv was left in the charge of a second secretary. The consulate in Jerusalem was closed, and the consular section of the Tel Aviv embassy was made responsible for Jerusalem. This signified a lowering of relations to the minimum level. Even though it formally participated in the resolutions of the OIC calling on members to sever all relations with Israel and declaring jihad, however, Turkey did not implement these resolutions. Furthermore, Turkey made every effort to have Egypt readmitted to the OIC after its suspension from the organization following the Washington-sponsored Camp David agreement of 1979. Turkey also supported Egypt's Israeli policies.

Turkey condemned the Israeli operation in Lebanon of 30 May 1981 and the Israeli attack on Iraq's reactor in the vicinity of Baghdad on 8 June 1981. When Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982 and drove the PLO out of that country, Turkey issued a statement calling on Israel to end its aggression. After the massacre at the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila, Evren and foreign minister İlter Türkmen expressed their sympathy with the victims. On 24 September, which had been proclaimed "Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians" by the PLO, special prayers and memorial services were held in mosques throughout Turkey. Although Turkey appeared to stand firmly against Israel, it was revealed in the 1990s that Ankara had collaborated with Tel Aviv in operations carried out against Armenian terrorists in Lebanese camps during the Israeli invasion.

After 1982 PLO leader Yasser Arafat intensified his ef-

forts to organize an international conference that would take up the question of Palestine. When he failed in these efforts, he began to work for a Palestinian state. This coincided with Arafat's second visit to Turkey in 1986. Arafat was warmly received in Ankara, and it was announced that Turkey would welcome an independent Palestine based on the Palestinians' right to self-determination. In December 1987 the Palestinians started attacking Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza with sticks and stones. This form of resistance, known as the Intifada (see Box 6-16 below), was to go on for five years.

The second step on the road to an independent state in Palestine came from Jordan. In a statement made on 2 August 1988, Jordan's King Hussein announced that he was relinquishing Jordan's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem and declared that he recognized the wish of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to establish an independent Palestinian state separate from Jordan. Now that it had been offered this territory, the PLO had obtained the possibility of establishing its own state. On 15 November 1988 the Palestine National Council proclaimed the establishment of the independent state of Palestine at its meeting in Algiers. Turkey had recognized Israel eleven months after its establishment. Now it was the fifth country in the world and the first in the Western Bloc to recognize the Palestinian state. Because it was not in control of its territory, Palestine did not have one of the main attributes of a state. That is why some Arab nations would not recognize the new state. In these circumstances, Turkey's support was of great importance to the Palestinians. This support also demonstrated the pro-Arab bias of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy in the 1980s.

#### D. Difficulties with Iraq and Syria

While Turkey developed its political, military, and economic relations with the Gulf States during the 1980s and pursued an active foreign policy in the Middle East region, it was a different story with Iraq and Syria. In regard to these neighboring countries, there were two questions that emerged in the 1960s and have continued up to the present time. One was the Kurdish question, the result of the oppressive atmosphere reigning in Turkey in the wake of the 12 September coup and the power vacuum in northern Iraq caused by the Iran-Iraq War. The other was the related question of sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which became more acute with the implementation of the regional development project known by its Turkish acronym as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi: Southeast Anatolia Project).

## 1. The Kurdish Question

Developments in Iraq and Turkey:

The Kurdish Question Takes Root in the Region

As a result of developments in Iraq and Turkey in 1979, the Kurdish question acquired a new dimension. On 16 July 1979 Saddam Hussein forced the Iraqi leader Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr to resign and took his place. Saddam's objectives were to make Iraq the leader of the Arab states and to turn Iraq into the strongest power in the Gulf. The international scene facilitated the attainment of these objectives. Iran was reeling under the impact of revolution and was in no condition to assert control over the Gulf, while it was using the Dawa Party in Iraq to foment rebellion against Baghdad among the Shiites. After its ostracism in the aftermath of the Camp David agreement, Egypt had lost all claims to leadership among the Arabs. Saddam Hussein believed that the vacuum left by Egypt should. be filled by Iraq and started by consolidating his hold on power. He took both military and police measures against the opposition organizations of the Kurds, Shiites, and Turcomans. In 1979 the Iraqi Communist Party was declared illegal and disbanded. In February 1980 a purge was carried out within the Baath Party itself,

To prevent a new rebellion, the Iraqi Command Council of the Revolution made a decision in December 1979 to end the practice of appointing members of the legislative assembly of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. From then on, the members would be elected by the people of the region, and the assembly would be empowered to pass legislation to develop the region's agriculture, economy, and culture. This move was far from being a democratic reform, however. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were barred from participating in the election, and a new plan would be implemented to establish a security belt. Under this plan, large numbers of Kurds and Turcomans would be forced to relocate in southern Iraq. This policy was quick to draw the ire of Ankara. When five Turcomans were executed in January 1980 and nine more on 9 July 1980, the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad was recalled to Ankara for consultations on 31 July. Prime Minister Demirel issued a statement condemning the Iraqi action (Bölükbaşı, pp. 45-50). The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War at this juncture prevented the crisis from escalating further.

In 1979 there were further developments in the Iraqi Kurdish front. Following the death of Mullah Mustafa Barzani on 1 March, the KDP's Ninth Congress met in November and elected his son, Masud Barzani (see Box 5-17 in Section 5), as party leader. The congress also decided to

transfer the party's headquarters from the city of Rezaiyah in Iran to Revanduz in northern Iraq. The KDP, backed by Iran, was about to escalate its struggle against Baghdad and was repositioning itself in Iraq for this purpose. Meanwhile the PUK, which broke away from the KDP in 1964 under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, installed itself farther south in the region of Suleymaniyah and enjoyed the backing of Syria. With these developments, the stage was set for the future power struggle among the Kurds.

The year 1979 was also an important turning point for the Kurds of Turkey. When martial law was declared in the southeastern region following the events in Kahramanmaraş in 1978, it became difficult for the PKK to operate in the region. In May the decision was made to move out of the country, and in July the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan went to Syria. Contacts had already been made with the PLO and with Abu Jihad. Following talks in Damascus, the PKK was assigned a sanctuary in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. After a short stay in Syria, Öcalan moved on to the Bekaa Valley. This introduced a new element to the Kurdish question. Until 1984 Öcalan was engaged in the task of building up his organization. The PKK fighters in the Bekaa Valley were being given military training by Palestinian guerrillas, while contacts with Talabani resulted in the PUK fundraising for the PKK in Libya. In this way, several Kurdish movements made ready for the struggle to establish a place for themselves in the region, where a power vacuum would emerge after 1980.

# The Iran-Iraq War: Syria and the Kurdish Movements Get Together to Fill a Vacuum

On 17 September 1980 Iraq unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Algiers that it had signed with Iran, and on 22 September Iraqi forces invaded Iran. This was the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War that would go on for the next eight years. The 12 September administration, which had seized power in Turkey a few days earlier, declared its neutrality. This stance was maintained for eight years, into the Özal government's term in office.

The Iran-Iraq War affected both Turkey and the balance of power in the region. As the hostilities were mostly concentrated in the southern theater, Baghdad kept most of its forces there. This left a power vacuum in the north. The Kurdish organizations and especially the KDP and the PUK took advantage of this situation and assumed control of numerous districts in the region. Both Iran and Syria supported the Kurds with material and logistical help. Iran did this as Iraq's adversary, while Syria was seeking to assume leadership of the Arabs by weakening Iraq. On 12 November 1980 the Democratic National Patriotic

Front of Iraq was established in Damascus. Among its members were the PUK and the Communist Party of Iraq, and their objective was the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. Soon afterward the KDP, which had been excluded from the group in Damascus, got together with the Communist Party of Iraq and the United Socialist Party of Kurdistan to establish the Democratic Iraqi Front in northern Iraq. The Democratic Iraqi Front enjoyed the support of both Iran and Syria. These developments also had an effect on Turkey. The PKK used the KDP and the PUK to obtain Syrian help and, taking advantage of the instability in the region, completed its preparations for its subsequent action against Turkey.

As Syria, Iran, and the Kurdish organizations stepped up their cooperation, Ankara began to cooperate with Baghdad. This new tilt toward Baghdad was seen when Iraq appealed to Ankara to release more Euphrates water in support of its eight-year plan to irrigate and develop northern Iraq. This was done at a time when Turkey was filling the reservoir of the newly constructed Karakaya Dam. Although Ankara turned down Iraq's request for more water, it did agree to the establishment of a joint technical committee to consider Iraq's requirements. On 19 December 1980 the two governments signed an agreement on cooperation in the fields of petroleum, irrigation, and transport. In addition, important steps were taken to develop economic cooperation. On 10-12 August 1981 the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Taha Ramadan, visited Ankara, where a trade agreement was signed that provided for the import of Iraqi oil in exchange for Turkish export products. Soon Iraq became Turkey's largest export market after the Federal Republic of Germany. In the course of this visit, an agreement was signed to boost the capacity of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. Iraq had turned down Turkey's proposal to do this before the outbreak of war. Now that the oil installations in the Persian Gulf had been destroyed by Iranian military action, Iraq depended on the Syrian and Turkish pipelines for its exports. Baghdad proposed that the annual capacity of the Turkish pipeline be raised from 35 million tons to between 45 and 50 million tons.

As relations with Iraq grew closer, tension increased in relations with Syria. The biggest problem was the activities of the Turks and Kurds who fled from Turkey after 12 September and were now collaborating with Armenians in Syria. During the visit of the Syrian minister of justice to Ankara on 15–19 June 1981, an agreement on Extradition and Mutual Judiciary Assistance in Penal Matters was signed. This agreement was not comprehensive enough to give Turkey full satisfaction, however. It did not include

political refugees. The agreement had a provision declaring that those resorting to violence could not claim to be political refugees, but this was of doubtful value because in practice the Syrians had a different way of interpreting concepts. When Turkey sought the extradition of terrorists who had fled to Syria after 12 September, Damascus declared that there were no terrorists on its territory and that the Turkish nationals in question were political refugees. Despite the agreement, illegal crossings from Syria to Turkey could not be prevented, and Turkey was forced to construct a road running along the frontier and to establish mobile patrols to police the border.

This Syrian policy had interesting effects on the PKK. Between 15 and 26 July 1981 the organization held its first conference to discuss the Middle East, Turkey, and "Turkish Kurdistan" in its camp located on the Lebanese-Syrian border. The following decisions were made at the conference: to accelerate training programs in the Syriancontrolled region, to establish contacts with all substantial groups in the region, especially the Kurdish groups in Iraq, to "return to the country, and to take the political and military steps to make this possible" (İmset, pp. 88-90). Under these decisions the PKK established its main contact with the Syrian administration. For the first time, personal contact was established with Rifad Assad, the brother of president Hafez Assad and the head of Syrian intelligence. Rifad Assad felt sympathy for the PKK and its cause. The intensification of training activities and the efforts to secure outside assistance were the preludes to the armed struggle that the PKK would start in Turkey in 1983.

In 1982 two important developments also had an impact on Turkey: the balance in the Iran-Iraq War shifted and Israel invaded Lebanon. Until then, the fighting between Iran and Iraq had taken place on Iranian territory. In 1982 the Iranian regime eliminated the entire internal opposition and got the people to direct their energies toward winning the war. In July the Iraqi army was expelled from Iran, and the battleground shifted to Iraq.

Turkey had declared its neutrality at the outset and had maintained its political and economic relations with both countries. Ankara had based its policy on the assumption that the war would be of short duration, that there would be no winner or loser, and that the status quo would be preserved. The new situation that appeared to be emerging was against Turkey's interests. Iran was intent on exporting Islamic revolution and now had invaded Iraq, a country with which Turkey shared economic interests in the form of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Ankara could not remain indifferent to the new developments and warned Tehran through public announcements not

to harm the operation of the pipeline. In August 1982 Prime Minister Ulusu traveled to Tehran and personally informed his Iranian counterpart of Ankara's concerns.

When the front shifted to Iraq's territory, this also affected regional balances. Syria took advantage of this situation to weaken Iraq further. The two oil pipelines crossing Syrian territory and carrying Iraq's oil to the export terminals at Banias and Tripoli were shut down. These pipelines were Iraq's only export outlet other than the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline crossing Turkish territory. In addition, Syria closed its border with Iraq in conformity with the agreement signed by its foreign minister during his visit to Tehran. As a result of Syria's action, Iraq became completely dependent on the Kirkuk-Yumutalık pipeline to export its oil. This dependency on Turkey lasted until 1985, when the Iraq-Saudi Arabia pipeline was brought into operation. It was this economic dependency on Turkey and the convergence of Turkish and Iraqi policies toward the Kurds that enabled Turkey to reach easy agreement with Iraq to carry out operations in the region when the PKK stepped up its activities in later years.

From Turkey's perspective, another significant regional development was the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the effect of this invasion on the activities of the PKK. During the Israeli attack on PLO camps, twelve PKK fighters were killed and a similar number taken prisoner by the Israeli army. Despite these losses, the PKK emerged stronger from the clashes. The resistance of the PKK fighters against Israel earned them the sympathy of both Palestinian organizations and Damascus. After this, the PKK established itself in the locations vacated by the Palestinians. The camp known as the Mahzun Korkmaz Academy was set up and became engaged in more intense military training and ideological indoctrination. Relations with the rapidly developing Kurdish movements in northern Iraq and Europe were reinforced. Israel's incursion into Lebanon turned the PKK into an element in the region that had to be reckoned with. It was now ready to launch major operations in Turkey itself.

Turkey was very concerned with the Syriansupported activities of ASALA and those of the PKK in Lebanon. In March 1983 minister of foreign affairs Ilter Türkmen visited Damascus to convey Turkey's misgivings and issue a warning. Damascus responded by denying any links with terrorist activities directed against Turkey. In subsequent visits at lower levels and in official notes, Ankara hardened its tone and conveyed the message that Turkey would have to resort to force if Syria did not change its ways and if it became necessary. Turkey's tough stand made Syria take a step back. The ASALA and PKK forces in its territory had to relocate to Iran, northern Iraq, and the Bekaa Valley. There were two reasons for Syria's retreat: its relations with the U.S. were very strained at the time and it was facing political instability at home. The deterioration of the health of president Hafez Assad following a heart attack that year brought about a power struggle among various military factions, including one led by his brother, Rifad Assad. Syria was forced to direct its attention to the domestic scene until Hafez Assad managed to curb his brother and regain full control in 1984.

# Turkish Operations in Northern Iraq and Their Effect on the PKK

The PKK's relocation from Syria to the Bekaa Valley and to northern Iraq was causing concern in Ankara. After talks with Iraq's government, an agreement was concluded to boost the flow of oil through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. İmmediately after this, in February 1983, an Agreement on Border Security and Cooperation was signed. This agreement allowed both parties to conduct "hot pursuit" operations into the neighbor's territory, after giving prior notification. Turkey had thus established the legal basis for its cross-border operations against the PKK. When PKK militants killed three Turkish soldiers at Uludere in the province of Hakkari on 10 May 1983, Ankara took action and launched an operation on 26 May with the participation of 7,000 soldiers. The force penetrated five kilometers into Iraq in the region between Zakho and Amadiyah. At the same time, the Iraqi army launched an operation from south to north. During Turkey's operations in Iraq, more damage was inflicted on KDP and PUK camps than on PKK camps. The KDP released a statement claiming that the Iraqi army was overstretched and incapable of eliminating the Kurdish resistance because of the war with Iran, so it was borrowing forces from Turkey to carry out this mission. The KDP announced that the Turkish objective was to destroy KDP bases in Iraq in the framework of a plot concocted against the Kurdish liberation movement and ended with a condemnation of the Turkish operation.

The KDP did not confine itself to condemning Ankara's action. Barzani also made a proposal to PKK leader Öcalan for closer cooperation. The protocol containing the Principles of Solidarity between the KDP and PKK was signed in July 1983. The protocol also provided for developing relations with other revolutionary organizations in the region. It called for struggling against imperialism and especially U.S. imperialism, resisting imperialist plans and plots in the region, and relying on the strength of the people of Kurdistan in this struggle (Imset, p. 101).

s.b.f. Kütüpelanesi In 1983 the PKK began to implement its "professional guerrilla war" and in 1984 completed the organization of its military wing known as Kurdistan Liberation Units (HRK: Hezen Rizgariye Kurdistan). In line with the decision to herald the establishment of the HRK with spectacular actions, operations were mounted under the code name "August Thrust." On 15 August, in the district of Eruh in Siirt province, a military outpost was attacked, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of six others plus three civilians. This was followed by an attack with machine-gun fire against another outpost located in the district of Şemdinli in Hakkari province. The PKK apnounced that the armed resistance had commenced, even though no major operations other than the Eruh and Şemdinli operations were mounted until 1985.

The Turkish public had not yet grasped the seriousness of the PKK operations, but important progress had been made in strengthening border security through representations made in Baghdad and Damascus. During the visit to Baghdad of Foreign Minister Halefoğlu and the deputy chief of the General Staff, Gen. Necdet Öztorun, the Turkey-Iraq Security Protocol was signed on 15 October 1984. This protocol was based on the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness signed on 29 March 1946 and allowed both states to engage in hot pursuit up to five kilometers inside the territory of the other signatory. This protocol was terminated by Iraq at the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, but it did provide Turkey with the legal basis to undertake its operations in northern Iraq in 1986 and 1987.

The main opposition to the 1984 Turkey-Iraq Security Protocol came from Iran as well as from the KDP and PUK, which enjoyed the backing of Iran. The Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, declared: "Iraq is defending its oil-producing region with the help of a NATO state. Turkey has to be warned not to disregard the wishes of the Iraqi nation. We will not allow the Baath Party to remain in control of the region much longer" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS]/WE, 22 October 1984, quoted in Gündoğan, p. 5). The PUK decided to end the negotiations with Baghdad that had been going on since 1 December 1983. The KDP declared that the protocol was a crime against the people of Iraq.

Iraq harbored suspicions that Turkey might still have historical claims on the Mosul-Kirkuk region. And yet it signed the Security Protocol with Turkey, which allowed the Turkish army to enter the region, because of the threat from the Kurdish opposition as it took advantage of the power vacuum in the region. Another important reason for signing the protocol was that, as noted earlier, Iraq

could only export oil, on which it was utterly dependent to keep its economy afloat, through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. This situation would change somewhat when the oil pipeline to Saudi Arabia was completed in 1985. By then, negotiations with Ankara were underway for a second pipeline through Turkey, which would be completed in 1987.

Soon after the Security Protocol with Iraq was concluded, Turkey started pressing Syria for a similar agreement. In December 1984 President Evren addressed a letter to Hafez Assad, proposing joint action against terrorism in the region. At a time when his power was being challenged by a number of power centers, including his own brother, Assad agreed to the Turkish proposal. Negotiations led to the conclusion of a Border Security Protocol, signed on 5 March 1985. Syria had made a tactical move once again and taken a step back because of internal difficulties.

After signing security protocols with Iraq and Syria, Turkey set up the system of village guards and went for the military option in its efforts to solve its Kurdish problem as the PKK was busy politicizing the struggle. In 1985 it set up the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Eniya Rizgariya Netewayi Kurdistan: ERNK), its political arm. Taking advantage of Turkey's harsh military measures in the region, the ERNK adopted policies designed to win over the local population to its cause. Starting in 1985, the PKK started becoming a mass movement. The PKK directed its attention to Turkey because Ankara's policies were alienating the local population and pushing people into the PKK camp. Another reason was that the PKK in northern Iraq got involved in armed clashes with the local Kurdish fighters (peshmergas), which led the KDP to suspend its relations with the PKK. The KDP was uneasy about the growing strength of the PKK in its region and was feeling Turkey's pressure, with the constant threat of hot pursuit into areas under its control. The KDP demanded that the PKK either return to Turkey or move farther south and out of the area under KDP's control.

Turkey's second operation into Iraq came when twelve gendarmes were killed at Uludere by PKK militants on 12 August 1986. Within three days, on 15 August, twenty Phantom fighters conducted an operation against targets in northern Iraq, focusing especially on KDP camps and killing 150 peshmergas. When it became clear that such operations would continue, the TGNA passed a law on 3 September, authorizing the government to conduct hotpursuit operations on the basis of cabinet decrees, after the permission of the neighboring country concerned had been obtained.

The Turkish operation of 1986 inflicted serious damage to the Kurdish movements in Iraq. Compelled to act in solidarity, the KDP and PUK concluded a cooperation agreement. Like the KDP, the PUK also began to receive aid from Iran. The most serious reaction to Turkey's operation came from Libya. The operation brought about a split between the KDP and the PKK. After the punishment inflicted by the Turkish air force, the KDP and the PUK were not prepared to consort with the PKK any longer.

After the northern Iraq operation, Turkey went about mending its relations with Syria. In August 1986 a bomb attack on the munitions factory at Kırıkkale near Ankara occurred. In November 1986 several persons of Syrian and Jordanian nationality were arrested on charges of spying on behalf of Syria. Some of those arrested admitted to carrying out the attack on the munitions factory. In Turkey this led to a public outcry and a call for tough measures against Syria in self-defense. But Ankara chose to follow a different course and made an effort to mend relations with Syria. Ankara refused to heed the lead of the U.S., which had severed diplomatic relations with Syria and advised its NATO allies to follow suit. Ankara also announced that it would not allow the base at Incirlik to be used by the U.S. for a possible air strike against Syria.

In 1987 it was assumed that Turkey had isolated the PKK in the region and that now its activities would begin to wane, but this was not case. Following the northern Iraq operation, the PKK's relations with the KDP came under strain. At its third congress, the PKK decided that it would return to Turkey to target the village guards system that had been set up in 1985. The year 1987 proved to be one of the bloodiest. Assuming that it had deprived the PKK of its foreign backing, Ankara reestablished the system of the village guards, thereby showing that it would not consider any solution for the problem other than the military one. The PKK took advantage of the opportunity thus offered by Ankara by stepping up violence and confronted the local population with the choice of backing either the authorities or the PKK. As a result of increased popular support, it became a force to be reckoned with.

When the PKK killed fourteen people on 22 February 1987 in a village in Hakkari province, Turkey mounted another operation in northern Iraq (with thirty combat aircraft) on 4 March 1987. At a time when relations with Iran were unusually strained because of the possibility that Iran might damage the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, some people in Turkey started calling for an extension of the scope of the operation. The hawks in Ankara were insisting that the object of the operation (in addition to neu-

tralizing the PKK) was to control the source of the oil—in other words, Iraq. They even suggested the occupation of a part of the region. Prime Minister Özal declared that Turkey had no designs on Mosul-Kirkuk but added that Turkey would be more actively involved in the region if Turkish security came under threat.

Turkey's 4 March 1987 operation had broken the KDP-PKK connection. Barzani's KDP then severed its relations with the PKK, and in April 1987 it unilaterally annulled the 1983 protocol. In May the PKK was declared a terrorist organization. It was announced that Turkey was a friend and that the KDP needed Ankara's friendship.

The void left by the KDP was filled by Talabani and his PUK. The PKK and PUK became allies in 1988. The PUK spokesman asserted that their area of operations was not confined to northern Iraq and that they were ready to extend their operations to Turkey if need be. The attitude of the Kurdish organizations of northern Iraq toward the PKK and toward Turkey was a function of their relations with Baghdad.

#### Özal's Syrian Visit

With its operations in northern Iraq, Turkey had demonstrated that it would resort to tough action in the region when necessary. The infiltrations of the PKK from Syria were troubling Ankara. Since 1979 Syria had been providing most of the PKK's foreign support in the form of a safe haven, funds, and identity papers for PKK militants fleeing Turkey. It was allowing the PKK to set up representative offices and propaganda bureaus and to organize its conferences and congresses. Damascus allowed the PKK to set up its camps in Lebanon to carry out military training. Prime Minister Özal arranged an official visit to Damascus in July 1987. This was just before an election, and Özal was seeking to impress public opinion with a successful visit. Özal's retinue included the ministers of foreign affairs and of the interior plus high-level officials like Hiram Abas from MIT (the National Intelligence Organization). In the talks that took place, the Syrian position remained unchanged regarding PKK terror. According to Syrian authorities, Öcalan and the PKK fighters were political refugees, and the government was very sensitive about terrorism; but cross-border operations were not always preventable because of the length of the frontier with Turkey, in spite of the efforts made. Syria raised the issue of the sharing of waters and asked for an agreement that would release a specific volume of water in the Euphrates River for Syria's use.

During Özal's Syrian visit, two protocols were signed. The protocol that related to security provided that the two sides would not tolerate terrorist activities on their territories directed at the other side and agreed to return those militants who had participated in armed action. The second protocol, which had to do with economic cooperation, provided for the release of 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria on the Euphrates River.

Although Özal's visit to Damascus did not produce any long-term results, it did have the effect of inducing Syria to remove all of the PKK camps on its soil and transfer them to the Bekaa Valley. Damascus continued to turn a blind eye to PKK militants who were crossing its territory on their way to Turkey, however. Özal translated his visit to Syria into an electoral victory, but the results of the visit were far from being a success scored against the PKK, as claimed by his party campaigners.

The visible improvement in relations between Turkey and Syria was causing apprehension in Iraq. Although Turkey gave Iraq \$1 billion in credits in 1987, the Iraqi government was uneasy about having been left out of the negotiations over the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and its nonparticipation in the agreement reached on this subject. Furthermore, Iraq adopted a new get-tough policy in northern Iraq to reestablish its control in the region after the Turkish operations. This policy was affecting the region's Turcomans and causing strains between Ankara and Baghdad. This situation would get even worse after the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

# The End of the Iran-Iraq War and Turkey's Problem of Kurdish Refugees

With the ending of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the Kurdish question came up as a major issue preoccupying the international community and causing much anxiety in Turkey. In March the Iranian army occupied Halabja, a town close to the Iranian border in the region of Suleymaniyah. The Iranian army had the backing of the Kurds in this operation. During the operation, Iraq used chemical weapons, causing mass fatalities among the Kurds. Soon after this event, Iraq recovered the initiative, checked the advancing Iranian army, and forced Tehran to agree to a cease-fire.

When the Iran-Iraq War ended on 17 July 1988, Baghdad was able to direct its full attention toward northern Iraq. The seasoned Iraqi troops were sent against the Kurdish opposition groups that had been engaged in an armed struggle for eight years in northern Iraq. Eight hundred villages were destroyed. Roughly 250,000 Kurds from the region were resettled in central and southern Iraq in small clusters consisting of five families. The purpose of this policy was to create an uninhabited zone along the border. In August the Iraqi forces used chemical weapons against

the Kurds living in the valleys close to the Turkish-Iraqi border. Recalling the events at Halabja, the Iraqi Kurds fled toward Turkey and Iran. When Iran closed its border, the refugees began to mass at the Turkish border.

Ankara was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the international community was insistently urging Turkey to admit the Kurdish refugees. On the other hand, Turkish public opinion had developed negative attitudes toward Kurds after eight years of insurrection by the PKK. In addition, the refugees would impose an economic burden and increase the likelihood of PKK infiltrators coming into Turkey along with the refugees. These factors were precluding the opening of the frontier to the mass of refugees waiting to get in. Also, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, who had previously criticized Turkey for allegedly killing women and children belonging to the PKK, visited Washington in April 1988. Ankara perceived this visit as a possible sign of the U.S. desire to implement the plan of creating a Kurdish client state that would thwart the USSR's efforts to reach the Gulf. There was concern in Ankara that the instability of the region might allow the U.S. project to be carried out.

At first Turkey announced that its border with Iraq had been closed and that those who had already entered Turkey had been returned to Iraq. As masses of refugees pressed against the border and international pressure mounted, however, Turkey relented and allowed the Kurds to cross over onto the Turkish side and remain there for a limited period. Two days later, Ankara announced that the refugees would be granted temporary residence but would not be granted political refugee status.

At this point, under the terms of the 1984 protocol, Iraq sought permission to exercise the right of hot pursuit vis-à-vis the Kurds. Although Turkey had mounted operations in Iraq on three occasions in the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, Ankara, which already was under pressure from international public opinion, turned down Baghdad's request. Baghdad was informed that those fleeing Iraq were being disarmed as they were admitted to Turkey and that they would not be allowed to carry out any activities hostile to Iraq while in the country. Iraq then denounced the hot-pursuit protocol, while Turkey announced that the Kurds showed no signs of having been subjected to chemical-weapon attacks.

By September 1988 Turkey had admitted 63,000 Iraqi Kurds, who were housed in twelve separate camps. Turkey was confronted with a serious refugee crisis. It was being constantly criticized by Western quarters for neglecting the living conditions of the refugees. The matter had also become a hot domestic issue. It was noted in opposition circles that Iran, which had supported the Kurds throughout the war, had closed its borders to the refugees. The opposition was against straining relations with Baghdad. Indeed, it called for making common cause with Iraq in fighting the Kurds. Özal ignored all of these voices when opening the border gates to the refugees. He had applied for membership in the ECs in 1987 and wanted to improve Turkey's image as a country that was concerned about human rights. Özal also wanted the votes of the people of the southeastern region in the upcoming local elections.

The question of Kurdish refugees had long-term effects on Turkey. The close relations with Iraq, going back to 1980, came to an end. In reaction to Turkish policies, Iraq hardened its approach to the Turcomans living in northern Iraq. Twenty-five of them were executed, and the Turcomans of Kirkuk were forcibly relocated in southern regions of Iraq. Furthermore, when the Iraqi army left the region, the PKK took over the empty camps. Finally, as a result of this episode, Turkey obtained the chance to establish a dialogue with the community leaders in northern Iraq.

In 1989 both the PKK and Turkey hardened their positions. On 17 August the chief of the General Staff, Necip Torumtay, declared that the armed struggle would be suppressed by military force. On the same day, Prime Minister Özal stated that no political measures were being contemplated for the region and that military operations would be stepped up. This meant that henceforth the military would take the lead in policy-making. These tough measures did not cow the PKK, which stepped up its attacks on civilians, especially teachers, doctors, and civil servants. The local inhabitants were forced to choose between the security forces and the PKK; this allowed the PKK, which was more effective, to gain new recruits and get additional support.

The struggle against the PKK automatically placed Turkey and Syria in confrontation. On 1 October 1989 Özal openly criticized Syria for its hostile attitude toward Turkey and expressed serious doubts about whether Syria was complying with the 1987 protocol. He also played his trump card: if Syria continued to violate the 1987 protocol and kept on supporting the PKK, Turkey would then ignore the second protocol signed in 1987 and not release the 500 cubic meters per second of Euphrates water as promised.

Syria did not want to give up its most effective weapon, the PKK, before it had settled the question of water sharing with Turkey once and for all. Turkey's tough talk elicited a tough Syrian response. On 21 October 1989 two Syrian MIG-21 combat aircraft violated Turkish air-

space in the district of Samandağ in Hatay province and shot down a civilian Turkish plane conducting a topographic survey. Although Damascus announced that the incident was the result of an error, that Turkey would be paid compensation, and that those responsible would be punished, this did not appease the Turkish public. Syria's policy was enunciated by Jamil Assad (the other brother of Hafez Assad). Although he had no official position, he exercised considerable influence in the Syrian administration. Jamil Assad declared in November that it was necessary to set up a Kurdish state in the region and admitted that Syria was giving political and logistic support to the PKK. In response to this, the scheduled visit of the Turkish minister of the interior, Abdülkadir Aksu, to Syria was canceled. At a time when relations between the two countries were under growing strain, the Syrian information minister, Muhammad Salman, told a Greek-Cypriot journalist in an interview that Hatay was not a part of Turkey. This showed that Syria was about to inflame an old issue.

## 2. The Question of Water The Background

The question of the sharing of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers had been on the agenda of all negotiations involving Turkey, Iraq, and Syria since the 1960s, but it became a contentious issue in the 1980s. From being a technical question, it now became a political issue. The best example of the use of a natural resource as a potent weapon in political relations was provided by the Arabs during the oil crisis of the 1970s. For a long time Turkey did not consider using water as a tool of its foreign policy; nor did it have a developed water policy. As the PKK terror became the most pressing question on its agenda in the 1980s, however, and the extent of the links between Syria and the PKK became more apparent, Ankara was led to link the issues of water and terror and to use water as an element of its Middle East policy to such a degree that in 1995 the foreign minister, Deniz Baykal, was led to declare: "as a neighbor, Syria must stop playing host to the headquarters of a terrorist organization. Syria might think that the hand that is soiled with blood can be washed with greater amounts of water. But Turkey will never agree to bargain with water against the use of terror" (Tür, pp. 105-6). Even as he made this assertion, Baykal was revealing how closely the two issues were interlinked.

The question of water in the Middle East can be described as the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates, Tigris, and, from Turkey's vantage point, the Orontes rivers (Box 6-14). These rivers have been essential for farming since time immemorial. The question of the sharing of

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# Box 6-14. Physical Features of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Orontes Rivers and the Consumption Targets Set by the Parties

The Murat and Karasu rivers in eastern Turkey join to form the Euphrates River, with a total length of 2,935 kilometers. The segment of the river flowing through Turkey is 1,170 kilometers. In the course of the year the water flow fluctuates from a minimum of 200 cubic meters per second (cusecs) to a maximum of 4,000 cusecs. The total annual flow is 35,58 billion cubic meters.

The Batman River in southeastern Turkey and other tributaries come together to form the Tigris River, which is 1,900 kilometers in length. The Turkish segment of the river is 523 kilometers. Its flow fluctuates from a minimum of 240 cusecs to a maximum of 6,000 cusecs, with a total annual flow of 48,67 billion cubic meters.

The Orontes has its source in Lebanon: Its trajectory in Lebanon is 40 kilometers, in Syria 120 kilometers, and in Turkey 88 kilometers, until it reaches the Mediterranean Sea at Hatay. The Orontes is 248 kilometers in length, with an annual flow of 1.2 billion cubic meters. Although Turkey has been seeking to include the

Orontes River in the negotiations over water rights, Syria has not agreed to this. It will be recalled that Syria does not accept that Hatay is under Turkish sovereignty and hence does not consider the Orontes a shared river.

(M. FIRAT)

The Water Potential of the Euphrates and Tigris Basins and the Consumption Targets of Riparian States (in billions of cubic meters per year)

| TURKEY SYRIA IRAQ  | TOTAL   |
|--|---|
| Euphrates  | 1000  |
| Water Potential 31.58 (88.8%) 4.00 (11.2%) 0.00 (—)  | 35.58 (100%)  |
| Consumption Targets18.42 (35%)11.50 (22%)23.00 (43%)   | 52.92 (100%)  |
| Tigris   |   |
| ·Water Potential 25.24 (51.9%) 0.00 (—) 23.43 (48.1%   | 6) ,48.67 (100%)  |
| Consumption Targets 6.87 (13%) 2.60 (4.8%) 45.00 (83%)   | 54.47 (100%)  |
| Control Contro | · 在1000年中的中国中国的中国中国的中国中国的中国中国的中国的中国中国的中国的中国的 |

Source: Department of Regional and Cross-Border Rivers of the MFA,

the waters was placed on the agenda as of the 1960s, as the waters started being used also for nonagricultural purposes. In addition, Iraq and Syria started claiming that Turkey, which had made little use of these rivers until then, was building dams that would reduce the flow, especially of the Euphrates, with very negative effects on agricultural production in the downstream countries.

Previously the Euphrates and Tigris had been the subject of bilateral agreements (Box 6-15). When Turkey undertook the construction of the Keban Dam in 1964, Syria declared in September that the use of cross-border rivers should be the subject of a multilateral agreement. In 1965 Iraq raised the subject and proposed holding a meeting of the three countries to reach an agreement. Turkey responded by saying that an arrangement over rivers should cover not just the Tigris and Euphrates but also the Orontes, which flows through Syria before entering Turkey. Syria objected to this, and the tripartite meeting failed to materialize. During the construction of Keban, the largest dam in the region, Turkey signed an agreement on 31 August 1966 with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) for a loan of \$40 million. Turkey undertook to continue its efforts to reach an agreement with the governments of Syria and Iraq. Should these efforts fail, Turkey would release adequate quantities of water to meet the needs of downstream countries in the course of filling the dam's reservoir. In the protocol concluded with AID, this quantity was fixed at 350 cusecs. After consultations with the governments of Iraq and Syria, however, this quantity was raised, first to 400 then to 450 cusecs.

With the completion of the Keban Dam, the filling of the dam's reservoir began in March 1974. Both Iraq and Syria started complaining that they were receiving less Euphrates water than had been agreed to. When Turkey announced that it would not be able to release more than 100 cusecs of water for some months, the arguments grew more acrimonious. Syria's request for a tripartite meeting was turned down by Turkey; but when the amount of water released was raised to 300 cusecs, relations resumed their normal course. Immediately after the construction of the Keban Dam, Syria undertook the construction of Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1975, which was to bring about differences between Syria and Iraq.

Water was now the most important element affecting relations among the three countries. This was demonstrated during the construction of the Karakaya Dam in Turkey on the Euphrates in 1976, when relations became very strained. On 20 November 1977 Iraq halted the flow of oil in the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. Although Baghdad declared that this was done to secure payment of \$330 million that it claimed Turkey owed Iraq, the real reason was that the flow of water in the Euphrates would be reduced during the construction of the Karakaya Dam. The interruption of the flow of oil was greatly harming the Turkish economy. Iraq stated that the negotiations over the payment of Turkey's oil debt could only start after the Euphrates flow returned to its normal level. When Ankara gave assurances that this would happen, Iraq signed an agreement with Turkey in August 1978. The agreement provided for the payment of Turkey's outstanding debt

#### Box 6-15. Bilateral Treaties on Rivers between Turkey and Syria and Iraq

1. Agreements on Rivers between Turkey and Syria
Two agreements concluded by Turkey and France, acting on behalf of its mandate Syria, contain provisions relating to rivers. Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement of 1921 provides that the Kuveik Stream will be shared equitably by Aleppo and the region that remains Turkish in the north in a manner that will satisfy both sides. To meet the needs of the region, the city of Aleppo will also be able to draw water from the Euphrates on Turkish territory with its own financial resources. This provision was designed to ensure equitable sharing. The Convention on Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations of 30 May 1926 provided in article 13 that the two countries would cooperate in Improving efficiency in the use of water.

2. Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness of 29 March 1946 between Turkey and Iraq Annex 1 of the treaty is the Protocol on Regulation of the Waters of the Tigris, Euphrates, and Their Tributaries. This deals with joint efforts to exploit these rivers by bringing them under control.

Article 4 of the protocol is especially noteworthy. This article provides that Turkey must reach agreement with Iraq in connection with all structures on these rivers, including dams. The whole sense and purpose of the protocol is to ensure Iraq a regular and dependable supply of water, and it even imposes financial burdens on Iraq to ensure this. In practice this protocol should limit Turkey in many of its activities, but both sides have refrained from invoking it and chosen to ignore it.

(M. FIRAT)

with the delivery of wheat and did not refer to the question of water use. The minister of energy, Deniz Baykal, however, announced after the signing of the agreement that a joint committee would be set up to determine Iraq's water needs and that it would not be faced with a scarcity of water. This was an indication that the deal made with Iraq also covered the water issue.

# The Launching of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP)

The launching of GAP in 1983 caused even more concern in Iraq and Syria. Whereas the Keban and Karakaya dams were designed to produce electric power, GAP was an integrated multipurpose project. It consisted of twenty-two dams (fourteen of which would be built on the Euphrates) plus nineteen hydroelectric power stations (eleven on the Euphrates). The project also included thirty intermediate water storage facilities in addition to forty-seven other pools to store water plus eighty-six pumping stations for the planned irrigation systems. The whole scheme would cost \$9 billion and take thirty years to complete. It was designed to produce 27 billion kilowatt hours of power

per year and bring 1.7 million hectares under irrigation. The project included the building of two tunnels (each twenty-six kilometers long) to carry water from the reservoir of the Atatürk Dam to the plains of Harran and Ceylanpmar. These irrigation tunnels would be the world's longest. When GAP was eventually completed, the flow of water in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers was bound to diminish. The project would also result in a degradation in water quality, because of pollution and residues caused by intensive farming. Despite the negative consequences of GAP that alarmed Syria and Iraq, there would also be benefits. The irregular flow of the two rivers because of the fluctuations in precipitation would come to an end, allowing for more economic use of water and diversification of farm production.

When GAP got underway, Turkey applied to the World Bank for loans. In order to obtain loans to dam rivers, it was necessary to have the approval of downstream states. Syria and Iraq refused to give their approval to the project, which caused the World Bank to back off from supporting the project and call for a quota agreement between riparian states. This setback did not prevent GAP from going ahead, as Turkey decided to rely on its own resources. In 1980 a Joint Economic Committee Protocol was signed with Iraq, which was also adhered to by Syria in 1983. Under the terms of this protocol, a Mixed Technical Committee was set up to discuss the issue of regional waters.

In the 1980s Iraq was fully preoccupied with the war against Iran, and relations with Turkey assumed vital importance for Baghdad. That is why the issue of water was raised only by Syria. Syria had launched a new economic policy in 1986, which would close its trade gap by increasing its agricultural production and exports. Hence it was sensitive about the water issue and pursued it with great determination. Large tracts of government land along the Euphrates had been privatized, and agricultural investments were being promoted. At a time when its need for water was increasing, it was natural for Damascus to look upon GAP with serious misgivings (Tür, pp. 111–12).

As the construction of the Karakaya Dam neared completion, Syria's prime minister Abdelrauf al-Kasm visited Ankara in March 1986. He warned that, if Turkey reduced the flow of water due to GAP, Syria would have to respond with the means at its disposal. Nevertheless, the talks proceeded in a constructive atmosphere. It was decided to set up four committees to further bilateral cooperation: the committees on international issues, border security, water and electricity, and trade and economy. At the Committee on Water and Electricity, Syria asked

Turkey to release sufficient water during the filling of the reservoirs of the Karakaya and Atatürk Dams. The Turkish representative gave informal oral assurances that 500 cusecs of water would be released. When Syria declared that it would not give support to the PKK, the impression was created that the issues of water and terror had been linked. Official representatives repeatedly asserted, however, that no linkage existed between the two issues.

When the Karakaya Dam was completed in 1987, the question flared up once again. Worried that the flow of water would diminish by 27%, Syria and Iraq sent protests and stressed that the flow of water could not be regulated on the basis of unilateral promises. They wanted a formal tripartite agreement on the subject, but Turkey did not want to hear of such an agreement.

At a time when relations with Syria were under strain because of the construction of the Karakaya and Atatürk dams and growing PKK activities, Prime Minister Özal visited Damascus on 17 July 1987 (see "Özal's Syrian Visit" above, on the PKK and the Security Protocol with Syria). The Economic Cooperation Protocol was also signed at that time. Article 6 of the protocol read as follows: "During the period when the reservoir of the Atatürk Dam is being filled, and pending the definitive allocation of Euphrates waters among the three countries, the Turkish side undertakes to release an annual average of more than 50d cusecs of water at the Turkish-Syrian border. Should the monthly average fall below 500 cusecs, the difference shall be made up in the subsequent month." Iraq and Syria claimed that the Turkish undertaking only covered the period during which the Atatürk Dam was being filled and pending conclusion of a tripartite agreement on water allocation; during the 1990s they pressed for the conclusion of a three-way agreement to replace the 1987 protocol. They also demanded the release of 700 cusecs of water.

#### The Peace Pipeline Project

Based on his philosophy of foreign relations, Özal was convinced that developing economic and commercial relations with Syria would lead to a resolution of political problems. In line with this philosophy, he submitted a number of joint projects to his Syrian counterpart. Among these were proposals on Turkish aid to Syria in oil and gas exploration, provision of electric power to Syria, and the piping of water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to Arab countries. This last proposal was dubbed the Peace Pipeline Project and was significant for Syria, a country short of water. Ankara was proposing to draw water from two rivers that flowed entirely in Turkey and, after meeting Turkish needs, to send the surplus through two pipelines all the way to Saudi Arabia and Oman. The

project was conceived in 1986, and its feasibility study was carried out by the U.S. firm Brown and Root. The first pipe would carry 3.5 million cubic meters per day through Hatay to Syria and then via Jordan to the cities of Mecca and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The second pipe would carry 2.5 million cubic meters per day through Syria, Jordan, and eastern Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

Although first unveiled in 1987, this project was formally proposed in 1988 but got a cool reception in the Arab countries and never reached the stage of implementation. Özal used the project as a trump card in his dealings with the Arab states, however. The Arab states cited high costs as the reason for rejecting the project. But it was obvious that their negative reception was due to political concerns that went unmentioned. They harbored suspicions that the plan was also designed to supply water to Israel. The project would allow Ankara to gain inordinate influence in the region, which was something they did not want. Nor did they want to become dependent on a powerful Turkey for a vital commodity like water. Ankara shelved the project when it became clear that what Arab public opinion really wanted was for Turkey to show its good intentions by agreeing to a fair sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris.

It soon became clear that the 1987 protocol concluded between Turkey and Syria after excluding Iraq would not be long-lasting. On 23. November 1989 Turkey informed Syria and Iraq that between 13 January and 13 February 1990 it would be diverting the Euphrates River in order to fill the Atatürk Dam reservoir. Syria was guaranteed 120 cusecs from the Euphrates downstream before the diversion; in order to compensate for the shortfall during the diversion, Syria would receive 750 cusecs from 23 November to 13 January. This would correspond to an average of 509 cusecs of water, thus complying with the terms of the 1987 protocol. Turkey also indicated that the filling of the reservoir would take place in the winter, when the water requirements of the two countries were at a minimum. Syria interpreted Turkey's move as the first in a series of similar cuts, protested Ankara's action, and called for a reversal of the decision.

To calm down Iraq and Syria, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs visited the neighboring countries in January 1990 and assured them that Turkey had no intention of applying pressure on them, that Turkish farmers would also be affected by the cuts in the water flow, and that efforts were being made to minimize the effects of the cuts by releasing additional water in the period preceding the cuts. These efforts failed to convince the neighbors. Iraq and Syria renewed their call to conclude a tripartite water-

sharing agreement and signed a bilateral agreement on water-sharing to set a good example. Under this agreement, the waters of the Euphrates entering Syria from Turkey would be split in the proportion of 42% for Syria's use and 58% for Iraq's use.

By 1990 the theses of Iraq, Turkey, and Syria regarding the sharing of water and their proposed solutions had become apparent. The main difference between the Turkish thesis and those of Syria and Iraq with respect to the sharing of the Euphrates and Tigris and other Middle Eastern rivers can be summarized as follows (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bölgesel ve Sınıraşan Sular Dairesi, pp. 37–43).

- 1. Turkey described the Euphrates and Tigris as cross-border rivers, while Iraq and Syria described them as international rivers.
- 2. Turkey held the view that the waters should be allocated on the basis of equity, while Iraq and Syria defended the principle of sharing.
- 3. Turkey claimed that the portions of the rivers on its territory were under its sovereignty; consequently, a tripartite agreement on water sharing would not be a legal but rather a political agreement and hence unacceptable. Iraq and Syria strongly favored concluding a tripartite agreement.

Iraq's took the following positions.

- 1. Iraq had utilized the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris since time immemorial and had built many structures to make this possible. Iraq had acquired rights on the two rivers going back to ancient times.
- 2. At the initial stage of the filling of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey had violated international law by not informing Iraq in good time and inflicted hardship on the Iraqi people by reducing the flow of water below the level previously guaranteed. Furthermore, Turkey appeared to be intent on building more dams and structures, thus inflicting additional hardship on the downstream states.
- 3. The waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers should be shared according to arithmetical formulas. Under such a system, the amount of water required by each project should be determined, indicating whether the project was in operation, under construction, or in the planning stage. Furthermore, the hydrological data relating to the two rivers should be compiled and exchanged. There should be a joint technical committee to review all the submitted data and determine the water requirements of all operating projects as well as the requirements of projects in the construction and planning stages.
- 4. Under the 1987 protocol, Turkey had committed itself to releasing 500 cusecs from the Euphrates where it flowed into Syria by the time of the completion of the Atatürk Dam. With the completion of the Atatürk Dam,

this protocol had lost its validity. The new amount of water to be released should be higher and in no case less than 700 cusecs. Since the average yearly flow of the Euphrates was 1,000 cusecs, this would imply an equitable sharing of its waters, with Turkey getting one-third and the remaining two-thirds to be apportioned in equal amounts to Syria and Iraq.

Syria's views were as follows.

- 1. The Euphrates and Tigris were international rivers and hence in the category of "shared resources." These resources should be shared in specific amounts by the countries of the basin. This sharing should be on the basis of arithmetical formulas. For this, each country should indicate its requirements of water from each of the two rivers and determine the capacity of each river. Should the amount of water required by the three riparian countries exceed the flow of one of the rivers, this excess should be deducted proportionately from the water to be apportioned to each country.
- 2. In the course of the initial filling of the Atatürk Dam reservoir, Turkey did not act according to the principles of good neighborliness when it drastically decreased the flow of the Euphrates River. This inflicted untold damage on Syria's agriculture, its energy production, and its drinking water supplies. Turkey was seeking to apply political pressure on Syria by this means. The Peace Pipeline Project and other plans envisaging the sale of water were all designed to serve Turkey's ambition of assuming a leadership role in the Middle East. The proposals to sell water while restricting the flow of the Euphrates demonstrated the muddle in Turkey's policies.
- 3. Employing up-to-date and economical methods in the use of the waters of an international river did not bestow on a country the right to use additional water from that river.
- 4. The work of the International Law Commission should be accelerated so as to secure the early codification of the rules on the subject. This would allow disputes among riparian states regarding the sharing of water to be resolved through international adjudication in the International Court of Justice or other such tribunals.
- 5. International observers should participate in the negotiations among riparian states and the country or countries that obstructed the sharing of waters should face UN sanctions in the light of the findings of the observers.
- 6. An agreement had to be concluded among the interested states on the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates River.

Turkey held the following views:

1. The Euphrates and Tigris were not international but cross-border rivers, and Turkey exercised sovereign

rights over the segments of the rivers flowing on Turkish territory. The claims of Iraq and Syria were designed to bring Turkey under international pressure and were devoid of legal foundation. In international law, the concept of rights acquired through prescription could not be invoked in isolation. The sharing of joint resources on the basis of arithmetical formulas was rejected by the International Law Commission and was in conflict with the principle of equitable use. The sharing of joint resources did not apply to cross-border rivers, because such rivers were not considered to be natural resources that could be shared.

- 2. The claims of Iraq and Syria regarding Turkey's actions in the course of the initial filling of the Atatürk Dam reservoir were incorrect, as were the figures relating to the extent of the irrigable agricultural land in their respective countries.
- 3. The Orontes River should be considered along with the Euphrates and Tigris, and in this context what should be discussed was not the sharing of waters but their allocation. There were rules of international law that applied to the allocation of waters: (a) scientific and objective common criteria should be developed in connection with the "equitable and rational use of the waters"; (b) the principle of "not causing significant harm" required riparian countries of cross-border rivers to refrain from actions that would harm one another when using water. Turkey had never used the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris basins as a weapon to be used to harm the downstream countries. Acting in the spirit of fairness, Turkey had made every effort to release the volume of water that it was committed to deliver.
- 4. The question of water in the Middle East was not one of quantity and sharing. To reach a long-term and lasting solution to the question, each country must review its water policy. It should take action to avoid wasting water, implement a rational pricing policy, develop national and regional projects designed to secure the use of recycled waste water, resort to advanced technology in irrigation, and select appropriate crops in farming.

The question of water also left its imprint on the relation of the parties in the 1990s, not just as a technical and legal question but also as a political question.

E. Economic Relations with the Middle East Turkey's developing political relations with the Middle Eastern states during the 1980s also had an important economic dimension. During the period of the 12 September administration, Turkey's trade and tourism exchanges with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Libya underwent a substantial increase. Workers went to these

Table 6-7. Turkish Exports and Imports, 1979-1984

|                             | E           | exports (%) |      |  |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|------|--|
|                             | 1979        | 1983        | 1984 |  |
| Muslim States               | 18.1        | 45.1        | 40.6 |  |
| European Economic Community | 48.5        | 34.1        | 38.3 |  |
| COMECON                     | 13.3        | 4.0         | 4.0  |  |
| U.S.                        | 4.6         | 4.0         | 5.2  |  |
| Japan                       | 1.0         | 0,6         | 0.5  |  |
|                             | imports (%) |             |      |  |
|                             | 1979        | 1983        | 1984 |  |
| Muslim States               | 22.2        | 40.0        | 35.0 |  |
| European Economic Community | 36.1        | 27.9        | 27.6 |  |
| COMECON                     | 12.2        | 8.4         | 8.8  |  |
| U.S.                        | 7.5         | 7.5         | 10.0 |  |
| Japan                       | 4.5         | 3.8         | 3.8  |  |

(Table by Melek Firat)

countries in growing numbers and Turkish businesses started investing there, particularly in the construction sector. There was a large increase in trade with the Middle Hast, helped by the growing opportunities created by the Iran-Iraq War. It is interesting to note that just as political relations developed with the Middle East while relations with Europe cooled off, a similar trend occurred in the field of trade. Europe's share in Turkey's exports and imports dwindled, while that of the Middle East grew. Table 6-7 (covering the period from 1979 to 1984) shows the development of Turkey's trade with different regions (Yalçıntaş, p. 321).

Although the Özal governments considered the economy to be the main element of foreign policy, the trade and economic relations with the Middle East, which had been steadily growing until 1984, began to dwindle. This was in large measure due to the economic difficulties confronting Iran and Iraq because of the war. Furthermore, in 1983 the military regime came to an end, and relations with Europe began to normalize. The application for membership in the ECs in 1987 helped make Europe Turkey's main trade and economic partner once again.

Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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#### II. RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB STATES

#### A. Relations with Israel

#### 1. Israel's Regional Actions and Turkey

The frostiness in Turkey's relations with Israel during the 1970s persisted during the major part of the 1980s. This was due to the displeasure caused in Ankara by Israel's high-handed actions in the region. Another reason was the Palestinian Intifada that broke out in 1987 and enjoyed widespread sympathy among the Turkish public.

Following the Camp David agreement, there was a generally held belief that the disputes in the Middle East were finally entering the stage of resolution. In these circumstances, Israel's actions that destabilized the region caused universal disappointment. Starting in 1978, Israel

started establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank. This was followed by the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980 and of the Golan Heights in December 1981. Finally, Israel shifted it capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The annexation of East Jerusalem and the transfer of the capital to Jerusalem led to the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions 476 and 478, declaring Israel's actions null and void. Turkey went further and, in addition to condemning Israel's moves, took two steps that made relations even frostier. Turkey shut down its consulate general in Jerusalem on 28 August 1980 and downgraded the level of Turkish representation in Tel Aviv from chargé d'affaires to second secretary on 2 December 1980.

Turkey's reaction went beyond what was called for in the UN's resolutions. In taking drastic steps like closing the consulate general in Jerusalem, which was not a diplomatic mission, and in further loosening its already diminished diplomatic relations, Ankara was motivated not by international considerations but by domestic political imperatives. These decisions were made at a time when Turkey was trying to surmount the difficulties in its balance of payments caused by the second oil shock and was seeking Arab friendship in order to relieve the isolation that had been imposed on it after the 12 September coup. It is interesting that the coup-makers took these steps at a time when they were most in need of the support of the U.S., the protector and friend of Israel.

Turkey maintained its hard line during the crisis that emerged as a result of the Israeli attack and destruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq on 8 June 1981. In the voting at the UN General Assembly, Turkey was among those that condemned Israel's attack.

Turkey softened its stand following the annexation of the Golan Heights. Although the UN Security Council resolution 497 of 17 December 1981 declared this action illegal under international law, Turkey abstained in the voting on the General Assembly resolution of February 1982 condemning Israel's action. Ankara did not regard Israel as a direct threat. It only joined the toughly worded warnings to alleviate its isolation. Now Turkey was trying to gain Israel's backing against its troublesome southern neighbor, Syria.

But it soon became clear that Turkey had not changed the main thrust of its policy. Ankara reacted sharply against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the expulsion of the PLO guerrillas from Beirut. Turkish public opinion was particularly incensed when, in September 1982, the Lebanese Phalangists, supported by the Israeli army, massacred almost a thousand Palestinians at the Sabra and Chatilla camps. The Turkish TV (TRT) broadcast the scenes from these camps after the massacre for several days, feeding the public outrage against Israel. Yet the official Turkish reaction to the invasion of Lebanon was milder than the reaction to the annexation of Arab Jerusalem.

The Israeli incursion into Lebanon led to an unexpected improvement in Turkish-Israel relations. The headquarters and the basic training centers of the Armée Secrète Arménien pour la Libération de l'Arménie (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos for the Genocide of the Armenians (JCGA), two organizations involved in action directed at Turkey, were located in Lebanon. During the invasion of Lebanon, Tel Aviv was in contact with Ankara and proposed joint action to "clean up" the camps. Ankara agreed to the proposal. In operations carried out with the participation of Turkish agents, the ASALA and JCGA camps were wiped out and a good number of militants were killed, including the leader of the JCGA, Agop Ahjian (Tavlaş, p. 12).

This incident could have accelerated the intensified cooperation between Israel and Turkey of the 1990s, but the PLO's action in organizing its resistance to Israel in a more systematic way prevented this from happening.

## 2. The Effects of the Intifada

After his expulsion from Lebanon, Arafat continued to lead the Palestinian movement from Tunisia. In December 1987 a rebellion broke out in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza in response to his call. This mass uprising was known as the Intifada. The Intifada placed the question of Palestine once again on the international agenda. Arafat put the opportunity created by the Intifada to good use: the Palestinian National Council, meeting in Algiers under his chairmanship, announced the establishment of the state of Palestine on 15 November 1988 (Box 6-16).

Turkey recognized the new state on the very same day, leaving even Egypt, Syria, and Jordan trailing behind. This move was in conformity with the pattern of pursuing pro-Arab policies that Turkey had been following since the mid-1960s. Ankara's decision to recognize Palestine was facilitated by Arafat's declaration that the new state recognized the UN Security Council's resolutions 181, 242, and 338, that it was ready to exist side-by-side with Israel, and that the PLO was against terrorism.

During Özal's term as prime minister, an effort was made to normalize relations with Israel while at the same time taking radical steps like the recognition of the Palestinian state. The decision to recognize Palestine led to certain logical consequences. Turkey was often critical of the harsh conduct of Israeli soldiers in response to the Intifada. At the inauguration of the 1989 session of the UN

#### Box 6-16. The Intifada

The Intifada was triggered by an accident caused by an Israeli truck on 8 June 1987, which resulted in the deaths of four Palestinians. Rumors started circulating that the incident was not an accident but a deliberate act, causing tensions within the community. Isolated demonstrations led to a mass protest demonstration on 9 December 1987 that initiated a movement that went on for two years. During this period Palestinian youths attacked Israeli soldiers with sticks and stones and were met by gunfire that caused hundreds of fatalities. This situation had extensive repercussions in the Middle East and throughout the world. The Intifada, which means "eruption" in Arabic, had three effects. (1) The Palestinians in the occupied territories set aside their differences and displayed a solidarity never seen before. A giant step was taken in the direction of confirming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. (2) The sight of the violence inflicted by Israeli soldiers on civilians helped gather sympathy for the Palestinians throughout the world and led to Israel's increasing isolation. In March 1988 the European Communities adopted a decision condemning Israel. Even in the U.S. there were those who started questioning the unconditional support given to Israel. (3) The Israeli public began to get weary of continuing demonstrations and the atmosphere of violence and started searching for peace.

In the process of peace-making following the first Gulf War, the Intifada had a positive effect and constituted a turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The second Intifada (the al-Aqsa Intifada), however, which erupted in September 2000, and the disproportionate violence of the Israeli reaction dealt a serious blow to the peace process

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General Assembly, a vote was called to decide whether Israel should be admitted to the meeting. Departing from its usual practice, Turkey did not abstain this time and voted no.

Near the end of the 1980s Turkey began to take steps toward returning to a more balanced approach to the question of Palestine. For this it was necessary for Ankara to develop its relations with Israel. Starting in 1990, the foundations were laid by both sides for an early and comprehensive revival of bilateral relations.

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#### B. Relations with Iran

### The Period of the Iran-Iraq War Questions Arising from Ideological Differences

For Turkey sovereignty rested on the nation, whereas for Iran it rested on religion. This ideological divergence was at the source of all the differences that affected relations between the two countries in this period. In the era of the shah, there were also differences between the two countries on issues like the source of power and its legitimacy, but they shared the same attachment to nationalism.

Although the divergent ideology issue emerged in 1979, it need not have been the dominant question between the two countries. The army carried out a coup in Turkey on 12 September 1980, however, and the military regime sought to resuscitate Kemalism, even if only on a rhetorical plane, while the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was bent on establishing Sharia law. These conflicting views led to ideological clashes and occasionally crises. Each regime perceived the other as antithetical to its own orientations and suspected the other of wanting to export its brand of regime.

The ideological clash manifested itself in different ways. The Iranian media carried articles disparaging Atatürk and the Turkish media, Khomeini Iran was critical of Turkey's proscription of the headscarf, and Iranian leaders visiting Ankara refused to lay wreaths at Atatürk's tomb. The Turkish press called the Iranian regime a "hotbed of reaction," while the Iranians described Turkey

as the "lackey of Satan." These examples could easily be multiplied.

After the revolution, the Iranians seeking refuge in Turkey became a major problem. A similar problem had existed during the monarchy when Iranian students in Turkish universities demonstrated against the shah. But after the revolution the number of Iranians in Turkey reached 1.5 million, most of them opponents of the regime. The most powerful Marxist organization in Iran, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (Popular Warriors), saw most of its organized militants move to Turkey. Iran claimed that Turkey was providing sanctuary to opponents of the regime and complained that Ankara refused to cooperate in dealing with "Iranian criminal fugitives." Against this, Turkey claimed that Iran was supporting Turkish fundamentalist groups and was engaged in propaganda in support of an Islamic revolution in Turkey through Iranians who resided there. Furthermore, Ankara saw the struggle on Turkish territory between agents of the National Intelligence and Security Organization of Iran (Sazman-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Melli-e Iran, known as SAVAMA) and Iranian dissidents as a serious threat to peace and security.

The ideological differences were pushed into the background after the death of Khomeini in June 1989. They recurred in the 1990s with more intensity, however, and continued to plague bilateral relations.

#### Questions Arising from the Iran-Iraq War

The war with Iraq caused Iran to revert to the old policy of the monarchy, which was to support the Iraqi Kurds in every way in their struggle against Baghdad (Box 6-17). Iran regarded the Iraqi Kurds as its ally and provided them with arms, thereby forcing Iraq to divert substantial forces to deal with these separatist elements. As in the days of the shah, northern Iraq came under the control of Kurdish clans, with the government in control of cities and main roads.

In the face of these developments, Turkey sought Tehran's support in the following two areas.

1. Iraq's trade with Turkey must not be harmed. This implied that Iraq's exports of oil via Turkey must not be disrupted by sabotage and that Turkish goods en route to Iraq must cross northern Iraq unhindered. Turkey made a similar request to Iraq: the Turkey-Iran railway, which carried the bulk of the goods traded between the two countries, must not be attacked. Although Iran and Iraq gave no verbal or written undertaking not to block these two main conduits of trade, they complied with Turkey's request, with very few exceptions. Iran must have instructed the

#### Box 6-17. The Iran-Iraq War

Although the Algiers Agreement of 1975 appeared to have settled the major problems between the two countries, relations began to deteriorate once again in 1979.

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Iraq suspected that in the name of exporting its Islamic revolution Iran was inciting the separatist Kurds in the North and the Shiftes in the South, while Iran suspected that Iraq was supporting the separatist Arabs, both Shifte and Sunni, in its province of Khuzistan. These suspicions soon led to border clashes. The clashes continued in the second half of 1979 and throughout 1980, when even heavy weapons were employed. With this state of affairs, the border dispute in the Shatt al-Arab, which had been resolved with the Algiers Agreement became a contentious issue once again. On 17 September 1980 iraq announced its denunciation of the Algiers Agreement.

War broke out on 22 September 1980 with a general of fensive launched by Iraq. Iraq held the initiative in the first year because the Iranian army had been weakened by the U.S. arms embargo. But as the war gradually turned into a war of attrition, the balance tilted in favor of Iran, a country with greater resources than Iraq. The West (including the U.S.) see Box 6-7 above) supplied both belligerents with weapons, claiming that this was to preserve the balance between the two countries. Meanwhile there were many mediation efforts, including one by Turkey, all of which falled to bring the war to an end.

Contrary to the predictions of some observers, the Iraqi Shiftes remained loyal to Baghdad and the Iranian Arabs maintained their loyalty to Tehran.

The war of attrition led the two sides to attack each other's oil export installations in the Persian Gulf, their main source of income. In 1984 these attacks created fear that the war night spread. Tensions rose when the U.S. started taking direct measures against Iran, but the escalation was contained.

The war came to an end on 18 July 1988 when both sides accepted the UN Security Council's resolution 598. The cease-fire came into effect on 20 August, and the questions between the two countries were frozen. After this, the questions of the exchange of prisoners of war and the lands under occupation were taken up sporadically. Although most of the outstanding questions were settled as a result of the conditions created by the occupation of Kuwalt by Iraq in August 1990, there was still no final peace treaty in 2008.

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Kurds of northern Iraq, who also complied with Turkey's request. But Turkey did suffer in the Persian Gulf, where its tankers loading oil came under aerial attack.

When the tide of war turned in Iran's favor, there was a real possibility that Iranian forces would advance in northern Iraq and seize part of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. Although Iran had refrained from damaging the pipeline by bombing it or using the Kurds as its proxy, it would be unrealistic to assume that Iran would allow the marketing of Iraqi oil through territory under its direct control. As Turkey was beginning to get alarmed by de-

velopments, the Iranian advance was halted, and the center of gravity of the battlefield again shifted to the south. Although it was not known to what extent Iran was acting out of consideration for Turkey's wishes, the impression that Iran was heeding Turkish interests brought relief to Ankara.

2. The PKK must not be supported. When the PKK started its armed struggle in Turkey in August 1984, Ankara concluded an agreement with Iraq in October, enabling Turkish forces to engage in hot pursuit against the separatist organization in northern Iraq, where it had its bases. When Turkey expressed its desire to conclude a similar agreement with Tehran, it was rebuffed. Tehran went further and asserted that the agreement that Ankara had concluded with Iraq violated Turkey's neutrality. Iran claimed that Turkish operations in Iraq would strengthen Baghdad's hold on the region and weaken the Kurds that Tehran saw as its allies.

Despite the deep differences between the two neighbors, Iran set Ankara at ease by concluding an agreement with Turkey in November 1984, by which it undertook not to allow its territory to be used by the PKK to conduct any action directed against Turkey (Bölükbaşı, pp. 27–29). Iran made an effort to abide by this agreement until the end of the war. But the question was not fully set aside, and the issue of Iran's logistical support to the PKK continued to plague Turkey's relations with Iran.

# Turkish Neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War and Economic Cooperation within the Context of the ECO

Turkey declared its neutrality in October 1980 and maintained this status so successfully that the two warring countries entrusted the Turkish missions in Baghdad and Tehran with undertaking the task of looking after their respective interests when they finally severed their diplomatic ties in July 1987.

The ideological clash between Turkey and Iran was symbolized in the persons of Kenan Evren, the soldier, and Ruhollah Khomeini, the cleric. But the conditions created by the war prevented the relations of the two countries from completely breaking down. Turkey badly needed dependable sources of oil and a market that could absorb its exports in exchange for oil. Iran needed a country that could guarantee steady and dependable transit for its imports during the war. This mutual dependence helped overcome the mistrust and the problems caused by this state of affairs. Outstanding questions were frozen and crises were overcome.

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Notwithstanding the disparate leadership, the lower echelons of the administration in charge of managing the economy chose to ignore ideological differences and prevented disagreements from getting out of hand. Turgut Özal in Turkey and Hashemi Rafsanjani in Iran epitomized this mentality. The visit of Deputy Prime Minister Özal to Iran in March 1982 produced concrete evidence that the two countries could work together. Two years later, in April 1984, Özal returned to Iran, this time as prime minister.

After the signing of the trade agreement by which Iran would supply oil to Turkey in return for Turkish basic commodities, Turkish-Iranian trade reached the highest levels ever recorded. The high point was reached in 1985, when the volume of trade reached \$2 billion. After this peak, a decline set in, because Iran complained that Turkey purchased only oil and was not interested in Iranian industrial goods and farm products. Another complaint was the high price and poor quality of Turkish products sold in Iran.

During this period Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan felt the need to manage the growing economic relations more effectively within an institutional framework. In view of the rapidly developing economic relations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the early 1980s, it was decided to expand these relations by adding the dimensions of technical cooperation, cultural exchanges, and trade. To this end, the organization known as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) (see "Relations with Iran" in "Relations with the Middle East" in Section 5) was modified and relaunched in Tehran on 29 January 1985 as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Article 3 of the ECO agreement indicated that the ECO would pursue broader objectives than the RCD: "The member states shall take the necessary measures to establish an ECO Free Trade Area by eliminating, over a period of 10 years, customs duties and nontariff barriers in the region."

Actually, the RCD (which consisted of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) and the ECO pursued similar objectives. Article 3 of the ECO agreement could well have been included in the RCD charter. But Iran was reluctant to allow the RCD to operate as an effective organization, because the new Iranian rulers saw it as a reminder of Western connection of the shah's era. When Iran left CENTO, it remained in the RCD because it felt the need for an organization that was engaged in economic cooperation. At Tehran's request, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to establish an economic cooperation organization that would be free of any political dimension. This was a realistic approach

given that it would have been impossible to bring the three countries together within a political organization.

The ECO was engaged in getting organized during the second half of the 1980s and did not start becoming effective in bilateral relations or regional affairs until the 1990s, when independent states emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

As the war drained both Iran and Iraq of their ability to import, Turkey intensified its mediation efforts within the framework of its policy of active neutrality. Özal took a personal interest in these efforts, but they remained fruitless. The war came to an end in 1988 independently of Turkey's mediation efforts.

# 2. The Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War

With the ending of the war, the questions between Turkey and Iran that had been frozen during the war reemerged, and relations began to get worse. The contentious issues had been put on hold because the two countries economically depended on one another in the early 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, however, both were free from their former dependence. Henceforth they would no longer overlook conflicting positions in the fields of ideology or security.

Iran did not depend exclusively on Turkey for a secure transit route anymore and was no longer in need of importing lower-quality goods from Turkey. Ideological considerations weighed heavily in the contracts being let out for the reconstruction of the country, and Turkish firms stood no chance against firms from Europe or the Far East. Turkey, in turn, had overcome its foreign exchange shortages and no longer needed to resort to barter to procure its oil. Furthermore, having gained a firm foothold in Arab markets, Turkey no longer needed the Iranian market. As a consequence of these factors, the volume of Turkish-Iranian trade had plummeted to one-tenth of its 1985 level when the war came to an end.

The first crisis in bilateral relations erupted on 10 November 1988 when the Iranian Embassy in Ankara refused to lower its flag to half mast to mark the day on which Atatürk died. A series of crises followed until May 1989, when Iranian ambassador Manouchehr Mottaki was recalled. The state of crisis also persisted because of president Kenan Evren's speeches. Among these were his rhetorical question addressed to Khomeini—"Who are you to utter such things about Atatürk?" (Çetinsaya, p. 154)—and his assertion that Khomeini had ruined his country and that history would remember him as the leader who dragged his nation down. For such remarks,

Evren was likened to Salman Rushdie. In another incident, SAVAMA agents were caught trying to smuggle Iranian dissidents out of Turkey in the trunk of their car.

Although the Turkish media, and even politicians, often used insulting language with reference to the Iranian regime, it was usually the Iranian side that caused the rows between the neighbors and then led to their escalation. Tehran's rhetoric was based on anti-imperialism and the export of the Islamic revolution. The slogan was "Ashura is every day and Karbala is everywhere." A foreign policy based on this fiery rhetoric was essential for the Iranian administration to strengthen its legitimacy among the Iranian public. The war with Iraq was also presented to the Iranians as a jihad. Without a jihad, the new regime in Iran would lose its raison d'être. Each of Tehran's moves against the secular Turkish government that "oppressed the Muslim people" (Tülümen, pp. 136, 198) would strengthen the Iranian people's support for the Islamic regime.

This period of recurring crises lasted no more than seven months. It came to an end with the death of Khomeini in June 1989. Although Khomeini was not officially a head of state, flags were lowered to half mast in Turkey when he died. After this, Rafsanjani, the former speaker of the Majlis, became president and pursued the regime's policies with greater restraint. On 10 November 1990 the Iranian flag at the Ankara Embassy was hoisted at half mast, and the new ambassador, Mohammad Reza Baqeri, paid his respects at Atatürk's mausoleum. In the early 1990s Turkish-Iranian relations were cool but crisis-free.

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# Relations with the USSR

The 1980s were of crucial importance to both Turkey and the USSR. Both countries went through a period of change. Without going into whether it was for better or worse, Turkey found itself transformed. The USSR expired as it was being transformed. The process was propitious for the development of bilateral relations.

#### I. THE USSR'S TRANSFORMATION

The most important domestic event in the USSR during the 1980s was the ending of the eighteen-year-long Brezhnev era, which began in 1964 and came to an end on 10 November 1982. Brezhnev was succeeded by Yury Andropov. Neither Andropov (12 November 1982—10 February 1984) nor his successor, Konstantin Chernenko (13 February 1984—10 March 1985), was as effective and decisive as previous general secretaries of the party had been. Their terms in office were too short for them to be effective, and the need for reform confronting them was too pressing and comprehensive. Hence the post-Brezhnev era really commenced when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985.

When Gorbachev took charge of the USSR, the country urgently needed economic restructuring and political transformation. To carry out these two requirements, the country needed to prepare itself for a long-term effort that was known as *peredyshka*. The last days of the USSR were spent in a search for ways to tackle these needs (Box 6-18).

In foreign policy, the 1980s started with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which occurred on 26–27 December 1979. When Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, the USSR gave the impression that it was pursuing a very hard-line policy. *Perestroika* also brought about changes in foreign policy, however. One significant sign of change was that Foreign Minister Gromyko was replaced by Shevardnadze on 2 July 1985. Shevardnadze would remain in charge of

#### Box 6-18. The Collapse of the USSR

As the decade of the 1980s commenced, the Soviet economy was in recession. It was unable to compete with capitalism. Having to coexist with that system while rejecting it placed the .USSR in an impossible institutional/Ideological dilemma, which became apparent during the latter part of Brezhnev's rule. Ways were sought to get out of the difficulty. The Novosibirsk Memorandum (by Abil Aganbegyan and Tatiana Zasiavskaya), which appeared in the press after Brezhnev's death, identified the bottlenecks in the economy and proposed ways to overcome them. This memorandum was never implemented because of the quick succession of general secretaries of the CPSU. In 1986 the memorandum was expanded and relaunched by Gorbachev under the label of restructuring (perestroika) (see Box 6-19 below). This was followed by glasnost (see Box 6-20 below), which stood for transparency in politics. Perestroika and glasnost led to a questioning of socialist values and created an ideological void. Perestroika also resulted in disaffection among the peoples of the USSR, because it failed to yield tangible benefits. This in turn strengthened separatist currents within the state (see Box 6-21 below).

The last phase of the USSR can be summarized as follows. Economic crisis led to efforts to overcome the crisis, perestroika and glasnost. This resulted in a social crisis and an ideological yold, which fomented nationalist stirrings. The end result was total collapse.

(E. TELLAL)

foreign policy until 20 December 1990. The internal economic and social upheaval the country was going through also found its reflection in the field of foreign policy. Gorbachev added the elements of "interdependence" and "international cooperation" to Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful coexistence." Stalin's theory of two opposing camps was repudiated for good. The approach to foreign policy based on class was also rejected. Lenin had pursued an approach in which there would always be a winner and a loser in each relationship. This zero-sum game was abandoned in favor of a policy that sought to identify convergent interests. The Soviet leadership attempted to explain this policy as the preparation for a long-term

#### Box 6-19. Perestroika

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU held in April 1985, attention was drawn to the need for restructuring (perestroika), democratization, and transparency (glasnost). At the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU, held on 1 March 1986, these needs were formally placed on the agenda. At the first stage of perestroika, the goal was to achieve psychological success. The people would be won over to restructuring and a balance would be struck between extremists and conservatives. The restructuring of the economy would commence on 1 January 1988.

Gorbachev asserted that the system of production in the USSR was based on the conditions prevailing in the 1930s and no longer corresponded to contemporary requirements. The factors making restructuring imperative were listed as economic crisis, the hability to apply socialism in one country, the integration of the USSR with the capitalist system in a major way during the 1970s, the impasse in bureaucratic planning, the need to regulate market forces, and the influence of other socialist states. Furthermore, it was no longer possible to keep the USSR closed off after the revolution in communications technology.

Economic reforms would be carried out by the following means; increasing the effectiveness of central management of the economy, expanding the autonomy of groups and enterprises, creating integrated economic organizations, and encouraging different ownership models.

The objective was to allow the market to replace planning, private ownership to replace state ownership, and integration with the capitalist economy to replace the national growth model.

The biggest resistance to these efforts came from the main beneficiaries of the system that was being reformed: the bureaucracy

One of the findings was that the system of equalizing wages (uravnilovka), which was applied prior to 1931 and during the Brezhnev period, was leading to laziness. So the leadership sought to benefit from the "laboriousness-generating" side of inequality. Nonmonetary benefits were introduced in the labor market, and workers began to be dismissed. This led to strikes by disgruntled workers and damaged the reform program.

In order to attract foreign investments, the requirement that the Soviet share in an enterprise must not be less than 51% was lifted in December 1988. Henceforth high level executives in enterprises could be foreign nationals. Customs facilities were introduced, designed to enable enterprises to procure their own requirements.

As a result of the decision made in 1988 to privatize public enterprises, the bureaucracy took over these firms. The higher echelons of the bureaucracy used resources that they had accumulated earlier to become capitalists and entrepreneurs.

Eventually a conflict emerged between uskorenie, which was supposed to accelerate the socioeconomic development of Soviet society, and perestroika. One aimed to achieve restructuring, while the other aimed to maximize production. One needed time to achieve its objective, while the other had to achieve instant results.

(E. TELLAL) (Source: Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol. 5, pp. 395, 1682–83)

#### Box 6-20. Glasnost

It was absolutely essential to break down bureaucratic hegemony and introduce openness and democratization to allow economic restructuring to go forward. Openness was the means and restructuring was the end.

The following measures were contemplated to achieve transparency, democracy in the workplace; more power to the soviets and more democratic elections; more democracy within the party; more freedom for the press, for the arts, and for science and more tolerance of criticism; enforcement of the rule of law, and reinforcement of organizations within civil society.

Transparency, was followed by idemocratization, starting in the latter part of 1988. The policy of transparency had caused a fraying in Soviet Ideology, however, which was not replaced with a more robust ideology. Different interest groups were now interpreting Ideology in their own ways. One way of interpreting Ideology was nationalism, which came to the fore in the Baltic and Caucasus republics. Transparency had been introduced along with restructuring, but starting in 1989 it was no longer under the control of those who had initiated it and spread throughout society.

(E. TELLAL) (Source: Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi vol: 5, pp. 1682-83) haul or peredyshka. The new policy was pursued starting in 1986 and was known as novoe myshlenie (the new way of thinking). Novoe myshlenie was the international dimension of perestroika and glasnost. This implied withdrawal from Afghanistan and Africa, emphasis on disarmament, removal of ideology from international relations, and an end to the theory of two economies and two world markets (Box 6-22).

The transformation process that got underway in 1985 resulted in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The Russian Federation, the successor of the USSR, found itself deprived of its allies in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Russia was now obliged to conduct its relations with the fourteen new states that left the union after the demise of the USSR within the context of its foreign policy.

#### II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

There is a general impression that Turkish-USSR relations during the coup period of 1980 to 1983 were stagnant. This is attributed to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the military coup in Turkey. True, the intervention in Afghanistan got a very bad reception in Turkey, which gave asylum to thousands of Afghan refugees. But this did not

# Box 6-21. The Question of Nationalities in the Collapse of the USSR

The USSR was a collection of hundreds of peoples. Anti-Soviet writers frequently referred to the USSR as the "prison of nations." Consequently, the question of nationalities played a key role in the process of the USSR's disintegration. During its seventy-year-long existence the USSR tried hard to instill the notion of "Soviet citizen" among all these peoples. By the 1990s it had become apparent that the USSR had falled in this effort.

The concepts of perestroika and glasnost, which began to be implemented in the second half of the 1980s, led to a questioning of the blind alleglance to the Communist ideology represented by the CPSU. The freedoms introduced by glasnost resulted in a reawakening of nationalist tendencies. There is no doubt that the Helsinki process that started in 1975 and the benefits it brought greatly facilitated the self-expression of the different nationalities.

By the end of the 1980s the view was prevalent in the USSR that the Russian nation was the oppressor of the other nations, and this view fortified the separatist nationalist movements. The Pamiat (Memory) group, known for its anti-Semilic tendencies, appeared at this time among the Russians.

In the process of disintegration, only the fifteen federated republics gained their independence. At present a similar process is underway in the Russian Federation (Chechnya, Tatarstan) and Georgia (Ajaria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia).

(E. TELLAL)

reflect negatively on bilateral relations. Its main effect was to bring Turkey closer to the U.S. The USSR, however, remained very circumspect toward the new administration in Ankara, which accused Moscow of being behind the anarchy in Turkey. Moscow showed no reaction to the mass arrests taking place in Turkey.

At a time when political relations were stagnant, economic relations went on without interruption. The program of the Ulusu government that took office on 20 September 1980 contained the following phrase: "special importance shall be attached to relations with the Soviet Union" (http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp44.htm). In 1981 Turkey's exports to the USSR attained their highest level since 1924. Similarly, in 1983 its imports from the USSR also attained record levels. More importantly, the foundations of Turkey's developing economic relations with first the USSR and then Russia were laid during this period.

As indicated earlier, Turkey's relations with the USSR started developing in the mid-1960s, first in the economic field and later spreading to the political sphere. The USSR began to overcome its obsession with ideology in the 1980s, and both the USSR and Turkey went through a period of economic restructuring. Cooperation in the

#### Box 6-22. *Novoe Myshlenie* (The New Way of Thinking)

The "new way of thinking" in political life led to debates on three fundamental issues: the leadership role of the Communist party, the need for a division of power in the political system, and the strengthening of pluralism. In the 1980s novoe myshlenie also affected foreign policy in the areas of disarmament initiatives, efforts to connect with the international capitalist system, and the "Common European House" project.

T. Economic difficulties forced Gorbachev to engage in disarmament negotiations with the U.S. and the West. He did not want to face external difficulties at a time when he was engaged in the process of economic restructuring and democratization at home. In 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan got together at the Geneva disarmament conference and agreed not to place nuclear weapons in space (this meant giving up the Star Wars project) and to reduce the number of medium-range missiles. The breakthrough in the disarmament talks came when the USSR accepted the principle of intrusive verification/on-site inspection.

2. The main goal of the foreign policy of that time was to connect the USSR to the international capitalist system. But this process of connecting with the capitalist system brought into the open a number of realities. First, it became apparent how weak the USSR was in regions of international tension. Second, as the USSR carried out reforms at home, it needed stability in its international relations. Finally, conditions dictated a reduction in the USSR's defense and foreign affairs budget.

3: Gorbachev launched his "Common European House" project on 10 April 1987. In doing this he was motivated by the need to connect not just the USSR but also the count less of Eastern Europe to the international capitalist system. Corbachev declared that he would support the reform efforts of these countries.

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economic field quickly spread to the political field. We shall therefore first look at economic relations and see how they influenced political relations.

#### A. Economic Relations

Turkey's economic relations with the pre-perestroika USSR were already quite developed and ready for the boom that would come in the 1990s after perestroika. On 10 March 1981, shortly after the 12 September administration assumed power, an agreement was signed for the extension of the Soviet-built Seydişehir Aluminum Plant. This was followed by a protocol signed in January 1982 that raised the level of trade by 30%. It was significant that this protocol was signed at a time when the U.S. was seeking to impose a trade boycott against the USSR for the imposition of martial law in Poland. Turkey also provided Moscow with the propaganda prize, as a NATO member ruled by a military regime.

Subsequently, on 20 May 1982, a payments agreement was concluded, providing for payments to be made with convertible foreign exchange. The replacement of the clearing system, which had hampered trade for many years, with the convertible exchange system was an important step forward. An implementation program was also adopted within the framework of the 1977 Turkish-Soviet Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

The Natural Gas Agreement signed on 18 September 1984 constituted a turning point in bilateral relations. The agreement, signed after two years of negotiations, opened up new opportunities in the fields of contracting services and trade exchanges. Turkey undertook to buy, for a period of twenty-five years starting in 1987, 120 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the USSR, with payment to be made with convertible currencies. The USSR agreed to spend 70% of the foreign exchange earned from these sales to buy Turkish goods and services. Of the funds to be spent in Turkey, 35% would be set aside to pay for Turkish contracting services; and 30% of the sale proceeds would be used to repay commercial loans extended to the USSR. For Turkey to agree as early as 1984 to procure one of its energy requirements from the other bloc was an important political development. The agreement would enable Turkey to diversify its energy sources. The decision to rely on Soviet gas was taken because Turkish decision-makers were favorably disposed toward the project. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany had a similar agreement with the USSR, which constituted a useful precedent.

The agreement had far-reaching effects. It opened the way for Turkish contractors to enter the Soviet market in a big way. Starting in 1988, Turkish contractors undertook a large number of projects in the USSR; this made them more competitive in that market in the 1990s. Many Turks working for these contractors began to earn their living in the USSR. The agreement also helped diversify Turkey's export markets. Previously, the USSR had appeared to be a donor and an investor in its relations with Turkey, making it a one-sided relationship. The agreement changed this picture and restored a balance in economic relations. From 1986 to 1991 the number of products exported by Turkey to the Soviet Union rose from twentyfive to seventy. In addition to the increased diversification in Turkey's exports, there was an expansion in volume. The agreement encouraged firms from third countries that wanted to enter the Soviet market to invest in Turkey. It also encouraged the formation of Turkish-Soviet joint ventures, which then made substantial investments in both countries. The agreement not only diversified Turkey's sources and types of energy but also opened new perspectives for its energy policy. Natural gas would help meet the growing needs of industry for energy and would make an energy crisis like the one experienced in 1970s more unlikely. Thanks to the agreement, natural gas as a commodity provided continuity in bilateral trade. Finally, the agreement led to the establishment of Botas, the firm that owned and operated the natural gas pipeline network.

Another development that helped the growth of bilateral relations was the Agreement on Border and Coastal Trade signed on 6 July 1989. This agreement helped develop the economic potential of border regions. The border crossing at Sarp on the Black Sea coast saw its traffic increase from 30 crossings per day in 1989 to 390 crossings in 1990 and then to 1,000 crossings in 1991. The so-called luggage trade (Russian tourists who came to Turkey to buy goods, carried them back to Russia in oversized luggage, and sold them for a considerable profit), which would attain substantial levels in the 1990s, started in the late 1980s, especially after the opening of the Sarp border crossing.

The volume of trade expanded rapidly, particularly in the late 1980s, helped by developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The expansion was also aided by the complementarity of the economies and political will of the parties. The gas agreement; the promotion of exports with credits; the opening of the border crossing at Sarp and the growing border/coastal trade; the growth in contracting services; the development of the industry of building, repairing, and overhauling ships; transport; and tourism all bore witness to the increased scope for cooperation. From 1980 to 1991 exports grew by 261.4%, while imports increased by 506.4%. When Soviet enterprises obtained the right to operate independently of the state in 1989, this gave a further boost to bilateral trade. Of Turkey's trade in 1989, 20% was conducted with nonstate enterprises. In 1990 the share of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe in Turkey's exports was the fourth highest among the OECD's twenty-four members. With respect to the rate of increase in this share from 1986 to 1990, Turkey ranked second among OECD members.

Another factor contributing to the trend was Turkey's Eximbank credits. From 1989 to 1991 Turkey extended the USSR \$1.150 billion in Eximbank credits, of which \$555.3 million had been used by the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the help of these credits, Turkey's exports to the USSR climbed steadily.

#### B. Political Relations

The satisfactory state of economic relations had a positive effect on political relations. As the Cold War drew to an end, the two countries' political relations became increasingly based on mutual interests in the line with the USSR's "new way of thinking" policies.

The first high-level contact between the two countries following the military coup in Turkey took place in September 1981 at the level of foreign ministers during the session of the UN General Assembly in New York. This was followed by the visit of the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, İlter Türkmen, to Moscow from 28 November to 3 December 1982. Turkey's decision to take part in the Rapid Deployment Force in 1983 was interpreted by Moscow as a negative development. During the visits of deputy foreign minister Georgy Kornienko to Turkey in 1983 and March 1984, he expressed the misgivings of his government over the installation of missiles on Turkish soil. After the visits, it was announced that there was no question of deploying Pershing missiles in Turkey and that Turkey would not accede to any proposal in this direction. This announcement indicated that Turkey had learned its lesson from the 1962 Cuba crisis.

In parallel with their Soviet counterparts, the Turkish leaders also adopted a constructive approach with respect to relations with the USSR. In the first civilian government following the coup that came to power in December 1983 under Turgut Özal, Vahit Halefoğlu, the former ambassador in Moscow until a month earlier, was appointed foreign minister. The first international agreement of this government was signed with the USSR to redemarcate the common border. The programs of both the first and the second Özal governments emphasized that relations with the USSR would be further developed, with special emphasis on economic relations. The Soviet side responded in like manner to the Turkish approach. The visit of the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolay Tikhanov, from 25 to 27 December 1984 was an important milestone in relations. In the course of this visit the Long-Term Program for Developing Economic, Commercial, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (with a term of ten years), the Agreement for the Exchange of Goods for the years 1986 to 1990, and the Cultural and Scientific Exchange Program were signed. Tikhanov and Özal met in February during the funeral of Andropov and agreed to develop relations further. It was declared during these talks that, after the natural gas agreement and the subsequent agreements, the course had been set for bilateral agreements to develop as the two countries headed into

the twenty-first century. This is how Tikhanov expressed his thoughts: "The agreements that we have signed today are the building blocks on which our relations will rest. I wish to emphasize that the Soviet Union wants this edifice to be not just large and tall but also capable of withstanding earthquakes" (Disisleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 12 December 1984, p. 130).

In September 1984 and August 1986, during the thirty-ninth and forty-first sessions of the UN General Assembly, the two countries' foreign ministers met to discuss international issues. These contacts ensured that bilateral relations followed the general trends in international relations. It cannot be claimed, however, that there were no differences between the two countries. Occasional tension was felt in relations, as when Gorbachev failed to receive Özal during the latter's visit to Moscow in July 1986. This was a time when Turkey was pressing Bulgaria very hard because of Sofia's treatment of the Turkish minority in that country. The Soviet Union could not appear to be repudiating its ally Bulgaria when the Cold War was still in progress. Furthermore, relations were affected when Mustafa Süleymanoğlu, a Bulgarian Turk, sought refuge in Turkey's Moscow Embassy.

These hitches were overcome, however, and bilateral cooperation continued to develop. A protocol was signed on 24 March 1988 that overcame the twenty-year-long question of the FIR line, delineated the line over the Black Sea, and granted Süleymanoğlu permission to leave the embassy premises and proceed to Turkey. In April the USSR gave up on its demand that the Cyprus question be solved through the international conference. In September 1988 the SS-20 missiles installed in the Kapustin region and capable of hitting targets in Turkey were removed in compliance with the intermediate-range missiles agreement of 1987. Turkey was very satisfied with this action and gave its consent to the opening of the Sarp border crossing.

The talks on the Limitation of Conventional Forces in Europe held in Vienna from March 1989 to November 1990 ended with the signing of an agreement by twenty-two states, including Turkey and the USSR, on 19 November. Under the terms of the agreement, the southeastern region of Turkey (which constituted 24% of its territory) was left outside of the scope of the agreement limiting conventional forces. Engrossed in its own domestic affairs, the USSR made no objection to this arrangement.

The intervention of the Red Army in Azerbaijan in January 1990 met with a very negative reaction among the Turkish public. At the official level, however, this was

seen as the internal affair of the USSR and did not cause any lasting damage to bilateral relations. This was in part because the volume of bilateral trade had grown fourfold over the previous four years, to \$2 billion. Also, Turkey stayed out of the USSR's internal affairs and retained its attachment to the principle of respect for territorial integrity. Following the signing of the cultural cooperation agreement in November 1990, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze paid a visit to Ankara. Although the main item on the agenda was the Gulf crisis, the two countries managed to sign four agreements dealing with combating the drug trade, cooperation in Black Sea fishing, judicial assistance, and reciprocal promotion of investments. The parties also exchanged ideas about the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project. In addition, a date was fixed for Özal's visit.

In summary, at a time when Turkey was carrying out reforms to enter the market economy, the USSR was engaged in a similar endeavor with its policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. The USSR became progressively more detached from ideology in its foreign policy under the influence of the "new way of thinking" in politics. This removed many obstacles to the development of economic as well as political relations. Turkey contributed to this process by remaining aloof from the separatist tendencies emerging in the USSR and its scrupulous respect for the USSR's territorial integrity.

The process of disintegration of the Eastern Bloc that began in Eastern Europe in 1989 would engulf the USSR in 1991. It was in the midst of this process that president Turgut Özal visited the USSR in March 1991 and signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Corporation. This treaty would later serve as the basis of the relations with the Russian Federation.

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# Relations with the Balkans

# FACTORS AFFECTING TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICIES

Turkey is at least geographically a Balkan state, with 5% of its territory consisting of Thrace (located on the Balkan Peninsula). Although this territory is tiny, the Republic of Turkey has been facing the West since its establishment, and its identity is more Balkan and Mediterranean than Middle Eastern. The Balkans have held an important place for Turkey in its foreign policy from a strategic as well as a human and cultural point of view.

The importance of the Balkans for Turkey can be examined under the following headings.

#### **Historical Ties**

Historically, the Balkan Peninsula was the main area of expansion of the Ottoman Empire. The region remained under Ottoman domination for about 500 years, which has affected the region's religious, ethnic, economic, and cultural character up to present times. This has been referred to as the Ottoman heritage and Pax Ottomanica and has been appraised in different ways, depending on whether the observer was from Turkey or from elsewhere in the region.

Because of this historical background, Balkan peoples and Turks have developed a number of prejudices about one another. These prejudices were particularly strong among the Slavs and the Greeks. Turkey had to carry out its Balkan policies against this historical background; and as it became more active in the region during the 1990s, this was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt to return to the Ottoman past.

From the perspective of non-Muslims among the Balkan peoples, the Ottoman era was full of dark images and negative features. Those of Orthodox-Slavic extraction perceive Ottoman rule as a period of political, economic, and cultural oppression. They tend to attribute their present-day problems and their economic and political backwardness to the fact that the Ottoman adminis-

tration cut them off from the Renaissance and Enlightenment that Western Europe experienced.

This frame of mind was developed mainly because these peoples conducted their struggle for national liberation in the nineteenth century against the Ottoman administration. In the process of building their nation-states by re-creating their histories, they had to rely on anti-Ottoman/Turkish themes and felt the need to rid themselves of their association with the Ottoman past.

Another negative aspect of Ottoman rule for the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans was that it introduced Islam into the region. The Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, and Torbesh (Box 6-23) who converted to Islam (some in part, others in full) were seen as ethnic or religious groups that were undesirable vestiges of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans. All Muslims, especially in the former Yugoslavia, regardless of their ethnic origin or language, were regarded as Turks. During the wars of the 1990s, an effort was made not only to repress the groups perceived as alien but also to destroy buildings like mosques and bridges that recalled the Ottoman past.

For a long time, Balkan historians dwelt on Ottoman/Turkish oppression. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, especially when the obligatory name-changing campaign was going on in Bulgaria (see the discussion below) there was some attempt to be objective. It was conceded that the religious/linguistic identity of peoples was at least preserved during the Ottoman era. In the 1990s, however, after the demise of the socialist regimes, nationalism was once more on the ascendancy and the former line was dropped.

In addition to those groups that converted to Islam, the Turkish minorities are another relic of the Ottoman period in the Balkans. The Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Macedonia are perceived as part of the Ottoman heritage and from time to time find themselves subjected to oppression.

Turkey also has negative associations with the Balkans. During the nineteenth century, when nationalism

#### Box 6-23. Muslims and Turks in the Balkans

Ethnically there are three large Muslim groups in the Balkans: Turks, Albanians, and Slavs.

The Turks live mostly in Bulgaria (900,000), Greece (120,000), Macedonia (100,000), and Kosovo (12,000). These figures represent those who identify themselves as Turkish. If an objective ethnicity criterion (i.e., ethnicity by birth) is applied, these figures include those who are actually Pomak-Muslims with Slavic roots in Bulgaria and Greece and Torbesh in Macedonia (also of Slavic origin). In addition, there are a number of Muslim Gypsies in Bulgaria and Greece:

The Muslims with Slavic ethnicities are considered Bulgarians by Sofia and Greeks by Athens; while Skopje considers them to be Muslim Macedonians. Starting in the second half of the 1990s, the Greek government has been attempting to instill an artificial Pomak consciousness among the Western Thracians of Pomak ancestry, Skopje is having the Torbesh sign documents declaring themselves to be just Muslims.

As a rule, those of Pomak and Torbesh ancestry resent being told they are not Turks. Pomaks in Western Thrace and Torbesh in Macedonia have frequently organized boycotts to enable their children to attend Turkish schools. There are many reasons for this. In the Balkans, outsiders have identified Muslims as Turks. (The French term "to become Turkish" means to convert to Islam.) Only the Turks have a kindred state to rely on, and only Turkey looks af-

ter the interests of the Muslim minorities in the Balkans. The Turks are better off than the other Muslims economically, linguistically, and historically as well as in other respects. In the Balkans, where the Orthodox reign supreme, religious identity counts for more than ethnic identity. This has always been the case since Ottoman times, when the Turks held the administration (the millet system).

The Bosnians, the largest ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are an important element of the Slavic Muslims (see Box 7-42 in Section 7).

The Albanians are another Muslim minority in the Balkans. Although they are a minority in Yugoslavia, they constitute 90% of the population of Kosovo (see Box 7-44 in Section 7). This ethnic group is the largest minority in Macedonia. According to official statistics they number 430,000, although the Albanians claim that they number 700,000

The general tendency in the Balkans is for Muslims to assimilate to the numerically superior Muslim group. That is why the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia strive to assimilate Turks through persuasion and occasionally through coercion, while the Pomaks in Bulgaria and especially in Western Thrace and the Torbesh in Macedonia readily consider themselves Turkish.

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was rampant, there was political and social chaos in the region. The lost battles and the retreats led to mass migrations of Balkan Turks/Muslims to Anatolia. With these migrations, the bitterness of the oppression and forced displacement experienced in the Balkans was carried over to Anatolia, to reinforce existing prejudices there. The Balkan region, which was the first area of expansion of the Ottoman Empire, was also the area where the process of disintegration and loss of territory began.

In addition, the Balkan region was where Turkish nationalism found its intellectual roots. It was here that the tradition of setting up political organizations among Turks got started. As nationalist currents in the Balkans reached their peak in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Turks also began to feel their effects. In particular, the Society of Union and Progress was inspired by the Balkan pattern of rebel band and secret revolutionary society, both in its establishment and in its structure. Salonica was a highly cosmopolitan city, and its cultural environment could be considered liberal in the Ottoman context. It was therefore natural that Turkish military officers and intellectuals would make their first contact with nationalism in this city.

From the establishment of the Republic until the end of the 1980s, the Balkans has been a region with mostly negative aspects for Turkey. In the interwar period the Balkan Peninsula was one of Italy's two areas of expan-

sion, which raised security concerns for Turkey. After World War II the Balkans became a cockpit for Cold War rivalries. The Balkans were perceived as a route over which the Communist threat could reach Turkey and as a region where minority issues could turn into political crises at any time.

#### People of Balkan Extraction Living in Turkey

It is estimated that there are about 5 to 7 million Balkan migrants living in Turkey. During the forced migration of Bulgarian Turks in the late 1980s, it was seen that most of these people maintain their links with relatives left behind and that their plight is a direct cause for concern for the migrants. First, they are naturally distressed by the oppression itself. They also know that if conditions for their relatives worsened and a new wave of migrations occurred, they would have to bear the burden and accommodate the newcomers, even if only temporarily.

During times of tension when Turkish/Muslim minorities are feeling oppressed, governments in Turkey are compelled to bear in mind the emotions of voters that hail from the Balkans. Those that came from the region through the 1950s now make up the middle classes, entrepreneurs, and civil servants, while those that arrived in the 1980s mostly ended up in industrial centers like Bursa, İzmit, İzmir, and İstanbul as skilled industrial workers. All of these people tend to be organized and con-

stitute a Balkan lobby. Among these can be cited the Arnavut Kardeşliği Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (Albanian Brotherhood Society for Culture and Solidarity), established in 1952; Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği (Mutual Support Society of the Turks of Western Thrace), established in 1975; Balkan Türkleri Dayanışma ve Kültür Derneği (Society for Mutual Support and Culture of the Balkan Turks), established in 1985; and Rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (Society for Culture and Mutual Support of the Rumeli Turks). This demographic composition and the corresponding political organizations are among the factors that contribute toward Turkey playing a greater role in the Balkans.

# Geographic and Strategic Reasons

From a geographic and strategic point of view, the Balkan region is important for Turkey for the following reasons.

1. The route to the West crosses the Balkans. Most of Turkey's economic and political relations are with Western European countries, and the routes connecting Turkey with those countries go across the Balkans. From this perspective, Turkey must consider the following elements.

First, the Balkans must be stable, to avoid compromising the safety of these routes. Turkey felt this imperative most acutely during the disturbances in Bosnia in the 1990s and during the Kosovo war in 1999. When these routes become blocked, more than half of Turkey's trade is affected. Furthermore, the physical links of Turkish workers in Europe with their mother country become problematic.

Second, Turkey is also apprehensive about a possible alliance between its Balkan neighbors, Greece and Bulgaria. This actually occurred in 1986, when these countries signed a nonaggression pact. After 1990 Bulgaria changed course and, while maintaining good relations with Greece, made sure not to pursue policies of confrontation with Turkey.

2. The region of Eastern Thrace, the only part of Turkey that lies on the Balkan Peninsula, is vital for the security of Istanbul and the Turkish Straits. Eastern Thrace lacks the territorial depth necessary for a successful defense against an attack coming from the Balkans. Consequently, this region is seen important from the perspective of strategic defense.

#### The Turkish/Muslim Minorities in the Balkans

From time to time, Turkey finds itself obliged to take up an active role vis-à-vis the Turkish/Muslim minorities in the Balkans. This is partly because of the pressure of the Balkan lobby and partly because Turkey happens to be a major power in its region. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral treaties require Turkey's action on behalf of the Turkish/Muslim minorities, especially those in Bulgaria and Greece, when they come under pressure or in the event of a breach of international covenants.

With the exception of Tito's Yugoslavia, the record of the Balkan countries in their treatment of minorities is far from being clean. Turkey has had to intercede not only on behalf of minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, where they were protected by treaties, but also on behalf of other Muslim/Turkish minorities. Whatever their ethnic origin may be, all oppressed Muslim minorities look to Turkey for protection and choose to settle in Turkey when forced to emigrate.

# II. TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR

The Balkan Pact and Alliance

In all international arrangements, Turkey has consistently striven for stability in the Balkans and has always pursued undiluted pro-status quo policies.

When pursuing these policies, Turkey ran into difficulties with Bulgaria, a country that stood out as revisionist in the interwar period. During the Cold War, an ideological dimension compounded the difficulties because Bulgaria was in the Eastern Bloc. Countries like Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania that did not have borders with Turkey, however, were able to maintain good relations with Ankara, even though they had Communist regimes, because of their distinct situations within the Eastern Bloc. Albania left the Soviet orbit in 1961, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union already had parted ways in 1948, and Belgrade gradually aligned itself with Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a model state in its treatment of minorities. Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu distinguished itself as a maverick state within the Eastern Bloc in its opposition to the USSR during the 1970s.

Greece, Turkey's ally within the Western Bloc, supported Turkish efforts to preserve stability in the Balkans during the interwar years. After World War II, starting in the mid-1950s when the first differences over Cyprus emerged, Greece became a rival and a source of concern for Turkey in the Aegean and the Balkans.

Strife and confusion have been ever present in the Balkans, but the region has also seen frequent initiatives for closer cooperation. Among these can be cited the 1934 Balkan Pact (of which Turkey was also a member), the Balkans Union or Federation (an idea floated by leftist

circles in the interwar period, which the socialist regimes established after World War II sought to revive), the Stability Pact, and the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), which came about after the Cold War.

The Balkan Pact signed in 1953 was Turkey's most noteworthy effort to preserve stability in the Balkans and bore the hallmark of the Cold War. Tito's Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948 when it refused to accept the tutelage of the USSR. When Yugoslavia felt itself threatened by its neighbors Romania and Bulgaria, it started coming closer to Western countries. At this point Bulgaria's mass expulsion of Bulgarian Turks in 1950–51 was causing great concern in Turkey.

Eventually, at Turkey's initiative and with the support of the U.S. and Britain, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed by Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia in Ankara in February 1953. A year later this pact became a full alliance with a treaty signed in Bled in Yugoslavia. Article 2 of this treaty contained the following provision that was typical of all alliances: "The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of them in any part of their territories shall be considered an aggression against all the Contracting Parties, who...shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense." In the years that followed, however, the meetings foreseen in the treaty failed to take place and the alliance became a dead letter due to the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations and the reconciliation of Yugoslavia with the USSR in 1955. The treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years and was allowed to expire at the end of this term in April 1975 (Soysal, pp. 474–77).

#### The Stoica Plan

This plan was conceived by Romanian prime minister Chivu Stoica on 17 September 1957 to promote cooperation among the Balkan states. The plan was submitted to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. These countries and Romania would engage themselves to develop economic and cultural relations, to settle their differences, to prevent disputes that could not be resolved from hindering their cooperation, and to undertake joint economic projects. The plan was immediately accepted by Bulgaria and Albania. Yugoslavia agreed on condition that all Balkan states would participate. Turkey and Greece turned down the plan.

The rejection of the plan by Turkey and Greece was due to the Cold War. At a time when the Democratic Party was in power in Turkey and the country was very close to the U.S., this initiative was perceived as designed to detach Turkey from NATO and to spread Soviet propaganda. It was unthinkable for Turkey to consent to a plan that had the USSR behind it when the Menderes government was doing its best to secure the installation of Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil (Sander, pp. 148–60).

In 1961 there was another initiative for Balkan cooperation. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece set up the Balkan Cooperation and Mutual Understanding Committee. The first meeting of the committee took place in Athens in April 1961, the second in Sofia in March 1962, the third in Bucharest in May 1963, and the fourth in Belgrade in June 1964. Turkey did not participate in these meetings, and Greece used the last two meetings as an anti-Turkish platform at a time when its relations with Turkey were strained.

Starting in the mid-1950s, Turkey's attention was focused primarily on the West and events in the Middle East, and Ankara remained aloof toward the Balkans. In the 1950s foreign policy was formulated in Ankara in conformity with the interest of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. The Balkan Pact and Alliance of 1953 and 1954 were concluded under Cold War conditions under U.S. guidance. Unlike other regions, Turkey took no individual initiative in the Balkans; nor did it attempt to develop its own foreign policy options in the region. This happened only when Turkish foreign policy turned in a multidimensional direction in the mid-1960s and when Ecevit set a new course in the 1970s.

## Turkey and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the Balkans

In addition to the Stoica initiative, proposals regarding political and economic cooperation and disarmament during the Cold War usually came from the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

The first initiative on the subject was the proposal of the USSR to the U.S., Britain, and France to eliminate nuclear weapons from the Balkan and Adriatic regions. The four powers would be the guarantors of the undertaking under the proposal.

Turkey was against the plan, but the USSR and the other Balkan states kept bringing this proposal up for discussion on subsequent occasions. Greece, however, began to support the plan after the government of Andreas Papandreou came to power in 1981. The Declaration on Good Neighborliness signed by Greece and Bulgaria in 1986 contained a reference to the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons from the Balkans. In addition to these two counties, Yugoslavia also favored the plan. As usual, Albania stayed away from this process. This left Tur-

key as the sole Balkan country opposing the elimination of nuclear weapons from the region. This was important, because Greece and Turkey were the only Balkan countries where nuclear weapons were located.

The reasons for Turkey's opposition were the following:

- The aim of the USSR was to weaken the Western defense system. The elimination of nuclear weapons would leave a gap in Western defenses that would require major restructuring. This would lead to diminished deterrence.
- The main objective of the USSR and its allies in introducing this proposal was to influence public opinion in the West.
- One of the aims of the USSR was to create discord among NATO allies.
- The Warsaw Pact enjoyed superiority in conventional forces in the Balkans. The elimination of nuclear weapons in Greece and Turkey would leave Thrace exposed to the threat of the superior conventional forces of the Eastern Bloc.
- This threat would be directed at Eastern Thrace, which lacked strategic depth, and particularly the Turkish Straits. The defense of this region called for both conventional weapons and short-range nuclear weapons.
- The elimination of nuclear weapons solely from the Balkans would weaken both Balkan and regional security, because the Balkans would still remain within the range of Soviet nuclear weapons (Karaosmanoğlu).

For these reasons, Turkey stood against the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Balkans as a matter of principle from the very beginning.

Turkey's Transition to an Active Policy in the Balkans When Turkey made a major turn in its foreign policy in the 1960s and adopted a multidimensional approach, its Balkan policy was also affected. From then on, Turkey started becoming more active in the region. Turkey's decision to adopt a multidimensional foreign policy was in large measure due to Cyprus and to its relations with Greece, and this naturally reflected on its Balkan policies.

Within the framework of its multidimensional policies, Turkey became more involved in regions that had been neglected until then, such as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. It also felt the need for new overtures to the countries of the Eastern Bloc. In this context, Turkey also started taking a closer interest in Balkan countries other than Greece.

While Turkey had neglected the Balkan states, Greece had developed its relations with them from the mid-1950s

to the mid-1960s. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were supporting Greece on the Cyprus issue. So Turkey turned its attention to the Balkans to reduce Greek influence there and to soften the positions of these countries on the question of Cyprus.

At this point Albania happened to be one of the five countries that voted in favor of the Turkish position in the vote on Cyprus that took place on 16 December 1965 at the UN General Assembly. Albania wanted to develop its relations with Turkey in order to break out of its isolation in the Balkans and because it had strained relations with Greece as a result of the dispute over the region of Epirus and the treatment of minorities.

Turkey gave priority to the Balkans for the second time after World War II when Ecevit was prime minister. The first foreign visit of the Ecevit government's foreign minister, Turan Güneş, was to Romania. This active policy continued after Ecevit. In 1975 a Declaration on Good Neighborliness was signed with Bulgaria and a joint communiqué with Romania. A year later, Tito visited Ankara. These developments were the result of Ankara's new foreign policy approach, as well the effects on the international environment of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

During Ecevit's second term as prime minister in 1978, disagreements with the U.S. over Cyprus, opium poppy cultivation, and the arms embargo led Ankara to formulate its foreign policy on a new basis. In this context, Ecevit adopted the policy of giving greater emphasis to good relations with neighbors rather than to armaments to ensure the country's security. Within the framework of this policy, special emphasis was given to relations with the Balkan countries. Ecevit's first foreign visit was to Yugoslavia, and this was followed by a visit to Romania.

In summary, Turkey started directing its attention to the Balkans in the mid-1960s and has maintained this interest almost without interruption ever since. This was in a certain measure due to Ankara's wish to be influential in the region. There were also other compelling reasons, however, such as the developments in Bulgaria in the mid-1980s and the conflict in Bosnia.

# III. THE STATE OF THE BALKANS IN THE 1980S

In general, the Balkan region appeared calm during the 1980s. Aside from the oppressive Bulgarian policies directed at the Turkish minority and the Greco-Turkish crises in the Aegean, there were no conflicts or sources of instability until 1989.

During the Cold War, all of the political tendencies in the international political scene were represented in the Balkans. Bulgaria and Romania were in the Warsaw Pact; Turkey and Greece belonged to NATO; Yugoslavia was one of the leaders of the nonaligned movement; and Albania was closely aligned with China from 1961 to 1978.

In the 1980s Nicolae Ceausescu was pursuing an economic policy in Romania designed to eliminate the country's foreign debt and cut down consumption. Enver Hoxha, who had been leading Albania for forty years, died in 1985 and was succeeded by Ramiz Alia. Although Albania continued to pursue its policy of having no relations with major powers and not resorting to foreign loans, its hard line began to give signs of softening somewhat. In May 1980 Tito, the founder and leader of postwar Yugoslavia, died and was replaced by a collective leadership in which the presidency rotated among the representatives of the component republics and autonomous provinces. This created a vacuum in the leadership that Slobodan Milosevic sought to fill after seizing power in Serbia in 1987.

As explained in detail in the following discussion, Bulgaria launched a policy of forceful assimilation in 1984.

This general picture in the Balkans started to change in 1985 and 1986 under the policies of glasnost and perestroika developed by Gorbachev in the USSR. As a result of this, Moscow indicated in 1989 to the Warsaw Pact members in Eastern Europe and the Balkans that they could take their own national course toward socialism. This led to the collapse of the regimes of these countries and even spread to socialist countries outside the pact, like Albania and Yugoslavia.

# IV. TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE TURKISH MINORITY

Factors Affecting Turkish-Bulgarian Relations
In the 1980s Turkish-Bulgarian relations developed against the following background.

Both countries were the most subservient members of their respective blocs. After breaking loose from the Ottoman Empire following the 1877–78 war and the subsequent Treaty of San Stefano and Berlin Congress process, Bulgaria became extremely attached to Russia, its active protector in the process. That is why the friendship for Soviet Russia ran very deep among Bulgarians. It is noteworthy that, although Bulgaria was an ally of Germany in World War II and took its place in the revisionist camp, it never declared war on the USSR.

As a member of the Eastern Bloc, Bulgaria was not a country that Turkey could afford to ignore prior to 1990. With the USSR on its eastern border and Warsaw Pact member Bulgaria on its western border, Turkey was caught between two countries of the opposite bloc. This situation posed a serious security problem. Unlike its eastern regions (which were mountainous and afforded good possibilities for defense), Thrace, next to Bulgaria, was relatively flat and difficult to defend. Furthermore, the distance from the border to Istanbul and the Straits was quite short, with little strategic depth. Consequently, it was necessary to make the necessary arrangements for defense within the framework of NATO, bearing these adverse conditions in mind.

Another significant factor affecting relations was the presence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria, numbering about 900,000. With Greece, there was a balance of sorts because of the presence of a Greek minority in Turkey, even if relatively small. No such balance existed with Bulgaria, however, which had almost no Bulgarian minority living in Turkey.

As noted earlier, it was always important for Turkey to make sure that Bulgaria did not cooperate with Greece on the minority question and that the two countries did not get together to block Turkey's access routes to the West

## Bulgaria's Policy toward the Turkish Minority

The most serious problems with Bulgaria emerged in connection with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, which had always been a source of discord between the two countries. Although there was a relaxation in Sofia's approach to the Turkish minority after World War II under the regime of Georgi Dimitrov, relations went sour when a significant part of the minority was forced to emigrate in 1950. In August 1950 Bulgaria was seeking to establish collective farms and consequently forced 250,000 people of Turkish stock to migrate to Turkey. Another reason for Bulgaria's action was to create difficulties for the pro-Western Democratic Party government after it decided to send troops to Korea. About 154,000 Bulgarian Turks had crossed into Turkey by the end of 1951. The Turkish government claimed that Sofia had also introduced 60,000 Gypsies and some Communist spies among these migrants. Turkey was eventually compelled to close its border. On 2 December 1950 the two countries signed an agreement. Article 1 stated that Bulgarian exit visas would be given to those who intended to leave Bulgaria for Turkey only after they had obtained Turkish entry visas. Article 3 provided that persons who came with the migrants without a Turkish entry visa would be turned back at the border by the Turkish authorities.

In the following years Turkey was apprehensive

#### Box 6-24. The Rights of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria

The Turks of Bulgaria are unlike other Turkish minorities in the Balkans. Despite their relatively large numbers and their long-standing legal safeguards, they have been subjected to harsh oppression.

By the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality under the Ottoman sultan. Article 4 of the treaty guaranteed the protection of the rights and interests of the Turks that lived alongside Bulgarians. There were additional arrangements concerning the Turkish minority in articles 5 and 12 of the treaty.

In 1908, at the time of the Young Turk revolution, Bulgaria declared its independence and became a monarchy. When the agreement with the Ottoman state to confirm this independence was concluded, a protocol was signed between the two states in Istanbulion 19 April 1909, dealing with the status of the Turks who remained in Bulgaria. Under this protocol, the Turkish-Muslim minority was to enjoy full freedom of religion and the same political and civil rights as Bulgarians.

Following the Balkan Wars, a peace treaty was concluded with Bulgaria in September 1913 and, in addition, a convention was signed dealing with the status of muftis (Muslim religious jurists) and specifying the minority rights of Turks.

Another international covenant dealing with minorities in Bulgaria was the Peace Treaty of Neully, concluded at the end of World War I. Although this treaty made no mention of the Turkish minority as such, it did establish the rights of minorities in Bulgaria. With the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria signed in October 1925. Sofia agreed to apply the minority rights specified in the Neuilly treaty to the Muslim minority. On the same date, a Residence Convention was also signed in Ankara. Under the provisions of this convention, nothing would be done to prevent the migration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey. This convention remains legally binding to this day.

Article 2 of the treaty of peace signed by Bulgaria and the Allied powers in Paris in 1947 following World War II also contains provisions regarding minority rights

In March 1968, when the Bulgarian head of state Todor Zhivkov Visited Ankara, a Migration Agreement was signed between the two countries aimed at reuniting divided families.

By signing the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975, Bulgaria committed itself to respect the minority rights contained in that document.

(B. ORAN)

(Source: Ali Dayioğlu, Toplama Kampından Meclis'e Bulgaristan'da Türk ve Müslüman (Azınlığı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005))

about the Turkish minority being used by Bulgaria as a tool of its foreign policy, as happened in 1950–51, while Sofia worried about the possibility of this minority being used by Ankara to undermine Bulgaria's security. After the signing of a migration agreement in 1968, nothing much happened until the middle of the 1980s, except for the banning of Turkish-language education in Bulgarian schools in 1974 (Box 6-24).

The Turks in Bulgaria were mostly rural folk who maintained their traditional way of life. They lived apart from Bulgarians and managed to keep their identities. As the rate of growth of the Slavic population went into decline, the Turkish population maintained its trend of growth. The Bulgarian administration was faced with the long-term prospect of a large minority that maintained its separate ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity. The attempt to reduce the numbers of the minority through emigration did not produce the intended results. Furthermore, according to one theory, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 after the Turkish operation on the island led the Bulgarian administration to suspect that Turkey might be planning to use the Turks for a similar move in Bulgaria (Poulton, p. 201). These apprehensions led the Bulgarian administration under Todor Zhivkov's leadership to launch the campaign to force the Turks to change their names toward the end of 1984. This campaign was dubbed "The Process of Rebirth" and was accompanied by much violence.

Starting in December 1984, the developments in Bulgaria began to be reported in the Turkish and international press. Although the Bulgarian government had forbidden the travel of foreign journalists to Turkish areas, reports of what was occurring were reaching Turkey by different routes. According to these reports, the villages that were resisting the campaign to change names were surrounded by tanks and those who rejected their new Bulgarian names were being arrested, sent to the Belene camp, or killed. The first operations took place in the towns of Haskovo, Kurdzhali, and Momchilgrad. In January 1985 president Kenan Evren sent a message to Todor Zhivkov calling for an end to the campaign. The campaign was intensified, however, and extended to the northern parts of the country. According to certain sources, between 800 and 2,500 Bulgarian Turks perished during this period.

During the campaign, all Turks were compelled to adopt Slavic names and were issued identity papers with their new names. While doing this, the Bulgarian government mobilized anthropologists and historians to prove that the Turks were actually Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman era. This was done to win over the Turks to their new identities.

The persecution was not confined to the changing of names. Those who spoke Turkish were punished. The newspaper Yeni Işık (New Light), published in Turkish and Bulgarian, was closed down. The sale of books in Turkish was banned, and circumcisions were proscribed.

Turkish cemeteries were destroyed to remove all traces of the past.

Although there were some attempts to resist on the part of the Turks of Bulgaria, they were eventually forced to submit to the oppression and intimidation. In 1985 they founded the nonviolent Turkish National Liberation Movement under the leadership of Ahmet Doğan. But within one year Doğan and a large number of his colleagues in the leadership of the movement were detained.

Bulgaria sought to deflect international criticism by claiming that the Turks had changed their names voluntarily. But these efforts did not prevent Bulgaria's already poor image from being damaged further. As the closest ally of the USSR, the Bulgarian government was under strong suspicion of being in league with international smuggling rings. It was also guilty of liquidating Bulgarian dissidents living in exile. The persecution caused Bulgaria's standing to suffer further damage.

#### Turkey's Reaction

The Özal government, in power since 1983, adopted a cautious approach when the initial reports of persecution reached Turkey. Having come to power following the 12 September military administration, the Özal government was anxious to improve Turkey's international standing. Also, it placed the development of economic relations at the top of its foreign policy agenda, so it sought to deal with the Bulgarian crisis without letting it get out of hand. In January 1985 Turkish minister of state Mesut Yılmaz made a speech in Bursa (a city with a large concentration of people with relatives in Bulgaria), calling on everyone to remain calm and giving assurances that the government would take the necessary measures to deal with the question. Prime Minister Özal was also calling for a rational rather than an emotional approach.

Under the pressure of public opinion, Turkey delivered a note to Sofia in March 1985, which called for negotiations to solve the problem and indicated that Ankara was ready to conclude a migration agreement. The Zhivkov regime responded that Ankara was interfering in Bulgaria's internal affairs.

As the crisis escalated and the full gravity of the situation emerged, Prime Minister Özal announced that Turkey would be prepared if necessary to receive and resettle all the Turks in Bulgaria in Turkey. At the same time, Turkey sought to attract the world's attention by internationalizing the issue. As a result of these efforts, the Council of Europe issued a report in 1985 calling on Sofia to end its persecution immediately. The Organization of the Islamic Conference adopted a resolution expressing its concern

over the developments in Bulgaria at its meeting of foreign ministers held in Fez. The OIC also sent a contact group to Bulgaria in July 1985 to report on the situation. The U.S. raised this problem in various UN meetings and reduced its diplomatic contacts with Bulgaria. The question was also negotiated by the CSCE at its Vienna meeting in 1987. Organizations like Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International issued critical reports on Bulgaria's action.

Until 1989 Bulgaria refused to discuss Turkey's offer of concluding a migration agreement. When Zhivkov forced the Turkish minority to migrate en masse to Turkey in the summer of 1989, however, the crisis acquired a new dimension. Starting in May, thousands of Turks started arriving in Turkey after disposing of their properties in haste and carrying only their personal belongings. Özal had stated earlier that everyone would be welcome and even Zhivkov could come. When the number of refugees reached 300,000 in August 1989, however, he instituted a visa requirement and closed the border.

The migration had two negative consequences. First, many ended up with relatives who had arrived in previous migrations. This constituted a heavy social and economic burden for Bursa and its surrounding areas. Second, large numbers of migrants looking for employment brought down workers' wages, especially in the industrial sector. Resentment arose against them when employers started replacing their workers with migrants, who were ready to accept lower wages.

During the crisis the West sided openly with Turkey, because Bulgaria's action was so flagrant and its international image was so poor. The U.S. in particular was highly critical of Bulgaria, in line with Reagan's anti-Soviet and anti-Communist policies.

Among the countries of the region, the Greek press held Turkey accountable for developments in Bulgaria, even if there were no official pronouncements from Athens. The Greeks declared that Turkey had aroused the Bulgarian Turks against Bulgaria. At a time when the persecution of the Turks in Bulgaria was in full swing, Greek prime minster Andreas Papandreou visited Sofia in September 1986 and signed a Declaration of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation.

In its actions, Greece was motivated by the perception that Bulgaria was an ally against Turkey. Greece could not afford to be critical of Bulgaria's treatment of the Turkish minority, because support of Turkey's complaints might constitute a precedent that could strengthen Turkey's hand in its actions to address the complaints of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace.

Yugoslavia, which had outstanding problems with

Bulgaria over Macedonia, was ready to blame Bulgaria on this issue. The Yugoslav press found it ridiculous that in Bulgaria, where the population had maintained its identity during five hundred years of Ottoman rule, the Turks would suddenly renounce their national/religious identities. The Yugoslav government also supported Turkey by granting refugee status to Turkish victims of oppression fleeing to Yugoslavia. Those taking refuge in Romania, however, were being sent back to Bulgaria.

As a result of these developments, a strange alignment occurred in the Balkans on the issue of treatment of minorities. Greece and Bulgaria were in one camp because of the Turkish and Macedonian minorities in their midst, while Turkey and Yugoslavia drifted closer because they were faced with similar problems. This alignment would fall apart, however, as a result of fundamental changes in the Balkans during the 1990s.

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# The Issue of the Turkish Straits

#### I. THE STRAITS FROM 1939 TO 1980

The subject of the Straits in earlier periods is discussed in the section on World War II and in the chapter on "Relations with the USSR" from 1945 to 1960 (see Sections 3 and 4). We shall start with a brief summary of the period from 1939 to 1980.

From the time World War II broke out on 1 September 1939 to 23 February 1945, when Turkey declared war on Germany, the situation with respect to the Straits under the Montreux Convention was a state of war in which Turkey remained neutral. In this situation the warships of belligerents could not sail through the Straits.

In the course of Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu's talks with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow in 1939, the Soviet leaders asked Turkey to prevent the warships of non-Black Sea Powers from sailing through the Straits without the USSR's consent, in contravention of the Montreux Straits Convention. Moscow also sought a pact with Turkey that would allow for the Straits to be defended jointly by Turkey and the USSR. Ankara rejected these Soviet proposals and concluded the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France.

During the war, the subject of the Straits was taken up in talks between Germany and the USSR. The USSR demanded a base on the Straits with a long-term lease as one of the conditions for joining the war on the side of the Axis powers. Following the German attack, however, the USSR delivered a note to Turkey on 10 August 1941, indicating that it had no claims with respect to the Straits.

In the course of the war, the most significant development in relation to the Straits that had long-term effects was the passage through the Straits of German and Italian warships in contravention of the Montreux Convention. After the war Moscow made certain claims regarding the Turkish Straits and tried to justify them on the basis of the passage of these ships. At the Yalta summit held in February 1945, the subject of the Straits was also taken up. In March 1945 Molotov informed Ambassador Sarper

that the USSR would not extend the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Nonaggression Treaty any further. Molotov stressed that postwar conditions had changed and that his country was ready to undertake negotiations to conclude a new treaty with Turkey in the light of the new conditions.

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the U.S., USSR, and Britain concluded that the Montreux Convention no longer corresponded to current needs and needed to be renewed. They agreed to submit their views on the regime of the Straits to Turkey.

The first country that submitted its views in compliance with the Potsdam decision was the U.S. In a note dated 2 November 1945, the U.S. proposed that the Straits be kept open to all merchant vessels in time of peace and war. This would also apply to the transit of war vessels of the Black Sea Powers. In time of peace, the transit through the Straits of the war vessels of non–Black Sea Powers (except for small-tonnage vessels) would not be allowed. Furthermore, the U.S. wanted the United Nations to replace the League of Nations in the revised system and called for the exclusion of Japan from the parties to the new convention. On 21 November Britain submitted its note, which was similar to the U.S. position. Turkey accepted the U.S. proposals as a basis for the negotiations on the revision of the Montreux Convention.

On 7 August 1946 the USSR submitted its note on the Straits. Moscow pointed out that the Montreux rules had been violated during the war and called for the revision of the existing convention. The Soviet note contained two important proposals that diverged from the American position: (1) the new regime would be determined solely by the Black Sea Powers; (2) Turkey and the USSR would join in the defense of the Straits to prevent this waterway from being used against the interests of the Black Sea Powers.

The U.S. and Britain responded to the Soviet note before Turkey did and rejected the Soviet proposals. In

#### Box 6-25. Treaties Creating Objective Status

As a principle of international law, treatles are applicable only to the states that are parties to them. A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without the latter's consent. Unlike this general rule, certain treaties establish universally applicable legal regimes (erga omnes). These treaties are those demarcating borders, establishing rules of navigation for international waterways, or regulating national questions like the status of a state. In practice these treaties are binding on all states regardless of their consent.

Although the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes no mention of these treaties, this does not signify that they do not exist. To cite an example, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States to Treaties provides in articles 11 and 12 that, in the event of the establishment of a new state on the territory of another state, the obligations and rights of the former state relating to borders and other territorial questions will continue to apply. International practice also demonstrates that certain treaties, by their very nature, bring about situations/obligations that third parties must accept.

(K. Özersay)

its response, Turkey refuted the claim that the terms of the Montreux Convention had been violated during the war and rejected the Soviet request to participate in the defense of the Straits. On 24 September 1946 the USSR submitted a further note, explaining in greater detail the reasons for its proposals. Whereas its previous note had also been submitted to the U.S. and Britain, this one was delivered only to Ankara. Turkey informed Washington and London of the Soviet note; as on the previous occasion, the U.S. and Britain responded before Turkey. In their response, these countries informed Moscow that the exchange of views with Turkey had taken place in conformity with the Potsdam agreement and would be pursued no further.

Turkey's response to the second Soviet note came on 18 October 1946. Ankara also indicated that the preliminary exchange of views to precede an international conference to revise the Montreux Convention had been completed. Moscow never replied to Turkey's note, and the contemplated conference never took place.

From 1960 to 1980 a number of difficulties arose in connection with the Straits: (1) invoking the terms "in time of peace" and "in time of war," (2) the consequences of developments in the military and technological fields, and (3) the classification of warships.

The first difficulty arose because liberation movements, decolonization, and the involvement of major powers in these developments led to fundamental changes in international relations and the concept of war after World War II. This led to a blurring of the concepts "in time of war" and "in time of peace."

Although article 19 of the Montreux Convention specifies that the war vessels of belligerents may not transit the Straits in time of war (Turkey being neutral), Turkey did not prevent the passage of the war vessels of the belligerents during the Arab-Israeli War. Specifically, it allowed the warships of the United Arab Republic to navigate through the Straits without any reaction from the contracting parties of Montreux.

During the war in Vietnam, Turkey allowed U.S. warships to sail through the Turkish Straits. The Soviet newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* accused Turkey of violating the convention by allowing the warships of a belligerent state to sail through the Straits. In response, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil declared that the U.S. was not at war in Vietnam but merely supporting one of the warring sides. Initially the U.S. declared that it was not a party to the Montreux Convention and therefore was not bound by its provisions. It subsequently adopted the Turkish government's argument based on objective status, however, and accepted the view that those not a party to the convention must also adhere to its terms (Box 6-25).

In regard to the second factor (the impact that technological changes made on the Montreux Convention), we can relate the case of the warships Dyess and Turner. These vessels of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean sailed through the Dardanelles in December 1968 and remained in the Black Sea for five days before returning to the Sixth Fleet. Both vessels were under the convention limit of 15,000 tons, and from this perspective there was no impediment to their passage through the Straits. Furthermore, the cannons on board these ships in the lightsurface-vessel category were smaller than the 203 mm specified in the convention as the upper limit. The Dyess was armed with eight ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) launchers with a diameter of 305 mm, however. This led the Soviet and Bulgarian embassies to deliver verbal protests to Turkey. In responding to these protests, Turkey stated that new weapons had been developed since 1936 that were not mentioned in the Montreux Convention. Consequently, the passage through the Straits of vessels armed with such weapons was not prohibited, provided the weapons in question were of a defensive nature. This question arose because annex II of the Montreux Convention had not provided for developments in weapons technology.

The third question (classification of warships) arose because Montreux allowed the passage of certain warships according to their category. This made it important to determine the category of a warship. This situation came up on 18 July 1976 when the Soviet warship *Kiev* passed through the Straits in transit, with Turkey's authorization. This vessel had the capacity to accommodate on its deck twenty-five to thirty Yak-36 fixed-wing vertical takeoff and landing aircraft in addition to twenty-five to thirty antisubmarine helicopters.

The USSR described the *Kiev* as an antisubmarine cruiser. There was an argument, however, about whether the ship was an antisubmarine cruiser as stated or was really an aircraft carrier designed to provide air cover for the Soviet fleet against the Sixth Fleet. The category in which the *Kiev* was placed would determine whether it would be allowed to sail through the Straits or not.

None of the parties to the Montreux Convention made a formal objection to the *Kiev*'s passage through the Straits in 1976, but doubts were raised about the meaning of certain provisions of the convention in international law.

# II. PROBLEMS THAT AROSE FROM 1980 TO 1990

When the Montreux Convention came into effect in 1936, the amount of shipping in the region of the Turkish Straits was considerably less than at present. There have also been great changes in the shape and size of ships since then as a consequence of developments in shipbuilding technology.

The meteorological and hydrological characteristics of the Bosphorus, however, have remained constant. This has led to new questions with respect to safety of life and property along the waterway and possible threats to the environment.

# A. The Reasons behind the Problems

There are three reasons for the threats to the environment and to life and property associated with navigation in the Bosphorus: (1) the particular features of the Bosphorus that make navigation dangerous; (2) the ever-growing intensity of maritime traffic; and (3) the restrictions and inadequacies of the Montreux Convention.

#### The Particular Features of the Bosphorus That Make Navigation Dangerous

Above all, the Bosphorus is hazardous because it is both narrow and long. Because of the difference in the salinity of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea there is a surface current that flows from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea and another deeper current that flows in the opposite direction. These currents run into the twists and turns of the Bosphorus, causing dangerous whirlpools. The numerous sharp turns in the waterway also make the Bosphorus hazardous to navigation. The passage through the Bosphorus requires a vessel to change course at least twelve times. Another serious hazard is fog. During February, March, April, and May visibility frequently falls to less than a kilometer because of dense fog.

#### The Volume of Maritime Traffic

Statistics reveal the changes in the volume of maritime traffic since 1936 when the Montreux Convention was concluded. Shipping in the Bosphorus in 1938 amounted to 7,500,000 tons. This figure had risen to 126,896,000 tons by 1980 and had reached 156,057,000 tons by 1996. A similar trend can be observed in the number of ships. Whereas 4,500 vessels sailed through the Bosphorus in 1938, this figure hit 49,952 in 1996, representing an eleven-fold increase. To this must be added the 1,500,000 passengers that commute every day between the two shores of the waterway. This traffic has to cut across the traffic that runs in a north-south direction. Finally, there is the great hazard posed by the increase in the size of ships, especially tankers that have limited maneuverability.

# The Impediments and Inadequacies of the Montreux Convention

Some of the difficulties confronted in the Straits region can be traced to article 2 of the Montreux Convention. This article contains a number of elements. "In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in Article 3 below." The only formality foreseen is contained in article 3 and relates to the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. "This control...shall be carried out by day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits." Article 2/3 declares that in time of peace pilotage and towage remain optional for merchant vessels. The provision "with any cargo" poses serious dangers. Under this provision, vessels carrying explosive, inflammable, or toxic materials (gaseous or liquid) are able to navigate freely through the Straits. Ships are also allowed to sail through the Straits by night. Given the nature of the narrow waterway, it is easy to discern the dangers posed by a large oil tanker making the crossing in the dark.

#### B. Some of the Questions That Emerged Maritime Accidents

Since the coming into force of the Montreux Convention, maritime accidents in the region of the Straits have increased. From 1988 to 1993 the number of accidents in the waterway rose by 135%. In 1982 there were three collisions involving two or more ships. In 1992 this figure increased by a factor of thirteen to thirty-nine collisions. Ten accidents occurred in the first six months of 1994. The number of ships running aground between 1982 and 1991 increased four-fold.

All accidents have harmful consequences, and the important thing is not the number of accidents but their effects. In all, 210 accidents were registered in the region of the Straits from 1 May 1982 to 18 October 1994. Among these, the accident of the tanker *Independenta* stands out for the damage caused. Forty-one sailors lost their lives in this disaster, and most of the cargo (consisting of 90,000 tons of oil) was spilled into the sea. Another such disaster was the collision of the *Nassia* with *Shipbroker*, when twenty-nine sailors were killed and 20,000 tons of oil spilled into the sea.

#### **Environmental Pollution**

Even without accidents, shipping in the Straits causes pollution, with all its attendant consequences. Environmental pollution can be divided into air and sea pollution. Air pollution results from the quality of the fuel used by ships, the state of maintenance of their engines, their speed, and their number. Water pollution results from vessels emptying their ballast tanks without processing, waste dumping, emptying of bilge tanks, washing of decks, and other such activities. From time to time, tankers also spill their cargo of crude oil into the sea through leakage.

Kudret Özersay

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### The Issue of Human Rights

The issue of human rights was a major preoccupation for Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s. During this period Turkey was confronted with criticism and occasionally pressure in its bilateral and multilateral relations because of human rights abuses. Although it assumed certain international obligations toward the end of the decade in an effort to improve its international image, Turkey could not avoid being tagged as a "violator of human rights." We shall examine the causes from both the international and Turkish perspectives.

#### The International Environment

In the 1970s the issue of human rights became a tool of international politics. Turkey and a good number of similar countries were exposed in international platforms through this tool, and Turkey suffered more than most of the countries in this category. The U.S. developed this policy for use against the socialist bloc under the Carter administration. Known as the Carter Doctrine, this policy used human rights for purely political purposes, was insincere, and applied double standards. The socialist bloc countries were being severely criticized for violating the human rights obligations undertaken within basket III of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a process that got underway with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Meanwhile the pro-Western dictatorships of the Third World were committing the most egregious human rights abuses and even receiving technical assistance from the U.S. for this purpose.

Regardless of the motives, this policy of using the issue of human rights became an important element in international relations over the long term. The policy that was used against the socialist states in the 1970s gradually started being used against other states violating human rights in the 1980s.

The Western NGOs had a big part in securing this shift. Although there had always been national and international organizations working in this field, the number of these organizations and their scope increased greatly after the mass movements and events of 1968. These organizations, led by Amnesty International, became extremely effective internationally and began to influence the foreign policies of Western countries.

This development had its origin in the 1789 French Revolution and, after making slow progress at first, started gathering pace during this period. Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law were the ideological and legal superstructure of the market economy, and it was natural that these concepts should find their place in international relations as the world became a single market.

Unlike most instances when international law trailed developments, in this instance international law kept pace with developments and even became a trailblazer. The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, mentioned respect for human rights among the purposes of the organization. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 specified what these human rights were. This was followed by more than fifty conventions in which the signatory states committed themselves to respect human rights. Both the UN and regional organizations like the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States engaged in determined and long-term efforts, which led to the emergence of a separate branch of international law in the 1970s that came to be known as "international human rights law" (Box 6-26).

This branch of law, while still within the bounds of international law, had the potential of going beyond international law and perhaps transforming it. Countries acceding to these conventions for different reasons came under the supervision of the independent mechanisms contained in the conventions. In this instance, the enforcement of human rights, buttressed by law, no longer depended on the political will of governments and acquired its own autonomy. The best example of this is the enforcement mechanism created by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In the 1970s the

#### Box 6-26. Principal Human Rights Conventions

The principal human rights conventions concluded by 1990 could be classified in the following categories.

General conventions; the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and its optional protocols, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950) and its protocols, European Social Charter (1961) and its protocols, American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1988), and African Charter of Human and People's Rights (1988).

Specific conventions: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (1968), Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926, Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention (1953); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956), Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Pros titution of Others (1950), International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29) (1930), Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO No. 105) (1957), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987), ILO Convention on Minimum Standards of Social Security (1952), European Code of Social Security and Annexed Protocol (1964), and European Convention on Social Security (1972)

Conventions on the protection of specific groups, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol

(1967), Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), ILO Convention on Migrant Workers (1949), European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977), ILO Convention Number 87 on the Protection of the Freedom of Association and the Right of Association (1948), Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and 1949 Geneva Conventions and additional protocols (1977).

Conventions against discrimination: the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), international Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1975), and UNESCO Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination in Education (1966).

To summarize the developments after 1990, there was a remarkable increase in the number and types of human rights conventions. Several additional protocols were adopted, complementing or expanding the rights and control mechanisms contained in the above mentioned conventions. Furthermore, new fields of human rights were regulated through international conventions; including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995). Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), international Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), and Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2007).

(G. ALPKAYA) (Source: Marie)

ECHR organs established a highly effective mechanism of enforcement (Box 6-27).

In addition, the decisions on human rights adopted by political bodies like the UN General Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament of the ECs (EP), although not legally binding, carried considerable ideological and political weight. The political and legal structure of a state and its relationship with its own citizens, formerly the core area of a state's sovereign rights, ceased to be within the national competence of that state. From now on, international organizations and other states could get involved with these issues without being considered to have "interfered in the internal affairs" of a sovereign state. This new practice was formally proclaimed in the 1991 Moscow Document of the CSCE: "The participating States emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order. They categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned" (http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1991/10/13995\_en.pdf).

As a result, a new political and legal climate emerged in the early 1980s. The states were no longer the sole and absolute arbiters of the fate of their citizens, and citizens were no longer helpless individuals caught within national borders. In this climate, Turkey's internal dynamics made it a prime target for attention on the issue of human rights.

#### The Situation in Turkey

Turkey entered the 1980s with a military coup and the 12 September regime that followed it. The direct and most obvious consequences of 12 September were in the area of human rights. The destructive effects and consequences of the military regime on Turkey's sociopolitical life can be classified as follows.

1. Democracy, the democratic experience, the legal order, and the political and social opposition that had been built up in Turkey up to that time were all forcibly suppressed or eliminated.

#### Box 6-27. The ECHR's Oversight System

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was signed in 1950 and came into effect in 1953. Until the Eleventh Protocol came into effect in November 1998, the convention had an oversight system consisting of three organs. Under this system, allegations of human rights violations could be brought to the attention of the oversight organs by either states or individuals.

The convention provided that, in the first instance, complaints would come before the European Commission on Human Rights (EcmHR), which was a quasi-legal organ. The commission made a determination on whether to receive the complaint, if it decided that the complaint was receivable, it would look into the substance of the complaint that a state had violated one of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. During this stage an attempt was made to reach a friendly settlement between the applicant and the concerned state; if a settlement was reached, the procedure came to an end, if no friendly settlement was reached, the commission prepared a report on the substance of the complaint. The report also contained the commission's opinion on whether the concerned state had violated the terms of the convention.

After this stage, the complaint was processed in two alterna tive forms. If the matter was referred to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by the commission or the concerned state, the court examined the complaint to make a final determination as to whether the concerned state had violated the convention. The findings of the court were binding. If the matter was not referred to the court, the complaint was brought before the Committee of Ministers (a political organ) for consideration and finalization. The most noteworthy feature of the oversight system was its voluntary character, if a state did not recognize the right of individuals to lodge complaints to the European Commission on Human Rights; the commission could not examine such complaints. Similarly, the competence of the European Court of Human Rights also depended on the consent of the state. The court could only bring a state to trial if that state had formally declared that it accepted the court's competence. Consequently, a state that had not formally declared its acceptance could only be accountable to the Committee of Ministers upon the complaint of another state (also see Box 7-50 in Section 7).

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- 2. In this way it became possible to implement smoothly the neo-liberal economic policies adopted on 24 January 1980 in Turkey, whereas such policies previously had caused serious social and political turmoil in other democratic countries.
- 3. The whole legal structure was completely overhauled, in violation of the basic rules of law, in order to make it impossible to engage in any opposition in the future or to depart from these policies.

After the three years of military rule following the coup, a democracy of sorts was established in the country to the extent that the new authoritarian legal system made this possible. The regime's authoritarian structure, however, remained more or less in place. Because of this, Turkey reached the end of the twentieth century bedeviled by the internal and external problems arising from its handling of the issue of human rights.

Another issue closely connected with this internal dynamic was the Kurdish question or "PKK terror" in official parlance. The Turkish General Staff described the question in 1994 as "low-intensity warfare" (Kışlalı, pp. 187, 215). But in its foreign relations this conflict was put before Turkey as a human rights issue and led to international pressures. In an environment in which the national liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s were gradually giving way to minority rights as the burning issue in the international arena, Turkey found itself seriously isolated because of its nondemocratic legal system.

These domestic and external dynamics must be as-

sessed against the backdrop of Turkey's chief foreign policy objective, which is integration with the West. Turkey is not a small country living in isolation from the rest of the world; nor is it a former colony on which a way of life not of its own choosing had been imposed. Ever since the Tanzimat reforms of 1839, its goal was Westernization, which implied resembling the West, being like the West, and doing as the West did. This goal meant that the relationship was on the whole based on reciprocity. Becoming part of the European Concert was reciprocated by the Reform Edict of 1856; and the granting of minority rights at the Lausanne Peace Conference was reciprocated by being recognized as an independent republic.

Similarly, in the 1950s membership in NATO and the Council of Europe was reciprocated by acknowledging the European human rights system (Box 6-28). Consequently, as a country that undertook international commitments willingly in order to be accepted as a member of the West, Turkey found itself in an impasse in conducting its foreign policy when it failed to carry out these commitments.

Having examined the background, we can now direct our attention to the period from 1980 to 1990.

Prior to 12 September 1980 the question of human rights was not an issue of concern for Turkish foreign policy. Before the coup, Turkey was a regular country, a member of the Council of Europe with no great pretensions. Although it was a party to the ECHR, it had not recognized the right of individual application and the

#### Box 6-28. The Council of Europe

The aim of the Council of Europe, set up in 1949, is "to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safe-guarding and realizing the ideals and principles that are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." According to its statute, "Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realization of the aim of the Council." A member state that seriously violates its commitments can have its right to be represented suspended and it necessary can be asked by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw.

The Council of Europe has two main organs. The decisionmaking organ is the Committee of Ministers, which has three main tasks. It is a platform where the national views on issues confronting European societies can be aired. It also seeks to find common ground in dealing with these issues. Finally, it upholds the values of the council. The Committee of Ministers carries out its tasks through conventions, recommendations to its members, decisions, declarations, and other such means. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is the consultative and deliberating organ of the council. It consists of the members of parliament of the component states. Its members are selected by the national parliaments from among their own members according to their individual rules. Each state is represented in the body in proportion to the size of that state's population. The bulk of the council's work consists of the assembly's deliberations and recommendations to the Committee of Ministers

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competence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). As such, it was a self-centered country that had not accepted international oversight. At that time, Turkey was a relatively democratic country with a Constitution that could be considered to be up to international human rights standards and attracted no international attention other than by its military presence in Cyprus. In fact, Turkey was added to the agenda of the Parliamentary Assembly for a while after the 12 March 1971 military intervention and was frequently having to answer complaints in the bodies of ILO because of restrictions on labor unions. The Republic of Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) had lodged three separate complaints against Turkey in the European Human Rights Commission because of alleged human rights violations in Cyprus. In those days, however, the world's attention was riveted on the socialist bloc (the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the struggle of the Solidarnosc labor union in Poland) and the military dictatorships in countries such as Chile and Argentina. In Europe, the regime changes in Spain and Portugal had ended the Fascist dictatorships there, and Greece had dealt with

#### Box 6-29. The National Security Council in Turkey

The NSC consisted of the chief of the General Staff, Gen Kenan Evren; the commander of the land forces, Gen. Nurettin Ersin; the commander of the air force, Gen. Tahsin Şahinkaya; the commander of the navy, Admiral Nejat Tumer, and the commander of the gendarmerie, Gen. Sedat Celasun. It seized power on 12 September 1980 "within the framework of the chain of command" (communiqué no. 1, 12 September 1980): It passed the Law on the Constitutional Order that gave it legislative power, and the council's president assumed the position of head of state. This body governed Turkey until 6 December 1983. It appointed a council of ministers accountable only to the NSC, proposed bills and enacted laws, appointed the members of a consultative assembly charged with preparing a draft Constitution, and adopted the Constitution in its final form after making certain revisions. All of the legislation known as the 12 September laws emanated from the NSC. When the president of the NSC, Kenan Evren, became president of the Republic following a referendum, the members of the NSC became members of the presidential council until November 1989: The provisional article 15 of the Constitution absolving the members of the NSC of all responsibility for their actions was still in force in 2008.

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its problem by overthrowing the junta of colonels and punishing its former members. Europe was feeling proud after having irrevocably established human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in its midst.

It was in this environment that a military coup took place on 12 September 1980 in Turkey, a country constantly seeking to prove its European credentials, and a military administration consisting of five military commanders seized the reins of power. The administration labeled itself the National Security Council (NSC) (Box 6-29). In its communiqué number 1, issued immediately after the coup, it took over executive and legislative power after abolishing the parliament and the government, lifted the immunity of members of parliament, banned all foreign travel, declared martial law throughout the land, and confined everyone indoors. The NSC also gave a briefing to NATO ambassadors and reiterated Turkey's attachment to its NATO commitments. On the same day, the Turkish permanent representative at the Council of Europe indicated that Turkey was invoking article 15 of the ECHR (Günver, p. 111). Article 15 read as follows: "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."

The immediate reaction of the Western states and international organizations to the coup showed concern but in general was restrained. The criticism and disapproval that would come later were not yet evident because of the reassuring official pronouncements coming from Turkey and because the flow of information was still limited. Among the international organizations, the PACE adopted a resolution on 1 October 1980 expressing its concern over the military takeover and the closing down of the parliament, the banning of political parties, and the severe limitations imposed on labor unions, which were in contravention of the statute of the Council of Europe. The council declared that, whatever the justification, the seizure of power by any group (whether civilian or military) and the overthrow of the democratic political system were a violation of the principles upon which the Council of Europe rested. In its resolution, the assembly also called on the Council of Ministers to monitor the situation in Turkey and, if the government of Turkey did not take the necessary steps, recommended that it be reminded that the Council of Ministers would be obliged to carry out the provisions of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

This recommendation was a sharp expression of disapproval. In another resolution adopted on the same day, the PACE recalled that the terms of the Turkish members of parliament would expire in May and charged the Committee on Political Affairs to monitor the situation in Turkey and make sure that the Turkish members were not prevented from participating in the TGNA's activities during their terms.

The European Parliament, to which Turkey did not belong and whose members had been elected by direct balloting for the first time only a year earlier, also adopted a relatively mild approach to Turkey at that stage. In its first resolution adopted on 18 September 1980, the parliament recalled Turkey's international obligations to respect human rights and stressed that relations with the ECs were conditional on respect for human rights. This tolerant approach was also shared by other organs of the ECs. As a matter of fact, the EEC-Turkey Council of Association met in December 1980 and made the decision to start the negotiations for the Fourth Financial Protocol.

As the world began to receive the news of developments in Turkey, the cautious approach of the international community was quickly replaced by harsh criticism of the 12 September administration. The NSC had banned all activities of political parties, suspended the activities of labor unions and associations, disbanded all elected bodies, dismissed all mayors, and carried out far-reaching purges in the civil service in rapid succession.

These measures brought all democratic activities in

the country to an end. These were followed by further tough measures: the period of detention was raised first to thirty and then to ninety days. Tens of thousands of people were detained, filling overcrowded barracks, while more and more people were perishing as a result of systematic torture. To this day, it has not been possible to gather accurate data about the events of that period. The information gathered from different sources indicates that close to fifty thousand people were detained and that fiftyfive people died as a result of torture from 1980 to 1983. On 16 March 1982 the minister of state, İlhan Öztrak, admitted that fifteen people had died as a consequence of torture. Martial law courts were handing out death sentences after summary trials. Erdal Eren was among the first to be sentenced. Although he was less than eighteen years old, he was hanged when it was determined through "a bone X-ray" that he was a full adult. Between 1980 and 1984 fifty people were executed, half of them common criminals.

Starting in 1981, there was a growing wave of disapproval of Turkey in international circles because of the developments taking place there. Following up its resolution to monitor Turkey, the PACE adopted a report in January 1981 after the visit to Turkey of its observer. The report contained a catalogue of violations of human rights in Turkey, concluding that there was no progress in the transition to democracy. The opinion of the report was that this was incompatible with membership in the Council of Europe. This report was followed by the "Resolution on the Military Junta in Turkey," adopted by the European Parliament in April 1981. The resolution called for the restoration of democracy in Turkey within two months or, failing this, the suspension of the Association Agreement.

These were tough resolutions, but they failed to have any effect. This was because the NSC attributed importance mostly to relations with the U.S., a country that was not applying pressure in the area of human rights. The 1981 issue of the U.S. Human Rights Report stated that there was no evidence to prove or disprove the allegations of widespread, systematic torture or that the authorities were tolerating torture. It said that there were no claims that the right to conduct searches granted to martial law administrators was widely used or was being abused. The report also contained a passage asserting that no censorship of the press was applied. There was no mention of capital punishments, while the drop in crime rates was praised.

Counting on this kind of support from the U.S., the NSC did not feel the need to take seriously the criticism coming from the PACE or the European Parliament. In any case, Turkey had already reduced its relations with the Council of Europe to a minimum. Ankara had stated that

Turkish members of parliament would not participate in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly. It also decided to forgo taking over the rotating chairmanship of the Ministerial Committee in order to escape from the inevitable criticism that would be coming its way. Ankara looked upon the European Parliament as a body with little power and assumed that it would have scant influence on its relations with the EEC.

Despite Ankara's efforts at damage control, numerous adverse decisions were made that would have lasting effects. Although Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe was not terminated, the PACE adopted resolutions in October 1981 and January 1982 that were highly critical of the military regime. The European Parliament decided in January 1982 that the mandate of the Joint Parliamentary Commission would not be renewed until general elections were held in Turkey and the parliament was reconvened. In July 1982 Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France decided to bring the issue of human rights abuses in Turkey before the ECmHR.

Once the NSC had established its control in Turkey, it started making preparations for the transition to democracy in 1982. As a first step in this direction, the political parties, whose activities had been suspended on the first day of the coup, were closed down for good on 15 October 1981. A Consultative Assembly, with a membership appointed by the NSC, was charged with preparing a Constitution. The PACE adopted a resolution reminding Ankara that the new Constitution must conform to the statute of the Council of Europe and to the ECHR. The European Parliament refused to ratify the Fourth Financial Protocol before transition to democracy. The NSC found the draft Constitution prepared by the Consultative Assembly too democratic and made numerous changes to make it more authoritarian. In the run-up to the referendum on the new Constitution, all expressions that might imply voting "no to the Constitution" were banned. An overwhelming majority of 91.3% of the electorate voted yes for the Constitution and at the same time approved General Evren, president of the NSC, as president of the Republic in a referendum monitored by the PACE, among others. Provisional article 15 of the 1982 Constitution granted legal immunity to the 900-odd items of legislation passed by the military administration from 1980 to 1983 (Box 6-30). In other words, this legislation could not be challenged in the courts. This article was removed from the Constitution in October 2001.

In January 1983 the PACE adopted a resolution by which it declared the 1982 Constitution (which carried over into the civilian administration the legislation of 12 September with its concept of the "almighty state") and

#### Box 6-30. The Legislation of 12 September

From the day the military coup took place to 6 December 1983, when the existence of the NSC came to an end, about 900 items of legislation were adopted by the military administration. This included laws and other arrangements with the force of law. Provisional article 15 of the Constitution stated that this legislation could not be challenged on the grounds of unconstitutionality. This legislation in general was an attempt to institutionalize an antidemocratic system. Its main feature was that it glorified the state and the state's authority while pushing human rights and freedoms to the background. Most of this NSC legislation was adopted prior to the 1982 Gonstitution, so in a sense the Constitution was designed to legitimize this legislation. The bulk of this legislation consisted of new laws, but there was an important component consisting of comprehensive and radical amendments to previous laws. With these features, the 12 September legislation replaced the legal framework set up by the 1961 Constitution with an authoritarian framework. Part of this legislation is now being gradually eliminated within the process of negotiations for Turkey's integration with the EU.

> (G. ALPKAYA) (Source: Gemalmaz 1997)

the manner of the Constitution's adoption to be incompatible with the principles and norms of the Council of Europe and called on Turkey to relinquish its voting right in the Ministerial Committee. Subsequently, in September 1983, the assembly declared that the restrictions that would apply in the Turkish election of 6 November and especially the NSC's right to veto candidates meant that the parliament would not reflect the free will of the people. Consequently, the Turkish members of parliament to be elected should not be admitted to the Parliamentary Assembly. Nevertheless, this would not be a firm position, and the final decision would be made in 1984.

After the election of 6 November 1983, in which only three of the newly created sixteen parties were allowed to participate, the NSC's existence came to an end when the new Turkish Grand National Assembly elected its bureau. With the adoption of the forms of democracy, some of the criticism directed at Turkey began to be toned down. In May 1984 the PACE readmitted the Turkish members of parliament, and after an absence of three years Turkey was once again represented in the assembly. This decision was made when Turkey threatened to withdraw from the Council of Europe if the full powers of the Turkish members were not approved.

But even if the criticism leveled against the lack of Turkish democracy came to an end, the question of human rights abuses was still a burning issue, which remained on the agenda of the European Parliament.

#### Box 6-31. State Security Courts (SSCs)

The SSCs were first set up by law in 1973 and were met by intense opposition on political and social grounds. They were declared unconstitutional in 1975 by the Constitutional Court, and their existence came to an end. In the authoritarian system that came into being following 12 September, however, the SSCs were restored and became an integral part of the regime. The 1982 Constitution made provisions for the establishment of the SSCs, and in 1983 the Law on the Establishment of State Security Courts and Their Functioning Procedures was passed. The courts started to function in 1984. They were to try offenses against the "unity of the state, the land, and the nation, against the free democratic order, and against the Republic as described in the Constitution, which directly threaten the internal and external security of the state." The justification advanced for establishing the SSCs was that they were specialized courts. But they were seen more as extraordinary courts because of their composition and procedures, which violated the principles of independence and natural jurisdiction. The SSCs were trying political offenses and were not affected by the improvements made to the procedures of regular courts. In the Incal and Ciraklar cases in 1998, the ECtHR decided that the presence of a military judge in the SSCs violated the right to a fair trial as provided in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Turkey conformed to this finding and removed the military judge only after the prospect emerged that the European Court might decide that Turkey was at fault in the case of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The change, however, consisted merely of replacing the military judge with a civilian judge. This change did not spare Turkey from being found at fault in the Öcalan case

> (G.-ALPKAYA) (Source: Katoğlu)

Martial law was still in force in Turkey during this period, and the mass trials and the detention of defendants were carried over from the time of the military regime. In 1984 the State Security Courts supplemented the martial law courts (Box 6-31). The last execution took place in 1984, but courts continued to pass death sentences. There was no letup in allegations of torture. In this period of repression, students were expelled from the university for the "crime" of buying theater tickets as a group. Everyone knew what was going on, but nobody could express views at a time when the press was under a form of de facto censorship. The first outcry against the repression was the Petition of the Intellectuals, containing 1,260 signatures, which triggered legal proceedings against the authors (Box 6-32).

The armed uprising of the PKK began with the raids on Eruh and Şemdinli in 1984. At first this did not make much of an impression in Turkey. But with the help of Kurdish political movements, which had been getting organized in Europe starting in the 1970s, the Kurdish

#### Box 6-32. The Case of the Petition of the Intellectuals

The Petition of the Intellectuals (Aydınlar Dilekçesi in Turkish) was a document dated 15 May 1984 containing 1,260 signatures. It was addressed to president Kenan Evren and to the Speaker of the TGNA by a group consisting of Professor Hüsnü Göksel, Professor Bahri Savcı, Professor Fehmi Yavuz, Aziz Nesin, Bilgesu Erenus, and Esin Afşar The petition had been drafted by Hüsnü Göksel, Bahri Savci, Aziz Nesin, Haluk Gerger, Yakup Kepenek, İlhan Tekeli, Yalçın Küçük, Erbil Tuşalp, Uğur Mumcu, Şerafettin Turan, Murat Belge, Mete Tunçay, and Mahmut Tali Öngören. Its objective was to "express our observations and views on the democratic order in Turkey in conformity with the duties imposed on and rights granted to citizens by the Constitution." The petition declared that the signatories felt humiliated because "our country has been placed in a situation where its human rights safeguards are being questioned in foreign countries." This was followed by demands, on the basis of democracy and respect for human rights, for guarantees on the right to life, the abolition of the death penalty, the elimination of torture, the conclusion of trials within a reasonable time, a general amnesty, the lifting of restrictions on freedom of association, and ensuring the freedom of the press and the autonomy of universities

The news of the petition was reported in the press four days later. Within one week, the Ankara Martial Law command called on the military prosecutor to take legal action against its signatories. After an investigation, fifty-six signatories were brought to trial on 27 June. The prosecution described the petition as a "declaration" and called for prison sentences ranging from three months to one year. With respect to the petition, Kenan Evren proclaimed that "those who declare themselves to be intellectuals offend the majority," "we have seen many intellectuals who committed treason," and "Vahideddin too was an intellectual" (Baskin Oran, Kenan Evren in Yazılmamis Anıldır [Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1989], p. 179). These were pronounced on 28 May 1984. Prime minister Turgut Özal opined that the prosecution of only fifty-six of the signatories was a step forward in the direction of democracy. The trial lasted two years and ended with the acquittal of the defendants.

(G; ALPKAYA)

question got on the agenda of the European Parliament and stayed there throughout the 1980s. In 1985 the European Parliament adopted a toughly worded resolution. There was a similar situation in the U.S. Human Rights report. The 1982 report referred to the Kurds as "a large minority" and stated that they could freely participate in political activities as long as they accepted the Turkish national identity. In the 1984 report there was a reference to the restrictions on the Kurdish language. The 1985 report cited the actions of "separatist terrorists" but stated that the security forces had forcibly evacuated the inhabitants of certain border villages and armed the local inhabitants. The report also mentioned Turkey's efforts to assimilate those who were not ethnic Turks.

At this point Turkey was still not taking the ECs and the EP very seriously. This was not the case with the Council of Europe, however, and Turkey reached an amicable settlement with the five countries that had lodged a complaint against it in 1982. In this framework, Turkey undertook to improve its practices in the area of human rights, starting with measures to be taken against torture. In carrying out this undertaking, changes were made in the penal enforcement law in March 1986 that resulted in the release of a majority of the convicts in Turkey, who numbered almost seventy thousand.

The Council of Europe considered Turkey's promises to be credible, and there was a softening in the tone of the usual resolutions on the situation in Turkey adopted by the PACE. The assembly adopted a resolution in April 1986, welcoming the lifting of martial law in most of Turkey, the amendments to the penal enforcement law, the nonimplementation of death sentences, the proposed changes in the penal code, and the preparations for accepting individual applications to the European Commission on Human Rights. The same resolution also mentioned the question of torture, the continued trials of members of DİSK and of the Peace Association carried over from the 12 September regime, and the restrictions on the freedom of association. But on the whole the tenor of the resolution was more optimistic. In 1986 Turkey's request to take over the rotating chairmanship of the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe was approved after the lapse of many years. The acquittal of the defendants in the Petition of the Intellectuals trial and the establishment of the Human Rights Association with broad participation were also welcomed as positive steps in the sphere of human rights.

These relative improvements in relations with the Council of Europe were followed in 1987 by the acceptance of the right of individual application to the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) (Box 6-33). This was done in order to gain support for Turkey's application for accession to the ECs but was nevertheless an important step. This was not an isolated event. Turkey acceded to the European and UN conventions against torture the following year.

But these steps did not constitute genuine democratization; nor did they correspond to a radical improvement in human rights practices. The bans on party leaders imposed by the 12 September administration were only lifted in 1987 through a referendum. That year, martial law was lifted in the southeast and replaced with a state of emergency (OHAL in the Turkish acronym) when a Regional OHAL Administration was set up (Box 6-34). In 1987

#### Box 6-33. Individual Application

Individual application relates to the applications for redress to the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights by individuals, political parties, unions, associations, companies, and others who feel that their rights under the convention have been violated. The applicant need not be a national of the state against which the complaint is being lodged, but the state must be a party to the convention or to the annexed protocols if the right that has been violated is contained in these annexes. There are two conditions for making an individual application. First, all the procedures of domestic law must have been exhausted. Second, the application must be made within six months after the final decision has been handed down. The first condition implies that the applicant must have recourse to all the legal processes allowed by a legal system. This includes administrative and legal processes depending on the legislation of each state. But if the national legislation is not appropriate, accessible, effective, and capable of yielding results in a reasonable span of time and If the grounds for complaint have become a standard, systematic, and regular practice of the state, the application is declared "admissible" without this first condition. The six-month deadline for lodging a complaint starts when it becomes clear that domestic legislation cannot provide redress. When the deadline has expired, applications will not be processed. The exception to this second condition is when the violations are repeated ("continuing violation"). In addition to these conditions, the application must be signed, must not have been submitted to any other international organization, must not be devoid of any foundation, must be in conformity with the terms of the convention, and must not constitute an abuse of the right of application,

(G. ALPKAYA)

Nihat Sargin and Haydar Kutlu (Nabi Yağcı) returned to Turkey with the intention of setting up the United Communist Party of Turkey. Their arrest upon their arrival dashed all hopes that Turkey was making progress on the road to democracy. The growing number of human rights abuses in 1988 and 1989 led to ever-sharper criticism from the EP and a rising chorus of complaints addressed to the ECmHR. No noteworthy political developments occurred during these two years.

The human rights violations that were prevalent in the 1980s were serious problems not just for Turkey but also for the European countries and international organizations that had to deal with these violations. The European states were forced to react because of the growing wave of Turkish political refugees and because of the pressure of their public opinion. But their reactions had to be restrained, because Turkey's total exclusion would worsen the human rights situation and total exclusion of Turkey was not a practical proposition in any case. Although pressure was applied in the form of cuts in financial and technical aid from time to time, the reactions of European states

#### Box 6-34. OHAL and the Regional OHAL Administration

OHAL is the acronym for Olaganustü Hal (literally, extraordinary state or situation), meaning state of emergency. The 1982 Constitution describes a state of emergency as a time when there is a natural catastrophe, a dangerous epidemic, or a serious economic crisis or when there are serious indications that widespread violence is about to occur or when public order is seriously impaired because of widespread violence. The law regulating the state of emergency was adopted on 25 October 1983 as Law No. 2935. The OHAL Administration was set up on 10 July 1987 with the ministerial decree (with the force of law) No. 285. This legislation transfuses the martial law measures to the state of emergency and gives wide powers to the administration, which are not subject to legal supervision. Among these are the government's powers to issue decrees with the power of law in connection with the state of emergency. The Constitution does not allow such decrees

to be challenged in the Constitutional Court. They cannot come under political control either, because the TGNA's internal regulations have not been amended to make this possible. Succeeding governments have used the power to issue such decrees freely, and the actions of the Regional OHAL Administration and OHAL officials have not come within the oversight of the administrative courts. The southeastern region has been administered under the OHAL regime uninterruptedly since 1987. The character of the OHAL regime led the ECmHR and the ECtHR to waive the requirement of exhausting all internal legal recourses before applying to these bodies. OHAL was lifted in November 2002.

(G. ALPKAYA) (Source: Gemalmaz 1994)

never reached the stage of effective sanctions. This spared Turkey from suffering unduly because of its human rights practices. But it constantly had to defend itself in international platforms. The effects of this situation were carried into the 1990s.

GÖKÇEN ALPKAYA

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SECTION 7

# 1990-2001

Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization

Table 7-1. The Administration of the Period 1990–2001

| PRESIDENTS                                    | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                          | SECRETARIES-GENERAL<br>OF MFA                 |
|---|--|--|---|
|   |  | Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz<br>(21 Dec. 1987–20 Feb. 1990)        |   |
| -   | Yıldırım Akbulut Government<br>ANAP<br>(9 Nov. 1989–23 June 1991)                  | Ali Bozer<br>(20 Feb. 1990–12 Oct. 1990)                 | Tugay Özçeri<br>(27 July 1989–1 July 1991)    |
| Turgut Özal                                   | •  | Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin<br>(12 Oct. 1990–23 June 1991) | ,   |
| 9 Nov. 1989–17 Apr. 1993)                     | 1st M. Yılmaz Government<br>ANAP<br>(23 June 1991–20 Nov. 1991)                    | İsmail Sefa Giray<br>(23 June 1991–20 Nov 1991)          |   |
|   | 7th S. Demirel Government<br>DYP-SHP<br>(20 Nov. 1991–16 May 1993)                 | Hikmet Çetin<br>(20 Nov. 1991–27 July 1994)              | Özdem Sanberk<br>(1 July 1991–31 May 1995)    |
| ·   |  | Mümtaz Soysal<br>(27 July 1994–28 Nov. 1994)             |   |
|   | 1st Tansu Çiller Government<br>DYP-SHP<br>(25 June 1993–5 Oct. 1995)               | Murat Karayalçın<br>(12 Dec. 1994–27 Mar. 1995)          |   |
|   |  | Erdal İnönü<br>(27 Mar. 1995–5 Oct. 1995)                |   |
|   | 2nd T. Çiller Government<br>DYP  | Coskun Kırca<br>(5 Oct. 1995–30 Oct. 1995)               |   |
|   | (5 Oct. 1995–30 Oct. 1995)  3rd T. Çiller Government                               | Deniz Baykal<br>(30 Oct. 1995–6 Mar. 1996)               |   |
| Süleyman Demirel<br>(16 May 1993–16 May 2000) | DYP-CHP<br>(30 Oct. 1995-6 Mar. 1996)  | Emre Gönensay<br>(6 Mar. 1996–28 June 1996)              | Onur Öymen                                    |
| (10 May 1995–10 May 2000)                     | 2nd M. Yilmaz Government<br>ANAP-DYP ("Anayol")<br>(6 Mar. 1996–28 June 1996)      |  | (1 July 1995–26 Oct. 1997)                    |
|   | Necmettin Brbakan Government<br>RP-DYP ("Refahyol")<br>(28 June 1996–30 June 1997) | Tansu Çiller<br>(28 June 1996–30 June 1997)              |   |
|   | 3rd M. Yılmaz Government<br>ANAP-DTP-DSP ("Anasol")<br>(30 June 1997–11 Jan. 1999) |  |   |
|   | 4th B. Ecevit Government<br>DSP<br>(11 Jan. 1999–28 May 1999)                      | Îsmail Cem   | Korkmaz Haktanır<br>(3 Nov. 1997–31 Mar. 2000 |
|   | •  | (30 June 1997–11 July 2002)                              | T . 1. T . K. M                               |
| Ahmet Necdet Sezer                            | 5th B. Ecevit Government<br>DSP-MHP-ANAP<br>(28 May 1999–18 Nov. 2002)             |  | Faruk Loğoğlu<br>(1 Apr. 2000–24 Sept. 200    |
| (16 May 2000-28 Aug. 2007)                    | (20 May 1977-10 1104, 2002)  |  | Uğur Ziyal<br>(1 Oct. 2001–28 Nov. 2004       |

ANAP (Anavatan Partisi): Motherland Party.
CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): Republican People's Party.
DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti): Democratic Left Party.
DTP (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi): Democratic Turkey Party.
DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi): True Path Party.

MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi): Nationalist Action Party. RP (Refah Partisi): Welfare Party. SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi): Social Democratic People's Party. (Table by Atay Akdevelioğlu)

### Appraisal of the Period

### I. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

## A. International Developments: Globalization and Its Consequences

The third globalization wave had its economic basis in the multinational companies that came into being in the 1970s. The technological basis lay in the information technology revolution of the 1980s, and it was complemented in the political dimension by the disintegration of the USSR in the 1990s. The West now stood unrivaled (see Box Intro-7 in the Introduction). This globalization came about forty to fifty years after the second globalization and was, in a way, a continuation of its predecessor (Box 7-1).

#### 1. The New Economic Order

In this environment, there was a transformation both of capital and of the economic order as a whole.

Unlike the second globalization, international capital acquired a high degree of fluidity in the third globalization. Capital could now be transferred to distant corners of the globe instantaneously with the modern means of communication. As a result, it became possible to invest in a manner that would maximize returns. Capital also acquired the tendency to go to countries for speculative gains, with important consequences for developing countries. A country could suddenly see large inflows of funds into its stock markets or financial markets. Once the profits had been made or if the outlook changed or another country emerged that appeared more promising, there would be a sudden reversal of flows. Such sudden outflows tended to cause economic upheavals and political instability.

With the globalization of production and distribution, national economies on which nation-states depended underwent great changes. Even the most powerful states began to form regional economic groupings to survive in this period of globalization. This process of regionalization resulted in the emergence of the North

### Box 7-1. The Second and Third Western Expansions: A Comparison

The second expansion of the West was known as imperialism. At that period the world was characterized by three main features: the monopolization and spread of capital, unemployment and increasing poverty, and lack of an alternative ideology. The same setting was prevalent during the third expansion.

In the second expansion, the monopolization and spread of capital became evident chiefly in the fields of energy, finance, and transportation-communications. The large oil companies came into being in this era. The term "finance capital," representing the fusion of banking and industrial capital, was coined at that time. The giant railroad, telephone, and telegraph companies were the symbols of that period. The same situation came about in the 1990s. At present there are only a handful of oil and natural gas companies in the world. Large banks are absorbing smaller banks and turning themselves into giants. Currently there are barely five large automobile producers. In computer software, Microsoft is a monopoly, and 70% of the information material on the internet has its source in the U.S.

The unemployment and pauperization of the second expansion found their expression in the novels of Emile Zoja and Charles Dickens. The difference in the income levels of the top 20% and bottom 10% of the world's population went from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 60 to 1 in 1990 and reached 74 to 1 in 1997.

In the second expansion, there was no alternative ideology to monopolistic capitalism. Workers had no other recourse to register their opposition to the system than jamming their wooden sabots in their machines to foul them up; the word "sabotage" is derived from this action. An alternative course first appeared with the Communist Manifesto in 1848 and was first put into practice in 1917, to be taken seriously only after 1945. This alternative only came about as a result of a steady accumulation of reaction. The opponents of globalization to-day are bombing McDohald's restaurants and smashing shop windows because there is not yet an accumulation of reaction, hence no alternative ideology.

In fact, the targets of the horrendous terror action on 11.5 eptember 2001 symbolized globalization (the World Trade Center) and the "global sheriff" (the Pentagon) (see also Box Intro-7 in the Introduction).

(B. ORAN) (Source Oran 2001 ["Hangi Kureselleşme?"], pp. 51–54) American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other such groupings. Those among the smaller countries that failed to associate with such groupings (such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran) found themselves in an environment that made trading difficult.

#### 2. The New Political Order

As the new economic order emerged, there was a parallel development with the emergence of a new political order that heralded the disintegration of the USSR.

#### The CSCE and the Charter of Paris

The Helsinki Final Act, which emerged from the first CSCE summit held in Helsinki in 1975, laid particular emphasis on the first basket, which dealt with security in Europe (see Box 5-1 in Section 5). The second summit held in Paris in 1990 that produced the Paris Charter was exclusively concerned with the third basket: human rights. At this time, the USSR was in its last days, the West was dominant, and the Paris Charter was proclaiming the political victory of globalization.

After this, the CSCE advanced the cause of human rights without interruption and began its process of institutionalization. Under the Paris Charter, it was not enough for member states merely to respect human and minority rights. They had to go further and create the conditions that would strengthen the separate identities of national minorities. The charter also set up the mechanisms for the institutionalization of the CSCE. Henceforth the secretary-general was to organize follow-up conferences and summit meetings every other year. At the 1992 Helsinki Summit, a High Commission for National Minorities was established. Its mandate was to determine the existence of ethnic tensions that might threaten stability or peace in the CSCE region and find solutions before these tensions resulted in conflict. At the 1994 summit in Budapest, the process of institutionalization was completed when the term "conference" was replaced with "organization," leading to the new acronym OSCE. The organization almost acquired the role of a European United Nations and added a new dimension to its existing functions in the fields of human rights and European security. This new and very important dimension was Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, which was designed to prevent conflicts in the region through diplomacy, such as the Bosnian conflict.

Against this backdrop, important developments took place after 1990 in the fields of human and minority rights. These rights began to be implemented over a large geo-

graphic area and were qualitatively strengthened. There was a transition from prevention of discrimination (securing equality of treatment) to protection of minorities. The protection of minorities was declared to be the duty of a state. States were no longer the sole arbiters of whether there were minorities under their jurisdictions; others could decide that groups displaying differences were indeed minorities. In the fields of human and minority rights, NGOs joined the international arena as influential actors along with states. Most significant of all, after 1991 these rights ceased to be viewed as a matter pertaining to the domestic jurisdiction of a particular country and became the legitimate concern of the international community (Oran 2001 [Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar], pp. 135–38).

As a result, the infrastructure of the West, which was international capitalism, acquired a superstructure in the form of human and minority rights. These were firmly implanted in the international agenda during the 1990s.

#### CFE 1990 (Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty)

Even before the USSR disintegrated, the political victory of globalization also became evident in the military field. The CSCE meeting, where the Charter of Paris was adopted, also saw the signing of the CFE. This was the most technical and most comprehensive disarmament agreement ever concluded. With the CFE, the Soviet Union made concessions that were unthinkable for a superpower. It felt obliged to reduce its superiority in conventional weapons (i.e., non-nuclear, nonchemical, nonbiological) to levels that would be compatible with "the new political architecture."

The process of negotiations got underway in March 1989 with the participation of twenty-two states from the Eastern Bloc and Western Bloc and was concluded with the signing of CFE on 19 November 1990. By 2001 the number of the participating states had reached thirty. Reductions were carried out in five categories of weapons in an area extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Each of the two blocs was allowed to maintain 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. In addition to this continent-wide ceiling, subsectoral and national ceilings were also imposed to prevent concentrations of forces in specific regions. The states that exceeded their national ceilings had to destroy their surplus weapons or sell or transfer them to states that were below their national ceilings. A system of verification was established to monitor the implementation of the agreement. In addition to CFE, which was legally binding, a nonbinding agreement called CFE 1-A was concluded,

which limited the number of military personnel. Under this agreement, Turkey's ceiling was 525,000 troops.

Turkey stood to gain from CFE because it was to receive from its allies weapons that were in excess of their ceilings under the system known as cascading. But most important of all, it was granted an exemption from the ceilings over 25% of its territory because its neighbors to the east and the south were not parties to CFE (see Map 7-1). The weapons in this area were not subject to the national ceiling or to verification.

In 1994 the Russian Federation that had emerged after the disintegration of the USSR


declared that it would not implement the limitations imposed by CFE in the Caucasus due to security considerations in the area. The "Flank Agreement" concluded in May 1997 raised Russia's ceilings in this region. At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an Adaptation Agreement was concluded; the bloc structure was ended and replaced with just the ceilings for individual states. The "national ceiling" was defined as the maximum amount of equipment that would be allowed in a particular country. To this would be added the foreign forces stationed in that country to establish the "territorial ceiling."

Turkey's national ceiling consisted of 2,795 tanks, 3,523 pieces of artillery, 3,120 armored vehicles, 750 aircraft, and 130 helicopters. The quantity of weapons available to Turkey in the area was considerably below these ceilings.

# 3. The Disintegration of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc and Its Consequences

The USSR and the Eastern Bloc came apart as a result of the prevailing international environment.

The principal successor of the USSR was the Russian Federation (RF). This was not just because the basic ethnic component of the USSR was Russian. The Russian Federation was twice as large as all the other Soviet territories combined. It possessed over half the population of the USSR, 90% of its oil, 80% of its natural gas, and 70% of its gold mines and produced 62% of the electric



Мар 7-1. Turkey's Areas Left Outside CFE Coverage

power. The RF had the most homogeneous population after Armenia and Lithuania. Most of its minorities, consisting of 17% of the total population, were not located in border regions. Furthermore, the RF could count on the existence of substantial Russian minorities living in the former Soviet territories, many of them in high administrative positions. These Russian minorities made up 41% of the population in Kazakhstan, 26% in Kirghizstan, and 12% in Turkmenistan.

This new Russia, whatever its initial problems, was bound to put its house in order eventually and could well be a cause for concern to its neighbors. As a matter of fact, it was quick to proclaim the policy of the "Near Abroad" (see Box 7-55 below), which indicated that the RF could not be taken lightly. Russia was dangerous because Western Europe no longer saw it as a danger because of the demise of communism and the "double buffer." In the U.S., there was a clash between the policies of Madeleine Albright and her team and those of the Soviet expert Strobe Talbott and his team, who were more influential because he had Clinton's ear. According to Talbott, Russia had to be kept on friendly terms with the West. This would keep it from opposing the expansion of NATO and from standing up to the global hegemony of the U.S. Thus, as long as they did not directly threaten U.S. interests, Russian military activities and military doctrines on the Caucasus and Central Asia must not be challenged, since these regions were Russia's own backyard.

The dramatic disintegration of the Eastern Bloc at this juncture led to significant changes in international relations, leading to consequences in a number of fields (Box 7-2).

These consequences can be summarized in the following manner. As far as the international system was concerned, the concept of balance came to an end. The Western system remained unchallenged. Those countries that had maintained their autonomy of action by relying on the existing balance entered a new and more perilous period.

From the angle of world peace, the old order (which, although perceived as risky, had been able to shed all risks toward the end and brought about great stability) was gone. It was replaced by an order that, although seen as risk-free, was extremely risky due to the existence of numerous independent states with nuclear weapons. The old stability was gone, and a great number of regional conflicts erupted that had been dormant in the era of opposing blocs.

From the ideological point of view, at least, communism as practiced in the USSR and Eastern Europe was finished. But the conviction remained among many that a similar ideology would not take long in emerging if the income disparities at the national and international level and the crass exploitation persisted.

From the perspective of the region, there was a great upheaval. Eastern Europe had become Communist at a time when the proletariat hardly existed and was now in the process of becoming capitalist without the existence of a proper bourgeoisie. This resulted in the Russian mafia taking over the economy and the collapse of many social values.

From Russia's perspective, Gorbachev had never considered the possibility of the disintegration of the Soviet state. He knew that the Soviet system could not continue in the shape that it was in, but his attempt to reform the system led to its collapse. In an environment where there was no proper registration of private property and no independent judiciary, a kind of savage capitalism took over, with political power falling into the hands of opportunists like Boris Yeltsin and economic power being seized by the mafia. Liberalization became synonymous with theft. Russia was the successor of a superpower, the USSR, where the citizens felt proud and also were used to having basic needs like health and education met as a matter of course. Now their country was being humiliated as a result of the war in Chechnya, with soldiers selling their weapons because of rampant poverty, Russian women engaged in prostitution in Moscow and neighboring coun-

#### Box 7-2. The Concept of Post-Cold War

The West emerged victorious from the Cold War. The U.S. became the global hegemon (see Box Intro-3 in the Introduction). But the EU, and particularly Germany and Japan, also emerged as regional axes. With the coming into being of an independent Ukraine and the emergence of a string of countries like Hungary and Poland from the debris of the former Eastern Bloclying between Western Europe and Russia, Europe was freed from security concerns. But now there were new sources of concern. One was instability brought about by the breakdown of bloc discipline. Another was the future state of the world: the population of the globe would rise from 5.5 billion to 8.5. billion in the first quarter of the new century. This would reguire an annual growth rate of 1.9% in the gross global product until 2025 to keep pace with the growth of population During the last decade of the Cold War, however, the growth rate had even been negative from time to time (Oran 1996, p. 357). Furthermore, the gap between rich and poor nations was growing ever wider (see Box 7-1). It was expected that competition would grow keener and the number of conflicts would rise. It was estimated that in the new century fifteen developing states would be in possession of weapons of mass

After great victories and wars that inaugurate new epochs, it is customary to talk of new orders. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, set up the "European Concert," and the "Versailles Dispensation" followed World War I. Inspired by the new order enunciated in the Atlantic Charter proclaimed in August 1941, U.S. president George Bush came up with the "New World Order" in 1991, soon after the end of the Cold War.

In the past, each epoch had seen more emerging states and more conflicts to contend with. The same thing happened this time with the New World Order.

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tries, and similar horrors. It was in these circumstances that Vladimir Putin came to power.

Putin could do little against the mafia. He started by tackling the downward slide and repairing Russia's tarnished reputation abroad. He did this by appealing to the patriotism of Russians. This tactic carried the risk of unleashing Russian nationalism that might prove difficult to control. In this respect, Putin's plight was somewhat similar to that of Gorbachev, who wanted to reform the system without tampering with the basic structure and ended up by unleashing forces that he could not control. Gorbachev attempted to save the USSR with internationalism and failed, while Putin took on the task of saving Russia with nationalism (*Stratfor*, 23 December 1999).

Finally, from Turkey's perspective, a powerful neighbor like the USSR was replaced by a powerful Russia; but this time there was no common border. Against this gain, Turkey lost much of its geostrategic importance for the West, which had depended largely on the argument of

#### Box 7-3. The End of History

In 1989 the American social scientist Francis Fukuyama published an article that had worldwide repercussions. He started by noting that a fundamental event had happened in world history. The reform movements taking place in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the consumer culture taking root throughout the world heralded the victory of the West. This was not just the end of the Cold War but also the end of history. The German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel had declared that history was the product of the clash of ideologies, which was reflected in the world as historical events. When the Cold War came to an end with the victory of the Western economic and political system (in other words; of capitalism and democracy), the ideological evolution of humanking attained perfection. This signified that history, as understood by Hegel, had come to an end. Of course, this did not mean that historical events would not keep on occurring, because the victory of Western liberalism was still in the realm of ideas and had not yet found its full reflection in the material world. Still, the basic conflict was over: from now on; Western liberalism would reign supreme in the world

Leaving aside the argument over whether ideas shape material reality or vice versa, however, Hegel's dialectic was a process with no end. A thesis begat a counterthesis, and the two resulted in a synthesis, which formed the new thesis, leading to a counterthesis. Fukuyama claimed that henceforth alternatives could only come from within the Western economic and liberal system and dismissed the possibility of an alternative to the Western system coming from the outside. But it must not be forgotten that the most powerful alternative to the Western liberal model. Marxism, was nothing other than a Western ideology.

Clearly, the notion of "the end of history" negated the historical process by pretending that no rival model could appear as an alternative to the Western system. The thesis of the end of history was nothing more than wishful thinking, as borne out by the growing number of conflicts in the world following the launching of the idea.

'Still, the "The End of History" constituted the theoretical underpinning of the concept of the New World Order as formulated by George Bush (Gerger, p. 176).

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"confronting the menace of the Communist USSR" since World War II. To compensate for this loss, Turkey began to rely on new crises, starting with the Gulf War in 1991. But this approach ran counter to the principle of upholding the status quo, preserving a relative autonomy, and ensuring the country's security.

#### 4. The New World Order

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the West was now in an unrivaled position economically, politically, and militarily. The Gulf War of 1991 revealed that it was ready to defend this new order by resorting to force if necessary. The U.S. and its allies removed Iraq from the interna-

#### Box 7-4. The Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI)

In the words of the president of the World Trade Organization, the body that succeeded GATI in 1995, the draft of the MAI was "a common constitution for a single global economy" (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webfiyer.asp?docid=3607 BintitemID=2298@Blang=1). The MAI was an attempt by legal means to equip the multinational corporations with a power that they did not yet possess in the economic realm. As the draft agreement was being prepared in secret. French filmmakers found out about the preparations and reacted sharply out of fear that Hollywood was getting ready to wipe them out. With the generally negative reaction that followed, the idea of concluding such an agreement was pursued no further

The draft of the IMAI, which will no doubt reemerge when international capital becomes stronger, would place nation-states at the mercy of multinational corporations. Under its terms, if changes in government policy inflicted losses on multinationals, governments would be held liable to pay compensation. There is such a clause in NAFTA; when Canada and Mexico-torbade the use of certain toxins, they had to pay compensation to the producers of these toxins. The MAI also contained a clause that would not allow a state to withdraw from the agreement for five years. Those that wanted to withdraw would have to implement the agreement for a further fifteen years.

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(Source: Oran 2001 [Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar], pp. 35-42)

tional equation when that country attempted to change the petroleum status quo in the Middle East. President George Bush used the term "New World Order" in a speech to Congress during the Gulf War. The New World Order rested on two pillars: human rights and the market economy. The term "capitalism" was carefully avoided because of the stigma attached to it. The president's actions demonstrated that he was ready to defend the New World Order by armed force when necessary. Bush's stand also reflected the theoretical view that these two pillars were eternally valid (Box 7-3).

At the same time, with the Gulf War, the U.S. established the basis of a new "law on intervention." Consolidation of this law continued during this period, with the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. It would be institutionalized with NATO's decisions made in Washington in 1999, when the organization adopted the "New Strategic Concept," which allowed out-of-area intervention for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes.

In this new environment, the U.S. also attempted to reinforce international capitalism with a legal superstructure through the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), which would serve as a sort of constitution for multinational capital (Box 7-4).

### **B.** Regional Developments

With the disintegration of the USSR and the Eastern European order, fundamental changes occurred in the map of the Eurasian region, completely overturning the existing balances.

#### The Balkans

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a country presented as a paradise for minorities, civil wars broke out that continued into the twenty-first century. The first to break away were the republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Located on the western side of the divide separating the Western and Eastern churches, they differed from the other peoples of Yugoslavia because they were close to the West and were Roman Catholic. Then came the attempt of Greater Serbian nationalism to absorb the Bosnian Muslims, with the participation of the Croatians, who were ready to grab what they saw as their share. Finally, the Albanian minorities attempted to break away from Yugoslavia and Macedonia.

The former Yugoslavia soon became the scene where the different Yugoslav nations got involved in bitter conflict. At the same time, opposing forces within the EU were also engaged in a struggle among themselves. Germany saw Slovenia and Croatia as the natural regions to come under its influence and had no qualms about encouraging their independence. It was also able to impose its views on the EU. Britain and France, however, were intent on checking Germany's growing influence and did this by backing Serbia. The result was the bloodbath in Bosnia, which continued until the U.S. decided to intervene. Once again, the U.S. demonstrated its unrivaled power.

Greece perceived the events in the Balkans as carrying the potential of a siege by Turks and Muslims. Alarmed by this prospect, Greece became the sole NATO country to provide open support to Serbia, while it did its best to smother Macedonia, which was hindering direct contacts with Serbia. These exertions left Greece in a weakened condition, and Turkey was able to take advantage of this. Once Greece found itself under the rational leadership of Costas Simitis, however, it freed itself from senseless complexes, stopped picking on its neighbor Macedonia, ended its quarrels with Turkey, and restored its image as the representative of the EU in the region.

Bulgaria had lost much of its standing during the Cold War in its attempt to change the names of its Turkish minority. Bulgaria mended its ways with admirable speed after the Cold War and became a model in its treatment of minorities. This made Bulgaria Turkey's most troublefree neighbor and turned it into a serious candidate for EU membership.

#### The Middle East

The effects of the Pax Americana were most clearly seen in the oil-rich Middle East. The U.S. was monitoring both Iraq and Iran under its policy of "double containment." When Iraq threatened the vital interests of the hegemonic power, it found itself completely isolated. Syria had been placed on the U.S. list of terrorist states. It found itself greatly weakened after losing the support of its patron, the USSR, and abandoned its policy of resisting the American-led Middle East peace process. After 1990 it opened its economy to private enterprise and foreign investments. In 1998 the U.S. would use its clout with Syria in Turkey's favor when it secured the expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan from Syrian territory (see Box 7-16 below).

The ascendancy of Israel was accompanied by a parallel deterioration in the position of the Arab states. The disappearance of the USSR left the Palestinians greatly weakened, and the left wing of the movement lost its predominant position in the organization. From then on, Palestinian nationalism came under the influence of Islamist organizations like Hamas, with its emphasis on terrorism in the struggle with Israel. This development proved detrimental to Israeli and U.S. interests.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran went through a phase when ideology was the main driving force. After this phase, Iran sought to extend its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s. While obstructing Turkey in Central Asia, it was also seeking to redress its economy. Its oil income had peaked at \$27 billion when its population was at 40 million. Now, when its oil income stood at just \$17 billion, its population had reached 60 million. It was having difficulty in making the optimum use of its ample natural gas reserves due to lack of capital and know-how. In the new century Iran would go through liberalization in its domestic policies as it sought to find export outlets for its natural gas through Turkey.

The demise of the USSR also affected Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East. Both the Turkish and the Iraqi Kurds came under U.S. influence. This gave the U.S. the chance to use the Kurds as a potential threat against the countries of the region.

#### The Caucasus and Central Asia

At first the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Iran were vying for influence in this region. The RF tended to look at this area as its own backyard and returned to the region as soon as its means allowed. The area was important for

the Russians, first because it was adjacent to the northern Caucasus. From the point of view of security, the northern Caucasus was important, with its unobstructed steppes extending to Moscow beyond the Caucasus Mountains. Moreover, any losses in the northern Caucasus could well lead to a new breakup. Second, Transcaucasia was rich in oil and was close to the Indian Ocean. Russia took advantage of the regional conflicts to establish its political and military presence in the region and demonstrated to Turkey and Iran in particular that it had to be taken into account whenever they wanted to deal with the countries of that region. Russian influence in Central Asia was also very obvious, however, and Moscow was quick to demonstrate that it had not abandoned this region.

When the USSR came apart, the U.S. calculated that it could enter the region in partnership with Turkey and gave Ankara strong encouragement to establish itself there. But the U.S. push faltered when it became clear that the RF was filling the void left by the USSR. In fact, the U.S. realized that in many cases regional instability could only be overcome with Russian help and slowed down its efforts to penetrate the area. As the size of Caspian oil reserves become more evident, however, the U.S. became concerned about the possibility that these resources might be taken over by Russia. The size of Azerbaijan's oil reserves in its zone of the Caspian stands at 10 billion barrels, with possible reserves reaching 30 billion barrels. Total reserves in the Caspian basin are estimated to reach 200 billion barrels, a level that could meet total U.S. consumption for the next thirty years and perhaps longer. It looked like the Great Game of the twenty-first century would be over the control of these reserves and transporting the oil to international markets. This is why George W. Bush, who took office as president in 2001, continued American support for the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline across Georgia and Turkey even though the oil companies considered the route to be uneconomical.

After Azerbaijan became independent in the Transcaucasus, its president, Ebulfez Elchibey, alienated Iran by harping on the theme of "Southern Azerbaijan," while scaring the Turkic republics and Russia with his Pan-Turkic policies. The news agency of Elchibey's party was named Turan, and its logo was a howling gray wolf. When Heydar Aliyev took power as president, Azerbaijan returned to a realistic policy. Georgia went through a similar process when its leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who led an anti-Russian campaign, was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze. This led Russia to ease up on its policies of openly encouraging separatism in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria.

One of the consequences of the disintegration of the USSR was the birth of an independent Armenia, which was significant especially for Turkey. Armenia was engaged in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and kept a large swath of Azerbaijan's territory under occupation. Under the leadership of Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia sought but failed to come closer to Turkey. With the coming of Robert Kocharian to power in Yerevan, Armenia was gripped by a nationalist fever that was fed by economic hardship. This led Yerevan to support Armenian positions that were causing apprehension in Turkey.

# II. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AND DYNAMICS

#### A. The Economy

Table 7-2 reveals the following picture (see Box 2-1 in Section 2).

- 1. Aside from the year 2001, the GNP grew by 32.8% during the period, while exports grew by over 100% and imports by 160%. Especially toward the end of the period, exports were stagnating while imports were soaring. This trend could be explained in the context of Turkey's membership in the customs union with the EU as of 1 January 1996, people's tendency to stop saving at a time when real interest rates were falling, and the easing of bank credits, which led people to purchase durable consumer goods such as automobiles.
- 2. The ratio of imports to GNP grew to the staggering level of 26.98% in 2000, when the stabilization program came into effect. The ratio of total foreign trade to GNP grew to 40.7% in that year. This high ratio, taken in conjunction with unrestricted capital flows, made Turkey extremely vulnerable to global economic fluctuations.
- 3. In this period there was a 2.3-fold increase in the level of external debts. The ratio of foreign debt to GNP rose to 77.7%, exceeding by far the commonly accepted limit of 60%. This compounded the difficulties caused by the vulnerability described in the previous paragraph, placing the economy completely at the mercy of external influences. Furthermore, the debts that were incurred did not go into investments but were used to finance current expenses and to service the existing foreign and domestic debt. This was unsustainable, and the day of reckoning was to come soon.

As further elaboration on the information in the table, it has to be added that the economy was kept going with short-term speculative funds, foreign debts, and internal borrowing, with terms fluctuating around twelve months.

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| YEAR | INFLATION (%)   | TL/\$ RATE   | (\$ NOLLUM). | EXPORTS (MILLION \$) | EXPORTS<br>AS % OF<br>GNP               | IMPORTS (MILLION \$) | IMPORTS<br>AS % OF<br>GNP | FOREIGN DEBT (MILLION \$)    | FOREIGN<br>DEBT AS<br>% OF GNP | DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (MILLION \$) |
|------|-----------------|--|--------------|----------------------|---|----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| 1991 | 55.3            | 4,169.85   | 152,138.10   | 13,593.5             | 8.93                                    | 21,047.0             | 13.83                     | 50,489.0                     | 33.19                          | 1,041.0                                 |
| 1992 | 52.1            | 6,868.69   | 160,671.80   | 14,714.6             | 9.16                                    | 22,871.1             | 14.23                     | 55,592.0                     | 34.60                          | 1,242.0                                 |
| 1993 | 58.4            | 10,985.96  | 181,806.90   | 15,345.1             | 8.44                                    | 29,428.4             | 16.19                     | 67,356.0                     | 37.05                          | 1,016.0                                 |
| 1994 | 120.7           | 29,704.33  | 130,886.70   | 18,105.9             | 13.83                                   | 23,270.0             | 17.78                     | 65,601.0                     | 50.12                          | 830.0                                   |
| 1995 | 88.5            | 45,705.43  | 171,858.90   | 21,637.0             | 12.59                                   | 35,709.0             | 20.78                     | 73,278.0                     | 42.64                          | 1,127.0                                 |
| 1996 | 74.6            | 81,137.15  | 184,601.80   | 23,224.5             | 12.58                                   | 43,626.6             | 23.62                     | 79,571.0                     | 43.14                          | 964.0                                   |
| 1997 | 81.0            | 151,428.52   | 194,106.50   | 26,261.1             | 13.53                                   | 48,558.7             | 25.02                     | 84,797.0                     | 43.73                          | 1,032.0                                 |
| 1998 | 70.2            | 260,039.56   | 205,808.40   | 26,974.0             | 13.11                                   | 45,921.4             | 22.31                     | 96,897.0                     | 47.09                          | 976.0                                   |
| 1999 | 62.9            | 417,580.86   | 187,467.80   | 26,587.2             | 14.18                                   | 40,686.7             | 21.70                     | 102,980.0                    | 54.29                          | 817.0                                   |
| 2000 | 32.7            | 623,685.00   | 201,977.80   | 27,774.9             | 13.75                                   | 54,502.8             | 26.98                     | 118,685.0                    | 59.25                          | 1,719.0                                 |
| 2001 | 61.6            | 1,225,412.00   | 196,736.00   | 31,334.2             | 15.93                                   | 41,399.1             | 21.04                     | 113,658.0                    | 57.77                          | 3,760.0                                 |
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Sources: DPT Temel Ekonomik Göstergeler, January 2001, p. 13; Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DİE), 2000 Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Ulugbay) Turkey went through three economic crises during this period when investments and production were low, and the value of the Turkish currency was propped up by Central Bank intervention.

The first crisis came in 1994. It was caused by the populist measures that had been taken continuously since 1987, leading to fiscal imbalances, while the currency was kept at an artificially high level even as the amount of currency in circulation soared. This resulted in a surge in the demand for dollars from both local and external savers, which left the treasury in a situation in which it could borrow no more. As a consequence of all this, the government was borrowing at rates of interest reaching 400% in May when it had considered rates of interest running at 90 to 100% unreasonably high in January and February 1994. Just as the 1958 crisis became a benchmark for measuring crises that followed, so the 1994 crisis became the benchmark for measuring subsequent crises (Sönmez, pp. 61–62). Henceforth, at the first sign of trouble, people would rush to foreign exchange bureaus to convert their savings into foreign currencies.

The second crisis was caused by the Far Eastern economic upheaval of 1997, which spread to Russia and then Turkey in 1998. When foreign speculators panicked and fled from an economy that was living from hand to mouth on debts, the Turkish economy slumped once again.

The third crisis came in two waves at a time when a stabilization program was being implemented to prevent the recurrence of the 1998 crisis. In the first wave, ten banks whose assets had been misappropriated by their owners were taken over by the state. As a result of this shock, speculators transferred abroad \$7 billion within a period of two weeks. Once more, the government had to resort to the IMF, which provided additional loans to deal with the crisis. At this point, on 19 February 2001, there was a row between president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit at a session of the National Security Council. When news of the dispute reached the public, the market collapsed once again, and a further \$6 billion left Turkey within a week. Turkey was desperate and needed to find new loans amounting to 25% of all the debts it had incurred over the previous seventy-five years. In these circumstances, a super minister was drafted from the World Bank: Kemal Dervis, who abandoned the pegged rate in effect up to then and replaced it with a floating rate. The condition for further IMF support was the privatization of basic public enterprises, among a number of other requirements. In the late 1940s and early 1950s (see Section 4), when people such as Max Weston Thornburg and James M. Barker had made similar proposals, people had assumed that they were joking. Among the enterprises due for privatization were organizations like Türk Telekom, the telecommunications operator. In October 2001 the markets still remained unsettled.

During the crises Turkey accepted the IMF's recipes as the only valid diagnosis and cure. It carried out these recipes carelessly even at the height of the crises and returned to old practices as soon as the emergency appeared to be over, making subsequent crises ever more severe.

#### The Structural Adjustment Program and Privatization

The economic model that was proposed to Turkey after 1945 would have turned it into a country that relied on agriculture and tourism. The economic and legal changes introduced by the Özal team led to the implementation of this structural adjustment in the 1990s. The basic tool of this adjustment was privatization.

The main argument for privatization was that public enterprises were loss makers and that the burden this imposed on the budget was detrimental to the national economy. The losses were due to a number of factors. The management of public enterprises consisted of rulingparty members who ran the enterprises as if they were the private property of the party. There was gross overstaffing in the enterprises, where anyone applying with a reference obtained from a politician was employed. Because obsolete machinery and equipment were not replaced, the enterprises were unable to compete. In other words, all of the conditions were present to ensure that the enterprises would run at a loss. The logic behind the sales of loss-making enterprises was flawed. But private businesses were only interested in buying profitable enterprises. Consequently, enterprises due for privatization went through face-lifting operations, proving that, with a will, they could be turned into profitable businesses.

When the considerable sums expended for privatization were deducted from the proceeds of privatization, however, this did not leave much in the way of income for the state. After over ten years of privatization, the government had received income amounting to \$4.2 billion by the end of 1997. In the same period, the expenditures for privatization amounted to \$3.9 billion (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1997).

In reality, privatization in Turkey aimed to achieve mainly two objectives. The first was to carry out structural adjustment in order to satisfy appeals coming from the IMF and the World Bank ever since the 1950s to conform to their model of international division of labor. The IMF's green lights were always conditional on this requirement being met, and the World Bank used structural adjustment credits to this end. The second was to secure the transfer of resources (in the form of factories, real estate, etc.) to private entrepreneurs below their actual cost. After the transfer of factories, real estate, and other properties belonging to non-Muslims at rock-bottom prices under the Wealth Tax of 1942 during World War II (see Box 3-2 in Section 3), this was a second wave of transfer of assets (but on a vaster scale) that took place in the 1980s and especially the 1990s.

This transfer of resources below cost was carried out according to the following two methods. First, the state enterprises that were due to be sold were assigned very low values to ensure their speedy disposal. To cite an example, the public share of the firm Fruko-Tamek was estimated to amount to 70 billion TL in 1991. This share was sold for this price four years later in an environment of runaway inflation. The business that acquired this share sold it two years later for \$65 million, which corresponded to 10 trillion TL (Boratav, p. 286). The same situation occurred in the privatization of Petrol Ofisi, a strategic state enterprise engaged in the marketing and sale of petroleum products. The major portion of the shares of this enterprise was sold for 724.5 trillion TL in 1999 even though its total sales in the first nine months of that year amounted to 902 trillion TL. This national enterprise had been sold for the equivalent of its annual turnover, and its profits in two years' time would exceed its total sale price (Cumhurivet, 3 and 4 March 2000). The prices of most enterprises were so low that their land, if sold separately, would have fetched higher prices.

The second method consisted of formulating the sales contracts in a way that allowed the purchaser to deviate from the enterprise's main line of activity and also to break the enterprise up if it chose to. An example of this was the privatization of the General Directorate of the Meat and Fish Enterprises (EBK in its Turkish acronym), located on a large tract of land next to the premises of Ankara's Police Department. The requirement to continue production was so vaguely formulated that the new owner could comply with the requirement by slaughtering just one steer. The sanction for not continuing production was set as a fine of 10% of the purchase price. The press did not report a single case of such a fine having been imposed. Of the eleven meat-packing plants owned by the EBK that were privatized, nine had ceased production within one year. Employment fell by 88%, and production

plummeted by 94% (Boratav, p. 288). The tract of land belonging to the EBK General Directorate was sold off to a retailer to build a shopping mall. With the EBK no longer operating and with the warlike conditions in the southeast imposing the need to clamp a ban on grazing animals in elevated pasturelands in the summer, there was a drastic contraction in animal husbandry in Turkey. As a result, importers resorted to procuring unhealthy buffalo meat from southern Asia and got involved in the scandal that came to be known as "Operation Buffalo."

The income derived from privatization was used to defray current expenditures and meet interest payments on public debts.

This process went on until 2001, when the government started selling state-owned lands over the Internet. As long as the economy remained in this state, it was to be expected that worse crises would occur and there would be nothing left to dispose of to overcome the difficulties. At the end of 2000 the British journal International Financial Review awarded Turkey the prize for being "The Best Borrower." At the award ceremony the undersecretary of the treasury, Selçuk Demiralp, received the prize from the comedian Rory Bremner (Milliyet, 13 January 2001).

The privatizations that were carried out in this period were accompanied by much talk of scandal and corruption. People assumed that all public contracts were tainted, and the state ended up by losing all its credibility. The press carried reports that frequent power cuts were deliberately prearranged in order to provide justification for the construction of nuclear power plants. At a time when the State Planning Organization estimated Turkey's natural gas requirements as 15 billion cubic meters for 2005, the Ministry of Energy's estimate was double this amount. The press claimed that the discrepancy arose from the government's efforts to push through the construction of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea. The same situation occurred in the field of electric power requirement estimates when the Ministry of Energy and the power-distribution organization TEAŞ (Türkiye Elektrik İletim Üretim A.Ş.) estimated Turkey's power requirement to be twice as high as the estimate of the Chamber of Power Plant Engineers (Meral Tamer, in Milliyet, 25 January 2001). As more banks kept failing due to fraudulent practices and were being taken over by the state, it was considered natural by many for the IMF to refuse to extend new loans in this environment of corruption. The honorary president of the American-Turkish Council, Brent Scowcroft, declared openly that the defects of the political system and the prevalence of corruption were behind the U.S. unwillingness to extend aid to Turkey to overcome its dire difficulties (*Milliyet*, 27 March 2001).

After the crisis of February 2001, foreign banks started buying out Turkish banks and companies at rock-bottom prices. This trend was causing dismay in certain quarters, most notably among the military as well as the bourgeoisie. Tuncay Özilhan, the president of TÜSİAD, which was all in favor of globalization, declared that, "not-withstanding the government's nationalism, Turkey's factories, banks, and commercial enterprises are being sold, one by one and for a pittance, to foreigners because of the government's policies" (Sabah, 13 April 2001).

Against this background, the IMF and the World Bank were not satisfied with either the "build, operate, transfer (BOT)" or the "transfer of the right to operate" models. They insisted on the outright sale of power plants to companies with majority shares held by foreigners. Following the crisis of November-December 2000, the IMF refused to give a "green light" unless 33.5% of the Turkish telecom enterprise was sold, with the buyer obtaining the right to manage the firm and a change in the present management. Following the crisis of February 2001, the IMF became even stricter in its conditions for providing loans. It now wanted new privatizations and monthly IMF inspections and called for the "transfer" of enterprises in the energy sector rather than "sale." This distinction would result in the state forgoing more than half a billion dollars in value-added tax.

This is similar to the situation described when dealing with the Peace Treaty of Sèvres (see Section 1), which in its article 232 required the Ottoman budget to be checked first by the Finance Commission made up of British, French, and Italian members before being submitted to the Ottoman Chamber of Representatives for approval. As a matter of fact, when the government sought to make provisions in the 2001 budget to pay civil servants an inflation differential, the IMF's Turkish desk officer, Carlo Cottarelli, declared in June 2000 that from now on he would insist that the IMF be notified of the budget not at the drafting stage but at the budget preparation stage (Milliyet, 6 June 2000).

Against this economic background, we can now turn to the political scene.

#### **B.** Politics

In this period the political scene was as chaotic as the economic scene. Just as the new economic policies of the 1980s led to the economic difficulties described above, so the difficulties in the political sphere were the direct result of the political recipes applied in the 1980s.

#### Islamism, Kurdish Separatism, and the "Deep State"

The 12 September administration used Islam under the label "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" as a social glue to ward off both the Left and Kurdish nationalism. When these policies were combined with impoverishment of the masses, the Islamist current in society was greatly strengthened. At the end of 1999 the poorest 20% of the population obtained 4.9% of the GNP, while the share of the richest 20% was over 50% (Cumhuriyet, 29 January 2001). The rise of Islam coincided with the prohibition of the head scarf in universities. This gave the Islamists a cause to rally around. In the elections in 1995, the Welfare Party (Refah) obtained 21.38% of the votes cast and emerged as the leading party. Its candidates became mayors in İstanbul and Ankara, while in İzmir a sympathizer got this post. In July 1996 Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition government in which the senior partner was his Welfare Party.

Erbakan was so sure of his position that he had the audacity to invite the leaders of sects and various religious orders to formal dinners at his official residence. These leaders attended the functions in their traditional religious garbs and turbans. The so-called green capital, consisting of entrepreneurs from Anatolia and represented by the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD in its Turkish acronym), had been fostered by Özal with cheap loans from Halk Bankası, a state bank. The impression started gaining ground among the public as well as among state institutions that the Islamic movement was being financed by the businesses belonging to MÜSİAD and by the foreign Islamic banking institutions that were allowed to set up operations in Turkey with special privileges during Özal's term as prime minister.

The 12 September coup administration had condoned torture in prisons and had prescribed Turkish-nationalist and Islamic indoctrination. The reaction to these practices helped strengthen the PKK, especially among the people in the southeast who had been alienated by the violations of human rights on the part of the 12 September regime. The spread of the PKK's influence reached such a magnitude that it became Turkey's major domestic and external problem in the years 1990 to 1994. During these years Turkey went through an acute "dismemberment (or Sèvres) syndrome." In the southeast people were afraid to leave their homes after dusk. The political arms of PKK

in foreign lands worked effectively to draw attention to human rights violations in Turkey during this period. These efforts helped them gain the backing of Western European countries in particular. There was even a time when foreign tourists wanting to travel in the southeastern region had to obtain a "visa" from the PKK.

In this chaotic environment, a growing number of people were being shot dead in broad daylight as they went about their businesses. More and more people were disappearing without trace after being detained by the security forces. In places like Mardin, Batman, and Istanbul and especially in Diyarbakır, these occurrences became so commonplace that it became impossible to keep track of them. The statistics provided by different government agencies showed large discrepancies. An investigative Committee on Murders Committed by Unknown Perpetrators was set up within the TGNA to look into these cases. The number of such cases was negligible prior to 1988 but grew rapidly thereafter. According to the data provided by the TGNA's investigation committee, the numbers went from 24 in 1988 to 48 in 1989, 44 in 1990, 68 in 1991, 732 in 1992, and 540 in 1993 (Cumhuriyet, 26 April 1994). These cases remained unclarified even in the districts under martial law, which led people to suspect they were the work of the so-called "deep state" (Box 7-5).

As a result of the Islamists' activities and the stresses on society imposed by terrorism, errors were committed in Turkey that were to have dire consequences. In violation of article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ministry of Education made a decision (later revoked) on 11 October 1993 to ban the teaching of the Armenian language in minority schools. The Islamist newspapers started campaigns to secure military intervention by Turkey in the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, Islamist mayors started naming squares and parks in Istanbul and İzmir after Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and named streets after notables and heroes from the Caucasus and Central Asia. The racist far-Right revealed its imperialistic ambitions by harping on the theme that the "National Pact is a wringer that is constricting us." A current calling itself "Neo-Ottomanism" defended the view that Turkish influence must be restored in the countries located on the territory of the former Ottoman state.

In this environment, the Chechen terrorists who hijacked the ferry Avrasya were tried merely for "diverting the ferryboat." As a result of all this, there was a sharp rise in Turkish nationalism in reaction to the PKK terrorism. Until then it had been a struggle between the PKK and the state. Now even minor incidents in the Aegean and in

### Box 7-5. The Argument over the "Deep State"

The term "deep state" is used in two different senses in Turkey. The first is rooted in a type of secret organization affiliated with NATO, which, with time, degenerated into an organized crime group engaged in the pursuit of private gain. In the second sense, the "deep state" is a type of special organization entrenched within the state apparatus and strives to keep the state on a predetermined course.

ABOUT OF SERVICE ASSESSMENT

The generally prevailing notion that "If the perpetrators of a crime cannot be uncovered, it must involve the deep state" goes back to the time in May 1988 when a NATO organization was accidentally unmasked in Italy. The public prosecutor Felice Casson learned that stores of arms were under the control of Italy's secret service (SISMI). This led to the revelation that in November 1956 the Italian and American secret services had established a secret organization with the code name "Gladio." Gladio distributed arms to anti-Communist civilians to be used in the event of an invasion coming from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Soon it became clear that similar arrangements existed in other NATO countries. These organizations were subsequently dismantled by governments or were eliminated after being exposed to the public (Ali Bayramoğlu, in Sabah, 12 July 2001).

The "Turkish Gladio" was never investigated. The suspicion quickly grew among the public that this outfit was responsible for a good number of incidents, such as those that took place in Istanbul and Izmir on 6 and 7 September 1955. In Taksimi Square on 1 May 1977, in Kahramanmaraş in December 1978, in Corum and Sivas in 1979, and elsewhere. Prime Minister Ecevit made mention of the existence of a "Special Warfare Department" in 1974. In 1977, after the events of 1 May, he wrote a letter to president Fahri Korutürk in which he revealed that this department had received

covert financial aid until 1974 from American sources for training in guerrilla and antiguerrilla warfare and added that it was highly probable that some of the individuals thus trained were using their skills in the acts of violence currently being carried out in Turkey (Hürriyet, 4 February 1978, quoted in Yetkin, p. 177). S. Demirel declared on 17 November 1990 that "the State cannot stand before the public if it has an image where it is perceived as the perpetrator of crimes" (Tercuman, 24 November 1990). As a result of these debates, this unknown entity implicated in these crimes came to be known as the "counterguerrilla" in Turkey.

The "deep state" was exposed somewhat after the scandal of the Susurluk accident (see Box 7-6 below) that took place on 3 November 1996. Security officials and civilians originally had been engaged in illegal operations on the state's behalf. These people gradually turned into mafia-like groups and began working for private gain. When these individuals were apprehended and brought to justice, however, their defense was based on the argument that they were serving their country.

The term "deep state" also is used in the sense that certain agencies within the state apparatus arrogate to themselves tasks not assigned to them by the Constitution or by law in order to make themselves more powerful or influential. These agencies see themselves as the "parallel state" and assume for themselves the function of determining the main axes of political life in the defense of certain concepts like secularism, the unity of the state national security, and others, which are considered to be invibible. The "parallel state" thus regards itself as having a mission to ensure continuity and permanence within the state.

(B. ORAN)

Mersin regions were likely to be turned into a Turkish vs. Kurdish fight if one of those involved happened to be of Kurdish stock. It was in these circumstances that the two nationalist parties, the Nationalist Action Party and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), came to power following the 1999 election.

#### A Change in the Environment

As politicians from the Islamic current came to power, demonstrations with a religious flavor began to occur. One such meeting was the Jerusalem Evening held in Sincan near Ankara. During prime minister Erbakan's foreign trips to Libya and Iran, incidents took place that caused dismay in secular circles and particularly among the military and the staff of the Foreign Ministry. A special working group (Working Group/West) was established by the Armed Forces to monitor the Islamist currents, determine their strength, and influence public opinion.

Eventually, even while Erbakan headed the government, the military within the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu in Turkish) succeeded in having a crucial resolution adopted on 28 February 1997 by this body. The resolution called on the government to stem

the growth of Islamist cadres within the administration and take the necessary measures for the proper and full implementation of the reform legislation dating from the earlier years of the Republic. This was followed by a series of briefings to the media conducted by the armed forces in which religious reactionaries were named as enemies. In October 1997 the National Security Council issued a paper entitled "National Security Policy Document," which contained some novel ideas and unusual goals in addition to the old mantras like "separatism and reactionary activities are the main concerns." Among the unusual views were the following: "Turkish nationalism is being turned into racism by certain quarters. The mafias formed by the right-wing militants are using these elements and threatening public order." Also: "Steps may be taken to develop local and cultural particularities provided they do not impinge on the public domain" (Hürriyet, 4 November 1997, quoted in Oran 1999, p. 152).

The coalition protocol of the government called for the office of prime minister to pass from Erbakan to his deputy Çiller at a predetermined date. In the process of this switch-over, President Demirel entrusted the task of forming the new government to Mesut Yılmaz instead of

#### Box 7-6. The Susurluk Accident

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At about 7:15 in the evening on 3 November 1996; a Mercedes ploughed into the rear of a truck parked in the vicinity of Susurluk, a town near Bursa. The accident led to three deaths and one injury. From the identity papers of the victims, it was determined that those killed were the deputy chief of the Istanbul police, Huseyin Kocadağ; Mehmet Özbay; and Gonca Us. The Injured person was a member of parliament from Şanliurfa, Sedat Edip Bucak, it was subsequently revealed that Mehmet Özbay's identification papers were false and that his true identity was Abdullah Calli, the nationalist far-right (Ukūcū) mafia leader who was accused of having committed the Bahçellevier massacre in 1978. Bucak was also the head of the Kurdish Bucak clan, identified with the government sponsored village guards in the southeast:

As the investigation went forward, the plot deepened. The smuggled weapons in the car's trunk were of the sort used by assassins and were not registered in the inventory of the police. The bodyguards assigned to Bucak were former police officers of the elite special forces who had been detained in connection with the recent murder of the casino owner Omer Lutfu Topal. They had been released upon the orders of the minister of the interior, Mehmet Agar, and assigned to the task of protecting Bucak. One of the bodyguards had also worked for Tansu Giller. Cath's license fallowing him to bear arms had been signed by Agar, Necdet Men zir, and Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, all high-level officials in the Ministry of the Interior. Cath was on Interpol's red list of wanted persons. He was the bearer of a green special passport, given only to high government officials, that was also signed by Agar. It had been issued by the police and renewed three times without a written record in the official register. On 13 December the police announced that the fingerprints on the murder weapon in the Topal crime corresponded to Catli's fingerprints.

As these revelations came to light, pollticians began to defend those involved in the Susuriuk accident, while at the same time threatening one another, When it transpired that Catli had

been employed against ASALA, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs Tansu Ciller declared on 26 November that "those who had fought on behalf of the state would be remembered with respect and considered to be honorable" (Milliyet, 27 November 1996). Bucak declared on 24 December that, if his parliamentary immunity was lifted, it would take only fifteen days for Mesut Yilmaz, then the leader of the main opposition party, to lose his immunity. In the trials of those who were involved in the Susurluk scandal, demonstrators began to cheer and chant "Turkey is proud of you" as the accused entered and left the courthouse, On the other hand, civil society groups, however, started a campaign called "One Minute of Darkness for Full Transparency" The campaign was launched in February 1997, and lasted for a whole month: at exactly 9 PM, lights in the buildings were made to blink for one minute. Prime Minister Erbakan referred to this campaign deprecatingly as a primitive tribal dance:

The trial went on for five years at the State Security Court. The verdict of the court, delivered on 12 February 2001, confirmed a relationship involving the police, the mafia, and politicians that had turned into a criminal organization. The twelve defendants, including Haluk Kirci, one of the perpetrators of the Bahçelievier massacre, members of the police special forces, a former intelligence officer belonging to MIT, and an international narcotics smuggler were sentenced to prison terms of four to six years. Bucak and Agar were not fried due to their parliamentary immunity.

When this verdict came before the Eighth Penal Branch of the Court of Cassation, the judges unanimously upheld the verdict of the State Security Court and declared in their judgment: "The most dangerous forms of criminal organizations are those in which public officials are involved."

(B. Oran

(Sourcest Cumhuriyet, 12 and 14 February 1997 and 13 February 2001) Radikal, 16 January 2002)

Çiller. The Islamists found themselves being prosecuted, student dormitories run by religious sects began to be inspected, Islamists in key positions in the administration found themselves reassigned, governors and prefects began to be investigated for Islamist leanings, and religious foundations whose numbers had reached 800 by 1997 came under scrutiny. But the most significant step was the raising of compulsory primary education level from five to eight years by eliminating the middle-level schools. This resulted in the closing down of the middle schools for training imams and preachers, which put an effective brake on the Islamist attempt to train new religiously inclined cadres by providing a religious education to youngsters aged eleven or twelve.

To understand fully the nature of this radical turnabout, we have to bear in mind that PKK terrorism, which peaked in 1993, was stopped in 1994 and subsequently defeated militarily in the countryside. By 1997 the Kurdish uprising had been largely suppressed. In the atmosphere tainted by the Susurluk incident (Box 7-6), however, the

news that the "dirty war" had led to the explosive growth of the narcotics trade in the southeast probably became a major source of concern for the military.

In reality, the change in the public mood in Turkey began much earlier than February 1997 and originated from the bourgeoisie. TÜSİAD, the spokesperson for big business, issued a report on education in September 1990 in which it advocated the extension of compulsory primary education to eight years (Cumhuriyet, 20 September 1990, quoted in Oran 1999, p. 153). In August 1995, when the effects of terror were still being felt, TOBB (the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) commissioned an "Eastern Report" prepared by Professor Doğu Ergil of the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University on the basis of his talks with ordinary people as well as with members of the elite in the region. The report described the Kurdish question, analyzed it thoroughly, and concluded that the inhabitants of the region wanted to be considered Turkish citizens but with a Kurdish identity.

The report caused such furious discussion that even its sponsor TOBB was taken aback. This was the first time that the bourgeoisie had been so outspoken. This was because GÜNSİAD (the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of the Southeast) had finally been able to make itself heard and informed TOBB that commercial life in the region was at a standstill. The industrialists of İstanbul had been told that the markets for their products in the region had dried up. In January 1997, one month before the communiqué of the National Security Council, TÜSİAD issued Professor Bülent Tanör's report entitled "Perspectives of Democratization in Turkey." Among the 'professor's recommendations, the one for the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense was radical enough to cause a big stir among the military. Professor Tanor also proposed lifting all restrictions on the Kurdish language, eliminating article 8 of the law on combating terrorism, closing down the lower three classes in religious preacher schools, ending the admission of girls to such schools (since they were disqualified from being preachers), and ending compulsory courses on religion in public schools.

In February 1973 the military leaders had declared communism to be Turkey's most serious enemy; after the 12 September 1980 coup, they had created an environment that allowed Islamism to advance rapidly. In this they had the support of the bourgeoisie. Now, twenty-four years later, there was a radical shift in the bourgeoisie's orientation. The reasons for the change were obvious. Both communism and Kurdish nationalism backed by armed violence (in Turkish: the 2 Ks, Komünizm and Kürtçülük) had ceased to be a serious threat. Furthermore, the new orientation of the military and bourgeoisie was in keeping with the new global trends.

After this, TÜSİAD's publications and statements would expose human rights abuses and demand an end to these practices. Even MÜSİAD became more globalized and liberalized as more and more Turkish firms began to trade with foreign (including Israeli) firms. Bülent Atuk, the president of the Turkish Association of Garment Manufacturers, declared in a speech that "the country must have a proper image if we are going to have people in Europe and America wearing 'Made-in-Turkey' T-shirts." He was voicing the views of Turkish businesspeople anxious to compete in the global market. Fuat Miras, the president of TOBB, spoke in a similar vein when he declared that "the main obstacle to trade is our inability to bring democratic reforms to our Constitution. Because of this, our trade is suffering, we are unable to tap the EU's aid funds, foreign capital is staying away, and we have trouble accessing foreign financial institutions for loans" (Milliyet, 25 June 1999, quoted in Oran 1999, p. 161).

Despite all this and notwithstanding the EU's pressures and the full support of the bourgeoisie, Turkey was unable to overcome its reluctance to commit itself in the National Program to do the things it had promised to do in the Accession Partnership Document submitted to the EU. In the middle of 2001 the regime was adopting, step by step, the infrastructure of the Western world in the form of global capitalism but was still suspicious of its superstructure, consisting of democracy and human rights. This was clearly evident in the continuing effort to shield the defendants in the Susurluk scandal. After the collapse of communism, it was no longer possible to cover up corrupt practices with anti-Communist rhetoric. All the financial, economic, political, cultural, and social capital invested in anti-Communism over the years had to be redirected against new internal and external enemies (Emre Kongar, in Cumhuriyet, 29 January 2001). If the true nature and the true perpetrators of the Susurluk scandal were to be revealed before this was done, it could spell the end of the network of corruption gripping Turkish society.

Although serious efforts were made to deal with Islamism, there were as yet no signs in 2001 that the Kurdish question was being addressed. The glib formula "the issue is not 'the Kurdish question' but 'the terrorism question'" was maintained. An atmosphere of complacency was created after the Kurdish uprising had been suppressed militarily. The measures to deal with the Kurdish question were confined to things like bringing Kurdish children to Ankara and İstanbul to visit amusement parks and shopping centers, having the İstanbul team of Galatasaray play football in Diyarbakır, providing financial assistance to teams like Diyarbakırspor and Vanspor, engaging pop stars to give concerts in the southeast, and arranging ballet shows with the dancers wearing Kurdish headgear.

# III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD

We shall consider the foreign policy of this period by first examining two tables (Tables 7-3 and 7-4).

The following factors stand out in these tables.

1. As in the previous period, the share of the first seven trading partners in Turkey's trade hovered around 55%. Only Germany was able to account for double digit figures, while the rest stayed in single digits as a percentage of Turkey's trade. Turkey was gradually diversifying both the composition of its foreign trade and its markets and suppliers (Table 7-3).

Although Turkey conducted a major portion of its trade with the members of the EU, it will be noted that its trade with the U.S. accounted for about only 10% of its total exchanges despite its many political, financial, and military links with America.

- 2. Turkey's total foreign debts, both public and private, increased by a factor of 2.2 during this period. While the long- and medium-term debts increased by a factor of 2.3, the short-term debts increased by a factor of 1.8. This period should be evaluated in two stages: the first covering the period from 1991 to 2000 and the second covering 2001. During the first stage the share of short-term external debt in total external debt was above 20% except for two years (1991 and 1994, which were 18.06% and 17.24%, respectively). This high ratio of over 20% short-term debt increased the vulnerability of Turkey. After the February 2001 financial market crisis, the IMF injected massive loans that helped to reduce the ratio of short-term debt considerably, to the level of 14.44%. But the ratio of interest payments to tax revenues rose from 30.61% to 77.09% during this period. This ratio even climbed to 103.26% in 2001 (Table 7.4; see Table 7.2 above).
- 3. The internal debts contracted by the treasury went through a period of very fast growth. Even if the dollar equivalent is considered to eliminate the factor of inflation in the Turkish currency, the level of the internal debt rose from \$11 billion in 1991 to \$100 billion in 2001. The sudden rise in the level from 2000 to 2001 was due to the failure of private banks, whose depositors' claims had to be met from public funds. In 2001 the long overdue treasury debts to public banks were also securitized, which contributed to the sudden jump in domestic debts. As a result, the ratio of internal debt to GNP rose from 7.22% to 67.34% in the course of this decade.
- 4. The interest payments on the huge debt stock posed a particularly serious problem. These payments consumed 30.6% of all tax receipts in 1991. Ten years later, they had reached the unprecedented and unsustainable level of 103.26%. Turkey had reached this level for the first time in its history when its total tax receipts could not cover the interest payments on its internal and external debt.

#### A. Foreign Policy against the Background of Globalization Turkey Trapped in the Debt Spiral

To deal with its desperate situation, Turkey had no choice but to resort to external sources like foreign capital, foreign loans, and foreign exchange earnings derived from privatizations. An alternative course would have been to undertake reforms in fields such as banking, energy,

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| 8.3 8.8 20.2 15.9 4.8 6.6 6.4 5.8 5.8   | 20.2 15.9 4.8 6.6 6.4 5.8   | 15.9 4.8 6.6 6.4 5.8                    | 4.8 6.6 6.4 5.8                         | 6.6 6.4 5.8                     | 6.4 5.8     | 5.8               |     | 5.8   |     | 9.2  | 3.3               | 3.1                        | 5.0          | 4.7                                   | 53.8                        | 54.1                                      |
| 9.2 7.6 20.6 14.5 5.9 7.7 6.9 5.4 6.3   | 20.6 14.5 5.9 7.7 6.9 5.4   | 14.5 5.9 7.7 6.9 5.4                    | 5.9 7.7 6.9 5.4                         | 7.7 6.9 5.4                     | 6.9 5.4     | 5.4               |     | 6.3   |     | 7.8  | 3.5               | 3.2                        | 2.2          | 5.8                                   | 54.6                        | 52.0                                      |
| 11.2 7.2 18.8 13.2 6.0 6.5 7.4 5.0 6.4  | . 18.8 13.2 6.0 6.5 7.4 5.0   | 13.2 6.0 6.5 7.4 5.0                    | 6.0 6.5 7.4 5.0                         | 6.5 7.4 5.0                     | 7.4 5.0     | 5.0               |     | 6.4   |     | 8.0  | 3.2               | 2.9                        | 2.3          | 7.2                                   | 55.3                        | 50.0                                      |
| 10.0 8.0 17.2 13.2 6.1 5.6 7.0 4.4 7.5  | 17.2 13.2 6.1 5.6 7.0 4.4   | 13.2 6.1 5.6 7.0 4.4                    | 6.1 5.6 7.0 4.4                         | 5.6 7.0 4.4                     | 7.0 4.4     | 4.4               |     | 7.5   |     | 9.8  | 2.9               | 2.6                        | 3.0          | 8.6                                   | 53.7                        | 51.0                                      |
|   |   |   |   |                                 |             |                   |     |       |     |      |                   |                            |              |                                       |                             |   |

Table 7-4. Structure of External and Domestic Debt, 1991-2001

| YEAR | TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT (MILLION \$) | MEDIUM- AND<br>LONG-TERM<br>EXERNAL DEBT<br>(MILLION\$) | SHORT-TERM<br>EXERNAL DEBT<br>(MILLION \$) | SHORT-TERM<br>EXTERNAL DEBT<br>AS % OF<br>TOTAL DEBT | TOTAL<br>DOMESTIC DEBT<br>(BILLION TL) | TOTAL DOMESTIC DEBT (MILLION \$) | DOMESTIC<br>DEBT<br>AS % OF<br>GNP | INTEREST PAYMENTS AS % OF TAX REVENUE |
|------|----------------------------------|---|--|--|--|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1991 | 50,489.0                         | 41,372.0  | 9,117.0                                    | 18.06  | 45,787.2                               | 10,980.5                         | 7.22                               | 30.61                                 |
| 1992 | 55,592.0                         | 42,932.0  | 12,660.0                                   | 22.72  | 149,688.8                              | 21,792.9                         | 13.56                              | 28.46                                 |
| 1993 | 67,356.0                         | 48,823.0  | 18,533.0                                   | 27.51  | 330,033.2                              | 30,041.4                         | 16.52                              | 44.07                                 |
| 1994 | 65,601.0                         | 54,291.0  | 11,310.0                                   | 17.24  | 841,400.0                              | 28,325.8                         | 21.64                              | 50.74                                 |
| 1995 | 73,278.0                         | 57,577.0  | 15,701.0                                   | 21.43  | 1,665,503.4                            | 36,439.9                         | 21.20                              | 53.13                                 |
| 1996 | 79,571.0                         | 62,226.0  | 17,345.0                                   | 21.80  | 4,625,420.5                            | 57,007.4                         | 30,88                              | 66.73                                 |
| 1997 | 84,797.0                         | 66,750.0  | 18,047.0                                   | 21.28  | 6,259,961.0                            | 41,339.4                         | 21.30                              | 48.00                                 |
| 1998 | 96,897.0                         | 75,680.0  | 21,217.0                                   | 21,90  | 14,254,323.0                           | 54,816.0                         | 26.63                              | 66.90                                 |
| 1999 | 102,980.0                        | 80,059.0  | 22,921.0                                   | 22.26  | 26,886,405.0                           | 64,386.1                         | 34.35                              | 72.40                                 |
| 2000 | 118,685.0                        | 90,384.0  | 28,301.0                                   | 23,85  | 36,420,600.0                           | 58,395.8                         | 28.91                              | 77.09                                 |
| 2001 | 113,592.0                        | 97,200.0  | 16,403.0                                   | 14.44  | 122,157,260.0                          | 99,686.0                         | 67.34                              | 103.26                                |

Sources: Hazine Müsteşarlığı, Hazine İstatistikleri 1980–1999, pp. 37, 68, and 71; http://www.hazine.gov.tr. (Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

agriculture, telecommunications, the state's system of letting out contracts, parliamentary immunity, and the judiciary to eliminate both waste and corruption. But it was impossible to undertake such a course, given the pervasive corruption in the system.

Because of the political and economic uncertainties, it was extremely difficult to attract direct foreign investments. The funds that did come to Turkey were mostly of the speculative kind and made the economic uncertainties worse. In a ten-year period, foreigners purchased \$26.7 billion in shares, bills, and treasury bonds and against this repatriated \$34.9 billion derived from these instruments. Of this sum, \$10.7 billion left the country from November 2000 to May 2001, when Turkey suffered two financial meltdowns and the economy's fragility grew more acute (*Milliyet*, 1 August 2001, based on Central Bank statistics).

Despite all this, at the IMF's insistence, new measures were adopted to promote foreign investments, which seemed to be the only remedy to tackle the emergency. Privatizations were undertaken, as explained above, whereby public properties were sold in haste to anyone ready to bid. In addition, notwithstanding the arguments against the move and without regard to the opposition of the intelligentsia, the Constitution was amended on 13 August 1999 to allow the adoption in July 2001 of the law permitting the resort to international arbitration.

The salient features of international arbitration can be summarized as follows.

1. Although it has run into opposition in Turkey, arbitration has been used in other countries from time immemorial as a practical and expeditious method for settling commercial disputes by experts without betraying confidentiality. Under this system, in the event of a commercial dispute, the parties resort to the arbitrator or arbitrators of their choice rather than to the courts. The legal system that will apply and the procedure to be followed by the arbitrator are determined by the parties. The arbitrator has the task of settling the questions arising from the contract. In arbitration, everything revolves around the contract.

Arbitration was also resorted to in Turkey over many years. Under the established legal precedents of the Council of State (the highest administrative court), however, concession agreements could only be referred to the Council of State (on concessions, see Box1-4 in Section 1).

When foreign corporations objected to this, the Constitution was amended in 1999 so as to allow disputes arising from concession agreements to be referred to arbitration. This was done to facilitate privatization of public enterprises. The amendment involved the addition of a new sentence to article 125: "Provision can be made for referring disputes arising from the interpretation of con-

tracts relating to concessions dealing with public services. Resort can be had to international arbitration if foreign parties are involved in the case."

"Foreign parties" meant that foreign credits had been obtained or some aspects of production were carried out with foreign inputs. This provision would also allow local firms to seek international arbitration on the grounds that foreign elements were involved in their operations. There was a general impression that this provision had been included at the behest of large Turkish media groups that were interested in investing in the energy and telecommunications sectors.

2. When the Constitution was amended in 1999, the following sentence was added to article 47: "The investments and services at present carried out by state economic enterprises or public legal entities that will become liable to be transferred through private legal agreements to real persons or private legal entities shall be determined by law." This provision would bring those concessions granted under the build, operate, transfer system within the private law framework, thus eliminating the concepts "public interest" and "the state shall have priority." This would block the possibility of taking such agreements to the Constitutional Court for annulment.

3. Another aspect of this question had to do with foreign dependency (from an interview with Professor Yücel Sayman). In the 1999 amendment, article 155 was also changed. Previously article 155 read: "The Council of State is charged with examining the draft statutes and contracts relating to concessions." The amended version reads: "The Council of State shall give its opinion on contracts relating to concessions dealing with public services within two months and shall examine the draft statutes."

The significance of the amendment was that the Council of State's opinion on whether there was a conflict with the concept of public interest was reduced to a purely advisory nature. The Council of State would render its opinion within two months, but it would not be binding. In these circumstances, a multinational corporation could apply pressure or resort to other methods of persuasion to influence government officials and its negotiating partners and seek an agreement that would serve its interests. After this, the arbitrator would only consider the agreement and its implementation.

By way of illustration, we can consider the following cases. Case 1: A foreign firm has built a dam and concluded a concession agreement for selling the water from the reservoir of the dam for a period of fifty years at a certain price. The firm can insert a provision in the agreement

that the administration will have to pay it the amount of money equal to the total cost of water procured from any source. Case 2: A concession agreement has been concluded with a firm that will build a bridge and collect tolls from vehicles crossing it for fifty years to defray the cost of building the bridge. The firm can insert provisions in the concession agreement that will allow it to collect tolls from vehicles that use an alternative road that might have been built later by the administration.

Without a preliminary examination by the Council of State and the elimination of those elements in agreements that are not in the public interest, the situations illustrated in the two cases can easily occur. It will be recalled that the privileges and immunities granted to Americans in the 1950s led to a public reaction against the U.S. The multiplication of the illustrations cited above might well lead to another such public reaction in the future.

#### An Asymmetrical Relationship with the EU

In 1987 Turkey applied for full membership in the EU. The approach of both sides to this issue was equivocal, which led to a troubled relationship.

The EU had plenty of reasons to oppose the admission of Turkey. Turkey had a large population, high inflation, an economy that would collapse without foreign loans, an unstable political system, Islamist currents that were on the ascendancy, and a poor record on human rights. But above all Turkey displayed no political will to correct these shortcomings. It would hardly be rational for the EU to admit such a country, especially after 1990, when it was having difficulties in coping with previous expansions.

But the EU could not afford to ignore such a large market.

Turkey had many reasons to seek membership in the EU. The Western orientation of Ankara had always given direction to its foreign policy. Globalization was also pushing the country toward economic integration. In the 1990s Turkey felt itself somewhat isolated and did not want its foreign ties to be confined to just the U.S. After 1987 the economy took a turn for the worse, and the need to tap EU funds became more compelling. Membership would also help balance the advantages that Greece was deriving from its membership in the EU.

From 1960 to 1980 Turkish public opinion had been strongly against the EEC. Now the EU was being seen as salvation. Formerly, leftists had operated under the slogan "We shall be the Market and they shall be the Common Exploiters," meaning we will open up our markets and our

partners will be the common plunderers of our resources if we join the EEC. Now they looked upon membership in the EU as the only way to be able to express their views without fear of becoming the victims of unidentified assassins or being hounded by the legal system. As for the Islamists, they abandoned the label of "Christian Club" attached to the European Union in their desire to secure a greater share for their growing "Green Capital" and business interests. The Islamists were aware that, even if they came to power, the regime would not allow certain practices like advocating the adoption of Sharia law, the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in parliament, the segregation of men and women, and so forth. At this stage, they wanted to enjoy the fresh wind of freedom and democracy that the EU would bring, while they gathered more support among the public. As for the ordinary citizens, their main concern was to improve their daily lot. Their dream was that, with Turkey in the EU, they could go to work in Germany or take a truckload of melons to sell in Brussels. Although they had scant knowledge about the EU, most people wanted EU membership for Turkey. A poll revealed that, while only 2% were informed about the EU, 68% were for membership.

But Turkey appeared to have no inclination to carry out the necessary changes for EU accession. Many customs and habits conspired to prevent change from taking hold in the country. It was unthinkable to transfer national sovereignty from the Turkish nation to a supranational body. It was difficult to abandon the rapacious economic system, even though communism had collapsed and the anti-Communist slogans could no longer be used as a cover to maintain this system, based on exploitation and instant riches for those who were well connected. Abandoning centuries-old customs in the name of civilization met with obstinate resistance. For many, introducing new freedoms carried the danger of encouraging Kurdish separatism.

To reconcile the divergent positions of the two sides, a compromise was found by which a customs union with Turkey would be established without any assurance that this would be followed by accession to the EU. This compromise would latch Turkey firmly to Europe economically. Europe was so eager to bind Turkey economically through the customs union that it chose to ignore the arrest and imprisonment of the members of the TGNA who belonged to the DEP (the mainly Kurdish Democracy Party). Turkey wanted the customs union, seeing it as a guarantee of future membership in the EU, even though the customs union made Turkey's trade deficit worse at the beginning. In 1995 the EU's share in Turkey's total

trade deficit was 41%. In the first year of the customs union in 1996 this share had risen to 57% (İSO Raporu, p. 7).

In the meantime the EU sought to remind Turkey that the customs union would not lead automatically to accession. At the Luxembourg summit in 1997, it adopted a decision designed to dash Ankara's hopes of eventual accession that sent shock waves through Turkey. In the face of the strong reaction coming from Ankara, EU became concerned about alienating Turkey. Probably for this reason, it rectified its mistake at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, although no significant change had occurred in the past two years. The Helsinki decision raised Turkey's hopes of accession once again. Turkey had previously been offered a "carrot" in the form of associate membership in the Western European Union in the field of security. Now the same tactic was being employed in Helsinki. In the meantime the initial negative effect of the customs union on foreign trade had been surmounted; the deficit stood at 56% in 1998, 50% in 1999, and 45% in 2000.

#### Relations with the Hegemonic Power

The close relations with the U.S. that had been established in 1980 continued during this period in a more intensive form. Following the collapse of the USSR after 1990, the U.S. steered Turkey toward "filling the void." A feeling of euphoria took hold in Turkey. The *Economist* used the expression "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" (*Economist* 297; see "Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia" below). Demirel used this expression in February 1992, after which it became a cliché that was abandoned with the restoration of realism only when Russia started reasserting its presence in the region.

The U.S. continued to give the impression of supporting the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline that would allow Caspian oil to flow to world markets through Turkey. It also supported Turkey's efforts to accede to the WEU and the EU and backed Turkey's efforts to establish links with Europe's security and foreign policy arrangements (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" below). The U.S. never resorted to the tough methods of the Europeans in the area of human rights. The concept of "strategic partnership" that it had rejected in the 1980s was revived in 1992 under the label of "enhanced partnership." The new trend was confirmed in 1999, when Bill Clinton came to Istanbul for the OSCE summit and expressed his strong support for Turkey.

But, above all, the U.S. worked closely with Ankara in this period to suppress the PKK, Turkey's most serious domestic and external problem. In the early 1990s Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sandan Sanda

Washington reversed its previous policy of refusing to deliver Cobra helicopters, thus helping to speed up the military defeat of the PKK. This was at a time when EU countries were loudly protesting the use in southeastern Turkey of armored personnel carriers that had been delivered through the OSCE's system of arms transfers known as "cascading." In the light of the European attitude, the U.S. delivery of Cobra helicopters was all the more noteworthy. It is quite probable that the U.S. was also instrumental in persuading Syria to deny sanctuary to Ocalan in the process that resulted in his expulsion from Syria in October 1998. Had Syria refused to comply with Turkey's demand that Öcalan be expelled, it would have been difficult for Turkey to carry out its threat to resort to force. Again, it was most likely through Washington's action that the Europeans were persuaded to deny Öcalan asylum in Europe, which would have posed the serious risk of internationalizing the PKK issue, which Turkey wanted to avoid. Finally, it was probably the U.S. that traced Öcalan to Kenya and had him delivered to a Turkish aircraft that flew him back to Turkey on 15 February 1999. It would have been very difficult to carry out such a complex operation successfully without the active cooperation of the hegemonic power that had the capability to monitor worldwide telecommunications through the Echelon system.

Why was the U.S. being so helpful to Turkey?

- 1. To control Eurasia, the U.S. needed Turkey. The U.S. was anxious to prevent Russia from reasserting its control over this region and appropriating the region's vast energy resources.
- 2. After the Cold War, the U.S. needed NATO and wanted its mission to continue in order to maintain its position as the hegemonic power. Conflicts in the Eurasian region and violations of human rights in the Balkans made this possible for the U.S. Humanitarian interventions would allow NATO to extend its activities out of area (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" below). This required the cooperation of a strategic medium power like Turkey with an army stronger than itself that was located at a critical geostrategic location and ready to act as a pivotal state.
- 3. To control a major nuisance like Saddam Hussein, it was necessary for the Provide Comfort flights to operate from reliable bases in Turkey. This U.S. intervention in northern Iraq allowed an embryonic Kurdish state to emerge in that region. Any Turkish misgivings over this development were assuaged by the capture of Öcalan.
- 4. In the precarious Middle East Peace Process, Turkey was needed to support Israel. After Öcalan was apprehended, the U.S. gave Turkey the opportunity to resolve

the Kurdish issue and stop worrying about the PKK. By carrying out reforms in this direction, Turkey would gain strength in the Middle East.

5. It was difficult for Ankara to oppose the U.S. unless its vital interests were threatened. Its economy was in a parlous state and completely at the mercy of the IMF, where the U.S. wielded great influence.

As for Turkey, it was grateful to the U.S. at a time when its geostrategic importance had disappeared with the dissolution of the USSR, when the EU was snubbing it, and when its economic woes had pushed it into a corner. Turkey was in no mood to stand up to NATO's extension of its mission out of area. Ankara not only supported the U.S. approach but also gave its backing to all of the international interventions in which Washington took part. In Somalia, the commander of the UN force was a Turkish general. Turkey sent soldiers and aircraft to Bosnia, supported the bombing of Yugoslavia, and contributed soldiers to the multinational force sent to Kosovo. Prior to the intervention in Afghanistan, it opened its airspace and its air bases to the U.S. and sent its forces to Afghanistan in 2002.

# B. The Aftermath of the Disintegration of the USSR and Turkish Foreign Policy

Just as the disintegration of the USSR and of the Eastern Bloc resolved many problems confronting Turkish diplomacy, it also created some new ones. These events called for a thorough restructuring of Turkish foreign policy.

### 1. Fluctuations in Turkey's Importance

Because Turkey's foreign policy was primarily geared to the East-West conflict, its geostrategic importance was bound to undergo fundamental changes with the disintegration of the USSR. While Turkey's importance diminished in one respect, it was also enhanced by new developments.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Turkey no longer had a common border with Russia, the USSR's successor. Russia was absorbed in its domestic problems. Turkey now enjoyed the luxury of sharing the Caucasus with its newly independent neighbors, all of them weak. The same held true for its other borders. As its neighbors grew weaker, Turkey's relative strength increased indirectly.

Against this, the disintegration of the USSR directly reduced Turkey's importance. Europe now had two buffers. Europe saw that it could contain the Yugoslav crisis and deflect its effects eastward and southward. Thanks to America's control of the Middle East, Europe knew that it would face no problems with its oil supplies. It realized

that Turkey was incapable of having a tangible effect on the course of events and tensions in Eurasia. This meant that Europe felt no need to admit Turkey into the WEU or the EU and that its interest in Turkey would remain confined to the customs union. The situation was not all that different from the U.S. perspective. It looked as if the U.S. would not get involved in Russia's affairs as long as Moscow did not encroach on America's global interests.

#### 2. Human Rights and the Kurdish and Armenian Questions

With the collapse of the USSR, the West now reigned supreme in the world. The problem for Turkey was that its regime refused to get rid of the authoritarian effects of the 12 September coup and thus left it exposed to Western pressures. These pressures were in the areas of human rights, the Armenian bills in Western legislatures, and the Kurdish question.

Although the most serious human-rights violations took place during the 12 September period, the Europeans did not press Turkey too hard in the 1980s. Thereafter, the pressure was greatly stepped up for a number of reasons. Turkey was slow in carrying out reforms, the Kurdish and Armenian questions were agitating European public opinion, and the USSR and its bloc had disappeared from the political scene. There was no more need to be indulgent toward Turkey out of a sense of bloc-solidarity. Europe no longer needed Turkey for its security, and questions of human rights became the priority issue in the new era. During this period violations of human rights would become the most serious issue confronting Turkish diplomacy.

The Kurdish question was completely entwined with the issue of human rights violations and became Turkey's main domestic and external problem from the end of the 1980s until about 1994. In the course of the war raging in the southeast, human rights were ignored and villages were forcibly evacuated or burnt. These and similar practices gave rise to growing hostile reactions in Europe, which were fed by the PKK's military successes. Various national legislatures and international bodies adopted resolutions that placed Turkey in an increasingly embarrassing situation. As the number of causalities on both sides increased and reached the figure of 30,000, it became progressively more difficult to describe these events as terrorism. It was also no longer possible for Turkish authorities to satisfy questions on Ankara's methods and proposed solution with the cliché answer: "This is a question of terrorism. Once terrorism is taken care of, the problem will disappear."

Turkey was also suffering from the heavy financial

burden imposed by the conflict. According to various estimates coming from well-placed individuals like cabinet ministers and professional organizations, the cost of the conflict over a period of ten years amounted to \$100 billion, including the cost of military operations, weapons, and preventive measures. The professional organization representing architects and engineers declared that Turkey had spent somewhere around \$60–70 billion for this purpose and produced a long list of projects that could have been carried out with this huge sum (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 November 1998 and 4 July 1999). The deficit of the 1992 budget in the amount of \$4.2 billion had grown to \$9.2 billion a year later.

The ASALA assassinations came to an end in this period, but an equally vexing campaign of Armenian-inspired parliamentary bills began. Turkey's image suffered when a number of provincial elected bodies and national parliaments adopted resolutions declaring that the events of 1915 constituted genocide. In November 2000 the European Parliament also adopted a similar resolution.

These Armenian bills were instigated by the Armenian diaspora. For the diaspora, Turkey's main challenger concerning the horrors of 1915, this was a highly profitable activity with no costs involved. It allowed the diaspora to enhance its political effectiveness in the host country and also enabled its members to preserve their ethnic identities by espousing what was considered to be a national cause. The same held true for the host country. The bills provided many benefits at no cost. By voting for the bills, politicians guaranteed the support of a segment of the electorate while at the same time acquiring a political and even an economic lever that could be used against Turkey. A company seeking a contract in Turkey could enhance its competitive position by working to block the adoption of an Armenian draft bill.

The victims of these resolutions were primarily Turkey but also Armenia. Turkey was frequently forced to engage its diplomats full-time for months in often fruitless attempts to prevent the passage of such bills. Given the number of countries in the world, no sooner was one problem dealt with than another emerged. As for Armenia, it was condemned to economic penury as a land-locked country with few resources that gave priority to hurting Turkey rather than to furthering its interests. The economic hardship helped strengthen the ruling Dashnak Party, which was fueling the anti-Turkish campaign. The prevailing situation was hurting both countries.

One person who realized this was Levon Ter-Petrossian, the politician who assumed power following Armenian independence. At first he followed a tough nationalist policy toward Turkey; but after a sober appraisal of the situation and probably with the prompting of his advisor Gerard Libaridian, he quickly changed tack. He did not allow a reference to genocide to be inserted in the Constitution, banned PKK activities, stopped the operations of the Dashnak Party and had its leadership prosecuted for trafficking in narcotic drugs, and dismissed the anti-Turkish foreign minister, Raffi Hovanissian. Above all, he undertook foreign trips to get the diaspora to end its anti-Turkish rhetoric. But Turkey failed to open its border in response to Ter-Petrossian's overtures because of the efforts of the Islamist and racist Right as well as the influence of Azerbaijan, which was motivated by the occupation of Nagorno Karabakh by Armenia. Although Ankara took rational steps such as providing electric power to Armenia and supplying food aid, it also insisted as a precondition to opening the border that Armenia evacuate Nagorno Karabakh, as if this had been Turkish territory. The Armenian public reacted when Ter-Petrossian's moderate policies eventually failed to achieve results. He was ousted, probably with the involvement of Russia. He was succeeded by Robert Kocharian of the Dashnak Party. From then on, the number of Armenian bills proliferated, causing Turkey many headaches.

The Armenian bills were a major preoccupation for certain state institutions and were hurting Turkey's international image. At a time when the economy was facing difficulties, the bills also damaged Turkey's relations with its creditors. The minister in charge of the economy, Kemal Derviş, had to go to countries with which Turkey was barely on speaking terms to seek loans and direct investments. The bills also harmed Turkey's security. When an American firm refused to deliver the avionics in F-16s that helped identify friends and foes, the contract went to a French firm in 2000 to supply this equipment. This contract was suspended in January 2001, however, because of an Armenian bill in the French parliament (Milliyet, 26 February 2001).

Turkish institutions, including universities, reacted to the bills in highly irrational and emotional ways. When the French parliament acknowledged the Armenian Genocide in January 2001, a university in Ankara eliminated the teaching of the French language from its curriculum (Sabah, 21 January 2001), doing further damage to Turkey's image. Some of the canceled contracts and boycotts initiated against EU countries recognizing genocide led them to threaten Turkey with demands for compensation. TÜSİAD warned the government not to proceed in this direction, while the EU Commission declared that

the measures against France were excessive (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 February 2001). Even the relatively mild reaction against the irrational measures taken in Turkey was an indication that these measures were not taken seriously, a further sign of the country's eroding prestige.

The Armenian question and the boycotts and canceled contracts that ensued from it increased Turkey's dependence on the Jewish lobby and, indirectly, on Israel.

During this period the only rational approach to the question came from the MFA at the end of 2000, when it proposed a three-stage campaign to neutralize the Armenian diaspora: (1) The border trade with Armenia would be encouraged and harbor facilities on the Black Sea and other economic benefits would be provided to alleviate Armenia's economic hardship in order to neutralize the influence of the Dashnak hard-liners. (2) An international or bilateral process would be set in motion to discuss the claims of genocide within an academic framework. (3) The problems of the Armenian minority in Turkey would be addressed (see Box 1-30 in Section 1).

When this proposal was taken up in the cabinet, however, Prime Minister Ecevit inquired about Azerbaijan's possible reaction. The plan was postponed to allow for consultations with Baku (Barçın İnanç, in Milliyet, 10 December 2000). This demonstrated that Turkey's Armenian policy had become a hostage to Baku. Nevertheless, the MFA sought to conduct an indirect dialogue with Armenia through private organizations like TESEV (Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey) (Cumhuriyet, 16 February 2001).

Despite these rational efforts, Turkey continued its previous practices of celebrating the anniversaries of the liberation of towns from Russian/Armenian occupation in World War I by reenacting the confrontation of national militias and Armenian irregulars in mock battles and by erecting a 43-meter monument to the "Victims of Armenian Genocide" at Iğdır in eastern Turkey, which cost 4 trillion TL at 1999 prices (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 December 2000). In other words, Turkey kept on losing precious time and providing cheap ammunition to the Armenian diaspora.

#### 3. The Sevres Syndrome

The disintegration of the USSR brought about radical changes in Turkey's threat perception.

In the years when the Eastern Bloc was coming apart in the first half of the 1990s, the PKK threat reached its peak and the Armenian bills were constantly on the agendas of Western countries. At the same time, political Islam (toward which the West had adopted a relaxed attitude) continued to gather strength in Turkey until it eventually came to power in a coalition with the True Path Party (DYP).

The disappearance of the USSR during these years meant that Turkey had lost a significant part of its value to the West and was acutely aware of this loss. The apprehension was made worse by events taking place in the region. In 1993 Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) proclaimed their Joint Defense Doctrine. In 1995 Greece concluded an agreement with Syria and Russia, while Russia concluded an agreement with Iran. In February 1995 Syria, Iraq, and Iran decided to develop their trade; and in June 1996 Greece reached an understanding with Iran. In 1994 a Kurdish House was set up in the vicinity of Moscow. In 1995 permission was granted for a meeting of the "Kurdish Parliament in Exile" to be held in Russia. Syria and Iraq kept pressing Turkey on the issue of water rights. Concern was growing over the possibility that the U.S. was seeking to set up a Kurdish state in northern Iraq by means of Operation Provide Comfort, which some claimed was assisting the PKK. Demirel referred to it as a "running sore" and a "can of worms" (Oran 1998, pp. 126 and 142).

In this atmosphere, a fear of coming apart that came to be known as the "Sèvres syndrome" took hold in Turkey. Many people in high positions started muttering that the Western allies, in collaboration with Turkey's neighbors, were intent on splitting Turkey by seeking to resuscitate the Treaty of Sèvres. This public concern was reinforced by the news that Middle Eastern countries possessed missiles capable of hitting Ankara, and these fears were duly echoed by the media and the general public. A series of articles appeared in the daily Milliyet from 2 to 4 December 1994. The author of the articles, retired ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, claimed that Turkey was being forced to fight on two and a half fronts: with Greece, with Syria, and with the PKK, which was supposed to represent the lesser front.

At the same time, Turkey presented itself as the country that would bring stability to the region, claimed the title of regional power, resorted to slogans like "the twenty-first century will be the Turkish century," and talked of the "Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China." Turkey also purchased two aerial refueling tanker aircraft to extend the range of its air force. There was a constant stream of delegations and visitors coming from and going to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Özal remarked casually: "What if a bomb was accidentally dropped on Armenia in the course of military ex-

ercises?" (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? res=9FoCE5DB163oF93BA25757CoA96595826o&sec=& spon=&pagewanted=all). It was against this background that the notion that the National Pact (see Section 1) was a constricting vise took hold and the "New Ottomanism" current became fashionable.

Was Turkey really confronted with a plot to bring about its disintegration or was it the loose talk about being a regional power that drew adverse reactions from neighbors? This is a moot question. The truth is that Turkey actually did have the perception that a master plan to bring about its disintegration existed somewhere. It felt itself to be the target of internal forces threatening its regime and external forces threatening its territorial integrity. It was this psychological state that drove Turkey to become seriously close to the U.S. and Israel. In January 1995 Ankara announced that Israel would assist Turkey in modernizing its F-4 fighter aircraft, in combating the PKK, and in shoring up its economy.

To a large extent, Turkey would free itself from this "syndrome" following the capture of Öcalan in February 1999, only to return to it at the end of 2004 with a strong reaction to the EU Harmonization Packages.

#### 4. New Initiatives in Turkish Foreign Policy

With the disintegration of the USSR, new states emerged in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although this situation was a novel experience for Turkey, it played an active part during this process and did not commit serious blunders.

Ankara proceeded with caution in the Balkans to avoid reviving memories of the Ottoman Empire. It refrained from taking unilateral initiatives; sided with the Bosnians, who were universally perceived with sympathy; and participated in joint actions undertaken by the U.S. As a result of this policy Turkey also gained an advantage over Greece in the region.

Ankara followed a more assertive course in the Caucasus and Central Asia. First, it sent exploratory delegations to determine the tendencies of these countries, quickly granted recognition to them, and established official ties. Then came cooperation in the light of their requirements. Turkish Airlines established direct links from Turkey to their capitals. The countries were provided with gifts in the form of digital telephone exchanges, enabling them to establish links with the rest of the world through Turkey. The capacity of the exchange provided to Kazakhstan was 3,500 lines, while the other exchanges had a ca-

pacity of 2,500 lines each. In all, 11,000 scholarships were granted to the Turkic states. They were also provided with loans and other financial assistance.

Turkey's patronizing attitude as the "elder brother" and its inability to deliver on economic commitments, however, led to estrangement. Russia's recovery also had a part in this, but in the main Ankara's approach was causing trouble. Turkey extolled independence (which irritated Russia), secularism (which irritated Iran), democracy (which irritated the leaders of the Turkic Republics, which were all relics of the USSR), and the market economy. Nevertheless, Turkey played a useful role in speeding up the integration of the newly independent states within the international community. To a certain degree, Turkey was able to alleviate its sense of isolation during this period thanks to its relations with the new states. These relations were also providing new economic opportunities.

Initially, these policies gave the impression that Turkey was abandoning its traditional pro-status quo policies. The truth was that a new status quo was coming into being, and Ankara was striving to make sure that its position in the new status quo was not less than before. Aside from Özal's Kirkuk-Mosul initiative, which was thwarted by the military-civilian bureaucracy and the media, Turkey never came close to making territorial claims.

Still, the newly independent states did carry certain risks for Turkey. As a consequence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis policies of the 12 September regime, the racist and religious Right was in the ascendancy. In this environment, the plight of Bosnia allowed the Islamists to exploit the issue to their advantage, just as the Turanian currents took advantage of Azerbaijan under the leadership of Elchibey to further their cause. This went so far that some quarters began to agitate for Turkish military interventions in Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh without regard to the serious consequences that would ensue from such action. A Turanian clique in Turkey sought to engineer a military coup in Azerbaijan to topple the new president, Heydar Aliyev. This plot was foiled through a last-minute intervention. Chechen militants hijacked a ferryboat in the Black Sea carrying mostly Russian passengers. After their trial by a Turkish court, the hijackers got off with light prison terms and later were allowed to flee from prison. Parks and squares in Ankara and Istanbul were named after Dudayev, the slain Chechen guerrilla leader. All of this annoyed and alienated Russia. This situation was made worse when Chechen terrorists raided the Swissotel in Istanbul in 2001 and held a number of tourists as hostages. These militants too were handed down token

sentences, probably due to the euphoria that followed the crushing of the PKK. According to a statement made by minister of state Abdülhaluk Çay and reported in the 24 August 2001 issue of *Cumhuriyet*, Turkey was borrowing from Western banks at 15% interest and lending to the Turkic states at rates ranging from 2.5 to 3%. Frequently, these loans were not repaid; but the damage to Turkish interests was less than the harm that was being done by antagonizing Russia.

#### IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

## A. Conditions in the Early Part of This Period

1. In the early part of the period Turkey was in a very unfavorable situation due to both internal and external factors.

#### The Internal Dynamics of the Period

First, Turkey entered the period suffering from the economic effects of the 12 September coup. The economy started faltering in 1987, and the situation got progressively worse as the country became ever more dependent on foreign aid. Second, the 12 September coup also aggravated the question of human rights and the Kurdish and Armenian questions. A third difficulty was dealing with the risks arising from Özal's opportunism, when he thought Turkey could reap fantastic economic benefits from the new situation in the Middle East. A fourth difficulty resulted from Özal's philosophy. In a speech he declared: "With the current policies we can never achieve major-power status. We will be condemned to remain a small country... Changing the status quo is the most difficult thing to do" (Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1991). With this, he was challenging one of the two pillars of Turkish foreign policy: to preserve the status quo by balancing opposing forces. Özal seemed to be unaware that Turkey was just a medium power and that it had to strive constantly to preserve even this status.

#### The External Dynamics of the Period

First, with the collapse of the USSR, Turkey lost its trump card in foreign policy: its geostrategic position. Second, now it had to face up to the fact that its policy of balance, followed since Ottoman times, could no longer be pursued. Western globalization had triumphed, both politically and economically, and a unipolar world had emerged. Ankara's traditional policy of balance was of no use in a unipolar world.

### Box 7-7. The "Interpretative Declaration" regarding Human Rights

Turkey's internal dynamics are slow in creating momentum for democracy and human rights. This is why it has to resort to external dynamics to speed up the process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs accedes to international conventions, which paves the way for the mandatory provisions of these conventions to be implemented in Turkey. Naturally, this process is far from being smooth, with several difficulties to overcome. Many quarters object to compliance on the grounds of "interference in Turkey's internal affairs."

This is why Turkey usually comes up with a very conservative interpretative declaration at the time when such conventions are signed. Technically such declarations cannot be in the nature of a reservation, which is why they are characterized as interpretative. The declarations are qualified as conservative because they are far from conforming to contemporary standards of human and minority rights.

In general, these interpretative declarations are formulated in the following terms: "Turkey reserves the right to interpret article X of the Y convention according to the Turkish Constitution and the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne dated 24 July 1923."

This sentence means: If the rights contained in the convention we have signed and agreed to concern the rights restricted by the 1982 Constitution or concern our citizens other than non-Muslims, they will not be recognized. The Constitution of 1982 was amended six times up to 2002 and also once in 2004, however, and the only person left who still defends this document is the leader of the 12 September coup and former president, Kenan Evren. Furthermore, the fact that the Treaty of Lausanne considers only non-Muslims to be minorities is irrelevant, because the conventions in question relate to human rights rather than minority rights. Articles 38 to 43 of the Treaty of Lausanne also grant rights to those who are not minorities (see Box 1-31 in Section 1). Finally, Turkey constantly refers to 1923, but in EU parlance any people who consider themselves different from the majority and consider this difference to be an inseparable part of their identity belong to a minority.

It is no longer possible for Turkey to get away with the argument that the only minorities in the country are the non-Muslims. In fact, the interpretative declarations are considered to be null and void in international tribunals. The only thing to do is to emulate France, a country that is very sensitive about the issue of minorities. In recent years, France has extended individual liberties (i.e., democracy) to a maximum extent in order to make it unnecessary for minorities to demand rights as a group:

(B. ORAN) (Oran 2005, p. 49)

2. In the post–Cold War world, a number of conflicts erupted that allowed Turkey to reclaim its geostrategic importance in the eyes of the hegemonic power, the U.S.

# B. The Salient Features of Foreign Policy during the Period

1. The chaos reigning in Turkey was fully reflected in its foreign policy. In the 838 months from April 1920 to February 1990, there had been 28 foreign ministers, with each minister serving for an average of 29.9 months. In the 88 months from February 1990 to June 1997, there were 11 changes of foreign minister, with each minister serving for an average of 8 months. Foreign policy requires specialization and experience, so this is disturbing.

Furthermore, some ministers during this period had no concept of foreign policy. Yet this was the period when—in addition to bilateral questions—the question of a customs union with the EU and the sensitive issue of NATO expansion (problems related to disintegration of the USSR and German reunification) arose. When Tansu Çiller was minister, she was so involved in domestic politics and the arguments over the sources of her personal wealth that she was hardly ever at her desk in the MFA, according to reports of diplomats serving under her.

In this period Turkey accepted international capitalism (the infrastructure imposed upon it by the West)

but put up great resistance to accepting the superstructure that was also being imposed: namely, democracy and human rights. That is why Turkey became economically dependent, while it was being forced into isolation politically, mostly by Europe. It should be considered a success story that foreign policy could be conducted without major damage to the country at a time of utter economic dependency and extreme political isolation. At the very least, it looked like Turkey would have to revise its approach to human rights and conform its practices to contemporary norms (Box 7-7).

3. On the surface, it looked like there had been no serious setbacks in foreign policy. The country had not been placed under serious risk, sovereignty had not been jeopardized, and irreversible concessions had not been made on the principles upon which foreign policy was based. But this impression is misleading for two reasons.

First, these things had not happened because Turkey's course was closely aligned to that of the hegemonic power, the U.S. Turkey's successful initiatives in the quadrangle of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East took place at a time when the U.S. was also closely involved in these regions. The successful policies pursued in Bosnia, the relationship with the former Soviet Republics, cooperation with Israel, closer engagement with the Palestinians, and other such ini-

tiatives can be cited as examples. After the U.S. involvement in these regions waned, Turkey's interest remained confined to the EU and Greece, with which relations had become smoother. When conflict broke out again in the Balkans and in the Middle East in the early years of the new century, there were no initiatives from Turkey. A country that claims to be a medium-sized power should have well-developed policies, even if some of them are on broad lines, in connection with all issues affecting its interests and with respect to all regions. In particular, Turkey should have had a well-defined position on the human rights and Armenian issues, two of the major preoccupations of Turkish foreign policy.

This was a time when the government was so involved with domestic politics that foreign policy planning, even with respect to Cyprus, was being neglected. Furthermore, the planning that the MFA proposed to undertake on other important issues was being blocked. In December 2000, as already stated, the implementation of the ministry's Armenian plan was prevented on the grounds that Azerbaijan had to be consulted. The ministry was also rebuffed when it reminded the judiciary authorities that the verdicts of courts that were not in conformity with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights were forcing Turkey to pay heavy fines. The judiciary considered this to be an interference in the legal process. The reminder from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in fact come when it transmitted the Turkish-translated texts of the decisions of the European Court to the judiciary organs.

Second, there are good reasons why no apparent fiascos occurred in connection with critical issues like Cyprus and the Aegean. The first reason was that the questions of major concern for Turkish foreign policy like Cyprus and the Aegean were no longer being taken up by Greece with its former zeal. With great skill, Simitis had passed this responsibility on to the EU.

The second reason was that the European Summit of Helsinki in 1999 had set up a calendar for dealing with these questions (see "Relations with the EU" and "Relations with Greece" below). Although the calendar did not contain specific dates, the resolution of the questions was postponed to a date that was not too distant.

The third reason was that the West appeared to allow the issues to come under the influence of creeping fatigue and the effects of the economic failures of Turkey. Fatigue was the consequence of the economic bankruptcy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the increasing number of Cypriot Turks who were applying to the

Republic of Cyprus for passports, their growing desire to become integrated with Europe, and other such developments. The connection between the resolution of these questions and Turkey's economic woes was more direct. The West knew that there would be a serious backlash if it pressed Turkey too hard on these issues. If Turkey was left alone, however, its economic woes would drive the country into a corner, and the questions would then be ripe for a solution.

4. As pointed out earlier, Turkey's loss of importance after 1990 was reversed as a consequence of the conflicts that erupted in its vicinity. In these circumstances, as long as Turkey steered a course that was closely aligned to U.S. positions, Ankara's policies would appear to be successful.

But this course posed three grave risks.

First, the U.S. was a hegemonic power and was determined to establish a "law of intervention." This was the essence of the policy of the New World Order. Turkey, however, was a strategic medium power that wisely based its foreign policy on a pro–status quo position that relied on balancing opposing forces. It challenged the status quo on two grounds, as long as they had nothing to do with territorial gain: (1) for defensive reasons, as in the case of the Cyprus intervention of July 1974; and (2) in situations that are in conformity with international law, such as the annexation of Hatay and the interventions that took place in northern Iraq from 1984 to 1988.

NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo was not defensive in purpose, however, and was illegal, lacking the UN Security Council's sanction.

The second risk was that the concept of humanitarian intervention, institutionalized at NATO's Washington Summit of 1999, might become a model for future interventions. In that event, Turkey could not disengage itself from such operations even if it wanted to and its foreign policy would be indexed to U.S. policies. This would carry the risk of turning a strategic medium power into a satellite (see the introductory chapter). This would be extremely harmful for Turkey. As a matter of fact, Turkey has not been able to overcome U.S. objections and open a second customs entry point to Iraq.

The third risk was in the economic field. For an economy that is at the mercy of foreign influences, this risk could not be underestimated. Turkey was more vulnerable to outside events than it was even in the period from 1950 to 1960. Turkey could easily find itself in an awkward situation where it is forced to do things against its will.

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# Relations with the USA and NATO

After the Cold War, relations between Turkey and the U.S. continued to cover a broad range of issues even though the nature of the relations changed somewhat. The major factor that influenced their nature in the 1990s was the developments that took place in the structure of international relations. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and Turkey underwent important changes in the new conditions that followed the ending of the Cold War.

The global changes taking place added new dimensions to the relations of the two countries and transformed these relations in ways that we shall examine later. The essence of these relations was unchanged, however, and their foundations and general direction remained as before for two basic reasons.

- 1. The bonds of alliance between the two countries were based on strategic and political cooperation. In this period Turkey continued to be a close ally of the U.S.
- 2. Another factor that kept relations on a steady course was that the issues of the past remained unchanged in this period. Among these issues were the question of Cyprus, economic and military aid, the U.S. approach to the Kurdish question, developments in northern Iraq, and the Armenian bills.

During this period some new international developments also brought the two countries closer together.

- 1. In the 1990s new fields of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. emerged in Europe and specifically in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in the Middle East. Developments in these regions had a major effect on bilateral relations. As a result, it even became possible for the two countries to cooperate occasionally on contentious issues like Cyprus or the Kurds.
- 2. Another change that occurred in the 1990s was the emergence of the U.S. as the sole superpower. This change had a double effect on Turkey's foreign policy. On the one hand, Turkey sought to attain its foreign policy objectives by engaging in closer cooperation with the power that had emerged as the victor of the Cold War and wanted

to preserve its global hegemony. On the other hand, the U.S. had increased its influence over Turkey's neighbors, including Russia, until Putin came to power. This prevented Turkey from seeking more freedom of maneuver in its foreign policy in the way it had done in the 1960s and 1970s. The initiatives that Turkey took in the Balkans and Central Asia were not alternatives to a foreign policy geared to the U.S. On the contrary, these initiatives were taken with Washington's support and cooperation. In this period Turkey's relations with the EU were extremely strained because of Ankara's unyielding position in the fields of democratization and human rights. This meant that Turkey had forfeited its room for maneuver vis-à-vis the U.S., which had a decisive effect on bilateral relations.

3. Globally the U.S. stand on the issues of human rights and democratization had shifted since the 1980s. Now the U.S. began to place a higher priority on these issues, and this was affecting Turkish-U.S. relations.

As a result, despite the frequent changes of government during this period and even when the Welfare Party made feeble attempts to make changes, relations with the U.S. followed a steady course. It can be said that the course of bilateral relations was set by international and regional developments rather than by the political leadership in Ankara.

Before examining bilateral relations, we shall look at the main features of U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War.

- I. MAIN FEATURES OF U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST—COLD WAR ERA
- A. International Developments and Economic Revival

After the Republican tenure in power in the 1980s, the Democrats took over the U.S. administration in the 1990s. At the end of Reagan's second term in 1988, he was

succeeded by his vice-president, George Bush. Bush's term coincided with the transition caused by the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Gulf War. As a consequence, the Bush administration was forced to concentrate on foreign policy issues.

Bill Clinton took office in January 1993 and was reelected for a second term in 1996. During his administration the priority issue was the economy. To maintain its global hegemony, the U.S. had to reinvigorate its economy (see Box Intro-3 in the Introduction). The first thing to do was to tackle the budget deficit that appeared during the Reagan administration and got worse during the Bush administration. A new economic program was launched in 1993 to deal with this problem. The budget deficit amounting to 4.9% of GNP fell to 2.4% in 1995. While the growth of the GNP averaged 2.7% from 1991 to 1995, it averaged 4.3% from 1996 to 1999. By the end of the 1990s the U.S. budget had a healthy surplus, and ways were being sought to cool the economy.

The monetary policy being pursued attempted to raise productivity and curb inflation. The economic program also contained a "strategic trade policy" designed to devise a new strategy to boost exports. In this context, a set of principles was developed in cooperation with business interests in order to increase export possibilities. The new policies were implemented up to the mid-1990s and were based on the premise that, in the absence of the Eastern Bloc, gaining market share was more important than gaining territories. The aim was to use this strategic trade policy to keep former allies and other countries under U.S. control. In this framework, the U.S. concluded over 200 trade agreements. The target was to raise U.S. exports to \$1.2 trillion by the year 2000. This would create 16 million extra jobs in the U.S. As a matter of fact, U.S. exports reached the trillion-dollar level at the end of the period, which meant that the share of foreign trade in the U.S. economy rose from 24% in the 1980s to 30% in the 1990s.

During the Cold War, the U.S. had taken the leadership of the West in the struggle against the Eastern Bloc. It had assumed a heavy burden of defense spending and established bases in many strategic regions of the globe. In a way, the U.S. was now seeking to make up for the economic losses it had incurred in the process of winning the Cold War.

After the mid-1990s the economic objectives had been largely attained, but regional instability continued to reign in places like the Balkans. This led the U.S. to revert to a geostrategic approach and reassertion of its political and military leadership even while it continued its policies that stressed the economic dimension (Box 7-8). As we shall see later, this new approach would affect Turkey's place and importance for the U.S.

# B. The Search for a New Strategy

A major debate was going on among American scholars, strategists, and politicians over the sort of foreign policy that the U.S. should follow in the new international environment of the 1990s. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. saw itself as the sole superpower and wanted to make sure that all others agreed.

America's self-confidence soared when the Eastern Bloc disintegrated in the 1990s and the West emerged victorious under U.S. leadership. In the 1970s and early 1980s books were being written like the one by Paul Kennedy entitled The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), which argued that the U.S. had entered a period of decline. Now the emphasis was on U.S. supremacy as the sole global power. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama declared in The End of History that liberalism had established its undisputed superiority over other ideologies. In his article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations," which appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1993, Samuel Huntington gave expression to the need to find a common enemy to preserve the cohesion of the West. Huntington maintained that henceforth conflicts would be between civilizations, based on religion and culture. In The Grand Chessboard (1997) Zbigniew Brzezinski described the strategic foundation upon which U.S. supremacy would rest. In his book Diplomacy (published in 1994) Henry Kissinger analyzed the search for a global balance of power in the post-Cold War era.

These works shared three things in common. All of the authors either came from the U.S. administrations or were in close contact with them. They all claimed that the U.S. was the sole superpower and henceforth global developments would be given direction by Washington. Finally, they all implied (and Huntington said so explicitly) that without U.S. leadership the world would be plunged into chaos.

At the end of the Cold War, the possible courses for U.S. foreign policy were classified under the following headings: (1) neo-isolationism, (2) primacy, (3) cooperative security, and (4) selective engagement.

In this period the approach that drew the most heated debate was whether the U.S. should abandon its international engagements and concentrate on its domestic problems. This approach was known as neo-isolationism or America First. It was based on the argument that the struggle against communism had been won and so, having completed its mission, the U.S. could now turn to domes-

#### Box 7-8. The Changing U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

The geopolitical and geoeconomic approaches have always been present in the foreign policy strategies of the U.S.

The U.S. went into action even before the end of World War II to ensure peace under its hegemony. In 1944 it set up the IMF, the World Bank, and the Exim Bank. In 1947 it was instrumental in the establishment of GATT, which sought to liberalize international trade. In 1948 the U.S. helped restore the capitalist system in Europe through the Marshall Plan, while it cultivated capitalism and democracy in Japan and Germany, turning these former totalitarian countries into peaceable societies.

The tug-of-war between the USSR and the USA after 1945 led directly to the Cold War. The Cold War in turn led to the establishment of blocs, pushing geoeconomics into the background. As a result, geopolitical policies became dominant. In accordance with the logic of geopolitics, the U.S. encircled the USSR with air fields, bases, and listening posts. Both sides established military alliances, developed weapons of mass destruction, and pressed their respective allies to build up their armed forces. The conflicts that they supported in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa resulted in thousands of deaths.

When it became apparent in the mid-1980s that the USSR would collapse, there was a letup in the pursuit of geopolitical policies. In 1991 geoeconomic policies were reinstated; and new strategies developed. In the knowledge that it would be unchallenged militarily until 2020, the U.S. started dismantling many of the bases surrounding the Russian Federation. The new strategy was

to establish a network of democratic countries bound together by the market economy. Democratic countries with interdependent economies trading with one another would not go to war. The, "New World Order" would be built upon the "commercial state" (see Box Intro-13 in the Introduction).

The establishment of economic organizations like the EU, the development of the Pacific market under Japan's leadership, and the creation of NAFTA all facilitated the attainment of U.S. objectives. Regional disputes and conflicts would henceforth be resolved by regional powers supported by the U.S. The era of ideological conflicts was over. The new system was described by scholars like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.

The new U.S. strategy based on geoeconomics and operating within the New World Order was not able to achieve peace, however. The liberalization movement led to the emergence of ethnic conflicts. Developing countries came into possession of weapons of mass destruction. Islamist movements in Muslim countries became involved in terrorism. As free trade expanded, transnational organized crime developed in step. Regional economic groupings acquired a tendency to turn inward and protect themselves with high-tariff walls. China took its place in the international scene as a future great military and economic power. In the face of these developments, the U.S. is reverting to geopolitical strategies:

(H. Köni)

tic issues. This approach became meaningless, however, when the U.S. found itself involved in the Gulf War.

The approach known as primacy argued that to preserve international security the U.S. must maintain its primacy in the global system. The U.S. must be the sole superpower; but, at the same time, the world must be able to perceive the U.S. as a benign power. Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington described this as soft power. In other words, the position of superpower had to be preserved not by overriding the opposition of other countries, but with their active support. In this way, they could be prevented from ganging up against the U.S.

Cooperative security called for the U.S. to share international responsibility with its allies and make use of organizations like the UN, NATO, and OSCE and others that might have to be created.

Selective engagement called for the U.S. to be concerned only with those countries and regions that might threaten the U.S. or with countries and regions in which a conflict breaking out might directly affect the U.S. In the first category were Russia, Europe, Japan, and China. The advocates of this policy would include the Balkans and the Middle East among the regions to be selected because of the possibility of the conflicts in these regions spreading and because of their strategic importance.

A study of the statements of high-level U.S. officials

and the publications of the State Department and the White House and the observation of U.S. policies over the decade reveals that the U.S. resorted to all of the abovementioned approaches except for isolationism.

In 1993 an approach began to be developed that took concrete form in 1995 when it was published as a security document under the title "Engagement and Expansion: National Security Strategy." This showed that the debates over different approaches had been formalized into foreign policy principles.

The principle of expansion was a substitute for the former concept of containment and included economic factors like free trade and investment possibilities and political factors like the spread of democracy and human rights. These policies were pursued especially in the former socialist countries. This approach was also known as the New Wilsonism. As democratization spread and human rights became entrenched, stability would be reinforced and the countries benefiting from this trend would become peace loving. According to this approach, the U.S. should strive for open markets and open societies everywhere.

As for engagement, it had a connotation of selectivity. The U.S. did not want to be the world's sheriff. According to the Presidential Decision Directive issued in May 1994 (known as PDD-25), the U.S. would intervene in two

specific instances: (1) in a situation that directly threatened its interests, the U.S. would intervene unilaterally; (2) if the interests of allies were also affected, intervention would be carried out with their participation. In the latter case, the operation would be under U.S. command, the operation's chances of succeeding had to be rated high, and there had to be an exit strategy. The third guideline assumed that the problem that caused the intervention would have been solved prior to the exit. In May 1997 the Pentagon confirmed the strategy elaborated earlier and added new elements such as early response to crises, establishing a favorable strategic environment for the U.S., and increased preparedness to deal with future threats.

In all its interventions during the period—the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, northern Iraq, and Kosovo—the U.S. acted within the concept of collective security and cooperated with its allies. But in the final analysis the U.S. led the forces that were involved and determined the timing, the strategy, and the weapons to be employed.

The U.S. operated on the basis of two concepts in the context of its regional policies: major regional contingency and minor regional contingency. The aim of the strategy was to have the capacity to deal simultaneously with two contingencies. This was designed to thwart those who might want to profit from U.S. involvement in a contingency by engaging in an anti-U.S. military operation. Examples of minor regional contingencies were northern Iraq and Bosnia. At the end of the 1990s Kosovo was added to this list.

In this decade the U.S. policy was to establish its primacy in international affairs and create an environment that would serve its interests. U.S. strategic documents stated that Washington wanted to see no rivals, either global or regional. This was demonstrated in the way in which the U.S. dealt with the EU, Japan, China, and India.

### The U.S. and the EU

For the U.S., Europe held a special place. The U.S. shared the same religion and culture with Europe, upheld the same political and social values, and, in the course of the twentieth century, fought twice on European soil. In the Cold War, it was vitally important for the U.S. that Western Europe remain strong in the face of the Eastern Bloc.

After the Cold War, Europe had a central place in the U.S. policy of expansion and engagement. For the U.S., Europe was a bridgehead to Eurasia. The U.S. was eager to keep Russia in the Western system and thereby prevent it from forming an alliance with China or India. Consequently, the U.S. encouraged Russia to set up close links with Europe.

In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. went about

reinforcing its ties to Europe within an institutional and conceptual framework. Starting in January 1994, U.S. and EC officials began to work on a new concept of Atlantic cooperation. As a result of this effort, Clinton and the president of the European Commission signed an agreement in Madrid in December 1995 by which they set up a New Transatlantic Agenda. This new construction, also called the New Atlantic Community, had the dual aim of developing trade relations and engaging in political cooperation.

A noteworthy aspect of U.S.-EU relations was the U.S. support for the process of deepening and enlarging the EU. The U.S. saw an economically developed and stable Europe as essential for its security and prosperity. The U.S. was uncomfortable, however, over the European efforts to act as a distinct economic and political entity. Washington certainly did not relish seeing Europe as its rival. Consequently, it used the institutional, political, and economic means at its disposal to check Europe. The most important tool the U.S. had for this purpose was the NATO alliance and the U.S. force of around 100,000 troops stationed in Europe within the framework of the alliance. These developments are examined in greater detail under the heading "The Emergence of the New Defense Identity in Europe: The WEU, the CDSP, and Turkey" below.

# The U.S., Japan, and the Far East

In the 1990s the U.S. displayed growing interest in the Asia-Pacific region and Japan, the world's most dynamic economic region. As in the case of Europe, the U.S. developed the concept of the New Pacific Community in 1993, designed to promote cooperation in the fields of economic relations, democracy, and the defense of human rights with the countries of the region. Another goal was to expand exports to the area and boost investments. The vehicle for carrying out these objectives was the strengthening of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November 1993. Unlike the European integration, the U.S. was a founding member of this new economic structure along with Canada and Mexico. This allowed the U.S. to steer the institution along a path of its choosing.

Whereas the U.S. saw Europe as a potential political rival, it viewed Japan as an economic rival and forced it to open up its market by removing barriers to trade. This allowed U.S. products, including automotive products and communication equipment, to gain easier access to the Japanese market.

Another difference from the U.S. approach to Europe was that there was no alliance similar to NATO in the Far East. As in the case of Europe, however, 100,000 U.S.

troops were stationed in the region, concentrated mostly in South Korea and the Philippines.

### Defense Spending and Disarmament

A sign that the U.S. was intent in preserving its global primacy was the high level of its defense spending during the 1990s. True, there was a reduction from the level of spending attained during the Cold War, when spending fluctuated between \$270 and \$300 billion in this period. Nevertheless, U.S. military spending in 1994 corresponded to the defense spending of Russia, China, Japan, France, and Germany combined. Some even claimed that the strategy of having the capability to conduct war simultaneously on two fronts was designed to justify high levels of military spending.

In short, the U.S. did not want to see others (especially Germany and Japan) enjoying strategic independence and took the necessary economic, political, and military steps to ensure its unrivaled supremacy. The U.S. wanted no competition and maintained its hegemony by engaging in cooperation with its potential rivals. Looking at the overall picture, the U.S. held control over Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia through economic and military ties, while it retained its influence in the Far East through its membership in APEC. By securing China's accession to the World Trade Organization, the U.S. was able to gain considerable influence over an important actor on the international scene. When the longstanding influence wielded by the U.S. over Latin America (now reinforced by NAFTA) is added to all of this, the extent of the U.S. global hegemony becomes more apparent. The U.S. wanted to prove its leadership to the EU and to Japan and China by intervening first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, by taking part in the negotiations in Northern Ireland, by getting involved in Cyprus and Turkish-Greek problems, by seeking to overcome differences between the two Koreas and China and Taiwan, and by conducting the peace process in the Middle East.

Located in the Europe/Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus/Central Asia triangle, Turkey was well placed and ready to engage in close cooperation with the U.S. in all three regions. As such, it became one of the principal U.S. allies in the 1990s.

# II. THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONS A. Turkey's Place in the

Global Strategy of the U.S.

At the end of the 1980s Turkey was considered by the U.S. and other Western states to be a country that had lost much of its strategic value. But, with Iraq's invasion of Ku-

wait in August 1990 and the coup in the USSR in August 1991 leading to its disintegration in December, Turkey's strategic importance was restored. As we shall see later, the brief interlude between the loss of strategic value and its restoration would cause considerable anguish among Turkey's leadership.

From 1991 on, Turkey's place in the global strategy of the U.S. would improve steadily, because Washington needed Turkey to establish a firm grip on Eurasia.

An array of experts (including Graham Fuller, Ian Lesser, and Paul Henze, who were all close to the U.S. administration) kept affirming that Turkey must assume new roles in the broad swath of territory stretching from Yugoslavia to western China. In a report authored by these pundits and issued by the Rand Corporation in 1993 entitled Turkey's New Geo-Politics, Turkey was asked to assume an active role in the Balkans under its Muslim identity and in the Caucasus and Central Asia under its Turkish identity. Turkey could act as a political, economic, and strategic bridge in these regions. But this would not come about automatically. Ankara had to display the necessary will and actively pursue this objective. Henze went even further: he suggested that Turkey should redefine the concept of Ottomanism to enhance its effectiveness and coined the term "Neo-Ottomanism." This approach would find ready adherents in Turkey among right-of-center circles and even among some former leftist journalists. These adherents were particularly interested in an increased role for Turkey in the Balkans and northern Iraq.

The American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski saw Eurasia as the prize for the victory in the Cold War and saw Turkey as a key player in this region. He described Turkey as a geopolitical pivot: a country that ensured stability in the Black Sea region, controlled the access to the Mediterranean, checked Russia in the Caucasus, acted as an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism, and served as the southern anchor of NATO. Turkey's new role in the region from Europe to China was reaffirmed throughout the 1990s, not just by pundits and experts but also by the U.S. administration.

In this period the U.S. attributed greater importance to Turkey's democratization and its record on human rights. This was a change from the relaxed U.S. approach of the early 1980s. This was mainly because, after the collapse of socialism, democratization became one of the main pillars of ever-growing globalization. Another reason was that the U.S. wanted Turkey to be a model for the former socialist lands in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. For this reason, Washington supported the preservation of secularism in Turkey. At the same time, when

the possibility of a coup against the Refahyol coalition emerged in 1996–97, the U.S. opposed this development as contrary to democratic practice.

Turkey's role as a model was not confined to the political realm. It also served as a role model in the economic sphere. Having completed its liberal economic reforms in the 1980s, Turkey approached the former socialist countries in the 1990s as a country experienced in the field that enjoyed U.S. backing.

# B. From Alliance to Enhanced (Strategic) Partnership

Turkey had built up its relations with the U.S. and the West in general during the years of the Cold War by relying primarily on its strategic importance. When changes occurred in the global scene after 1989, Turkey briefly lost this strategic importance, causing anxiety among its decision-makers.

Certain developments occurring during this period compounded the fears of the Turkish leadership. One reason for concern was the EU's rejection in December 1989 of the Turkish application for membership made in April 1987. In the course of his visit to Washington in January 1990, President Özal proposed that the U.S. and Turkey conclude a free trade agreement. The U.S. failed to respond to Özal's proposal and also announced that it intended to close some of its bases in Turkey and started reducing the number of its military personnel. Even though the U.S. was also closing bases elsewhere (such as in the Philippines and Greece), citing budgetary reasons, the U.S. action worsened Turkish anxieties. In the preamble of the DECA signed with Greece in July 1990, the U.S. had agreed to insert a phrase that guaranteed Greece's territorial integrity. The U.S. also turned down Ozal's proposal, made during his visit to Washington in March 1991 right after the Gulf War, to engage in "strategic cooperation" (http://www.hurriyetusa.com/haber/haber detay.asp? id=5757). His request for aid in the amount of \$1 billion to compensate Turkey for the losses it had suffered during the Gulf War was also turned down by Washington.

After the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991 and the emergence of the new republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, however, the U.S. itself proposed a new version of the cooperation it had rejected a year earlier. In the course of Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Washington in February 1992, the U.S. came up with the concept of "enhanced partnership." The U.S. announced that it regarded Turkey as a "partner" and also a "model" for the newly independent republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

During this period U.S. policy toward Turkey was framed by secretary of state James Baker during President Bush's term and assistant secretary of state for European affairs Richard Holbrooke during President Clinton's term. Holbrooke held the view that Turkey was now a frontline state, somewhat like the position held by Germany during the Cold War. This meant that Turkey was an actor in all issues relating to NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and energy corridors. Holbrooke would be succeeded in Washington by Marc Grossman, former U.S. ambassador in Ankara, who would pursue the same policy with the full backing of the administration and the Pentagon.

Turkish-American bilateral relations continued to develop well during the 1990s and had reached a pinnacle by the end of the decade. Over time, the "enhanced partnership" of 1992 acquired new content. When prime minister Mesut Yılmaz visited Washington in 1997, bilateral relations were taken up under five headings: regional cooperation, economy and trade, energy issues, Cyprus, and defense and security cooperation. In 1999 a number of high-level visits took place that further reinforced relations. In April 1999 President Demirel went to Washington for the NATO Summit. This was followed by Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Washington at Clinton's invitation. This time, the relationship was described as "strategic partnership." This relationship was confirmed during Clinton's visit to Turkey in November 1999 on the occasion of the OSCE summit.

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In the course of the 1990s this "enhanced (strategic) partnership" was a constant feature of relations despite the frequently changing governments in Ankara. If anything, the relationship got stronger because it was proving mutually beneficial. For the U.S., Turkey was a country whose cooperation could be counted on in sensitive regions. For Turkey, the U.S. was a superpower whose support could be relied on in those regions. Close cooperation on regional matters was of utmost importance for both countries.

# III. AREAS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE U.S. AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. included the issues where the two countries shared the same views, provided one another with political support, and, in certain cases, acted in unison. It must not be assumed that the two countries were always in identical positions. On many regional questions Turkey acted in partnership with

#### Box 7-9. The Gulf War

Although the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is associated with Saddam Hussein's policies, the history of the problem goes back to July 1961, when Iraq announced its annexation of Kuwait but was soon forced to retract it:

After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Saddam claimed that Kuwait had stolen Iraq's oil by drilling into Iraqi territory. Baghdad also claimed that Kuwait had deliberately boosted oil output to depress the price of oil and inflict economic damage on Iraq. Baghdad asked its neighbor to write off Iraq's debts, ranging from \$50 billion to \$80 billion. When the negotiations on debt forgiveness got stalled, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and declared Kuwait to be Iraq's nineteenth province on 28 August.

Iraq failed to comply with the UN Security Council resolution calling on it to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. This noncompliance unleashed the U.S. led allied bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. After an aerial bombing campaign lasting a month, the land offensive Operation Desert Storm was launched on 24 February. Within 100 hours, the Iraql forces were put out of action by the allied forces, consisting of the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and others.

It was subsequently claimed that the U.S. had deliberately given Saddam the green light to invade Kuwait. The American ambassador told Saddam on 28 July 1990 that the U.S. would not get involved in inter-Arab disputes. Her departure from Baghdad

two days later and the fact that no protest was made despite the massing of Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti border were considered to be proof of complicity.

The gains that U.S. derived from this war can be cited as follows: by moving half a million soldiers to the Middle East and inflicting a crushing defeat on Iraq, the U.S. proved that it was the undisputed leader of the world and thereby overcame its Vietnam syndrome. The cost of the war was borne mostly by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, and Japan. The U.S. was able to get rid of a large part of its arms and ammunition that had either become obsolete or been made redundant by disarmament agreements. It was also able to try out and perfect many new weapons systems under real combat conditions. By not removing Saddam from power, the U.S. forced the conservative Gulf States to procure large amounts of American weapons. Finally, the U.S. caused the partitioning of Iraq into three distinct regions and imposed an embargo that seriously weakened Baghdad, allowing Washington to determine the flow of oil from Iraq and therefore its world price. It was during this war that U.S. president George Bush proclaimed the "New World Order

Israel was relieved as a result of Irag's defeat, while the Palestine Liberation Organization faced great difficulties. After this, the U.S. would accelerate the Middle East Peace Process.

(İ. Uzgel)

the U.S., offered the means at its disposal, and engaged in active cooperation because it had no other alternative. Northern Iraq and Operation Provide Comfort were examples of Turkish cooperation that was only half-hearted. There were also issues like the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton, however, where the two sides' positions were identical and cooperation came naturally.

#### A. Turkey, the U.S., and the Middle East

In the post—Cold War era, U.S. policy in the Middle East pursued the following goals: maintaining control over oil resources and ensuring the uninterrupted supply of oil products to global markets; ensuring the survival of Israel; curbing the influence of radical Islam; containing Iran and Iraq; and preventing regional countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

After the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. became the undisputed power in the region. With Russia preoccupied with domestic problems, the only power that challenged U.S. hegemony in the region was the EU, led by France and Germany. But this challenge was hardly adequate. The Gulf States were grateful to the U.S. for removing the threat that Iraq posed. The Palestinians were in difficulties for having supported Iraq during the war and chose the route of reconciliation with Israel. Iraq was not only

defeated but also lost control over an important part of its territory. The U.S. was pursuing the policy of "dual containment" in regard to Iran and Iraq. After having entered the Middle Eastern scene in the late 1940s, the U.S. was at the zenith of its power in the region and relied extensively on Turkish cooperation to attain this position.

# 1. The First Steps in Cooperation after the Cold War: The Gulf War

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussein on 2 August 1990 came as a shock to the world (Box 7-9). Turgut Özal was president in Turkey at that time, and his prime minister was Yıldırım Akbulut. During that period Özal took direct control of foreign policy and often bypassed the MFA, the parliament, the armed forces, and even the government. With his so-called telephone diplomacy he tried to convey the impression that he exercised influence over President Bush's policy decisions. Özal sought to prove that Turkey was a strategically important country by conducting an active foreign policy. With such a policy, Turkey expected to extract trade and economic benefits from the U.S., accelerate its accession to the EU, gain economic advantages in the Gulf States, and become a major player in the restructuring of the Middle East following the war. Özal likened this policy to the gambler who obtained high winnings from a small bid.

Özal was to come under harsh criticism for exceeding his constitutional powers. There were also claims that he had certain high-risk plans regarding Mosul and Kirkuk (examined below).

After President Bush's telephone call to Özal, the Turkish government complied with the Security Council's embargo resolution of 6 August and shut off the flow of Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline on 8 August. It also stopped all trade with Iraq. These were significant moves for Washington at a time when the U.S. was eagerly seeking allies and Saudi Arabia was vacillating, not wanting to be the first to shut off an Iraqi pipeline.

During this crisis the U.S. sought Turkey's help in three areas. One was to allow the bases on Turkish soil to be used to conduct operations against Iraq. Turkey was also asked to deploy forces to its border with Iraq to force that country to redeploy some of its troops in the southern front to the north. Turkey was also asked to contribute troops to the allied force massing in Saudi Arabia (Abramowitz, p. 5). Turkey agreed to the first two requests. Although Özal was ready to comply with the third request, he deferred to the armed forces, which were against contributing troops.

Turkey deployed 180,000 men from the Second Army to the Iraqi border, forcing Saddam to maintain eight divisions in the north and thereby relieving the allied forces engaged in operation Desert Storm.

Turkey's main contribution to the American war effort was to allow the U.S. to use air bases located on its soil. On 17 January 1991 the TGNA adopted resolution 126, and the next day U.S. combat aircraft arrived at İncirlik to start operations against Iraq. During the campaign, allied aircraft were either taking off from İncirlik to bomb Iraq or landing at İncirlik after taking off from bases or aircraft carriers located in the Indian Ocean and completing their missions over Iraq. This information was withheld from the Turkish public, which was told that the aircraft were engaged in training missions.

# The Significance of the Gulf War for Turkish Foreign Policy

The Gulf War had certain features that made it particularly significant for Turkish foreign policy.

- 1. Turkish foreign policy had always rested on the assumption that a pro-status quo course would be maintained so long as Turkey's vital interests were not threatened. Özal's desire to open a second front in northern Iraq was the most serious departure from the traditional foreign policy line (Box 7-10).
- 2. During this war there was a serious crisis in the decision-making process. At a time when developments

affecting Turkey's security and foreign policy were occurring next door, minister of foreign affairs Ali Bozer resigned on 11 October 1990, minister of defense Safa Giray resigned on 18 October 1990, and chief of the General Staff Necip Torumtay resigned on 3 December 1990. These resignations were a protest against Özal's policies.

3. Torumtay's resignation was significant from the perspective of relations between the army and the civilians. It became obvious that the bureaucracy that was in charge of implementing policy was in a position to obstruct decisions made behind its back. By his resignation, General Torumtay not only blocked the policies he disapproved of but also acted in conformity with the best democratic practices. Because the army's comportment had the support of democratic circles in the country, the legitimacy of the part that the military played in the conduct of domestic and external policy was reinforced. Torumtay's resignation created a paradoxical situation: a civilian opted for war while the soldier took a stand against this course.

- 4. Özal's stand was also criticized by the opposition and the public. The press criticized both his style of conducting foreign policy and the foreign policy itself. Analogies were made between the way in which the Ottoman Empire was dragged into World War I and the use of İncirlik by the U.S. Air Force, which might cause Turkey to get involved in the conflict.
- 5. It was presumed by many that Özal was being manipulated by the U.S.

# b. The Gulf War and Its Consequences for Turkey Turkey suffered from the Gulf War both politically and economically.

Özal had expectations of high levels of economic aid both from the U.S. and from the Gulf States. When he went to Washington in September 1990, he called for the lifting of quotas on Turkish textiles, the modernization of the armed forces, and the alleviation of Turkey's debt burden. Bush responded to these pleas by securing \$82 million in emergency aid in January 1991. In addition, the U.S. provided supplementary assistance in the amount of \$282 million in 1991. There were increases in military aid amounting to \$150 million in 1991 and \$200 million in 1992. Aside from this, a Turkish Defense Fund in the amount of \$4.2 billion was set up, with the participation of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the U.S. All of these contributors honored their commitments except the United Arab Emirates, which paid only \$150 million out of the \$500 million pledged by its leader, Sheikh Zayed. Just before the Second Gulf War the UAE agreed to honor its commitment and pay the remaining

#### Box 7-10. Özal's Mosul-Kirkuk Project during the Gulf War

During the Gulf War, President Özal not only engaged in active diplomacy but also gave the impression that he had certain plans with respect to Mosul and Kirkuk, the off-producing regions in northern Irag. Özal defended his active approach and openly advocated military intervention. People close to him kept speaking about plans with respect to Mosul and Kirkuk. All of this led many to believe that he harbored plans to invade this region. The suspicions were reinforced by Özal's actions. He wanted to be the sole policy-maker in Ankara with respect to the Gulf conflict. He had a private conversation with the U.S. secretary of state when he visited Ankara in early August. During Özal's visit to Washington in November, he did not allow his foreign minister to be present at his meeting with President Bush, even though the American secretary of state attended the meeting. He was eager to get a parliamentary resolution allowing troops to be sent out of the country. The sudden resignation of the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Necip Torumtay, only reinforced these suspicions. Ozal had asked Torumtay to prepare the army for cross-border operations, stressing that Mosul and Kirkuk came within the limits drawn in the National Pact in 1920. He wanted to find a practical and dynamic solution to this question.

In his memoirs (published subsequently), Torumtay expressed the opinion that an operation in Iraq was technically feasible, but he had certain misgivings. (1) He wanted written, explicit orders from the government (Ozal had sent the order verbally through the undersecretary of the prime minister's office without an official document signed by cabinet members). (2) The purposes and objectives of an operation such as the one Ozal was proposing were not clearly spelled out. It would be easy to capture northern Iraq, but it would be very difficult to hold onto this region. (3) Even if the invasion was confined to northern Iraq, the Kurdish question would emerge in the region at a time when Turkey was faced with serious difficulties in the struggle against the PKK within its own borders. (4) To mount such an operation, troops would have to

be deployed from Thrace and eastern Turkey, giving rise to defense weaknesses in these regions and perhaps even in Cyprus (Torumtay, pp. 108–18). In the end, Torumtay did not comply with Özal's personal request to prepare the army for the operation and tendered his resignation in December 1990. It was significant that a soldier had opposed the policy of using force proposed by a civilian and resigned:

Ozal held the belief that Saddam would be toppled and that the map of the Middle East would be redrawn: If Turkey acted energetically, it would be able to get a larger share of the spoils. This pointed directly at Mosul and Kirkuk. At that time, Ozal declared that the question of a federation should be debated in Turkey to solve the Kurdish problem and that the Turkish army would enter train in the event of an Iraqi attack on Turkey or a joint Iranian-Syrian invasion of Iraq. He added that he had discussed these issues with President Bush and obtained his backing. This was a time when people in Ozal's entourage talked of Turkey facing the alternatives of either contracting or expanding. If such a plan was seriously considered, it was not carried out mainly because of opposition from the General Staff and the combined resistance of the opposition parties and public opinion.

Others argued, however, that Özal never contemplated making a bid to grab Mosul and Kirkuk and that all he wanted was to take an active part in the allied military operation. Those who held this view claimed that he deliberately gave this impression to boost his public popularity. In other words, "Özal was playing to his domestic audience. It was also pointed out that the U.51 and other Western countries would not want to see an oil rich region like Mosul-Kirkuk under the control of a powerful state like Turkey. The Western powers might even have given the appearance of endorsing Özal's putative Mosul-Kirkuk plans in order to keep Turkey firmly aligned with the West (Erkaya and Baytok, p. 92).

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\$350 million. But the U.S. was unhappy with the decision of the TGNA on 1 March 1 2003 and probably advised the UAE not to make the payment, and the UAE complied.

Finally, an Egyptian order for Turkish-built F-16 aircraft was secured. Part of the Turkish Defense Fund was used to finance the second phase of F-16 purchases for Turkey, thus bringing more orders for U.S. suppliers.

The embargo that was imposed on Iraq after the war caused Turkey economic losses amounting to \$100 billion over ten years, according to an article appearing in Milliyet on 14 March 2000. The author of the article based his calculations on data supplied by the Turkish Treasury. Compared to these huge losses, the aid provided was insignificant. Although Turkey often referred to its losses because of Iraq in its dealings with the U.S., nothing was done to compensate these losses. Turkey's losses consisted of loss of income from the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, large-scale disruption of bilateral trade as well as the border trade and the unemployment that this caused in the southeastern region, Iraq's nonpayment of its debts to Turkey,

and the construction projects that were never carried out in Iraq, representing huge potential losses for Turkish contractors.

Turkey sought to invoke article 50 of the UN Charter, which makes provisions for compensating the losses incurred by members due to sanctions, but could not persuade the U.S. to support its stand. And yet Amman was able to use article 50 to compensate its losses caused by the embargo even though it had stood close to Iraq during the crisis in a bid to appease the Palestinian component of Jordan's population.

Turkey was also affected politically, because the economic difficulties in the southeastern region aggravated the Kurdish question. The PKK profited greatly from the widespread unemployment in the region. It also took advantage of the power vacuum in northern Iraq to carry out operations against Turkey from there. It was able to obtain large amounts of arms and ammunition from the defeated Iraqi military for rock-bottom prices. Finally, the Kurds of northern Iraq who fled from Saddam after 1991 increased

the level of awareness of the Kurds in Turkey, making the Kurdish problem more intractable.

Turkey's contributions to the waging of the Gulf War also failed to yield tangible benefits in relations with the EU.

Contrary to Özal's expectations, Turkey was not invited to the meeting in Madrid that initiated the Middle East Peace Process after the Gulf War. It was represented at a low level in some of the working groups established subsequently. Nor was Turkey offered the opportunities expected in connection with the postwar reconstruction of Kuwait. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia even forgot to include Turkey among the countries that helped them in their offi-

cial statements of appreciation after the end of hostilities.


Turkey's most important gain was that Iraq's military might was broken without the need for Turkey to resort to arms. Ankara had been upset when Iraq got the support of fellow Arab countries on the issues of water rights, which strained Arab relations with Turkey. When Prime Minister Akbulut visited Baghdad in May 1990, he was told in a menacing tone that NATO would no longer be in a position to protect Turkey. This is why many in Turkey saw cooperation with the U.S. in the crisis as a natural consequence of the convergence of Turkey's interests with America's. But this had to be weighed against Turkey's losses and Turkey's cooperation with Iraq on the Kurdish question over many years.

The most important development after the war was the situation of the Kurds in northern Iraq, which directly affected Turkey. Turkey's cooperation with the U.S. during the Gulf War would acquire a new dimension with the developments in northern Iraq.

# 2. The U.S., Operation Provide Comfort, and Turkey's Half-hearted Cooperation in Northern Iraq

#### The Origin of Provide Comfort

Before launching the land campaign against Iraq, the U.S. called on the Kurds in the north and the Shiite Arabs in the south to revolt in order to distract the Iraqi army. When the Iraqi army was removed from Kuwait and a cease-fire was in place at the end of February 1991, the Shia revolted in the south in early March, followed by the



Map 7-2. Safe Haven and No-Fly Zone in Iraq (Source: Oran, p. 320)

Kurds in the north (the information on Provide Comfort is derived from Oran).

Saddam easily suppressed the Shiite uprising and turned his attention to the north. The Kurds were quickly routed by the Iraqi army. But the U.S. disappointed the Kurds once again and failed to come to their aid. The calculation in Washington was that Iran would stand to gain from Iraq's disintegration, so the U.S. allowed Saddam to remain in power (Box 7-11). The U.S. took no military action to assist the Kurds. It did nothing even when Iraq used helicopter gunships against armed Kurdish groups, on the grounds that the cease-fire agreement covered only the use of Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft. As a consequence, 1.5 million Iragi Kurds fled to the Turkish and Iranian borders in early April 1991. Turkey had decided that it would not admit the 500,000 refugees pressing at its border after its experience of 1988. On that occasion, Turkey had incurred heavy expenditures to accommodate the refugees but had received no help from the West and plenty of criticism. The government was also drawing criticism from the Turkish public, because the increase in PKK activity was attributed to the presence of the Iraqi-Kurdish refugee camps on Turkish soil. There was also a fear that refugee camps in Turkey would become a permanent fixture and turn into something analogous to the Gaza Strip. The pressure on the border kept on mounting, however, and keeping the border closed was drawing international criticism, so the Kurds were eventually admitted. For the second time since 1988, Turkey was faced with the Kurdish problem in Iraq spilling over into its territory.

#### Box 7-11. The USA's Kurdish-State Scenarios

There have been claims that the U.S. would like to set up a Kurdish state in the Middle East that would include parts of Turkey. Although the question became topical during the Gulf War, it has a long pedigree going back to earlier times and is based on the premise that the U.S. was dissatisfied with the Middle Eastern borders drawn in the 1920s. The U.S. would like to have a weak and docile client state in the Middle East to help it strengthen its grip on the region and alleviate the pressure on Israel.

Some of the scenarios go back to the 1960s. The U.S. advanced the Idea of a federal Turkey that would also encompass a federated Kurdish state including the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey on two occasions, once after the 27 May 1960 coup in Turkey and then again in 1965. A permanent feature of these projects was that Turkey would be given a share of the Kirkuk oil reserves.

A similar scenario was advanced at the end of 1986, when Iranian forces started pushing toward Kirkuk during the Irani-Iraq War. On that occasion, the U.S. called on Turkey to preempt Iran and Invade the region. This proposal met with the disapproval of the Turkish General Staff and was never carried out.

The most recent U.S. Initiative came during the 1991 Gulf War and the period following the war. This latest initiative had certain features that distinguished it from previous plans. (1) Previous U.S. initiatives were just soundings and tentative in nature and came during times of crisis, whereas the 1991 initiative was insistent and comprehensive and extended over a longer term. (2) Previous U.S. Initiatives had come when there was no armed Kurdish uprising in Turkey, whereas this time the PKK insurgency was at its most interise. (3) The U.S. had paved the way for such a development in northern fraq with Operation Provide Comfort, (4) In the 1990s the U.S. project-counted on the support of none other than the Turkish head of state, President Özal.

All of these scenarios faced one big and effective obstacle blocking their realization, the Turkish military establishment.

(İ. Uzgel)

When the crisis was at its height, Özal proposed to Bush that the Kurds be transferred from the mountainous region, with all of its supply problems, to the plain on the Iraqi side of the border, which was to be turned into a safe haven. After this, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 688 on 5 April 1991. The resolution called on members and aid agencies to join in providing humanitarian aid.

At that time, the plight of the Kurds pressing into Turkey and Iran was on daily display on television screens. The U.S. government felt the need to do something under the pressure of American public opinion. Turkey was also pressing the Americans to act. But, above all, the U.S. government was aware of the possibility that Britain and France might intervene if it remained passive. As a result, Washington decided to bring aid to northern Iraq by air. On 10 April the U.S. established a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel and forbade all military activity in this region.

The U.S., Britain, and France established a safe haven in the region of Zaho in northern Iraq, and Operation Provide Comfort got underway. The military personnel of the three powers operated out of Silopi in Turkey and conducted the air operations from the base at Incirlik. The operation involved 1,862 military personnel and 77 aircraft and helicopters, of which 44 were American and 4 Turkish. The Kurds returned to Iraq within a short time, relieving Turkey of the burden of supporting them at a cost of \$1.6 million per day. At the end of the first phase of the operation, the second phase, known as Operation Provide Comfort II, began on 16 July 1991.

On 12 July 1991 the Turkish cabinet agreed that a multinational force would be stationed in Turkey, which included a complement from the Turkish armed forces. The legal basis for this decision was resolution 126 of the TGNA, though this basis was contested by some. Its justification in international law was even more controversial (Box 7-12). With the decision Turkey agreed to the use of installations at İncirlik and Batman air bases. Turkey also agreed to participate in the force, with the Turkish commander holding the same rank and enjoying the same status as the force commander. The Turkish General Staff had to approve the activities undertaken within the framework of the operation, and the weapons brought into Turkey would be under its supervision. The duration of the operation would be extended every six months.

Upon Turkey's request, the ground forces were removed from Turkey in September 1991 and the force was reduced to the seventy-seven aircraft and helicopters operating out of İncirlik. A military coordination center was established at Zaho.

After this, Operation Provide Comfort became a source of considerable controversy in Turkey's domestic politics as well as its foreign policy. The opposition parties and the public in general saw Operation Provide Comfort as a vehicle for establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with Turkey's participation and consent. All of the political parties were opposed to the operation; but when they found themselves in office during the 1990s, they gave their grudging consent to its continuation without heeding public opinion.

A question that was strictly in the realm of bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq eventually became an issue affecting Turkey's relations with the U.S. as a result of international developments during the 1990s and U.S. Middle East policies. The reason why the problem became more acute was the intensification of the Kurdish

# Box 7-12. The Legal Basis in Domestic and International Law for Operation Provide Comfort

There was no precedent for Provide Comfort, and the Turkish government had some difficulty in finding a legal basis for it that would be in compliance with existing legislation. According to article 92 of the Constitution, only the TGNA could grant permission to admit foreign troops into Turkey, and this body had made no such decision. The government was basing itself on resolution 126 of the TGNA, dated 17 January 1991. This resolution was adopted during the Gulf crisis, when the TGNA authorized the government to make decisions in this regard. This resolution contained the following passages: "for the purpose of effectively protecting Turkey's vital interests in accordance with developments during and after the crisis" and "the Government may take appropriate action when it deems necessary in support of resolution 678 of the UN Security Council." This resolution transferred the legislature's prerogative to the executive and the powers of the president to take emergency action to the government. Instead of relying on a law, the decision was based on a resolution, a mechanism that was designed to regulate the TGNA's internal functioning. The timing and the need for this were left to the discretion of the milltary. All of these aspects were shortcomings that drew widespread criticism and drove the opposition to challenge its constitutionality in court. The constitutional tribunal ruled that it was not competent to consider the issue because no law was involved in this case, only a parliamentary resolution.

With respect to international law, Security Council resolution 688 was taken by the government as a basis for Provide Comfort. This resolution called on all members and ald agencies to provide

humanitarian assistance, and Turkey was complying with this appeal. In this case, allowing Provide Comfort to operate from Turkey was in conformity with international law.

But another controversial aspect was the issue of intervention in Iraq from Turkish territory. There was no justification for this intervention, such as an Iraqi attack on Turkey. Furthermore, the Security Council's resolution 688 made reference only to humanitarian aid.

Establishing a safe haven on Iraqi territory was even more problematic from the legal point of view, because it violated Iraq's sovereignty. The U.S. was resorting to the principle of "humanitarian intervention," which had not found acceptance in international law and was causing uneasiness in some countries. Chapter VII of the UN Charter discussed the possibility of resorting to force in situations where peace was threatened or breached or aggression had taken place. There was a general agreement that this provision also applied to internal situations in which a minority found itself under oppression. But the use of force could only be under the direction of the Security Council. Under these circumstances, military intervention by the U.S. and its allies based on resolution 688 was a violation of international law. At this time, a "law on intervention" was being elaborated, however, and the international community did not show much opposition.

(İ. Uzgel) (Source: Oran, pp. 81–98) insurgency in Turkey, especially after 1991, and the suspicion that the U.S. was seeking to set up a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Developments in the region were feeding this suspicion.

# Provide Comfort from Turkey's Perspective

Throughout the 1990s Provide Comfort was a source of great controversy in Turkey's foreign policy, with much discussion pro and con.

The arguments in favor of Provide Comfort can be summarized as follows.

From the perspective of the Kurdish question, Provide Comfort was preventing Saddam from crushing the Kurds and driving them into Turkey. Thanks to Provide Comfort, Turkey was able to claim that it was the defender of the Iraqi Kurds and had no quarrel with the Kurdish people as such. Provide Comfort was also preventing the PKK from gaining a foothold in northern Iraq. While Turkey allowed Provide Comfort to function, the U.S. made no objection to Turkey's cross-border operations into northern Iraq. By allowing Provide Comfort, Turkey was also able to build ties of friendship with the Iraqi Kurds.

If Ankara had denied Operation Provide Comfort permission to operate out of Turkey, it would probably

have been relocated in some other country. Turkey would have lost the ability to monitor the activities of the troops now based on its soil.

From the perspective of Turkey's regional policy, Provide Comfort was keeping Iraq from posing a threat to Turkey. Without Provide Comfort, Saddam would be stronger, Baghdad's policy toward Turkey would harden, and the embargo against Iraq would be tightened further in the event of further oppression of the Kurds. Turkey also expected benefits from the Gulf States, whose security was enhanced by Provide Comfort.

Most important of all, Provide Comfort was a trump card that Turkey could use in its relations with the U.S. in areas such as American aid, regional cooperation, and unhindered security operations in northern Iraq.

Those opposed to Provide Comfort stressed that it benefited the PKK, that it led to a power vacuum in northern Iraq, and that it paved the way for the establishment of a Kurdish state in that region. Turkish public opinion was disturbed by the intensification of PKK activities after Provide Comfort came into action. The Turkish press reported that helicopters engaged in that operation were also ferrying supplies to the PKK and rescuing their wounded fighters.

### The Issue of a Kurdish State in Northern Iraq

One of Turkey's worst fears was a Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq. It was precisely Provide Comfort (and the safety it brought to the region) that allowed the development of the embryo of such an entity. A clear sign of this development was the election that took place in northern Iraq in May 1992, followed by the convening of a parliament. Although the Iraqi Kurds informed Ankara of the coming vote, they described it not as a parliamentary election but as a municipal election.

After the launching of Operation Provide Comfort, Turkey started taking a closer interest and getting more involved in northern Iraq, with President Özal leading the way. This was designed to forestall developments that might be detrimental to Turkey's interests. At Özal's request, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Masud Barzani, and the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani, were invited to Ankara. The two leaders came in July 1992, when they held talks and were given diplomatic passports by the Turkish state to enable them to travel abroad. They subsequently went to the U.S., where they met with secretary of state James Baker. Ankara allowed the Kurdish leaders to establish offices in Ankara to represent them. Ankara also helped in building infrastructure projects in northern Iraq.

Turkey decided to take more effective steps after the Imqi Kurds set up a government in July 1992, established an intelligence service and a police force in September, accelerated the preparations for forming an army in October, and announced the establishment of a Federated Kurdish State in Erbil that same month. Ankara declared that this decision was detrimental to peace and stability in the region and indicated that it would not recognize the new entity. It launched a major operation in northern Iraq in October 1992 in the region where the PKK was entrenched. The Barzani group cooperated in this operation in order to attenuate Turkey's reaction to establishment of a federated state. Ankara proposed to the Iraqi Kurds that they enter into a dialogue with the Baghdad regime and expressed the view that Baghdad should reassert its control of the region. Ankara also arranged a meeting in November 1992 bringing together Syria, Iran, and Turkey. A tripartite declaration was issued, calling for the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity. In this way, Turkey was able to form a common front with two countries with which it did not have very warm relations. Ankara was firmly conveying the message to the U.S. and to the international community that it would not allow the establishment of a Kurdish state. Finally, starting in 1993, Turkey decided to develop its relations with the Iraqi administration and (also taking into consideration its economic interests) began a campaign to secure the lifting of the embargo on Iraq.

By the mid-1990s Turkish public opinion as well as the government and the opposition had become more averse to Provide Comfort. The main reason for this was the gradual emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Another reason was the intensification of PKK activity starting in the early 1990s. The news that Provide Comfort helicopters were rescuing wounded PKK fighters only made things worse. Notwithstanding these developments, the government felt obliged to extend the duration of Provide Comfort when the time came.

Turkey tried to mitigate the effects of unfavorable developments in the region and the continued presence of Provide Comfort by taking a series of measures that included controlling the access to the region of a great number of NGOs via Turkey, mounting operations into northern Iraq, engaging in cooperation with Barzani, and occasionally pressing him to cooperate with Saddam. One of the measures taken by Ankara was to join the dialogue being conducted by the U.S. with the Iraqi Kurds.

#### The Dublin Process

Turkey also cooperated with the U.S. in the Dublin Process, designed to secure the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurdish groups that were hostile to one another. The ostensible reason for the differences between the groups was the sharing of the income derived from trucks using the Habur border crossing into Turkey. But the real reason was a struggle for power between the two main clans that were seeking to dominate the region. This rivalry resulted in clashes between the two groups in May 1994, endangering the U.S. policy of checking Saddam by relying on the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurdish factions. In the face of these developments, the U.S. intervened and brought the two Kurdish sides together in Dublin in August 1995. Turkey participated in these talks as an observer. The U.S. secured the reconciliation of the two groups. At the Turkish observer's insistence, a paragraph was inserted in the document issued after the meeting, stating that Turkey's security concerns would be fully taken into account.

This American initiative did not prove successful, however, and Iran continued to increase its influence in northern Iraq. It sent a brigade of 10,000 troops into the region to enforce the cease-fire between the two Kurdish groups. This forced the U.S. into action once more: a delegation that included Turkish officials was sent to the region to bring the two sides together again. This finally resulted in a new cease-fire.

Cooperation between Saddam and Barzani in Northern Iraq: Upsetting Regional Balances

When the PUK under Talabani's leadership, having secured Iran's backing, took control of the city of Erbil in August 1996, the regional balance was upset once again. But this time something unexpected occurred. Finding himself in difficulty, Barzani appealed to the Baghdad regime for help. In response, Iraqi units entered the region for the first time since the establishment of Provide Comfort and expelled Talabani from Erbil. During this operation 6,700 Iraqi Kurds, consisting of those working for the U.S. (very probably for the CIA) and members of their families, left Iraq for Turkey and were shipped to Guam by the U.S. This development rekindled Turkish apprehension over U.S. intentions in the region. It also brought about important changes in the regional policies of the U.S., the existing balances in the region, and the policies of Turkey.

At a time when criticism of Provide Comfort in Turkey was on the rise and suspicion of U.S. intentions was growing more intense, the emergence of the Saddam-Barzani alliance proved useful for Ankara.

- 1. This development dealt a serious blow to U.S. aims in northern Iraq. If Provide Comfort was meant to afford protection from the Saddam administration to the Iraqi Kurds, it became meaningless in a situation where the Kurds in the KDP-Barzani camp were collaborating with Baghdad. The U.S. policy of uniting the Iraqi Kurds and getting them to resist Saddam had obviously failed.
- 2. The developments in the region resulted in the formation of two alliances: an alliance of Turkey, Iraq, and the KPD (Barzani) and an alliance of Iran, the PKK, and the PUK (Talabani). The U.S. policy of securing a united front under the two Kurdish leaders had been seriously undermined.
- 3. The Military Coordination Center moved from Zaho in northern Iraq to Silopi in Turkey. The activities of about 150 NGOs that were causing concern for Turkey came to an end.
- 4. Until then, Turkey had been restrained about raising the issue of the Turcomans. Now it began to give more emphasis to the presence of this group. The reappearance of the Turcomans in the northern Iraqi balance upset Iraq but was well received by the U.S.

The Ankara Process and the Transformation of Provide Comfort into Operation Northern Watch When clashes reemerged between a weakened Talabani and Barzani, the U.S. and Turkey interceded once again and invited the parties to come to Ankara. In October

1996 Turkish, American, and British officials met with the representatives of the KDP, the PUK, and the Turcomans. Whereas Turkey was merely an observer in the previous Dublin Process, this time it was one of the parties as well as the host and the Turcomans were participating in the political process in northern Iraq for the first time. As the Dublin Process turned into the Ankara Process, Turkey's influence over events in northern Iraq was growing. But this new process lost its steam when the PUK came closer to the PKK and the KDP took offense over the Turcoman presence in the political process and refused to cooperate.

Meanwhile talks were in progress with the U.S. over the structure and functions of Operation Provide Comfort. The coalition government consisting of the Welfare Party and True Path Party announced that Provide Comfort's mission had come to an end and that it would be replaced by a force consisting exclusively of air power. In December 1996 the government called on the TGNA to extend the duration of this new arrangement, which was renamed Operation Northern Watch (ONW). In flights over Iraq, weapons would be used only in self-defense and the types of weapon would be subject to Turkey's approval. The duration and extent of operations would also require specific Turkish approval. ONW would involve forty-one U.S., seven British, and four Turkish aircraft and helicopters and 1,324 dombined personnel. Turkey had secured the transfer of the Military Coordination Center (a major source of apprehension) to Silopi within its own borders and had attached new rules to the former Operation Provide Comfort, which had caused much nervousness in Turkey. After this, the extension of the term of ONW would no longer cause the heated debates among the Turkish public or political circles that Provide Comfort had unleashed. The extensions now took place smoothly, without debates and almost automatically.

The Ankara Process continued until May 1997, during which four meetings were held. After the 1996 operation conducted by Baghdad into the region, U.S. influence in northern Iraq suffered a setback. Washington took new initiatives to make up for this situation. It invited the Kurdish groups to Washington in September 1998 and restored its control over the negotiating process. Although the communiqué issued after the meeting made reference to respect for Iraq's territorial integrity and the Ankara Process of 1996, the document was signed by the U.S. secretary of state and Turkey had been left out of the proceedings. Turkey was unhappy because the document referred to a federal structure for Iraq and did not specifically mention the PKK in the passage declaring that the borders would be protected against the infiltration of terrorists.

Meanwhile Turkey's relations with Washington were under the shadow of U.S. operations against Iraq and the possibility of a breakaway Kurdish state there. In early 1999 Turkish diplomats and U.S. officials pursued their talks with Barzani and Talabani in northern Iraq. When U.S. secretary of defense William Cohen visited Ankara in July 1999, he declared that ONW would continue as long as Saddam remained in power (Box 7-13).

Beginning in 2000, the U.S. reached the decision to topple Saddam and stepped up its activities in northern Iraq. In April 2000 a conference was arranged in Washington with the title "The Search for a Kurdish Identity." Along with Barzani and the representatives of the PUK, it included participants who looked upon the PKK with sympathy. At the conference the KDP received the sort of treatment that would be normally accorded to a regular state. All of this caused much concern in Turkey. Although the U.S. claimed that the conference was a private affair, the participation of the U.S. diplomat in charge of the region, Frank Ricciardone, did nothing to appease Turkey's uneasiness.

# The U.S. in Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy

The main aims of Turkey's northern Iraq policy were to fill the power vacuum in the region, prevent the PKK from using the region as a base or sanctuary, and prevent the emergence of a Kurdish entity. Turkey considered all arrangements in northern Iraq to be temporary, pending the reestablishment of Baghdad's authority in the region (Box 7-14).

Within the framework of its northern Iraq policy, Turkey took steps such as cooperating with Baghdad, as it had done in 1996, and declaring its opposition to the establishment of a Kurdish state in the region, together with Syria and Iran. It also sought some control over developments in the region by engaging in cooperation with the Kurds of northern Iraq.

Turkey defied international opinion by engaging in a number of military operations in the region, starting in 1983. These operations were designed to dislodge the PKK from the area. From time to time, Turkey also bombed targets belonging to Iraqi Kurds to convey the message to the U.S. and to Barzani and Talabani that it would not countenance a Kurdish entity. As a consequence, military operations in the region became the most important element of Turkey's northern Iraq policy.

These Turkish incursions met with a very poor reception both in the EU and in the Middle East. The Arab League condemned Turkey's action, while Germany

# Box 7-13. Provide Comfort, the Kurdish State, and U.S. Policy

The significance of Provide Comfort for Turkey derived from the uncertainty about U.S. Intentions with respect to the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. True, U.S. officials made statements affirming their respect for Iraq's territorial integrity. But, at the same time, a structure resembling a state was being built that had its own parliament, government, police force, and army Provide Comfort was perceived as the tool to implement this plan.

It was obvious that the U.S. was in no hurry to set up a Kurdish state in the region at that stage. Such a move would result in the disintegration of Iraq and would have negative consequences on the region from the U.S. perspective. (1) Most of the Kurds were Sunni Muslims; If they had their own state, a Shiite-dominated Arab state in the center of Iraq and a Shiite state in the south would emerge, bearing in mind that the proportion of Shia in Iraq was already 54%; Such a development would only benefit Iran. (2) A breakup of Iraq might bring the Sunni element closer to Saddam (3) The establishment of a Kurdish state might bring Iraq and Iran closer together, which would be detrimental to U.S. policy goals in the region. (4) Such a development would alienate Turkey from the U.S. With the establishment of a Kurdish state, the U.S. would no longer be able to use the threat of a possible Kurdish state as a tool to keep the countries of the region in line

For these reasons, the effect of Provide Comfort was not to create a Kurdish state but to serve the policy of "double containment." With Provide Comfort, the U.S. was ensuring the security of the Kurds and keeping them from cooperating with Saddam. It was able to give direction to developments in Iraq and the Gulf. By the same token, the U.S. was also playing the Kurdish card in its relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, in the environment of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Provide Comfort will end up creating a defacto Kurdish state.

(İ. UZGEL) (Source: Oran, pp. 264–67)

halted the delivery of weapons. France and Belgium claimed that Iraq's territorial integrity was being violated.

The U.S. showed understanding by declaring that the PKK was a terrorist organization and that Turkey was exercising its right of self-defense to such a degree that the activities of Provide Comfort were suspended during Turkish operations in northern Iraq. In debates in the U.S. Congress, however, some members recalled that the U.S. had sent its forces to the region to protect the Kurds from Saddam and criticized the administration for supporting Turkey's operations in this region. They also claimed that Turkey was using U.S.-supplied weapons unlawfully in its operations.

The U.S. had a number of reasons to overlook Turkey's operations in northern Iraq during this period.

1. Turkey was giving advance notice to the U.S. (as well as to Britain and France) before launching its operations.

# Box 7-14. Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy

Turkey's northern Iraq policy in the 1990s is inextricably linked with domestic politics and hence full of contradictions. According to an MFA press release, Turkey pursues three goals in northern Iraq. (1) the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity (in other words, preventing the emergence of a Kurdish state in that country); (2) meeting Turkey's "legitimate security concerns" (or, stated in different terms, preventing PKK attacks on Turkey from Iraq); (3) defending the rights of the Turcomans living in that region.

A closer examination reveals that this policy has two fundamental objectives: one tactical, the other strategic.

The tactical objective has two aspects: first, to hit the PKK and expel it from the region; second, to prevent a power vacuum in the region that would serve the PKK's interests...

The first objective was pursued by conducting military operations into the region. These operations were based on four grounds, although their legal validity became debatable over time. (1) Iraq's consent (this applied to the operations of May 1983, 1986, and 1987); (2) the Security Protocol signed with Iraq that allowed hot pursuit into Iraq up to a depth of five kilometers (this applied to the operations from October 1984 to October 1988); (3) legitimate self-defense, a justification that was used for the first time in August 1991; (4) self-preservation (this was used after March-April 1995).

Each operation was followed by communiques daiming that the PKK's backbone had been broken. Although the number of these operations was close to thirty by the end of 2000, the pursued objective was never attained (the PKK lost its position in northern Iraq as a result of other factors). This was because Turkey was unable to establish a permanent presence in northern Iraq; it was also difficult for a regular army to eliminate fighters conducting guerrilla-type warfare. There was a further element in the equation. If Turkey had gotten rid of the PKK, the Kurds of northern Iraq would have lost their trump card for securing Turkish aid. Turkey's methods were drawing fire from Western Europe, from the Iraqi Kurds who suffered from the operations, and from Iran

Turkey was forced to seek the indulgence of the U.S., which in turn compelled Ankara to give the green light to Provide Comfort and suffer its consequences.

The method used to attain the second objective was to strengthen the northern Iraqi Kurds and to help them in their effort to unite. Turkey provided diplomatic passports to top Kurdish leaders, electric power, arms, and economic aid to the Kurds and called on them to avoid internecine strife. The quid pro quo was for the Iraqi Kurds to deny sanctuary to the PKK. But there was a fundamental contradiction in this policy. As Barzani and Talabani came closer and grew in strength with Turkish help, Ankara began to fear that they would form a separate state.

Turkey's strategic objective in northern Iraq was to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state, which would constitute a bad precedent for Turkey's Kurds and might pursue irredentist policies toward Kurdish-populated regions of the three neighboring countries. Turkey's strategic objective was also full of contradictions. By approving Provide Comfort, helping the northern Iraq! Kurds, and allowing access to Western NGOs, Turkey was bolstering the embryonic Kurdish state in the region.

After long years of neglect, Turkey had begun to take an Interest in the fate of the Turcomans. But some quarters in Turkey saw them as an element to be manipulated and used and even called for arming them. Such policies turned the Turcomans, who had no disposition to engage in armed conflict, into potential targets of Arab and Kurdish nationalism.

Despite the active and occasionally successful policies of the MFA, the issue of Provide Comfort and the contradictions it entailed continued to be a major preoccupation for Turkey: in order to solve that foreign policy question, Turkey had to find a lasting and democratic solution for the Kurdish question within its own borders.

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Ankara also gave assurances that the operations would be of limited duration and honored its promises.

- 2. The U.S. depended on Turkey's cooperation to pursue Operation Provide Comfort and carry out its other policy objectives in northern Iraq as well as in the rest of Iraq. Consequently, it was careful not to cross Turkey.
- 3. The suspicion that the U.S. was in the process of creating a Kurdish state in northern Iraq was taking root among the Turkish public. To oppose the operations would have confirmed Turkey's suspicions and adversely affected Turkish-U.S. relations.
- 4. Finally, Turkey's operations in the region were targeting the PKK, and U.S. policy in the Middle East did not rely on the PKK. In fact, the PKK was a rival to the KDP and PUK, which were in close cooperation with the U.S. Furthermore, the PKK was creating a destabilizing effect in the region through Partiya Azadiya Kurdistan (PAK), its affiliate in northern Iraq. This is why PKK's policies

were aimed at securing European rather than American support, and Washington was ready to allow the PKK to be wiped out in the region.

While Turkey sought to reconcile the contradictions in its policies, it also used its support for Provide Comfort to extract concessions from the U.S. A number of subjects were raised by Turkey whenever the extension of the duration of Provide Comfort was taken up, including changes to the structure and function of the force, the lifting of the economic embargo on Iraq, the DECA, the frigates that were due to be delivered to Turkey, and compensation for losses suffered during the Gulf War. In the overall context of Turkish-U.S. relations, many of these issues had not been addressed to Turkey's full satisfaction. Despite this, during the 1990s Provide Comfort continued to be one of the principal elements of Turkish-U.S. cooperation and constituted a useful tool for the U.S. administration to use in justifying its policies toward Turkey in Congress.

# 4. The U.S. Policy of Dual Containment and Turkey

The U.S. policy of dual containment was the result of the attempt to isolate those regimes that Washington characterized as rogue states. Libya, Cuba, and North Korea (as well as Iran and Iraq) were in the category of rogue states. The U.S. claimed the right to isolate and exclude these states and keep them under constant pressure in order to prevail over them and, if possible, turn them into constructive elements of the community of nations. Just as the U.S. had contained the USSR in the past, it now felt that it had a duty to contain these states in order to force them to conform to international standards of conduct.

The U.S. was seeking to maintain control of the Middle East by pressuring Iraq and Iran and keeping them in international isolation. This policy was supported and kept going with the help of the Jewish lobby but began to lose its effectiveness toward the end of the 1990s, especially after the European countries adopted the approach of "critical dialogue" with the two regimes.

This policy was initiated in May 1993, pursued by the U.S. and Turkey in cooperation. Turkey played an important part in this policy, especially in relation to Iraq.

Turkey's Role in the Containment of Iraq and Iran Washington attributed much importance to keeping Iraq isolated from the international system through its policy of containment, and Turkey was its chief collaborator in this undertaking. The main vehicle used to carry out this policy was the no-fly zones created north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel. This area was subsequently extended by shifting the southern zone up to the 33rd parallel in 1996. Operation Provide Comfort constituted the main pillar of this policy. In addition, the U.S. employed other measures against Iraq, including economic sanctions, inspection of its armaments, hitting specific targets in the country, and (as announced in 1997)

Although the containment of Iraq also hurt Turkey in different ways, Ankara felt the need to go along with this policy and cooperate in its implementation. From time to time, however, Ankara departed from the overall policy of cooperation. The most noteworthy initiative was the decision in 1994 to open the Habur border crossing. This accelerated the border trade between Turkey and Iraq and brought northern Iraq closer to Turkey economically. Although the border trade violated the embargo, it was tolerated and allowed to continue.

supporting the Iraqi opposition.

Turkey was constantly pressing the U.S. because of the harm it was suffering due to the embargo. The people of Iraq, and especially the children, were also suffering grievously from the embargo. As a consequence, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 986 in April 1996, authorizing the oil for food program. At Turkey's insistence, the U.S. got this resolution to provide for the export of Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Iraq was extracting 1.5 million barrels of oil each day, and 60% of this was being exported through the Yumurtalık oil terminal at Ceyhan. The flow of oil provided Iraq with an income amounting to \$9 million per day, while Turkey also benefited to the tune of \$500,000 a day. This sum, however, was far from making up for Turkey's losses.

When Baghdad barred UNSCOM (the UN Special Commission in Iraq) from inspecting Iraq's armaments in 1998, the resulting tension raised the possibility of the U.S. using force against Iraq. When the U.S. secretary of defense visited Ankara in November 1998, the conclusion drawn was that the U.S. was seeking permission to use the İncirlik air base to strike Iraq. But Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, which took place on 18 December 1998, was conducted with aircraft and missiles launched from U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. Starting in January 1999, however, the U.S. and British aircraft flying out of İncirlik began to hit targets, after claiming that Iraqi radars had locked onto these aircraft. In 1999 the U.S. aircraft hit targets in Iraq on 600 occasions. In the course of these attacks the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was also accidentally hit, cutting off the flow of oil for a while. The U.S. subsequently apologized to Turkey for the error.

Meanwhile the Clinton administration modified its Iraq policy by introducing the new element of regime change. In September 1998 Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Law, which brought sixteen opposition groups under the roof of the Iraqi National Council. The new law also set aside \$97 million to fund the activities of the council. In January 1999 an official of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Frank Ricciardone, set about organizing the Iraqi opposition and using the embassy as a center for conducting the activities aimed at toppling the Iraqi regime. Turkey was displeased with this development and—distancing itself from the U.S. position—declared that toppling Saddam's regime through outside intervention would lead to chaos in Iraq.

Turkey's Iraq policy was in large measure a reflection of U.S. policy in the Middle East. When the U.S. was supporting Iraq militarily against Iran in the 1980s, Turkey was collaborating with Saddam on the Kurdish question. In the 1990s the U.S. was in collaboration with the Kurds of northern Iraq to overthrow Saddam. At this time, Turkey's policy toward Iraq also relied in large measure

on the Iraqi Kurds. The basic difference in the two approaches was that the U.S. perceived Iraq as the principal regional threat, while Turkey saw the possible emergence of a Kurdish state as the real threat.

At the end of 2000 Turkey started taking some small steps toward Iraq. Among these were the provision of humanitarian aid, the visit of a trade delegation, and raising the Turkish diplomatic representation in Baghdad to ambassadorial level. These steps were taken because nothing was being done to compensate Turkey's losses caused by U.S. policies. As France and Russia increased their contacts with Iraq, the sanctions regime was being ignored and the policy of containment was becoming less effective. When the Bush administration became aware of this, it proposed the system of smart sanctions and tried to prevent the sale of Iraqi diesel fuel for cash and the expansion of trade relations.

In regard to the U.S. policy of containing Iran, the justification for this policy corresponded to Turkey's concerns to a very large extent. Among the basic Turkish concerns vis-à-vis Iran were Tehran's support for PKK and certain terrorists, its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and its manipulation of Islamic radicalism as a tool of its foreign policy.

The role of Turkey, as a secular state with a Muslim population, was important in checking radical Islam based in Iran. In this sense, Turkey was the antithesis of the Iranian model. Turkey also had an important place in the containment of Iran because of its location as a bordering country.

Containing Iran was not very successful from the U.S. point of view, and putting pressure on Iran was not as easy as pressing Iraq. The relaxation of the policy of containing Iran also had its effect on Turkey's policy. The most significant departure from the policy of containment came during the Refahyol coalition between the Welfare Party and True Path Party. Prime Minister Erbakan visited Tehran and (shortly after the passage of the D'Amato Law in the U.S.) concluded a \$23 billion natural gas deal with Iran. Then came the visit of the Iranian president and foreign minister to Turkey. Although it was announced that the gas deal did not violate U.S. legislation because each country would build its own section of the pipeline and hence Turkey would make no investments in Iran, the U.S. was disturbed by the development. The U.S. warned Turkey that the extra income from the sale of gas would be used to destabilize the region and that Turkey would become more dependent on Iran for its energy. The U.S. also delayed the delivery of equipment to be used in the construction of the pipeline.

# The Consequences of Dual Containment for Turkey

Turkey's ambivalence toward Provide Comfort was also evident in the case of dual containment. The U.S. policy had elements that Turkey welcomed but also elements that were disquieting. The cause for the ambivalence did not lie only in U.S. policy but in the complex structure of Turkey's relations with its two neighbors. True, Turkey's relations with the two countries under U.S. pressure were not all that good. Once Turkey adopted the U.S. line, however, it found its own freedom of movement restricted. Nevertheless, Turkey did support many aspects of this U.S. policy (as shown below).

- 1. After the ending of the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey's relations with Baghdad began to sour. As explained earlier, Iraq obtained the backing of other Arab states and caused displeasure in Turkey by raising the water issue. That is why Turkey welcomed the policy aimed at keeping Iraq weak and limiting its military capabilities.
- 2. After 1990 the regime in Baghdad was not a free agent in conducting its foreign policy. This introduced an element of uncertainty in Turkey's relations with Iraq. Certain Turkish actions were regarded as hostile by Baghdad. Among these were shutting off the pipeline, close relations with Barzani and Talabani, getting the Turcomans involved in the political process in northern Iraq, and above all allowing Turkish bases to be used to bomb Iraq. Consequently, the removal of U.S. pressure on Iraq before the overthrow of the Saddam regime could easily lead to hostile acts against Turkey. Such acts might come in the form of support for the PKK, persecution of the Turcomans in northern Iraq, or joint action with other Arab countries on the water issue.
- 3. In regard to the containment of Iran, it should be recalled that Iran was Turkey's main rival in the Middle East as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 1990s. In this rivalry, Turkey stood to gain from the containment of Iran. Furthermore, it was to Turkey's advantage that the U.S. listed Iran among the countries that supported terrorism. This meant that Iran was subject to economic sanctions, hindering its rearmament efforts. The U.S. also prevented third countries from selling Iran materials that might be used to produce nuclear or chemical weapons.
- 4. The shortest and cheapest route for oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin to reach international markets was through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. was opposed to this route, however, on political grounds. Tense relations between Washington and Tehran allowed the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project to go forward with U.S. support.

5. Turkey's role in the containment of Iran and especially Iraq was the principal area of cooperation in the Middle East between Ankara and Washington during the 1990s. In his visit to Turkey in 1999, President Clinton qualified Turkey as a "valued ally" because of this role (Hürriyet, 16 November 1999).

But containment also had drawbacks for Turkey.

- 1. As indicated earlier, containment of Iraq led to significant economic losses for Turkey.
- 2. The frequent bombing of Iraq by aircraft based at İncirlik was causing problems for Turkey in conducting its Middle Eastern policy. In the Middle East, Turkey was perceived as a country serving U.S. interests.
- 3. The use of the base at İncirlik was hurting Turkey's relations with Iraq. When Iraq threatened to take action against Turkey after Operation Desert Fox, Ankara requested and obtained Patriot missiles from the U.S.
- 4. As long as Turkey worked hand in hand with the U.S., it got harder for Ankara to improve relations with its two neighbors. During the 1990s it became progressively more difficult for Ankara to shift its policy and revert to the policy of the 1980s, when it cooperated with Baghdad rather than with the Kurds of Iraq.

# 5. The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement and the U.S.

Starting in the mid-1990s, Turkey's relations with Israel began to improve. This was most evident in the field of military cooperation. Here we shall focus on the U.S. role and its effect on Turkish-U.S. relations rather than on the regional dynamics that led to this rapprochement. This aspect of Turkish-Israeli relations is examined later.

Israel's right to exist in the Middle East within secure borders has been one of the main pillars of U.S. regional policy, going back to the time when the state of Israel was established. Within this framework, Washington sought to bring Turkey and Israel closer together. These were two non-Arab countries that were democratic and closely linked with the U.S. This policy helped Washington to buttress its effectiveness in the region, while it also strengthened Israel's security.

When the Middle East Peace Process got underway in the 1990s, the U.S. stepped up its efforts in this direction and sought to soften Arab reactions by also involving Jordan in the rapprochement.

The Cooperation in Military Training Agreement between Turkey and Israel was signed in February 1996. This was followed by the Agreement on Cooperation between Defense Industries in August 1996. The U.S. participated in joint military exercises held in January 1998 and approved the modernization of Turkish F-4 aircraft and M-60 tanks in Israel.

When Israel sought to establish close relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia by developing joint projects with Turkey in 1992, the U.S. agreed to contribute to the financing of these projects.

Relations with Israel were important for Turkish-U.S. relations in two respects. First, Turkish-Israeli cooperation was seen as a sure way to influence U.S. foreign policy in Turkey's favor. By developing its relations with Israel, Turkey sought to secure the support of the influential Jewish lobby in the U.S. This would be particularly useful in dealing with the U.S. Congress, which was not all that well disposed toward Turkey. The support of the Jewish lobby was especially sought in connection with the purchase of U.S. attack helicopters and frigates. The Jewish lobby was helpful not just in overcoming the reluctance to sanction military sales to Turkey but also in blocking the Armenian bills. In fact, the Greek and Armenian lobbies took a joint stand against Jewish members of Congress for their support of Turkey.

The second benefit of good relations with Israel for Turkey was that it could allow Turkish exporters to use Israel to bypass U.S. import quotas. In this framework, Turkey and Israel concluded a free trade agreement in March 1996. The export of Turkish textiles to the U.S. via Israel soon ran into difficulties, however, when the requirement that the Israeli content of such products must not be less than one-third was introduced. In November 1999 preparations got underway for the U.S., Turkey, and Israel to establish a free trade area in Gaziantep or Yumurtalık.

Through Turkey's good relations with Israel, the U.S. became more effective in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. Thus the U.S. was better able to ensure Israel's security, while it reinforced its ability to apply pressure on Syria in the course of the implementation of the Middle East Peace Process. The corresponding advantage for Turkey was that it could count on the support of Israel and the Jewish lobby in its dealings with the U.S. In the Middle East, Turkey was already in cooperation with the U.S. in the framework of Provide Comfort and the policy of dual containment. The third pillar of this cooperation would be the rapprochement with Israel.

# B. The Balkans and the

Convergence of Turkish-U.S. Interests

In the 1990s Turkey's and America's interests in the Balkans were almost totally convergent. The two countries had similar interests and objectives in the Balkans and were supporting the same countries and groups.

In the 1990s the U.S. was the nonregional actor with the greatest ability to influence developments in the Balkans. The Balkan region was not well endowed with natural resources but was still important to the U.S. for a number of reasons.

First, the region had strategic value because it was located in close proximity to the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish Straits, and the waterways of the Middle East. Second, this was a region where the U.S. had been able to assert its international primacy. By delaying its intervention in Bosnia, the U.S. had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the EU. Two of its armed interventions in the post-Cold War era had taken place in the Balkans: in Bosnia in 1995 and Yugoslavia in 1999, with the third intervention being in Iraq from 1991 to 1999. Third, the U.S. was instrumental in putting in place a number of measures designed to control regional conflicts in the Balkans: peacekeeping, as in IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia; peace enforcement, as in KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo; and preventive deployment, as in UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) in Macedonia.

In this period the U.S. had the closest cooperation with Turkey in the region; thanks to this cooperation, Turkey was able to wield greater influence in the area. Turkish and American positions and interests coincided almost totally in all instances, the sole exception being the differences over the timing of the Bosnian intervention. This was not only true with respect to military operations in the Balkans. It also applied in the case of diplomacy and the regional cooperation structures that were being developed in that part of the globe.

When Yugoslavia began to show signs of coming apart in the early 1990s, the U.S., like Turkey, took a strong stand to help maintain the country's integrity due to fear of the instability that might result from disintegration. But when the country finally broke apart, both the U.S. and Turkey were quick to recognize the newly emerged states. The sole exception was the Republic of Macedonia, which posed some difficulties for the U.S.

When ethnic strife broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina after its declaration of independence, Turkey and the U.S. adopted similar policies, even if they did not engage in explicit cooperation.

Turkey strongly advocated the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnians and called for armed intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. In the U.S., too, the State Department and some congressional circles defended the policy known as "lift and strike." Although the U.S. did not strike until 1994, it later became evident that the U.S. had allowed the arms ban to be breached and had looked the other way even when Iran was the supplier of weapons. It was also revealed that Turkey had also supplied arms to the Bosnians in the course of the war. This meant that both countries had been providing covert assistance to the same side.

Turkey and the U.S. also collaborated in the formation of the Bosnian-Croat Federation in Washington in March 1994. This development strongly affected the course of the war.

The Dayton Agreement that ended the war was largely the result of U.S. efforts. Turkish-U.S. cooperation also continued after the agreement. The largest contribution to IFOR and SFOR came from the U.S., but Turkey was also a contributor of troops.

In order to restore the balance of power in the region by strengthening Bosnia's military capability, the U.S. carried out the "train and equip" program with the participation of Turkey. Turkey took over the training part of the program, while the U.S. ran the equipping part.

While Ankara was busy building up its relations with Albania, this country was among the first of the former socialist countries of the Balkans to develop strong relations with U.S. The U.S. established a good political rapport with Tirana and even enjoyed the use of certain bases in Albania. The U.S. also supported the sale of weapons by Turkey to Albania and the training of its military personnel (including officers) by Turkish instructors.

Turkish-U.S. cooperation was even more notable in the case of the Republic of Macedonia. Both countries felt strongly that the maintenance of regional stability depended on the existence of a stable Macedonia and were concerned about the possibility of interethnic strife spreading from Bosnia to Macedonia. That is why Turkey appealed to the U.S. to deploy troops to the Macedonian-Yugoslav frontier. At that time, the U.S. was reluctant to commit land forces to the Balkan Peninsula. Instead the U.S. agreed to send a force of 500 within the framework of UNPREDEP (the UN's deterrent force) to a country that it had not recognized yet.

# The Kosovo Question and the Bombing of Yugoslavia

Kosovo was important for the U.S. in several ways. First, it had the potential to destabilize the Balkans. Second, controlling Kosovo would allow the U.S. to influence the course of events in both Yugoslavia and Macedonia. The U.S. had been able to prevent the tension in Kosovo from

degenerating into violence for ten years by exercising influence over Tirana and over the passive resistance movement under Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo.

But, starting in February 1998, the passive resistance movement was displaced by armed resistance under the leadership of Ushtria Clirimtare Kosoves (known by its acronym: UCK). The U.S. then launched an intense diplomatic effort and convened the Contact Group, consisting of the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, and Italy. A meeting was held in Rambouillet, France, where a proposal was made to send an international force to Kosovo. It proved impossible to reach an agreement, however, and NATO aircraft under U.S. leadership started bombing Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999.

Given its own problems with Kurdish separatism, Turkey was not as active in this instance as it had been in the Bosnian conflict. Nevertheless, Ankara continued to cooperate with the U.S. and dispatched a number of F-16 aircraft to conduct surveillance and protection operations. Later Turkey also took part in attack operations. As Yugoslavia kept up its resistance, the U.S. increased the intensity of the bombing campaign. Washington was not prepared to accept the political consequences of abandoning the effort before it had imposed its will. When the U.S. approached Turkey about making use of Turkish bases, Ankara placed the bases at Bandıma and Çorlu at the disposal of the U.S. Air Force. U.S. ground personnel began arriving soon afterward; but before air operations could be launched from Turkish bases, Yugoslavia accepted the conditions set at Rambouillet and the NATO bombing came to an end.

KFOR was deployed in Kosovo after the air campaign, and Turkey contributed a contingent to this force. The U.S. was now militarily installed in Kosovo with KFOR as well as in Bosnia.

In addition, Turkey participated in the Southeastern Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), which was conceived in Washington. Also contributing to regional stability was the Southeastern Europe Multinational Force, in which Turkey participated as a member and the U.S. as an observer.

# The Reasons for Turkish-U.S. Cooperation in the Balkans

- 1. Turkey and the U.S. had a long tradition of political and institutional cooperation. Turkey was an ideal ally in view of its geographic location and its political, human, and cultural links with the region.
  - 2. The Balkan nations that the U.S. supported—the

Bosnians, Albanians, and Macedonians—were the very nations that Turkey supported and entertained good relations with. This made Turkey a perfect regional partner for the U.S.

3. The U.S. and Turkey were in general agreement regarding the instruments to be employed to overcome the region's problems. The use of force against the Bosnian Serbs, supplying Bosnia-Herzegovina with arms, preserving the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, and developing regional cooperation were among these instruments.

Cooperation with the U.S. in the Balkans brought Turkey tangible benefits.

- 1. Turkey's standing in Washington improved, and its weight in U.S. policy-making was enhanced. When President Clinton came to Turkey in November 1999, he recalled that "from Korea to Kosovo" Turkey stood shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. (Hürriyet, 17 November 1999).
- 2. Thanks to its cooperation with the U.S., Turkey was able to widen its field of maneuver in the Balkans. This led to an improvement of its relations with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
- 3. By being able to count on U.S. backing, Turkey encountered hardly any opposition from either the West or the regional countries when its importance in the Balkans increased.
- 4. Turkey was also able to gain an advantage over Greece, which was aligned with the EU and Russia in the Balkans.

To sum up, the U.S. had been able to use the Turkish bases at locations like İncirlik, Balikesir, and Çorlu when resorting to force against Iraq in 1991 and 1998–2000, against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, and against Yugoslavia in 1999. Turkey was also contributing troops to SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo. No other country was in a position to play a similar role.

# C. The U.S. and Turkey's Relations with the EU

Turkey's relations with the Western European countries and the EU did not run as smoothly as did its relations with the U.S., especially during the 1990s. This led Turkey politically to drift away from this region despite its many links. During this period the U.S. supported Turkey's efforts to accede to the EU. Successive secretaries of state as well as President Clinton raised this issue in their contacts with European leaders.

The U.S. maintained its support at the time of the confirmation of Turkey's membership in the customs

union with the EU in 1995 as well as in the periods preceding the European summits of Luxembourg in December 1997 and Helsinki in December 1999, when Turkey was accepted as a candidate for accession. U.S. officials lobbied for Turkey with leading members of the European Parliament, and U.S. ambassadors made representations in Turkey's behalf. When the U.S. efforts proved unsuccessful at the Luxemburg summit, it became clear that the EU was prepared to ignore the U.S. when a conflict with the EU's interests was perceived.

The U.S. had a number of motives for supporting Turkey's membership in the EU.

- 1. Full membership would reinforce Turkey's links with the West. The U.S. did not want to see Turkey under a radical Islamic regime; nor did it want to see Turkey drifting further apart from Europe. Such developments would completely overturn the existing balance in the Middle East and cut off the link between Central Asia and the Caucasus with the West, jeopardizing energy corridors and the U.S. position in the region.
- 2. As indicated earlier, Turkey's long-standing links with the U.S. became even stronger during the 1990s. Since this situation was unlikely to change in the short term, it was in the U.S. interest to have such a close ally in the EU. Turkey's membership would ensure a second member of the EU with strong U.S. ties (after Britain) and reinforce U.S. influence within the European integration movement.
- 3. The U.S. was seeking to draw Eurasia into the broad European-Atlantic community during the 1990s, and Turkey was at a pivotal location within this geographical area.
- 4. With Turkey's membership, the EU would lose its homogeneity and lose its monolithic block structure and character by spreading out into new regions.
- 5. At this time, the EU was constructing its security apparatus; as a full member, Turkey would become part of the European Security and Defense Identity. The U.S. was particularly eager to see Turkey, a close U.S. collaborator in the field of defense issues, integrated with the WEU.

The EU clearly was not ready to admit Turkey merely because the U.S. desired this outcome, and this was obvious to both Washington and Ankara. The U.S. diplomatic effort, however, did ensure that Turkey was not totally excluded by Europe during the 1990s.

# D. The Caucasus, Central Asia, and Energy Corridors in Turkish-U.S. Relations

In the 1990s some aspects of the policy objectives of Turkey and the U.S. in the Caucasus and Central Asia were concordant. Turkey and the U.S. now found a new area of cooperation in a region that was important to both countries. Dealing with these regions was a novel experience for both of them. Turkey had the ability to develop its ties with both regions thanks to its linguistic, religious, and cultural affinity with their peoples. In this endeavor Turkey had the backing of the U.S.

Throughout the 1990s American interest in Central Asia was on the increase due to a number of factors. Among these were the Russian effort to increase its influence in the region through the policy of the Near Abroad (see Box 7-55 below), the EU's launching of the Transportation Corridor Europe-Central Asia (known as TRACECA) and the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport Europe (known as INOGATE) projects, and China's efforts to develop its relations with the region and especially with Kyrgyzstan. In 1994 the U.S. got the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia into the Partnership for Peace program of NATO (see Box 7-17 below) and began to provide economic and military aid to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the most important countries in the region. This allowed the U.S. to develop its political relations with these two states. The U.S. State Department described this region in 1998 as being important from the point of view of the "strategic" and "vital" interests of the U.S.

The region was important for the U.S. from the following perspectives.

- 1. From the strategic perspective, a number of strategists (including Brzezinski) advanced the view that this region was at the center of the global struggle for power and that the country that established its primacy there would be preponderant on the world stage. This geopolitical theory had a long lineage (see Box 4-8 in Section 4). The region was also important because of its proximity to the Middle East.
- 2. Azerbaijan was always a major producer of oil, but recent surveys had revealed that the Caspian basin contained huge amounts of hydrocarbons. U.S. secretary of energy Bill Richardson speculated that the Caspian basin would free the U.S. from depending on the Middle East for oil.
- The U.S. did not want the Caucasus and Central Asia to revert to Russian control; nor did it want Iran, Afghanistan, or China to exert influence in the region.
- 4. The U.S. priorities in the region were the development of democracy and the market economy, the prevention of ethnic strife, and effective controls over nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

After reinforcing its control of the Middle East in the post–Cold War era, the U.S. moved rapidly to fill the vacuum in this newly emerging region. U.S.-based companies like Chevron, Exxon and AMOCO were present in all of the oil agreements signed and consortiums set up to develop the energy resources of the region. The U.S. also expanded its political activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia through Turkey. After the oil and gas resources of the Middle East, the resources of the Caspian Basin also came under U.S. control.

The areas in which Turkey and the U.S. cooperated in the Caucasus and Central Asia can be listed as follows:

- Although Russia was allowed a certain freedom of political maneuvering in this region, it was prevented from exercising exclusive control over pipelines.
- Iran's religious and political influences would be checked, and Islamic radicalism would not be allowed to gain strength in the region.
- The oil and natural gas of the region would be marketed via Turkey and the Mediterranean and not via Iran and the Persian Gulf.
- Turkey would wield political, economic, military, and cultural influence in the region and would be held up as a role model.
- Both countries were opposed to the Russian legal position, which considered the Caspian Sea to be a lake.

Turkey and the U.S. had divergent interests, however, in some areas:

- In the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the U.S. sided with Armenia and suspended aid to Azerbaijan.
- Although the U.S. supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, it was quite cautious at that time and had also supported alternative pipelines not crossing Iran. This reduced the importance of the BTC pipeline and affected its feasibility. Furthermore, Washington again had failed to persuade U.S. oil companies that considered the project too costly and therefore uneconomic. Nonetheless, the BTC project was finally realized.
- The U.S. would allow Russia a free hand in the region from time to time. One example was when the U.S. allowed Russia to ignore its commitment under the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to reduce its forces in the region.

The Opening Up of Turkey to the Caucasus and Central Asia and the Stand of the U.S.

At this time, Turkey was seeking to enhance its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, relying on its linguistic, religious, cultural, and historical ties with the Turkic inhabitants of the region. The U.S. supported Turkey's efforts to gain greater access to the region, and Turkish and U.S. interests became convergent in a number of areas.

Politically, the U.S. wanted to see these countries steering away from Russian and Iranian influence. That is why Washington supported Turkey's efforts to strengthen its political and military ties with these countries and entered into military cooperation with Ankara, similar to the cooperation already taking place in the Balkans and the Middle East. In 1994 all of the countries of the region, with the exception of Tajikistan, were admitted into NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Their army officers were sent to Turkey for training, and in 1997 the U.S. and Turkey conducted military exercises with the participation of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

The U.S. also supported growing Turkish penetration into the region in the cultural and religious fields. Washington was backing Turkey's efforts to get these countries to switch from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. The U.S. also supported the sending of Turkish preachers and Qurans written in the Latin script to these countries. The choice was between Iran's radical interpretation of Islam (backed in the 1990s with radio broadcasts beamed into the region) and Turkey's secular system, with religion firmly under state control. The U.S. was giving strong backing to the Turkish model. This gave rise to persistent claims that the U.S. was supporting the proliferation of Fethullah Gülen's schools in the region. It was claimed that (after meeting with the U.S. ambassador in Ankara, Morton Abramowitz) Gülen sent seventy teachers to Uzbekistan under the banner "U.S. Friendship Bridge" (Yeni Şafak, 25 June 1999) Economically, the U.S. wanted to see these countries switch over to the market economy and felt that Turkey's practices of the early 1980s could be transferred to these countries. Turkey and the U.S. encouraged them to leave the ruble zone. When entering this region, U.S. businesses frequently went into partnership with Turkish companies.

After 1997 the U.S. took a firmer stand against Russia's policies in this area and in so doing helped the regional countries in their efforts to break loose from Russia's grip. A report to the U.S. Congress stated that—uneasy over Turkey's growing influence in the region—Russia engaged in closer cooperation with Iran, resulting in two rival alliances vying for influence in the region: the U.S.-Turkey alliance and the Russia-Iran alliance. With the backing of the U.S., Turkey proposed a Stability Pact for the Caucasus in 1999 that would strengthen Ankara's presence in the region. (This pact was not realized because the U.S. finally disapproved it.)

### The U.S. Position on Pipelines

One of the most important areas of Turkish-U.S. cooperation in the 1990s was the transport of Caspian oil to Turkey via a pipeline running from Baku to Ceyhan.

The main features of U.S. policy on this issue were the following:

- U.S. policy in relation to the pipeline was part of the strategic dimension of Washington's Eurasia policy and went beyond the transport of oil to market by the shortest route. The policy was based on long-term strategic considerations rather than short-term profit calculations by oil companies.
- The political objective was to bring these countries closer together and align their policies with those of the U.S.
- The U.S. wanted the oil be transported through more than one pipeline. The purpose of this objective, also backed by the major oil companies, was to ensure the dependable and uninterrupted delivery of oil to world markets.
- The U.S. wanted to release the region's oil producers from the stranglehold of the Russian pipeline monopoly, thereby reinforcing their independence.
- Another goal was to keep Iran out of the regional competitions for pipeline routes.

The U.S. interest in Turkey in the field of energy was concentrated in two areas. One of these was investments in Turkey in energy (examined in the framework of economic relations below). The other area was the East-West Energy Transportation Corridor, which had to do with the transport of oil and gas to global markets through pipelines.

In the second half of the 1990s U.S. activities in connection with pipelines in the region intensified and cooperation with Turkey accelerated. After 1995 the U.S. began to support the Baku-Ceyhan project. In May 1998 the Caspian Sea Initiative was launched; and in June 1998 President Clinton signaled the importance that he attributed to this issue by appointing a special representative.

U.S. support for the Baku-Ceyhan line was highly welcome to Turkey. As indicated earlier, however, U.S. support was within the framework of a multiplicity of links, which meant the U.S. also supported alternative pipelines. The political support of the U.S. for the Baku-Ceyhan line was important because the oil companies and financial institutions did not consider this link, expected to cost \$2.4 billion, to be economically viable.

In 1998 and 1999 the U.S. efforts to secure the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline began to gain pace. As a result of these efforts, the Ankara Declaration was signed in October 1998 at a ceremony attended by the U.S. secretary of energy. As signatories, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan affirmed that the Baku-Ceyhan line would be the main route for transporting Caspian oil to global markets.

The breakthrough came in November 1999, when Clinton came to Ankara and witnessed the signing of the agreement for the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan line. The U.S. secretary of energy qualified this agreement as a "political victory" and added that it was an agreement that would serve America's strategic interests.

In 2000 vast new oil reserves were discovered in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea in the region of Kashagan. This discovery raised the hopes of Turkish and U.S. officials that the production of this field would be channeled to Azerbaijan and incorporated within the Baku-Ceyhan project. This would raise the amount of oil carried in the pipeline, improving the line's economic prospects. In April 2000 the U.S. Eximbank indicated that it would contribute to the construction of the pipeline. This was a further sign of continuing U.S. support for the pipeline.

While Turkey and the U.S. were cooperating on the Baku-Ceylan pipeline, they were in disagreement on the subject of other energy outlets.

The U.S. was uneasy about the natural gas agreement concluded by Turkey with Iran in 1996 and the Blue Stream Project being developed with Russia. The U.S. was against any project that would strengthen Iran's economy and increase its influence in the region. In his speech at the Second Energy Conference held in Ankara in March 1999, American ambassador Mark Parris declared that the Caspian pipeline should have priority and that Turkey had to concentrate on projects that were realistic and feasible. Nevertheless, a week after the Baku-Ceyhan agreement had been signed on 18 November 1999, Turkey reached an understanding with an Italian firm for carrying out the Blue Stream Project (see Box 7-56 below).

Turkey was pleased with the backing given by the U.S. to the Baku-Ceyhan line but also apprehensive about certain other developments. In the first place, despite the U.S. support for the project and the agreements signed, little was being done in the way of implementation. Many experts held the view that the project would not be completed because of low oil prices and the lack of an adequate supply of Azerbaijani petroleum.

In addition, the U.S. was giving support to trans-Balkan pipelines in the framework of its policy of supporting multiple outlets for Caspian oil. One of these projects caused particular unease to Turkey. This was the project that would take Caspian oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. It would then be transported by tanker to the Bulgarian port of Burgaz, which would be connected by pipeline to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean. This project would compete with Baku-Ceylan and remove one of Turkey's trump cards in its negotiations over the transport of oil by bypassing the Straits. Another U.S.-sponsored project causing doubts in Turkey was the proposal by the U.S. Department of Commerce to construct a pipeline that would carry natural gas from Qatar and Egypt to Turkey via Israel and Jordan.

Furthermore, the U.S. had not supported Turkey's proposal to hook up the pipeline from Baku to Supsa to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The U.S. kept up its support for Baku-Ceyhan in all its official statements on the subject, however, and renewed its efforts in this direction, allowing this route to remain a viable option. The project maintained its importance as an example of U.S. support for Turkey. Things continued to drag throughout the 1990s, but construction finally got underway on 20 September 2002. The project was expected to cost \$2.4 billion and was due for completion in February 2005. (It was finally completed in July 2006, with a cost close to \$3 billion.)

### The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict and the U.S.

The policies of Turkey and the U.S. in the Caucasus and Central Asia were in large measure concordant. But this was not the case in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijan was a more important country from the point of view of its geographic location, its natural resources, and the size of its population, it nearly found itself among the states ostracized by the U.S. because of the activities of the Armenian diaspora.

After the dispute erupted over Karabakh and Azerbaijan reacted by imposing a blockade on Armenia, the Armenian lobby in the U.S. went into action and forced the passage of a law to deny Azerbaijan economic aid. Under the terms of this law, known as Freedom Support Act 907, all humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan was suspended in 1992 because it had imposed an economic blockade on Armenia. The U.S. administration was aware that Armenia had occupied a fifth of Azerbaijan's territory and that the victim of the conflict was being treated unfairly. This is why aid continued to be provided to Azerbaijan by the U.S. Administration through NGOs. Congress subsequently offered even more flexibility by deciding that the administration itself could provide aid if it determined that the aid provided by NGOs to Azerbaijan was insufficient.

The U.S. also objected to the blockade that Turkey imposed on Armenia and sought to have this measure repealed. Turkey did not comply, however, because of the

complications that this would create in its relations with Azerbaijan and also because of the problems that it would raise in Turkish domestic politics.

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia remained a source of disagreement between Turkey and the U.S. throughout the period.

# IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS

A. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) and U.S. Military and Economic Aid

The Defense and Economic

### Cooperation Agreement

It will be recalled that DECA was signed by Turkey and the U.S. in 1980 and was extended for five more years in 1985 by a side letter that was dated 1987. When the agreement came to an end on 17 December 1990, it was automatically extended for a year when neither side indicated a desire to terminate it. Turkey gave notice of its wish to make changes in the agreement at each extension date throughout the 1990s but was unsuccessful in securing any changes.

Turkey's main reason for wanting changes was the altered circumstances following the end of the Cold War. When DECA was due to expire on 18 December 1992, Turkey called for a renegotiation of the agreement, without, however, demanding that it be terminated. Turkey recalled that in the past the U.S. had promised to make an effort to repeal the 7:10 ratio and raise the level of military aid and submitted the following requests:

- DECA also contained provisions regarding the status of Turkish bases used by the U.S. As the number of bases was progressively reduced, the capacity of Incirlik was expanded, and it was used by Allied forces during the Gulf War. A new arrangement was needed on this issue.
- Operation Provide Comfort should be incorporated into DECA.
- Transfer of technology should take place in defense industries, U.S. training facilities should be made accessible to Turkish personnel, and Turkey should be given priority in the delivery of surplus U.S. materials and equipment to allies.

Turkey's main objective was to prevent the U.S. from cutting aid by citing budget constraints and to secure more favorable terms for loans provided at prevailing market rates. It failed to attain these objectives, however, and the level of aid continued to diminish.

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When the Clinton administration took office in January 1993, Turkey made one more attempt and called for the commitments contained in the side letter of 1987 to be incorporated in DECA. But it was disappointed once again. Whereas in the past Congress had insisted on the 7:10 ratio in the apportionment of aid to Greece and Turkey while the administration resisted, this time the administration itself proposed the 7:10 ratio. Later, when Mümtaz Soysal was foreign minister, the U.S. raised the rate of interest on the aid funds being furnished to Turkey. Turkey warned that DECA would be reviewed but was still unable to bring about changes.

The Refahyol coalition (consisting of the Welfare Party and True Path Party) approved DECA without proposing any changes to it.

In the prevailing circumstances, the U.S. was able to obtain all that it wanted from Turkey. Under these conditions there was no need for the U.S. to consider a renegotiated DECA that might create new problems and give rise to new demands.

### U.S. Military and Economic Aid

Having started with the Truman Doctrine, U.S. aid was designed to bolster Turkey and Greece militarily and economically to enable them to stand up to the Eastern Bloc. When the Cold War came to an end, the purpose and function of military and economic aid to these countries became the subject of debate in the U.S. One of the salient features of this period was the tendency of Congress to make substantial cuts in the funds set aside for the State Department and especially for foreign aid. At this time, the Clinton administration submitted a bill to Congress to replace the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that was designed to deal with the circumstances of the Cold War (that is, contain communism and check the influence of the USSR). The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy bill, submitted in 1994, pursued five basic objectives: to support sustainable development, develop democracy, furnish humanitarian aid, strengthen peace, and promote growth through trade and investments. U.S. officials declared in Congress that the new bill would help the developing countries to grow and increase their trade. This would create new export markets for U.S. companies. The U.S. also intended to use economic aid as a means to resolve regional problems and prevent conflicts. Another important goal was to use aid to assist the countries of Eastern Europe and Russia to carry out the transition to democracy and the market economy. While no cuts were contemplated in the aid being provided to Israel and Egypt, Turkey and Greece were placed among the countries that would not require further external aid after the mid-1990s.

The new developments on the global scene affected the form, amount, and terms of the aid being provided to Turkey. This happened at a time when Turkey was expecting U.S. aid to increase in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Turkey's expectations were only partially met, because U.S. external aid policy was undergoing a transformation and a number of developments were taking place in Turkey itself.

In 1989 the U.S. terminated the Military Assistance Program that had been operating since 1961. This was replaced by the Foreign Military Financing Program under the Pentagon's control. At the same time, the aid being furnished to Turkey from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) was turned into a source for arms procurement. Even as the level of aid provided to Turkey from the ESF dwindled, there was a large increase in Turkey's arms purchases from the U.S.

The first significant development of the 1990s was the emergency aid of \$82 million provided to Turkey during the Gulf War. Even if this did not come in the category of direct aid, Turkey's textile export quotas were raised. When the 1993 aid budget was being debated in Congress in 1992, no provision had been made for economic aid to countries like Turkey that were playing host to joint bases. At U.S. senator Robert Byrd's initiative, Turkey was allocated \$125 million in aid. This was the result of the goodwill generated by Turkey's actions during the Gulf War. Furthermore, the administration and the legislators made no mention of the 7:10 ratio in the course of the debates on the aid budget. The ratio came up again in 1993, however. This time it was the administration that proposed observing the ratio in the apportionment of aid to Greece and Turkey, whereas it had been imposed by Congress in the past. In 1993 a number of senators proposed the suspension of aid until Turkey took concrete steps toward settling the Cyprus question; but this proposal was turned down, thanks to the State Department, which opposed the move.

Another important change in the nature of the aid to Turkey came in 1993, when Congress eliminated the grant portion of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to Greece and Turkey on the grounds that the threat to NATO had been removed. Henceforth this assistance would consist exclusively of loans, and the rate of interest would be the prevailing market rate of 10 to 14% rather than the previous 5%. As the grant component of FMS

was eliminated, there was a large increase in the amount of military equipment provided to Turkey under the Southern Regional Amendment and Excess Defense Articles.

In addition, when Turkey ran into an economic crisis in April 1994 under the Çiller government, the Clinton administration agreed to provide \$1.2 billion from the Gulf Fund that had been set aside in 1991 for the procurement of F-16 aircraft under the second phase.

U.S. aid to Turkey ran into difficulties, especially after 1994. The arrest of the DEP deputies and the closure of the party intensified U.S. congressional criticism directed at Turkey. By now Turkey's position in the Gulf War had become a thing of the past. Although the administration kept stressing that Turkey was allowing Operation Provide Comfort to go on and that Turkey was an ally of strategic significance, the Greek and Armenian lobbies were active and influential.

When Congress was reviewing aid to Turkey in June 1994, a provision was added that read "aid must not be used in violation of international law." It made 10% of the aid contingent on the State Department's report on Turkey's progress in human rights and the question of Cyprus. The State Department's report noted that human rights abuses did occur in the course of the struggle against the PKK but added that Turkey had a right to ensure internal security to defend itself. Nevertheless, Turkey refused to accept the 10% of the aid that had been made conditional. When the U.S. introduced a similar provision in the aid package to Greece, in which Greece's compliance with the sanctions against Yugoslavia would be monitored, Greece too rejected 10% of the aid.

Turkey's annoyance grew when, in addition to the Cyprus and human rights conditions, the U.S. Congress cut \$5 million from the aid package because Turkey had closed its airspace to Armenia.

For fiscal year 1996 the administration proposed \$450 million in military aid to Turkey in addition to \$100 million from the Economic Support Fund. Congress trimmed the administration's proposals to \$320 million for military aid and \$33 million for economic support. Aid to Greece was also trimmed to comply with the 7:10 ratio. In May 1996 President Clinton cited America's national interest and rejected the Humanitarian Air Corridor clause that had been introduced into the aid bill through the strenuous efforts of the Greek and Armenian lobbies.

In 1997 a subcommittee of the House of Representatives decided that the \$60 million in economic aid to Turkey proposed by the administration should be limited to \$22 million until Turkey acknowledged the Armenian

Genocide of 1915. The Senate subcommittee cited Turkey as a "faithful NATO ally" and an "important actor in the implementation of Operation Provide Comfort" and set the level of aid to Turkey at \$175 million for the military component and \$22 million for the economic component. Because economic aid had been made conditional, Turkey refused to accept it and only did so after the conditions were lifted.

In 1998 the U.S. converted into a grant \$20 million of the \$150 million earmarked for Turkey as Foreign Military Sales loans. That year, Turkey refused to accept economic assistance because it came with the condition that it be spent on projects in southeastern Turkey.

An important development was the U.S. decision to end FMS loans after 1999. Congress declared that Greece and Turkey were now capable of meeting their defense needs from their own resources and decided to reallocate this type of assistance to the new members of NATO. In this process, Turkey first saw the grant component of military aid eliminated; then loans began to be extended at market conditions bearing an interest of 10.5%; and eventually the aid program itself was brought to a complete end. This happened in stages during a period when Turkey's relations with the U.S. were being developed within the framework of "enhanced partnership."

The ending of FMS loans also had beneficial effects, however. First, Turkey was no longer subject to intense critical scrutiny in Congress each time aid appropriations came up for debate. Then there was the requirement that FMS loans be spent in the U.S. The purchases were made by U.S. agencies on behalf of Turkey, which sometimes resulted in wasteful spending. Occasionally funds were spent on obsolete systems. A third benefit was that FMS loans had started becoming a substantial economic burden. In the 1990s Turkey was spending over \$400 million annually to service these loans. In 1992 repayments consisted of \$166 million for principal and \$269 million for interest. Payments during the first decade of the new century would amount to \$200 million annually, with repayments ending in 2016. A fourth benefit was that the ending of FMS gave Turkey the possibility of submitting requests for surplus military equipment. Furthermore, no political conditions were attached to the delivery of surplus weapons and military equipment.

In summary, during the 1990s new conditions were attached to U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey: that the Turkish embargo on Armenia be lifted and that the weapons be used in compliance with international law. These conditions were in addition to the former

conditions regarding Cyprus and the observance of the 7:10 ratio. The most important development in the field of aid was that it began to diminish and finally came to a complete end. This removed aid as a factor influencing Turkish-U.S. relations.

U.S. Weapons Sales and the "Hidden Embargo"
During this period Turkey procured weapons from the
U.S. under four separate programs: (1) Foreign Military Sales (FMS); (2) Direct Commercial Sales (DCS);
(3) delivery of Excess Defense Articles (EDA) by the
Pentagon; and (4) delivery of weapons slated for disposal
within the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, under
the system known as cascading.

Starting in 1990, Turkey obtained large amounts of weapons through these programs, much in excess of what it had been getting in the past. The value of the equipment thus procured fluctuated from a low of \$536 million in 1995 to a maximum of \$1.2 billion in 1997. There were a number of reasons for these high levels of arms purchases, notably the intensifying struggle against the PKK, the instability reigning among Turkey's neighbors, the acquisition of missile systems capable of hitting Turkey by Syria and Iran, and the arms race with Greece. The U.S. supported Turkey's efforts to renew its defense systems.

During this period Turkey faced two obstacles in its arms procurements from the U.S. One obstacle was paying for these weapons. In the case of weapons that were not delivered as an outright grant, joint ventures were established with the manufacturers of the weapons or payments were made with Eximbank loans guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. The second obstacle was the criticism directed at the U.S. administration particularly by the Greek and Armenian lobbies and human rights organizations in connection with the weapons delivered to or jointly manufactured with Turkey.

Until 1995 the sale of Cobra attack helicopters to Turkey was prevented by Congress and the opposition of human rights groups. Of the fifty helicopters being sought by Turkey, it was possible to procure only ten. But when Turkey sought bids for the joint manufacture of 145 helicopters within a program amounting to \$4 billion, U.S. companies interested in the program appealed directly to the White House and sought permission to submit their tenders. The administration gave its conditional approval to this request in order to avoid alienating Turkey and especially in order not to leave the field to European and Israeli-Russian firms. Under the administration's conditions, the U.S. State Department would make a determination in December 1997 regarding Turkey's compliance

with democracy and human rights according to seven criteria: lifting the state of emergency, ensuring freedom of expression, releasing journalists and deputies imprisoned for their opinions, ending torture and punishing those guilty of torture, repealing the decrees closing certain NGOs, extending democracy and political participation, and returning those displaced in the southeast to their homes. If Turkey complied with these criteria, the sale of helicopters would be allowed to proceed.

Another difficulty arose over the delivery of three frigates of the Perry class. Two of these vessels were to be delivered as grants, and the third was to be leased. When delivery was delayed, the Turkish media described this as a "hidden embargo." Turkey had dispatched the crews of these vessels (consisting of 480 men) to the U.S. and had incurred additional expenses amounting to \$50 million because delivery of the frigates was delayed. The Clinton administration had held up the delivery because of the U.S. election in 1996 and the Kardak-Imia crisis with Greece in January 1996.

There were also difficulties in connection with the delivery of aerial refueling tanker aircraft that would extend the range of Turkish combat aircraft. The delivery of the two tanker aircraft that Turkey had leased at the initial stage was delayed by the Greek lobby, but these were eventually delivered in November 1995.

All in all, the figures for the 1990s show that the U.S. sold, gave, or leased large quantities of arms to Turkey; although occasional delays occurred, there was no comprehensive embargo that applied to these deliveries. These large-scale deliveries reflected the U.S. approach to Turkey. The U.S. administration was cooperating with Turkey in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in the Middle East and wanted Turkey to be strong militarily. The U.S. used this argument to rebut the domestic criticism directed at it for its arms deliveries. Furthermore, U.S. defense industries wanted a larger share of Turkey's arms procurements and obtained the backing of some members of Congress, the administration, and especially the Pentagon (Box 7-15). This proved that, when necessary, the administration was capable of surmounting the opposition of Congress. Turkey used its cooperation with the U.S. to secure Washington's backing for the modernization of its armed forces.

#### B. Economic and Trade Relations

The main issues affecting Turkish-U.S. economic relations during this period were the restrictions placed on Turkey's textile exports, the possibility of substantial U.S. investments in Turkey in the energy and communica-

#### Box 7-15. The Military-Industrial Complex in the U.S.

The term "military-industrial complex" is used to describe the shared interests of certain groups in the triangle consisting of defense industries, the Pentagon, and Congress and the effects of these shared interests on foreign policy. Occasionally this is referred to as the "Steel Triangle." The phrase "military-industrial complex" was first coined by Dwight Eisenhower at the end of his term as president in 1961 when he announced its existence and warned the administration to be on guard against its influence.

The military industrial complex is made up of the Pentagon, glant defense industries (like Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin, General Dynamics, and Bechtel), and the members of Congress coming from those states where these industries are located. To these must be added tesearch and development companies, labor unions with mem-

bers employed in these industries, and universities that work on defense projects. The relationship between the Pentagon and defense industries has a noteworthy feature. Many retired Pentagon officials work in defense industries and constitute the organic links between the two entities. It has often been alleged that these organic links influence the arms procurement procedures of the U.S. armed forces as well as U.S. foreign policy.

The military-industrial complex is held responsible for the tough anti-USSR policies of the Cold War, the high defense spending brought about by the fear of communism whipped up in the U.S. the overkill capacity created in the field of nuclear weapons, and the Vietnam War and the inability to bring it to an early end.

(I. UZGEL)

tions sectors and in the GAP project, intellectual property rights, and the imbalance in favor of the U.S. in bilateral trade.

#### Trade Relations

Toward the end of the 1980s Turkey sought to develop its trade and economic relations with the U.S. and adopted the mantra of "less aid, more trade." But it cannot be said that Turkey was able to achieve its objectives. Although there was an increase in the volume of trade, the balance of trade had become more unfavorable for Turkey. As economic relations developed, the Joint Economic Committee was established in 1993 and the Business Development Council in 1996.

The most noteworthy development in this area occurred in 1995, when the U.S. Department of Commerce included Turkey among the ten big emerging markets. By describing Turkey as such, it was significant that the U.S. perceived the Turkish economy as having reached a high enough level of purchasing power to be worthy of U.S. attention. Starting in 1997, there were five important issues in the agenda of Turkish-U.S. relations: regional cooperation, energy issues, Cyprus, and defense and security cooperation. In May 1998 a meeting was organized at U.S. initiative in Istanbul under the banner "Turkey, the Crossroad of Continents." This meeting was attended by 600 businesspeople and investors from the U.S. The U.S. Embassy also got Turkish businesspeople to travel to America to establish business contacts. The U.S. supported Turkey's bid for membership in the G-20 in 1999. This group included the countries with the twenty largest developing economies.

The total volume of trade between Turkey and the U.S. grew from \$3 billion in 1992 to \$6 billion in 1997. The share of the U.S. in Turkey's trade grew steadily to

reach 10% of imports and 9% of exports. Turkey's share in America's total trade volume, however, was barely 0.5%.

Despite this growth, there were also problems in bilateral trade. First, Turkey's trade gap with the U.S. was constantly growing. Of the total trade amounting to \$6 billion, Turkey's exports amounted to only \$2 billion. Although the U.S. had a total trade deficit running into hundreds of billions, Turkey was one of the few countries with which the U.S. balance of trade was in surplus.

Second, both countries had complaints about trade restrictions. Turkey had been complaining about restrictive quotas imposed by the U.S. on Turkish textiles and garments since the 1980s, and these complaints persisted in the 1990s. These quotas were important because textiles and garments made up half of Turkey's exports to the U.S. The U.S. gave assurances that quotas would be gradually eliminated by 2005. But this lifting of quotas would apply to U.S. imports from all sources. When Prime Minister Ecevit visited Washington in September 1999, he declared that the level of trade relations was unsatisfactory and called for the reduction of restrictions on textiles. There were also difficulties in Turkey's exports of iron and steel products, figs, and pasta.

As for the U.S., it had complaints over restrictions placed by Turkey on the importation of American agricultural products and livestock.

#### U.S. Investments

Although trade relations with Turkey did not develop as expected, the U.S. appeared to be greatly interested in direct investments in Turkey. A Bilateral Investments Agreement had been signed in 1985 but only came into effect in May 1990. The agreement allowed investors to repatriate their profits and established procedures for settling disputes.

The interest of the U.S. was basically due to the large energy projects being undertaken in Turkey. American firms were particularly interested in the GAP project. In November 1999 a group of American businesspeople visited the GAP region, accompanied by American ambassador Mark Parris. The delegation consisted of the representatives of firms like General Electric and DuPont and David Rockefeller, the honorary president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations. At the end of the 1990s the U.S. got ready to invest \$2 billion in Turkish energy projects (including the construction of dams and upgrading power plants) plus a further \$800 million to be invested in the GAP project. The first step in this direction was taken by Turkish and U.S. companies when they signed an energy agreement in the amount of \$675 million in November 1999.

The U.S. had complaints about the investment climate in Turkey. The first complaint was the 15% tax imposed on U.S. investors, but the taxation agreement signed in 1996 and ratified in 1998 eliminated this tax.

Another complaint was Turkey's lax enforcement of copyright laws. U.S. companies claimed that Turkish legislation protecting copyrights and patents was inadequate and that they were losing millions of dollars because of this. As a result, the U.S. placed Turkey in 1992 and 1993 on the list of countries that would be kept under close scrutiny. When Turkey enacted the law on copyrights and patents in June 1995, U.S. officials expressed satisfaction, even though complaints persisted over the law's implementation.

The U.S. administration maintained its position that Turkish legislation on investments did not entice American investors to put their money in Turkey. At a meeting in Istanbul in December 1998, U.S. ambassador Mark Parris even warned that Turkey might have to face electrical power cuts very soon because of its investment laws.

In the 1990s the U.S. share of foreign direct investments in Turkey was 14%, placing it in second or third place depending on the year, after Germany and France.

During the 1990s Turkey's importance for the U.S. was growing, not just as a strategic partner but also as a market and a place to invest. The U.S. was pursuing a policy based on finding new markets as well as developing traditional markets. Turkey offered many possibilities, especially in the energy sector. At the end of 1999 the representatives of the Trade Development Agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Eximbank formed the Caspian Financial Center in Ankara, with a view to seeking investment and trade opportunities in Turkey and the Caspian Basin. Another sign of the importance attributed

to Turkey's economic potential was the establishment by Senator Byrd of the Appalachia-Turkey Trade Project in 2000. The project's aim was to direct traders and investors in thirteen states in the Appalachian region to Turkey. It will be recalled that in 1990 Senator Byrd had prevented the Armenian Genocide bill from coming to a vote in the Senate by his filibustering.

Traditionally, Turkey had sought to extract economic advantage from its strategic importance to the U.S. In the 1990s the U.S. was using its close cooperation with Turkey to gain economic advantage.

# C. Turkish-Greek Relations, the Cyprus Question, and the U.S.

In the post–Cold War era, the U.S. continued to play an important role in Turkish-Greek relations and the question of Cyprus. Although the U.S. was unable to achieve tangible results in resolving the chronic problems between the two neighbors, it was able to exert its influence to prevent the status quo from being upset during the acute Kardak-Imia crisis and the installation of S-300 missiles in southern Cyprus.

#### Turkish-Greek Relations and the U.S.

Unlike the situation in the 1980s during Papandreou's premiership, in the 1990s Greek foreign policy was not based on a strident anti-American rhetoric. Both Konstantinos Mitsotakis (who was the prime minister from 1990 to 1993) and Andreas Papandreou (who came to power once again in October 1993) adopted a policy based on good relations with America. Greece did not want to confront the U.S. now that it was wielding greater influence in the international arena after emerging from the Cold War as the sole superpower. The Simitis government that followed also maintained good relations with the U.S., even though Greek policy was now focused on the EU.

In the context of Turkish-Greek relations and the question of Cyprus, Turkey enjoyed two advantages during this period in its relations with the U.S. One was its close cooperation with the U.S. in the triangle covering the Balkans, the Caucasus/Central Asia, and the Middle East. Another was that in the 1990s, when the U.S. was closely involved in the Balkans, Greece took the Serbian side first in Bosnia and then during the Kosovo crisis. Greece violated the sanctions regime against Yugoslavia, took an unreasonable stand in its dispute with the Republic of Macedonia, strained its relations with Albania, and became the odd man out in March 1999 by opposing NATO's operation against Yugoslavia. It is worth noting that the U.S. House of Representatives punished Greece

by reducing the amount of aid by 10% for not complying with UN sanctions against Serbia.

During the Cold War, the U.S. was uneasy over Turkish-Greek tension because this weakened NATO's southeastern flank in the confrontation with the Eastern Bloc. In the 1990s different factors came into play. The U.S. was unhappy with the Turkish-Greek confrontation because it threatened stability in the eastern Mediterranean, created problems within NATO, and could have a negative effect on the finely balanced U.S. relationship with the EU.

What really alarmed the U.S. was the crisis that erupted in 1996 over the rocks of Kardak-Imia (see "Relations with Greece" below). The official U.S. position was that these islets were under the sovereignty of neither Greece nor Turkey. At that stage, the U.S. was seeking to keep the crisis under control rather than to find a final solution. In the course of the crisis, the assistant secretary of state in charge of European affairs, Richard Holbrooke, appealed to Greek officials to haul down the flag that had been hoisted at Kardak and withdraw the soldiers that had taken up position there. The Greeks agreed to withdraw their soldiers but refused to haul down their flag on the grounds that Kardak belonged to Greece. Both sides eventually agreed to put the question on ice. Convinced that the rocks were Greek, Athens was upset by the manner in which the crisis had been handled. The subsequent course followed by the U.S. was also unsatisfactory from Turkey's point of view.

After the Kardak crisis, the U.S. State Department took action, seeking to prevent a recurrence of such incidents between Greece and Turkey. The Madrid Understanding emerged from this action. At the time, the U.S. was instrumental in the NATO's development of confidence-building measures in the Aegean Sea. Among these were a limitation of NATO-sponsored naval exercises, the presence of observers from the other side in military exercises, and exchange of information between military personnel. The U.S. even stationed an aircraft carrier off the island of Rhodes to monitor the implementation of these measures.

But other U.S. actions in relation to the Aegean led to unhappiness in Turkey. Greece had not been participating in NATO exercises in the Aegean for seventeen years. To persuade the Greeks to reverse this policy, the U.S. agreed that a portion of the NATO exercise due to take place in September 1997 would be carried out under the command of a Greek officer. The U.S. also proposed that the Madrid Understanding be extended to cover Kardak and that the issue of sovereignty be referred to the International Court

of Justice. In response to this, Turkey refused to take part in the NATO exercise. It was the first time that Turkey took such a step.

# The Question of Cyprus and the U.S.

Toward the end of the 1990s America's interest in Cyprus was growing, and Washington renewed its efforts to find a solution. One reason for this was the criticism that Washington was facing for being active in quelling ethnic strife in the Balkans while doing nothing in Cyprus. The U.S. considered it to be part of its leadership role to intervene in regional conflicts with a view to facilitating a settlement.

Washington's Cyprus policy was based on the following principles. (1) The dispute must not degenerate into open conflict and must not lead to tension in Turkish-Greek relations. (2) The status quo (the division of the island) was unacceptable. (3) The negotiations under the aegis of the UN must continue; in case of a deadlock, the U.S. should intervene to overcome existing obstacles. (4) The objective was a bizonal, bicommunal federation. (5) The issue of EU membership must not further complicate the question and support should be given to the membership of Cyprus as a federation. (6) Russia must not be allowed to gain access to the region through the Cyprus question.

At a time when the U.S. was intensifying its efforts to find a solution, the Greek Cypriots launched campaigns in August and October 1996 to organize marches across the Green Line. These campaigns led to incidents in which the Turkish side was blamed by the U.S. for using excessive force. When Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war during the Kardak crisis, the U.S. increased its pressure to reach a settlement in Cyprus. The Clinton administration even declared 1997 to be the year when the question of Cyprus would be solved. By appointing Richard Holbrooke, the man who had ended the war in Bosnia and was the architect of the Dayton Agreement, as special representative for Cyprus, the Clinton administration demonstrated its resolve to settle a question to which it attached great importance.

Throughout 1998 Holbrooke sought to bring the two sides closer through diplomacy and also by involving NGOs and businesspeople, using second track diplomacy. Despite his efforts, the only success registered was the establishment of a direct telephone link between the two parts of the island.

The U.S. announced that it would support the accession of Cyprus to the EU if it reflected the wishes of both parties. This meant that the U.S. was against the unilateral

accession of just the Greek Cypriots, which would make it even harder to reach a settlement.

In the meantime the U.S. Congress maintained its anti-Turkish bias. It faulted the Clinton administration for not being effective enough in finding a solution to the Cyprus question. Although some members of Congress sought to cut U.S. aid to Turkey until it withdrew its forces from Cyprus, the U.S. State Department's efforts prevented these proposals from being adopted. Starting in 1994, Congress began invoking Cyprus, along with human rights and the Kurdish question, when slashing aid allocations to Turkey.

When the Greek Cypriots signed an agreement in January 1997 to take delivery of Russian-made S-300 missiles, the Turkish position on this issue converged with the U.S., whose Cyprus policy had been quite different from Turkey's.

The main U.S. concern was the rising influence of Russia in the eastern Mediterranean. Most importantly, the missiles were scheduled to be delivered to the island along with radar systems and Russian experts, who would then be in a position to monitor the region close-up. It was interesting to note that, in its effort to dissuade the Greek Cypriots from emplacing the missiles on Cyprus, the U.S. found itself reminding them that the island had been at peace for twenty-four years and that it would be wrong to upset a stable situation. These were exactly the same arguments that Turkey had been using in connection with Cyprus. Although the U.S. held different views from Ankara's on the question of Cyprus, it did not shirk from using Ankara's arguments when its interests required such a shift.

The question was finally resolved in February 1999 with the decision to install the missiles in Crete. The U.S. press reported that the Greek Cypriots had been persuaded by Washington and the missiles would be stored instead of being installed. By keeping the missiles out of Cyprus, Turkey had been appeased, the delivery of the missiles had not been prevented, and the Russians had been kept away from the eastern Mediterranean.

The reason for this intense U.S. involvement in Cyprus was grounded in the general U.S. foreign policy orientation during this period. The U.S. had been exerting its influence not just in Cyprus but in all Balkan questions, in the Middle East peace process, in Northern Ireland, and in the confrontation between China and Taiwan. Cyprus remained one of the instances where the U.S. was unsuccessful in finding a way to overcome the dispute.

Although the U.S. and Turkish positions on Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus did not coincide, Washington refrained from adopting policies that would force Turkey to conform to U.S. positions. The U.S. confined itself to gentle persuasion on the issues of Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations because at that time it was engaged in very close cooperation with Turkey in a number of other fields.

# D. The Kurdish Question and Human Rights

During the 1990s the Kurdish question gave rise to differences between Turkey and the U.S. Unlike the European countries, the U.S. approach to this question appeared to be based on human rights rather than political considerations. The official U.S. position was not concerned with Turkey's struggle against the PKK but with the manner in which this was being conducted. Washington continued to criticize Turkey for violating human rights in the course of its struggle against the PKK.

### The U.S. Position on the Kurdish Question

There was a distinct difference of approach to the Kurdish question between the U.S. administration and Congress.

As mentioned previously, the U.S. administration declared in its official statements that it supported Turkey's territorial integrity. In fact, the U.S. was the first country to declare the PKK a terrorist organization, and it described Turkey's struggle and the military measures it took as legitimate self-defense. But the U.S. maintained that the solution to the problem lay in the economic development and more human rights reforms in southeastern Turkey and recognition that the Kurds should have the right to express themselves in their own language and develop their own culture and the right to form their own political party. The U.S. view was that such policies would only strengthen Turkey.

Meanwhile it was being alleged in Congress that human rights were being violated in the struggle against the PKK with U.S.-supplied weapons, and there were calls for ending aid and military sales to Turkey. Although the administration joined the critics of Turkey from time to time, it did defend its Turkish policies in Congress and thereby indirectly supported Turkey.

Notwithstanding the administration's positive approach to the Kurdish question, some U.S. practices were causing anger in Turkey. One of these was the annual human rights report issued by the State Department (examined in detail in the discussion of human rights below). A second issue was the establishment of the Kurdish Institute in Washington in 1996. The institute described its mission as publicizing the Kurdish question and seeking improvements in the human rights enjoyed by the Kurds. The third issue involved the restrictions placed on the sale

of Cobra attack helicopters (already examined above in the discussion of U.S. arms sales). These helicopters were a potent weapon in the struggle against the PKK. The fourth issue was the increasing U.S. interest in the southeastern region, especially after Öcalan's capture. The U.S. ambassador in Ankara, accompanied by a group of businesspeople, visited the southeast to explore investment opportunities in the region. In June 2000 the U.S. sought to establish something akin to a trade office in Diyarbakır, but Ankara withheld permission.

Notwithstanding these concerns, Ankara was highly satisfied with the U.S. role in the capture of Öcalan.

# The Apprehension of Öcalan and the U.S.

The U.S. role in the apprehension of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was a good indicator of the U.S. approach to the Kurdish question. Press reports and the investigations of some journalists after Öcalan was captured in Kenya reveal that the U.S. was involved from the very beginning in the string of events that led up to his capture (Box 7-16).

According to the press, CIA officials met with their counterparts in the MIT (the Turkish intelligence agency) and informed them on 4 February 1999 that they would assist in the capture of Öcalan if an undertaking was given that he would receive a fair trial. With the approval of the Turkish government, a memorandum of understanding was signed to this effect. When the operation had been carried out, the U.S. issued an official statement expressing its satisfaction at the capture of the terrorist Öcalan. In response to media reports about its involvement, Israel declared that it was not involved in the operation.

The U.S. was involved in Öcalan's capture diplomatically, politically, and technically. This was more than the capture of the leader of an organization. It also revealed the U.S. stance with respect to its Middle Eastern and Turkish policies and its approach to the Kurdish question.

The U.S. role explained why Turkey had waited until September 1998 to threaten Syria. The Turkish decision-makers never explained why they had not acted earlier against Syria, even though they knew Öcalan's address and telephone number in Damascus. Throughout the 1990s the U.S. secretary of state met with Hafez Assad twenty-three times and Clinton met with him three times. Yet Turkey had been unable to exert any pressure on the Syrian leader. Turkey was able to do this only when the U.S. decided to accelerate the Middle East peace process.

The U.S. helped in the capture of Öcalan for the following reasons.

1. The U.S. began to distance itself from the PKK

# Box 7-16. The Capture of Abdullah Ocalan

On 16 September 1998 the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, Gen. Atilla Ates, delivered a speech in Hatayan which he accused Syria of harboring Abdullah Ocalan and gave it a stern warning. This was a turning point in the process that led to Ocalan's apprehension. It was followed by statements from Turkey's leaders (including President Demirel) that force might have to be used against Syria. The Turkish army begen to deploy units to the Syrian border, hearful of finding itself in armed conflict with Turkey, Syria signed the document known as the Adana Understanding in October 1998, Gralan was forced to leave Syria under the terms of this document on 9 October 1998, U.S. authorities were able to determine from cell phone calls that Ocalan had gone to Moscow and passed this information on to their furkish counterparts. As a result of pressure coming from Turkey and the (1.5., Ocalan left Moscow after spending thiny three days there and that eled to Rome on 12 November 1998. Now the U.S. began to apply pressure on Italy. In January 1999 Ocalan left Rome and returned to Moscow but soon had to leave for Athens, Greek officials, uneasy about harboring Ocalan, told him that he was being sent to South Africa but sent him to Kenya instead the intelligence was quick to determine that Ocalan was soving at the Greek Embassy in Nairobi Nairobi was swarming with U.S. intelligence personnel because there had been a bombattark on the U.S. Embassy there. Ocalan later accused Green and deliberately sending him to Kenya, which was full of CIA agents, and claimed that he was the victim of a plot

On 14 February Ocalan was told to leave Kenya. When he departed from the Greek Embassy heading for the airport, his car left the convoy for unknown reasons and drave up to the aircraft of the special team that had come from Turkey. Once apprehended, Ocalan was flown back to Turkey. The U.S. Involvement in the operation was limited to providing intelligence, exerting diplomatic pressure, and training. The U.S. did not get directly involved in the capture.

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after the mid-1990s, when the movement went into decline. U.S. criticism of Turkey's Kurdish policies was at its peak when the PKK's influence was greatest and its actions were most effective. It was noteworthy that the U.S. helped apprehend Öcalan when it became clear that the PKK was going to face defeat in its armed struggle. That is why Öcalan and the Kurdish exiles in Burope were criticizing Washington for abandoning them in mid-course. This was not the first time that the Kurds of the Middle East had been betrayed by Western countries, especially the U.S.

2. With Öcalan's capture, the U.S. had gained an advantage over Germany, France, and other European countries that were using the PKK in their jockeying for influence in the region.

3. The PKK was disturbing the equilibrium that the U.S. had been seeking to establish in northern lead since

1997. Furthermore, the PKK was getting Saddam's support, which the U.S. was not ready to tolerate.

After a speedy trial that Western observers considered satisfactory from the human rights perspective, Öcalan received a death sentence. The U.S. did not share the negative reaction of the Europeans to this verdict. Since capital punishment was still allowed in a number of U.S. states, Washington was in no position to be critical over this issue.

This development brought about two results in Turkish-American relations. First, Öcalan's capture brought Turkey closer to the U.S. The U.S. had given concrete evidence of its support for Turkey in the struggle against the PKK. Second, the U.S. became more serious about finding a political solution to the Kurdish question after the capture of Öcalan. Washington was now pressing Ankara to grant the Kurds more cultural and political rights. The U.S. also wanted to see the state of emergency in the southeast lifted. After 1999 the U.S. started taking a closer interest in this region.

### The U.S. and Human Rights in Turkey

Turkey's human rights record during the 1990s was under constant U.S. critical appraisal. The U.S. administration, Congress, and those interested in foreign policy perceived the issue of human rights and the Kurdish question in the same context. The human rights reports of the U.S. State Department described abuses in Turkey (mostly those occurring in the southeast) in detail, and the closing down of newspapers and journals close to the DEP and to Kurdish nationalism came in for criticism. Among other human rights abuses mentioned in the State Department's reports were the issues involving religious groups such as the dwindling Assyrian community, the closing down of the Welfare Party, the imprisonment of Istanbul's mayor, Tayyip Erdoğan, torture, political murders, and prison conditions. The reports also contained references to the human rights violations perpetrated by the PKK.

In summary, at a time when the U.S. and Turkey were in close cooperation in a great number of fields and when their regional policies were in large measure convergent, the Kurdish question and the issue of human rights remained points of disagreement. But they did not affect the fundamentally good bilateral relations between the two countries.

#### E. The Armenian Question

The Armenian question came up in different guises during this period. One was the passing of resolutions by state legislatures in the U.S., acknowledging the Armenian Genocide as fact. Armenian groups also attempted to set

up a "genocide museum" in Washington and to have the House of Representatives adopt a genocide resolution. These activities were being conducted by well-established organizations in the U.S., such as the Armenian National Institute and the American National Committee of Armenians.

#### At the State Level

Inspired by the Holocaust Museum in Washington, the Armenian lobby went into action in the second half of the 1990s to establish a museum and to erect a monument to the victims of the Armenian Genocide. The foundation was laid at a site near the Holocaust Museum, with a ceremony attended by a delegation from Armenia.

The Armenian Americans were pursuing their activities at a number of levels and were able to obtain genocide resolutions from several state legislatures in the U.S. With the addition of nine states in 1999, the number of legislatures that had passed resolutions reached twenty-four. Among these were important states like California, New York, New Jersey, and Georgia. The Armenians were even able to get the subject introduced into school textbooks. The Armenians were convinced that, as more states adopted such resolutions, it would become easier to get the U.S. Congress to do likewise and that the administration would not oppose this. Turkey could do very little to block these efforts. Ankara confined itself to symbolic protests, and the question did not arouse much public interest.

#### The Genocide Bill

Unlike the 1980s, the genocide bill did not figure in the U.S. congressional agenda in the 1990s. In 2000 (which was an election year), however, the matter came to a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, causing complications in Turkish-U.S. relations. California had a significant number of inhabitants of Armenian extraction, and the members of Congress representing that state were especially active.

The bill was sponsored by a Republican and a Democratic member and was signed by 134 representatives. Entitled "Teaching and Remembering the Armenian Genocide," the bill claimed that 2 million Armenians were driven out of Anatolia from 1915 to 1923 and 1.5 million of them were killed and mandated teaching this to State Department personnel and other concerned public officials. In addition, the bill would have the U.S. presidents use the term "genocide" instead of "massacre" in their annual statements issued on 24 April commemorating the events of 1915.

There were three reasons why the bills came to the congressional agenda in 2000. First, the Armenian lobby

felt that, after its successes at the state level, the subject was now ripe to be taken up at the federal level. Second, Robert Kocharian, who came to power in Armenia in 1998, was pursuing a more nationalistic policy than his predecessor. His principal foreign policy aim was to seek international recognition of the Armenian "Genocide." Third, unlike the U.S. election of 1996, the two parties were running neck and neck in 2000. Every vote counted in this election.

Bill 389 came up for discussion on 14 September 2000 at the fourteen-member Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. In the course of the debate Marc Grossman, formerly ambassador in Ankara and now responsible for the training of State Department personnel, declared that the events of 1915 to 1923 were already being taught and added that the passage of this bill would harm relations with Turkey. The debate was also being monitored by Thomas Pickering, the State Department's number-three man. The American historian Justin McCarthy made a statement defending the Turkish viewpoint, Ankara sent retired ambassador Gündüz Aktan to submit the Turkish thesis. He sought to show the weakness of the Armenian case by pointing out that the Armenians were refusing to allow the question to go to the International Court of Justice. Despite these efforts, the subcommittee approved the bill by a show of hands on 21 September.

When the bill came before the fifty-member Foreign Relation Committee on 28 September, a number of amendments were proposed. The bill underwent some changes and became bill 596. Among the amendments were a proviso that Turkey should not have to face demands for compensation, deletion of the requirement to teach the events, and the specification that the genocide would be attributed to the Ottoman Empire and not to Turkey in the annual presidential statements. In the course of the debate, the consideration of the bill was deferred for a week. During this interval both Turkey and the administration redoubled their efforts. The American ambassador in Ankara went to Washington to explain the damage the bill would do to relations. For the first time, Turkey sent a parliamentary delegation, consisting of five deputies, to Washington to demonstrate its sensitivity on the issue.

In the meantime the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and General Staff in Ankara prepared a "joint action plan" containing the measures to be taken in the event the bill was approved. In its official pronouncements, Ankara declared that the measures being considered would not harm Turkey's national interests, serve the purpose of

the Armenian lobby, or damage the fabric of Turkish-U.S. relations. It appeared that care was being taken not to affect relations with the U.S. and most of the measures were directed against Armenia. Among these measures were restrictions on trade with Armenia being carried out via Georgia and Iran as well as the closure of the air corridor to Armenia. Although no linkage was made by official quarters, other measures included the consideration of the appointment of an ambassador to Baghdad, the intimation that restrictions might be imposed on Operation Provide Comfort, the minister of energy's warning to the U.S. ambassador that U.S. companies might be adversely affected in the bidding for new projects (including defense contracts), and the elimination of a U.S. manufacturer of computers for helicopters from the short list of potential suppliers. The chief of the General Staff canceled a scheduled visit to the U.S.

The reaction was not confined to the government. The business association TÜSİAD sent a letter to the chair of the subcommittee, stating that the passage of the bill would have harmful effects on America's economic and trade interests in Turkey.

U.S. companies in the defense sector that were doing business in Turkey were seeking to persuade the members of the committee. Highly placed individuals (including a former secretary of defense, a deputy secretary of defense, and a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) were also involved in the lobbying. Seven of them, including William Perry, Alexander Haig, and Richard Perle, sent a joint letter to the chair of the committee, reminding him of Turkey's strategic importance and informing him that the passage of the bill would have adverse effects on U.S. interests.

But all of these efforts were to no avail. On 3 October the Foreign Relations Committee approved bill 596, with twenty-four votes in favor, eleven against, and two abstentions. This meant that the bill would now go to the floor of the House of Representatives for consideration. At this point the U.S. secretaries of state and defense sent a joint letter calling for the rejection of the bill. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the bill would harm regional stability. In an unusual move, the director of the CIA sent the Speaker of the House a letter warning of the negative impact that the passage of the bill would have.

The item was placed on the agenda of the House of Representatives on 20 October, and observers expected a majority of its 435 members to approve the bill. At this point an unexpected development took place when President Clinton sent a letter to the House Speaker, asking him to withdraw the bill. Clinton indicated that the bill's timing was bad and that the U.S. had significant interests

in this troubled region that would be harmed by passing such a bill. Clinton also warned that the bill would be counterproductive and would only worsen Turkey's relations with Armenia. In response, the Speaker announced that he favored the bill but would withdraw it in the face of the president's arguments.

Turkey received the news of the bill's withdrawal with satisfaction and relief, even though Clinton had expressed his regret at the "massacres" that occurred from 1915 to 1923. Clinton had asked for the withdrawal of the bill in the face of dangerous developments in the region, including in particular the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. In other words, the president objected not to the bill but to its timing. By extending the date of the massacres to 1923, Clinton was including the period that covered Turkey's War of Liberation.

Clinton made his last-minute intervention because he did not want a confrontation with an ally with which the U.S. had an "enhanced partnership." In his intervention, the president reaffirmed Turkey's importance for U.S. interests in the sensitive region stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia. He also considered the defense and energy contracts that Turkey was about to place. The uprising and instability facing Israel also helped remind the U.S. administration that it needed Turkey on its side. This explosive situation provided Clinton with a useful justification for his intervention.

Toward the end of 2000 the Turkish MFA considered the possibility of neutralizing the Armenian diaspora by developing relations with Armenia, especially in the economic field. These plans could not be put into effect, however, due to fears of alienating Azerbaijan.

The French and Italian parliaments as well as the European Parliament placed the Armenian genocide issue on their agendas at about this time. This created problems for Turkey with European countries and led to claims that a concerted international campaign was being waged against Turkey. Public apprehension was compounded by the fact that the Kurdish question began to figure prominently in relations with the EU. The organization of a Conference on the Treaty of Sèvres in Yerevan in August 2000 only made things worse.

## F. The U.S., Political Islam, and Relations with the Refahyol Government

In the 1980s the U.S. sought to create a "Green Belt" in its struggle with the USSR and gave its support to Islamic countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In the post–Cold War period, the international situation had changed, and with it the U.S. approach to Islam.

#### The U.S. after the Cold War and Political Islam

In 1993 the American political scholar Samuel Huntington expounded his theory that after the Cold War the world would be polarized according to civilizations and that religion constituted the basis of civilizations. This theory led to speculation that the U.S. was seeking a common threat to hold the West together after the collapse of communism and that this threat was political Islam. This view was criticized in many U.S. circles as not credible, however, and Washington shied away from taking this course.

In the 1990s the USSR had disappeared and the question of using Islam to fight communism had ceased to be relevant. But political Islam was seen as a political factor by the U.S., and Washington sought to maintain its ties with it during this period. In this context, Washington maintained its links with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which practiced an extreme form of Islam, as well as with the fairly radical Islamic groups in Daghestan and Chechnya in the northern Caucasus. In addition, the U.S. focused its attention mainly on Islamic movements that could be considered moderate. Washington held that movements and parties of this tendency in places such as Malaysia, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey should be drawn into the political process. This approach was led by Graham Fuller, an American expert on the Middle East and Turkey. He argued that drawing such parties into the political process would transform them into mainstream parties that could be accommodated in the political life of Muslim lands. The responsibility of governing would help moderate Islamic parties and turn them into the likes of the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. Turkey experienced this process when the Welfare Party (Refah) came to power.

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## The Islamic Movement in Turkey, the Refahyol Government, and the U.S.

In 1989 the Rand Corporation prepared a report on Islamic currents in Turkey at a time when the global scene was undergoing fundamental changes. The report concluded that Islamic currents in Turkey posed no threat to U.S. interests and recommended that channels of communication with these movements should be established.

In this framework, the U.S. concentrated its attention on Fethullah Gülen's group, which operated as a community organization within the Islamic movement in Turkey and the Welfare Party, which operated as a political party.

The U.S. links with the Gülen community included the support given to its educational activities not just in Turkey but also in Central Asia (see "The Opening Up of Turkey to the Caucasus and Central Asia and the Stand of the U.S." above).

A number of events shed light on the U.S. backing for Gülen and Washington's approach to Turkey's secularism. Fethullah Gülen had been living in the U.S., ostensibly for medical treatment. During these stays he met with U.S. religious personalities, including a cardinal. With U.S. backing, Gülen had an audience with the pope in the Vatican, during which he was depicted as a statesman representing Islam. Turkey's ambassador to the Vatican was at the airport to receive Gülen, presumably under instructions from Ankara.

News began to circulate that the U.S. favored a pro-American Islamic administration that would be pliable toward Washington. Experts with close links to the U.S. administration began to assert that Turkish concepts and practices like Kemalism and secularism were outdated. All of this raised the suspicion that Washington was not satisfied with the orientation of the Turkish regime. These suspicions were reinforced by the new currents that began to appear in Turkey in the late 1980s, including "Neo-Ottomanism" and "Second Republicanism."

Aside from these claims, the U.S. approach to political Islam in Turkey and Washington's links with the movement were presented as human rights issues.

This U.S. approach was nothing new. The new development was that the process of moderate Islam taking power in Turkey was well underway. The process developed when the Welfare Party came to power in a coalition government in 1996. It would reach its zenith when the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP: Justice and Development Party) of Tayyip Erdoğan took the reigns of power in 2002 and again in 2007.

Unlike the other parties that came to power in the 1990s, the Welfare Party's foreign policy platform rested on anti-West, anti-U.S., and anti-Israel principles. That is why the foreign policy stand of the Refahyol coalition (of the Welfare Party and True Path Party) was awaited with great interest.

There were many initial difficulties. In August 1996 Erbakan went to Tehran, his first foreign visit. There he signed a natural gas agreement, which was not well received in Washington. During the prime minister's visit to Libya, Khaddafi's remarks about Turkey's political structure and the Kurdish question caused outrage in Turkey.

The U.S. was facing a dilemma. Open opposition to the Welfare Party would lead to accusations of interference in Turkey's domestic affairs. At the same time, entering into cooperation with this government and lending it support would aggravate the Turkish military establishment and secular circles.

With the passage of time, the Welfare wing of the coalition sought an accommodation with the U.S. and sent two ministers, Fehmi Adak and Abdullah Gül, to Washington. After this, the leaders of Welfare began to declare that they were in favor of secularism in Turkey along the lines of the U.S. model, even though they never described exactly what they meant (see Box Intro-1 in the Introduction). Although the Welfare Party sought to convey a message to its constituency that would be consistent with its past rhetoric, its actions did not differ in any way from the actions of previous governments. In foreign policy, it developed relations with Israel, extended the term of Operation Provide Comfort, and allowed the Kurds who operated on behalf of U.S. intelligence to be evacuated from northern Iraq via Turkey in September 1996. Welfare Party objectives such as an Islamic NATO, an Islamic Common Market, and the D-8 initiative were utopian projects far removed from daily reality and were recognized as empty rhetoric bearing no relation to Turkey's overall foreign policy orientation.

At a time when there was much talk of a possible coup in Turkey, the U.S. made it known through different channels that it would not favor the overthrow of the Turkish government through a coup. After the Cold War, military coups were definitely out of favor. Although the U.S. continued to support some undemocratic regimes, it had proclaimed democracy and human rights to be the foundation stones of globalization and the New World Order. Furthermore, Washington wanted to use Turkey as a model in the process of the democratization of the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Another consideration that held the U.S. back was that support for a coup would be a deviation from the policy of coming to terms with political Islam. Washington feared that this might lead to the radicalization of the Islamist movement in Turkey and result in the Turkish government's closer cooperation with the fundamentalist movements of the Middle East. That is why Washington's message this time was that problems had to be resolved within the framework of democracy and human rights. By proclaiming itself to be in favor of "secular democracy," the U.S. sought to curry favor with both the secular circles of Turkey and Islamists.

The U.S. approach to Islamism in Turkey and to its political manifestation in the form of the Welfare Party acquired a new dimension in the course of the legal proceedings that led to the closing down of this party. The U.S. openly declared that it was against banning the party.

Washington also made its policy known when the American consul in İstanbul visited the city's former mayor, Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been tried for his antisecular remarks and sentenced to serve a term in prison.

The Welfare Party made a number of overtures to the East and to Islamic countries during its tenure in government, but it also managed to establish close relations with the U.S. Although radical Islamist groups were active in Europe and especially in Germany, the Welfare Party preferred to maintain close contact with the U.S. because of its awareness of U.S. influence in Turkey, being perfectly conscious of the many ties that bound Turkey and its institutions like the armed forces to the U.S. Moreover, Washington was all in favor of drawing the Welfare Party into the political system.

## V. THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR AND TURKEY

# A. The Transformation of NATO and the New Strategy

In November and December of 1989 the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed in quick succession. This was followed by the disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991 and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. These developments led to an intense debate about the place and function of NATO in the new international setting. Some held the view that NATO should come to an end in a situation where there was no opponent to confront. This view was opposed by others who claimed that NATO should undergo a restructuring, in order to face the security threats of the new era. There were also differing views on whether NATO should seek to expand or not.

Having emerged as the winner of the Cold War in the 1990s, NATO did not cease to exist. On the contrary, it expanded and assumed new functions. During this period NATO's agenda consisted of issues such as the role of the organization in the new international environment, relations between the U.S. and Europe, the buildup of the EU's security structure, and the enlargement of the organization. The decisions on the restructuring and transformation of NATO were made at two NATO summit meetings held in the early 1990s.

## The London and Rome Summits and the New Strategy

The reduction in international tension had a direct effect on NATO's internal development. At the NATO summit held in Brussels in 1989, the U.S. unexpectedly announced that it was reducing its forces in Western Europe and called for the acceleration of the conventional arms reduction process. After the collapse of the regimes of Eastern Europe at the end of that year, the meeting of NATO defense ministers decided to abandon the target of raising defense spending by 3% and to downgrade the "threat" from Eastern Europe to the level of "risk."

The changes in NATO's structure became more apparent at the London Summit held in July 1990. At this meeting, it was announced that Warsaw Pact members would no longer be defined as the enemy. Gorbachev, the leader of the USSR, was invited to the NATO meeting, and a nonaggression pact was proposed. On the strategic plane, NATO would support the limitation of armaments, abandon the strategy of forward defense, and review the strategy of flexible response (see Box 6-10 in Section 6).

The foundation of NATO's strategy for the post—Cold War era was laid at the Rome Summit, held in November 1991. At the same time, NATO's relations with the Eastern European countries and the USSR were set on a new footing, while the status of transatlantic relations was changed:

- NATO members were no longer under the threat of an all-out attack. This threat was now replaced by risks coming from different directions, however, which were difficult to define. Among these risks were the spread of weapons of mass destruction, interruptions in the supply of vital resources like oil, terrorism, and sabotage.
- NATO was shifting from the concept of threat to the concept of risk.
- NATO would cooperate with the EU, with the WEU, and with the OSCE and join UN missions. All of these activities were seen as complementary.

This was the first summit after the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, and the new structure and functions of the organization were designed to reflect the new situation.

The New Military Strategy and NATO's New Role

NATO's strategic planning developed along the lines of the decisions of the Rome Summit. From 1967 to the end of the 1980s NATO's strategy was based on the doctrines of forward defense and flexible response. The new strategy abandoned flexible response and replaced it with a strategy based on reduced reliance on nuclear forces, which would be considered a last resort. In other words, nuclear weapons would be maintained, but their function would be to deter aggression, even if the possibility

of aggression was very low. After 1991 a reduced number of NATO's nuclear weapons were no longer locked onto specific targets, and this also applied to Russian weapons.

The strategy of forward defense was replaced by the strategy of reduced forward presence. The strategy of forward defense had been designed to transfer the frontline of a conventional war onto enemy territory, relying on the increased effectiveness of conventional weapons. This strategy was important for Germany, which had a high concentration of population, and to Turkey, a flank country. But forward defense became meaningless when there was no specific enemy and significant reductions had been made in conventional weapons. At the London Summit of July 1990, it was decided to abandon this strategy wherever it applied, and this decision was confirmed in 1991 at the Rome Summit. Because there was no significant threat to NATO's Central Region, it was decided to create more flexible units with greater mobility in this region.

NATO's new-era strategy had been designed in the conditions of 1991, which also took care of maintaining a balanced approach toward Russia. But with the changes taking place (especially in Europe) after that date, it became necessary to rethink NATO's strategy once again. When NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit was held in Washington in April 1999, the new strategic concept included the maintenance of transatlantic ties, greater responsibilities for the European allies, and the accession of new members to the alliance.

In reality, the Washington Summit made formal decisions on the basis of NATO actions taken in the 1990s, such as the peacekeeping forces fielded in Bosnia and Kosovo and the European Security and Defense Identity (examined below).

The process of redefining NATO's functions and restructuring the organization that began in the early 1990s was given its final form at the 1999 Washington Summit with the formulation of the strategic concept. At the meeting, it was noted that the international environment presented many uncertainties and that NATO had to operate under these conditions. These conditions included the instability in the European-Atlantic region and its periphery; ethnic and sectarian strife; territorial disputes; serious economic, social, and political difficulties; human rights abuses; and the disintegration of states.

It was underlined that the basic function of the alliance was the protection of the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members. At the same time, however, the alliance assumed the responsibility of contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability as one of the basic pillars of its new strategy. That is why the Washington Summit reaffirmed the concepts of security, consultation, deterrence and defense, and crisis management.

In this framework, NATO adopted the concept of non-article 5 operations. This implied that NATO was ready to intervene in situations where a member of NATO had not been a victim of direct aggression. To carry out this function the Defense Capabilities Initiative was undertaken. This involved the creation of highly mobile units, well-trained and ready to intervene at short notice in crisis operations outside NATO territories. These operations would be conducted by NATO members in cooperation with partners. It was also reaffirmed that NATO would contribute to peacekeeping operations at the request of other organizations such as the UN Security Council or the OSCE.

As NATO agreed to get involved in operations outside the territory of its members and without the triggering mechanism of article 5 of the treaty, the question of out-of-area operations that had been much discussed before the 1990s lost its relevance.

Turkey had been involved in the debates over the out-of-area question in the past, and the new situation affected its position. To cite an example, Turkey approved the NATO decision to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorization of the UN Security Council and even participated in the operation. Turkey also placed some of the bases located on its soil at the disposal of the alliance. NATO decisions were taken by consensus, however, which meant that Turkey would be able to decide its position on further operations on a case-by-case basis. In cases where NATO would need to use Turkish military installations in future non-article 5 operations, Ankara would negotiate the issue within NATO.

Another development in this period that affected NATO's strategy was the significant progress made in the field of arms limitation. The process started in 1987 with the INF treaty (which eliminated intermediate-range missiles), followed by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990 (which drastically reduced conventional forces) and the decision to reduce short-range nuclear weapons in 1991. The process accelerated with the elimination of 1,400 short-range nuclear weapons from Europe in July 1992 and the START II treaty of 1993, providing for the reduction in nuclear weapons. As a result of these reductions, NATO's armies were cut by 35%, its naval forces by 30%, and its air forces by 40%. The nuclear

weapons in the territories of NATO's European members were reduced by 80%.

One of the most salient aspects of NATO's changing strategy was that, although the alliance maintained the concept of collective defense, it assumed new roles in keeping with the changed international environment. This was seen in Europe in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, where ethnic strife brought about mass migrations. NATO was being transformed to deal with such questions as well.

The first step in this direction was taken at the Oslo meeting of NATO foreign ministers held in June 1992, when the ministers agreed that NATO would undertake the function of preserving peace in crises occurring in Europe and that the OSCE could appeal to NATO for help in preserving peace. The help that NATO members would furnish in such cases was left to the discretion of each individual member. In December 1992 NATO notified the UN Security Council that it was ready to join in peace-keeping operations.

NATO also underwent institutional restructuring to facilitate its participation in peacekeeping activities. In January 1994 it decided to set up the Joint Combined Task Force. This decision, reconfirmed at the Berlin meeting of foreign ministers held in June 1996, had two aims.

1. An effort was being made to lay the groundwork for NATO to engage in peacekeeping operations with nonmember countries. Nonmembers would be able to use their national armies and NATO headquarters in these operations, while the forces of NATO members would continue to carry out their responsibilities within NATO and take part in operations. This was first tried in Bosnia.

2. Germany and France led the group that wanted to develop a European security system, while the U.S. and Britain represented the group that emphasized NATO in common defense. These two approaches were being reconciled. The new task force would allow forces not belonging to NATO to participate in operations of this nature. An example would be Eurocorps, which was being set up by some EU members. This compromise would subsequently break down.

#### NATO's Changing Strategy and Turkey

In the early 1990s Turkey was becoming increasingly concerned about a possible disbanding or downgrading of NATO. It was also concerned about a weakening of the transatlantic link and the strengthening of the European part of the alliance. Turkey was also unenthusiastic about the enlargement of NATO by admitting new members. Ankara shared the U.S. view that NATO must be preserved as a strong alliance under America's leadership in the post—Cold War period.

At the 1991 Rome Summit, Turkey defended the view that European security was indivisible. Ankara held that the OSCE, NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe must act in unison in dealing with regional instability. This approach corresponded to the American view.

Furthermore, Turkey adopted the Anglo-American line in NATO by emphasizing the preservation of the transatlantic link. Ankara did not want to see the U.S. abandon Europe; nor was it very eager to see the development of the EU's security component. In defending its position, Turkey based its argument mainly on the failure of European institutions to deal effectively with interethnic strife in Yugoslavia.

In the area of arms reduction, Ankara welcomed the decision on the elimination of nuclear artillery, which was of direct concern to Turkey. These weapons, which were located in places like İstanbul, Çorlu, and Erzurum, were removed as a consequence of this decision.

At this time, when the threat from the East had disappeared, NATO began to perceive Turkey as the barrier that protected the alliance from the instability reigning in the region stretching from the Maghreb to the Persian Gulf. This perception was articulated by NATO secretary-general Manfred Wörner, who said that Turkey was directly threatened by illegal immigration, radical religion, terrorism, and instability and had an important role to play in combating these threats. Turkish spokespersons stressed that Turkey was no longer a flank country as in the Cold War but was now a "central front" country.

#### NATO's Expansion and Turkey

In general terms, Turkey was unhappy about NATO's expansion (Box 7-17). But it was also aware that it could not prevent this. Although not articulated in official statements, Ankara's concerns were the following:

- NATO would cease to be an exclusive club of a select number of Western states, and Turkey's privileged position would become diluted.
- The new members would be in no position to make a positive contribution to Turkey's security. On the contrary, the new members would impose additional security responsibilities on the alliance and on Turkey.
- The attention of the U.S. and other NATO members would shift to the new members, and priority would be given to meeting their needs. This could lead to less aid for Turkey. Indeed, this later proved to be the case.
- In order to appease Russia's opposition to NATO expansion, the U.S. displayed a tendency to give Russia a free hand in other regions, especially in the Cauca-

#### Box 7-17. NATO'S Expansion

After the regime changes of 1989 and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the interest of the Western states was directed toward Central and Eastern Europe. Their main concern was to prevent the countries of this region from returning to Russia's orbit by reintegrating them in the European political and economic system. At the time: Russia still maintained troops in these countries and did not fully withdraw them until 1994. It was believed that one of the most effective ways of integrating these countries within the Western system would be by developing their relations with NATO.

NATO acted with speed: in December 1991 it established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and appealed to the former socialist countries to engage in dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. Most of the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia became members of the NACC. With the accession of Georgia and Albania in June 1992, the membership of the body rose to thirty-eight, including the sixteen NATO members. In this way, the former socialist states became involved in exchange visits, training, consultations, and other forms of cooperation that created new links with NATO.

The members of the NACC from Eastern Europe (and especially Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) appeared to be eager for NATO membership. In order to avoid arousing Russian hostility and at the same time avoid disappointing these countries, a compromise solution was found in the form of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project in January 1994. Russia and the Eastern European, Central Asian, and Caucasian states, with the exception of Tajikistan, all became members of the PfP. They were also joined by Slovenia, Finland, and Sweden.

This was a step further on the road to integration. The menibers of the PFP were allowed to set up a liaison office in Brussals and participated in joint exercises along with NATO members. This brought the countries with the appropriate political and geographic conditions closer to full NATO membership, while the remainder strengthened their relationship. The Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) still had security concerns and did not consider NATO's yerbal assurances to be adequate.

The principle of expansion was accepted at the Brussels Summit of 1994, and it was decided to develop the PfP further. Expansion posed three problems, however: Russia's continuing opposition, selecting the countries for membership, and meeting the costs that expansion would entail. NATO diplomats made a major effort to persuade Russia, which was given assurances that nuclear weapons would not be deployed in the new member countries, that no changes would be made in NATO's nuclear strategy, and that no additional combat units would be deployed on the territories of the new members. Furthermore, the new members would have to abide by the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement.

Because the NACC no longer responded to changed requirements, it was replaced in mid-1997 with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. At the same time, the PIP was being strengthened.

At the NATO summit held in Madrid in June 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were issued invitations to join NATO. Their membership was formalized in early 1999, raising the membership of the alliance to nineteen.

In 2004 the membership rose to twenty six with the admission of seven other states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). At the Bucharest summit of 2008, Albania and Croatia were invited to begin accession talks.

(İ. UZGEL)

sus. Russia was allowed to maintain forces in Armenia and to ignore the terms of the CFE agreement in the region. This approach was causing apprehension in Turkey.

During the process of expansion, Turkey collaborated with the southern members of the alliance like France and Italy and supported the membership of Romania and Slovenia to balance NATO's eastward expansion. Turkey favored maintaining a geographical balance in NATO's expansion and advocated the admission of at least one Balkan state in the first wave of expansion. The preferred Balkan candidate was Romania, because as a Black Sea state it would help balance Russian predominance in the Black Sea once it joined NATO.

In the process of NATO's expansion, Turkey sought to take advantage of its right of veto. It attempted to link NATO expansion with its candidacy for the EU prior to the EU's Luxembourg Summit of 1997. This tactic failed to produce the desired result, however, because Turkey's EU candidacy depended on many other criteria other than security. In fact, Turkey had already been forced to abandon this position in July 1997, when it approved NATO's expansion plan at the Madrid Summit. Turkey then in-

troduced some flexibility to its position by adopting the view that the expansion of NATO should follow a course parallel to the expansion of the EU and WEU. As new members were being admitted to NATO, new members (meaning Turkey) should be admitted to the EU and the WEU in order to ensure a balanced expansion in Europe's security structure. The EU eventually expanded by admitting Austria, Sweden, and Finland; and NATO expanded by admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Turkey was unable to gain admission to the EU or to block the expansion of NATO. Turkey threatened to use its veto power once again when the question of the European Security and Defense Identity and its use of NATO facilities came up.

Turkey's veto threat did not work, because it had already approved the principle of NATO's expansion at previous summits. Furthermore, Ankara could not afford to enter into a confrontation with the U.S. on this issue.

In addition, it was not very convincing to link the expansion of NATO, an organization designed to ensure security, with the expansion of the EU, which was a supranational economic and political integration project. In a sense, Turkey was continuing its practice dating from the

Cold War, when it received economic aid in return for its security and strategic cooperation.

Another reason was that NATO's expansion was not related only to NATO and its structure. The question was intimately linked with global issues such as U.S.-European, U.S.-Russian, and European-Russian relations. It was not credible for Turkey to raise the veto issue under the circumstances.

Finally, there was a lot of confusion and backtracking on the issue of NATO expansion in Ankara because this coincided with the coalition government, when the Welfare Party was in power and Tansu Çiller was foreign minister, and the country was deeply preoccupied with domestic politics.

The outcome of all this was that Turkey's credibility would be greatly reduced if it should threaten to use its veto power in the future even on good grounds. Turkey's position had also jolted the U.S., which until then had always found Turkey on its side on matters dealing with NATO.

### The National Missile Defense System (Missile Shield) and Turkey

The Strategic Defense Initiative was conceived by President Reagan but was never implemented. This issue resurfaced in the late 1990s in the Clinton administration under a different label and based on a different concept. Whereas the SDI was conceived to defend against an attack from the USSR, the new system was to provide defense against missiles coming from rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

In a 1998 report prepared by Donald Rumsfeld (who would become secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration), it was claimed that the rogue states had a greater missile capability than commonly thought and that they constituted a very serious threat. The National Intelligence Assessment Report of 1999 confirmed the findings of the Rumsfeld report and declared that within fifteen years the U.S. would be confronted with the threat of intercontinental missiles located in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The U.S. declared that it was also eager to shield allies like Turkey, South Korea, and Japan from the threat posed by rogue states.

Actually, the U.S. knew that the missiles possessed by these states did not have the range to reach targets in the U.S. Washington was intent on circumventing the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile Agreement, which forbade the setting up of anti–ballistic missile systems. With this project, the U.S. would protect itself against Russia and China, become invulnerable to missiles and reinforce its posi-

tion as the sole superpower, expand its room for maneuver, and maintain its superiority in civilian and military technologies.

The project consisted of interceptor systems to be deployed on land and at sea, designed to destroy missiles in the air. The system would be controlled by means of satellites and cost around \$100 billion. The first tests of the system during the Clinton administration were unsuccessful, and the project was left for implementation by the next administration.

Russia and China were opposed to the project, while NATO members were reluctant to cooperate in the venture. Turkey appeared to favor the project, however, and Turkish military personnel were present at the initial simulation exercises. Washington wanted Turkey to be included in this initiative and announced that 75% of Turkey's territory was within the range of missiles belonging to neighbors like Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Four of the five rogue states on the U.S. list (Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya) were in the neighborhood of Turkey.

Turkey had a positive approach toward the missile shield project, given the development of missiles among its neighbors, but there were also good reasons for Ankara to proceed with caution. First, the all-important question of how the project would be financed was not settled. Furthermore, Turkey wanted to see other NATO members, including Greece, taking part in the project. Ankara also wished to develop its relations with neighbors and felt that the project would have a negative impact on these relations. Finally, Russia was opposed to the project.

## B. The Emergence of the New Defense Identity in Europe: The WEU, the CDSP, and Turkey The Development of the WEU and the CDSP

As Europe began to emerge as a bloc in the international arena during the 1990s, it set about establishing a common currency. In this process, attention was also directed at the important question of collective security and the establishment of a security organization.

The Western European Union (WEU) was established under the Brussels Treaty of 1948 but acquired this title only in 1954 when Italy and Germany joined. After remaining on paper for decades, it was revived in 1984 at the initiative of France and Germany. The Council of Ministers of the WEU decided in October 1987 to develop relations with NATO and to consult on a regular basis on questions of European defense and security in order to enhance the effectiveness of the organization.

But the most significant development occurred in

December 1991 at the Maastricht Summit, when it was decided to revive the dormant organization in order to establish a security structure for the EU. This would be done by linking the EU and WEU. The decision entailed the development of the European Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP), the automatic membership of all EU countries in the WEU, and the shifting of the WEU Council and Secretariat from London to Brussels.

In May 1992 the first steps were taken toward establishing a European army with the creation of the Eurocorps, made up of French and German units. At Petersberg in 1992, the WEU decided to take part in peacekeeping, peacemaking, crisis prevention, and humanitarian missions. The WEU also came to the conclusion that the European pillar of NATO had to be strengthened. Questions relating to Europe's security and defense, including the WEU, began to be considered under the title European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). At the NATO summit held in Brussels in 1994, the development of ESDI was supported.

The WEU did not have the wherewithal to carry out the tasks assigned to it at Petersberg, however. For this reason, NATO established the Joint Combined Task Force (JCTF) in 1994, and it was agreed that the WEU would make use of the means at the disposal of the JCTF. Thus the WEU was provided with the possibility to use NATO's command and control and communications facilities and rely on NATO's personnel during this transition phase. At the same time, NATO had made sure that the ESDI would develop under its wing. As the EU developed its security identity, it felt the need to rely on NATO, especially after its singular lack of success in Bosnia. The aim was to develop military capabilities that were separable but not separate, NATO also wanted the EU to consult with it before undertaking an operation to determine whether NATO was prepared to undertake the mission or not. In other words, NATO wanted to have the first right of refusal.

At the EU Amsterdam Summit of 1997, the WEU was recognized as the security organization of the European Union. At the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997, it was decided that the WEU would participate in NATO's planning process. It was subsequently agreed to provide the WEU with the capability to intervene in regional crises and to give it a structure that would preclude the possibility of a veto by NATO members that belonged to the EU.

At the Washington Summit of NATO that took place in April 1999, the EU obtained the right to intervene in a situation in which NATO did not intervene by using the means at NATO's disposal. But the EU could avail itself of NATO's means in such situations (known as NATO's first right of refusal) only with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, the decision-making organ of NATO.

Toward the end of the 1990s the EU accelerated its efforts to create its army, despite the objections of the U.S. Former NATO secretary-general Javier Solana was appointed as the EU's joint defense and foreign policy senior representative and secretary-general of the WEU. At the EU's Cologne Summit in June 1999, the WEU was absorbed within the EU. The WEU had concluded its mission as an organization dealing with the EU's security issues and came to an end in May 2000.

The Helsinki Summit of the EU held in December 1999 established a headline goal whereby a European rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops would be established by 2003. It would have the capability of being deployed to a crisis zone within two months and would be able to operate there for a full year. The force would be under the exclusive control of EU member states. It was agreed that the force would undertake missions in which NATO did not participate. This conveyed the message that cooperation with NATO would continue.

At the EU Summit in June 2000 held at Feira, Portugal, new principles were adopted with respect to the contributions of Turkey and Norway (NATO members that were not members of EU) and Slovenia and Bulgaria (candidates for accession to the EU). The nature of the decisions made and Turkey's reaction to them are examined below. Steps were taken to facilitate the EU's use of NATO's means, and mechanisms were developed to ensure the exchange of information between the two organizations. Cooperation between these two bodies was being intensified, notably in the region of the Balkans.

The EU was seeking the ability to intervene on its own in trouble spots like Bosnia and Kosovo. The EU was in a dilemma. It wanted to be a power in its own right and have the capability of intervening in crises like Bosnia and Kosovo independently of the U.S. and NATO. At the same time, it was having difficulty in getting organized to carry out these missions and provide the financial means that were required.

By 1999 the EU was determined to establish its own security identity but was confronted by a number of obstacles:

- The forces of WEU members were all assigned to NATO, and it was difficult to create the extra forces required by the new restructuring. To create a force of 60,000 with the capability of operating for one year, it would be necessary to employ 200,000 personnel.
- The proposed restructuring required substantial additional financial resources. Public opinion was against

raising defense spending, however, at a time when defense budgets were being trimmed. Germany's defense spending in relation to its GNP had been cut to 1.5%, and Britain's was down to 2.5%. Merely providing for transport (and especially air transport capability) called for expenditures in the order of \$62 billion.

- The WEU was far from having the resources in command and control, intelligence, satellite surveillance, communications, and planning that were at NATO's disposal and was utterly dependent on NATO in these areas. Nor did it have the bases and headquarters that were required. In Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, it was the U.S. Air Force that largely carried out the bombings. The European allies were incapable of providing even adequate air transport to ferry troops.
- Should a crisis in which WEU members were involved escalate and begin to threaten WEU members themselves, it was not clear that NATO's article 5 calling for other allies to intervene to repel an attack would apply.

#### Turkey, the WEU, and the ESDI/ESDP

Turkey's institutional association with the European security structures went through several developments.

When Turkey applied for accession to the EC in April 1987, it also applied to join the WEU, which was being revived at the time. The members of the EC attributed great importance to the WEU as the embodiment of the European defense identity and would not relish including a nonmember like Turkey. The Europeans could not envision Turkey's membership even in the medium term, so instead they granted Turkey associate membership in the WEU in 1992. The other associate members were Norway and Iceland, joined by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999.

In 1994 membership in the WEU was made conditional on membership in the EU, which closed the door on Turkish membership in the WEU. This meant that Turkey's links with the EU consisted of associate membership and, since 1996, membership in the customs union, while its link with the WEU was also confined to associate membership. Associate members were allowed to take part in meetings of the WEU Council but not to vote. Ankara was in a situation where it was not able to influence decisions that had binding effects on Turkey. Turkey welcomed the WEU decision of 1997 under which associate members were allowed to take part, along with full members, in the planning and decision-making process in operations in which they participated directly, although it considered this step insufficient. Turkey also of

fered to participate in the force that would be set up along the lines adopted in the headline goal. This participation would consist of a unit of 3,000 men. The Turkish offer was made because Ankara feared that its position would suffer further erosion with the ending of the WEU. But the EU failed to take up Ankara's offer.

The founding charter of the WEU (the 1948 Brussels Treaty) actually made no provision for associate membership. This meant that Turkey's legal status within the WEU was imprecise. That is why Turkey was seeking some legal arrangement to overcome this situation.

Turkey's approach to Europe's efforts toward building up its security organization can be summarized as follows:

- This new organization should not be an alternative to NATO. NATO has been tested over a span of fifty years and has proven to be effective.
- In its approach to the question of security, Europe should not be guided solely by considerations of integration. It should also take into account the region's strategic environment and security requirements.
- All the European members of NATO should automatically become full members of the WEU and participate in ESDI.
- If the EU insists on setting up its own security structure, this should be done in a manner that would make it the European pillar of NATO.
- The transatlantic link (that is, the organic link with the U.S.) should be preserved.
- Turkey is unlike other NATO members that are not WEU members. As the country with the second largest army in Europe, Turkey has made a solid contribution to Europe's security for fifty years.
- In the post-Cold War era, sixteen potential sources of trouble have been identified. Of these, thirteen are in the neighborhood of Turkey. Under these circumstances, it is not rational to leave Turkey outside ESDI.

The Turkish and U.S. approaches to ESDI were generally convergent. Although the U.S. did not take a position of outright opposition to ESDI, it was uncomfortable with the idea of Europe setting up a security structure that was completely separate from NATO. Washington went so far as to declare that NATO would be nothing more than a historic relic if Europe went ahead and established its own army without first seeking an agreement.

In its efforts to prevent its total exclusion from ESDI, Turkey's strongest card was its membership in NATO. At the NATO summit in April 1999, Turkey secured the inclusion of paragraph 17 in the Strategic Concept paper.

This paragraph noted that the EU was taking steps to strengthen its security and defense dimension and was in the process of accelerating its efforts in that direction. This process was bound to have important effects on the alliance. Based on the arrangements made by NATO and the WEU, paragraph 17 stated that the European allies should be included in this process.

Although Turkey was accepted as a candidate for accession at the EU's Helsinki Summit in December 1999, its place in matters dealing with European security continued to erode. As Europe accelerated the process of building up the ESDP, there was no room for Turkey in the decision-making process. In fact, in June 1999 it was decided to allow the ESDP to make use of NATO facilities without consulting countries like Turkey, even though the decision had been made at the Washington NATO summit in April 1999 that NATO members who were not members of the EU would participate in European security and defense activities. This angered Ankara and compelled the government to use its NATO card when it threatened that it might veto the WEU's use of NATO facilities if Turkey continued to be obstructed on this issue.

As mentioned previously, the subject of how non-EU members would contribute to European security was taken up at the EU summit held at Feira in June 2000. It was decided on that occasion that, if the European Council decided to carry out an operation and use NATO facilities for this purpose, countries like Turkey that were members of NATO but not of the EU could participate in the operation.

The EU also proposed institutional arrangements to cater to the needs of countries like Turkey and came up with the 15 + 6 formula. Under the formula, the fifteen members of the EU and therefore of the WEU would get together with the six members of NATO that were not members of the WEU (Turkey, Iceland, Norway, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) under a consultative arrangement that provided for meetings twice a year. In addition, NATO and the WEU would form four working groups to consider matters of common interest.

The decisions of the Feira summit did not satisfy Turkey. They did not involve participation and cooperation on a political and strategic plane but a consultative mechanism at a lower level. No distinction was made between autonomous EU operations and operations carried out with NATO backup and support. Instead of setting up a single permanent structure, an arrangement involving dialogue, consultation, and cooperation was foreseen. No place was provided in the EU's military structure for NATO members that were not members of the EU.

Turkey's dissatisfaction with the ESDI arrangements led it to insist that the EU seek the approval and obtain the authorization of the alliance for all EU operations that would make use of NATO facilities. At the NATO meeting held in Brussels in July 2000, Turkey was able to secure a formal decision to this effect. Although the Turkish press described this as a success for Turkey, the decision resulted not just from the firm Turkish stand but from U.S. support for Turkey at the meeting. Ankara did not want to find itself in a situation where its troops assigned to NATO would go into action as a result of the EU's use of NATO's means when Turkey had not been involved in the decision or given its consent. That is why it was insisting on explicit prior authorization by NATO of each operation in which the EU wanted to have recourse to NATO facilities.

The EU held to its decision not to admit Turkey into the decision-making mechanism and preferred to confine Turkey within the consultative arrangements.

At the EU summit at Nice in early December 2000, the decision was made to provide the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with an autonomous rather than an independent structure. This was done at Britain's insistence and also conformed to the wishes of the U.S. The U.S. was worried that the EU might develop its own independent structure if it was denied access to NATO's facilities. That is why the U.S. was prepared to allow for the EU's use of NATO facilities through consultations. Turkey took a firm stand, however, because the EU was not ready to give assurances that countries in Turkey's position would be involved in the decision-making. Although President Clinton was generally supportive of Turkey, he appealed to Ankara to show more flexibility. But Ankara held to its position, and the meeting ended without a decision on the issue. Turkey had demonstrated that it could block progress on Europe's security restructuring and use the NATO card for this purpose. Turkey also wanted to use this card in connection with its membership in the EU. The media and public opinion in Turkey were backing Ankara's determined stand and contrasting it with Kenan Evren's consent to the Rogers Plan in 1980.

Turkey was unhappy with the determination of the EU to set up its own security structure for the following reasons:

- Turkey was not part of this process, and the likelihood that it would be admitted later was remote.
   Ankara was naturally against being excluded from a European security organization in the making while it claimed that Turkey was part of Europe.
- · Turkey had been a member of NATO for fifty years

and had made important military and other contributions to the alliance. Yet, when the EU started using NATO facilities within the framework of the ESDI, countries like Austria and Finland would be using NATO's facilities without ever having contributed anything to the organization while Turkey was being excluded from the decision-making arrangements of the ESDI. The difficulty arose because the EU wanted to make use of what was already in place without having to bother with creating a new structure.

- When Greece became a full member of the WEU, Turkey found itself confronted with a potential Greek veto in another European organization (the first being in the EU itself). This put Turkey at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis Greece, especially with respect to the questions of Cyprus and the Aegean, where the EU now confronted Turkey with a security organization. The difficulty did not disappear with the end of the WEU, because it was succeeded by the ESDP.
- While the EU was able to use NATO's facilities within the ESDP framework, Turkey was excluded from the decision-making bodies of the EU even though it was an associate member. This is why Turkey insisted on participating in decisions involving operations in which NATO facilities would be used. In operations where NATO facilities would not be used, Turkey wanted to participate at least in the process leading up to the decision-making stage.
- Turkey faced a number of political and economic problems in its bid to join the EU, in the areas of human rights, democratic procedures, hyperinflation, and its level of economic development. In the military field, however, Turkey found itself in a stronger position than most EU members. Its exclusion from the EU's security arrangements could only be explained by the EU's reluctance to see Turkey within the EU.
- Turkey was deeply disturbed by the possibility of the envisaged Rapid Intervention Force being used in Cyprus or the Aegean. When the European media included Cyprus among the disputes posing a threat to Europe in 2000, Turkey's apprehension increased.

The EU kept Turkey away from the ESDP because of the Greek veto and because it did not want the transatlantic link emphasized at a time when it was seeking to stand on its own feet and to distance itself from NATO. Because Turkey maintained close links with the U.S. at the time, the EU tended to perceive Turkey as a possible American Trojan horse within the ESDI.

Turkey maintained its stand throughout the late 1990s

and early 2000s and blocked all decisions that might allow the EU to use NATO facilities. In doing so, Turkey based itself on the argument that NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999 had decided that the ESDI would be built upon the WEU and would constitute the European pillar of NATO. Ankara held that the issue was not between Turkey and the EU but between NATO and the EU.

Turkey's firm stand led London and Washington to send high-level delegations to Ankara in order to persuade Turkey to soften its stance. Turkey attributed great importance to the issue, however, and maintained its position. Even the economic crises confronting Turkey at the end of 2000 and early 2001 did not lead Turkey to change its stand.

The diplomatic contacts allowed Turkey to clarify its position and its concerns with respect to the ESDP. Ankara was apprehensive over the possibility of an EU intervention in regions close to Turkey where it felt it had vital interests. Cyprus and the Aegean headed the list of these regions. The Greek opposition to Turkey's demands only confirmed Turkey's fears. Ankara's demands consisted of the following:

 In peacetime Ankara demanded full participation in the consultation arrangements and exercises. Turkey wanted to be in the decision-making process during a crisis and when operations were being undertaken. 

- At times when the EU decided to intervene in a crisis and mount operations by using NATO's means and facilities, Turkey wanted to be present at all phases of decision-making and implementation.
- When the EU intervened in a regional crisis without resorting to NATO, Turkey wanted guarantees that it would be allowed to participate in the operation and be given some say in the decision-making arrangements if Ankara deemed that the crisis was geographically close to Turkey and that its vital security interests were at stake.
- Crisis-management activities and operations would not be undertaken by the ESDP in situations where a NATO member (meaning Greece) happened to be a party.

Thus, even if the EU did not make use of NATO facilities, Ankara wanted to be in the decision-making process when the intervention was in a region of great interest to Turkey or concerned its security. Pressure was brought to bear on Ankara to modify this position. The U.S. and Britain were trying to reconcile the Turkish and EU approaches and proposed that Turkey participate in the implementation of operations in its vicinity but not in the decision. Turkey was seeking to constrain the EU from

engaging in operations even in cases where the EU would not use NATO facilities, despite not being a member of the EU. In a sense, this revealed Ankara's mistrust of the EU, even as it sought membership.

During this period the U.S. and Turkish positions on European security were identical or very similar, even though their considerations and objectives might have been different. The U.S. made no specific statement on the subject of Turkey's membership in the WEU. But it did provide general support for the membership of all European NATO members in the WEU. The U.S. supported Turkey's position by calling for all European members of NATO to be integrated in the WEU decision-making mechanism. At the debates in NATO on the subject, Washington stood by Ankara, The U.S. was motivated by the desire to keep an eye on the ESDI through Turkey and Britain as the ESDI/ESDP drifted away from NATO.

## C. Turkey's Defense Industries and Arms Procurement/Production Projects

The arms procurement and military modernization programs undertaken by Turkey in the 1980s were accelerated in the 1990s. In doing this, Ankara was motivated by the struggle against the PKK and the long-standing arms race with Greece as well as the ongoing instability and conflicts in its vicinity.

During the Cold War, the U.S. held first place as an arms supplier to Turkey, followed by Germany. In the 1990s American-made weapons and equipment made up 80% of Turkey's inventory. With the ending of the Cold War, however, it became noticeable that Turkey was seeking to diversify its sources of weapons through international bidding when it began to carry out the modernization of its armed forces. This was due to a number of factors: (1) the obstacles and restrictions placed by Congress and human rights groups on the sale of weapons by the U.S.; (2) the high rate of interest that applied to FMS credits and the subsequent end of FMS credits altogether; (3) the decision of some European countries (notably Germany) not to sell arms to Turkey on the grounds that they would be used against the PKK; and (4) the discovery in the 1980s that large arms-procurement projects could serve as a useful tool to extract political or economic concessions.

In the 1990s Israel, Italy, France, and Russia joined the countries from which Turkey procured arms or with which it undertook joint production projects.

From 1988 to 1999 Turkey spent over \$28 billion to modernize its armed forces. After 1999 a new philosophy was developed for defense procurement. Starting in the mid-1980s, Turkey became one of the major arms importers, and its defense spending was proportionately among the highest in the world.

As the Cold War came to an end, Turkey changed its defense strategy, which led to changes in its defense production and arms procurement projects. Turkey's defense doctrine was formulated in the light of the following developments:

- Turkey had become a "front country" in the 1990s.
   It was located at one of the most strategic points of the region referred to as Eurasia, and conflicts were raging on three sides. In these conditions, Turkey needed adequate military capabilities to serve as a deterrent.
- During the Gulf War of 1990-91, it became clear that the Turkish army was not adequately equipped to fight in a situation where it might find itself dragged into a conflict with Iraq.
- During this period Turkey experienced low-intensity conflict in the southeast, tension with Syria, and sporadic crises with Greece. This called for the ability to carry out "two and a half" wars (Syria, Greece, and the PKK) and the weaponry that such a strategy would require.
- Turkey was seeking the status of a regional power and the military capability that this status required.
- The forward defense strategy called for engaging potential aggressors beyond Turkey's borders.
- Ankara had adopted the policy of making military contributions to international crisis-management operations.

Although some of these factors underwent alterations with changing circumstances, the basic factors continued to apply. When the ten-year procurement program launched in 1985 expired, a new defense and procurement plan was prepared in 1995. In 1998 the policy paper on "The Turkish Defense Industry" was adopted in the light of the threats contained in the 1997 document on national security and defense.

In this framework, the resources that would be required to modernize the armed forces over the next twenty-five years were estimated at \$150 billion: \$55 billion for the army, \$35 billion for the navy, and \$60 billion for the air force. Of these huge sums, 35% would come from the budget of the Ministry of Defense, 18% from the Fund for Supporting the Defense Industry, 10% from the Turkish Defense Fund, and the rest from foreign credits. The most important project was the joint production of F-16 aircraft, which was completed in 1999. Toward the end of the 1990s forty-one projects were in the implementation

stage, including tanks and helicopters, upgrading of the communications network, early-warning aircraft, and the adoption of lighter assault weapons. As in the case of the F-16s, the contracts in most of these projects contained a clause requiring local production, in order to acquire new technology.

The Initiative to Create a National Defense Industry When such a big project was launched, Turkey set a number of conditions. Among these were that local firms must be involved in the project, some of the components must be locally produced, the possibility of exporting the finished product to third countries must be kept open, and no political restrictions such as the situation in Cyprus or human rights would be imposed. The overall objective was to establish a national defense industry. This would help reduce dependence on foreign sources and allow for the import of technology. To cite an example, the tank project initiated in 1996 by the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries called for the production of tanks in Turkey through technological cooperation with the producing firm, which was required to submit its bid through its local partner firms to produce the tanks.

Talks were held with the Istanbul Chamber of Industry in May 1997 to involve the Turkish business community with defense industries. A target was set to allow the local content of defense products (then at 21%) to reach 40% by the year 2000. An important milestone in this process was the document entitled "The Policy and Strategy of the Turkish Defense Industry," which came into force in June 1998. This document was prepared in consultation with local industrialists, who were called upon to invest in defense production and to seek foreign partners for this purpose. The document divided defense systems into three categories: "national," "critical," and "other systems." Firms that produced in these categories were required to obtain security clearances. In bidding procedures, local firms were allowed a price advantage (up to 15%).

Tusaş Aerospace Industries (TAI) undertook a project for the manufacture of 160 aircraft, which was completed in 1995 with the delivery of 152 aircraft to the Turkish Air Force. At this time, Turkey, the U.S., and Egypt reached an agreement for TAI to produce forty-six F-16 aircraft for the Egyptian Air Force, which were delivered from 1993 to 1995. This was the first time the F-16 was being produced outside the U.S. for delivery to a third country. The project demonstrated the close relations between Turkey and the U.S.

The second phase of the F-16 project was carried out

with the support of the Turkish Defense Fund. In this framework, a further eighty F-16s were produced starting in 1995, with the final delivery taking place in November 1999. This was Turkey's largest defense project ever, with a total cost of \$8 billion.

As this project drew to a close, TAI undertook new projects. Among these was the production of fifty CASA CN-235 transport aircraft produced under Spanish license. Delivery of these aircraft was completed in 1998. An agreement was reached with Eurocopter for the production of thirty Cougar helicopters. There was also a project to produce parts for Sikorsky helicopters.

Another important project (announced in October 1996) involved the manufacture of 1,000 new tanks. The magnitude of this project was \$7 billion. A \$3 billion project called for the modernization of 1,000 tanks in the army's inventory. The Modern Main Battle Tank Project entailed the production of 1,000 tanks from 2004 to 2013. The call for tenders went out in August 1997 and initially involved the production of 250 tanks. Those tendering included General Dynamics—BMC Nurol for the M-1 Abrams tank (U.S.), Krauss Maffei—Otokar for the Leopard 2 (Germany), GIAT-Roketsan for the Leclerc (France), and Ukreksport-ASMAŞ for the T-84 (Ukraine). (All these projects were later postponed or canceled because of economic crises.)

Turkey called for co-production with Turkish firms rather than direct imports in carrying out this project. This procurement method would ensure that the final product would fully conform to Turkey's particular requirements.

Another project initiated in 1987 concerned the acquisition of 720 helicopters. This procurement was necessary because helicopters were essential in combating the PKK, both for ferrying troops and for striking at targets. The decision was made in September 1992 to acquire 200 helicopters in the first batch. The original intent was to import 45 Black Hawk helicopters and start the manufacture of a further 50 in Turkey. In view of the urgent needs of the armed forces, however, the decision was made to import the whole lot and have TAI produce certain parts under an offset agreement. With this purchase, Turkey rose to second place among the countries with the largest fleet of Black Hawks. As mentioned earlier, TAI was already manufacturing Cougars. In addition, 10 Cobra helicopters were acquired from the U.S. firm Bell-Textron. Finally, 19 Mi-17 helicopters were bought from Russia in April 1995 in repayment for Russia's debts to Turkey's Eximbank.

An important stage of this process was Turkey's call for tenders in May 1997 to co-produce 145 attack helicop-

ters. Those firms submitting bids included the Italian firm Augusta with its A-129, the U.S. firms Bell-Textron with its King Cobra and Boeing with its Apache, the French-German firm Eurocopter with its Tiger, and an Israeli-Russian partnership with its KA-50, which was given the Turkish name Erdoğan. When the bids were considered, the contract was awarded to Bell for the King Cobra.

With the completion of this project, Turkey will become one of the major helicopter operators, with a fleet of approximately 650 helicopters.

#### Defense Projects and Turkish Foreign Policy

The huge rearmament project undertaken by Turkey added a new dimension to its foreign policy. It should be noted that, at a time when the arms market was contracting following the Cold War, the project for purchasing and/or co-producing arms in the amount of \$150 billion riveted the attention of arms producers on Turkey. This project was to bring benefits to Turkey.

- 1. Because of the substantial profits for defense industries, they were ready to undertake lobbying on behalf of Turkey in their own countries. Among those who came to Ankara during the negotiations of the arms deals were the executives of the supplier firms as well as the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the countries involved. When the Öcalan crisis erupted between Turkey and Italy, the executives of the Italian helicopter firm traveled to Ankara to ease the tension between Turkey and Italy while also applying pressure on their own government. In France the "Armenian Genocide" bills came before the parliament in 1998 and 2000 but failed to pass, in part thanks to defense projects involving Turkey. When the EU's Luxembourg Summit made the decision to exclude Turkey in December 1997, the General Staff made a list of the countries that had taken a stand against Turkey and refused to accept bids for defense contracts coming from the countries on its list. The contract for the upgrading of F-4 aircraft was awarded to Israel in order to speed up the implementation of the military cooperation with that country that had been initiated in 1996. Prime Minister Ecevit himself confirmed that the helicopter contract had been awarded to the American firm Bell because of the letter in support of Turkey that President Clinton had written to the leaders of the Armenian community in the U.S. Arms deals had become a card that Turkey employed in the implementation of foreign policy.
- 2. The projects being undertaken were contributing to Turkey's technological development. As time went by, Turkey was manufacturing not only bodies and engines

but also the electronics and weapons systems of its military hardware. This allowed firms like Aselsan and Roketsan (producers of electronic and other technical components) to upgrade their technological skills.

- 3. Unlike direct purchases, joint production allowed Turkey to acquire equipment that was best suited to its particular requirements.
- 4. The indirect offset clauses inserted in contracts resulted in tourism facilities in Turkey built by supplier firms and other such benefits.
- 5. The projects were being implemented in stages and often extended for periods up to twenty-five years. This gave Turkey added political leverage. It has been claimed that the awarding of contracts was often postponed in order to gain more leverage.
- 6. Large defense contracts were inhibiting the Western countries from raising human-rights issues while strengthening Turkey's hand in negotiations. Germany had created difficulties for Turkey in the sale of armored vehicles in the past, citing the likelihood that the vehicles might be used in the southeast. When Germany also attempted to raise this issue with respect to the tank contract, the Turkish authorities reacted sharply, pointing out that the contract had not yet been finalized and that the German manufacturer would end up the loser if the issue was pressed.

7. Ankara saw its rearmament program as a vehicle for turning Turkey into a regional power and strengthening its voice in world councils. This was also strengthening Turkey vis-à-vis neighbors with which it had contentious issues. The ambitious nature of its program was revealed by Turkey's acquisition of aerial refueling tankers and the inclusion of an aircraft carrier in the strategic procurement program for the years 1999–2008. In this manner, Turkey gained more credibility when it warned Greece that extending its territorial waters to twelve miles would lead to war or when it threatened war against Syria in September 1998 unless Damascus expelled the PKK leader from Syrian territory.

8. As a result of its efforts to build up a defense industry, Turkey became a small-scale exporter of arms in the 1990s. Turkey secured a \$75 million order for the delivery of 133 armored combat vehicles to the United Arab Emirates and reached agreement with Malaysia in 2000 for the sale of 211 armored vehicles costing \$300 million.

Despite these benefits, the ambitious projects also had a down side for Turkish foreign policy.

1. The awarding of contracts was not purely a technical question but also had political implications. To deny

U.S. companies orders would have repercussions on relations with Washington, while it would be equally inconvenient to exclude European companies from contracts.

- 2. While the powerful arms lobbies of the U.S. and Europe were quite prepared to support Turkey during the competition period, the likelihood existed that the companies that lost out in the race might reverse their positions toward Turkey.
- 3. As Turkey accelerated its arms procurements, this was compelling its rivals in the region to do likewise. Indeed, Greece announced a \$24 billion arms procurement program in the 1990s and reached agreement for the purchase of 50 F-16s from the U.S. While General Dynamics was bidding for joint production in Turkey, it was also proposing the sale of M-1 tanks to Greece.
- 4. In building up its defense industries, Turkey was seeking to become more self-sufficient. Joint production, however, meant depending on outside sources for key components. Although takeovers and consolidation were the common features of most sectors in the world, foreign takeovers of defense industries were regulated and restricted by law in many countries.
- 5. Procurement of weapons, whether from local sources or through imports, was always a costly affair. With arms purchases amounting to \$9.5 billion in 1999, Turkey was in thirteenth place among the countries of the world. The procurement of an aircraft carrier or AWACS earlywarning aircraft would increase these expenditures substantially. Although it was pointed out that the purchase of helicopters and tanks was carried out with resources derived from the Defense Industries Fund rather than the state budget, important national resources were still being absorbed by purchases of military hardware. The total rearmament program involving expenditures of the order of \$150 billion was considered excessive for a country faced with serious economic problems and came in for sharp criticism. The criticism reached a peak in March and April 2000. A very tight economic policy was being implemented at this time, and the public reacted unfavorably to Ecevit, who attended the World Economic Forum at Davos with a long list of defense contracts. As the public criticism mounted, the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries arranged a press conference for the first time to announce that defense expenditures would be kept at a level that would not damage the economy. It was also pointed out that countries like Greece, Armenia, and Syria in Turkey's neighborhood were spending proportionately more than Turkey for their defense. Still, Turkey's defense expenditures, representing 5% of its GNP, were twice as

high as Russia's defense spending of \$4.5 billion. After the financial crisis of November 2000, the IMF also began to question the level of military expenditures.

#### Conclusion

In summary, in the 1990s the U.S. was the most important country for Turkey's policy-makers. Although Ankara cooperated very closely with Washington, problems cropped up frequently. There was no question affecting Turkish foreign policy that did not somehow involve the U.S. The U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke declared that Turkey was critical in every issue that Washington considered important in Eurasia. Secretary of state Madeleine Albright described Turkey as a close and reliable ally with which the U.S. cooperated in the region stretching from Kosovo to Kyrgyzstan as well as in organizations like the EU, NATO, the WEU, and the OSCE. She called Turkey an "irreplaceable ally" (Hürriyet, 29 September 2000). Turkey took advantage of this close relationship to further its influence in the Balkans and in Central Asia and to promote the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The U.S. was either directly involved with all developments in Turkish foreign policy or influencing events from the background.

As a result of this involvement with the U.S. and the course of international developments, Turkey occasionally pursued policies against its will, as in the case of Operation Provide Comfort. In a way, the enhanced strategic partnership between Turkey and the U.S. had turned into an "imperative partnership." Turkey became overly dependent on the U.S. as a consequence of the emergence of the U.S. as the sole superpower, the growing strategic dimension of bilateral relations, Turkey's difficulties with its neighbors, its political rift with Europe, its economic problems, and its foreign debts, in excess of \$110 billion. Ankara had given its approval to Operation Provide Comfort in order to obtain the possibility of conducting military operations in northern Iraq; it agreed to the Baku-Supsa pipeline to secure U.S. support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; and it entered into military cooperation with Israel to gain leverage against Syria. For Turkey, relations with the U.S. became crucial. By the end of the 1990s it had become increasingly difficult for Ankara to bring about changes in this relationship even it wanted to.

The close relationship with the U.S. lasted from 1992 to 2000, when there was a Democratic administration in Washington. This disproved the popular notion that Republicans were closer to Turkey than Democrats. It was international developments that determined the nature of bilateral relations rather than the party in power.

In general terms, in the 1990s Turkey was seeking room for maneuver within the confines of its overdependence on the U.S.

The \$150 billion arms procurement project was scaled down to \$80 billion as a result of negative public reaction and the dire economic situation. The only projects that were carried out were the purchase of four AWACS early warning and communication aircraft and the upgrading of F-4 aircraft and M-48 tanks.

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## Relations with the EU

### I. TURKISH-EU RELATIONS IN THE 1990S

The two determining factors in Turkey's relations with the EU during the 1990s were the ending of the Cold War and the accelerating pace of European integration. The removal of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about fundamental changes in perceptions and policies in the political, economic, and security fields in Europe and throughout the world. The removal of the threat coming from the East led to ambivalence over the strategic value of Turkey to the West.

Six developments left an imprint on Turkish-EU relations during this period.

1. The former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe all adopted parliamentary democratic systems on the Western model and took steps toward establishing a market economy. This transformation offered the possibility of creating a united Europe by including these countries in the integration process. All of the EU member countries agreed that, in addition to the political, economic, and security dimensions, the transition countries were important culturally and historically and that their identities called for them to be part of the process of European integration. EU members were convinced that it was in their individual and collective interest to contribute to the democratic and economic development of these countries and launched large-scale technical and financial assistance programs. These programs were provided with legal foundations in the form of Europe Agreements concluded with the former socialist countries. The ultimate objective of these efforts was to admit these countries to the EU, bring to an end Europe's ideological division, and establish an integrated market on a continental scale.

2. These developments took place at a time when the ideas about a political union to supplement the monetary and economic union were beginning to take shape. In this framework, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and came into effect in 1993. This was the most important breakthrough since the 1950s and resulted in the creation

of the European Union. The EU was now on its way to becoming a political union.

3. With the acceleration of political integration, the questions of identity, culture, and vocation came to the fore, leading to the question of where the political borders of Europe were to be drawn. In the 1960s the EC stressed economic relations and downplayed ideological and historical questions. With the coming into being of the European Union, a heated debate got underway regarding Turkey's place in the European ideal and identity and whether Europe's borders encompassed Turkey or not. At a time when democracy and economic liberalism were gathering strength as European values, there was a corresponding rise in factors like ratism and religious fanaticism. As the EU embraced the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the number of those who questioned Turkey's European identity significantly increased.

4. In the 1990s the issue of human rights was being upheld by more and more people in Europe and throughout the world. Respect for human rights was a key factor in determining the nature of the foreign relations of Western states. The violations of human rights that became a burning issue in Turkey's relations with the EC following the coup of 12 September 1980 continued to plague relations with the EU during the 1990s.

5. The issues that were in the foreground in Turkish-EU relations such as Turkey's chronic political and economic troubles, the struggle against the PKK, the disputes with Greece, and the Cyprus question began to affect relations more than ever during this period.

6. The differences over the future, nature, and goals of Turkey's relations with the EU became clear in the 1990s. Turkey was pursuing the goal of full membership with great determination and regarded each step in further developing relations as progress in this direction. Until the late 1990s the EU pursued its relations with Turkey in the framework of association and the customs union, however, and was careful about not raising false hopes of

eventual full membership. These differences in approach resulted in a very strained relationship during the period from 1990 to 2000.

## II. THE CUSTOMS UNION INSTEAD OF FULL MEMBERSHIP

## A. The Turkey-EC Council of Association and Growing Cooperation

The Matutes Package

The European Commission issued its opinion on Turkey's application for full membership in 1989. According to the commission, Turkey's application would not be acted upon. But this adverse opinion also contained a "Cooperation Program" that was submitted to the EC's Council of Ministers on 6 June 1990. The program was authored by commissioner Abel Matutes and became known as the Matutes Package. Under this package, the Customs Union would come into effect at the end of 1995, cooperation would be stepped up in certain areas to achieve closer economic integration, financial cooperation would be resumed, and political cooperation would be developed. The Matutes Package stressed the Customs Union and the relationship of association but made no mention of full membership (Tekeli and Ilkin, pp. 208–14).

The Matutes Package was received with guarded optimism by Turkish political and business circles and by the bureaucracy. The Akbulut government showed enthusiasm for the cooperation program in order to soften the adverse public reaction to the suspension of Turkey's membership application. The Motherland Party claimed that the package demonstrated the readiness of the EC to develop further relations. Since the Customs Union was the most important stage on the road to full membership and a natural outcome of the Ankara Agreement, the views contained in the package did not contradict Turkey's approach. The opposition (part of the bureaucracy and notably the State Planning Organization as well as the business community) held the view that the Matutes Plan could be considered significant only if the Council of Ministers endorsed it. This would require the overcoming of a possible Greek veto.

The Council of Ministers took no action in 1990 or later with reference to the Cooperation Program, confirming the cautious approach of those who expressed reservations. Both the EC's bureaucracy and its Turkish counterpart, however, were ready to take practical steps to implement the program, which had not yet been formally endorsed. Under the terms of the Ankara Agreement, it was possible to proceed with the creation of the Customs Union without the council's specific authorization. On

this basis, the foundation of the Customs Union was laid as soon as the Matutes Package was made public.

An important step in the direction of implementing the Customs Union had already been taken in 1988. On 7 and 20–21 November 1988 a delegation led by the undersecretary of the State Planning Organization, Ali Tigrel, held talks in Brussels with the commission within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee. In the committee, the Turkish side committed itself to resume progressive tariff cuts with a view to achieving the Customs Union. For the first time, Turkey had formally declared that it was ready for the Customs Union by the end of 1995.

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## The Council of Association Meeting after a Long Break

A new Motherland Party government took office in July 1991. This government demonstrated its resolve to develop relations with the EC further by intensifying its efforts to hold a meeting of the Council of Association, which had not met for the past five years. As a result, a meeting of the council was held on 30 September 1991. This was important because it indicated that the institutional relationship and political dialogue between the parties had been resumed. It was decided at the meeting to set up committees to discuss existing problems and come up with solutions. The meeting of the Association Committee held on 6 December 1991 (with the participation of the permanent representatives of the EC, officials of the European Commission, and Turkey's ambassador to the EC) took up a number of technical questions. Among these were the calendars for the Customs Union, the quotas on textile products, allegations of dumping, and questions affecting Turkish workers in the EC countries.

In 1992 the European Commission's vice-president, Martin Bangemann, submitted a Working Program to the commission and to Turkey. This program indicated that the European side was eager to develop relations with Turkey within the framework of the Customs Union. The Working Program was signed on 21 January 1992. It contained the measures and policies leading up to the Customs Union, policies on industry and technology, communications policies, and cooperation in the social field. Bearing in mind the possibility of a Greek veto, these fields were selected because they did not require political decisions (Tekeli and İlkin, "Working Program between the European Commission and the Government of Turkey in the Framework of the Ankara Agreement and Its Additional Protocol," Ankara, 21 January 1992, pp. 246-47, cited in Tekeli and İlkin).

At this time, elections had taken place in Turkey on 20 October 1991 and a True Path Party–Social Democratic People's Party coalition government had taken office. The new government displayed an inclination to abandon Özal's policy of "full membership whatever the cost." Instead of insisting on full membership without regard to the EC's coolness to this prospect, the new Demirel government favored implementing the Ankara Agreement and, in this context, putting the Customs Union into effect at an early date. The EC was also glad to base its relations with Turkey on the Customs Union without making any further commitments for the future and speeded up its preparations.

The coalition government was giving priority to the Customs Union without losing sight of the ultimate objective of full membership. That is why it followed closely the developments in the process of European integration. We shall now examine the increasing European integration as it affected Turkey's policies.

## The Widening and Deepening of the European Union and Their Consequences for Turkey

The Consequences of the Maastricht Treaty

On 9–10 December 1991 the heads of state and government of the member states of the European Union met at Maastricht in the Netherlands and decided to form a monetary union among the member states. They also took the first steps toward a political union, in which the members would pursue common policies in the fields of foreign policy and security as well as cooperation in justice and home affairs (Box 7-18). Signed in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty extended the areas of competence of the European Community, thereby making it more difficult to achieve full membership. The treaty affected Turkish-EU relations in two important ways.

- 1. The Maastricht Treaty amended article 237 of the Rome Treaty, regarding the accession of new members. Paragraph O of the new treaty declared that "all European states may apply for membership in the Union." The procedure for new members was changed with the Single Act, making it necessary to obtain the approval of the European Parliament to admit new members. Ankara was concerned because there was no clear definition of what a European state was. The prior approval of the European Parliament also caused concern, in view of the many anti-Turkish resolutions adopted by this body after 1980.
- 2. The Maastricht Treaty turned the WBU into the institution that would implement the EU's common foreign and security policy, although the WBU was not legally part of the EU and had been set up before the other European communities. NATO members that were not WEU members were called upon to become associate mem-

### Box 7-18. The Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and came into effect in 1993. With this treaty, European integration made its most significant leap forward since the early 1950s. The EU had now become a reality. This treaty established an economic and monetary union based on a single internal market, a single currency, and coordinated economic policies. In addition, the treaty established the basis for common foreign and security policies and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. Through the treaty, economic integration had been supplemented and reinforced with the goal of political union.

The treaty also made changes in the existing Institutional structure and brought new dimensions to Integration, including economic and social cohesion, regional policies, and strengthening existing political links. A deeper stage of European Integration was being achieved.

One of the most important changes was the introduction of the co-decision procedure; whereby the European Parliament was granted the right to participate in certain areas of decision-making on a par with the Council of Ministers.

The Maastricht Treaty also introduced the principle of subsidiarity, whereby decisions were to be made at the lowest possible level of government. This meant that decisions would be made by the EU, national governments, or local governments on the basis of the criterion of maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Action would be taken at the EU level when individual member states were unable to obtain results or when it would be more effective to act as a group. If results could be obtained at the national or local level, however, then the action would be taken there. The idea was to take action at the closest possible level to the ordinary citizen. This principle was introduced to assuage the concerns of national governments that did not want to see too much power concentrated in Brussels.

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bers. Thus Turkey would become an associate member of the WEU. But this sort of membership did not allow for participation as a full member in the decision-making process on the vital subject of Europe's security and defense. For the first time, Turkey felt that it was being excluded from the European security and defense structure. This trend continued throughout the 1990s.

#### The Enlargement of the EU

The events of the late 1980s that brought the Cold War to an end, as noted earlier, and the institutional and structural changes taking place within the EC brought fundamental changes to relations with Turkey. At the Dublin Summit of 28 April 1990, the decision gradually to integrate East Germany and to initiate a comprehensive enlargement move set the stage for a major transformation of the process of European integration.

The successive signing of Europe Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was intended

to prepare these countries for the EC and subsequently for EU membership. This meant that Turkey began to lose its privileged status of associate member that it had held since 1963. Similarly, as the EU shifted toward providing increasing amounts of financial and technical assistance to this group of countries, Turkey was being left behind.

In the first half of the 1990s, when the questions of which countries would be admitted to the EU and the timetable for enlargement were being discussed, Turkey was either completely left out or placed behind the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Southern Cyprus, and Malta. Ankara was particularly upset when Southern Cyprus applied for membership on 4 July 1990 and the application was found admissible despite Turkey's objections. Before this, Turkey had been feeling European pressure on the question of Cyprus but refused to take this subject up within its dialogue with Europe. After the Cypriot application, however, European pressure increased steadily, and Turkey was forced into making concessions.

At the Lisbon Summit of 25–27 June 1992, the decision was made to start accession talks with EFTA members Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway immediately after the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The decision with regard to Turkey stated that "relations will develop in accordance with the objectives established in the Ankara Agreement and will include a political dialogue" (Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 1992). On this occasion, it became apparent once again that the phrase contained in the commission's 1989 opinion that "no further accession talks will be undertaken before the EC has completed its deepening process and the establishment of the Single Market" would apply only to Turkey.

At the Edinburgh Summit of 11–12 December 1992, it was decided that accession talks with Austria, Sweden, and Finland would begin in 1993. In the meantime Switzerland and Norway had withdrawn their applications, following national referendums in which EU membership was voted down.

#### The Copenhagen Summit

One of the important milestones on the road to enlargement was the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, where the conditions and criteria for EU membership were spelled out (Box 7-19).

The Presidency Conclusions adopted at the summit included the following paragraph: "On the subject of cooperation with Turkey, the EU Summit calls on the Council to implement effectively the Conclusions of the

#### Box 7-19. The Copenhagen Criteria

The Copenhagen Criteria were established at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit and were further developed at the 1995 Madrid Summit and 1997 Luxembourg Summit. These criteria described the standards that a European country had to attain before it could be admitted to EU membership. The criteria came under two main headings; political and economic, According to the political criteria, the countries that were-candidates for EU membership had to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and protection and respect for human rights and minorities. Among the economic criteria, the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU were considered to be preconditions for membership. It was also established in Copenhagen that candidates must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. This meant that candidates must conform to the acquis communautaire of the EU. This confirmed that the EU was a project of political as well as economic integration

At the Madrid Summit of 1995, a new criterion was added: "Candidate states must be ready to adjust their administrative structures following accession in order to ensure uniformity in the implementation of Union policies." Moreover, it was stated that "[w]hile it is important to transpose the EU's acquis into the national legislation, it is even more important that the legislation is implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures" (Madrid European Council, Presidency Conclusions, December 1995).

At the Copenhagen, Madrid, and Luxembourg summits, the question of the EU's ability to absorb new members was also considered. EU institutions and members would bear in mind the burden that new members would impose on the EU in considering a country's eligibility in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria.

These criteria did not receive much attention in Turkey at the time of their adoption because attention was totally riveted on the Customs Union. The criteria became a subject of debate in Turkey after the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, and Turkey committed itself to complying with the criteria at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The Accession Partnership Document issued by the commission on 8 November 2000 would be based on the Copenhagen Criteria.

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EU Lisbon Summit with a view to establishing a customs union in line with the 1963 Association Agreement and the 1970 Additional Protocol."

This phraseology clearly demonstrated that relations with Turkey would be conducted on the basis of a customs union. The same document declared that cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be directed toward achieving full membership. This signified that Turkey, whose association agreement and membership application predated the application of

the Central and Eastern European states, was being left behind in the process of enlargement. Feeling that insisting on full membership would be futile, Ankara decided to concentrate its efforts on achieving a Customs Union in the belief that this would provide access to the EU through the back door.

We shall now examine briefly the reasons that led Turkey to shift its efforts from full membership to a Customs Union.

## c. The Customs Union

### Reasons for Turkey Wanting to Establish a Customs Union

#### Political Reasons

In addition to the fact that Turkey had been left behind by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they tightened their links with the EU, seven political reasons induced Ankara to seek membership in the Customs Union. (1) Greece was becoming the main obstacle to developing Turkish-EU relations as it took advantage of the Cypriot impasse and the application by Southern Cyprus to join the EU. (2) The process of deepening the EU gave rise to fears in Turkey that no enlargement would occur in the short term. (3) There was apprehension in Ankara that a number of EU countries (notably Germany) were being prevented from taking up positions in favor of Turkey by the prospect of free movement of Turkish workers after Ankara's accession to the European Union. (4) The Customs Union was being used by the Turkish government to secure benefits in domestic politics. (5) The Customs Union was expected to help restore the broken political dialogue between Turkey and the EU. (6) After the establishment of the single market following the Single Act and Maastricht Treaty and the extension of the competence of Brussels to new political areas, Turkey's accession responsibilities had become more onerous in a great number of fields. In carrying out the responsibilities arising from the Customs Union, Turkey would also be preparing for full membership in the EU and begin to cover some of the ground in this direction. Turkey felt that, through economic integration, it would accomplish the integration of its infrastructure and facilitate its political integration with the EU (7) The establishment of the Customs Union was among the legal commitments undertaken by the parties to the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Furthermore, Turkey was committed to realizing the Customs Union under the World Trade Organization agreements and the GATT system (Tekeli and İlkin,

#### **Economic Reasons**

In addition to the political reasons, Turkey also had four economic reasons to look upon the Customs Union with favor. (1) There was a conviction that the harmonization of legislation and of economic policies that the Customs Union would require would impose a certain discipline on the economy, lead to restructuring, eliminate macroeconomic instability, and attain higher standards of governance. (2) By producing for a larger market, Turkish firms were expected to increase their productivity and efficiency, leading to economic development, improved quality of life, and greater prosperity. (3) It was also hoped that the Customs Union would have a favorable impact on the inward flow of foreign direct investments. (4) The elimination of trade barriers in sectors like textiles was expected to allow easier access to EU markets for these products and lead to rising exports (Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 298-309).

Beyond these political and economic reasons, Turkey chose to pursue the policy of joining the Customs Union before full accession to the EU because this was seen as a means to give vigor to the stagnant relations with the EU and was considered to be an important step on the road to EU membership. Just as the main objective of the application for full membership in 1987 was to resuscitate Turkey's moribund relations with the EU by means of shock treatment, so the Customs Union was regarded as a means to attain a more advantageous position for Turkey after the prospect of accession was pushed into the background following the emergence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

### 2. Concrete Steps toward the Customs Union The Decision to Establish the Customs Union

The Council of Association that met on 9 November 1992 led to a number of important developments. The decisions of the Association Committee adopted on 16 October 1992 were endorsed and adopted by the council, including the decision to start preparations for initiating the technical negotiations leading to a Customs Union. In addition to this, it was also decided to convene the Customs Cooperation Committee and undertake technical work in the areas of free circulation of individuals and services, harmonization of legislation on competition and taxation, relations with the Economic and Social Committee, joining the trans-European networks, and the implementation of the renewed Mediterranean Program.

This was the first time that a framework for cooperation had been drawn up that would be filled in by joint action at the technical level. Turkey's commitments under the Customs Union were also being specifically spelled out for the first time. The Council of Association declared that its decisions would "form a framework for further developing relations" and allow for the "Ankara Agreement to be implemented within a new and dynamic framework" (EC-Turkey Council of Association Decision, 9 November 1992). Turkey attributed great importance to the Customs Union as a means to intensify cooperation between the parties, without giving up the objective of full membership. In fact the Customs Union would be a step in the direction of the ultimate objective. The European proposals for resuming the political dialogue were also welcomed by Turkey.

The Customs Cooperation Committee held its first meeting on 3 December 1992. This body was responsible for taking up the technical questions that arose in connection with trade relations between Turkey and the EC and issues relating to customs. Negotiations at the technical level were also pursued within the Association Committee. The Turkish side submitted a series of proposals at these meetings: for the Customs Union to be introduced in 1995 within the framework of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol as a step in the direction of full membership, for the Customs Union to include both industrial and agricultural products, for progress to be made on social questions, for harmonization of Turkey's competition and trade policies with the EC's policies, for engaging in financial cooperation and technical assistance, for the elimination of textile quotas, and for the establishment of a permanent organ to deal with the implementation of the Customs Union.

The Steering Committee of the Customs Union was established on 18 March 1993. This committee would consider the proposals coming from the parties and carry on the negotiations for the next two years.

#### Negotiating the Customs Union

The bulk of the negotiations between Turkey and the EC for the Customs Union took place within the Steering Committee of the Customs Union. Some questions dealing with implementation were taken up within the Customs Cooperation Committee. Among the issues taken up by the Steering Committee were the date on which the Customs Union would come into effect, the arrangements for the free movement of goods, the regime that would apply to processed agricultural products, the regime that would apply to the products within the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community, agricultural products, adjustment to the common customs tariff

and to the common commercial policy, harmonization of legislation to allow for the smooth functioning of the Customs Union, the free movement of Turkish workers, the free movement of services, freedom of establishment, and financial and institutional cooperation. There was very little common ground or no agreement at all on the subjects of agricultural products, the free movement of Turkish workers, the free movement of services, the right of establishment, and financial cooperation. The subjects on which agreement had been reached were approved by the Council of Association on 8 November 1993.

Throughout 1994 Turkey continued its efforts toward harmonizing its legislation and reducing tariffs. Meanwhile there were indications from Europe that the EU considered the Customs Union not as a stage toward full membership but as an objective in itself. In February 1994 the vice-president of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, came to Turkey and warned that the protection sought by Ankara for sensitive sectors like the automotive industry would lead the EC to seek similar protection for textiles, thus diluting the effects of the Customs Union. He also declared that it would be a mistake to establish a linkage between the subjects of financial support and the Customs Union.

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The representatives of the Turkish automotive, textile, iron and steel, and electronics industries participated in the negotiations of the Steering Committee in 1994. At the negotiations, Turkey took the position that it would become a part of the EC's Customs Union, while the EC's position was that it was entering into a separate Customs Union with Turkey.

After reaching an agreement that the Customs Union between Turkey and the EC would constitute a new customs union space, the question of how Turkey would carry out its unfulfilled commitments under the Additional Protocol prior to the end of 1995 and subsequently was taken up. A Consultative Machinery was established to discuss harmonization of policy and legislation after 1995. These negotiations resulted in the Council of Association's "Decision on the Customs Union and Its Annexes" (no. 1/95, dated 6 March 1995).

This decision specified the manufactured products that would be covered by the Customs Union and took as a basis, to the extent possible, the provisions of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol on other subjects. On agricultural products, Turkey was given additional time to move closer to the EC's agricultural policy.

The conviction of nine deputies (members of the TGNA) belonging to the Democracy Party (DEP) in December 1994 raised fears that the Customs Union, already

opposed by Greece, would run into difficulties in the European Parliament. The trial of the nine DEP deputies had stirred bitter anti-Turkish sentiments in the European Parliament, and there was a strong movement to block a Customs Union that would bring benefits to Turkey. At the Essen Summit of 9–10 December 1994, it was announced that Southern Cyprus would be among the countries in the next round of enlargement, but Turkey went unmentioned. The displeasure caused by the conviction of the DEP deputies was reflected in the EU's carefully worded statement (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 386).

On 15–18 December 1994 some political groups in the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it was stressed that Turkey continued to display shortcomings in the areas of human rights and democracy and that under these circumstances the Joint Parliamentary Committee would not meet until the necessary conditions had been fulfilled. The resolution also called for the immediate suspension of the contemplated Customs Union with Turkey and wanted the decision relating to the Customs Union submitted to the parliament for approval (Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 368–70).

In the shadow of these developments, the Council of Association, meeting on 19 December 1994, decided to postpone a decision on the Customs Union until its meeting scheduled for 6 March 1995. As a matter of fact, the text of the decision had not yet been drafted, and a postponement had become inevitable.

#### Policies to Overcome the Obstacles

The EU wanted to see solid progress in the areas of human rights, democratization, and Cyprus before agreeing to the Customs Union. The Turkish government of the time appeared to be committed to take the necessary steps.

In this framework, Turkey took certain measures in the period proceeding March 1995 to overcome the European objections to the Customs Union. Among these, the provisions of the Law for Combating Terrorism relating to freedom of thought and expression were changed, civil servants were given the right to form unions, and a package of constitutional amendments designed to secure more democracy was introduced. Only some of these measures would be put into practice, however.

Greece was systematically opposing Turkey's efforts to establish a Customs Union. To soften its stand, Athens demanded that Cyprus (the southern part administered by the Greek Cypriots) be admitted to the EU in the first round of enlargement. This, Greek demand was met in principle at the Essen Summit of 9–10 December 1994, but no clarification was made as to how this could be achieved

without first resolving the political question that had led to the de facto division of the island into two separate political entities.

On 3 February 1995 Turkish foreign minister Murat Karayalçın sent a letter to Alain Juppé, the foreign minister of France, which was holding the presidency of the EU at the time. In this letter Karayalçın informed his French counterpart that Turkey would be pleased if the decision to set up a Customs Union would be adopted at the next Council of Association on 6 March 1995, but added that, "if the EU establishes a date and a timetable for accession negotiations with Southern Cyprus and makes an announcement to this effect, it will be inevitable for my government to take steps toward integration between Turkey and Northern Cyprus" (Tekeli and İlkin, p. 403). In addition, Minister Karayalçın reiterated Turkey's position on the issue when he delivered a similar message to his EU colleagues on 6 March 1995 at the meeting of the Turkey-EC Council of Association, when decision 1/95 setting up the Customs Union was adopted.

### The Adoption of the Decision on the Customs Union

At the meeting of the Turkey-EC Council of Association held on 6 March 1995, Council Decision 1/95 was adopted. It laid down procedural and substantive provisions for the establishment of a Customs Union between the EC and Turkey as of the end of 1995 and for the Customs Union's smooth functioning in the future. We shall now examine the content of the decision and its annex as well as the declaration regarding the furnishing of financial aid to Turkey.

The Council of Association also decided that the decision on the Customs Union would be reviewed at the next Council of Association meeting, scheduled for on 30 October 1995. The review would consider whether the harmonization work in connection with the Customs Union had been carried out and whether the Customs Union should come into effect on 1 January 1996 as agreed or be postponed for six months.

A joint statement in the decision also declared that the parties would continue to be bound by their commitments under the Additional Protocol if decision 1/95 of the Council of Association was postponed. This was done in order to preclude the possibility of Turkey acting unilaterally in the event of a postponement (after carrying out the necessary preparations) by announcing the coming into effect of the Customs Union in line with the Additional Protocol and thereby claiming all the rights derived from it, including the free movement of workers.

In the period following the adoption of decision 1/95 of the Council of Association, Turkey intensified its harmonization efforts and secured the passage of the necessary legislation to a certain degree. At the Council of Association meeting of 30 October 1995, it was agreed that Turkey had met the required technical conditions to ensure the smooth functioning of the Customs Union.

## The Consideration of the Decision by the European Parliament

The Customs Union had been prepared and completed in compliance with the rules and procedures of the Association Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1973. Both of these documents had come into effect after the completion of all legal formalities, including ratification by the parliaments of member countries. Consequently, it could be argued that any contrary action by the European Parliament would be without legal effect.

When the EU submitted the decision to it, however, the European Parliament put the decision to a vote to give its assent. The decision was submitted to the Parliament's External Relations Committee. The committee prepared a report dated 22 November 1995, which reflected a positive view on establishing a Customs Union with Turkey. The plenary took up the issue on 13 December 1995, when the decision was adopted by 344 votes, with 149 against and 36 abstentions (European Parliament Session Documents A 4-0322/95 C 1-17 Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Decision, Official Journal of the European Communities, 22 January 1995, pp. 45-46).

At the same meeting, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on human rights in Turkey by a large majority. Paragraph 3 of the resolution stated that the European Parliament "appeals to the Turkish Government, the PKK, and other Kurdish organizations to do all in their power to find a nonviolent and political solution to the Kurdish issue, calls upon the PKK to refrain from violence, and calls upon the Turkish Government and Grand National Assembly to lift the curfew operating in the southeastern region and to consider ways and means of allowing citizens of Kurdish origin to express their cultural identity while ensuring that the territorial unity of Turkey is guaranteed and respected" (European Parliament Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Turkey, 13 December 1995). The resolution also stipulated what Turkey must do in the areas of human rights, torture, and ill-treatment of prisoners and called upon Turkey to comply with UN Security Council resolutions to end the division of Cyprus. Finally, the committee was asked to submit a report to the plenary at least once a year on developments in Turkey in the areas of democratization and human rights.

Ankara was so elated with the approval of the Customs Union decision that it pushed into the background the massive and comprehensive rebuke in the European Parliament's resolution. It became obvious, however, that the parliament was as formidable an obstacle as Greece on Turkey's path toward full membership in the EU.

In summary, the EU regarded the Customs Union as an important stage in the association relationship with Turkey and not as a step leading automatically to full membership. In contrast, Turkey regarded the Customs Union covering manufactured products as a vehicle for achieving full membership.

## 3. The Customs Union: Its Substance and an Analysis The Substance of the Customs Union

As had been prescribed in the Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union provided for the elimination of all customs duties, quantitative restrictions, and other measures having similar effects on manufactured goods. Turkey would gradually adjust its tariffs to the European Community's Common Customs Tariff and harmonize its legislation and its policies relating to customs and foreign trade with those of the EC to ensure the smooth functioning of the Customs Union. Turkey was also committed, under article 43 of the Additional Protocol, to adjust itself to the legal practices of the EC in the area of competition. This was interpreted in a comprehensive manner to include all the rules of competition and all situations that limited competition. It was clear that harmonization of legislation covered a very extensive area.

Article 48 of the Additional Protocol contained this provision: "The Council of Association may make recommendations to the contracting parties to harmonize their laws, regulations, and rules if they directly affect the functioning of the association even if they do not come within the compass of the protocol or if the Ankara Agreement has not established a procedure for dealing with cases encompassed by the Protocol." Thus provision had been made for harmonization on the basis of decisions by the Council of Association. Decision 1/95 of the Council of Association gave Turkey five years, starting in 1996, to make the necessary adjustments.

The Turkey-EC Council of Association adopted decisions on three issues at its meeting of 6 March 1995. The document relating to the first issue consisted of sixty-four paragraphs and ten annexes and dealt with free movement of goods and the technical aspects of the implementation

of the Customs Union. These included the elimination of customs duties and duties having similar effects, quantitative restrictions and restrictions having similar effects, Turkey's adjustment to the EC's Common Customs Tariff, adjustment to the EC's technical norms and standards, adjustments made to state aids in order to conform to EC rules, elimination of state monopolies, elimination of discrimination in taxation and harmonization, elimination of discrimination in public procurement and making the bids accessible to both parties, adjustment to the EC's preferential trade agreements, and adjustments to Turkey's legislation on competition, intellectual property, patents, and so forth.

The second document dealt with the decision in principle to extend relations to fields beyond the Customs Union for industrial products foreseen in the Ankara Agreement. These fields of cooperation included culture, industry, technology, scientific research, the environment, statistics, information, telecommunications, transport, justice, and administration. Furthermore, the ongoing negotiations on preferential trade in iron and steel products and agricultural products would be completed, the harmonization efforts in the area of agricultural policies and legislation would be supported, the social condition of Turkish workers would be improved, cooperation would be enhanced in the area of macroeconomic policies, and the political dialogue would be restructured.

The third document was the Community Declaration dealing with the framework of the financial assistance that would be furnished to Turkey to meet the requirements of the Turkish economy as it adjusted to the changes brought about by the Customs Union and to reduce the gap in the level of development of the two sides. This was in the nature of a unilateral declaration of intent to compensate for Turkey's losses arising from the Customs Union and provided for giving Turkey loans totaling 2.525 billion ECUs from the EC budget.

#### Analysis of the Decision on the Customs Union

The Customs Union was based on the Ankara Agreement. The decision made reference to the Ankara Agreement, and especially to article 28, which provides Turkey with the prospect of full membership. The decision was made in order to elaborate once again the time-table, the principles, and the procedures for Turkey to carry out those commitments under the Additional Protocol to attain the objective of establishing a Customs Union, which Turkey had not yet been able to carry out.

Actually, Turkey had postponed from 1976 to 1988 the measures that it had committed itself to carry out in order

to implement the Customs Union. Although Turkey had successfully carried out the reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers following the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee held after the application for EC membership, it had done practically nothing to adjust its policies and its legislation. It had therefore become necessary for Ankara to get together with the EC to determine the calendar, the substance, and the procedure for carrying out the measures that were still awaiting implementation (Arat 1995 ["Türkiye ile Avrupa Topluluğu Arasında Gümrük Birliği ve Hukuki Uyum"], p. 238).

The first part of decision 1/95 of the Council of Association was devoted to how Turkey was going to carry out its overdue commitments with regard to harmonizing its legislation. This part of the decision contained the specific changes that had to be carried out in Turkish legislation to harmonize it with the current EC legislation and a timetable for effecting these changes.

The second part of the decision was devoted to how legislation changes would be carried out after 1995 in the European Community and in Turkey. In this context, it stated that the harmonization of legislation would be carried out "to the extent possible." It also specified that this was to be carried out by adopting parallel legislation (Arat 1996, pp. 104–5).

The coming into effect of the Customs Union signaled the beginning of the final phase of the relationship of association between the parties (articles 4 and 5 of the Ankara Agreement). In this phase the free movement of people, services, and capital was to be achieved, in addition to the free movement of goods. Harmonization with the Common Agricultural Policy was to be attained, and relations would also be tightened in other areas in preparation for full membership, which was the ultimate objective of the association.

The decision on the Customs Union did not include the subject of financial cooperation, which was taken up separately as a unilateral commitment of the EC. At the meeting of the Council of Association held on 6 March 1995, the EC side issued a declaration dealing specifically with financial cooperation. This denoted that the EC was committing itself to providing a certain amount of support for Turkey's efforts to adjust to the Customs Union and in particular to help its industries adapt to the new environment of competition that would result from the free movement of industrial products. This commitment was founded on the principle of solidarity that was at the basis of the association. The EC would decide how the commitment would be carried out within its established procedures. The declaration stated that financial cooperation

with Turkey would begin before the Customs Union went into effect and that detailed arrangements about its implementation would be made in the first half of 1995. It was thought that this procedure might help overcome the opposition of certain members (notably Greece) to providing financial assistance to Turkey (Arat 1996, p. 101).

# III. RELATIONS WITH THE EU IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CUSTOMS UNION

Turkey's relations with the EU during the second half of the 1990s, and especially after 1997, were seriously affected by the EU's enlargement toward the East. Turkey made strenuous efforts not to be left out of this process. In the first half of the 1990s Turkey acted on the assumption that the Customs Union was the best course toward preparing itself for full membership. In view of the developments in the second half of the decade, however, Ankara had to focus on the objective of full membership. We shall now examine the reasons for this change of strategy in the light of developments in the second half of the 1990s.

# A. Difficulties in Turkish-EU Relations Despite the Customs Union

With the coming into effect of the Customs Union on 1 January 1996, Turkey's relations with the EU entered a new phase. Turkey had proceeded on the assumption that this important step toward fuller economic integration would make relations rapidly evolve in the direction of full membership. The EU saw the Customs Union as a tool for expanding and diversifying trade with Turkey. It supported the Customs Union because it provided the opportunity for EU firms to establish partnerships with Turkish firms in order to undertake joint projects in places like the Commonwealth of Independent States. The EU was also glad to give the impression that it was contributing to the preservation of Turkey's European orientation.

Turkey felt that it could shoulder without much difficulty the burdens that full membership would bring, because it had been fairly successful in meeting the financial burden imposed by the Customs Union and achieving the harmonization of legislation. Turkey felt that it enjoyed a distinct advantage through being the sole country to achieve a Customs Union without being a full member and expected to reap solid benefits once the process of enlargement began.

Although the unilateral declaration made by the EU on 6 March 1995 at the Council of Association to provide financial assistance to Turkey had not been implemented because of Greece's obstruction, this was not considered to be a serious difficulty. There was no question of link-

ing the Customs Union to the EU's financial assistance. The purpose of financial assistance was for the more developed party within a system of economic integration to provide support to the other party in a spirit of solidarity and mutual assistance. Even if the undertaking was based on a unilateral declaration, the failure of the EU to carry it out was an important sign indicating that the spirit of solidarity and the political will were missing among EU members. Furthermore, the resolution adopted at the meeting of 6 March to develop institutional cooperation and integration remained unimplemented by the EU during this period. The EU took none of the measures designed to facilitate and develop integration after the Customs Union began to apply to manufactured products.

Turkey's expectations were not realized for four basic reasons, three of them external and one internal.

The first external reason was the opposition and obstruction by Greece, which consistently pursued policies designed to thwart Turkey in its efforts to develop its links with the EC from the day it became a full member of the EC in 1981. The Kardak crisis (which broke out early in 1996) led to a serious deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations, which, in turn, intensified Greece's anti-Turkish activities within the EU. On the initiative of Greece, the EU's Council of Ministers adopted a decision on 24 July 1996, placing the responsibility for the Kardak crisis on Turkey and calling for the submission of the question to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Based on this decision, Greece started resorting to the veto to stop all relations between the EU and Turkey.

The second external reason was the position adopted by the European Parliament. Using the violations of human rights in Turkey and the country's shortcomings in the democratization process as pretexts, the EP considered that it had a duty to keep Turkey under constant scrutiny. Because Turkey displayed great eagerness to join the EU, no matter what the conditions, the EP carried out its scrutiny in the most offensive and provocative manner. The EP found Turkey to be at fault in all instances. It even attempted to negate the Customs Union in some of its actions and used the EU's financial aid as a tool to bend Turkey's political will. It frequently went further and blocked the aid altogether.

Third, the EU's agenda during this period was focused on deepening itself and on institutional reform, which would lead to its enlargement. The EU directed its attention toward carrying out the changes that had become necessary in the founding treaties. The increased membership also required revisions in the institutional machinery, in the decision-making procedures, and in the structures dealing with financial cooperation. There were

also the countries that had been engaged in accession talks and had to be groomed for membership. In these circumstances, the EU had little time to spare for Turkey, which had been included in the enlargement process at Ankara's insistence and with which accession talks had not yet begun. Whenever the question of Europe's frontiers or Turkey's identity came up, its marginal situation always received exaggerated attention. The Mediterranean island of Cyprus, however, which had nothing to do with Europe geographically, was readily given a European label.

The internal reason was quite simple. Turkish public opinion, academia, the media, and the political parties always looked upon European integration as a secondary issue. There appeared to be no firm political will to integrate Turkey with Europe among these circles.

For these reasons, Turkish interest in both the Customs Union and the European Union began to wane. Nothing other than the initiation of accession talks would change this picture.

## B. Turkish-EU Relations on the Eve of the Luxembourg Summit: Agenda 2000

In 1997 Turkish-EU relations reached an important threshold. It was expected that the Luxembourg Summit at the end of 1997 would draw up the EU's enlargement strategy, decide which countries were to be designated as candidates for accession, and establish a time-table and a procedure for their accession. Turkey noted that its efforts prior to the summit to secure eventual membership were having little effect in the capitals of the EU. There were increasing signs that Turkey was not included in the EU's plans for enlargement toward the East.

#### Objections to Turkey's Candidacy

Turkey found itself confronted with a situation it had not anticipated at a time when it cherished the hope of being included in the EU's enlargement strategy. Ankara not only was disappointed by the unanimous opposition of EU members to Turkey's full membership but also discovered for the first time in its relations with the EU that cultural differences were being openly underlined.

At the meeting of the prime ministers of Turkey, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, and Spain held in Rome on 29 January 1997, Prime Minister Çiller stressed that the time had come for Turkey's full membership, now that the Customs Union had come into effect. She called for an early confirmation of Turkey's status as a candidate and a date for its full membership. The EU side, led by Germany, turned down this request. The prime ministers pointed to the difficulties facing the EU during the enlargement pro-

cess and insisted on pursuing relations with Turkey on the basis of the enhanced Customs Union. They also stressed the need for Turkey to take concrete steps in complying with the Copenhagen Criteria in its quest for full membership and declared that under these circumstances Turkish pressure for membership would be premature and have a negative impact on relations with the EU (Birand, pp. 496–97).

The first concrete objection to Turkey's candidacy based on "cultural difference, identity, and sense of belonging" came on 4 March 1997 at the summit of the Christian Democratic parties of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, and France. At the end of this meeting held in Brussels, prime minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium made a statement to the effect that Turkey had no place in the European Civilization Project that was underway. This statement drew sharp reactions from Turkey and also from liberal and secular quarters in Europe. It allowed Turkey to note once again how it was perceived in certain segments of European society, while it brought Turkey the support of those segments that did not share this perception. But even the Europeans that sided with Turkey on the issue of cultural differences had a number of preconditions for Turkey's candidacy, starting with compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. It became clear to Ankara that Turkey would not be able to count on firm European support for some time to come. It was necessary for Turkey to carry out a transformation and reforms that would allow it to acquire the identity of a European society of the twenty-first century. This would be a difficult task to achieve in the short term, especially with respect to the change of mentality that the reforms would require. Moreover, the political and social will to carry out the changes was simply not there.

#### The Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty

The Amsterdam Summit was held on 16–17 June 1997. The changes in the founding treaty proposed by the Intergovernmental Conference were approved at the summit (Box 7-20). In this framework, the fields of responsibility pertaining to the EU were deepened and certain changes were introduced in the institutional structure. There was also a consolidation of the amendments made in the founding treaties at different times.

## Agenda 2000 and Turkey

The European Commission issued its report Agenda 2000 on 16 July 1997. The report contained the commission's proposals in connection with the preaccession strategy. This eagerly awaited report was to create great disappointment in Ankara. The report foresaw the accession of the

#### Box 7-20. The Amsterdam Treaty

The changes to the founding treaties proposed by the Intergovernmental Conference were approved by the Amsterdam Summit held on 16–17 June 1997. Although these changes were originally supposed to prepare the European Union for the new century and the process of enlargement, the results obtained were quite modest. In this framework, some increases were made in the EU's areas of competence, while some minor changes were made in its institutional structure. In addition, the changes made over the years in the founding treatles were reordered and consolidated.

Compared to the Maastricht Treaty, however, the reforms carried out were guite meager. Given the new wave of enlargement that was approaching, the necessary changes in the institutional structure were not completely carried out, nor were the required reforms in the decision-making procedures completed.

The main accomplishments of the Amsterdam Treaty were the reaffirmation of the common values of the member states—liberty, democracy, human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law-as the founding principles of the EU and their incorporation in the treaty. Enhanced cooperation and the principle of flexibility were added to the founding treaties. Cooperation in some aspects of justice and home affairs was incorporated in the European Community Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty's other accomplishments included the Schengen Protocol (aimed at incorporating the Schengen Agreements on border controls and visa regimes signed between some of the EU member states outside the EU framework into the European Union legal structure); some measures in the field of employment, and the efforts to en hance the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

(S. BAYKAL)

countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Cyprus (referred to as the Republic of Cyprus in the report) in two waves during the early years of the new century. Six of these countries were considered to have a higher capacity for meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and were slated for accession in the first wave: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and Southern Cyprus. Those that were found to be lagging would join in the second wave: Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Turkey was not included even in the second group.

Turkey was dealt with under a separate heading. It was noted that the Customs Union was functioning well and constituted a solid basis for the development of relations between the parties. But the current political situation did not allow the financial cooperation and political dialogue to proceed as foreseen in the 6 March 1995 documents. The implementation of the Customs Union had demonstrated that Turkey was up to conforming to the EU's acquis in this field. But the country still faced

serious macroeconomic instability. In addition, Turkey had unresolved problems in the fields of human rights, democratization, and the questions affecting the southeastern region. After setting this general framework, the report confirmed once again that Turkey was eligible for full membership in the EU but made no mention of a specific time frame. Turkey had been effectively excluded from Agenda 2000, the EU's most important document on enlargement.

While some quarters in Turkey had hoped that the Customs Union would confer an advantage on Turkey and place it ahead of the other candidates for accession, the EU's appraisal was quite different. As far as the EU was concerned, there had been no substantial change in the situation since the commission submitted its opinion after Turkey made its application for membership in 1987. Turkey was suitable for membership but had serious shortcomings in the fields of democracy and human rights and had not been able to overcome its macroeconomic imbalances. Relations with Turkey should be developed in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields; new areas of cooperation should be sought; and priority should be given to issues like the Customs Union. Turkey was not ready for full membership in the EU, however, at least not in the short and medium terms.

The report constituted a great letdown for Ankara. Turkey made urgent contacts with EU members and the European Commission to secure the inclusion of some of its expectations in the report prior to the Luxembourg Summit, where the report was due for finalization and approval. Among these expectations was a declaration that Turkey was included in the EU's enlargement process. Ankara wanted its candidacy to be supported with an appropriate preaccession strategy and also sought to participate in the European Conference foreseen in Agenda 2000 on a footing of equality with the other candidates (Birand, pp. 502–4).

#### C. The Luxembourg Summit

The most important issues taken up at the Luxemburg Summit of 12–13 December 1997 were Agenda 2000 and strategic decisions regarding the enlargement process.

The paragraphs of the Presidency Conclusions (i.e., the Final Declaration of the Summit) directly concerning Turkey read as follows:

The Council confirms Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will be judged according to the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political and eco-

nomic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not yet satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field. This strategy should consist in development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement, intensification of the Customs Union, implementation of financial cooperation, approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis, and participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programs and in certain agencies... In addition, participation in the European Conference will enable the Member States and Turkey to step up their dialogue and cooperation in areas of common interest.

In paragraph 35 of the Summit's Presidency Conclusions, Turkey's EU membership was made conditional on progress in four areas in the political field:

(1) the pursuit of political and economic reforms on which [Turkey] has embarked, including the alignment of its human rights standards and practices with those applying in Europe; (2) respect for and protection of minorities; (3) establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey, the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and (4) support for the negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

The declaration also contained a passage on a European Conference to which all European states that aspired to join the EU and share the values and internal and external goals of the EU would be invited if they met certain conditions. Some of these conditions were of a nature that caused concern in Ankara:

The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighborliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law, and a commitment to the set-

tlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

Finally, the document declared that the invitation was addressed in the first instance to Cyprus, the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, and Turkey. Turkey had been specifically included among the invitees.

The Presidency Conclusions of the Summit were in conflict with the policies that Turkey had been pursuing over a long period of time and singled out domestic and external issues of vital importance to Turkey. In response, Ankara announced that it was suspending its political dialogue with the EU. Although the government's statement issued on 14 December deplored the EU's biased and discriminatory approach to Turkey, it also stressed that Turkey would persevere in its goal of full membership and that existing relations with the EU would be maintained. The statement emphasized that development of relations would depend on the EU carrying out its commitments and that political matters not within the frame of relations with Brussels would not be discussed until the EU changed its present mentality and approach.

Subsequent official statements also announced that the political dialogue with the EU would not include matters that prevented the smooth development of relations, such as the question of Cyprus, Turkish-Greek relations, and human rights. In this framework, it was announced that Turkey would not take part in the European Conference, which was scheduled to hold its first meeting in London on 12 March 1998. Turkey would implement the Customs Union on the basis of the existing association agreements. Furthermore, Turkey would await the proposals referred to in the Luxembourg Summit's Presidency Conclusions regarding the intensification of the Customs Union and the full utilization of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement. This meant that the ball was in the EU's court: it was up to the EU to take the necessary steps to break the stalemate in relations.

To understand the profound disappointment felt in Turkey over the Luxembourg Summit decisions and the difficulty of the European side in grasping the reasons for Ankara's strong reaction, we must recall the misunderstandings that took place between the two sides throughout the 1990s and their differing purposes and expectations. Whereas Turkey's sole objective was full membership, the EU tended to see Turkey as an important regional actor with which it was necessary to conduct relations based on economic and political cooperation but nothing more binding at this stage.

Turkey had been in partnership with the EC for over thirty-five years and had been relentlessly pursuing the aim of being integrated within the Western European system. It was tired of being the butt of criticism over a number of economic and political questions. Now it had been left behind by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had been in the Eastern Bloc until recently and that had limited experience with Western European liberal democracy and with the market economy.

Notwithstanding Ankara's efforts and protests, the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 formally announced the candidates for accession and excluded Turkey, demonstrating once again that enlargement was primarily a politically oriented affair. Europe's priority was to integrate within the EU the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with which it shared the same cultural identity and values. Europe felt that these countries had been artificially kept out of the European mainstream during the Cold War and that it had a responsibility to correct this injustice. In contrast, it saw Turkey as a huge country with huge problems that would constitute a threat to the economic and political union if admitted into the EU. The EU had no stomach to mitigate this threat through joint efforts and mutual sacrifice. Turkey was expected to make all the effort to be accepted as a candidate, with the EU doing very little by way of support or assistance.

## D. Developments after the Luxembourg Summit

Relations became strained following the Luxembourg Summit. While Turkey refused to discuss political matters in EU platforms, it was also careful not to allow the strains to escalate to a level that would lead to a complete rupture or to a review of the Customs Union. During this period the EU began to pay heed to Turkey's sensitivities and made an effort to overcome the existing difficulties.

In line with the instructions of the Luxembourg Summit, the European Commission issued the report "A European Strategy for Turkey" on 4 March 1998. The document made it clear that Turkey would join the enlargement process of the EU with the implementation of the strategy. It stressed that this implementation depended on the EU to carry out its commitments to furnish financial assistance to Turkey and recommended that the EU's Council of Ministers make the necessary arrangements.

The EU's financial assistance had been blocked by various means for years, and it was important for Ankara to secure the implementation of this aspect of cooperation. Being aware of this, the commission was seeking to soothe Turkey. At the Cardiff and Vienna Summits of 1998, further steps were taken to appease Turkey.

#### The Cardiff and Vienna Summits

At the Cardiff Summit held on 15 and 16 June 1998, the Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit were recalled and the need to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria to qualify for membership was reaffirmed. The Cardiff Summit's approach to Turkey within the context of enlargement was relatively more positive. Instead of noting Turkey's eligibility, it described Turkey as a candidate, even if this was done indirectly. Turkey was being included in the mechanism designed to examine the stage at which candidates were on the road to membership. The summit instructed the commission to include a section on Turkey in its annual report on the progress achieved by candidates. The report on Turkey would be based on article 28 of the Ankara Agreement (which alluded to Turkey's eventual full membership) as well as on the Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit. The summit also approved the European Strategy submitted to Turkey to prepare it for full membership and suggested that this strategy should be developed with proposals coming from Turkey. Finally, the European Council was called upon to find a solution to the problem of providing financial support to Turkey. All of this was meant to lessen Turkey's grievances.

But the Cardiff Summit Presidency Conclusions failed to appease Turkey. Ankara announced that the discriminatory attitude of the EU was still there and that, despite the improvements, Turkey was still being treated differently from the other candidates in the process of enlargement. Ankara declared that as long as the four political conditions for Turkey's candidacy put forward at the Luxembourg Summit continued to apply, the official statement of the Turkish government dated 14 December 1997 was still applicable.

The enlargement process was also on the agenda of the Vienna Summit on 11–12 December 1998. The Presidency Conclusions stressed that the European Strategy for preparing Turkey for full membership must be further developed and relations tightened. This was a reaffirmation of the status quo

### The European Commission's Progress Report for 1998

The European Commission issued its first report on the progress achieved by the eleven candidates on the road to EU membership on 4 November 1998. It showed that Turkey was being treated differently from the eleven countries whose candidacy had been confirmed.

The report appraised Turkey's situation in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria. Under the heading "Political Criteria" the appraisal included democracy and the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities, and the question of Cyprus. It alleged that the functioning of public authority presented certain anomalies, that human rights continued to be infringed upon, that there were important shortcomings in the treatment of minorities, that the lack of civilian control over the military was disturbing, that this was reflected in the way in which the National Security Council dominated Turkish political life, and that it was essential to find a political and nonmilitary solution, because most of the current violations of civil and political rights could be traced to this situation. Turkey was also called upon to make a constructive contribution to the peaceful settlement of all its differences with various neighboring countries in accordance with international law.

With respect to the economic criteria, the report noted that Turkey possessed most of the basic features of a market economy, a well-developed institutional and legal framework, a dynamic private sector, and liberal trade rules. Turkey also had been successful in adapting itself to the Customs Union. The report added, however, that Turkey was in urgent need of a rigorous macroeconomic stability program and a plan to eliminate regional disparities in economic development.

The report noted that Turkey had not encountered much difficulty in conforming to the EU's *acquis* with respect to the Customs Union, which was operating in a satisfactory way. But it also noted that legislation had to be changed in many areas and that the revised legislation had to be properly implemented.

#### The Cologne Summit

The Social Democrat—Green coalition that came to power in Germany in 1998 was more favorably disposed toward Turkish-EU relations than the outgoing Christian Democratic government had been. In view of Germany's former opposition to Turkey's candidacy, this was an important development.

A draft text was prepared by Germany for the Cologne Summit on 3–4 June 1999 that responded to Turkey's expectations. Although supported by Britain and France, it was rejected as a result of the negative stance adopted by Greece and some other members. Although Greece's opposition continued, the tense relations between Turkey and the EU appeared to be easing.

### The European Commission's Progress Report for 1999

The European Commission's second progress report on candidate states prepared in compliance with the directive of the Cardiff Summit was released on 13 October 1999. This report declared that Turkey was ready to become a candidate for membership. It proposed an Accession Partnership Strategy for Turkey similar to the proposal made for other candidates at the Luxembourg Summit.

In the section dealing with political criteria, the report noted that, although the basic features of a democratic system existed in Turkey, the Copenhagen Criteria were still not being fully met. There were shortcomings in the fields of human rights and minorities; torture was still a widespread although not systematic practice; the authorities were persistently restricting freedom of expression; the role of the National Security Council in political life went on as before; and the system of extraordinary tribunals continued, despite some improvements in the area of the independence of the judiciary and some positive developments in the sphere of democratization. The report expressed the hope that the positive trend would not be marred by the possible execution of Abdullah Öcalan.

With respect to the economic criteria, the report declared that, even though it would not be easy, Turkey would be able to cope with the pressures of competition and the market forces within the EU, provided sustainable macroeconomic stability was achieved and progress was made in implementing programs of legal and structural reforms.

With respect to the ability to fulfill the requirements of membership, the report stated that Turkey had registered the greatest progress in the domain of the Customs Union, but greater emphasis needed to be placed on administrative restructuring and training of personnel.

In the light of its report, the commission recommended a preaccession partnership for Turkey to prepare it for membership, similar to the ones that had been recommended for the other candidates at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. The preaccession partnership would involve the following elements: an intensification of the political dialogue and the possibility of association with the joint positions and activities within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the combination of all preaccession financial resources under one program to ensure coordination; the possibility of gaining access to all of the programs and agencies of the EU; the establishment of an accession partnership that would be combined with the National Program designed to secure harmonization with the EU's acquis; the establishment of machinery within the framework of the Ankara Agreement to monitor the implementation of the accession partnership; and the launching of the analytical examination of the EU's acquis with a view to harmonizing Turkey's legislation and its implementation with that of the EU.

These developments raised expectations that Turkey would be declared a candidate at the EU Summit due to be held in Helsinki in December 1999. These developments remained at a technical level, however, and needed to be confirmed at a political level. Turkey's political circles and its diplomats redoubled their efforts and awaited the results of the Helsinki Summit.

## The Helsinki Summit and the Confirmation of Turkey's Candidacy

At the Helsinki Summit held on 10–11 December 1999, Turkey was unanimously declared a candidate for accession to the EU by the attending heads of state and government. By this decision, Turkey acquired the status of the other candidate states. This meant that Turkey would be included in the preaccession strategy like the other candidates, in accordance with a specific program. Henceforth Turkey would have access to EU programs and institutions and participate in the meetings foreseen for candidates in the preaccession process.

Above all, for the first time, Turkey would be able to take advantage of a financial aid package to support its efforts to achieve membership. In practice, however, the financial aid would depend on factors such as the attitude of Greece and the tendencies of the European Parliament.

The Summit Conclusions provided for the preparation of an Accession Partnership Document. This document would be prepared in the light of the National Program for the assumption of the acquis communautaire and would contain the steps to be followed in preparing for accession, bearing in mind the political and economic criteria for membership. The commission was charged with the task of carrying out the preparations for harmonizing Turkish legislation with the EU's acquis.

#### The Factors behind the EU's Changing Attitude

After the Luxembourg Summit, the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU was broken. Contacts were gradually resumed in the two years that followed, and Turkey's candidacy was finally confirmed at the Helsinki Summit in the context of the EU's enlargement process. There were six main causes for this development.

- 1. After the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and in the light of the security of the energy sources in the Caucasus, the EU began to have a better appreciation of Turkey's strategic importance.
- 2. Turkey's important place in the framework of the European Security and Defense Identity, which the EU was seeking to develop in cooperation with NATO, became more apparent. In particular, Turkey had the power

to veto decisions in the NATO Council. Ankara had repeatedly stated that the ESDI could be realized only if Turkey was allowed to participate in the decision-making mechanism of the expanded WEU.

- 3. The U.S. was pressing the EU to include Turkey in the enlargement process. At a time when the EU was getting ready to introduce a new mechanism that would deal with defense and security issues along with NATO, Washington was ready to support the inclusion of Turkey, which had close ties to the U.S.
- 4. There had been changes in the governments of some EU members, notably Germany. In these countries, conservative or right-wing governments that were opposed to Turkish membership on cultural or identity grounds were replaced by Social Democratic governments. The Social Democratic parties felt that it would be against their pluralistic and inclusive ideologies to appear opposed to Turkey on cultural grounds. This frame of mind helped in dispelling some of the prevailing prejudices.
- 5. The Simitis government in Greece was pursuing a conciliatory line toward Turkey. Simitis wanted Greece to join the European Monetary Union and had to meet the necessary criteria. This meant that Athens had to cut down its public spending, especially its very large spending on defense. Simitis was also conscious of the need to pursue a softer line toward Ankara in order to enhance Greece's credibility within the EU as well as with non-EU countries. This led Greece to revise its former policy of automatically vetoing every EU overture toward Turkey. Furthermore, when Ankara had suspended its political dialogue with the EU following the Luxembourg Summit, Athens had lost the means to apply pressure on Turkey through the EU on the issues of the Aegean and Cyprus. Athens was aware that it had to give Ankara the green light on EU candidacy in order to regain this possibility.
- 6. Turkey was doing well economically and politically. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan and his subsequent trial contributed to a significant reduction of the threat posed by separatist terrorism. This in turn paved the way for new initiatives on the path to greater democracy. The economic programs drawn up with the IMF and other international organizations appeared to be leading to more stability and growth. All of this helped in changing the EU's perception of Turkey for the better.

In considering these various factors, the EU came to the conclusion that the cost of excluding Turkey at this stage would be far greater than any possible negative effects that might ensue from granting the status of candidate to Ankara. It would be much easier to influence and transform Turkey to suit the interests of the EU within the process of accession. In these circumstances, the initiative would rest with the EU: as in the case of other candidates, Brussels would be able to determine the conditions and the calendar that would apply when the negotiations for membership were underway. The EU would determine whether any particular condition had been met, and it would be up to the EU organs and the member states to decide whether to grant membership or not. In short, the EU had much room for maneuver and enjoyed a broad freedom of choice. It was the correct choice for Brussels to include Turkey in the enlargement process and to engage it in a dialogue that would promote EU interests. This in no way meant a binding commitment for the EU to follow any particular course.

# Lipponen's Letter and Turkey's Inclusion in the Enlargement Process

After a brief period of hesitation, Turkey accepted the Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions. Ankara considered this to be a great success and a guarantee that it would lead to full membership in the short or at most medium term. The phraseology on Cyprus and the Aegean in the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions was at first perceived to be setting conditions. This led to doubts among government circles and others, but these doubts were quickly overcome (see "Relations with Greece" below).

The fourth paragraph of the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions also dealt with the question of the Aegean Sea. It declared that candidate states

must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect, the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.

Cyprus was taken up in paragraph 9 (subparagraphs a and b):

(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion. (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

In other words, if Turkey failed to take steps toward reaching a solution, the council would be in a position to decide on accession of Cyprus without waiting for a settlement acceptable to Turkey. This formulation naturally did not mean that Southern Cyprus had to be admitted without regard to the existence of a political settlement.

When this text reached the Turkish government on 10 December 1999, the cabinet had a heated debate about whether these paragraphs were preconditions or concessions. It will be noted that the Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions included no references to two of the four political conditions contained in the Luxembourg text: human rights and a nonmilitary solution in the Southeast. But the other two conditions—the Aegean and Cyprus—were still there. Turkey was highly sensitive about these issues, which is why it did not hesitate to convey its misgivings to the EU.

Upon receiving Turkey's lukewarm reaction, Finnish prime minister Paavo Lipponen (Finland was holding the presidency at the time) addressed a letter to Prime Minister Ecevit, explaining how the EU's leadership interpreted these paragraphs. This important letter contained the following passages:

Today the EU has given its relations with Turkey a new direction. I am extremely pleased to formally communicate to you the unanimous decision to grant Turkey the status of candidate state on an equal footing with the other candidate states. When the draft of my letter was considered in the European Council, I said that there were no other criteria in paragraph 12 outside the criteria already established in Copenhagen and there were no objections. I also said that references in paragraph 12 to paragraph 4 and 9 were unrelated to criteria attached to membership and that they only implied political dialogue, and again there were no objections. Accession to the EU will take place on the basis of the existing rules. The date 2004 in paragraph 4 indicates the deadline for settling disputes at the International Court of Justice. As regards Cyprus, the EU seeks a political settlement. As for the accession of Cyprus, the Council will take account of all relevant factors when reaching a decision. In the light of these clarifications, I am inviting you to the working dinner to be held in Helsinki tomorrow together with all candidate countries. (Birand, pp. 535–36)

Furthermore, Xavier Solana (the EU's high representative for common foreign and security policy) and Günther Verheugen (the commissioner responsible for enlargement) came to Ankara on 10 December on French president Jacques Chirac's plane and sought to persuade the government to accept the status of candidate. Following the Lipponen letter and contacts with the representatives of the EU, the cabinet held a meeting and, after long discussions, agreed to accept the status of candidature for accession. The next day, Prime Minister Ecevit flew to Helsinki to attend the working dinner and appear in the "family photo."

In this framework, the phrase "end of 2004" with reference to the Aegean Sea would be understood to mean that the progress made toward a settlement would be reviewed by the European Council by that date, which would not be read as a deadline for submitting the issues to the International Court of Justice. Similarly, the phrase referring to Cyprus would be interpreted to mean that the island's membership would be facilitated by a political settlement but would be decided by the European Council if no settlement was reached. A settlement would not be a precondition for membership, and all relevant factors would be taken into account.

The announcement that Turkey was a candidate on the same basis and according to the same principles as the other twelve candidates meant that the preconditions laid down at the Luxembourg Summit had been dropped.

The debate over whether these paragraphs were ex-

plicit enough or whether they set down preconditions or not continued even after the government accepted the status of candidate offered at Helsinki. How these vague paragraphs would be interpreted in the future would depend on the conditions of the day and the political dispositions of the decision-makers.

## F. Turkish-EU Relations after Helsinki and the Accession Partnership Document (APD)

The Meeting of the Council of Association on 11 April 2000

After a hiatus lasting three years, the Turkey-EU Council of Association met in Luxembourg on 29 April 2000 and reached important decisions. Eight subcommittees under the Association Committee would start the screening process in connection with the *acquis* (which was divided into thirty-one separate chapters) and negotiations would begin on the free movement of services, which had been pending since the introduction of the Customs Union.

## The Release of the Accession Partnership Document by the Commission

When Turkey acquired the status of a candidate state in December 1999, it became part of the EU's preaccession strategy. In this framework, the European Commission was due to prepare an Accession Partnership Document (APD) for approval by the EU's Council of Ministers and Turkey would prepare a National Program in line with the APD. The APD would constitute the commission's "homework," just as the National Program would be Turkey's. These documents would be prepared in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria. Paragraph 12 of the Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions stated that the APD would contain the conditions for Turkey to comply with the EU's acquis in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations stemming from membership.

The APD was released on 8 November 2000 but had to be revised somewhat to meet certain objections raised by Turkey and Greece. The revised version was approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 4 December 2000.

The object of the APD was to establish the conditions under which Turkey's membership process would operate, set a time-table, and draw up a framework for monitoring the process and for supporting it with financial and technical assistance. The APD would constitute the first step in the process and, along with the National Program to be prepared by Turkey, would form the legal and technical basis of the preaccession strategy.

### The Content and Nature of the APD

From a legal standpoint, the APD was a unilateral declaration made by the EU and was binding on only the EU. Given the nature of the declaration and its content, however, it also had a binding effect on Turkey in a practical if not a legal sense. For the accession process to progress smoothly, the conditions and the time-table set out in the document had to be observed. It would up to the EU institutions to decide whether there was compliance with the conditions and the time-table.

Separate APDs were prepared for each of the countries in the EU's enlargement process. These documents contained the steps that candidate countries had to take if the accession process was to make headway. These steps were based on the Copenhagen Criteria and the *acquis*.

One of the key elements of the expanded preaccession strategy was the APD that provided that all of the assistance to be furnished to candidates would come under a single program, as decided by the European Council at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Although the APD was prepared single-handedly by the EU, the basic principles, priorities, midterm targets, and conditions in the document were established through consultations with Turkey. It was subsequently approved in its final form by the EU's Council of Ministers.

The purpose of the APD was to consolidate in one document the priority areas in the commission's progress report on Turkey for the year 2000, the assistance that would be furnished to Turkey to implement the priority areas, and the conditions that would govern the assistance. The APD also indicated that in 2000 Turkey would submit to the commission its National Program (based on the APD), detailing how Turkey would harmonize its legislation with the EU's legislation.

The APD contained the following chapters: Introduction, Objectives, Principles, Priorities and Medium-Term Objectives, Programming, Conditions, and Monitoring.

The chapter on objectives stated that, although the National Program would not be an integral part of the APD, the priorities of the program would have to conform to those of the APD. Thus, even if the National Program did not have to reflect the APD exactly, its basic substance and time-table would have to correspond in large measure. Otherwise there would be difficulties and delays in the progress of the accession process, in the monitoring, and in the flow of financial and technical assistance.

The chapter on principles indicated that the basic priorities established for each state were related to that state's ability to comply with political, economic, and legal criteria for membership. After the Madrid Summit of 1995, a further condition was set in order to harmonize the implementation of the EU's policies. After accession, candidates would have to harmonize their administrative structures. It was not enough just to include the *acquis* in the legislation; this legislation would also have to be effectively implemented.

Another point stressed in the chapter on principles was that all thirteen candidates would form part of a single accession strategy and the same criteria would apply to them all. According to the document, the candidates had to share all of the values and goals contained in EU treaties. In this framework, the document referred to territorial disputes and the question of Cyprus, which were the subject of paragraphs 4 and 9(a) of the Helsinki Summit Conclusions. The APD declared that the European Council confirmed that Turkey would benefit from the preaccession strategy in order to encourage and support Turkey's reforms and progress in the direction of meeting the political criteria related to accession, including the expanded political dialogue on the issue of human rights and emphasizing paragraphs 4 and 9(a) of the Helsinki Summit Conclusions. This signified that the EU would provide financial assistance to Turkey to enable it to achieve objectives cited in the APD.

The chapter on Priorities and Medium-Term Objectives elaborated the fields in which the candidates had to undertake preparations. Some were in the short-term category and had to be completed in one year (that is, by the end of 2001). If these were not completed, substantial progress in attaining the objective had to be registered. The chapter also included a list of other objectives that were classified as medium-term. No date was indicated for these objectives, which would take more than a year to complete. It was expected, however, that the preparations would commence (to the extent possible) in 2001.

The APD also described intermediate-stage goals, which would lead to specific objectives determined in cooperation with candidates. Success in this context would determine the level of assistance and the opening of negotiations. In this framework, it was clear that it was necessary to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria before accession negotiations would begin.

The priority areas for Turkey to prepare for membership were specified in the APD. Turkey had to deal with all the points contained in the Progress Report. For negotiations to start, all of the issues raised in the APD had to be addressed. Furthermore, even if they were not included in the APD, the issues raised in Progress Reports also had to be addressed for accession to take place. It was not enough to incorporate the *acquis* in the national legislation. It was

also necessary to implement the legislation effectively in conformity with EU standards.

The short-term priorities fell under the following subheadings in the document: Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria, Economic Criteria, Internal Market, Taxation, Agriculture, Fishing, Transportation, Statistics, Employment and Social Affairs, Energy, Telecommunications, Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, Culture and Audiovisual Policies, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs, Customs, and Reinforcement of Administrative and Judicial Capacity. The medium-term priorities were listed under similar subheadings.

The short-term and medium-term priority political objectives included a number of sweeping reforms that would be difficult to implement: freedom of expression and worship, elimination of all obstacles to the establishment of civil society (including freedom of association), legislative reform, elimination of violations of human rights and torture through legal measures and education, cultural rights, legal reform (including the status of state security courts), training of members of the legal profession in the field of EU legislation, an end to the state of emergency, elimination of regional disparities, the right to publish and broadcast in native languages and to learn them, and the abolition of the death penalty.

In addition, the APD called for the completion of economic reforms among the short-term and mediumterm priorities. These included reining in public spending, implementation of the stability and structural reform programs agreed to with the IMF and the World Bank, financial sector reform and financial oversight, agricultural reforms, privatization, an independent Central Bank, the creation of a sustainable pension and social security system, and improved education and health services.

Furthermore, a comprehensive program of new legislation was foreseen in the APD in line with the reforms that would be carried out over the short and medium terms.

The APD chapter on Programming described the financial assistance that the EU was due to provide for Turkey to carry out the structural adjustments called for in the document.

The assistance was to come from two sources. Starting in 2000, Turkey was to receive an average share of 15% from the bilateral MEDA II funds. It was also due to receive allocations from the funds under the heading European Strategy/Preaccession Strategy, consisting of two regulations. The first regulation, introduced in April 2000,

foresaw annual payments of 5 million euros for a period of three years to help in the implementation of measures to reinforce the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The second regulation related to the provision of 45 million euros for a period of three years to support measures that would contribute to Turkey's economic and social development.

The conditions under which EU assistance would be furnished were contained in the chapter on Conditions. "EU assistance to Turkey to finance projects is dependent on Turkey living up to its commitments. Progress must be registered in adopting measures to comply better with the Copenhagen criteria and especially in carrying out in 2001 the specific reforms foreseen in the Accession Partnerships. Noncompliance with these general conditions may lead to the Council deciding to suspend financial assistance." In other words, Turkey's performance and determination to carry out the reforms foreseen for 2001 would constitute a precondition for the assistance.

The chapter on Monitoring contained the procedures for monitoring Turkey's performance in carrying out the reforms and meeting the conditions set in the document. The implementation of the Preaccession Partnership would be monitored within the framework of the Association Agreement. This meant that the Council of Association and its subcommittees would be charged with carrying out the monitoring, which would lead to the evaluation that would constitute the basis for the Commission's Progress Report for 2001 and determine the way in which relations would develop.

## The Adoption of the Accession Partnership Document

The text of the APD drafted by the commission was released on 8 November and submitted to the Council of Ministers for adoption. The following phrase was included among the political criteria: "strong support will be given, within the framework of the political dialogue, to the efforts of the Secretary-General of the UN to conclude successfully the search for a comprehensive solution of the question of Cyprus." This meant that Turkey was expected to meet this political criterion by the end of 2001.

Having defended the view throughout the 1990s that no linkage could be established between EU membership and the settlement of the question of Cyprus, Ankara found this approach unacceptable. Furthermore, Greece was pressing hard to include the settlement of the Aegean disputes among the medium-term priorities. The priorities were formulated in general terms as territorial

disputes. As a result of these developments, Prime Minister Ecevit announced that this might lead to a review of relations with the EU.

Although unanimity was not required for the approval of the APD by the Council of Ministers, it became necessary to seek a common position among the member states on issues that were of such importance. Furthermore, the Framework Regulation that would regulate the financial and technical assistance that would be provided to implement the APD would have financial implications, which would also require a broad agreement. Therefore, it was necessary to find a compromise that would have Greece's approval while being acceptable to Turkey. The solution was finally found on 4 December 2000 at the Council of Ministers through a formula proposed by France as president of the EU. According to the formula, an addition in the form of Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria was placed under the heading Priorities and Medium-Term Targets. This would allow the question of Cyprus and territorial disputes to be taken up within the political dialogue, but according to differing priorities.

In line with the French formula, the paragraph relating to Cyprus was revised to read as follows: "In conformity with the Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions and as referred to in paragraph 9(a) of the Conclusions within the context of the political dialogue, the UN Secretary General's efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the question of Cyprus will be strongly supported." There was also a paragraph dealing with Aegean questions among the medium-term objectives. "In conformity with the Helsinki Summit Presidency Conclusions, and as referred to in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions and in compliance with the principle of settling disputes peacefully contained in the UN Charter, all efforts will be deployed to resolve outstanding territorial disputes and other questions."

The desire of the parties to see progress in relations and the accession process had made it possible to overcome the difficulties encountered. It was not easy to discern the extent to which the devised phraseology was setting conditions for Turkey.

The best answer to this question was probably contained in the Commission's Progress Report of 2001 on Turkey's accession process. As long as the EU maintained its political will to see Turkey's accession process on track (and harmonization of legislation progressed and the economic and political criteria were in large measure complied with), the continued existence of these questions that were not completely the responsibility of Turkey

would not, by itself, prevent the process of accession from going forward.

In this context, the report of Jacques Poos on the state of the accession negotiations with Southern Cyprus adopted by the European Parliament on 5 September 2001 gave an indication of the thinking in EU circles. The report declared that the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus was the sole representative of the island with international recognition, that it was in full compliance with the Copenhagen and Maastricht Criteria, that Turkey was occupying a part of the island, that the process of accession was a catalyst toward finding a political solution in the island but that a political solution was not a precondition for Southern Cyprus's accession, and that the entire island and all its people would legally become a part of the EU when the negotiations were finalized. The report went on to state that there was no question of negotiating separately with the two communities in Cyprus or admitting two distinct Cypriot states or admitting the northern part of the island after Turkey's accession to the EU. If Turkey went ahead and integrated the northern portion of the island following the accession of the southern portion, this would make it impossible for Turkey to gain membership in the EU.

## The Commission's Progress Report for 2000

On 8 November the EU released the APD as well as the Progress Report for the year 2000 ("Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession for 2000"). The report contained the commission's appraisal of Turkey's progress during the year 2000.

In the portion dealing with political criteria, the commission drew attention to the benefits of the debate in Turkey on the need for political reform that had been triggered by its inclusion in the preaccession strategy at the Helsinki Summit. In this context, the signing of some international covenants on human rights and approval by the government of the work of the Human Rights Coordination Council were noted as positive developments. But the report added that progress had slowed compared to the previous year and that Turkey was still not in full compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. The slow pace of institutional reform, the influence of the army on political life, the problems besetting the judiciary, persistent corruption, the state of human rights, the conditions in prisons, and even the situation of non-Sunni Muslims were singled out as problem areas.

In the area of economic criteria, the report noted that Turkey had made progress in tackling the most serious

### Box 7-21. The Nice Treaty

The heads of state and government of the member states of the European Union met in Nice on 8-10 December 2000 and agreed on the draft text of the Nice Treaty that made significant changes in the founding treaties. After going through the ratification procedures of the member states, the treaty went into effect in February 2003. The treaty was designed to meet the requirements of enlargement and provided for changes in EU institutions to allow the EU to function effectively.

The membership of the main structural Institutions (such as the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors), and of functional institutions like the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions was rearranged, taking enlargement into account. The "Declaration on the Enlargement of the European Union" that was annexed to the treaty contained the dates on which the revisions of the institutional structure would take effect. It also projected the shape of the institutional structure of the EU up to the year 2010. In this projection, the number of members that the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and other bodies would have after the EU membership reached twenty-seven was specified, without making any provisions for Turkish accession. The qualified major

ity voting system was altered to give greater weight to the larger member states.

Burkhari ya ya kusa ka kali kata inaliya ya 1966 ya alimba kali

The mechanism of "enhanced cooperation" introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty was also modified. Other changes related to the EU citizens' residence and travel arrangements, elimination of discrimination, fundamental rights, visas, the right to seek refuge and to migrate, the status of the European Central Bank, the common trade policy, social regulations, environmental policy, economic financial and technical cooperation with third countries, the Common Security and Defense Policy, and cooperation among police and judicial authorities in criminal matters

Furthermore, the European institutions signed the European Charter of Fundamental Rights at the Nice Summit and submitted this document for the consideration of EU members. The legal status and binding force of this document are still undefined at present. In a sense, the document is a declaration of intention. It is designed to address the need to have a catalogue of fundamental rights in the European acquis. This is a step in the direction of transforming the founding treaties into a Constitution, which in turn should lead to a political union.

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imbalances and achieving macroeconomic stability but had not yet completed the process of achieving a functioning market economy. Progress had been made in the privatization of public enterprises and in the fields of agriculture, social security, and the financial sector, but more progress was needed in the fields of public finance, the role of the state in the economy, overcoming social and regional disparities, and increasing the competitiveness of the Turkish workforce and industry.

On the subject of adjustment to the EU's acquis, the report stated that Turkey had demonstrated a high capacity to adjust to the acquis in the area of the Customs Union, but here too there was much work to be done in specific areas. It stressed that new mechanisms were needed in the fields of implementation and execution.

## G. The Nice Summit and Turkish-EU Relations

The meeting of the heads of state and government that took place on 7–8 December 2000 was one of the important milestones in the EU's history. The Intergovernmental Conference held after the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 resulted in the signing of the Nice Treaty at this summit (Box 7-21). The treaty revised the institutional structure of the EU to allow it to function effectively and efficiently, especially following enlargement. The EU was already facing difficulties in its institutional structure and its decision-making process, and there was a danger of total deadlock when the membership went from fifteen to twenty-seven or twenty-eight (if Turkey

was included). This induced the member states to make these changes prior to enlargement.

Some of the arrangements within the Nice Treaty forced Turkey to appraise its relations with the EU once again after the Accession Partnership Document.

The annex to the treaty entitled Declaration on the Enlargement of the European Union included a projection for the shape of the institutional structure of the EU up to the year 2010. This projection caused widespread disappointment in Turkey. It contained the number of members that the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission would have when European membership had been enlarged to twenty-seven, without any provision for Turkish membership. The EU declared that Turkey had not been included because accession negotiations with Turkey had not yet begun, whereas negotiations were going on with the other candidates.

Although the EU stated that it would be incorrect to interpret this to mean that Turkish membership before 2010 was being excluded, the approach did reveal that the EU considered it unlikely that Turkey would become a member before that date. This was not surprising and once again revealed the wide gap between Turkey's expectations and those of the EU.

### н. The National Program

On 4 December 2000 the EU's Council of Ministers adopted the APD and the legal basis of this document (the Framework Regulation that contained the aid that would

be provided to Turkey under the preaccession strategy and that set up an Accession Partnership between Turkey and the European Union). It was now Turkey's turn to take the necessary steps and submit its National Program to the EU.

"The National Program of Turkey for Adopting the European Union's *Acquis*" was adopted by the Turkish cabinet on 19 March 2001 and published in the *Official Gazette* on 24 March 2001. This document reflected the state of Turkish-EU relations on that date.

Legally, this was a unilateral declaration by Turkey. Together with the APD (which foresaw Turkey's adherence to the membership criteria) and the Framework Regulation (which provided the basis for financial aid to Turkey in the process of accession), the National Program was an element of the Preaccession Strategy for Turkey foreseen in the Helsinki Summit.

The National Program committed Turkey to harmonize its legislation to comply with the requirements of EU membership. It revealed how and when Turkey would carry out its structural adjustments. Although the National Program did not have to correspond exactly to the APD, the extent of its correspondence would ensure swift and untroubled progress in the process of accession.

The National Program contained six chapters: Introduction, Political Criteria, Economic Criteria, Ability to Assume the Responsibilities of Membership, Ability to Implement the *Acquis*, and Financial Appraisal of the Reforms.

The Introduction stressed that membership in the European Union would conform to the guiding philosophy of the Republic and confirm Atatürk's vision. Consequently, membership would be in conformity with the relevant criteria and the basic principles of the Turkish Republic as reflected in its Constitution.

The APD had included the questions of the Aegean and Cyprus under the heading Political Criteria. By placing these items in the Introduction, the National Program indicated that these were not criteria for membership. The program employed the following language in this respect:

Turkey is a country that contributes to the enhancement and reinforcement of peace, security, stability, and prosperity in international relations and will continue to develop its relations with neighboring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy; in this context, Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts toward the settlement of bilateral problems through dialogue with Greece. Turkey will con-

tinue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, in the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the Island.

Under the heading Political Criteria, the government undertook to accelerate its efforts in 2001 in the direction of carrying out political, administrative, and judiciary reforms and to submit its bills to this effect to the TGNA as early as possible. In this framework, revisions of the Constitution were foreseen as part of the reforms in the areas of democracy and human rights, accompanied by the required changes in legislation. Among the measures to be taken were the development of rights and freedoms: above all, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, strengthening civil society, enhancing the functioning and effectiveness of the judiciary, improvement of the condition of convicts and detainees prior to their trials, speeding up the adoption of measures against torture, effective deterrence of violations of human rights, reductions in regional discrepancies within the country, training of civil servants and other public officials in the field of human rights, and other such legislative and administrative measures to be adopted in both the short and medium terms. The National Program, however, revealed certain differences of approach compared to the APD in the areas of education in one's mother tongue (teaching of native languages), broadcasting/publishing in one's mother tongue, and the abolition of capital punishment (Box 7-22).

Under the heading Economic Criteria, the measures foreseen were in general compliance with the APD. The steps taken and the progress expected in the areas of social security, spreading the tax burden, bringing discipline to the informal economy, the financial sector, the agricultural sector, and privatization were described. The document also noted that the economic program for 1999 had to be revised because of the crisis of February 2001 and that the implementation of the structural reforms was absolutely essential for the success of the new program.

Under the heading Ability to Assume the Responsibilities of Membership were included the objectives that would be attained in the short and medium terms to adjust to the *acquis*. In this context, the legislative and administrative arrangements that would be carried out in the twenty-eight fields contained in the APD were enumerated. These included legislative harmonization; free movement of goods, people, services, and capital; competition and state aid; common agricultural, fisheries, and

| hort Term APD   | National Program  |
|---|---|
| 1. Freedom of expression  | Full conformity   |
| 2. Freedom of association and of assembly and civil society.                                  | Full conformity   |
| 3. Prevention of torture  | Full conformity (short/medium term)   |
| 4. Improving conditions of detention  | Full conformity (medium term)   |
| 5. Deterrence of violations of human rights and compensation                                  | Full conformity (medium term)   |
| 6. Human rights training for civil servants   | Full conformity   |
| 7. Human rights training for judges and prosecutors   | Full conformity   |
| 8. Continuation of the moratorium on the death penalty  | Full conformity within the competence of the TGNA   |
| 9. Right to broadcast/publish in one's mother tongue  | No conformity   |
| 10. Regional discrepancies and development of the southeast                                   | Full conformity (medium term)   |
| 11. Support for a Cyprus settlement   | Partial conformity (taken up under "Introduction" and not as "Political<br>Criteria." no time scale given and only conditional support)   |
| Viedium Term APD  | National Program  |
| No discrimination based on language, religion, creed, or gender and constitutional safeguards | Full conformity (short/medium term)   |
| 2 Constitutional revisions based on European Convention on Human Rights                       | Full conformity (short/medium term)   |
| 3. Abolition of death penalty.  | Partial conformity (will be considered by the TGNA)   |
| 4. Accession to international conventions   | Full conformity (no term indicated)   |
| 5 Improvement of prison conditions  | Full conformity (short term)  |
| 6. Advisory organ status for National Security Council  | Full conformity (medium term)   |
| .7. Lifting of State of Emergency.  | Full conformity (medium (erm)   |
| 8. Education in one's mother tongue (i.e., teaching of native languages)                      | No conformity   |
| 9. Maintenance of good relations with neighbors   | Partial conformity, settlement of disputes with neighbors again mentioned in the "Introduction" of the National Program, therefore not treated as a political criterion for membership. |
|   | (S. BAYK<br>(Source: Günuğür 2001, p.   |

transport policies; economic and monetary union; social policies and employment; the environment; justice and home affairs; and the common foreign and security policy.

A general appraisal of the administrative capacity required to carry out the adjustments to conform to the *acquis* was contained in the chapter Ability to Implement the *Acquis*.

Finally, the resources necessary to carry out the reforms to implement the National Program were described in the chapter Financial Appraisal of the Reforms, which also included the financial assistance expected from the EU.

According to the National Program, Turkey was to amend six articles of its Constitution and revise twenty-three laws. It also had to pass twenty new laws. All of this would be carried out by approximately the end of 2001.

Over the medium term, there would be ten more constitutional amendments, ninety-five laws would be amended, and twenty new laws would be enacted.

Clearly, the National Program responded in large measure to the requirements of the APD. At this stage, issues such as teaching and broadcasting/publishing in native languages, the abolition of capital punishment, the Aegean and Cyprus questions, the manner in which structural adjustments would be carried out to prepare for membership, the meaning of membership, the changes that the EU would undergo, and the place of Turkey in the EU would be the subject of intense debates in the beginning of the twenty-first century and give direction to Turkey's relations with the EU.

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# Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia

# HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkey's View of the Caucasus and Central Asia during the Soviet Era

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity between the Soviet government and the TGNA in March 1921 and following the death of Enver Paşa in 1922 in Central Asia while leading the Basmacı Movement against the Russians (see Box 1-14 in Section 1), Turkey relegated the issue of "external Turks" to the background. The 1921 treaty contained the following provision in article 8: "the parties undertake never to allow the formation or the establishment on their territories of organizations or groups that would claim to be the government of the other party or one of the territories of that party." In this way, Turkey agreed not to support the pro-Turanian movements in the Soviet Union, while the Soviets guaranteed that they would not support the efforts to spread communism in Turkey.

This policy continued after the death of Atatürk. Being fully aware of the dangers caused by the Turanian adventure in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire, the leadership of the Turkish Republic steered clear of expressing any public interest on the subject of "external Turks," especially those living in the USSR. The aim was to give the USSR no cause for complaint on the issue. Notwithstanding the existence of a limited number of groups that advocated a *jihad* against the USSR in order to establish a Turkic Union with the Turks of Central Asia, no Turkish government displayed the slightest interest in the issue. The prevailing anti-Communist stance in Turkey prevented even research on the Turkic peoples living under Communist rule. The USSR, in turn, was well aware of the dangers posed by the Turkic-Muslim communities in its population having contacts with Turkey; thus it did not allow even the Turkish Communist Party to have any contacts with these communities. Similarly, the people of the Caucasus and Central Asia were under the strict control of Moscow and never had a chance to establish any relations with Turkey or the rest of the world. As a consequence, until the last part of the Gorbachev administration, when the Soviet grip on the component republics was loosened, Turkey had hardly any relations with the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

# Turkey's View of the Caucasus and Central Asia after the Cold War

Important developments and reappraisals took place in global politics following the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Turkey had been undergoing substantial sociopolitical and economic changes throughout the 1980s and was inevitably affected by changes in the global scene. Turkey's policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia after the end of the Cold War was shaped by the following world context.

- 1. Both the possibilities for cooperation and the risks increased. After the disintegration of the USSR, the emergence of Russia and fifteen new states that abandoned the Communist system and embarked on a course of liberalization meant that the divisions of the Cold War had been overcome and, for the first time in the twentieth century, created opportunities for bringing all the major powers together in cooperation on a global scale. The system for avoiding regional conflicts that had developed during the Cold War was also swept aside, however, along with the old order. There was constant instability as the internal restructuring was being carried out in the newly independent states. This was compounded by tensions between these states. The risks of internal and international wars grew alarmingly in Eurasia.
- 2. Instability began to spread. As the Soviet system collapsed, the international alliances designed to combat it began to be seriously undermined. This led to serious sociopolitical instabilities beyond the territories of the former USSR.
  - 3. Systems were changing, models were being de-

bated, and regional rivalries were growing. The former regions and republics of the USSR that had only a marginal influence on international affairs began to acquire critical importance in the new system. The model that these states would adopt and the debates over this issue would lead to tensions not only internally but also with neighbors and among the interested major powers. The competition among regional and other states that scrambled to fill the void left by the Soviet withdrawal from the Caucasus and Central Asia would lead to new rivalries and new tension on the international scene.

4. The rivalry between the East and West gave way to the North-South divide. As a natural consequence of the ending of the Cold War, the East-West divide began losing its intensity and was gradually replaced by the North-South divide. In an environment where the bipolar system of the Cold War was coming to an end, it was inevitable that regional interests would play a larger part in international affairs than global concerns. It was obvious that the short- and medium-term struggles for regional leadership in the various subsystems of the international system (such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and Central Asia) would become the determining factor.

With the disintegration of the USSR, eight states gained their independence in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. International interest in these countries has been growing ever since then, mainly for economic and strategic reasons. The region has been attracting the interest not just of the major powers but also of regional powers such as Iran, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey, due to the wealth of natural resources, the region's closeness to the Middle East, and its strategic location between Europe and Asia.

Outside the Soviet Bloc, the emerging new order and the changes it brought about affected Turkey most of all. Turkey had based its security and foreign policy during the Cold War on its relations with the Western allies and the strategic importance attributed to it by the allies. With the ending of the Cold War, the Europeans found themselves in a much more secure environment, while Turkey found itself in an environment breeding regional conflicts on all sides. In this new era when NATO's role and necessity became a subject of intense debate, Turkey found itself in a security limbo. With the ending of the threat from the North, Turkey's security links with the West and the economic, political, and military benefits it derived from these links had come to an end. It was no longer possible to pursue the usual policies based on the relative "security" and "stability" of the Cold War. Furthermore, the

appearance of Eastern European states pursuing liberal democratic goals created a buffer zone between the Western European states and Russia. This allowed Western Europe to relax while Turkey remained tense as a result of the instability in its vicinity, which it perceived as a threat. This threat perception was compounded by the danger that it might be abandoned by its Western allies. This shook Turkey's security policies to the core and led to an urgent reappraisal of possible threats to its security in the post–Cold War era.

As the chain of events that broke up the USSR was unfolding, Turkey was reappraising its foreign policy orientations and its fundamental ideological assumptions. There was increasing concern in Turkey over foreign and security policies at this time, and its place and importance in the world were the subjects of intense debate. The appearance at this juncture of six independent Muslim states (five of them Turkic), with a total population of 60 million living in an area totaling 6 million square kilometers, created a great stir and caused much joy in Turkey. This presented Ankara with a historic opportunity to derive political, economic, and psychological benefits from this transformation. In his speech at the opening of the new session of parliament on 1 September 1991, president Turgut Özal declared that the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR had given the Turks a historic opportunity to assume regional leadership for the first time in 400 years and that this opportunity must not be missed.

Turkey had not expected the USSR to disintegrate so rapidly and did not have a policy of taking a close interest in the fate of external Turks. As noted earlier, during the Cold War period it had followed a policy of staying clear of the questions of external Turks. The exceptions were the Turks of Cyprus, Western Thrace, and Bulgaria, and these concerns had been forced upon Turkey by outside events. The new developments led to unrealistic expectations and high hopes. The feeling of isolation going back for many years was suddenly at an end, and the shared cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with the majority of the newly independent states of the Caucasus/Central Asia were frequently cited both at home and abroad as factors that would enhance Turkey's importance in the region.

In this framework, Turkey was presented to the new states as an example of a successful development model, while Pan-Turkic and Turanian ideas began to take hold in Turkey. The West and particularly the U.S. openly supported Turkey in the region for fear of seeing pro-Iranian Islamic regimes gain power there. For the first time in history, the Russian Federation tolerated Turkey's influence

in the region for the same reason. Initially, the Turkic-Muslim states of Caucasus/Central Asia looked upon Turkey to reinforce their independence, to gain respectability and status in the world, and to carry out their transformation.

All of this was bound to affect Turkey in its efforts to redefine its identity at the end of the Cold War. But it did not take long for reality to reassert itself after the initial excitement. The financial and technological resources of Turkey were no match for the enormous socioeconomic requirements of the former Soviet republics.

As the initial hopes and expectations gave way to disappointment, a more serious and sober assessment began, considering Turkey's future role in the region and how this would affect Turkey's domestic and external policy, its identity, and so forth. After the Cold War, Turkey was in fact confronted with great opportunities as well as potential risks in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which had to be analyzed with the greatest care. A complicating factor was that much emphasis had been placed on the original Turkish homeland in Central Asia when a new Turkish identity was being forged in the 1920s. Since then, people in Turkey had lived by the myth that theirs was the last Turkish state that had resisted the onslaughts of surrounding enemies all these years. This myth of "isolation" and "uniqueness" was suddenly brought to an end by the emergence in the international arena of fraternal Turkic states. All of this compelled Turkey to make complex analyses of its identity (Box 7-23).

# II. RELATIONS WITH THE REGION AND CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY

In the post–Cold War era, Turkey's Caucasus/Central Asia policy went through a number of different phases. From 1989 to 1991 Turkey steered clear of nationalist currents taking shape in the Soviet Republics and clung to its traditional Moscow-centered foreign policy. After the disbanding of the USSR and the emergence of independent states in the region from 1991 to 1993, Turkey was the first country to recognize these states. In this period Turkey strove to play a leadership role and presented itself as a model, actively seeking to eliminate Russian influence in the region. Turkic, Turanian, and Islamic motifs came to the fore amidst all the excitement in the scramble to complete with Russia and Iran. Turkey engaged in a struggle for influence without any particular plan or program.

From 1993 to 1995 it became increasingly clear that the vacuum left in the region by the disintegration of the USSR would be filled by the Russian Federation. This was

### Box 7-23. Turkish-Turkic

In none of the Turkish dialects is there the distinction between "Turkish" and "Turkic" that exists in English. Turkic in English describes a family of languages, while Turkish is the language spoken by the Turks in Anatolia and in former Ottoman territories (Cyprus, Western Thrace, Bulgaria, etc.). "Turkic" also denotes the whole people, while "Turkish" describes those who live in Anatolia and speak the Turkish language. To make the English distinction, the word "Turkis" was concocted in Turkey after 1990 to correspond to the word "Turkic."

In this confusion, politicians and academics in Turkey used the expression "Turkish Republics" to describe the new states set up by Turkic people in the Caucasus and Central Asia following the collapse of the USSR and called the languages spoken by these people Turkish. In doing this they were under the influence of the notion that these people were no different from the Anatolian Turks and that they all made up a single people. This usage was interpreted abroad as a sign that the Turks of Turkey were considering an expansionist policy based on the concept of ethnicity. As similar views also began to be expressed in Turkey, the new states gradually came to be called "Turki" (that is, "Turkic Republics") in public parlance. Only people living in Cyprus, Western Thrace, and Bulgaria were referred to as Turks, with the remainder of people of Turkish stock living outside Turkey being described as Turkic peoples

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the period when Turkey was discovering its inadequacies and its limitations and was feeling disappointment over not being able to establish relations with the regional countries at the desired level. Since then Turkey has been pursuing policies more in line with its means and corresponding to the realities of the region. This policy does not seek to exclude Russia but is more realistic and balanced and based on mutual cooperation.

# The Gorbachev Period and Moscow-Centered Foreign Policy (1989–1991)

Before Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Turkish-Soviet relations were developing rapidly, especially in the economic area. In line with the 1984 agreement for the sale of natural gas, the USSR started delivering natural gas to Turkey in 1987. This led to increasing Turkish exports to the USSR and a leap in the volume of bilateral trade (see "Relations with the USSR" in Section 6 and "Relations with Russia" below). Developing economic relations added a new incentive for Turkey's traditional policy of not getting involved in the internal affairs of the USSR. Turkey maintained this traditional policy even after the closed Soviet system began to open up to the world as a result of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. Ankara made no attempt to establish direct links with the

# Box 7-24. The Distinction between Sovereignty and Independence in Soviet Terminology

At the time of the disintegration of the USSR, the concept of sovereignty came to the fore. Under this concept, the laws of the component republics had precedence over the laws of the Union, the republics had control over their resources and made their own domestic and external policies. Against this, the republics undertook to maintain their confederal ties with the Union. The declaration of sovereignty by the republics was an important step in the path that led to independence but did not imply independence. In the region of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Azerbaijan declared its sovereignty on 23 September 1989, Uzbekistan on 20 June 1990, Georgia on 9 August 1990, Türkmenistan on 24 August 1990, Armenia on 23 August 1990, Tajikistan on 24 August 1990, Kyrgyzstan on 12 October 1990, and Kazakhstan on 25 October 1990. Full independence came about a year later.

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Soviet Republics; nor did it engage in any activity that might be construed as threatening the existence of the USSR.

Even Turgut Özal, who was not averse to challenging the traditional course of Turkish foreign policy, exercised extreme caution in this respect. When asked about his view regarding the events that took place in Soviet Azerbaijan in January 1990, he replied that this was an internal affair of the USSR, that Turkey did not pursue a policy of uniting the Turkic people of that country within an empire, and that Ankara was attached to Atatürk's precept of "Peace at home and peace abroad." He even went so far as to suggest that the Shiite Azerbaijanis were more the concern of Iran than of Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1990). In line with these views, Turkey remained silent when Soviet troops violently suppressed the supporters of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in Baku, despite a strong current in Turkey that favored giving active support to the Azerbaijanis.

Starting in 1988, Gorbachev began to grant limited autonomy to the republics in the USSR. The people of the Caucasus and Central Asia established their own structures, began to set their own courses, chose their national emblems, and declared their sovereignties in the second half of 1990. Turkey then began to shift its attention from the center to the republics (Box 7-24). In practice Gorbachev's reforms did not grant the republics the right to pursue policies without regard to the center. Nevertheless, low-level delegations began to visit Turkey from these republics to establish cooperation in fields such as culture, science, communications, health, and the economy.

The high-level visits began with President Özal going to the USSR in March 1991. Accompanied by a large group of businesspeople, Özal went to Moscow and then proceeded to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Ukraine was important for the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization. In Kazakhstan, the largest country in Central Asia, Özal signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and discussed Turkey's possible contribution to the economic restructuring of Kazakhstan. He also indicated that direct flights between Alma Ata and Istanbul would be established. It will be noted that none of these subjects were sensitive issues that might perturb Moscow. At this stage, Turkey was extremely careful not to offend Moscow when it was dealing with the republics.

Özal's visit allowed Turkey to gauge the extent to which Turkey might establish links with the regional countries without provoking the USSR. High-level visits to Turkey ensued from this visit. Among these were the visits of the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan to Ankara in May 1991 and the visit of the president of Tajikistan to Istanbul in June, when he attended a meeting of the World Economic Forum.

The failed coup attempt of 19 August 1991 that hastened the disintegration of the USSR was also a turning point in Turkey's relations with the Central Asian and Caucasus republics. Although this coup against Gorbachev failed, it demonstrated to the leadership of these countries that the end of the USSR was approaching and encouraged them to act more independently of Moscow.

At first the leaders in Central Asia avoided declaring their independence in order not to upset their sizable Russian minorities. The Turkish visit of Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev in September 1991 acquired considerable significance as a result of the failed coup against Gorbachev. Although originally conceived as merely a courtesy visit, it resulted in the signing of a Joint Declaration on Purposes and Objectives. Furthermore, it was decided to set up a joint consultation mechanism and establish interparliamentary relations between the two countries. In the economic field, Turkey would extend Kazakhstan a \$10 million loan through the Turkish Eximbank and import coal in repayment for consumer goods to be exported to Kazakhstan.

At that point Turkey was still maintaining friendly relations with Moscow while developing its relations with the republics. It was careful, however, to make sure that relations with the republics did not cast a shadow on relations with the center. When Azerbaijan declared its independence on 30 August 1991, the undersecretary of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Özdem Sanberk, made a statement the next day (Milliyet, 1 September 1991, p. 5) that revealed Turkey's intention to maintain its balancing act:

[A]t this stage Turkey is observing development from Moscow's perspective. For Ankara, relations with Moscow take precedence over relations with the republics. That is why Turkey is preceding with caution... Turkey will not rush into any race to recognize the republics that declare their independence. Turkey will proceed in line with its own strategy. When Muslim Turkic republics like Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan declare their independence, Turkey will respond and recognize these republics. We are in the process of explaining our motives to the Soviets.

On 31 August 1991 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan followed Azerbaijan and declared their independence. This attracted the public's interest in Turkey, and the press began to call for a speedy recognition of these states. The breathtaking events in the aftermath of the failed coup in the USSR and the sudden independence of the Caucasian and Central Asian republics threw Turkish-Soviet relations into uncertainty. While the government was seeking to strike a fine balance between Turkey's interests and its responsibilities, the press was clamoring for more support for the Turkic republics and calling on Ankara not to evade its responsibilities. Others were calling for caution in responding to the political changes taking place in the USSR.

When the MFA issued a statement on 3 September to clarify its position with respect to relations with the Baltic countries, which had declared themselves independent, the debate over the recognition of the Turkic states intensified. The MFA's statement declared that Turkey received the news of the regaining of independence by the three Baltic States with satisfaction and announced that Turkey would restore its relations with these states. As a matter of fact, Turkey had established diplomatic relations with these states in the 1930s and had never recognized their annexation by the USSR in 1940. Consequently, it did not feel the need to recognize their independence and confined its statement to declaring that it was restoring diplomatic relations.

The government was following the process of the conversion of the USSR into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) very closely with a view to for-

mulating an appropriate policy and did not want to rush into any course before the status of the new CIS republics became clear. At this point the Soviet republics in Central Asia had not yet made up their minds about the course they would follow, and Turkey had received no call for recognition from any of them.

### The Sending of Delegations

In view of the confused situation, Turkey readied two delegations in September 1991 with the mandate to go to the region to look into the situation and provide accurate firsthand information. One of the delegations was to go to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics, the other to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. These delegations would convey Turkey's interest and determine what these countries expected from Turkey.

The first delegation consisted of ambassador Bilal Şimşir, minister plenipotentiary Kurtuluş Taşkent, and the first counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, Halil Akıncı. The delegation visited Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan from 12 to 17 September 1991, conveyed Turkey's good wishes, and inquired about the host countries' expectations. This was the first foreign delegation to visit Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan following their declaration of independence on 9 September 1991. Thanks to their good timing, these visits allowed Turkey to gain an advantage over its rivals in the countries of the region.

The delegations reported that the region's countries wanted to increase trade with Turkey, engage in joint ventures, and send students and personnel to Turkey for training. All of the Central Asian states, including Tajikistan, declared that they looked upon Turkey as a model. Their first wish was to be granted recognition: apart from Kazakhstan, which had not yet declared its independence, all of the regional countries were anxious to obtain early recognition. The Turkic republics were also eager to establish relations with Turkey without delay. Their presidents wanted to make their first foreign visit to Turkey and were awaiting an invitation from Ankara.

The delegations reported that the newly independent republics should be recognized but noted that the timing of the recognition had to be judicious. At this point Turkey was getting ready for parliamentary elections and was focused on the domestic scene. The election took place on 20 October 1991; after the developments in Azerbaijan, the question of recognizing that country became topical once again.

### Recognition, Starting with Azerbaijan

On 29 October 1991 the parliament of Azerbaijan appealed to all countries to recognize the independence of the new state. On 1 November foreign minister Hüseyin Sadikov told Altan Karamanoğlu (the Turkish consul general in Baku) that they wanted Turkey to be the first country to recognize independent Azerbaijan. The prime minister of Azerbaijan, Hasan Hasanov, visited Ankara on 3 and 4 November on his way back from Italy and had an audience with president Turgut Özal. Hasanov informed that Italy was ready to recognize Azerbaijan but added that Turkey should be the first in granting recognition.

Finally, the Turkish government recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. This was the result of public pressure and the desire not to be left behind by a possible earlier Iranian recognition. The government's awareness that Turkey's lukewarm response to the brutal suppression of the Baku demonstrations by Soviet forces in January 1990 had damaged Turkey's image also played a part in this recognition. But Turkey continued its cautious policy of paying attention to Moscow's wishes and was careful not to offend Soviet sensibilities. This became clear when Turkmenistan declared its independence on 2 December. President Saparmurad Niyazov (subsequently Turkmenbashi) paid his first foreign visit to Turkey to call for recognition but failed to obtain satisfaction. Instead Ankara decided to set up a consulate in Turkmenistan and signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation along with various economic agreements.

When the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed in Minsk on 8 December to establish the CIS and when the Central Asian republics agreed to join it three days later at Ashkhabad, it became clear that the USSR had indeed come to an end. After these developments, Turkey recognized all fifteen of the newly independent states, including Armenia, on 16 December without even waiting for the formal dissolution of the USSR. At the same time Turkey declared its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with them. Thus Turkey had become the first state to recognize all of the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

On the same day, Uzbekistan's president Islam Karimov came to Turkey on an official visit to sign a number of agreements. The Turkish government went beyond these agreements and, in addition to setting up consulates in the two countries, informed Karimov that it was ready to establish full diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan. When he arrived in Ankara in the morning, Turkey had not yet recognized Uzbekistan and did not receive him at the air-

port as a head of state. The Soviet flag was present alongside the Turkish and Uzbek flags, and Soviet ambassador Albert Chernishev was present to greet him. The situation changed that same afternoon, however, when Turkey recognized Uzbekistan. The Soviet flag, anthem, and ambassador were excluded from the contacts. In a sense, it was Turkey that confirmed Islam Karimov as the head of state of an independent state.

On 18 December Turkey decided to establish consulates that would be upgraded later to embassies in all of the Central Asian and Caucasus republics. The only exception was Armenia, which was excluded for its role in the dispute with Azerbaijan on the question of Nagorno Karabakh and for having occupied part of the territory of Azerbaijan. Pending the establishment of these missions, Turkey's relations with the former Soviet republics would be conducted under the coordination of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. On 21 December eleven former Soviet republics met in Almati and declared that the USSR was no more. A day later, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, and afterward (in January 1992) the president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Muttalibov, came to Ankara and signed Friendship and Cooperation Agreements. During Akayev's visit it was decided to deliver emergency aid from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan, which was suffering from an unusually cold spell that winter. The aircraft that took Akayev back to Kyrgyzstan was carrying 10.5 tons of Turkish emergency relief aid.

## The Implementation of a New Policy

From 28 February to 6 March 1992 minister of foreign affairs Hikmet Çetin visited all of the Turkic republics and Ukraine. Turkey's diplomatic initiatives were gathering momentum and reached a peak two months later with Prime Minister Demirel's Central Asia tour.

These visits demonstrated that Turkey was rapidly abandoning its Moscow-centered policy and replacing it with policies more in keeping with the changed circumstances. As the awareness began to take hold that there were other "Turks" in the world, a new feeling of excitement and expectation gripped the Turkish public as well as the administration.

The excitement was reflected in the records of the TGNA on 12 and 17 December 1991, when it took up the issue of "policies to be pursued in relations with the Turkish republics." At both sittings, the deputies noted that Turkey could gain advantages over countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the U.S. by being the first to get actively involved in the region. Some deputies

demanded the establishment of a cabinet post that would be responsible for the "external Turks." During a foreign policy debate that took place at the TGNA on 25 December, the news that a neighboring country (probably Iran) was getting ready to open an embassy in Baku led Hikmet Çetin to announce from the podium that Turkey would open embassies in all of the new republics except Armenia. The minister had been advised by the personnel of the MFA that Turkey had always been first to act in this region and that Turkish ambassadors should be the deans of the diplomatic corps in all of these capitals. The government formally decided to open embassies on 30 December 1991.

# Relations Based on Emotion and Enthusiasm (1991–1993)

By the end of 1991 Turkey had completely abandoned its Moscow-centered policy and was fully engaged in developing active relations with the post-Soviet successor states. Promises of support and aid were given to the leaders of the Turkic republics, who visited Ankara one by one; and by 1993 more than 140 bilateral agreements had been signed with these states.

In this context, Turkey's activities in the region at least in the cultural sphere began to display Turkic motifs. Turkish public opinion started to take a renewed interest in Turks living abroad. Until a few years ago, dwelling on Turkish peoples abroad was regarded as a sign of harboring racist tendencies. From 1991 to 1993 there was a rising awareness of "external Turks," however, and society began to shake off its former diffidence and deal with the subject within the framework of a new perception of ethnicity. In September 1991 the Economist (no. 297) referred to the people that spoke Turkish all the way "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" in the post-Soviet world. This theme was picked up in Turkey and used to such an extent that it became a banality. The distinction between the Turks of Anatolia and the "ethnic Turks" of Central Asia grew fuzzy as a concept and led people to imagine that the twenty-first century would be a "Turkish century," as asserted by Nazarbayev during his visit in September 1991 ("İstikbal Türklerin," Türkiye, 25 September 1991).

True, these developments were all based in large measure on the emergence of independent states with which Turkey shared a common culture, language, and religion. But Turkey's approach to the Turkic republics in Caucasus and Central Asia was not based exclusively on purely nationalistic and domestic policy considerations. Other important and more fundamental economic and foreign policy considerations guided Turkey's actions in the early 1990s. The international environment had changed, and

the bloc system was at an end. According to Kamran İnan, a former minister, Turkey was compelled to admit that it was now a regional power. The changes in Turkish foreign policy were, to a large extent, a function of the regional and global transformation that was shaking the foundation on which the country's international position was based. In other words, Turkey was passing through an adaptation process imposed on it by regional and global transformation. Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey had a unique cultural, geographical, and historical position and was located in the very center of the emerging political and economic structure known as Eurasia. As such, Turkey's regional and international responsibilities had grown and could no longer be avoided (Demirel, p. 89).

In referring to "responsibilities," Demirel meant that Turkey had to take an active role to ensure that the newly independent regional states were linked to the outside world. Turkey also had the responsibility to be helpful to the new states in their reach for their true identity. These activities included the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) initiative and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which helped maintain the stability of the region and thereby contributed to world peace and helped the new states to establish closer relations with the outside world. The Turkish government felt that its responsibilities also included helping the new states to become respected members of the international community.

That is why Turkey was the first to recognize the newly independent states and compiled a list of principles that would guide its relations with these states. Accordingly, Turkey appealed to these countries to comply with the principles of "noninterference in internal affairs, the inviolability of frontiers, and respect for territorial integrity" and declared that it would conduct its relations with the republics on the basis of "respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and ensuring equal rights and common interests" (Newspot, 19 December 1991, pp. 1, 7). Turkey also conveyed the message that both Ankara and the rest of the world expected the republics to abide by the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE, to respect human rights, to comply with the obligations arising from the treaties signed by the USSR, and to have regard for the rule of law and the principles of democracy.

Turkey expected that the opportunity for cooperation with the new entities would provide significant benefits for its developing industries. After the European Commission turned down Turkey's application for full membership, Ankara saw the region as an area with a very

high potential for lucrative cooperation. In fact, Turkish entrepreneurs detected the region's attraction and opportunities for profit long before the state. By mid-1992 the number of Turkish firms with investments in the region had already surpassed the 200 mark (Haktanır, p. 10).

Turkey also expected that it would acquire a new stature in the politics of the region as well as the whole world as it developed its cultural and ethnic links with the Turkish peoples of the region undergoing a great transformation. This expectation was grounded on the belief that as a secular, democratic country, Turkey would be accepted as a "model" by the republics of Central Asia.

During this period, however, some people held contrary views and opposed the proposed policies, especially when these were embellished with Turkic images or accompanied by excessive promises of aid. The public made a sharp distinction between showing an interest in the external Turks and incurring vast expenses as a consequence of the new policies. Also, the public did not generally support a purely nationalistic foreign policy. The objections to such a policy were by no means groundless, even in the special conditions of that period. There was the question of whether Turkish foreign policy should have a Western or an Eastern orientation. Some also questioned the wisdom of Turkey's extravagant promises, made without regard to its huge budget deficits and high inflation. Even in this period of exhilaration and excitement, voices were frequently heard cautioning that the promises being made to the regional republics might not be met and that Turkey's capacity to deliver might have been overestimated.

The decision-makers, however, were under the spell of public excitement and were intent on realizing the potential benefits for Turkey that the region appeared to offer. Within the first year of their independence, more than 1,200 Turkish delegations had visited the new states. Furthermore, a new structure was established (based on a Japanese model) that would coordinate aid activities and ensure the flow of aid to the region: the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) with headquarters in Ankara (Box 7-25).

It has to be emphasized that these activities were encouraged by the West and particularly by the U.S. At this point the Western states feared that the vacuum left by the USSR in the Caucasus and Central Asia might be filled by political Islam backed up by Iran; consequently, they supported Muslim-populated, pro-Western, and secular Turkey. As President Demirel asserted, Turkey proved that Islam, democracy, human rights, and the market economy could coexist harmoniously.

Russia also appeared at this point to be closing its

### Box 7-25. TIKA's Structure and Responsibilities

The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was established by a decision of the Council of Ministers dated 27 January 1992. Originally attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, It was attached to the office of the prime minister on 28 May 1999. It finally became an autonomous agency attached to one of the ministers of state on 12 May 2001. TIKA's responsibility would be to help the progress of developing countries, in particular those speaking Turkic languages and neighboring countries. This would be done through projects and programs of cooperation in the economic, trade, technological, social, cultural, and educational fields.

TIKA's goals were (1) to undertake cooperation projects with developing countries that would contribute to their development, (2) to prepare or to commission the preparation of projects and programs and to designate the fields of cooperation and assistance, bearing in mind the development goals and requirements of developing countries; (3) to assist these countries in developing their state structures, preparing their legislation, training civil servants, and carrying out the transition to a market economy; (4) to send experts and coordinate the allocation of fellowships to these countries, (5) to make arrangements to carry out cooperation programs in the fields of education and culture through Turkish Gultural Centers to be established in these countries, and (6) to engage in cooperation and coordination with other public agencies in the fields falling within its responsibilities.

TIKA's project principles include giving priority to projects proposed by the reciplent states and to their national, social, and cultural values; sharing responsibility for the projects with the reciplent country on a footing of equality, and allowing reciplent countries to take over once the project is completed.

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eyes to Turkish activities in the region. In February 1992 NATO secretary-general Manfred Wörner declared in Moscow that the alliance relied on Turkey to protect its interests and resist religious fundamentalism in Central Asia. It was significant that the Russians displayed no reaction to this assertion. Similarly, Moscow did not react to U.S. secretary of state James Baker when he declared in February 1992 that Washington expected the Central Asian republics to look to Europe and to secular Turkey and not to neighbors like Iran when charting their strategic orientation (Winrow, p. 13).

During this period the regional countries also looked to Turkey to play a more active role. In the course of their visits to Ankara in December 1991, Islam Karimov (the president of Uzbekistan) and Askar Akayev (the president of Kyrgyzstan) openly aired their expectations of support from Turkey. Karimov also stated that he believed Uzbekistan and the other newly independent states of Central Asia had much to learn from Ankara and that he regarded

Turkey as an elder brother. He also appealed for urgent economic, political, and cultural assistance (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1991). Karimov's visit was followed immediately by the visit of Kyrgyzstan's president Askar Akayev who compared Turkey to a "morning star" indicating the way for the Turkic republics (*Turkish Daily News*, 24 December 1991).

Looking back at these events several years later, it can be said that the Central Asian and Caucasus republics had no stomach for a new elder brother after seventy years of Soviet experience and that Turkey may have offended them by attempting to assume such a role. But it must not be forgotten that they were in dire need of support for their independence in 1991 and required Turkey's help to gain wider recognition in the world. In that initial heady period, the leaders of the new republics did come under the spell of their long-forgotten feeling of being Turkish and did not he sitate to express this feeling to Turkey. At the time, Turkey was eager to assume the role of elder brother, encouraged by the Western countries, the countries of the region, and even Russia. The Turkish leadership was quite unprepared to play this role, however, being almost completely uninformed about the region and greatly overestimating Turkey's capacity to give direction to the region's sociopolitical and economic transformation.

At the end of 1991 Turkey felt itself to be ready, with the political support of the West, to seize the economic and political opportunities offered by the birth of the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Following the succession of visits of the Central Asian leaders to Ankara, Prime Minister Demirel visited the region from 27 April to 3 May 1992 in order to appraise the potential of the new states and offer import credits and aid amounting to \$1.1 billion, a sum that would strain Turkey's capacity to the limit. In the course of his visit, a number of cultural and economic cooperation protocols were signed. Demirel also told his hosts that it would be in their interest to leave the ruble zone. This was Turkey's first direct challenge to Russia's interests in the region. Turkey took up issues such as the provision of military training to the Central Asian states and the construction of pipelines to market Central Asian gas and oil through Turkey. The Central Asians were also urged to switch to the Latin alphabet.

Given the importance of developing links with the Central Asian republics without going through intermediaries, the Turkish postal and telecommunications administrations (PTT) provided a grant for equipment with a capacity of 2,500 lines that would allow the region to link up with the outside world without having to go through the Russian network. This equipment included ground

# Box 7-26. Private Turkish Educational Institutions in the Caucasus and Central Asia

Permission from both the Turkish Ministry of Education and the host government is needed before the private sector can open a school in these countries. Usually the premises are provided by the host country, while most of the teachers come from Turkey. By the end of 2000 there were 120 private educational institutions established by foundations, companies, associations, or individuals, Education is carried out in English, Turkish, and the official language of the host country. In addition to the Ministry of Education, the following entities have established educational institutions in the region: (1) the Religious Foundation of Turkey; (2) the Turkish World Research Foundation; (3) members of Fethullah Gulen Congregation through the following entities: Çağ Öğretim İşletmeleri A.Ş. (Azerbaijan), Feza A.Ş. (Nakhechevan), Feza Gazetecilik A.Ş (Kazakhstan), Şelale A.Ş. (Kazakhstan), Eflak A.Ş. (Kazakhstan), Kazak-Türk Liseleri Genel Müdürlüğü (Kazakhstan), Sebat A.Ş (Kyrgyzstan); Silm A.Ş. (Uzbekistan), Başkent Eğitim A.Ş. (Turkmenistan), and Çağlar Eğitim Mal Ltd. Şti (Georgia).

> (M. AYDIN) - (Source: MEB 1997, pp. 229–47, Sabah, 28 January 1997)

stations for satellite links with Turkey and the rest of the world. Starting in May 1992, direct flights were established from İstanbul and Ankara to the capitals of the new states.

In addition, Turkish Cultural Centers and Turkish schools were opened in several localities to strengthen cultural ties. The schools were staffed and equipped by Turkey, which also provided scholarships. The schools were designed to meet the need for trained workers and personnel with foreign language skills. By 2000 the region had scores of schools and language courses established and operated by the Turkish state or Turkish nationals as well as ten universities and two faculties established with Turkish funds (Box 7-26).

Given the need for well-educated cadres for economic development, Turkey launched a large program in 1991 to provide scholarships to students from the region. Each country was assigned a quota of 2,000 scholarships, of which 1,400 would be university scholarships. After overcoming many difficulties, it became possible to carry out the program, which allowed thousands of students from the Caucasus and Central Asia to receive an education in Turkey. By January 1999 Turkey offered 26,368 scholarships, allowing 16,692 students to take advantage of the offer. Of these, 2,133 received degrees, while 5,889 dropped out or were recalled home. In 2003 Turkey had approximately seven thousand students from the region. From 1992 to 1997 Turkey spent around \$55 million for this program (MEB 1998, pp. 93–94).

The major difficulty in carrying out the program was the tendency of a large number of scholarship holders to drop out and return home because of various problems. The most frequently cited problem was the inadequacy of the stipend provided to the scholars. In a poll taken in 1998 among the scholarship holders, 36.1% claimed that their stipends were inadequate, and 34.9% declared that they had a full-time job. Early in the program, there was the problem of unqualified students who had been given a scholarship through their connections. Others had difficulties adapting to the educational system or had trouble with the Turkish language. It soon became clear that Turkey should have opted for a system in which it would select those who would qualify for scholarships. Scholarships should have been given to those who would assume leadership roles in the future. Furthermore, more generous stipends should have been given to fewer scholars. Those who dropped out without obtaining a degree did. not become goodwill ambassadors for Turkey when they went home. On the contrary, they spread negative impressions of Turkey. A poll conducted in 1998 revealed that only 58.2% of the respondents had a positive opinion about Turkey.

A positive development that occurred subsequently was the reduction in the quotas set aside for each country. A new difficulty cropped up, however, when scholarship holders chose not to return to their country of origin at the end of their education. Those that did return found it difficult to get government jobs because they were considered "too Turkified" after spending long years in Turkey. Furthermore, Uzbekistan started reducing the number of its students in Turkey after 1994, because it feared that the opponents of the regime living in Turkey might influence these students. By 1998 Uzbekistan had recalled most of its students studying in Turkey, and Ankara reallocated the Uzbek quota to other countries. In 1998 Uzbekistan also stopped issuing visas to Turkish students wanting to study in Uzbekistan.

In July 1993 the Turkish Ministry of Culture, in cooperation with its counterparts in the other Turkic countries, developed a project for joint management of Turkic cultural and artistic events (the Turkish acronym for the project is TÜRKSOY). In November 1992 the Ministry of Education started preparations for common history and common literature books that would be used throughout the Turkic countries. First, committees were set up to write the books; in March 1995 steps were taken to translate the books that had been written into the dialects of the individual countries. It has not proven possible to bring the books into use, however. In April 1992 the pub-

licly owned television and radio network TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu) started transmitting to the region via satellite under the label "TRT Eurasia," subsequently changed to "TRT-Turk." Although a secular country, Turkey also took steps to engage in cooperation in the field of religion. It shipped religious materials to the region and offered to provide religious education. With money raised through fundraising campaigns, the Religious Affairs Directorate of Turkey commissioned the building of a mosque and a cultural center along Turkish architectural lines in each of the Turkic republics. The Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation also contributed to the construction or repair of scores of mosques in these countries and established Faculties of Theology in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. A number of ministries and state institutions in Turkey participated in various activities in these countries without the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sometimes without regard to established policies.

In summary, Turkey took serious steps in 1992 to be effective and play a leadership role in the region in the political, economic, cultural, military, and financial fields (Box 7-27). In addition to the opportunities, however, the region also posed serious threats and risks in the medium and long terms. Turkey chose to ignore this.

# The First Summit of Heads of State of Turkish-Speaking Countries and the First Disappointment (1992)

As a rule, Demirel tended to be a cautious leader in matters of foreign policy. But, as already mentioned above, under the influence of an article in the Economist, he declared in February 1992 that a giant Turkish world was emerging "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" (Time, 31 August 1992). This brought cries of alarm from a broad spectrum ranging from the ultranationalist Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic all the way to Russian officials that Turkey was pursuing the aim of empire-building once again. Demirel sprang another surprise during his visit to the Turkic republic from 27 April to 3 May 1992 by including in his delegation Alparslan Türkeş. This was the man who had based his political program on the concept of "Pan-Turkism" over the years and now advocated the establishment of a "Turkish Union" with the Turkic republics under the leadership of Turkey. During the visit Demirel kept reassuring his hosts that Turkey harbored no Turanian ambitions, while at the same time advocating the establishment of an association of independent Turkic states. Türkeş in turn proposed the establishment of a Supreme Council of Turkic States with a rotating presidency

## Box 7-27. Military Cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia

in the aftermath of the Cold War, a good number of diplomats, police officers, and security personnel from the Caucasus and Central Asia were trained in Turkey. Military Cooperation Agreements were concluded with all the countries of the region other than Armenia and provisions were made for these countries to send students to Turkey.

Under the procedure that was established, Eriendship and Cooperation Agreements were concluded with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, followed by Agreements for Military Cooperation in Training and the Technical and Scientific Fields concluded with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. After these framework agreements, the Turkish General Staff signed training agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, while the Ministry of Defense signed a Cooperation in Defense Industries Agreement with Kazakhstan.

The Agreements for Military Cooperation in Training included visits by military personnel to units, headquarters, and institutions; exchange of personnel, sending observers to military exercises) and sending trainees to military schools. By the end of 2000 some two thousand officers and noncommissioned officers had been trained in Turkey within the framework of these agreements: 520 men from Azerbaijan, 265 from Turkmenistan, 95 from Kazakhstan, and 45 from Kyrgyzstan were studying in Turkey at the expense of the Turkish government.

In addition, from 1993 to 2000 Turkish military training personnel sent to Azerbaijan and Nakhechevan had trained 853 officers. In 1996 a five-man Consultative and Coordination Council was established in Azerbaijan. This council helped in the establishment of the army and air force academies of Azerbaijan. Turkey undertook the task of raising military units of these countries up to the level of brigade to NATO standards by 2001.

A Caucasus Working Group was set up to work jointly with the U.S. Similarly, a Consultative and Coordination Council was set up in Georgia and a Caucasus Working Group was established on 13 October 1999 to work jointly with the U.S. and Georgia. The Marnauli airbase was restored by Turkey and made available to Turkish aircraft after the work was completed in January 2001. Turkey started restoration work at the Vaziyani military base in the vicinity of Tbilisi that same year.

As a rule, the officers of the armies of the Central Asian countries tended to be mostly Russian, and many were being trained in Moscow, An Image of Turkey replacing Russia in military matters was naturally a sensitive issue. When the Turkish minister of defense visited Kazakhstan to conclude an agreement, his Kazakh counterpart stressed that the agreement was merely a preliminary arrangement for joint production of Weapons and would in no way affect the cooperation agreements that Kazakhstan had concluded with other countries, meaning Russia.

Turkey has not participated in military cooperation with Ta-Jikistan because of internal turmoil or with Armenia for political reasons. There are difficulties in cooperating with the other countries that have signed agreements, owing to the lack of tradition, infrastructure, and trained personnel as well as differences in outlook and doctrine.

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that would bring together the presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers of these states on an annual basis. It was also decided to arrange joint consultative meetings at the level of heads of state and government among the Turkic states to discuss common issues and regional and international affairs. All of this talk came to an abrupt end after the first summit in October 1992, which ended in failure.

The last high-level visit prior to the summit was carried out by foreign minister Hikmet Çetin from 16 to 18 July 1992 to Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Çetin was accompanied by the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumière. Turkey was the rotating president of the council at that time, and the purpose of the visit was to assess the eligibility of these states for membership in the council. By going in the company of the council's secretary-general, Çetin was underlining Turkey's relationship with Europe and conveying the message that the Central Asian states could establish their links with Europe through the intermediacy of Turkey. But this effort could not prevent the collapse of the October summit.

The summit took place in Ankara from 30 to 31 October 1992, with the participation of the heads of state of Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Although the Tajiks were of another ethnic stock, the president of Tajikistan had also been invited to the summit but failed to show up because of the civil war in his country. When the meeting got underway, it became clear that the Turkish officials had not carried out prior consultations with each other or with the other leaders who were attending the summit. The Turkish delegation was aiming for the signing of a Political Declaration, an Economic Declaration, and a Press Communiqué at the conclusion of the summit. But all the leaders, with the exception of Azerbaijan's President Elchibey, took fright when President Özal declared in his opening speech that the twenty-first century would be the Turkish century and called for the establishment of a Turkish Common Market and a Turkish Development and Investment Bank. Özal also exerted pressure on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to obtain guarantees for the construction of oil and gas pipelines to Turkey. It was inevitable that Russia would be antagonized by this move,

because it wanted all such pipelines to go through its territory in order to preserve its economic and political influence in the region.

The first summit of Turkish-speaking states ended with the signing of a single document. The Ankara Declaration made reference, in vague and general terms, to the need to establish cooperation among the republics in the fields of culture, education, language, security, the economy, and judiciary affairs.

A protocol was signed at the summit, providing for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey (without specifying the route to be followed) and for the construction of the terminal building at Ashkhabad airport by Turkey. There was no reference in the Ankara Declaration to either the Turkish Common Market or the Turkish Development and Investment Bank. Neither did it prove possible to secure the firm support of the Central Asian states for the construction of petroleum pipelines.

Worse still, Islam Karimov announced that he was against the formation of any supranational organization to coordinate activities in the Turkic world. Conscious of the large ethnic Russian population in his country, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated that he would veto any document that provided for the formation of any structure based on religious or ethnic foundations. Furthermore, he refused to sign a communiqué that seemed to suggest that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had been recognized as an independent state. This prevented the issuing of a press release after the summit. It appeared that Nazarbayev was worried about the possibility of an analogy being drawn between the Russians in his country and the Turks in Cyprus.

Not wanting to upset Russia, the Central Asian leaders ignored the pleas of Turkey and Azerbaijan and refused to include any reference to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the Ankara Declaration. This was another indication of the cleavage within the group. Even before the summit, all of the Central Asians represented in Ankara, with the exception of Turkmenistan, had signed the Joint Security Treaty in Tashkent with Russia and Armenia (see Box 7-28). Four days after the Ankara Declaration, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met with Russian prime minister Andrey Kozirev and asked Russia to intervene in Tajikistan. It was apparent that all roads in Central Asia led to Moscow.

The disappointing results of the summit were due mainly to the miscalculation of Turkey's leaders. They had failed to note the changes that had taken place in the Cen-

### Box 7-28. The Treaty of Tashkent

After the disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the CIS, Russia saw that it would not be possible to form a comprehensive security partnership that would bring the members of the CIS together. When the former Soviet republics headed by Ukraine set up their own defense ministries on their territories, Russia developed the doctrine of the "Near Abroad" It also began to press the CIS members to sign bilateral agreements granting Russia the right to maintain bases and allowing Russia to keep on training their armies. Meanwhile Russia established its own Ministry of Defense and its own armed forces on 7 May 1992. Not wanting to conclude bilateral agreements with Russia, the representatives of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajlkistan, and Uzbekistan held talks with Russia in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 and signed the Joint Security Treaty: The treaty provided for a collective response to an attack on one of the signatories, although it was more in the nature of a political statement rather than a legally binding alliance. Only six of the eleven CIS countries signed this document, which demonstrated the level of apposition to Russia within the group.

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tral Asian states after independence. First, after the middle of 1992, Russia had started taking a closer interest in the fate of the Russian diaspora that now found itself in the newly independent former Soviet republics. Russians accounted for 41% of the total population in Kazakhstan and 26% in Kyrgyzstan. Russia's interest in these minorities was a source of concern for both countries. In addition, the fear of radical Islam, caused by the strife in Tajikistan, was compelling these countries to seek the security of Russia's protective umbrella. Demirel had been urging his hosts to abandon the ruble zone during his Central Asia trip. They disregarded his advice, however, and sought to benefit from Russia's indirect economic support by remaining attached to the Russian currency.

Finally, the Central Asian republics had acquired new self-assurance by the time of the summit in October 1992. Turkey had initially been of great help in getting them admitted to international organizations and especially into the OIC and the ECO. But at this point they no longer needed Turkey's assistance. At the same time, the new states, having noted that Turkey's economic means were fairly limited, were getting ready to seek economic and political support elsewhere. For instance, after the Ankara Summit, Nazarbayev went to Iran to develop bilateral economic relations.

The great expectations that had been raised over relations with the Central Asian republics had to be scaled down after the disappointing Ankara Summit. Only after this summit did the Turkish leadership realize that Central Asian leaders were glad to develop their ties with Turkey but not at the expense of good relations with Russia; nor would they forgo the possibility of developing relations with other countries that were in a position to provide them with support.

# C. Disappointments and Facing Reality (1993–1995)

After the fiasco of the hastily convened Summit of the Turkic States' Leaders, Turkey did not lose its interest in the region. On the contrary, dozens of visits at all levels were exchanged with the new states after the summit. The high point was the trip that President Özal made to the whole region in 1993, shortly before his death. In October 1994 President Demirel went to Turkmenistan to participate in the celebration marking the third anniversary of Turkmen independence. This visit laid the foundation for the pipeline designed to carry Turkmen natural gas to Turkey via Iran.

From 21 to 23 March 1993 a semiofficial meeting called the First Congress of Friendship, Fraternity, and Cooperation among Turkic States and Communities was held in Antalya. This congress was expected to strengthen solidarity among Turkic peoples. It was attended also by the representatives of a great number of Turkic groups from the Russian Federation. Much importance was attached to this gathering by Turkey, which was represented by both President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel. It was noted, however, that the proceedings of the congress were being directed by Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party.

The final communiqué of the congress contained an appeal to hold annual meetings to develop cooperation in the fields of science, technology, language, education, and culture and urged the establishment of a parliamentary working group of the Turkic republics and communities as well as a Supreme Council of the Turkic Republics. The congress also approved a 34-letter framework alphabet based on the Roman script as the common alphabet of the Turkic peoples. This alphabet had been elaborated by the Alphabet Spelling Conference convened in Ankara by TİKA from 8 to 10 March 1993. Each Turkic republic or community would be able to select its own alphabet based on this framework alphabet. The semiofficial congress adopted as its motto the phrase coined by the Turkic ideologue İsmail Gaspıralı (Gasprinski): "Unity in Language, in Thought, and in Action."

It looked like some quarters in Turkey were working toward establishing a Turkic Union or Commonwealth without rousing the government's opposition. Although the Turkic republics sent delegates to such congresses, they did not agree to have them take place on their soil. The concerns over Russia's reaction to such congresses and activities led the Turkic republics to remain cautious about getting too involved. As a result, notwithstanding the decision to hold these congresses in a different country every year, they continued being held in Turkey every time

Although high-level visits from the Caucasus/Central Asia to Turkey continued to take place, it was only possible to hold the second summit of all the leaders of the Turkic states in October 1994 in Istanbul and not in Baku in 1993, as originally planned. Because of the internal turmoil there, Tajikistan was left out of the official programs. Nevertheless, Tajikistan's vice-president paid a visit to Ankara in July 1993, when he signed a bilateral Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation.

Looking back at this period, we can discern errors in Turkey's post-USSR Central Asian policy arising from miscalculation, poor planning, and hasty action. For instance, in his first visit to the region, foreign minister Hikmet Çetin informed his hosts that Turkey stood ready to represent the Central Asian republics in the international sphere. This offer was accepted only by Uzbekistan. The other republics, being sensitive about asserting their independence and sovereignty, were offended. Similarly, Çetin's offer to send books written in the Latin script was turned down on the grounds that no formal decision had been made yet to discard the Cyrillic alphabet.

In the meantime it became clear that Turkey was not the only country seeking to fill the void left by the collapse of the USSR. On the contrary, a number of states were vying for influence in the rapidly changing political landscape in the Caucasus/Central Asia region. The resulting competition was reminiscent of the rivalries of the imperialist powers that struggled for superiority in the region during the early part of the twentieth century (Box 7-29). Among those seeking to be the key actors were Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Pakistan, China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the EU. Four of these (Turkey, Iran, China, and South Korea) stand out as the role models for the region. Each country had its own reasons for engaging in the contest, and their rivalry had economic, political-ideological, and religious dimensions. This created many possibilities for conflict. Turkey had to avoid the risk of armed conflict with Iran and/or Russia.

### Box 7-29. The Distinctive Features of the "Great Game" and the Second Great Game

During the nineteenth century the British and Russian Empires fought one another for the control of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The flight was conducted with money, spies, weapons, and soldiers. It was not just over wealth, territory, and resources. Differences of view, demonstrations of power, rivalries, and assertions of influence also played a part. Rudyard Kipling called this struggle the "Great Game" in his novel Kim. With the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, there was talk of a similar "Great Game" to achieve lofty ideals and objectives. Russia's great rival in the Caspian region during the nineteenth century was Britain. A hundred years later, the critical question was who would fill the void left by a weakened Russia.

In the original Great Game, the protagonists were seeking to exclude their rival from the region. Although it went unsaid, the same objective was being pursued in the Second Great Game. This new rivalry first emerged in the field of trade but quickly spread to political interests: as well. The new Great Game also had an ideological dimension: Western liberal democracy versus Islamic fundamentalism and Soviet-style authoritarian regimes. In the nineteenth century the rivals were striving to assume the "white man's burden" and "bring civilization" to the region. In the Second Great Game, the U.S. and others saw this as "a historic opportunity to spread freedom and democracy." Both Great Games had three attractive dimensions: profit, power, and "lofty ideals."

The Second Great Game had certain distinctive features, however. Whereas the first had two actors, this one had more actors, making it difficult to predict the outcome. At first, Turkey, Iran, and the Russian Federation were the principal actors, with the U.S., Pakistan, India, China, Japan, Israel, the EU, and Saudi Arabia lurking as potential actors. This situation changed in 1995, when the Russian Federation and the U.S. became the principal actors, while Turkey, China, and the EU assumed the role of supporting actors. After the attack of 11 September 2001, the U.S. assumed the leading part.

This time not just governments but also corporations, both national and multinational, took part in the game. In the case of the U.S., the corporations had preceded the government into the game. Now the Great Game was being played not only for political influence and strategic advantage but also for economic gain, more business, pipeline rights, and new markets. Unlike the first game, national leaders in the region did not oppose the foreign intrusion. On the contrary, they welcomed foreign investors and advisors, because this time foreign intrusion signified more investments, new employment opportunities, more economic development backed by foreign ald, and more political stability

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### The Issue of the "Turkish Model"

The peoples of the Caucasus/Central Asia region were still in the process of establishing their identities and setting up their nation-states. The success of Turkey's strivings in the area depended on how the regional countries perceived themselves and how they perceived Turkey over the long term. By and large, these states were still being run by their former Communist bosses, who were now following a nationalist line to preserve their posts. For the leaders who now controlled the destiny of these states in the chaotic circumstances prevailing after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the first priority was the consolidation of their power. For them, a rapid transition to democracy carried the risk of national disintegration. That is why they tended to prefer the Chinese or South Korean model of economic development (which did not have a democratic component).

Turkey had consistently been striving to have the Turkic republics adopt the "Turkish model" for their development. Whether Turkey could play a central role in the region depended in large measure on whether the newly independent states saw Turkey as a suitable and acceptable model. At first Turkey appeared to be the main alternative, with its modern and secular model backed by the West. Turkey assumed this role with such zeal that Demirel went as far as submitting draft Constitutions to

the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan when he visited the region in 1992. It was unlikely that the leaders would accept Constitutions based on a democratic administration from a country that had failed, after trying for seventy years, to achieve a civilian Constitution or establish a well-functioning democracy. In any case, in practice, none of the Central Asian states (with the possible exception of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan) went for the Turkish model. Even if they referred to the Turkish model now and then, for them it was not the model of the 1990s, based on liberal democracy as understood in Turkey, but the model of the 1930s, which was statist and authoritarian:

The acceptability of the model did not depend on Turkey's international connections or the model's ideology. It depended much more on its compatibility with the sociopolitical and economic realities of the region. This was an important point that Turkey seemed to overlook. The models that claimed to be suitable for all of the region's states and pretended to be the solution to all of its problems were bound to fail there. Notwithstanding some common features and problems, each state in the region had its own special character and problems that were not shared with its neighbors. That is why the "one model fits all" approach could not work and each state required a tailor-made model.

Turkey was attractive because of its Western ties and its claim to be a prospective EU member. At a time when Turkey had difficulty in making itself acceptable to Europe, its offers of helping the Central Asian states in developing their ties with Europe were bound to ring hollow. Furthermore, it was clear that Turkey by itself could not be of much economic assistance and that any contribution it could make would have to be in conjunction with the West. In particular, when the Western oil companies started entering the region, newly independent states established their own direct links with the West and no longer needed Turkey's intercession. In addition, Turkey was still far from having resolved its own problems of identity, ethnicity, unity, and so forth and was in no position to serve as a model for nations grappling with similar problems.

Furthermore, the Turkish model was in general terms a secular, democratic, and free-market model, but its implementation was not all that clear-cut. The attitude of Turkish leaders and businesspeople that "we shall enlighten our Turkish brethren" in the spirit of missionaries spreading the Turkish model did not make much headway in Central Asia. These leaders and businesspeople failed to understand that, after many years of Russian domination, the newly liberated nations were not eager to seek a new "older brother" to boss them around. Ankara was slow in grasping the reality that the new nations were seeking not subservience but cooperation in their relations. This caused much disappointment in the region and lessened the chances for acceptance of the model proposed by Turkey. The reminiscences of Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, in 1997 about the first Turkic Summit of 1992 more or less represented the views of all Central Asian Republics:

[A]t first, many people believed that all of Kazakhstan's problems would be solved by Turkey. However, this meant forgoing our independence, severing our traditional ties with neighbors, and replacing one elder brother with another. This was quite clear in the draft document prepared by our Turkish colleagues, where reference was made to historical common roots, language, and cultures and traditions. Based on these it was asserted that we would engage in cooperation with Turkey. I was compelled at the time to hurt Turgut Özal's feelings and declared that I would not sign the document. I told him that I was only in favor of economic, political relations and relations between peoples. It is true that our roots are common; it is also obvious that we have been

separated for a long time. I proposed that we repair the broken links of our civilization while respecting our newly won independence and the sovereignty of every state. I added that we would not sever our links with other peoples and states and would never again enter into an unequal relationship with any state. (Nazarbayev, pp. 200–201)

Turkey's intense efforts to establish close links with the Turkic republics led its adversaries to interpret these efforts as an attempt to establish regional hegemony or the pursuit of the dream to establish a Turanian Union. Although the Turkish leaders frequently declared that they pursued no Pan-Turkic ambitions and that the expressions of concern in this regard were unfounded, its neighbors' suspicions were not totally dispelled, and relations with them suffered. Greece, Iran, Russia, and the Arab states continually claimed that Turkey was pursuing Pan-Turkism and that its growing activities in Central Asia were motivated by racist considerations. Such claims were reinforced by the Turkish practice of referring to all nations speaking a Turkic language as Turks and by the tendency to talk about the Turkish-speaking peoples spread across the region "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China." Nevertheless, Turkey continued to promote the Turkish model both in the West and in Turkey itself by using the motif of the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural unity of Turkey and the Turkic peoples. It did this without regard to the sensitivity of Russians and Persians to Pan-Turkism and the anti-Turkish tendencies that Ankara's policies might engender.

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Aside from angering its regional rivals, Turkey's rhetoric also began to irritate the Central Asian countries themselves. The rhetoric ran counter to their search for a national identity and to their wish to establish their unique and distinctive national character. The reaction against Turkey's Turkist policies in the region was expressed by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev during his visit to Turkey in December 1991: "In this part of the world Turkism has become a political current only as a reaction to Soviet hegemony... I am against fitting people into specific molds on the basis of Turkism or Islamism, and such attempts will have no chance to succeed. What we are witnessing at present is a rapprochement among Turks based on the common values shared by the Turkish-speaking peoples. But this should not turn into a dangerous chauvinism" (Cumhuriyet, 16 December 1991). Although they had common ethnic roots, the majority of Central Asian peoples appeared to have developed a distinctive identity during their more than seventy years of Russian/Soviet domination. At least at this initial stage of their independent existence, they appeared to prefer stressing their individual identities rather than coming under a broad cultural-political umbrella that would blur their distinctive features.

Turkey itself was wary of appearing to be meddling in other countries' internal affairs; nor did it want to be accused of harboring Turanian or expansionist ambitions. Finding the right balance between getting more involved with these countries and not giving rise to such accusations or offending them was not an easy task. For instance, when Muhammad Salih, the leader of the Uzbek opposition movement Erk, was forced out of his country, he sought refuge in Turkey. Whether to give him refugee status or not suddenly became a delicate issue. Feeling sympathy for Salih, who was being forced out of his country by Karimov merely for being in opposition, Ankara wanted to allow him to settle in Turkey. At the same time, it did not want to confront Uzbekistan's protests or allow bilateral relations to sour over this issue. As a consequence, Salih was allowed to remain in Turkey but was forced to leave the country whenever a high-level visit from Uzbekistan took place. Obviously, this compromise satisfied neither Salih nor Karimov.

There was also the question of democracy, which the Central Asian leaders considered to be "excessive" in Turkey. For example, when the ambassador of Uzbekistan in Ankara was recalled in the summer of 1994, Turkey tried to explain this by Uzbekistan's economic difficulties. Muhammad Salih, however, who was living in Turkey at the time, claimed that the ambassador had been recalled for being too sympathetic to Turkey. Salih also claimed that the Uzbek students in Turkey would also be recalled soon because Karimov feared that if they stayed too long in Turkey and were thus exposed to democracy they would join the opposition when they returned home. In fact, all Uzbek students as well as Uzbek nationals in Turkey were recalled home in July 1994. This was followed by the closure of Turkish schools in Uzbekistan. All of these actions were motivated by the fear of Turkish democracy. When Karimov came to Turkey in June 1994, the visit was under the shadow of the ambassador's recall. Karimov's declaration that the two countries should not allow third parties to spoil bilateral relations was interpreted as a reference to the asylum that had been granted to Salih by Turkey. Unlike his visit to Turkey in December 1991, this time Karimov made no mention of the Turkish model. This clearly indicated how relations between the two countries had taken on a different character in recent years...

The strain in Turkey's relations with Uzbekistan was not due solely to Salih's presence in Turkey, however; nor was it due to the "indoctrination of Uzbek students against the regime with Turkey's connivance," as Tashkent claimed (personal interview with an Uzbek source). It became clear that the strain had deeper causes when Salih left Turkey for good and settled in Germany, but relations still did not improve. The real problem was that Karimov had the grand design of establishing a "Greater Turkistan" with Uzbekistan at the center and saw Turkey and the Turkish model as undermining his leadership.

Relations began to improve somewhat in October 2000 when Uzbekistan had to turn to Turkey for advice and assistance in connection with a number of law and order issues. Among these were the Islamic fundamentalists based in the Fergana Valley (who were perceived as threatening the unity of Uzbekistan) and the violent protests in the summer of 2000, which were becoming difficult to contain. After a long period of opposition from Tashkent, high-level Turkish visits were resumed. The Uzbeks discovered that they were unable to deal with their domestic problems single-handedly and knew that Russia would not be of any use in this sphere. In the autumn of 2000 minister of foreign affairs İsmail Cem and minister of the interior Saadettin Tantan visited Tashkent in quick succession and held talks with the Uzbek leaders.

To sum up, given the problems confronting the newly independent countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Turkish model that was being offered to deal with the daunting economic and political restructuring problems was inadequate.

# The Second Summit of the Turkish-Speaking Countries (1994)

After several postponements, the second Summit of Baku in Turkic States was scheduled to meet in January 1994. Özal's sudden death in 1993 and the recurring political crises had prevented the Turkish leaders from properly engaging in the effort to convene the Turkic leaders at another summit. Meanwhile the Russian opposition to the holding of such meetings was becoming stronger. At the Summit of the CIS held in Ashkhabad in December 1993, Yeltsin persuaded Karimov to block the holding of the Baku Summit. Two days prior to the holding of the Turkic Summit, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan requested a postponement. The weakness of Turkic solidarity in the face of Russian opposition had been demonstrated once again, especially when Turkey did not display the will to pursue the objective with determination. In addition to the Russian pressure, another factor was influencing the Central Asian republics. They did not want to congregate in Baku and give the impression that they were supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia. In fact, no Central Asian

leader had ever visited Baku at that point, and Turkmenistan continued to supply natural gas to Armenia. At this time, all of the Turkic leaders were striving to consolidate their hold on power and were suspicious of the nationalist rhetoric of Azerbaijan's president Elchibey, who advocated a Turanian union. This was another factor that explained the lack of enthusiasm for the Baku Summit.

Under these circumstances, it required a major diplomatic effort on the part of Turkey to convene the summit in Istanbul on 18 and 19 October 1994. That summer President Demirel had persuaded Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's President Karimov when they visited Ankara to hold all future summits in Turkey until these meetings became a regular event.

Russia declared that it did not welcome such meetings, which were being held on the basis of ethnicity. Moscow contended that such meetings irked neighbors and gave rise to regional tensions within the CIS by stoking nationalism. Russia also looked upon the Assembly of Turkic Peoples held in Antalya in March 1993 as an expression of militant nationalism.

Demirel responded to this criticism by stating that the summit was not pursuing Turanian aims and was directed against no other state. He also pointed out that CIS leaders did not need the approval of nonparticipants to take part in any regional meeting of their choosing. Despite Demirel's statement, the Central Asian leaders were trying hard to allay Moscow's concerns. Niyazov declared that cooperation among Turkic states did not imply that they were forgetting their responsibilities as members of the CIS. The statements made by Turkic leaders at the end of the summit showed that this time they were satisfied with the outcome of the meeting. Unlike the first summit, the expectations at this meeting were much less ambitious, and an effort had been made to avoid disappointments by distributing the draft final document to the leaders and seeking their views prior to its consideration and approval.

The communiqué adopted at the end of the meeting included a request for the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, calling for respect for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. It also contained more specific references to oil and gas pipelines, declaring that the parties called for the early exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the region and their transportation to world markets by the most economic routes and, in this framework, welcomed the work being carried out regarding pipelines through Turkey to reach markets in the Mediterranean and Europe. The summit praised the regular meetings of the ministers

of culture and education and expressed the wish to promote interparliamentary cooperation. It was decided that the foreign ministers would also hold regular meetings and that the next summit would be held in Bishkek in August 1995.

The second summit demonstrated once more that the inter-Turkic solidarity was less than would be desirable. Turkey and Azerbaijan apparently pressed for a tough line that would condemn Armenia as an invader and occupier, but the others blocked such a move. Together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were concerned over a contract signed by Azerbaijan with an international consortium just prior to the summit for the exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea. The leaders of both countries contended that an agreement over the use of resources had to be reached among the littoral states before such concession contracts could be signed (see Box 7-36 below).

Soon after the summit, the Second Assembly of the Turkic States and Communities for Friendship, Fraternity, and Cooperation was held in İzmir on 13-21 October. It looked as if the organizers of the İzmir meeting were trying to convey the impression that the assembly was closely linked to the summit of Turkic leaders. The Turkish administration's participation in the assembly at the highest level made it clear that Ankara was not against conveying this impression. In her speech at the assembly, Prime Minister Ciller referred to the EU and to NAFTA and declared that a similar link-up was possible among the Turkic states. President Demirel declared that a Turkic world had emerged over the last five years and pointed out that the members of this new grouping were not seeking to find an identity because they had never lost consciousness of their true identity.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had nothing to do with this meeting, at which there was much Pan-Turkic rhetoric. With high-level participation from Turkey at such a meeting, it was inevitable that this would create problems abroad. At this stage, Turkey's Central Asia policy was still under the influence of emotional considerations.

With the disintegration of the USSR, innumerable ethnic conflicts erupted in the Caucasus. Turkey's response to this ethnic strife would determine the degree of its effectiveness in the region.

The ethnic makeup of the Caucasus region was extremely complex. Although each Caucasus republic was made up of dominant national groups, each also had numerous minority groups. Furthermore, the dominant national groups of the newly independent states belonged to different religions, which were closely identified with

### Box 7-30. The Question of Nagorno Karabakh

The origin of the question of Nagorno Karabakh goes back to 1988. In 1989 the region had a population of around 192,000, of which 70% was Armenian, The Armenians refer to the region as Artsakh, which means "dense forest." In the Soviet era this territory of 4,400 square kilometers had been an autonomous region within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan since 1923.

As the USSR entered its phase of disintegration in the late 1980s, the Soviet of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh applied to the Soviets of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the USSR on 20 February 1988 and Indicated its wish to separate from Azerbaijan and become linked to Armenia. The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan rejected the petition on the grounds that it violated the provision of the USSR's Constitution declaring that the borders of a constituent republic could not be revised without the consent of that republic. In July 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR overrode and nullified the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia to absorb Nagorno Karabakh into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and in January 1989 took over the administration of Nagorno Karabakh.

After Azerbaijan and Armenia gained their independence in 1991, Azerbaijan inullified the autonomous status of Karabakh on 26 November 1991 and brought the district under the central administration of Azerbaijan. In tesponse, the Armenians held a referendum on 10 December and declared their independence, But their petition to Join the Commonwealth of Independent States as the Autonomous Republic of Nagorno Karabakh was turned down. In the early part of 1992 Russian troops evacuated Karabakh, and the dispute rapidly degenerated into an armed conflict.

By mid-1992 Karabakh had been ethnically cleansed of non-Armenians. Backed by Russia, Armenians took possession of Karabakh and a large belt of territory around the district, in fighting that took place in 1993 and 1994. With the occupation of the Lachin corridor, darabakh and Armenia were directly linked to one another. In 2003 roughly 20% of Azerbaijan's territory was still under Armenian occupation and 1 million people in Azerbaijan had been displaced from their homes. Meanwhile Armenia had lost

about a quarter of its population through emigration brought on by the economic dislocation caused by the war.

Armenia failed to comply with the UN resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of all troops from Azerbaljan's territory. To maintain its influence in the region, Russia helped in keeping the dispute alive.

When it appeared that the conflict might spread in the region, the Ministerial Council of the OSCE set up the Minsk Group on 24 March 1992 in order to help settle the dispute. The group was made up of eleven countries, including Turkey. With Russian intercession, a cease-fire agreement was signed in Moscow on 24 May 1994. Despite a number of violations, the cease-fire is still in force.

The OSCE Summit of heads of state was held in Lisbon on 2 December 1996. At this meeting, a plan was adopted by fifty three states, including Russia, with only Armenia dissenting. This plan called for the evacuation of occupied Azerbaijani territories, ensuring the security of the inhabitants of Karabakh, and granting the highest level of autonomy to Karabakh within Azerbaijan. The plan was immediately accepted by Azerbaijan, but Armenia accepted the plan only under international pressure on 26 September 1997. Russia delayed the implementation of the plan, however, because it feared josing its influence in the region if an OSCE peacekeeping force was deployed there. President Ter-Petrossian of Armenia, who had accepted the plan, was forced to resign as a result of the pressure of ultranationalists on 5 February 1998.

Ter-Petrossian was replaced as president by Robert Kocharian, the leader of Armenians of Karabakh. He had been appointed prime minister by Ter-Petrossian under the pressure of public opinion. "Kocharian's intransigence as president has blocked a diplomatic solution to the dispute. Meanwhile Azerbaijan is pursuing a policy that calls for the liberation of its lost territories by diplomatic efforts and, if this proves impossible, by the use of force.

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their respective national groups. This rendered the situation even more complicated.

The situation in the northern Caucasus within the borders of the Russian Federation was even more complex. The last Soviet census of 1989 revealed that there were nineteen officially recognized autochthonous national groups alongside Russian diasporas as well as Kazakhs, Nogays, and other minorities. With this population pattern mode, the northern Caucasus was one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world.

It was inevitable that disputes would erupt between different ethnic groups as the central authority weakened. Turkey's effectiveness and position in the region would be closely tied to its response to these disputes. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh in particular revealed how easily Turkey could be drawn into such dangerous disputes in its immediate vicinity (Box 7-30).

# D. Relations with Azerbaijan in the Context of Nagorno Karabakh

The ethnic strife that erupted in the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Cold War presented Turkey with a no-win situation. In the Karabakh conflict, Turkish public opinion was fully behind Azerbaijan; and as long as hostilities continued in the region, the Turkish government was under pressure not to remain neutral. Direct intervention, however, was bound to have fateful consequences for Turkey in the Caucasus region and would seriously affect Turkish relations not just with Russia but also with NATO, the U.S., and Europe. In this situation, the government was torn between the pressure of public opinion sympathizing with the Azerbaijanis and the desire to remain neutral in order to be able to act as mediator. The dispute constituted an obstacle to Turkey's efforts to resolve the questions with Armenians that were rooted in history, while it also created difficulties in tracing the route to be followed by petroleum pipelines. The clashes sharpened Azerbaijan's nationalistic rhetoric. This, in turn, drove Iran (fearful that its own Azerbaijani minority would be stirred by this rhetoric) to support Armenia in the conflict, which was an additional complication for Turkey.

The question of Karabakh started with tension between the two communities and street clashes in 1988 and escalated into full-scale warfare in 1991. The only country that gave full support to Azerbaijan from the beginning was Turkey. Ankara's policy with respect to Karabakh colored Turkey's relations with Armenia and cramped its Caucasus policies in general.

In the international arena, Turkey stood side-by-side with Azerbaijan and took part in the embargo imposed by Azerbaijan on Armenia, although it was not consistently strict in its implementation. Turkey also avoided diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Although Turkey's actions were partly the result of historical events that still rankled, Ankara kept repeating that relations could not be normalized so long as Armenia continued to occupy Azerbaijani territories. Ankara considered the occupation to be a very serious transgression. Turkey's support of Azerbaijan did not lead to the provision of significant military aid; nor was there any question of direct involvement in armed conflict.

Turkey recognized Azerbaijan's independence on 9 November 1991, one month before recognizing the other Soviet republics. Despite this, Azerbaijan's internal turmoil prevented relations from developing rapidly. At this stage, Turkey was seeking to avoid basing its relations on a single individual, Ebulfez Echibey. In fact, Turkey was uncomfortable with his rhetoric based on Turkish unity. Rumors were circulating in the press that Elchibey wanted to see a federation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This led to concern over the possibility of conflict with Russia and Iran. It should be noted that Azerbaijan never made a formal appeal to Turkey to intervene in the Karabakh conflict.

In this period Turkey concluded a number of economic agreements with Azerbaijan, started TV broadcasts beamed to Azerbaijan, and supported Baku's efforts to change to the Latin alphabet by sending books and typewriters. Turkey's standing in Azerbaijan, however, was in large measure determined by Ankara's approach to the Karabakh issue.

In the early phase of the conflict, Turkey sought to remain neutral so that it could act as a mediator. Armenia was not averse to this role at first, and Turkish diplomats and especially foreign minister Hikmet Çetin undertook numerous diplomatic missions to the region and to European capitals and made a major effort to get the issue included in the OSCE's agenda. Çetin sought to bring the issue to the attention of Western governments and especially the American government. Prime Minister Demirel was in favor of a more cautious approach, however, declaring that Turkey had no legal grounds for intervening in the matter and that, in any case, Azerbaijan had not made a formal request for Turkey to get involved. Acting at the request of Armenia, Demirel sent a message in November 1991 to Hasan Hasanov, the prime minister of Azerbaijan, calling for restraint in order to avoid exacerbating regional tensions. Baku interpreted this as a mediation effort on the part of Turkey. In his reply two weeks later, Hasanov indicated his satisfaction over Turkey's mediation initiative. This compelled the Turkish MFA to issue a statement denying that Turkey intended to act as mediator. When Azerbaijan's president Ayaz Muttalibov visited Ankara on 23 and 24 January 1992, he was informed that Turkey could serve as mediator if both parties agreed to this.

But Turkey's even-handed efforts would not last for long. In particular, certain remarks made by president Turgut Özal cast doubts in the minds of Armenians that Turkey could be a neutral broker. When Azerbaijani civilians were massacred by Armenians in Hojali in February 1992, there was a public outcry in Turkey for intervention. Right-wing groups organized public rallies, and even some influential people (including the president at the time, Turgut Özal) argued that Turkey "had the right to intervene" (Financial Times Report on Turkey, 7 May 1993, p. 5). Despite Demirel's statements to the contrary, these demands and public outrage brought Turkey's efforts to act as honest broker to an abrupt end.

When Armenia started occupying Azerbaijan's territory beyond Karabakh and the plight of Azerbaijani refugees was displayed on TV screens, a powerful current erupted in the country and the government was publicly blamed for being ineffective. This led to an overtly pro-Azerbaijani stance in Ankara. Media criticism that Turkey's wish to play a leadership role in the region following the Cold War was in direct conflict with its ineffective position on Karabakh overlapped with the clamor from all the opposition parties that the government was passive while "our Azerbaijani brethren are being slaughtered." Among the parties, the Nationalist Action Party stood out in its opposition to the government's policies. The MHP had been calling for intervention since February 1991 and now expressed the view that Turkey could not remain silent as more of Azerbaijan's territory came under Armenian occupation. For the MHP, the time for military intervention had come. Ecevit (the leader of

# Box 7-31. Turkey's Historical Links with Azerbaijan and Nakhechevan

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Turks of Azerbaijan began to distance themselves from the Russians and declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in May 1918. The new state sought the protection of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman army entered Baku in September 1918. When the Ottomans lost World War I and signed the Armistice of Mudros the next month, the Turkish forces were obliged to evacuate Baku.

While Turkey was engaged in the War of Liberation, the Red Army occupied Baku in April 1920 and brought the Caucasus under Soviet control. On 16 March 1921 Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity in Moscow with the Soviet administration. Article 3 of the treaty declared that Nakhechevan would be an autonomous region under Azerbaijan's protection and that this status of protector could not be transferred to a third party. This arrangement may be seen as a concession made by the Soviets, who regarded Turkey as an ally at the time. Article 5 of the Treaty of Friendship signed by Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia at Kars on 13 October 1921 declared that the parties had agreed that Nakhechevan would be an autonomous region under the protection of Azerbaijan.

When the clashes in Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia threatened to spill over into Nakhechevan in the early 1990s, certain groups in Turkey declared that Turkey was a guarantor of the region's status, which could not be changed without its consent. The treatles of 1921 do not allow for such an interpretation, however, But since the Treaty of Moscow states explicitly that "the right to protect cannot be transferred to a third state," Turkey would have the right to object if Nakhechevan became attached to a third state such as Armenia.

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the Democratic Left Party) claimed that Turkey's passive stance would damage its prestige in the Caucasus and Central Asia while Mesut Yılmaz (the leader of the Motherland Party) declared on 4 March 1992 that Turkey should deploy forces to the Armenian border and claimed that Turkey had guaranteed the status of Nakhechevan and Karabakh (Box 7-31).

It was inevitable that the Turkish government would succumb to the pressure of public opinion. On 2 March it announced that all aircraft on their way to Armenia through Turkish airspace would have to land in Turkey to ensure that they were not ferrying arms to that country. Subsequently the transit of aid material from the West to Armenia was stopped. In the meantime Demirel had shifted his position. In an interview with the Washington Post on 19 March, he declared that he felt himself under pressure to pursue a tougher policy and added that it was wrong to assume that military intervention was out of the question. When the president of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Nakhechevan, Heydar Aliyev, called

on Turkey to send troops after Lachin was captured by the Armenians on 17 May and attacks against Nakhechevan began to increase, however, Turkey confined itself to bringing the issue to the attention of the UN, the OSCE, and NATO.

Notwithstanding these developments, Turkey kept its channels of communication with Armenia open and strove to keep its bilateral relations from being adversely affected by current events. The border was sometimes opened to allow humanitarian assistance to get through to Armenia. In September 1992 Turkey consented to the sale of 100,000 tons of wheat to that country. An agreement was signed in November 1992 to supply Armenia with 300 million kilowatt hours of electric power to alleviate the shortage there. The Turkish opposition described this agreement as a betrayal of Azerbaijan, however, and the government felt compelled to annul the agreement in January 1993 before it could be implemented.

At this time, peace talks were taking place between Azerbaijan and Armenia within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, designed to resolve the question of Nagorno Karabakh. Turkey had sent a delegation to Yerevan to persuade the Armenian government that settling this question would contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations with Turkey But these efforts were frustrated when the Armenians daptured the Kelbedjer region linking Karabakh to Armeria on 3 April. President Özal then declared that this question would never be settled if "Turkey did not display its teeth" (http://query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FoCE5DB163oF 93BA25757CoA965958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted =all). In contrast to Özal's more interventionist approach, Demirel turned down Azerbaijan's request for helicopters to evacuate the wounded and civilians on the grounds that this might lead to a direct confrontation with Russia (Bölükbaşı, p. 85). When Özal visited Baku on 14 April, he revealed his differences with Demirel once again when he declared that "Turkey would always stand shoulder to shoulder with Azerbaijan" and added that "Turkey's patience should not be tested" (Ayın Tarihi, 14 April 1993).

The process triggered by the fall of Kelbedjer led to a coup in Azerbaijan on 4 June 1993, resulting in the overthrow of Elchibey's government and his replacement by Heydar Aliyev. This was seen by many quarters in Turkey and abroad as Turkey's failure to maintain a friendly administration in power in Azerbaijan. Some commentators in Turkey saw the overthrow of Elchibey as the end of the so-called Turkish model. Russia had already intervened in Georgia and Lithuania to help bring leaders of the former Soviet administration to power. By openly

supporting Col. Suret Huseyinov, the architect of the coup, Russia had demonstrated its ability to intervene directly also in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. Meanwhile Turkey had prepared a diplomatic plan of action on 7 June, when the rebellion was still confined to Gence. It was only able to send a delegation to Baku on 15 June, however, when it had became too late to change the course of events. When foreign minister Hikmet Çekin was questioned by the press on this issue, he declared that Turkey was not to blame for Elchibey's downfall and asked the journalists: "Should we have created a second Cyprus question?" This revealed the thinking of his government (Sabah, 22 June 1993).

Elchibey's Turkist rhetoric was creating antagonism in Iran and Russia and causing uneasiness in the Turkic republics. Some claimed that it was also making Turkey uncomfortable. As a result, they concluded that Ankara had been looking around for a more moderate leader in Azerbaijan and did nothing to prevent Aliyev's assumption of power even if it was not directly involved in Elchibey's overthrow. Turkey's uneasiness about the coup, however, was quite clear from a letter from Foreign Minister Çetin on 24 June (at a time when it was too late to change anything) to the UN secretary-general, describing the coup that brought Aliyev to power as "a military rebellion aimed at overthrowing the legitimate government" (Ayın Tarihi, 26 June 2003). The letter went on to add that Turkey would "continue to support Azerbaijan's legitimate representatives." According to certain Turkish and Azerbaijan newspapers, Elchibey was still in contact with Turks in his hiding place. But in due course Turkey's attitude changed, when it became obvious that Aliyev's hold on power was firm and that Elchibey was unlikely to recover power in the short term. At that point Çetin saw nothing wrong in remarking to the press that Aliyev was in power on the basis of an election that was carried out under democratic procedures.

Ankara's inability to keep in power a friendly administration in Azerbaijan caused Turkey to lose standing in the region. Similarly, Turkey was unable to muster the courage to intervene on behalf of Armenian president Ter-Petrossian when he was facing difficulties in later years, and there were accusations that Turkey had not provided adequate support to the pro-Turkish ethnic Uzbek general Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan in his struggle with the Taliban. Inevitably, the realization took hold in the region that having close relations with Turkey did not constitute a guarantee that one could remain in power. But it should also be noted that Turkey's powerful support of

Georgia helped keep Shevardnadze in power in Tbilisi for several years.

Aliyev's assumption of power was originally perceived as a Russian success, but it soon become apparent that this was not quite so. Although Aliyev made conciliatory gestures to Russia like joining the CIS, he was absolutely against the redeployment of Russian troops on Azerbaijan's territory. Aliyev's policies were far from satisfying Russia, which became clear when Moscow was implicated in the coup attempt against him carried out in October 1994. It also became apparent that Aliyev would depart from Elchibey's policy of giving priority to Turkey in his foreign relations. Aliyev would use the Turkish card when it suited him; and when it did not, he was capable of turning away from Turkey. In September 1993, two months after assuming power, Aliyev suspended the agreements that the Elchibey administration had concluded with Turkey. This resulted in the dismissal of 1,600 Turkish military experts serving in Azerbaijan and the reintroduction of a visa requirement for Turkish nationals traveling to Azerbaijan. Although there was reversal of this policy one year later when Aliyev embarked on improving Turkish-Azerbaijani relations once again, it was obvious that bilateral relations would no longer be as smooth as in the past.

The first indication of improved relations came on 19 September 1993, when minister of foreign affairs Hikmet Cetin visited Baku. Aliyev announced that he had selected the Turkish route for the pipeline that would carry Azerbaijani oil to world markets. He also announced that Turkey would resume the training of Azerbaijani military personnel. Subsequently, Aliyev visited Turkey in February 1994 and established a good rapport with President Demirel. His speech at the Turkish parliament on 9 February, which emphasized the importance that he attached to the relations between the two "brotherly countries" (http://aliyevheritage.org/cgi-bin/ecms/vis.pl?=001&p =1175&n=000013&g=), dispelled most of the mistrust among Turkish decision-makers. But there were still some elements in Turkey that did not trust Aliyev and preferred the Turkish nationalism preached by Elchibey. This became manifest in March 1995, when it was revealed that Turkish nationals were also implicated in an unsuccessful plot to unseat Aliyev. But Turkey was by now convinced that chaos in Azerbaijan would be detrimental to Turkey's overall Caucasus policy, and Elchibey was forgotten in this context. Aliyev was so fully accepted as Azerbaijan's legitimate leader that Demirel himself warned Aliyev as soon as the government became aware of the coup attempt in Baku. With this early warning Aliyev succeeded

in foiling the plot. Nevertheless, he was very upset that Turkish nationals were involved in the plot against him and expressed his disappointment on numerous occasions, including in a speech to the TGNA.

The Karabakh conflict revealed how Turkey would react to potential ethnic disputes in the Caucasus. Ankara would strive to find an early solution to the conflict without becoming involved directly. It would do this not through bilateral contracts but by drawing the attention of international public opinion and international organizations to the region.

This conflict also showed how difficult it was for Turkey to be evenhanded in ethnic conflicts within the former Soviet Union when one of the parties happened to be Turkic or Muslim. Turkey chose to remain aloof when the Gagauz in Moldova and the Abkhaz in Georgia began agitating for independence. The strained relations between Chechen separatists and the Russian Federation, however, would lead to serious questions for Turkey.

# From the Great Game to Regional Rivalry (1995–2000)

In the five years following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 when it attempted to establish its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey ran into all kinds of problems and had numerous disappointments. These developments revealed that Turkey's economic means and political experience were not sufficient to assume the role it was seeking for itself in the region. It was clear that the time had come to formulate regional policy on a more realistic basis. Turkey was not alone in attempting to assert its influence. The struggle with the other contenders had economic, political, ideological, and religious dimensions and could easily lead to conflict with Iran and Russia in particular. This was an important factor for Turkey when it came to reformulating its regional policy.

### 1. Relations with Armenia

When Armenia became independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey recognized its independence on 16 December 1991 without any reservation and also furnished humanitarian assistance to relieve Armenia's economic hardship. In fact, even before the USSR collapsed, Turkey's ambassador in Moscow, Volkan Vural, went to Yerevan in April 1991 to discuss ways for developing bilateral relations with Armenia. This was the first high-level visit to Yerevan (*Newspot*, 11 April 1991). During this visit, it was agreed to establish direct border trade between the two countries, open the highway to traffic, and start

direct flights. The draft of an Agreement on Good Neighborliness was also prepared (*Hürriyet*, 12 April 1991). Both sides believed that the events that took place in the last years of the Ottoman Empire should be allowed to fade into the past.

Subsequently, when Turkey sent exploratory delegations to Central Asia and the Caucasus in September 1991, Yerevan was not left out. At this time, public opinion in Turkey was turning negative toward Armenia because of the Karabakh question, which had begun to fester in 1988. Despite this, the Turkish MFA held the view that Armenia's independence should be recognized and supported. In this context, Turkey sent Armenia an invitation to become a founding member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation process signed on 25 June 1992 even though Armenia was not a littoral state of the Black Sea.

The leader of the Armenian National Movement that led the country to independence was Levon Ter-Petrossian, who became its first head of state. In the height of the conditions prevailing in the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Cold War and the problems confronting independent Armenia, Ter-Petrossian concluded that Armenia should review the basic assumptions upon which relations with Turkey were based. The response of the Turkish MFA to this approach was receptive and positive. Although the rhetoric of genocide had become an existential ideology for the Armenian diaspora, cut off from the realities of the Caucasus and following events in Armenia from a distance, the Yerevan administration had to grapple with the daily realities of the region. For this administration it was more rational to secure a rapprochement with Turkey, the link to Europe, than to dwell on events that took place in the early years of the twentieth century (Box 7-32). Ter-Petrossian held that, to achieve full independence from Russia, Armenia should discard historic antagonisms and seek the normalization of relations with Turkey. This was dictated by Realpolitik (International Herald Tribune, 25 May 1991). Similarly, by developing relations with Yerevan, Turkey could secure direct links to Central Asia and free itself of the difficulties created by the Armenian diaspora, especially in the U.S. At this stage, public opinion in Turkey and Armenia and in the diaspora had not established effective control over national policies and the decision-makers in both Ankara and Yerevan were formulating their policies on the basis of pragmatism and the dictates of geography.

As a consequence, the Ter-Petrossian administration did not comply with the terms of article 11 of the Declaration of Independence adopted by the Armenian

### Box 7-32. The Mentality of the Armenian Diaspora

The Armenians are a people of the diaspora. At present they number about 6.5 million people all over the world. Of these, 3.4 million live in Armenia, 1.1 million in Russia, 1 million in the U.S., 250,000 in France, 45,000 in Canada, 200,000 in Iran, 200,000 in Lebanon, 70,000 in Syria, and 65,000 in Argentina. About 65,000 Armenians live in Turkey today.

Three elements determine the national interest and the state policies of Armenia. (1) the Armenians living abroad (the diaspora), (2) the Armenians of Armenia, (3) the Armenians of Nagomo Karabakh. These three groups have differing interests and mindsets. But they are all reconciled on the Armenian national ideology based on Haydat (Armenian Cause) developed by the nationalist Dashnaksutyun (Revolutionary Armenian Federation) in the latter years of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, another element strengthens the bonds of solldarity within the diaspora. This is the strong and ever-present sense of victimization nurtured by the Haydat ideology, which is unique to the Armenian communities. The Haydat doctrine originated from the events that took place in the Ottoman Empire from the end of the nineteenth century to World War Litt drew its strength from developments outside Armenia in the early years.

of the twentieth century and the terrorist acts against Turkish nationals by various secret Armenian organizations and in particular ASALA. The doctrine has three basic goals: (1) to recover historic Armenian lands and establish the nation-state of "United Armenia"; (2) to regroup the Armenian communities spread throughout the globe in these lands; (3) to set up a social welfare state on these lands.

After the establishment of an independent Armenia in 1991, the Dashnak Party continued to draw its strength from the diaspora, which was cut off from the realities of Armenia. After the overthrow of Ter-Petrossian, the Dashnak movement gained strength in Armenia and the Haydat doctrine came to the fore once again with even more fervor. After the overthrow of Ter-Petrossian, the Dashnak movement gained strength in Armenia and the Haydat doctrine came to the fore once again. With the election of Serzh Sarkissian to the Presidency and his conciliatory attitude towards rapproachment with Turkey, protests among the Diaspora took place against him and his policies.

(M. AYDIN)

Parliament on 23 August 1991 and refrained from raising the issue of genocide in the international arena. Article 11 read as follows: "The Republic of Armenia shall support the efforts to secure the international recognition of the genocide perpetrated in 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia." The administration also resisted the pressure exerted by the nationalists and subsequently prevented this text from being included in the Armenian Constitution adopted in 1995. Furthermore, when acceding to the CSCE in 1992, it accepted the condition for membership that there should be no claims for revision of frontiers. It was even said that the Ter-Petrossian administration had asked the leadership of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. in December 1991 to tone down its anti-Turkish activities in the U.S. Congress.

The reference to Turkish territories as Western Armenia contained in the Declaration of Independence found its way into the Armenian Constitution, which in its preamble mentioned "[r]ecognizing the national aspirations contained in the Declaration of Independence." This was interpreted in Turkey as opening the door to eventual territorial claims and demands for compensation (Şükrü Elekdağ, in *Milliyet*, 15 June 1998). When the Armenian Parliament announced in February 1991 that it did not recognize the Turkish-Armenian border as traced in the Treaty of Kars (*Turkish Times*, 12 February 1991), Turkey declared in the spring of 1992 that it would not establish diplomatic relations with Armenia until it received a written notice from Armenia that it recognized the existing

Turkish-Armenian border. Furthermore, no Armenian leader, including Ter-Petroassion, ever indicated that Yerevan was giving up its claims against Turkey with reference to the dream of a "Greater Armenia" or abandoning the claims for compensation arising from the allegations of genocide in 1915. On the contrary, in the early months of 2001 the Armenian diaspora took initiatives in a number of countries to secure international recognition of the allegations of genocide. On 12 March 2001 the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Armenian Presidency, Paruyr Hayrikian, called on Russia to denounce the 1921 Treaties of Moscow and Kars and demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan to Armenia, because "their award to Turkey under the terms of these Treaties was unjustified" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Armenia Report: Presidential Commission Head Demands Return of Nakhechevan, Kars, Ardahan," 9 March 2001) (Box 7-33).

At the time, Turkey gave signals that it was receptive to any move toward rapprochement that might come from Yerevan by allowing humanitarian aid materials destined for Armenia to cross its territory. Another signal was the expansion of the port of Trabzon to allow its use by Armenia, whose economy was in serious trouble because of the embargo imposed by Azerbaijan. In the early part of 1992 Armenia invited a number of Turkish businesspeople to Yerevan and sought their intercession to secure the use of the port by Armenia. After this, a group of Armenian entrepreneurs, including some Americans of Armenian extraction, came to Turkey to discuss this issue with Foreign

### Box 7-33. From the Loyal Nation to ASALA and the Armenian Bills

Within the system of nationalities living in the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians formed an ethnic/religious group that existed peacefully. Some were so Ottomanized that they spoke Turkish in their homes. This group, thus called the "loyal nation/community," began to get restless toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, as a result of both internal and external dynamics. As a consequence of the breakdown in the system of land tenure and the disruption caused by the Russian war of 1877–78, the pressure of Kurds and Circassians on the eastern Anatolian Armenian peasants began to intensify. Heavy taxes imposed on them both by the central government and by the local Kurdish chieftains worsened their already exploited condition. The Armenians Who grew wealthy through handicrafts and commerce were drawing the envy of the masses, who had not yet achieved the level of mercantilism. Not only religious differences were creating friction; but the Muslim-mentality that regarded the non-Muslims as inferior. proved to be quite detrimental for the Armenians in this setting. There was also the discontent caused by Abdulhamid's failure to implement the promised egalitarian reforms.

In addition to these internal dynamics, external factors were at play: the ideology of nationalism generated by the French Revolution that began to reach the eastern region of the empire; the shocks created by the successes of nationalist movements in the Balkans, the influence of the Russian popular terrorist movement known as Narodnik, the Western policy of interference using the minorities as a pretext for interventionism, the activities of missionaries; and Russian exploitation of the Armenian cause after the 1878 treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.

In this environment, the leftist Hinchak movement came into being in Geneva in 1887 and the bourgeois Dashnak movement emerged in Tbilisi in 1890. Both movements were involved in terror activities partly as set defense and partly to attract the West's attention to further their nationalist goals. To suppress the rebellions in eastern Anatolia. Abdulhamid created the infamous Hamidiye Regiments made up of Sunni Kurds. When World War I broke out and some of the Armenians began to support the Rus-

sian army, the tension between the Turkish nationalist government of the Union and Progress Party and Armenian nationalists reached a breaking point. This led to the forcible deportation of all the Armenians, with the exception of those living in Izmir and Istanbul, under the Deportation Law of 1915 (see Box 1.2 in Section 1).

The painful memories of this deportation during which hun dreds of thousands died or were killed were constantly kept alive by the Armenian diaspora. Having failed to register any progress in their political struggle since the 1930s, the world's Armenians launched a process of assassinations and terror, starting with the murder of two Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles on 27 January 1973. In the course of this campaign, forty Turkish diplomats and nationals were killed and fifteen injured in thirty-eight cities located in twenty-one countries. In addition, four non-Turks were killed and sixty-six injured. The majority of these acts were perpetrated by the Armée Secrète Arménienne pour la Libération de l'Arménie (ASALA). When ASALA attacked the Turkish Airlines at the Orly airport in Paris in 1983, causing the deaths of French people as well, the organization lost strength. ASALA's activities ceased, also in part because it had in fact attained the objective of attracting attention to its cause through terrorism

The diaspora then changed its strategy of wearing Turkey down by concentrating its efforts on securing the passage of bills in local assembles and national parliaments on the subject of the Armenian Genocide. This new strategy was able to make considerable headway due to a number of factors. The American and European legislators who had been under the influence of long years of Armenian discourse were ready to please their Armenian constituents to secure their votes. The Dashnak Party had come to power in Armenia as a result of the dire economic situation there and now wielded more influence. Because of human rights violations, Turkey's international standing was very low in the 1990s, and its policy based only on the rhetoric that "the allegations of genocide are lies" was very ineffective and even frustrating in the West

(B. ORAN)

Minister Çetin (International Herald Tribune, 31 March 1992). Although these discussions (which were conducted with Yerevan's approval) did not lead to concrete results, Turkey agreed to let 100,000 tons of wheat from the EU be delivered to Armenia through Turkish territory. Turkey also allowed Armenia to draw electric power from the Turkish grid when that country was facing a power shortage. These agreements demonstrated that relations between the two countries could develop along a logical course. But Turkey was torn between two different viewpoints on the issue of relations with Armenia.

One group, led by president Turgut Özal, held the view that the collapse of the USSR presented Turkey with great opportunities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This group felt that to seize these opportunities Turkey must pursue an active policy and should openly support Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. The other group maintained

that developing relations with Armenia (starting with economic cooperation) would help pry Armenia loose from Russia's grip and bring it closer to Turkey. Such a policy would also render Turkey more effective on the question of Nagorno Karabakh (Bölükbaşı, p. 85). Demirel defended his policy of allowing Armenia to receive wheat through Turkey by declaring that, aside from humanitarian considerations, this action was in Turkey's national interest.

When the balance in the region shifted in Armenia's favor in the middle of 1992 and the clashes in Karabakh intensified, however, this led Turkey to suspend all bilateral contacts with Yerevan. Simultaneously, Turkish public opinion was becoming aroused. Demonstrations began to be organized, at which there were cries for Turkey to intervene in Armenia. Demirel resisted these demands by declaring that the state could not be governed from the

streets and pointed out that allowing the Karabakh dispute to be turned into a Muslim-Christian issue would create an international bloc that would hurt Azerbaijan and Turkey most of all. Nevertheless, the pressure of public opinion made itself felt in the sphere of bilateral relations, especially after Armenia went beyond the borders of Karabakh and began to occupy large swaths of Azerbaijani territory. Public pressure prevented Turkey from following precedent and establishing an embassy in Yerevan even though it had done so in all of the former Soviet republics.

In the meantime Armenia concluded an agreement with Russia on 30 September 1992, which granted Russia the right to establish military bases in Armenia and to deploy troops to guard its frontiers. This was a sign that the Karabakh question had the potential to drag Turkey into a confrontation with Russia. This was followed in 1993 by a warning from General Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS Armed Forces, when he declared that a direct involvement by Turkey in the conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan "might lead to the Third World War" (Ehteshami and Murphy, pp. 522–23).

When Turkey began to be accused of breaking the embargo imposed by Azerbaijan at the end of 1992, Ankara slowed down the pace of the delivery of EU wheat to Armenia. In January 1993 the agreement to furnish electric power to Armenia was canceled even before it had been implemented. When Armenia occupied Kelbedjer in Azerbaijan in April 1993, this dealt the final blow to the attempts to bring Turkey closer to Armenia. Although it was frequently repeated that Turkish-Armenian relations must not be linked to the question of Nagorno Karabakh or to the state of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it was inevitable that the evacuation of one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory under Armenian occupation would become a precondition for the dialogue between Ankara and Yerevan to resume.

Following the occupation of Kelbedjer, Turkey announced that in April 1993 all deliveries of merchandise, including humanitarian aid to Armenia through Turkish territory or airspace, would be stopped. The justification for this action was that these deliveries to Armenia had the effect of bolstering its war effort.

When it appeared that Armenia might extend its operations to Nakhechevan, the news that Turkey was deploying forces to the frontier and getting ready to intervene spread alarm in Armenia. President Özal's statements such as "the Armenians should be given a fright" and "what if some bombs fell on the Armenian side of the border in the course of military exercises in the region"

also put a strain on Turkey's relations with the U.S. and Russia (Financial Times Report on Turkey, 7 May 1993, p. 5).

As Armenia became directly involved in the Karabakh dispute and Turkey blocked its border with Armenia and began to side openly with Azerbaijan, bilateral relations between the two countries came to an end. Henceforth the contacts with Armenia would continue solely within the framework of international organizations like OSCE and BSEC.

When President Özal died in May 1993, the Armenian president was among the foreign dignitaries attending the funeral. In the course of this visit, President Demirel brought together the president of Armenia and Azerbaijan: Ter-Petrossian and Elchibey shook hands for the first time. Although this tripartite meeting produced no results, the more radical and more pro-Azerbaijan Caucasus policy of Özal was no longer pursued and Turkey appeared ready to play the role of mediator to secure the resolution of the Karabakh question. Within a short time, Turkey submitted a tripartite plan for the settlement of the dispute that was prepared in collaboration with the U.S. and Russia. Although all the parties to the conflict were in agreement with the proposed formula, it could not be implemented after the administration of Elchibey was overthrown in Baku. When Armenia took advantage of the chaos in Azerbaijan to extend its military gains on the ground, the Turkish initiative came to an end.

Thus bilateral relations with Armenia were interrupted once again. As Azerbaijan's losses on the battlefield increased, Turkey's statements got tougher. When Armenia appeared to be poised to invade Nakhechevan, Prime Minister Çiller declared that she would seek the authorization of the TGNA to declare war if Armenian violated the Kars Treaty and invaded Nakhechevan (see Box 7-31 above).

Relations became even more strained when the Turkish press printed stories about Armenian support for the PKK and said that training camps were being set up on Armenian and occupied Azerbaijani soil. After this, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, especially in international forums, became more uninhibited. Starting in the summer of 1994, Turkey began to stress that in order to guarantee Azerbaijan's territorial integrity Turkish forces should take part in any future peacekeeping operation in the region.

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The international atmosphere improved, however, when a cease-fire was signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia on 12 May 1994. There was also international pressure on Turkey to slacken the isolation of Armenia. Some members of the U.S. Congress wanted to extend to Turkey the terms of the American legislation adopted in October

1992 that would bar U.S. aid to any country that prevented the delivery of humanitarian assistance to a country in need. In view of these developments, Ankara, in consultation with Azerbaijan, decided to reopen air corridor H-50 to allow aircraft to fly to Armenia through Turkish airspace after obtaining Azerbaijan's consent.

In the meantime Armenia was feeling pressured in the region, and its economy was suffering. This led it to call on Turkey to uncouple bilateral relations from Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and from the question of Karabakh. Armenia also sought to ease Turkey's concerns in relation to the diaspora's allegations of genocide. Ter-Petrossian never took an overt stand against such allegations. But he did put an end to the activities of the Dashnaktsutyun Party in December 1994. This was the party that wanted to keep the genocide issue permanently on the agenda. Ter-Petrossian also forced the resignation of his foreign minister, Raffi Hovannisian, a member of the diaspora and a U.S. citizen, for bringing up the issue of genocide when Ter-Petrossian was in Turkey. This was a demonstration of how far he was willing to go to normalize Armenia's relations with Turkey. But at this point the government in Turkey was under the influence of public opinion, which was incensed over Karabakh. Furthermore, it felt that Turkey's effectiveness in the Caucasus could be enhanced by wholeheartedly supporting Azerbaijan and decided to ignore Armenia's overtures over the issue of genocide.

Subsequently, when the government changed in Ankara, Turkey's policy toward Armenia softened. In the spring of 1996 prime minister Mesut Yılmaz announced that Turkey could reopen its border with Armenia if Azerbaijan and Armenia could reach an agreement on the principles under which the question of Karabakh would be resolved. In September 1994, after the signing of the "agreement of the century" by Azerbaijan and the multinational oil companies, Turkey unexpectedly declared that the path of the proposed pipeline to deliver Azerbaijani oil to world markets might be through Armenia. This proposal was made conditional on a resolution of the Karabakh dispute. It was Turkey's hope that this approach might induce Armenia to be more conciliatory on the issue. But Yılmaz was soon forced to reconsider this policy under pressure from both Azerbaijan and domestic public opinion. Shortly thereafter, the Motherland Party and True Path Party coalition collapsed and a new government was formed by the Welfare Party and True Path Party under the leadership of Erbakan. This signified that Turkey would no longer be able to come up with any new initiatives toward Yerevan. After the signing of the "agreement of the century," the pro-Armenian policy of the U.S.

began to shift and Armenia became progressively more isolated. In these circumstances, Armenia moved closer to Russia in the area of security and an Iran-Armenia-Russia axis began to emerge in the Caucasus. Given that Turkey was in competition with Iran and Russia on the question of pipeline routes, this situation made the deadlock between Ankara and Yerevan worse.

In 1997 Armenia formalized its alliance with Russia by signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Help. It subsequently signed an agreement that would allow 5,000 Russian troops to be stationed on Armenian territory. In this way Yerevan chose its place in the growing competition in the Caucasus. Russia deployed a squadron of MIG-29s to Armenia in December 1998 and deployed the Zenith S-300 air-defense system at the Gumri military base in February 1999, substantially altering the military balance in the region. This created a new source of tension in Turkish-Armenian relations.

# The Effect of the Diaspora in Armenia's Foreign Policy and the Allegations of Genocide

The question of Karabakh had already spoiled Turkish-Armenian relations. To this was added the burden of the diasporas, especially in the U.S. and Western Europe, which kept the issue of the allegations of genocide alive. In these conditions it became impossible to place bilateral relations on a rational basis.

When Armenia gained its independence, the Armenian diaspora took charge of developments in the home country and its political orientation. There was an active Armenian diaspora in the U.S., Russia, Iran, France, Lebanon, and even South America. After the Yerevan earthquake of 1988, the diaspora organized a worldwide humanitarian effort to come to Armenia's assistance. After independence, the diaspora Armenians were reluctant to invest in their homeland because of the political uncertainty and the state of war. Instead they concentrated their efforts on acting as a lobby to secure political backing for Armenia in the West and in particular in the U.S. (see Box 7-32 above). After the Cold War, Washington concentrated its effort in the region mainly on Georgia and Armenia. The 1 million members of the Armenian community in the U.S. were highly influential in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Armenia. As a result, Armenia received the highest amount of U.S. aid on a per-capita basis among all the former Soviet republics. In absolute terms, it ranked fourth among the recipients of U.S. aid, coming after Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

Shortly after Armenia's independence, the diaspora had become a complementary element of Armenia's

foreign policy and played a key role in reinforcing its political and economic ties with the U.S. and Europe. To cite an example, the Armenian National Council of America (ANCA) responded to Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia by securing the passage through the U.S. Congress of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in October 1992. It contained the following provision: "Until Azerbaijan takes steps to demonstrate that it has ceased all attacks and embargoes on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh," the U.S. would ban all aid to Azerbaijan. Although America's regional interests later shifted and a number of attempts were made to repeal this legislation, it was still in effect in 2003.

The diaspora was especially effective in the U.S., Russia, France, Georgia, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon and succeeded in securing the passage of resolutions through the Russian Duma and French National Assembly, acknowledging the allegations of genocide against Turkey. From 1999 to 2000 the diaspora concentrated its efforts on the issue of genocide in Sweden, Holland, the U.S., and Australia. It secured the passage of a law in France on the subject of recognizing the genocide and registered substantial gains in Sweden. In addition, the Israeli minister of education Yossi Sarid called for the inclusion of "the Armenian Genocide" in the high school curriculum, causing diplomatic tension between Turkey and Israel.

While Armenia pursued a policy line that corresponded closely with the diaspora on the international scene, domestically there were differences and clashes with the diaspora parties. The strongest party among the diaspora was the Dashnaktsutyun (Dashnak) Party, which took a hard line on the issues of Turkish-Armenian relations and Nagorno Karabakh. This party constantly ran into problems with the government during the sevenyear presidency of Ter-Petrossian. In June 1992 Dashnak declared unilateral independence in Karabakh and confronted the government with a virtual ultimatum to recognize this independence. When this ultimatum went unheeded and relations between the government and Dashnak became tense, Ter-Petrossian accused the Dashnak of secretly collaborating with the KGB (Russian Committee for State Security) and began to deport its leaders.

The effects of the Nagorno Karabakh factor in Armenia's domestic politics began to fade after the cease-fire of 1994, and the country's dire social and economic questions came to the fore. The diaspora took advantage of this situation to apply pressure on the Ter-Petrossian government. In response, Ter-Petrossian gave the order in December 1994 to suspend the activities of the Dashnak Party. He justified his action by alleging that the party had

supported a terror group and contravened the law that banned parties whose members and leaders were residents of foreign countries. This was followed by imprisonment of the party's leaders. The Dashnak army, which had fought in the Karabakh conflict, was disbanded. The measures taken against the Dashnak Party caused relations with the Armenian lobby, always pursuing a hard line on the Karabakh issue, to grow ever more tense.

During the presidential election held on 21 September 1996, the Dashnak Party and other opposition group used the economic and social hardship of the Armenians as an issue to push Ter-Petrossian into a corner. These tactics drove him to resort to antidemocratic methods to win the election. This radicalized the opposition even further and led to a serious political crisis. Robert Kocharian, leader of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh, assumed a key role in resolving the crisis. Feeling that it would not be in Armenia's national interest, Kocharian opposed a change of government. In return, Ter-Petrossian found himself forced to share power with the Dashnak Party and Kocharian, who was very influential among the diaspora. On 20 March 1997 Kocharian took over as prime minister in Yerevan. This strange situation for Armenia, with the prime minister wielding more power than the president, led to Ter-Petrossian's resignation in November 1998.

In the election that took place after the resignation, Kocharian was elected president. His first action was to lift all the restrictions that had been imposed on the Dashnak, the party that constituted the main link between Armenia and the diaspora. With this he reinforced the weakened links between Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh, and the overseas Armenians. He also strengthened the consensus on the Armenian national interest. With the full restoration of its legal status in 1999, Dashnak became the most loyal supporter of Kocharian.

After this the Armenian lobby in the U.S. changed its tactics and, intensifying its propaganda, began to secure the passage of genocide bills in state legislatures. The lobby went on the assumption that securing its objective in some thirty states would make it easier to secure the recognition of 24 April by the federal government. By March 2001 the number of states stood at twenty-five. As a result of activities by the Armenian lobby, a bill was introduced in the legislature of New Jersey in April 2000 that called for designating the week from 15 to 21 May "Genocide Recognition Week." This bill differed in an important way from the Armenian Genocide bills of the past. It included not only the Armenians but other ethnic groups, including Kurds, that had allegedly been victims of genocide in the past century. The bill declared

that genocide did not involve just the millions of Jewish victims but also Armenians, Cambodians, Tibetans, Bosnians, Kurds, Ukrainians, and the Tutsis of Rwanda. This allowed the Armenian lobby to attain its objectives with greater ease by securing the support of these other ethnic groups. As a result, the New Jersey legislature adopted the bill in March 2001.

In summary, Kocharian responded with the genocide issue to Turkey's action in advancing the resolution of the Karabakh problems as a precondition for establishing relations with Armenia. The Armenian lobby prepared the ground for pressing Turkey into a corner by establishing an alliance with the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Jewish lobbies.

### Deadlock and Resolution

Aside from the question of what really transpired in the period from 1914 to 1918, the belief that the Armenians were subjected to genocide constitutes an important element in the collective identity of the modern Armenians. This belief affected the foreign policy of Armenia after it gained its independence in the following ways. First, it constituted an important obstacle to the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. It caused Armenia to look upon Turkey's efforts to extend its influence in the Caucasus region in the post-Cold War era with suspicion. It also made Armenia seek close cooperation with Russia to counterbalance Turkish influence in the region. In addition, it tightened its relations with Iran and Greece, which were uneasy about increasing Turkish influence at the end of the Cold War. Finally, Yeravan made its problems with Azerbaijan more intractable by identifying Azerbaijan with Turkey and thereby implicating Azerbaijan too in the genocide episode.

The Armenian National Movement under the leadership of Ter-Petrossian that emerged in the late 1980s and ran Armenia's affairs from 1990 to 1997 tried to break away from the traditional patterns of Armenian politics. Ter-Petrossian's government wanted to break free from dependence on Russia by developing Turkish-Armenian relations. According to this approach, Turkey was a large and powerful neighbor with which Armenia was bound to come to terms at some point. Modern Turkey differed from the old Ottoman Empire and pursued different objectives. Above all, Turkey had nothing to do with the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist objectives that were on the agenda of the Ottoman Empire in its final years. On the contrary, Turkey was seeking integration with Europe, a goal that would facilitate a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. These were the views of Ter-Petrossian and his close associates.

But a number of developments intervened to prevent a quick and fundamental rapprochement between the two countries. Among these were Turkey's insistence on the need for Armenia to give up the allegations of genocide and explicitly renounce all claims on Turkish territory, which Armenia refused to do. Also, Turkey began to support Azerbaijan unconditionally on the Karabakh issue in its quest for greater influence in the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The corollary of this policy was the adoption of anti-Armenian policies. The developments in the Karabakh conflict were driving Turkish public opinion against Armenia. This led to a strengthening of Turanian tendencies in Turkey, which helped inflame historical Armenian fears.

To conclude, two things must happen for Armenia to free itself from the tight spot it finds itself in and for peace and stability to take hold in the Caucasus. First, the Karabakh problems need to be resolved; and, subsequently, Turkish-Armenian relations need to be normalized. For this, Turkey should approach Armenia and help it sort out its economic difficulties. Armenia has to abandon its allegations of genocide and give up all of its territorial claims. It must apply pressure on Karabakh's Armenians to force them to end the state of war. Yerevan must respect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and recognize its sovereignty over an autonomous Karabakh. Finally, it must stop supporting the anti-Turkish activities of the diaspora.

## 2. Relations with Georgia

When the USSR collapsed, Caucasus and Central Asia acquired a special place in Turkey's foreign policy; the access to and security of these regions became dependent on Georgia, which quickly turned into a strategic spring-board for Ankara. Furthermore, Georgia became Turkey's preferred route for the transport of the natural resources of these regions to global markets.

In December 1991 Turkey became the first country to recognize Georgia's independence. The historical Turkish-Georgian rivalries were quickly forgotten when foreign minister Hikmet Çetin paid a visit to Georgia on 21 May 1992 and signed the protocol that established diplomatic relations between the two countries. On 30 July 1992 Prime Minister Demirel flew to Georgia with a planeload of medicines and food to sign the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness with president Eduard Shevardnadze. The agreement, consisting of fifteen articles, declared in its preamble that the parties expressed their desire to strengthen their relations based on respect for one another's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the principles

of the inviolability of frontiers and noninterference in internal affairs. In the preamble, the parties referred to the Treaty of Kars (dated 13 October 1921) and confirmed their adherence to its provisions and all the other treaties and agreements concluded since then. The parties also confirmed that the Kars Treaty had irrevocably traced the borders between the two countries and that they would abide by its terms.

Turkey had fixed its eastern borders with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia at a time when these countries were under Bolshevik control. They had signed this treaty after making numerous concessions, and it was important for Turkey to know that they continued to be bound by its provisions after the collapse of the USSR. Azerbaijan and Georgia confirmed their borders with Turkey under their Agreements of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness, while Armenia refrained from doing so, which became another contentious issue between Armenia and Turkey.

After the declaration of its independence, Georgia ran into serious difficulties in preserving its territorial integrity. In grappling with its difficulties, Georgia was always able to count on Ankara's backing, which contributed to the rapid development of relations between the two countries. Under article 13 of the Treaty of 30 July 1992, both parties had undertaken to "prevent the activities of organizations, groups, or individuals on their territory seeking to undermine the territorial integrity or the legal order of the other party through the use of force." With this provision, Turkey was seeking to prevent the PKK from operating in Georgia and, in return, prevented the Abkhaz separatists from getting organized in Turkey. Turkey ignored the demands of people of ethnic Abkhaz extraction in Turkey and upheld the territorial integrity of Georgia in all international platforms. It also aided in seeking peaceful solutions to Georgia's difficulties in coping with its separatists. Turkey sought to be helpful in resolving the question of Abkhazia in conformity with the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. The issue of Abkhazia had been instigated by Russia and flared up from time to time with Russia's connivance. Turkey approached the question by seeking to gain the trust of both contenders by providing humanitarian assistance to both the Georgians and the Abkhaz at the time of the fighting. It contributed five military personnel to the United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIG) that went to Georgia on 21 October 1994. In addition, Ankara supported the dialogue that took place within the framework of the Geneva process of the OSCE. On 7–9 June 1999 Turkey

contributed to the peace process by arranging a meeting of the two sides in İstanbul.

Within a short time after Georgia's independence, Turkey had become its principal trade partner. The volume of trade, which stood at \$17.9 million in 1992, rose to \$239 million in 1997 and \$251.8 million in 1998. At the end of 1999 the level of Turkish investments in Georgia had reached \$45 million, while the level of credits provided by the Turkish Eximbank stood at \$41.5 million. In 2000 Turkey's share of Georgia's foreign trade amounted to 17.7%. The Russian share was 15.4%, the German share 8.4%, the Azerbaijani share 7.6%, and the U.S. share 7.5%. Turkey became an important alternative to Russia, which was using its trade ties with Georgia as a vehicle for exerting political pressure. In 2001 Russia imposed a visa requirement for Georgian travelers, causing hardship for many Georgians who were employed in Russia. To lift this requirement, Moscow was demanding that Georgia join the union between Russia and Belarus or, failing that, the Russian-sponsored Eurasian Union. Georgia sought alternative markets and employment outlets in Turkey. During his visit to Turkey in February 2001, Georgian minister of agriculture David Kirvalidze came up with proposals for joint fishing in Georgia territorial waters as well as joint production of tea and hazelnuts on Georgian soil and called on Turkey to create employment opportunities by setting up tea-processing and fish-processing plants (Georgian Times, 7 February 2001).

The border crossing at Sarp had been opened in August 1988, long before Georgia had gained its independence. In 2001 preparations were undertaken for setting up a second border crossing point at Çıldır-Aktaş. Agreement was reached during President Demirel's visit to Georgia on 14–15 January 2000 to construct and develop the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku rail link. After Russia's second Chechnya operation, it became clear that Georgia could not single-handedly confront the threats to its security. To provide security for Georgia, Turkey proposed the conclusion of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus during Demirel's visit to Georgia (see Box 7-34).

In addition to political and economic support, Turkey also provided military support to Georgia by helping in the establishment of the national army of Georgia within NATO's program of Partnership for Peace. Under the terms of the Security Cooperation Agreement signed on 18 February 1994, Turkey provided \$5.5 million in 1998, \$3.8 million in 1999, and \$4 million in 2000 to Georgia to improve the capability of its army. The importance of this assistance becomes clearer when measured against Georgia's total defense budget, amounting to about \$20

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### Box 7-34. Seeking Stability in the Caucasus

The search for cooperation in the Caucasus began within the framework of the OSCE when Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova signed the declaration known as GUAM (based on their initials) in Strasbourg in October 1997. Two factors drove these countries to come together. One was the Russian support for local conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh. The other was the location of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova on the route of the oil pipelines leading out of Azerbalian. In April 1999, during the NATO meeting in Washington on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of NATO, Uzbekistan joined the quartet, turn-

ing GUAM into GUUAM.

Although its members claimed that the grouping was mostly concerned with the security of energy transports, GUUAM's activities included developing relations with the Partnership for Peace (see Box 7-17 above), conflict resolution and cooperation in the face of ethnic tensions, separatism, religious radicalism, and terrorism. GUUAM's members supported disarmament in unstable regions and the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor within the Silk Road Project. To ensure the security of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, it was proposed to establish a joint Azerbaljan-Georgia peacekeeping force with the support of Ukraine. GUUAM could count on the support of NATO; despite its heterogeneous makeup and its uncertain future, it sought to develop the ties of its mempers with the West without upsetting the Russians. Although Russia did not openly oppose GUUAM, it remained distant, perhaps bearing in mind that the grouping might hurt its interests. Much of-GUUAM's credibility was lost when Uzbekistan suspended its membership and when the U.S. sent military experts to Georgia.

Aside from GUUAM, another proposal directly related to the Caucasus was made by Armenian foreign minister Vartan Oskanian on 15 March 1999. Known as "3 + 3," this proposal was never taken seriously. It aimed at the creation of a Regional Security and Cooperation Pact among Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the three countries of the southern Caucasus. At the Istanbul summit of the OSCE held in December 1999; Aliyev proposed the creation of a Caucasus Security Pact. It differed from the Armenian proposal in that it did not include Iran but provided for U.S. participation

President Demirel later proposed the establishment of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus under the aegis of the OSCE. This initiative obtained the support of the U.S., France, Germany, Britain, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Armenia, and the EU.

But by then the interest of the Caucasus states had begun to wane. Ten days after Demirel's initiative, the CIS meeting was held in Moscow on 24-25 January 2000. The members of the CIS decided to support the tougher line pursued by Russia in the Caucasus after Moscow's launching of the second Chechen operation. The CIS members were reluctant to take any stand that would arouse the displeasure of Russia. The message of the meeting was clear: It would be difficult to get a Stability Pact for the Caucasus without Russia's full support and participation

After the Stability Pact for the Caucasus came Moscow's counterproposal, known as the Caucasus Quartet or '1 +3," bringing together the Russian Federation plus Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaljan. This demonstrated that Russia was determined to keep the search for cooperation in the Caucasus under its close supervision and control. Azerbaijan and Georgia did not show much sympathy for this proposal, which would leave them at Russia's mercy: Armenia supported the Russian proposal but also indicated that it would approve the formula known as the Caucasus G8 or the "3 + 3 + 2", formula, which included the three Caucasus republics, Russia, Turkey, and Irah, and the EU and the U.S. The West insisted that the "1 + 3" model could not provide stability to the region without.Western participation.

The search for cooperation in the Caucasus eventually resulted in a struggle among the different approaches to the question. The Western states, international organizations, Turkey, and Georgia wanted to see a model similar to the Southeastern Europe Stability Pact under the aegis of the OSCE and hence closed to Iran.: Armenia wanted to loosen the embargo imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan with a Stability Pact for the Caucasus, in which only the regional countries (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) would take part: Iran supported to 3 + 3 formula that would exclude the U.S., while Russia was adamant in being a party to whatever arrangement was mode. Azerbaijan wanted friendly relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Western states and was more sympathetic to an arrangement similar to the EU-backed Southeastern European Stability Pact model for the Caucasus

(M. AYDIN)

million annually. Turkey also helped in training Georgian officers and in developing the gendarmerie within the framework of the military cooperation agreement signed in June 1997. Under this agreement, ten officers from Georgia's internal security forces received training in Turkey. President Shevardnadze described Turkish-Georgian military cooperation as a "strategic partnership" during his visit to Turkey in February 1999 (Hürriyet, 27 February 1999). It was announced that in March 2000 Turkish combat aircraft would start using the Marneuli military air base, which had been repaired and brought into service by Turkey within the framework of this military cooperation. To forestall possible Russian pressure on his country, Shevardnadze made clear in March 1999 that the strategic partnership of the two countries was directed at no other third party and that Georgia would not grant military base facilities on its territory to Turkey.

Turkey and Georgia also cooperated on the issue of transporting the region's oil to global markets (see Box 7-35). Turkey supported Georgia on the question of early oil by backing the Baku-Supsa line, while Georgia supported Turkey on the issue of building the main pipeline along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan route. But this support cost Shevardnadze dearly. On 29 August 1995 he survived an assassination attempt, with light wounds. After he stated that he supported the Baku-Ceyhan line, there was a second attempt on his life on 9 February 1998, followed by a short-lived military uprising. Shevardnadze declared

#### Box 7-35. Early Oil

After the dissolution of the USSR, the attention of the major oil producers was directed at the Caspian Sea. The questions on their minds were the quantity of the oil reserves, how much could be extracted and in what time frame, and how this oil was to be shipped to global markets. There were also serious dilemmas. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan needed to get this oil extracted and sold as soon as possible. The major oil companies, however, reckoned that marketing this oil before 2020 would depress the price of oil and affect their profits.

In this context, the companies advanced a number of arguments to support their case. They claimed that the size of the reserves in the region did not justify the large investments that were required; that the quality of the oil in the region's largest reserve in Tengiz, Kazakhstan, was low because of high sulphur content; that the legal status of the Caspian Sea was uncertain; that the oil companies would have to await their turns to use the one drilling platform in the Caspian, that the introduction of new platforms through the Don-Volga waterway would require Russia's consent, which would not be granted; that access to global markets from the region would require building expensive pipelines; that instability in the Caucasus would prevent the construction of pipelines, which would be difficult to operate on a permanent basis even if built, and that the region's oil would not be able to compete with cheap Middle Eastern oil. These arguments advanced by the oil companies were echoed by the Russians and the

The regional countries were eager to market their oil as soon as possible in order to reinforce their independence. Seeing that the arguments pro and con were going to continue for some time, the producers insisted on a formula known as "early oil," which was designed to test whether the oil could be shipped to markets on a regular basis and whether there would be buyers for this oil. This formula involved building pipelines that did not require large investments in order to transport the oil already discovered in order to assess the situation. If this proved feasible, the main pipeline calling for large investments would be undertaken.

The two lines selected for early oil (Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk) eventually were seen to be operating without a hitch, which led to an increase of investments into the region and to the opening of negotiations for the main pipeline.

(M. Aydın)

openly that these events were instigated by outside forces opposed to pipelines across Georgia. He was referring to Russia (*New York Times*, 22 October 1998).

### 3. Rivalry with Iran

Turkey feared (especially in the period prior to 1995) that Iran would convert the Muslim countries of the region into theocracies. Meanwhile Iran interpreted Turkey's activities in the area as an attempt to impose Turkish hegemony. In this tug of war between the two regional powers, Turkey had the active support of the West, ever fearful of Islamic fundamentalism. This was a further cause for

alarm to Iran's rulers. After the death of Khomeini, Iran eased up on using religion as a tool in the conduct of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, there was always the likelihood of the Turkish-Iranian rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia turning into an ideological struggle in the event of a worsening of relations between the two countries. In such an event, Iran's most effective tool to employ against Turkey and the West in this region was political Islam. For its part, Turkey saw its role in the region as promoting moderate Islam and the secular state model, the reverse of the approach adopted by Iran.

The cultural rivalry between Turkey and Iran made itself particularly apparent over the issue of the alphabet to be adopted by the Central Asian states. When the question of giving up the Cyrillic alphabet came up in Central Asia and Azerbaijan after independence, Turkey proposed the adoption of the Latin script, which had been briefly used prior to the Bolshevik revolution. This was opposed by Iran and the Arab world. Only Tajikistan, which was under Iranian influence, eventually opted for the Arabic script. Uzbekistan (on 1 September 1995) and Turkmenistan (on 1 January 1996) decided to follow Azerbaijan's 1991 example and adopted the Latin alphabet. But implementation was slow and gradual in both countries. Although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan decided to adopt the Latin alphabet, they did nothing to implement that decision.

Turkey and Iran were also drawn into a struggle to assert their influence in the region. Both countries were expecting to benefit from trade, transit trade income, and the benefits that would accrue from pipelines and transport routes crossing through their respective territories. Iran had the advantage of being contiguous to the region and having expertise in petroleum production and transportation. But the U.S. embargo was a serious handicap for Iran. Turkey had the advantage of location when it came to access to Western markets through Mediterranean ports, in contrast to Iran's ports located on the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the regional countries were put off by Iran's theocratic system, its Shiite population, and its policies of confrontation with the West.

Turkey also had problems in using Iran as a transit country in its trade with Central Asia. Whenever there was tension with Iran, Turkey's overland trade with Central Asia was affected. At this juncture, Iran made a move to reinforce its Caspian links in a way that would exclude Turkey. In 1992 it began to implement the Caspian Sea Cooperation Plan with Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. This was an alternative to Turkey's initiative to set up the Black Sea Economic Cooperation ar-

rangement, but it did not prove effective because of Russia's moves to make Iran's plan work to its advantage and reinforce its dominance in the Caspian Sea.

In the meantime Iran was supporting Armenia in its confrontation with Azerbaijan in order to check Azerbaijani nationalism, which Tehran feared might foment trouble among the Azerbaijanis living in Iran. This caused deterioration in Iran's relations with Turkey.

Despite these rivalries, it must not be forgotten that there were areas of convergence in the economic interests of Turkey and Iran in Central Asia, including the possibility of constructing a pipeline to carry Azerbaijani oil through Iran and Turkey. Iran's deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki proposed such a plan during his visit to Turkey in November 1994 as the guest of TİKA. Similarly, the two countries were cooperating to carry Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Turkey. Furthermore, when it became clear that neither of the two countries could individually establish economic dominance over the region and that the real rival was Russia, the competition between Iran and Turkey lost its intensity.

## 4. Competition with the Russian Federation

In addition to the miscalculations in Turkey's policies in the region from 1991 to 1993 (described above), Ankara also failed to take adequate account of Russia's influence Given Russia's status as the sole major power in the region, with ties going back over many years between Russia and the region and extensive interdependence, no country had a chance to make much headway there in open confrontation with Russia. Turkey failed to grasp Russia's aversion to Turkist and Islamist currents in the region up to 1995 and roused Russia's hostility with its assertive policies in the region. At first, in the period from 1989 to 1991, Russia feared the extension of Iranian-backed Islamist administrations in the region and saw Turkey's influence as a benign countervailing force. When Russia perceived that Turkey was seeking to fill the vacuum in Central Asia more assertively than Iran in the period from 1991 to 1993, however, its attitude shifted. Members of the Russian administration began to complain that Turkey was the tool of Western interests that were out to eliminate Russian influence in the region. Russia was particularly incensed when Turkey gave the impression that it was going beyond the former Soviet republics and fomenting separation in Russia's Turkic regions like Tatarstan and Bashkiria or Muslim regions like Chechnya. Russia was gripped by fear that the region along the Volga might break away, which led Moscow to play the "Kurdish card" against Turkey. This revealed, once again, how

inappropriate it was for Turkey to take sides in the internal affairs of neighbors without first resolving its own internal ethnic problems.

It can be said that the Yeltsin administration deliberately exaggerated the danger of Pan-Turkism in order to counteract the activities of extreme right-wing politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The fear of Pan-Turkism first appeared in the Stalin era and has remained present in Russia ever since. The president of the Institute of Global Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, Alexei Arbatov, advanced the thesis that Turkey had to be prevented from establishing ties with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia through Azerbaijan and the Caspian. According to Arbatov, this would encourage the Islamic fundamentalist and separatist movements in the Russian Federation, triggering the process of its disintegration. This thesis had a large following in Moscow after 1992.

When Demirel visited Central Asia in April 1992, he declared that the Turkic states could not be considered fully independent so long as they remained within the ruble zone. The Russians were upset that Demirel was encouraging these countries to break free from Russia's zone of economic influence. Until then Russia had taken a benevolent attitude toward Turkey's activities in Central Asia because, with its secular principles and moderate nationalism, Turkey would be a barrier to the harmful effects of Islamic radicalism and extreme nationalism in the region. But Russia now saw a direct challenge to its influence in the region. The Russians were also getting jittery over the expression "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China."

As Russia grew more uncomfortable with Turkey's activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it began to get more sensitive about its interests in its neighborhood and eventually enunciated the doctrine of the "Near Abroad" (see Box 7-55 below) in 1993. The doctrine amounted to declaring that Turkey and Iran could not fill the void left by the disappearance of the USSR and that this void could only be filled by Russia. Russia's main worry was that this region might turn into a center of racist Turkism or Islamic fundamentalism that might threaten the Russian diaspora in the region or spill over into Russia to cause trouble among its ethnic and religious minorities in the northern Caucasus. After a short period of turning inward, Russia began to reassert its former dominant position in the region. These efforts were seen as legitimate and backed by the West, which feared that the pro-Western elements in the Russian administration might be eliminated by the ultranationalists or the Communists. In implementing this policy all sorts of political and economic pressure and strong-arm tactics were employed that would allow Russia to return to the region as a dominant force.

At the same time, Turkey began to have a better appreciation of Russia's concerns over ethnic separation in the northern Caucasus even as it worried about Russia's repressive action in the region. Turkey sought to calm Russia by supporting the integrity and the stability of the CIS and by taking a stand against the effort of Muslim groups to dismember Russia. But these actions failed to reassure Russia about Turkey's intentions. The Turkish MFA had been pursuing a policy that was always aware of Russia's sensitivities, but the same could not be said about Turkish politicians. Special care was taken to conduct relations with Turkish-Muslim peoples within Russia through Moscow to demonstrate clearly that Turkey had nothing to do with those who were seeking to dismember Russia. In the case of Tatarstan, which wanted closer relations with Turkey, Ankara restrained itself. Turkey gave advance notice to Moscow of the visit by Tatarstan's president Mintimer Shaimiyev to Ankara in October 1992. Turkey also sought the help of Russia's foreign minister during his visit to Ankara in July 1994 to secure the opening of a consulate in Kazan. Despite these efforts, Turkey was not able to alleviate Russia's misgiving about Ankara's intentions or prevent a confrontation with Russia over Chechnya because of Turkish public sentiment.

#### The Chechen Question

When the Chechens, who were Muslims but not ethnically Turkish, rebelled to obtain their independence from the Russian Federation, they naturally looked to Turkey because of its interest in the region and its Ottoman past. Furthermore, many Chechens in Turkey had become Turkish citizens. As the fighting in Chechnya progressed, these people began to get involved in anti-Russian demonstrations. In addition, some went to Chechnya to fight as volunteers. All of this led Russia to accuse Turkey of not only overlooking but also actively supporting the Chechen separatists.

The Chechen leader Jehar Dudayev visited Turkey repeatedly to seek aid from Turkish leaders. Although Turkey sought to avoid getting involved in this question, the pressure of public opinion forced it to take sides. Russia was extremely sensitive about this issue. Even before the intervention of 1994, Russia had summoned the Turkish ambassador in Moscow to the foreign ministry when Dudayev was received by President Demirel in October 1993 and sought guarantees that this would never happen again. Meanwhile the municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara had begun to name parks and squares after Dudayev.

Turkey avoided condemning Russia's intervention in Chechnya, which began in December 1994 but did indicate its wish to see this question settled peacefully. Very soon Chechnya became a very sensitive issue for Turkey, already deeply involved with the Kurdish question on its own territory. Although Turkey kept stressing that the issue was Russia's internal affair, it did bow to public opinion and—especially after Russia started bombarding Grozny—indiscriminately raised the tone of its criticism of Russia's tactics in order to rouse the West to focus on this issue. The Russians accused Turkey of supporting the Chechens and responded by providing a farm to the PKK in the vicinity of Moscow. This was an indication of the way in which Russia was going to react to Turkish support for the Chechens.

#### The CFE and Other Military Questions

Another subject that came up as a consequence of Russia's intervention in Chechnya was Russia's demand for review of the force ceilings in the Caucasus established by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The treaty came into force on 17 July 1992 after the dissolution of the USSR. The Russians never implemented the provisions of the CFE in the northern Caucasus flank area. Furthermore, on 17 September 1993 Moscow sent notes to the signatories informing them that Russia would not be bound by the limitations imposed in the flank regions. Notwithstanding Turkey's strenuous opposition, the Western powers were prepared to compromise. It was decided to exclude the northern Caucasus region from the provisions of the treaty at the review conference held on 15–16 May 1996.

For Turkey, the real issue was the struggle for influence in the Caucasus. Turkey's concern was that Russia would use its forces concentrated in the northern Caucasus to exert pressure on the regional countries. As a matter of fact, Russia had removed its troops from Armenia and Georgia within the framework of the military cooperation agreements concluded with these countries, but now it redeployed these forces to Armenia's and Georgia's borders with Turkey. Furthermore, Russia was meddling in Georgia's and Azerbaijan's internal affairs, openly supporting coup attempts in these countries, siding with Armenia on the Karabakh issue, and preventing the deployment of multinational peacekeeping force in the region. These activities were strongly criticized by Turkey.

By 1995 Turkey was highly alarmed about Russia's intentions in the region. To prevent an open conflict of interests and perhaps even an armed conflict with Russia, Ankara was aware that it had to show greater deference to Russia's interests in the region. It was essential for Turk-

ish policy-makers to determine when Russia's concerns in the region had to be taken into account in pursuing Turkey's own interests. As a result of this, Turkey began to reverse its policy of the early 1990s, which neglected Russia and concentrated on the newly independent states of the region. The reversal came when the potential threats of confrontation became more apparent, leading to the realization that the potential fruits of cooperation with Russia were greater than the potential of all the new states combined. Turkey's policies underwent a marked tilt toward Russia in the second half of the 1990s, especially in the areas of economic and especially energy cooperation.

## III. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

At first Turkey underestimated the economic problems of the Central Asian states and their requirements for foreign aid and misjudged the nature and magnitude of the economic interdependency between them and the USSR that had been forged over many years. For these reasons, the rapid developments that occurred in Turkey's political relations with Central Asian states could not be replicated in the field of commercial and economic relations.

#### Loans

With close commercial ties and foreign aid, Turkey aimed to gain economic and political influence in the region. It also aimed to become the main provider of foreign aid to the area from 1991 to 1993. But these goals were much beyond Turkey's capacity. During this period Turkey acted rashly and promised to provide economic aid to all visitors from the region. The same promises were made by Turkish leaders who were visiting the region. These promises soon reached the level of \$3 billion, much beyond Turkey's ability to deliver. It became apparent very quickly that Turkey, by itself, was not in a position to give economic direction to the region. The situation called for a more sober analysis.

Until 1993 Turkey claimed that its economic reforms carried out in the 1980s could serve as a good model for Central Asian countries and help them in their economic restructuring efforts. It was also said that Turkish businesses and firms could serve as good business partners for Western firms seeking to invest in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

As a matter of fact, Turkish businesspeople had a greater affinity with the regional language and culture than their Western counterparts and found it easier to adjust to local conditions. When Americans and Western Europeans were running into difficulties during their negotiations with their customers in the region, small Turk-

ish firms were prepared to take risks in markets where taxation legislation was uncertain and where the legal infrastructure was inadequate. In these conditions, partnerships between Turkish and Western firms made sense. Western firms would provide capital and technology, while Turkish firms would supply skilled labor at a reasonable cost and take advantage of their familiarity with the region. Western firms that were considering investments in the region usually started by setting up an office in Turkey, where they could hire low-cost Turkish personnel and find partners to be subcontractors.

Over time, however, Western firms began to find Moscow a more convenient location to reach the region than Istanbul or Ankara. By being in Moscow, these firms could also top the fast-developing Russian market. Another factor that worked against locating in Turkey was the economic crisis of January 1994. This crisis and the policy of belt tightening that came in April 1994 demonstrated once again that—with high inflation, large budget deficits, loss-making publicly owned enterprises, and a currency that kept losing its value—there was not much chance for Turkey to act as an economic role model.

Furthermore, the economic requirements of the regional countries were enormous. In Soviet days, the role of people of Russian extraction had been preponderant in the economics of the regional countries and the system was geared in a way to provide commodities to the metropolis. All transport infrastructure (including roads, railways, pipelines, and communication) links were directed toward Russia. This situation could not easily be altered in the post-Soviet era, and the Russian Federation remained the number-one economic partner of the regional states until 2000.

An analysis of the economic situation in the Turkic republics throughout the Soviet era reveals a striking picture. The Turkic republics disposed of vast natural resources, including oil and natural gas and extensive and productive agricultural land. They had no labor problem and were located on the east-west trade routes. As a result of the policies of economic specialization pursued by the USSR, however, these countries turned into suppliers of unprocessed farm products, including cotton. Underground resources and now materials were shipped to Russia, because the processing plants did not exist on their territories. Their inefficient production facilities operated with local labor being employed only as unskilled workers under managers and engineers of Russian extraction.

In the 1980s the Soviet economy took a turn for the worse, the quality of products fell below world standards, and central planning lost its original driving force. All of this compelled Gorbachev to resort to new economic

measures after 1985 to reverse the process of deterioration. The economic malaise of the USSR coincided with the beginning of the social reawakening taking place in the component republics. When the attempt to manage the USSR in a more liberal and looser form under the policies of perestroika and glasnost failed, the whole system came apart. Political independence in the new states inevitably led to a search for greater economic independence. But to realize their potential the new states needed financial resources, technology, managerial cadres, and skilled labor. They were utterly dependent on Russia to enable their energy resources to reach global markets. Even in 2000 their economic independence was more apparent than real.

At a time when the newly independent states were in the process of restructuring their economics, they were also obliged to establish a new transport and communications infrastructure. They were in urgent need of foreign aid and technical assistance, and it was clear that Turkey was not able to meet these needs. Turkey had to cope with political problems caused by unstable governments as well as hyperinflation. This did not allow Turkey to look beyond its problems and do much to meet the financial needs of the new states. The Turkish economy was in no condition to provide the required financial and technical aid to the new states that were struggling with the problems of structural adjustment as they moved away from the Communist model to a sort of market economy. Rash promises of aid were made, and relations were conducted on an emotional rather than a pragmatic plane. As a result, the original euphoria gave way to disappointment arising from unfulfilled expectations as Turkey began to be perceived in a negative light.

These new republics had been politically and economically cut off from the world for seventy-four years. As they entered a complex and bewildering system of international relations, they saw Turkey by their side, a country close to them in many ways and ready to give guidance as well as assistance. In this framework, Turkey concluded trade and economic agreements with each of these states after their independence. In addition, agreements were concluded to regulate road transport, civil aviation, communications, technical cooperation, banking, protection and promotion of foreign investments, consular and legal assistance, the lifting of visa requirements, and cultural cooperation. Turkey was at the forefront in establishing the legal foundations of relations with countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia in a broad range of areas.

By 1994 Turkey had extended humanitarian aid to the Central Asian states amounting to \$78 million. The lion's share went to Uzbekistan with \$54 million, while Tajikistan trailed with a mere \$404,000. During the same period these states received loans in the amount of \$666 million from the Turkish Eximbank. These were longterm loans designed to increase and diversify Turkey's exports to the region. Repayments were not being made as scheduled (as of 30 March 2000 only \$468.32 million in interest and principal had been repaid), however, and Turkey's means were in any case limited, so the total level of loans to the region remained low. Some of the loans had to be converted into grants because of difficulties encountered in repayments. Granting these loans made no economic sense to Turkey and obviously could not be continued indefinitely. Consequently, the loans that were originally meant to finance exports were converted to loans extended to Turkish contractors to enable them to carry out projects in these countries. But even these loans ran into difficulties in specific instances, and some loans remained unutilized. The Turkish Eximbank agreed to project loans in the amount of \$1.5 billion to the regional countries by the end of 2001. Only about 50% of this amount was utilized, however, owing to difficulties in repayments of previous loans. The same situation arose in the field of industrial cooperation. Despite the large potential, and even after the feasibility studies had been made, the targets set could not be achieved because of funding difficulties. Achievements were confined to a few textile, paper, and sugar factories.

### Investments

The amount of Turkish capital invested in the region by 2000 amounted to \$2 billion. The regional countries were seeking to prevent shortage in their local markets by imposing taxes and other restrictions on exports. These discouraged large foreign investments in export industries, and most of the Turkish investments in the region were confined to the service sector.

Turkish construction firms used Eximbank loans to build hotels, textile and cement factories, airports, and other installations and contributed to the industrialization of the region. The amount of construction work undertaken by Turkish contractors in the five Turkic republics amounted to \$7 billion by 2000.

Until recently, Turkmenistan was the Central Asian country in which Turkey had the largest investments. Turkmenistan was geographically isolated, and Turkey was seen as an outlet to the wider world. But in 1999 and 2000 there was a cooling in political relations, which also affected economic ties. One reason for the souring of relations was that Turkmenistan was mentioned in the report

issued by the TGNA on the Susurluk scandal in Turkey. Another was the signing of the agreement with Russia to construct the natural gas pipeline known as Blue Stream. Turkmenistan possessed 35% of global reserves of natural gas and was eager to sell gas. It felt that Turkey was not active enough in seeking to meet its energy requirements from that source. As a result of the frosty political relations, no Turkish contractor was able to secure a contract in Turkmenistan in 2000. Until then construction jobs in Turkmenistan had been going almost exclusively to Turkish contractors.

#### Trade

Turkey's trade with the region was rising rapidly. Exports rose from \$160.92 million in 1992 to \$969.54 million in 1998. By 1998 Turkey's exports to the region accounted for 3.6% of total exports, amounting to \$26.97 billion. (That year Russia's share alone was 5% of Turkey's exports.) It has to be pointed out that most of these exports to the region were made possible through the utilization of Turkish Eximbank's export credits. Turkey's imports from the region, in contrast, were realized at a much lower level: amounting to \$85 million in 1992 and rising to \$548.05 million by 1998. This figure represented 1.2% of Turkey's total imports: \$45.93 billion in 1998.

Uzbekistan was Turkey's main trading partner in Central Asia until relations become strained in 1994. Russia accounted for 60% of Turkey's total trade with the former Soviet republics, however, while the share of all Central Asia republics barely reached 16%. This was due to the low purchasing power of these countries, Turkey's shift from exports to the construction sector, and the difficulties encountered in the area of transportation.

Turkey sought to become economically preeminent in the region, but there were two big obstacles. One was Turkey's distance from Central Asia. Another was that Turkey's location did not allow it to provide these landlocked countries with easy access to international markets. In reaching these countries by road, trucks had to cross through Georgia or Iran. Both of these countries, and especially Iran, placed a number of obstacles, which crippled Turkey's export possibilities. Turkish vehicles transiting Iran faced many delays, especially when relations were strained. Because of transport problems, delivery schedules of shipments could not be met and costs rose.

Another reason why Turkey had difficulties in boosting its exports was the poor quality of the goods shipped to the region during the initial period. In the period after independence, lower-quality goods that could not be sold

in Western markets were exported to the region, with very negative effects on the image of Turkish goods. Because of the poor quality of the goods produced in the region, it was difficult for these countries to export much to Turkey other than raw materials and cotton.

Because the banking system was very inadequate, many of the commercial transactions were carried out on the basis of cash. This made it difficult to transfer foreign exchange, which also had a dampening effect on trade. Without a properly functioning system of arbitration to settle trade disputes, commercial risks were very high. The habits of the Soviet years persisted, and the need to observe rules and regulations in business life was not properly appreciated. High taxes, licensing system, corruption, breaches of contract, lack of means of enforcement of contracts, and excessive bureaucratic formalities were all obstacles to the development of trade.

But beyond all of these factors, the main impediment to the development of trade and economic relations was the difficulty in finding adequate financial resources. The rich potential of the Central Asian republics was not of much use without know-how, technology, and financial resources. That is why Turkey concentrated its efforts on transferring knowledge, training experts, and providing funds to the extent that its means allowed. But there was no way for Turkey by itself to furnish the vast sums necessary to carry out the needs of post-Soviet restructuring projects.

At present, large-scale projects in Central Asia are being carried out by the firms of countries that are providing the financing. These firms belong to European, American, or Far Eastern countries. As a rule, Turkish companies get involved in large-scale projects as partners or subcontractors to these firms, taking advantage of their familiarity with the local inhabitants.

## The Energy Resources of the Caspian Basin and Turkey

Following the disintegration of the USSR, the Caspian Basin attracted much attention because of its oil and gas resources. It became clear that the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, would be among the major producers of energy in the twenty-first century. That is why there was a scramble among the oil companies to conclude agreements to exploit the oil and natural gas resources of these countries. The neighbors were also competing with one another to secure the right to locate the pipeline that would allow the oil and gas to be sold in international markets on their territories. Actually, most of the oil and

## Box 7-36. The Legal Status of the Caspian

In the Soviet era, there were only two littoral states in the Caspian: Iran and the USSR. Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan took their places as littoral states after the dissolution of the USSR, triggering the dispute over the legal status of this body of water. Under international law, the Caspian could be seen either as a condominium (where all of the littoral states would agree on joint sovereignty) or as an area to be carved up into national sovereignty segments under a formula to be negotiated by the littoral states.

When Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan undertook offshore oil explorations without waiting for an agreement on the status of the sea, the legal dispute heated up. Russia took the position that the Caspian should be used by the littoral states on a joint and equal basis. Russia had the backing of Iran and Turkmenistan when it claimed that the Law of the Sea could not be applied in the Caspian, because it did not have a natural access to the high seas. Because the Caspian was an internal sea or a lake, it should come under joint sovereignty. This implied twenty miles of national economic zones. The waters beyond these belts would be open for joint exploitation.

In opposition to the Russian view, Azerbaijan, supported by Kazakhstan, described the Caspian alternatively as a shared lake or as high sea. As a shared lake the Caspian would be divided into national sectors by extending territorial waters to the median line. The littoral states would have full sovereignty over the surface seabed, shipping, and exploitation of biological resources within their national sectors. Using the approach of the open sea, the lit-

toral states would have twelve miles of territorial waters and two hundred miles of economic zones without, however, encroaching on the median line:

At first, Turkmenistan leaned toward the Russian position, but in February 1998 it announced that it had reached agreement with Azerbaijan to set the border between the two countries on the median line. The two countries have yet to reach agreement, however, on the course of the median line. Although Iran opposed the carving up of the Caspian into national sectors and defended the principle of "Joint ownership," It later moderated its stand, especially after it received a share of Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz Fields. In April 1998 Iran announced that it was ready to accept sectoral division on condition that the shares were equal. This would give Iran a share of 20% of the Caspian Sea, whereas under Azerbaijan's formula Iran's share would be 10%.

As time went by, there were changes in the position of littoral states, including Russia. Russia reached an agreement with Azerbaijan in April 1998 and with Kazakhstan in July 1998 to divide the seabed lying off their coastlines. Thus all of the littoral countries appear to have abandoned the "joint ownership" approach and adopted the "Individual ownership" principle. The sole exception is Iran, which has yet to conclude any agreement on sharing the seabed.

(M. AYDIN) (Source: Aydın 2000, pp. 48–56)

gas reserves of the region have not yet been developed. In fact, even the extent of the reserves is not fully known.

The Caspian Basin is not a second Middle East. But it does rival the North Sea fields, one of the most important sources of energy under Western control and now entering the phase of depletion and exhaustion. From the point of proven reserves, Kazakhstan is the leading country in oil and Turkmenistan in natural gas.

The International Energy Agency has estimated that the Caspian region's crude oil production will reach 79 million tons in 2000, 194 million tons in 2010, and 308 million tons in 2020. The oil consumption in the region will follow a similar pattern, rising from 22 million tons in 1998 to 117 million tons in 2010 and to 180 million tons in 2020.

Similarly, it is expected that production of natural gas will reach 200 billion cubic meters in 2010, of which 84 billion cubic meters will be exported. At present the Caspian Basin exports approximately 43% of its oil and a mere 9% of its gas production. By 2010 these ratios should reach 60% and 40%. These high ratios indicate that the region will have an important place in the world in 2020 as a supplier of oil and gas.

The countries of the region were anxious to market their energy resources as quickly as possible. Without direct access to the sea, this would only be possible with pipelines transiting the territories of their neighbors. This meant that there would be international competition not only at the stage of claiming (see Box 7-36) and producing the hydrocarbon resources but also at the stage of their delivery to markets.

In 1991 the pipeline network was Soviet-built, and its layout served the interests of Russia. Furthermore, the operator of the pipeline network was the Russian company Transneft, which was reluctant to increase the quotas of the former Soviet republics that would allow them to raise their exports of oil through the network. The natural gas pipeline was controlled by Gasprom, another Russian company, and Turkmenistan was being obstructed from exporting its gas through this system. Gasprom was transporting Russian gas to the rich Western European market, while it sent Turkmenistan's gas to markets like Ukraine and Georgia, which had accumulated unpaid gas bills amounting to billions of dollars.

For this reason, it was essential for the Caspian Basin countries to find ways of marketing their hydrocarbons without passing through Russian pipelines if they were going to strengthen their economic and political independence. That is why the search for alternative routes to

export the region's energy resources started in the early 1990s.

The building of a new pipeline network was no easy task, given the vast sums required and the complex geopolitics of the region. The first pipeline that would be built was bound to remain the main outlet for a considerable time. Although consideration was given to about half a dozen alternatives (all of which would transit more than one country), eventually two projects emerged as the most suitable. These were the Baku-Novorossiysk and the Baku-Ceyhan lines.

In addition to the economic effects of the pipelines, there was also the question of the geopolitical strategic advantages that pipelines bestowed on the country in which they were located. That is why the struggle for influence between Turkey and Russia drew in the powers from outside the region as well as the multinational companies.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline, also known as the Caspian-Mediterranean Pipeline, is designed to allow Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's oil to flow to the Mediterranean. The project is open to the other regional producers of oil. The pipeline's feasibility plan and environmental impact report were carried out with World Bank financing and completed in June 1998. According to the plan, the pipeline would have a length of 1,730 kilometers and a capacity of 1 million barrels per day; 468 kilometers of the pipeline would go through Azerbaijan, 225 kilometers through Georgia, and 1,037 kilometers through Turkey. In addition there would be a marine terminal in Ceyhan. It has been estimated that the project will cost \$2.4 billion, including the terminal.

Although the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline is longer than the alternatives going to Supsa or Novorossiysk, it has a number of advantages over these rival links.

- 1. Comparison with alternative routes: with this route, it is possible to diversify the means for shipping Caspian oil to global energy markets. For Turkey, the project offers the advantage of developing and strengthening relations with Caucasus and Central Asian states. For the Caspian countries, it allows them to free themselves from dependence on a single route when exporting their resources. By allowing them to stand on their own feet, the project contributes to the development of democracy, the market economy, and the integration of the region with the global economy.
- 2. The possibility of tapping an existing market: Turkey is an important market for the region's oil and gas, and the pipeline can be used to meet part of its requirements.
  - 3. Advantages in installation and climate: by world

standards, the Ceyhan terminal is a well-managed export facility. It also has a deep-sea port that can handle tankers of up to 300,000 tons. Because of unfavorable weather conditions in the Black Sea, loading and unloading operations are interrupted for up to seventy-five days per year, whereas in Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea the climate and weather conditions are very favorable. The natural conditions of the Turkish Straits prevent tankers over 200 meters in length from sailing through. This means that tankers over 150,000 to 200,000 tons cannot sail into the Black Sea. Furthermore, the tanker route from Ceyhan to global markets is shorter than the routes from Black Sea parts.

4. Environmental considerations and the state of the Turkish Straits: transporting Caspian oil from Black Sea ports to global markets would greatly raise the volume of traffic in the Turkish Straits. Moreover, the foreign trade of the former COMECON countries is not yet fully developed. As their international trade increases in the twenty-first century, they will have to utilize the Straits to a much greater extent. This will mean that the hinterland of the Black Sea will extend from Central and Eastern Europe all the way into Central Asia. Adding petroleum and petroleum products to this increasing traffic would seriously increase the risks and danger to which the waterway would be exposed. Consequently, the Black Sea alternatives not only are disadvantaged from the economic point of view but also pose the grave risk of irreversible damage to the environment.

For all of these reasons, the Baku-Ceyhan project is the main element of the East-West Energy Corridor that would link the southern Caucasus and Central Asia to Turkey and the Mediterranean. This project clearly has the additional advantage of minimizing the risks in the Straits arising from ever-increasing traffic.

Important developments have taken place since 1998 toward realizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. On 29 October 1998 the Ankara Declaration was signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, who were visiting Ankara in connection with the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The declaration was also signed by President Demirel on behalf of Turkey. U.S. secretary of energy Bill Richardson attended the signing ceremony as an observer. The declaration reiterated that it was necessary to market the oil and gas resources of the region through multiple pipelines in order to strengthen the independence, security, economic development, and prosperity of the countries of the Caspian Basin. The signatories also reaffirmed their determination to construct the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Construction began on 20 September 2002, and the expected date for completion was set for February 2005.

On the same day as the Ankara Declaration, an agreement was signed providing for Turkish purchase of natural gas from Turkmenistan and the construction of a pipeline for carrying natural gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey and beyond into Europe. On 9 December 1998 Mobil, Shell, and Chevron signed an agreement with the Kazakh government to undertake the feasibility study of the pipeline to carry Kazakh oil and gas to Turkey. These agreements made the realization of the Baku-Ceyhan project more probable, because it was unlikely that this line would be economically viable unless it also carried Kazakh oil. Furthermore, a natural gas pipeline to transport Turkmen gas to Turkey through a pipeline parallel to the Baku-Ceyhan line would also help in spreading the pipeline's construction costs.

The package of agreements designed to set in motion the construction of the project was signed in Istanbul on 18 November 1999, during the holding of the İstanbul Summit of the OSCE. The package included the Intergovernmental Agreement signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, the Host Country Agreement, and the Turkey Contracting Agreement, including Turkey's oil purchase guarantee and the construction of the Turkish portion. These agreements were ratified by the Azerbaijan and Georgia parliaments in May 2000 and by the TGNA on 22 June 2000. Also signed on the occasion of the summit was the İstanbul Declaration, by which Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey undertook to complete the project in 2004. President Clinton also signed the document as an observer. The legal underpinning of the project was completed on 3 October 2000 with the parties' signing of the agreement for constituting the group of sponsors that would take over the financing of the pipeline. Once the support of BP had been obtained, the arguments over the feasibility of the pipeline came to an end.

Turkey was also interested in a natural gas pipeline that would carry Turkmenistan's gas under the Caspian Sea to Turkey and then on to Europe. In Soviet times, Turkmenistan was one of the main suppliers of gas to Europe. Disruptions in transportation and payments after independence forced Turkmenistan to cut down its production. Whereas the volume of production had reached 85 billion cubic meters in 1991, in 1998 it had fallen to 13 billion cubic meters. Turkey saw the Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe natural gas pipeline both as a vehicle for allowing Turkmenistan to tap new markets and as a means for di-

versifying Turkey's and Europe's energy suppliers in the twenty-first century.

An important step in carrying out this project was the agreement for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) and the sale of Turkmenistan's gas to Turkey. The agreement was initialed by the energy ministers of the two countries on 20 October 1998 and signed by the two presidents in Ankara on 29 October 1998. The agreement was for a term of thirty years and involved the transport of 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year, of which 16 billion would be for Turkey's consumption, with the remainder going to Europe. The pipeline would run through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into Turkey, cross the Dardanelles Strait and Thrace, and go on to Europe.

The Intergovernmental Declaration on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline was signed on 18 November 1999 by Turkey, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan on the occasion of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul. U.S. president Bill Clinton also signed the declaration as an observer. With this document, the signatories pledged themselves to inform the project sponsors of their particular wishes to complete the formalities related to the intergovernmental agreement and transit country agreements by March 2000 and to provide the necessary support to the sponsors to ensure the completion of the project by the last quarter of 2002. But due to later developments and Turkey's decision to give priority to the procurement of Russian gas through a pipeline under the Black Sea (see Box 7-56 below) the TCP project was almost put on hold at the end of 2000. This was because all of the studies showed that the TCP and the Blue Stream could not both be economically viable due to insufficient Turkish demand for gas. This development put a strain on Turkey's relations with Turkmenistan and compelled Turkmenistan to sign a new natural gas agreement with Russia, thus increasing its dependence on its large neighbor.

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## Relations with Greece

The collapse of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe in quick succession, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ending of the Cold War brought about changes on the international scene that also affected Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus question. In the new unipolar system in which the U.S. exercised leadership, there was renewed emphasis on ending regional conflicts. The emergence of new nation-states and nationalism, however, created new sources of conflict. These two trends were most visible in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, regions where Greece and Turkey were located and that both countries regarded as their area of special interest. Consequently, both countries were forced to review their foreign policies in the light of the new developments.

At first Turkish policy-makers were concerned that their country's strategic importance would be diminished as a result of the ending of the Cold War and the disappearance of the "Soviet threat." To compensate, they began to stress the role as intermediary that Turkey aspired to play between the West and the newly established nation-states. The phrase "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" epitomized this new approach. Turkey's active foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis and during the conflict in Bosnia and its commercial and economic dealings with the Caucasus states centered on oil should be seen in this framework.

But it soon became apparent that Turkey did not have the political and economic capacity to play a leadership role in the region or to act as an intermediary for the West. The goals set in the early 1990s remained as pious hopes. In the second half of the 1990s in particular, relations with the EU became strained and Turkey found itself coming closer to the U.S. Ankara had to content itself with playing the role of a loyal ally, helping in carrying out American plans in the region.

Be that as it may, Turkey established close ties with Albania, Bosnia, and Macedonia, improved its relations with Bulgaria, engaged in close trade and economic cooperation with Russia, demonstrated its economic and cultural affinity with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia (and most notably Azerbaijan), strengthened its alliance with Israel, and did all this in close bonds of alliance with the U.S. Hence Greece began to get the feeling that it was being outmaneuvered and sought ways to check Turkey by stepping up its own efforts.

The ending of the Cold War was greeted positively by Greece in the first instance. Athens expected that, with the "Soviet threat" gone, Washington would no longer see Turkey as strategically important. This would restore a balance between Turkey and Greece in America's perception. Furthermore, the Gulf War would reveal the strategic importance of Greece and Cyprus. But developments did not bear out Greek expectations. The U.S. did not tilt toward Greece, a member of the EU and therefore constrained by the foreign policies of European states. Furthermore, Greece was beset by internal political and economic questions. Instead the U.S. tilted toward Turkey, which was located in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Despite all of Turkey's internal troubles, Realpolitik had brought its strategic importance to the fore.

In the 1990s the changes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of Yugoslavia had a greater affect on Greece than the demise of the USSR. During the process of restructuring that took place in the Balkans, Greece's relations with its neighbors ran into much turbulence. There were disputes over minorities with Albania and differences with Macedonia over its name, which turned into a question of sovereignty because of the dispute's historic roots (see Box 7-43 below). Against the background of traditional friendship with Serbia, relations with Bosnia took a turn for the worse. Greece's policies in connection with these issues led not only to deteriorating relations with Balkan neighbors but also to serious loss of prestige in the

U.S. and the European states. Greece was losing ground in a region where Turkey was getting more effective.

This situation started changing after 1996. Andreas Papandreou resigned for health reasons and was succeeded by Kostas Simitis. After Andreas Papandreou's death, Simitis also took over the helm of PASOK and gave a new direction to his country's foreign policy. Simitis was a follower of the modernization process launched by Venizelos and Karamanlis. This signified strict adherence to a Europe-centered foreign policy. Even during Papandreou's term, Simitis was critical of the populist policies then in vogue. When he took power, he chose as his main goal the objective of turning Greece into a respected member of the EU. For this he followed a consistent course aimed at strengthening Greece economically and politically. This implied accelerating the economic reforms initiated by the Konstantinos Mitsotakis government, abandoning the populist nationalist rhetoric that created artificial questions and forced additional defense expenditures, and establishing good relations with neighbors in the region and above all in the Balkans.

As a result, minority problems with Albania were overcome after Simitis assumed office. Economic relations with Romania and Bulgaria were developed, the Macedonian crisis was resolved, and, while ties of friendship of Serbia were reinforced, effective policies were followed in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Simitis also intended to establish a serious dialogue with Turkey, but it was not so easy to change entrenched ill feelings. In this area he was confronted with two obstacles. In his country and even within his own party, nationalist elements made up the inner circle around Papandreou. In Turkey there were the unstable governments that got increasingly hawkish in foreign policy as economic and political conditions worsened.

The Kardak crisis that occurred soon after Simitis took office revealed just how difficult it would be to improve relations with Turkey. Greece used its increasing prestige within the EU and took advantage of Turkey's political difficulties, notably in connection with the PKK and political Islam, to apply pressure on Ankara in the framework of human rights. To overcome the tension with Ankara and the lack of a proper dialogue, it was necessary to wait for a serious crisis. In the past, dialogue had often come after the eruption of a crisis. This time the crisis over Abdullah Öcalan led to a dialogue that allowed an atmosphere of friendship to emerge after the Marmara earthquake.

When examining Turkish-Greek relations in the 1990s, it is necessary to bear in mind a new element that

was added to the existing bilateral issues. This was the struggle by the two countries to become regional powers in the context of the New World Order. Turkey carried out this struggle by developing its relations with the U.S. and using its historical ties with regional countries to the detriment of Greece. Greece used its membership in the EU and took advantage of Turkey's political and economic shortcomings. Turkey appeared to be ahead in the first half of the decade, while Greece gained the advantage in the second half. But by the end of the decade both countries realized that confrontation was not getting them anywhere and was only aggravating what was already an unsatisfactory situation. As a result, they decided to enter into the new century engaged in a dialogue.

## THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT (1990–1993)

As the post–Cold War transformation in the world scene began to take shape in 1990, Greece was confronted with serious political problems. The end of the ten-year Papandreou and PASOK era coincided with the Koskotas banking scandal, widespread rumors of other cases of corruption, and an economy in serious difficulty. Although PASOK had lost the election in 1989, it took a whole year to form a stable government with a parliamentary majority. After three elections in quick succession, the New Democracy Party government was formed in April 1990 under the leadership of Mitsotakis.

Mitsotakis promised political transparency under the slogan *katharsis* (clean-up) and introduced an austerity program to rehabilitate the economy. This was a time to turn inward, but the transformation of the global scene and the upsetting of the status quo in the Balkans compelled Athens to focus its attention on foreign policy. As new states emerged in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Athens was confronted with new problems, particularly with Macedonia. Meanwhile Ankara was conducting an active policy toward these countries. These developments drove Athens to seek a dialogue with Turkey. Nothing much emerged from this dialogue, however, because of the problems confronted in Western Thrace and Cyprus.

## A. The Search for a Dialogue with Turkey

During PASOK's tenure of power, Greek-Turkish relations had steadily deteriorated, except for the brief interlude during the so-called Davos process. When Mitsotakis took office, he indicated that he wanted to visit Ankara and start a serious dialogue between the two neighbors.

The Greek and Turkish prime ministers met at the London NATO Summit held on 6 July 1990 and decided that their dialogue should be pursued. But they preferred not to address the basic issues of the Aegean, Cyprus, and the worsening question of Western Thrace.

Notwithstanding the decision to pursue the highlevel dialogue, developments in relations with the U.S. and EU rather than bilateral issues conspired to prevent the dialogue. Greek foreign minister Antonis Samaras declared that the Defense Cooperation Agreement signed by Greece and the U.S. on 8 July 1990 was a shield against the Turkish threat. This declaration met with a rebuke from Turkey. The U.S. gave verbal assurance to Turkey that they would sign no document that discriminated against one of their allies, but this did not suffice to dispel the suspicions on both sides of the Aegean. Furthermore, soon after the agreement signed with the U.S., Greece vetoed the EU initiative to release the loan to Turkey in the amount of \$700 million that had been blocked since 1980. The Greek veto on an EU initiative that was designed to normalize Turkey's relations with the EU led to renewed tension between the neighbors.

A new page was turned when Mesut Yılmaz became prime minister in Turkey. In a letter to his Greek counterpart Mitsotakis, Yılmaz called for a renewal of the dialogue. In 1991 there was talk of a nonaggression pact between the two countries. But when Greece alleged on 17 May that its airspace had been violated by Turkish aircraft, the new prime minister's initiative came to nothing.

In spite of the unresolved questions inherited from the past, the two governments persisted in restoring the Greek-Turkish dialogue. As a result, the two prime ministers met in Paris on 11 September 1991 on the occasion of another meeting that both were attending. In the joint communiqué issued after the meeting, the prime ministers reiterated their desire to develop bilateral relations in all fields. They also announced their intention to establish a working group to prepare a draft Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation to be signed on the occasion of a visit by Mitsotakis to Ankara at the first opportunity. They also announced that they had examined the work of the UN secretary-general in connection with his mission of good offices on Cyprus and had noted a divergence of views on this issue.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the two sides were unable to implement their desire to improve bilateral relations when it came to specific questions. When the question of holding a summit of four (Turkey, Greece, and the two Cypriot communities) came up, Yılmaz, with

an approaching election in mind, asked for a postponement until after the election. The Greek public took this as another instance of Turkish intransigence.

In 1990 and 1991 developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus and Turkey's active policy toward the newly independent states were causing Athens concern. This was especially true with respect to Turkey's relations with Macedonia, which had become a major foreign policy issue for Athens. That is why Athens was pursuing a double game. It was conducting bilateral talks with Turkey while at the same time it followed an anti-Turkish course within the EU. As a member of the EU's defense organization, the WEU, it saw to it that Turkey was only admitted as an observer. Greece took advantage of Turkey's internal weaknesses and did not shrink from contacts with the PKK.

Following the election of October 1991, a new coalition government was formed in Turkey consisting of the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP). The Özal era had come to an end. The pragmatic approach to relations with Greece as practiced by Özal was abandoned and the traditional policies and theses were resurrected. The bureaucracy was again allowed to take charge of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, prime ministers Demirel and Mitsotakis did meet on three different occasions during 1992.

The first of these meetings took place at Davos on 1 February 1992. Compared to previous meetings and especially the 1988 Davos meeting, this meeting was carefully planned. No room was left for unrealistic expectations to take hold. Turkey attended the Davos meeting with a delegation of sixty-five officials. This was an attempt to demonstrate Turkey's strategic importance in the New World Order and also an attempt to downgrade Greece's place in its new foreign policy. There were three items in the joint communiqué issued after the meeting: (1) the two foreign ministers would meet soon in connection with the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation that Mitsotakis would sign during his visit to Ankara; (2) Turkey supported Greek participation in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project; (3) the two sides agreed to seek a just, lasting, and early solution to the question of Cyprus through negotiations and to support the good offices mission of the UN secretary-general.

After Davos, the two prime ministers met again when Mitsotakis came to İstanbul on 21 June 1992 to attend a baptism ceremony at the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. By then, however, attentions were riveted on the Cyprus negotiations taking place in New York, and the atmosphere of dialogue began to sour because of the lack of progress

in these negotiations. As a result, when Mitsotakis came to Istanbul again the following week to attend the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Summit, he confined himself to signing the Summit Declaration and avoided bilateral talks with Demirel. At a time when bilateral relations were once more entering a difficult phase, Greece succeeded in participating in a project, at Turkey's invitation, that Athens feared would allow Ankara to pursue an active policy in the Black Sea region.

## **B.** Minority Questions

From 1990 to 1993, when Greece and Turkey were seeking to establish a dialogue, the Muslim-Turkish minority of Western Thrace and the patriarchate in Istanbul began to make their voices heard for the first time after a long silence.

## 1. Developments in Western Thrace

When a court order was obtained by the PASOK government banning the use of the adjective "Turkish" in their titles by minority associations in Western Thrace, public opinion in the region was stirred into action. Yet this pressure of public opinion was not enough to get the questions affecting the minority included in the agenda of the Turkish-Greek talks that got underway after Davos. The minority took advantage of the changed international environment to press their cause directly in Athens without seeking Turkey's support. During the 1990s the Turks of Western Thrace made themselves heard as they had never done before (the following account of the disturbances in Western Thrace is based on Oran).

Although Mitsotakis came to office with the determination to start a real dialogue with Turkey, he quickly discovered that he was confronted with a question in Western Thrace that would frustrate his intention. The issues of the election of muftis, the trial of Sadık Ahmet, and the amendment to the electoral legislation that made it impossible for the Turks to elect an independent deputy (all dating from PASOK times) were agitating the Turkish minority. Furthermore, the question of minority rights acquired a new importance in the New World Order of the 1990s, and the Turkish minority was able to express its reaction more strongly. But the Greek government was unable to isolate itself from the wave of intensified nationalism sweeping through the Balkans. The rhetoric of nationalism was also being stirred by the dispute with Macedonia. All of this prevented Athens from responding with tolerance to insistent demands for respect for minority rights coming from Western Thrace. During the 1990s

the question of Western Thrace ceased to be a Turkish-Greek issue and became a European issue. Athens began to be criticized at different international platforms, starting with the EU, because of its policies toward the minority in Western Thrace.

## The Question of the Muftis

According to Greek Law No. 2345/1920 regulating the status of muftis, they were to be elected by the Muslims of their districts. The authority of the minister of national education and religious affairs in this area was confined to striking out the candidacy of those who met with his disapproval. This law was never implemented, however. Since 1920, when the law came into effect, the muftis had always been appointed by the government; because the minority was largely passive, no one had objected to this practice.

The question came up when the mufti of Komotini, Hüseyin Mustafa Efendi, died in 1984. The Greek government appointed Imam Rüştü Ethem as acting mufti, a man who was educated in Egypt and was considered close to the government. When the community reacted negatively to this appointment and Rüştü Ethem resigned, the new appointee was Hafız Cemali Meço, educated in Saudi Arabia and also considered close to the government. Meço, who had been appointed acting mufti, declared that he would disregard the pressure and criticism coming his way and maintain his post until a full-time mufti was appointed.

As public pressure mounted on the government to abide by the provisions of Law No. 2345/1920 and allow the mufti to be elected by his flock, the government submitted a bill to parliament entitled "Method of Appointing Muftis, Their Attributes, Conditions of Service, and Manner of Replacement." Under this bill, the muftis would be appointed by the minister of national education and religious affairs upon the advice of the governor. In this way, muftis would be reduced to the status of civil servants. Parliament did not consider this bill in 1989 and 1990.

When Mustafa Hilmi, the mufti of Xanthi, died on 5 February 1990, the Greek government appointed his son, Mehmet Emin Aga, who enjoyed the support of the minority, as acting mufti. On 30 March 1990 Meço, the acting mufti of Komotini, was appointed full mufti by a cabinet decision. This left the minority in a quandary, because Mehmet Emin Aga had been a strong opponent of the selection of muftis by appointment. This difficulty was overcome with an election held in the mosques of Komotini

on 17 August 1990 after Friday prayers. As a result, the appointed mufti Mehmet Emin Aga was elected mufti by his flock.

On 24 December 1990 the Greek government issued Decree No. 182 with the force of law regulating the status of muftis in Western Thrace, while rescinding Law No. 2345/1920. The people of Komotini refused to recognize this decree and on 28 December elected İbrahim Şerif as mufti. This meant that Komotini had two muftis, one "official" and the other "elected." The government did not back down in the face of the popular opposition. Decree No. 182 was approved in parliament on 22 January 1991, and the government appointed Mehmet Emin Şinikoğlu as mufti of Xanthi.

The issue of muftis began to strain Turkish-Greek relations once again in February 1993. The Religious Affairs Directorate of Turkey sent muftis to Western Thrace on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan. When the muftis arrived in Western Thrace on 20 February, the Greek authorities told them to deal with the appointed muftis Meço and Şinikoğlu. The Turkish clerics replied that they would not deal with muftis who did not enjoy popular support. The Greek Ministry of Public Order warned the clerics that they would be arrested unless they left the country, upon which the muftis returned to Turkey.

#### The Sadık Ahmet Incident

The world became aware of the troubled situation in Western Thrace through an incident involving Dr. Sadık Ahmet that occurred at the time of the difficulties over muftis. In the election that swept PASOK out of power in 1989, Sadık Ahmet, İbrahim Şerif, and İsmail Rodoplu were candidates and were under investigation for their campaign manifestos. Rodoplu was elected and thereby gained parliamentary immunity. Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif were not allowed to participate in the election on the grounds that their applications for candidacy were incomplete. As a result of the investigation, three charges were brought against these two. They were accused of creating an atmosphere of terror and anarchy, spreading slanders and false information, and using the adjective "Turkish." Use of this word meant stoking violence among citizens, spreading discord, and thus disturbing the peace. The defendants were unable to find Greek lawyers willing to defend them in their trials. Sadık Ahmet was being tried for spreading falsehoods by claiming that the Greek authorities were denying the Turkish minority the right to buy real estate and also for falsifying documents by getting husbands to sign for their wives when collecting signatures for petitions. The trial took place on 25 and 26 January 1990. The defendants were absolved of spreading slanders and false information. They were found guilty of disturbing the peace, however, and each was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and banned from the exercise of his political rights for three years. According to the report of Helsinki Watch, the trial that had been observed by the foreign media and NGOs had not been conducted fairly by an independent court.

At the end of the trial, the accused were sent to the prison in Thessaloniki. As they left the courthouse on 26 January, a crowd of about five thousand people of the minority Turkish community that had waited outside was attacked by mobs. Before the tension died down, the minority decided to hold a prayer gathering to mark the second anniversary of the march that took place to protest Davos on 29 January 1988. As the formalities were being carried out with the police to secure permission for the gathering, the local radio announced that a certain Solidakis had been killed in a hospital by a Muslim fellow patient and demanded that permission for the prayer gathering be denied. Although this news was later found to be false and Solidakis had died on 21 January, angry mobs of Greeks started gathering on the streets. One of these groups attacked a Turkish coffeeshop. The fleeing customers took refuge in the building of the Turkish Youth Association of Komotini (the adjective "Turkish" referring to the Turkish identity of the minority). When the attackers failed to break into the building, they began to ransack the shops of the Turkish minority without the police intervening. Not a single Greek-owned shop was damaged. This was a minor-scale Greek version of the attacks and ransacking of Greek shops etc. in Istanbul on 6-7 September 1955.

The events of Western Thrace quickly affected Turkish-Greek relations. On 1 February Turkey's consul general in Komotini, Kemal Gür, sent a letter to the governor of Rodopi Province, informing him that he intended to visit the ransacked shops and asking for the necessary arrangements to be made to ensure his personal safety. Because the consul had referred to the victims as "kinsmen" in his letter, the Turkish ambassador in Athens was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requested to have the consul recalled. When Turkey turned down this request, Greece, for the first time, declared a Turkish diplomat persona non grata in a note on 3 February 1990. Turkey then took the same action against Greece's consul general in Istanbul.

Two other trials against Sadık Ahmet were due to take place from 8 to 15 February 1990. These trials did not

take place as scheduled as a result of international protests. When Sadık Ahmet was elected to parliament on 8 April 1990, he acquired parliamentary immunity, and the trials never took place.

## Changes in the Electoral Law

It is not an accident that the Sadık Ahmet incident occurred at the time of the 1989 election. The political parties had made it a practice to include Turkish names among their candidates in order to get the support of the minority. As a consequence, there had always been one or two deputies of Turkish extraction in the parliament. The concept of independent deputies was introduced in the 1985 elections to defend the identity of the minority without pressure from Greek political parties and enjoyed support, although it was not successful. The Turkish border was closed in the election held in 1989, ostensibly because of a strike, in order to prevent Greek citizens of Turkish extraction from returning to Western Thrace to vote. The broadcasts of channel 2 of Turkish TV were jamined, and traffic fines as well as taxation-related fines were raised as part of the campaign to intimidate the minority. Despite this obstructive action, Sadık Ahmet succeeded in getting elected as an independent deputy.

When it proved impossible for any single party to form a government on 18 June, an early election was held on 5 November. In this election more measures were taken to prevent any candidate of Turkish origin from being elected. Military units were deployed to Rodopi Province in order to change the balance of voters. Measures were taken for Greek civil servants from the province serving elsewhere to return to their province to vote. As mentioned earlier, these measures were supplemented by the cancellation of the candidacies of Sadık Ahmet and Ibrahim Şerif on the grounds that their applications were uncompleted. Despite these tactics, İsmail Rodoplu succeeded in getting elected as an independent deputy. This election also failed to produce a result that would allow a party to form a government, and the ensuing coalition government decided to hold an early election for a third time in one year.

The election held on 8 April 1990 was conducted under the supervision of neutral international observers and the foreign press, most notably the Turkish press. In these circumstances, the election proceeded in a normal and legal manner, the only irregularity being the casting of votes by military personnel. After the counting of votes, Sadık Ahmet was elected from Rodopi Province and Ahmet Faikoğlu was elected from Xanthi. The election of two candidates from the minority as independent depu-

ties represented a first in Greek history and made Athens uncomfortable, leading it to take measures to prevent a repetition of this.

When the New Democracy Party succeeded in setting up a government, it introduced a bill on 24 October 1990 that would change the electoral law. Although the bill was opposed by PASOK and the two independent members of parliament, it was adopted by the 151 votes of the New Democracy Party. The new Electoral Law No. 163 provided that an independent candidate could not be elected without obtaining more than 3% of the total votes cast in the country. In practice, this meant that independent candidates would no longer be elected to parliament. The 3% of votes required represented about 200,000 votes, which was more than the total minority population. This figure even exceeded the total number of registered voters in the region where the minority lived.

The new law was a serious blow to the political life of Western Thrace. Still, Sadık Ahmet went ahead and set up a new party. Even if it had no chance of being represented in the national parliament, the new party would have the primary objective of sending a member to the European Parliament. It was obvious that the region's problems could not be solved by merely pursuing a policy of obstruction. When Mitsotakis visited the region in May 1991, he felt it necessary to admit that Western Thrace had been neglected and promised to rectify this situation.

At a time when Greece's treatment of its minorities was being criticized by various international organizations, Turkey failed to stand behind the Western Thracians. Western Thrace was not on the agenda of the talks held by Mitsotakis and Yılmaz in September 1991. Both countries had their attention riveted on Cyprus as the talks got underway in New York. When Sadık Ahmet died in a traffic accident on 24 July 1995, the struggle for political rights in the region suffered a serious setback. But the question of Western Thrace was now firmly on the international agenda, and Greece was under the scrutiny of political and legal organizations dealing with human rights. This international attention would lead to significant changes in the way Greece dealt with its minorities, particularly after 1995.

## 2. The Views and Policies of Patriarch Bartholomeos regarding the Patriarchate and the Orthodox Seminary

In the post-Cold War New World Order, minority rights came to the fore. This stirred the minority in Western Thrace into action. The same developments would probably have occurred in Turkey too if the balance between minorities established under the Treaty of Lausanne had not been upset, with the numbers of the Greek Orthodox in İstanbul having dwindled to next to nothing. But the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the symbol of the Greek Orthodox community of İstanbul, took advantage of the new international environment and spoke up after many years of silence (see Box 2-10 in Section 2).

At a time when the question of muftis in Western Thrace was in the limelight, the death of Patriarch Dimitrios in Istanbul brought up the question of electing a new patriarch. At first there was talk of electing Archbishop Yakovos of the American Orthodox community, but this idea was abandoned when the press reported that Yakovos was banned from entering Turkey because of his previous anti-Turkish activities. Bishop Dimitris Arhondonis of Chalcedon was elected patriarch on 2 November 1991 and assumed the name Bartholomeos.

After his election, the new patriarch, a native of Imbros, was faced with a great deal of rivalry from the religious hierarchy. Since the collapse of the USSR and its succession by the Russian Federation, the patriarch of Moscow was becoming even more powerful on the basis of a religious revival and was beginning to challenge the historical position of the patriarch of Istanbul, who was first among equals (primus inter pares).

The patriarch of Moscow claimed that the Patriarchate of Istanbul had lost its flock, was under the control of the Turkish state, and was merely symbolic, whereas its Russian counterpart had the largest following and should be recognized as having a higher position in the religious hierarchy. In making this claim, the Russian patriarch was not acting on the basis of strictly religious concerns. The large Orthodox communities in the former Soviet republics that had broken free and the churches in these new states were considering coming under İstanbul rather than Moscow, out of fear that the latter would exert pressure on them. The rivalry between the two patriarchates was political as much as it was religious. Both Moscow and Ankara, which wanted to be active in the region, were following developments with great interest. Ankara was faced with a dilemma. It wanted to see the Patriarchate of Phanar as a vehicle for engaging in closer cooperation with the Orthodox countries of the region. At the same time, it did not want to see the patriarchate acquiring an ecumenical status once again.

Patriarch Bartholomeos preferred to follow an active policy. In 1992 he held a meeting at Phanar with the representatives of the churches under his wing. During the same year he paid visits to the Bishoprics of Athos and Crete, the Patriarchates of Antioch and Moscow, the autonomous Churches of Greece, Romania, and Bul-

garia, the Swedish Lutheran and Orthodox Churches, the German Evangelic Church, and the Romanian Catholic Church. In addition to these ecclesiastic contacts, he attended a dinner in his honor hosted by Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission in Brussels. He was also entertained by the British royal family. These visits continued in subsequent years. They would not have attracted as much attention as they did if the patriarch had not begun to use the word "ecumenical" with his title.

In February 1994 a meeting was held in Istanbul on the theme of International Peace and Tolerance. When signing the English text of this meeting's final communiqué, the patriarch added the adjective "ecumenical" to his title. This attracted public attention in Turkey and triggered a debate. Other countries recognized the patriarch as ecumenical, so the question concerned only Turkey and the Turkish state's relations with the patriarchate. The question has remained unresolved to this day.

Another question concerns the Theological Seminary at Heybeliada (on the island of Halki), to which Patriarch Bartholomeos attributed great importance (see Box 7-37). This issue is directly related to the future of the patriarchate. The future clerics who go to Greece from Turkey for their training tend not to return; as the hierarchy in Istanbul grows older, it will prove very difficult to find clerics to pursue the functions of the church. It is estimated that by the middle of the twenty-first century the patriarchate will de facto disappear, due to lack of clerical personnel. Based on this argument, Patriarch Bartholomeos has been pressing for the reopening of the seminary at Heybeliada under a special status in the course of his local and foreign contacts.

Although the activities of Patriarch Bartholomeos found some support in public opinion in Turkey, the Turkish state's stance vis-à-vis the patriarchate did not change over the years. The rise of Islamic fervor and the adoption of the rhetoric of religious tolerance in Islamic quarters did not allow the state, forever obsessed by the Treaty of Lausanne and also in constant fear of the Islamism threat, to review its approach. If Turkey could bring itself to adopt a more flexible policy toward the patriarchate, it could improve its image in the West, establish much warmer relations with the former socialist states, and strengthen its negotiating position when dealing with Greece on the issue of the minority in Western Thrace.

### C. Developments in Cyprus

When the Denktaş-Vassiliou summit in February 1990 ended in failure, there was much disappointment among those in the two Cypriot communities and beyond who entertained hopes for a breakthrough.

#### Box 7-37. The Question of the Theological Seminary of Heybeliada

The Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary, founded in 1844, trained clerical personnel for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Phanar. In 1951 the seminary absorbed the School of Higher Theology, providing four-year courses, by a decision of the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education closed down the seminary by a decision dated 12 August 1971 and numbered 101787. According to Phanar sources, the decision was verbally communicated to two bishops in Ankara. The legal justification for this action was the decision of the Constitutional Court that determined that article 1 of Law No. 625 regulating private schools was unconstitutional. This finding resulted in private schools of higher learning being turned into public institutions and taken over by public universities. The seminary, however, had not been officially considered a school of higher learning until then. This was indicated in the seminary diplomas, which bore this inscription. "According to the regulation approved by the Ministry of Education on 25 September 1957, with the reference number 151, the graduates of the Theology Section are considered to have an education at the level of schools providing vocational education one year beyond high school." This being the case, graduates of the seminary did not have the right to carry out their military service as reserve officers like university graduates but served as privates. In addition, they had to submit to an examination to gain admission to a university

The section of the seminary that operated at the secondary level continued to function for a while as the Greek Private Heybellada High School for Boys. When there was a drastic drop in the number of boys attending the school, the patriarchate petitioned the government to have the school closed. This petition was turned down. The school limped on until 1984, when it ceased operations. It was never formally closed.

Eventually, it became very difficult to obtain clerics to serve in Phanar. The Turkish citizens of Greek origin numbered less than two thousand, and the few among them who wanted a religious career began to attend theological seminaries abroad.

Under these dircumstances, it is likely that Phanar will practically cease to function by the middle of the twenty-first century.

This prospect is seen in very different ways by the Turkish pub lic. One group that perceives Phanar as a mainspring of mischief within Turkey claims that the patriarchate aspires to become another "Vatican," For this group, it is in Turkey's interest to have the institution ended for want of personnel. Another group sees things differently. For this group the end of Phanar, in the present circumstances, would only serve the interest of the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Russian Federation, Phanar is a Turkish institution, and the Turkish minority of the Dodecanese Islands, which fall under Phanar's jurisdiction, fares better than the minority in Western Thrace under the jurisdiction of the Bishopric of Athos. This group also claims that keeping Phanar going even though its flock has been greatly reduced would help burnish Turkey's tarnished image in the field of human rights. As a matter of fact, Western dignitaries, including U.S. presidents, have repeatedly pressed Tura key to allow the Heybeliada Seminary to operate once again

Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne recognized the equal rights of minorities to establish, operate, and supervise all types of schools. Since Turkey allowed private institutions of higher learning to operate once again during the 1980s as "foundation universities," could not the Halki Seminary operate under this system? There is a legal impediment in article 24 of the 1982 Constitution and in article 3 of the law on the Higher Learning Council that prevents private universities from operating military or theological institutions of higher learning. As an interim solution to this problem, the governing body of the Higher Learning Council in 1999 proposed the establishment of a Department of World Religions within the Faculty of Theology of the University of Istanbul to serve the needs of minority communities in the area of training their ecclesiastical personnel. But neither Phanar nor the Armenian and Jewish communities, which were experiencing similar difficulties, were ready to have their priests or rabbis trained in an institution attached to a faculty of theology dealing essentially with Muslim teachings.

(B. ORAN)

The summit broke up when, at the last minute, Vassiliou refused to recognize the right of the Turkish-Cypriot people to self-determination. The Security Council then met and, basing itself on the secretary-general's report, adopted resolution 649 on 12 March 1990. The resolution called on the leaders of the two communities to cooperate with the secretary-general to form a federation within the framework of the 1977 and 1979 summit agreements that would be bicommunal in regard to the Constitution and bizonal in regard to the territory. Resolution 649 sought a solution stressing the equality of the Turkish community. For this reason, the resolution met with a positive reception in the TRNC and Turkey but failed to silence the opposition within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

The political and economic troubles besetting the TRNC had greatly strengthened the opposition. When the summit of February 1990 broke down, Denktaş came under increased fire from those who accused him of op-

posing a settlement. Conscious of the difficulty of continuing the intercommunal talks under these conditions, he went to elections to renew his mandate. The way the election was held also came in for criticism. Shortly before the election, the settlers from Turkey were issued TRNC identity documents. TV broadcasts from Turkey were conveying the message that the Cyprus cause would be lost if Denktaş were to withdraw. Such practices raised doubts about the fairness of the election. Nevertheless, Denktas was given a new mandate with his election victory. The presidential election was followed by parliamentary elections. The National Unity Party (UBP) in power had done nothing to change the electoral law, although party members acknowledged the law's shortcomings. The opposition, which participated in the election as a bloc, decided to boycott the parliament. To fill the seats thus left vacant by the opposition a by-election was held, from which the UBP emerged as the winner. This resulted in an unhealthy situation in which the executive also entirely controlled the legislature.

## A New Factor in the Question of Cyprus: The European Union

After these political events in the TRNC, an important development placed the question of Cyprus within a new context. In the new international restructuring, the EU had come to the conclusion that it had to get involved and contribute to the resolution of some major issues of the day if it was ever to become an effective counterpart to the U.S. in the international scene. This conclusion brought the EU into the Cyprus picture. The question could be resolved by removing Denktaş from the equation and starting direct negotiations with Turkey. Pursuing this course, the EU made Turkey's membership in the EU conditional on a Cyprus solution. The communiqué issued following the Dublin Summit of June 1990 declared that Turkey's relations with the EU depended on the question of Cyprus.

At a time when the search for a solution within the framework of the UN was going on and the EU's pressure on Turkey was mounting, the Greek-Cypriot government submitted its application for full membership in the EU on 3 July 1990, which would add a new dimension to the whole question.

Turkey reacted to this development in two ways. Foreign minister Ali Bozer made known Ankara's opposition by declaring that the Greek-Cypriot move was devoid of any legal foundation and lacked validity. At the same time, an agreement was reached with the TRNC, aimed at the tightening economic and social ties. In the framework of this agreement, a customs union between the two countries would be considered in the light of future developments. The two countries also declared their intention to dispense with passports and allow travelers to enter their countries with only their identity documents. Turkey was seeking to convey its reaction in the form of a warning by creating the impression that, if it became necessary, it might unite with the TRNC. This would actually be a very difficult course to take in view of the international uproar that this would probably cause.

When the Greek-Cypriot government made its application to the EU on behalf of the whole island on 3 July, Denktaş responded by issuing a memorandum in his capacity as president of the TRNC on 12 July. The memorandum was dispatched to Gianni De Michelis, president of the European Council, on 16 July. In his memorandum Denktaş explained the political and legal reasons for his opposition to the application. He pointed out that the Greek-Cypriot administration could not represent the

whole island, that the application violated UN Security Council resolution 649, that the proper course for the European Council was to take no action in connection with the application, that any question that might be submitted to the commission should concern the legality of the application and not its content, and that he was not against membership in the EU but that membership of Cyprus must come after a political solution based on the intercommunal talks (see Box 7-38).

On 11 September UN Secretary-General de Cuéllar noted at a press conference that, when examining the Greek-Cypriot application, the EU must bear in mind that the resolution of the question depended on a comprehensive settlement with the consent of both parties and that resolution 649 called on all parties to refrain from any action that would make a solution more difficult.

Notwithstanding these objections, the European Council of Ministers decided on 17 September 1990 to treat this application in the regular way and sought an opinion from the commission. This came as no surprise to Ankara, but the official reaction was quite subdued. The reason was that the MFA wanted to pursue a more assertive policy, while President Özal saw the question of Cyprus as cramping Turkey's foreign policy and leaving it isolated in the world. Özal did not want to strain relations with the EU because of Cyprus and called for a muted response to Brussels.

The anti-Turkish policies pursued by Greece within the EU led Özal to take new initiatives in Cyprus in 1991. In doing this he was acting with the conviction that the Gulf War had demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance to the Americans. Özal abandoned the traditional Turkish policy, which held that the solution in Cyprus must emerge from intercommunal talks and proposed a conference (without consulting the government) that would bring together the TRNC, the Greek-Cypriot administration, Greece, and Turkey. Although Mitsotakis was not against a four-party conference, he held that the conference should include the five permanent members of the Security Council. The idea of an international conference had international backing. American special representative proposed a conference of five, which would include the representatives of the two communities, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. This proposal was rejected by Turkey because it would confirm the existence of the Republic of Cyprus and allow the Greek Cypriots to be represented twice.

Convinced that it could use its special relationship with Özal, in 1991 the Bush administration sought ways to bypass Denktaş and resolve the question by supporting

## Box 7-38. TRNC Objections to Cyprus's Application for Membership in the EC

In a memorandum issued on 12 July 1990, Rauf Denktas advanced the following reasons for his objections to the Greek-Cypriot gove ernment's application for membership in the EC on behalf of the whole island.

#### Political Reasons

1. The existence of two separate communities on the island was acknowledged even at the time of the British administration and the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 on the basis of the political equality of the two separate communities. Consequently, the Greek-Cypriot administration, which does not represent the Turkish-Cypriot community, cannot act on behalf of both communities and take an important political step like applying for membership in the EC. This is why the application was made on behalf of Cyprus and not the Republic of Cyprus.

2. The membership of Cyprus cannot be considered before there is a political settlement accepted by both sides, based on a federal republic that is bicommunal and bizonal. This principle must be observed, because the rules of the EC cannot be made to

function in a divided island

 If the Greek Cypriots Join the EC under the label of the Republic of Cyprus, this would result in Greece having two votes Within the EC.

#### Legal Reasons

1. Article 185, paragraph 2, of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus reads as follows: "The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other state or the separatist independence is

excluded." The Turkish Community of Cyprus considers that this provision should be interpreted in the proadest sense to mean that Cyprus may not establish links with Greece even within the framework of the EC.

2. Article 50 of the Constitution contains provisions on the right of the president and the vice-president to make use of the veto. The article reads as follows: "(1) The President and the Vice-President of the Republic; separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning (a) foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate." This provision means that the president or vice-president can veto any step that would take the country into any international organization of which both Greece and Turkey are not members.

3. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee declares that "the Republic of Cyprus undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever." Thus the restriction imposed by article 185 of the Constitution is also an

international obligation.

4. Both the 1960 Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee, one of the founding treatles of the Republic of Cyprus, are international treatles and under the guarantee of the parties. Because it, contravenes these treatles, the membership of Cyprus in the EC would also violate international law.

(M. FIRAT)

the idea of a quadripartite conference. There was a search for a way to detach the question and its resolution from its historical background. As pressure mounted to have Morphou ceded to the Greek Cypriots and to allow 27.5% of the island to remain under Turkish-Cypriot administration, the main hurdle remained the subject of political equality.

All the efforts in the direction came to nothing when early elections were called in Turkey. At a time when everyone's attention was focused on the elections that were to take place on 20 October 1991, the Yılmaz government was reluctant to take any step that might be used by the opposition in the election campaign.

The new conditions that emerged in 1992 brought to an end the process of abandoning traditional policies that had been set in motion by Özal as well as the pressures that had been mounting during 1991.

## Negotiations over the Boutros-Ghali Set of Ideas

In 1992 Turkey entered the new year with a new government. The Motherland Party, in power since 1983, was now in opposition. On the subjects of Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus, the new Justice Party-Social Demo-

cratic People's Party coalition government abandoned Özal's pragmatic approach and returned to the traditional foreign policy positions, allowing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play its usual role. The new government's policy was welcomed by Denktaş, who occasionally felt himself to be sidelined and unsupported during the previous government's tenure of power.

In 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali became UN secretary-general. A former minister of foreign affairs in Egypt, Boutros-Ghali was a Copt and was friendly toward the U.S. The Turkish Cypriots felt uneasy about his appointment, for Egypt traditionally had supported Greece and the Greek Cypriots. On 3 April 1992 he submitted an optimistic report to the Security Council, containing a Set of Ideas that would be the framework for an agreement. Denktas now assumed the role formerly played by the Greek Cypriots and appeared reluctant to engage in negotiations. In view of the fate of the Eastern European states with a federal structure that broke apart, sometimes ending in bloody conflict, Denktaş was having second thoughts about a solution based on federation. For him, preserving the status quo appeared to be the wiser course. The UN continued its search for a solution without regard to Denktaş's misgivings.

According to Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas contained in his report of 3 April 1992, the solution in Cyprus should be based on the political equality of the two communities and acceptable to both parties. The Cypriot state would have a single sovereignty and a single international identity even if it would be based on a federal structure consisting of two zones. The two communities would have 50-50 representation in the upper house of the legislature and 70-30 representation in the lower house. The proportion of representation in the executive branch would also be 70% and 30%. All powers not attributed to the federal administration would be exercised by the federated states. Free circulation would come into force simultaneously with the federal Constitution. The right to settle and to acquire property would be regulated by the federated states in accordance with the federal Constitution once the territorial adjustments had been made.

The first round of the intercommunity talks under the aegis of the secretary-general took place from 18 June 1992 to 14 August 1992. Under the agreed format, the secretary-general met with the two leaders individually and would bring the two together when he detected common ground. There were three basic issues: land, settlers, and the Constitution. Denktaş saw these three issues as a whole and held the view that there would be a final agreement only if the two sides could reach consensus on all three issues. International public opinion wanted to see the question of Cyprus resolved, so both Denktaş and Turkey were under pressure to act accordingly. Boutros-Ghali's actions reflected international opinion, and in the course of the negotiations he was leaning heavily on Denktaş.

The first issue taken up was territory. Boutros-Ghali produced a map that granted the Turkish side 28.2% of the island's territory, with Morphou left to the Greek side. Denktas made a counterproposal that left the Turkish side with slightly more than 29% of the territory (known as the 29+ formula), including the town of Morphou. He refused to accept Boutros-Ghali's map as a basis for negotiation. Although the two proposals were fairly close in regard to the division of territory, the main reason for the rejection of the map was that it called for giving up Morphou, a well-irrigated region containing the only aquifer in Cyprus. Furthermore, this map was prepared without regard to economic viability, ownership, or security. The acceptance of the map would result in substantial loss of land currently held by the Turkish side and cause 50,000 to 60,000 Turks to become displaced once more. Moreover, by accepting territorial concessions up front, the Turkish side would be deprived of a valuable negotiating chip when it came to discussing the Constitution of the new state.

When it became clear in the first week of August that the Turkish side could not be persuaded on the territorial issue, the questions of displaced persons and the Constitution were taken up. On the question of displaced persons, Denktaş wanted freedom of settlement to be on a restricted level, while Vassiliou claimed that this issue would be a test of the sincerity of the Turkish side.

The main sticking point in the negotiations over the Constitution was the question of Turkey's guarantees. Although Vassiliou accepted that the Treaty of Guarantee was still valid, he did not agree that it gave Turkey the right to intervene unilaterally. On 12 August the talks were adjourned.

On 21 August 1992 Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council and attached his map to the report. By doing this, he was formalizing a map that Denktas had refused to accept as a basis for negotiation. Upon receiving this report, the Security Council adopted resolution 774 on 26 August. The resolution accepted the map as being part of the Set of Ideas and a basis for reaching a comprehensive framework agreement.

When the talks were resumed in New York on 26 October, Denktaş was in a somber mood because of the fait accompli he had been confronted with at the UN. Nevertheless, by the time the talks ended in November, he had accepted 91 of the 100 paragraphs contained in the Set of Ideas. This did not stop Boutros-Ghali from pointing his finger at the Turkish side for being the main obstacle to a solution in the report he submitted on 19 November 1992. The Security Council resolution 789 of 25 November was based on the secretary-general's report. This resolution angered the Turkish side: while the validity of the Security Council's previous resolutions was reiterated and some resolutions were singled out, no mention was made of resolution 649, acknowledging the political equality of the two sides. Boutros-Ghali's map was formally accepted as a basis for the negotiations. The resolution called on the Turkish side to adopt a position in conformity with the Set of Ideas. It also called for the following confidencebuilding measures.

- 1. Meaningful reduction in the foreign forces stationed in the island would be a step in the direction of removing all non-Cypriot military forces in the Republic of Cyprus as well as a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus.
- 2. The district of Varosha would be brought under the control of UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus).
  - 3. Feasibility studies for resettling the persons who

would be displaced as a result of territorial adjustments, notably in the region of Morphou, would be prepared, with both sides facilitating the accomplishment of this task.

Both sides would allow free passage of Cypriots and foreign nationals through the dividing line.

Vassiliou regarded resolution 789 as a personal success and wanted to capitalize on this success in the election due early in 1993, when he would be seeking a second term. The other candidates, however, starting with Clerides, maintained that the Set of Ideas could not be accepted as a basis for negotiation and contested all of its proposals. The Greek-Cypriot election had been turned into a referendum on Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas. In this environment, Vassiliou also began to express the view (in February 1993 in the second round of the election) that the Set of Ideas was not a basis for negotiation. Eventually, despite the support of AKEL, Vassiliou lost the election and was succeeded by the candidate of the right, Clerides.

On 30–31 March the two leaders met with Boutros-Ghali in New York and held talks together. At this point they agreed to resume their talks on 24 May, preceded by preparatory work in Cyprus. There was no longer any need to conduct the talks on the basis of the Boutros-Ghali Set of Ideas. The joint communiqué stated that the parties should negotiate fully while also using the Set of Ideas to strive to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

When the two sides got together in New York on 24 May, the Turkish side found itself confronted with a fait accompli. Without prior modification to the Turkish side, the five permanent members of the Security Council were present at the first meeting. Denktas's advisor Professor Mümtaz Soysal claimed that this move was an attempt to turn the Cyprus negotiations from a process conducted within the mission of the secretary-general's good offices by two equal communities into an international conference. He also alleged that this move was the price that had to be paid for Özal's attempt to ingratiate himself with the U.S.

In addition to the change being made in the procedure, the secretary-general introduced a "minipackage" of confidence-building measures that the parties were asked to sign or reject immediately. The minipackage contained the following elements.

- 1. The district of Varosha enclosed by barbed wire would come under UN control and be opened for resettlement. Both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots would be able to benefit from this measure.
- 2. The international airport of Nicosia would be opened to international air traffic under the management

and control of the UN. The airport would be opened to foreign airlines that possessed traffic rights to Cyprus, and Turkish-registered airlines would be able to acquire these rights.

3. Those foreign nationals entering Cyprus through Nicosia Airport would enjoy the right to go to either zone of the island unhindered.

Denktas left New York after declaring that he could not sign this agreement without first consulting the TRNC Assembly. Ankara was favorably disposed toward the minipackage. Denktaş paid an official visit to brief Ankara during a political crisis in the TRNC. The friction with the leader of the National Unity Party (UBP), Derviş Eroğlu, had increased. When he emerged victorious at the UBP congress, Hakkı Altun and Serdar Denktaş, both prominent members, left the party and formed the Democratic Party. When the UBP's opposition to Denktaş hardened, the president reappraised his position and declared that he would no longer take part in the intercommunal talks as the representative of his people. The minister of foreign affairs, Kenan Atakol, would go in his place to take up the technical aspects of the reopening of Nicosia Airport. When the secretary-general declared that he would not accept Atakol as representative at the talks scheduled for 14 June, the negotiating process came to an end.

What Denktas was seeking was a review of the Turkish negotiating strategy. At a time when federations in other countries were coming apart one by one, how could federation be the solution for Cyprus? Wouldn't a confederation based on the status quo be a more realistic and sensible solution than a federation? At that time, such a solution was not openly articulated; but after 1997 a solution based on confederation became the official thesis of both the TRNC and Turkey. The first signs of this change in strategy appeared to come from Denktas in 1993.

There were two developments in 1993 that facilitated Denktas's change of course: the EU's decision with respect to full membership for Cyprus and PASOK's electoral victory in Greece, which resulted in Papandreou becoming prime minister once again.

# II. A RETURN TO STRAINED RELATIONS (1993–1995)

Two aspects of the Greek election in October 1993 drew the attention of the Turkish public. One was the new minimum 3% of votes required to be represented in parliament. As a result of this restriction, no minority candidate from Western Thrace was able to get elected. This had never happened before. Second, following the coming to power of Papandreou, there was an expectation in Turkey that the recently initiated Turkish-Greek dialogue would come to an end and a period of strained relations would set in.

Be that is it may, with his electoral success, Papandreou undeniably had been exonerated by the Greek people despite the allegations of corruption, his populist policies, and the criticism heaped on him since the late 1980s for his extravagant lifestyle. During this period Papandreou had been tried and acquitted for his part in the Koskotas banking scandal. Now he emerged strengthened not only vis-à-vis the opposition but also vis-à-vis his adversaries within PASOK, led by Simitis. With the silencing of his critics, he was the strong leader at the helm of his party. With his hand strengthened at home, he was able to resume his tough talk in the field of foreign policy. With a barrage of criticism against his predecessor Mitsotakis, Papandreou deplored the concessions made to Macedonia and Turkey and claimed that Greece had suffered a loss of prestige over the last four years. He would now take action to repair the damage.

## A. Greece's Adoption of the "Common Defense Doctrine" and Worsening Bilateral Relations

When he assumed office, Papandreou's first action was to walk out of the talks being conducted with Macedonia under the aegis of the UN with a view to finding a solution to the problem arising from the Republic of Macedonia's name. Foreign minister Karolos Papoulias then gave a speech in which he outlined Greece's Balkan policy. In this context, Papoulias declared that relations with Serbia would be developed in all fields as he referred to the traditional historical, cultural, and religious ties between the two countries. The tough line was taken further when Greece decided to impose an embargo on Macedonia on 16 February 1994. These developments revealed clearly how divergent Greek and Turkish policies in the Balkan region had become.

Papandreou had been critical of the Mitsotakis government for making too many concessions to Turkey and now took steps to harden the Greek stand against Ankara. When Glafkos Clerides visited Athens in November 1993, the new Common Defense Doctrine was announced. According to this doctrine, (1) Cyprus would be included in Greece's defense area; (2) Greece would consider a Turkish attack on Southern Cyprus to be an attack on itself and a casus belli; (3) Greece and the Greek-Cypriot government would jointly formulate and implement their

defense plans; (4) the two governments would coordinate their decision-making and actions in international forums.

The doctrine led to serious misgivings in Turkey. This was compounded when five PASOK deputies attended the Democracy Party (DEP: a Kurdish party in Turkey) Congress in December 1993. One of these deputies, Costas Badovas, gave a speech in which he declared: "We wish the brave Kurdish people success in their struggle. We sympathize with this rightful struggle and heartily support it." This indicated that Greece was going to exploit Turkey's weak spot, the Kurdish question. Ankara found this most disquieting and summoned the Greek ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was issued a warning.

At this point the patriarchate issue came to the fore once again. In February 1994 the Appeal to the Conscience Foundation issued the Bosphorus Declaration after holding a meeting. The head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, Mehmet Nuri Yilmaz, refused to sign the English text of the declaration because the title of Patriarch Bartholomeos contained the adjective "ecumenical." On 24 February U.S. president Bill Clinton wrote a private letter to Prime Minister Çiller in which he appealed to Turkey to support the work of the patriarchate and help it to obtain recognition of its international status to relieve the tension in Ankara's relations with Greece.

Patriarch Bartolomeos stepped up his activities at a time when the question was attracting increased international attention. On 15 March 1994 a religious congregation was held in Istanbul, with the participation of the patriarchs and archbishops of Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Warsaw, Prague, and Helsinki. Patriarch Bartolòmeos presided over the meeting. At the time, many countries were confirming the ecumenical status of the patriarch. As expected, the meeting had the effect of irking Turkey. Meanwhile there were calls on Turkey to allow the Heybeliada (Halki) Seminary to reopen and to clarify and reorder the status and working conditions of the patriarchate. These calls were coming from the U.S. and the European countries. On 19 April Bartolomeos was invited to address the Union of European Parliaments. This was the treatment usually accorded to heads of state, and the patriarch's acceptance of the invitation triggered a new debate in Turkey. Some argued that, under the new international conditions, a reinvigorated patriarchate would enhance Turkey's prestige and increase its influence among its northern neighbors. Others maintained that the Treaty of Lausanne had confirmed the national jurisdiction of the patriarchate and that its current activities aimed at negating this denoted the existence of hidden plans.

Another source of tension with Greece was the coming into effect of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on 16 November 1994. Greece claimed that the convention, which it had signed and ratified, granted Greece the right to extend its territorial waters to twelve miles, while Turkey kept repeating that it would regard such a move as a *casus belli*.

At a time when Turkish-Greek relations were particularly strained and tension was at its height in June 1994, Foreign Minister Papoulias visited Ankara, helping relieve the tension somewhat. In talks held with his Turkish counterpart Hikmet Çetin, they set aside divisive issues like the extension of territorial waters to twelve miles and decided to seek ways to restart a dialogue. The two sides agreed to refrain from statements and actions that might lead to tension and to maintain contacts at different levels. Both countries would take confidence-building measures, and they would conclude agreements in fields such as tourism, culture, double taxation, and promotion of investments. In response to Turkey's complaints, Papoulias gave assurances that his government was ready to engage in closer exchange of information on PKK activities.

The resumption of dialogue between the two countries following the visit of Papoulias came as a relief to the EU as it entered the final stage of the negotiations for the establishment of the Turkey-EU Customs Union and on the eve of the commencement of accession negotiations with Cyprus.

## The Effects of Turkish-EU Relations on Turkish-Greek Relations and on the Question of Cyprus

In 1990 the Greek-Cypriot government applied for membership in the EU on behalf of the whole island. On 30 June 1993 the European Commission gave its affirmative opinion on the application.

The commission's opinion forced Turkey to consider its course if the Greek-Cypriot zone got the green light for accession to the EU. The leader of the DSP (Democratic Left Party), Bülent Ecevit, came up with an interesting proposal that also had the backing of Denktas. Ecevit declared that the question of Cyprus should not be discussed with those who refused to recognize the TRNC. He proposed the signing of an Autonomy Treaty with the TRNC whereby that state would be attached to Turkey in foreign relations and defense and fully autonomous in its

internal affairs. When the decision was made at the Corfu Summit of 1994 to include Cyprus in Europe's expansion program, the TRNC began to lay the infrastructure to carry out Ecevit's proposals. On 29 August 1994 the Assembly of the TRNC adopted resolution 47, which contained the following provisions.

- 1. The Turkish-Cypriot people had a separate right to sovereignty. As long as this right was not recognized and the Turkish Cypriots were not accepted as one of the two peoples with equal political and legal status, meaningful negotiations could not be pursued to establish confidence-building measures.
- 2. The military and defense measures taken by the Greek-Cypriot zone and Greece made it imperative for the TRNC and Turkey to adopt equivalent measures in the fields of foreign relations, defense, and security.
- 3. It was essential to lift all economic restrictions between the TRNC and Turkey in order to commence the economic integration of the two countries.
- 4. With this resolution, the previous resolution of the TRNC Assembly declaring federation to be the only possible solution for Cyprus was repealed.

This resolution could be read as a measure taken by Denktaş to preempt any decision that Turkey might later make within the EU. For the first time, Greece was showing signs of not vetoing the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. Denktaş was disquieted by the possibility that Greece might have been given a concession to obtain its consent to the Customs Union.

At the meeting of the Turkish-EU Council of Association held on 6 March 1995, the Customs Union was formally approved. Upon receiving assurances about the accession of Cyprus to the EU, Greece refrained from resorting to the veto. In signing the Customs Union Treaty, Turkey refrained from objecting to the establishment of a calendar governing the accession negotiations that the Greek-Cypriot government would undertake with the EU on behalf of the whole island. Furthermore, under the terms of article 16 of the Customs Union decision, Turkey was committed to conclude a trade agreement with the Greek-Cypriot government before 2001. This meant that Turkey had accepted the Greek-Cypriot government as an interlocutor.

The Customs Union became a subject of heated debate in Turkey. Those opposed to the treaty used the argument that Cyprus had been "sold out" in order to secure the Customs Union. This argument was used to obtain popular backing. On 13 December 1995 the European Parliament approved the treaty on the Customs Union

that would come into effect on 1 January 1996. Coalition partners Çiller and Baykal wanted to use the EU success in the election due on 24 December 1995, so the treaty was quickly ratified by the TGNA. On the day of the ratification Baykal declared in Brussels that five years (until 2001, when Turkey had to sign a trade agreement with Cyprus) was a long time and that he was optimistic that the question of Cyprus would be settled by 2001.

Sensing the uneasiness in Turkey and the disquiet in Cyprus, President Demirel took action: on 28 December 1995 a Joint Declaration was issued by the TRNC and Turkey. The declaration said that the objective in Cyprus continued to be a solution based on two communities and two zones, that the Turkish guarantee would be maintained after reaching a solution, that Turkey would continue to defend the security of the TRNC pending a final solution, that the necessary measures would be adopted to block the military escalation provoked by the Greek/ Greek-Cypriot side, that Federal Cyprus would be able to accede to the EU along with Turkey after a final political solution, that economic ties between the TRNC and Turkey would be tightened, that Turkey would help ensure that the voice of the TRNC was heard in international organizations, and that for this purpose the cooperation between the foreign ministers of the TRNC and Turkey would be enhanced by establishing a permanent political consultation mechanism.

This declaration demonstrated that there were differences in Turkey on the issues of the Customs Union and Cyprus. The government was according priority to the Customs Union with the EU and was prepared to make concessions on the issue of Cyprus in Brussels. The military and civilian bureaucracy, however, was closer to the traditional policy and against the policy of seeking a Customs Union by taking a soft line on Cyprus. The president was acting on their behalf when he reassured Nicosia.

Even if the impression was given in early 1995 that relations with Greece were thawing thanks to the EU and the Customs Union, the outstanding problems remained unresolved. As a matter of fact, tension reappeared when Greece announced in the summer of 1995 that an air base would be established in Paphos within the framework of the Common Defense Doctrine and that long-range A-7 aircraft would be based there. Soon afterward Patriarch Bartholomeos attended the meeting dealing with Revelation and the Environment held in Patras on 22 to 24 September 1995. The claim of being ecumenical came up at the meeting, bringing the question of the patriarchate once again to the fore. As a consequence of Ankara's anger, the president of the Religious Affairs Directorate,

Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, canceled his trip to Patras even though he had previously announced that he would attend the meeting. The press release issued at the meeting also irked Alexios, the patriarch of Moscow. He accused Patriarch Bartholomeos of trying to detach the churches of the countries that broke away from the USSR from the Russian church.

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The year 1995 ended with elections held in Turkey. In early 1996 Papandreou retired from politics for health reasons. These events marked the end of an era in the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece. During his last twoyear term as prime minister, Papandreou created tension with Turkey on all the unresolved issues separating the two neighbors. He pursued tough policies toward both Macedonia and Albania. Greece began to be perceived as troublemaker by the EU as well as by the U.S. As a result of the pressure exerted by the EU, Athens refrained from using its veto against Turkey on the issue of the Customs Union and was rewarded by assurances about the membership of Cyprus in the EU. Greece had earned the image of being intransigent in its relations with Turkey and in its foreign relations as a result of Papandreou's hard line. This brought political damage to Greece and necessitated heavy military expenditures, with attendant effects on the Greek economy. The new Simitis government was fully conscious of the damage done to Greece and determined to follow a new course. But it would not prove easy for Greece to distance itself rapidly from the previous policies of recurrent crises.

## III. FROM CRISIS TO FRIENDSHIP (1996-2000)

Greece came to a turning point in 1996 as a result of the changes that took place within PASOK. When Papandreou's health forced him to resign, the internal opposition within the party led by Simitis went into action. Papandreou praised Simitis as a technocrat with an orderly mind but did not want him as his successor in the post of prime minister, because he saw him as a politician without courage. The opposition, however, known as the "modernizers," would not be cowed. By 20 January 1996 Simitis would fill the seat vacated by Papandreou.

To understand the change that took place in Greek foreign policy after 1996, we must bear in mind Simitis's vision of Greece's place in the new world order. Simitis was the minister responsible for economic affairs in Papandreou's government and in that capacity handled relations with the EU. Simitis was critical of Papandreou's populist policies that were obsessed with Turkey. He knew that these policies were at the root of heavy defense spending

and the economic burden that this kind of spending imposed. He was also aware of the negative impact that the image of bellicose nationalism that Greece had earned was having on his country's relations with the EU. Although the ideology of his party was not pro-Western, Simitis believed in a Western-oriented foreign policy for Greece in line with the policies of Venizelos and Karamanlis. His objective was to turn Greece into a country that enjoyed a high political, economic, and cultural standing within the EU. A strong Greece would be a stepping stone for the EU in the Balkans and the Mediterranean and serve as a model for the countries aspiring to be members of an expanding EU. This objective would call for a Balkan policy based on good neighborliness. In line with this, the problems inherited from the Papandreou era were quickly resolved. Greece developed its relations with Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Yugoslav Federation, concentrating especially on economic ties.

Turkey was the only country with which the Simitis government was not able to make substantial changes in its relations. Papandreou had always kept alive the perennial Greek perception of the "Turkish threat" as the central issue of his foreign policy. A sudden change in the approach to this issue might have provoked a strong public reaction. Simitis was not the kind of politician that the Greek nation was used to, and he realized that a wrong move on his part on this sensitive issue could well bring his political career to a sudden end.

That is why Simitis made no attempt to change the course of Greece's Turkish policy in the short term and retained the program of arms modernization and the Common Defense Doctrine. Furthermore, he improved Greece's relations with the Balkan and Middle Eastern countries, whose relations with Turkey were also strained. The long-term policy developed by Simitis to deal with this question that was harming Greece's relations with the West and the Balkans consisted of drawing all outstanding questions, including Cyprus, into the EU, to let Turkey deal directly with the EU. This would allow Greece to terminate the arms race with a country that was militarily much stronger. It would also allow Greece to deal with Turkey on a political platform, where it had the political upper hand.

The first steps in this new policy would be to ease tensions with Turkey, start a process of dialogue, and end the belligerent image of Greece. But the Kardak (Imia) crisis that erupted soon after the government assumed power and the string of crises that followed did not allow these steps to be taken. To implement his long-term policy toward Turkey, Simitis had to await the Öcalan crisis, when

tension was at its height. This interval also allowed him to get rid of the nationalist cum populist politicians inherited from Papandreou. The great Marmara earthquake in Turkey facilitated the taking of the first step.

#### A. The Crises

Soon after he took office on 20 January 1996, Simitis was confronted with the Kardak crisis, followed by the question of Gaudos, the tensions in Cyprus, Turkey's problems with the EU, and finally the Öcalan crisis. These crises continued until 1999. During this period both Greece and Turkey sought to isolate one another in the Balkans and the Middle East, which meant that their regional policies were also having negative effects on their bilateral relations. This was one of the worst periods in Greek-Turkish relations.

At a time when Simitis was relatively inexperienced, he overcame the crises without armed conflict and managed to position himself so that he could implement his long-term policies toward Turkey. In this way he scored points not only in his foreign policies but also in the area of domestic politics. He silenced the opposition within PASOK and asserted his leadership within the party. Simitis also abandoned the traditional rhetoric of the past and adopted a foreign policy that was up to European standards. He finally managed to get the Greek people to rally to his new-look policies. Before appraising the results of his policy toward Turkey, we shall examine the developments that led up to this situation.

## 1. The Crises of the Rocks and Islets in the Aegean The Kardak (Imia) Crisis

On 25 December 1995 the Figen Akad, a Turkish freighter, ran aground off the rocks of Kardak (the Greek name is Imia), also referred to as İkizce. The crisis that erupted rapidly brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of armed conflict and gave rise to the issue of sovereignty over islets and rock formations in the Aegean. This meant another contentious issue in the Aegean separating the two quarrelsome neighbors.

When the Turkish freighter sought help, it was Greece that responded, with Greek patrol vessels undertaking a salvage operation. On 29 December Ankara sent a diplomatic note to Greece and protested the intrusion of Greek patrol vessels into its territorial waters and the mounting of a salvage operation there. Athens claimed that the rocks were Greek and that it therefore had the right to carry out a salvage operation at that spot. When Ankara contested this argument, the issue became one

of sovereignty. Tension began to rise. The argument conducted between the two ministries soon spilled over to the press and turned more dangerous.

Theodoros Pangalos, the minister of foreign affairs of the Simitis government, which had not yet obtained a vote of confidence, made a tough statement and alleged that Turkey was making territorial claims on Greece for the first time. Although Simitis wanted to defuse the tension with Turkey and allow things to cool off, he was compelled to follow the traditional policy after the Pangalos statement in order not to draw criticism. In the early stages of the crisis, a group of Greeks, encouraged by the mayor of Kalymnos, planted a Greek flag on one of the Kardak rocks. When a correspondent of the newspaper Hürriyet replaced this flag with the Turkish flag, the Greek navy and air force were placed on full alert. Greek naval commandos landed there on 29 January and replanted the Greek flag.

It was of some interest that the second rock had been left without a flag. Ankara ordered the navy into the Aegean Sea and placed the Kardak rocks under a blockade on 30 January. The situation was extremely tense. Turkey had just been to the polls, and difficulties were being experienced in forming a government. This was an opportunity for Tansu Çiller to deflect the public's attention from domestic policy to a foreign issue. She roused the public by manipulating the press, which was already involved, with her cry: "That flag shall go, and so shall that military presence" (Cumhuriyet, 30 January 1996). Greece was warned to remove its troops. In an operation conducted under the cover of Turkish warships at midnight on 31 December, special forces landed on the second rock and planted a Turkish flag. Turkish and Greek soldiers were now emplaced on the two rocks, just 325 meters apart. This bizarre situation was the most serious confrontation in the Aegean since 1987.

Not wanting a new source of tension in the region, Clinton intervened and, after consultations with both governments, secured the removal of the flags, the soldiers, and the ships from the two rocks. Simitis agreed with the American proposal that talks be held with Ankara but called for these talks to be put off until June, when the PASOK party congress was due to be held.

Although the Kardak crisis was overcome without an armed clash, this did not mean that the question had been settled. Both countries continued to issue statements reiterating their respective official legal positions with regard to islets and uninhabited rocks in the Aegean Sea and reasserting their claims to sovereignty.

It was obvious that the issue was not merely sover-

eignty over the tiny rocks of Kardak, which were unsuitable for human settlement. The two sides had come to the brink of war because sovereignty over the many islets and rock formations in the Aegean would determine the breadth of the territorial sea as well as the continental shelf (Box 7-39).

After the Kardak crisis, the Turkish armed forces undertook the task of preparing an inventory of all the islets/rocks not specifically mentioned in treaties. This would constitute the political and legal foundation of the Turkish thesis, based on the "gray areas" (areas in the Aegean that were not specifically designated as belonging to one of the countries). Because these islets/rocks did not belong to either side, they could not be claimed by Greece, according to this view.

Once the Kardak flare-up had been overcome through the American intervention, Simitis took a bold diplomatic initiative and undertook the first step toward drawing contentious issues between Turkey and Greece into the framework of the EU. For this he visited all of the EU countries to convey the Greek position. In a statement issued after the Kardak crisis, the European Commission expressed its solidarity with Greece, noted that Greece's borders were also the EU's borders, and added that the EU was aiming for a close relationship with Turkey through the Customs Union. This relationship had to be based on democratic principles, respect for international law, and the principle of nonresort to force under any circumstances.

Ankara was upset over the commission's position. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefed EU members on the subject and declared that Turkey did not accept the Greek contention that the sole issue in the Aegean was the continental shelf. For Turkey, there was a string of unresolved issues ranging from the territorial sea to the airspace. The ministry also declared for the first time that Turkey stood ready to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. Turkey was not against referring the matter to the ICJ as a matter of principle but wanted the issues to be taken up first in bilateral talks, resorting to the court if no agreement was reached. In any case, the formulation of the submission to the court (the Compromis) would require preliminary talks.

Under pressure from Washington and Brussels, prime minister Mesut Yılmaz announced Turkey's position on the question at a press conference on 24 March 1996. According to Yılmaz, Turkey would pursue the following objectives.

1. All the outstanding questions between the two countries and particularly the questions and differences

### Box 7-39. The Turkish and Greek Theses regarding the Kardak Rocks

In claiming sovereignty over the Kardak Rocks, Greece and Turkey relied on the same legal documents but interpreted these documents in different ways.

The Lausanne Peace Treaty

The last sentence of article 12 reads as follows: "Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the Islands situated less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty." According to Greece, all pieces of land situated more than three miles from the Asiatic coast were beyond Turkish sovereignty. Since the Kardak rocks were located 3.6 and 3.9 miles off the Asian coast, respectively, they could not be under Turkish sovereignty. According to Turkey, this provision was laid down because the breadth of the territorial waters was 3 miles at the time. This was not a provision governing the sovereignty over pieces of land beyond territorial waters. If this had been the intention, it would have been stated explicitly that Turkey had relinquished sovereignty over the islands, islets, and rock formations lying beyond 3 miles instead of naming the islands one by one

Article 15 of, the treaty named the Islands ceded to Italy one by one, with the phrase "and the Islets dependent thereon" added at the end; According to Greece, the rocks of Kardak were 2.3 miles away from the Turkish Island of Cavus, whereas they were located only 1.9 and 1.08 miles from the Island of Calimnos, which is among the Dodecariese Islands named in article 15. Consequently, they were ceded to Italy along with Calimnos, Turkey contended that the Kardak rocks were located at a greater distance than all the other Islands named in article 15 compared to the distance from the Asian coast and therefore could not be regarded as dependent. Furthermore, the rocks at Kardak could not be described as Islets and treated as such. Thus they did not come under Italian sovereignty under article 15.

Article 16, provided that Turkey renounced all rights and title over the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the treaty and the islands other than those over which its sovereignty was recognized by the treaty. Greece contended that Turkey renounced all rights and title over the Kardak rocks because they were not given to Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey contended that article 16 made reference to islands and not islets and rocky outcrops. Consequently, there was no question of renouncing sovereignty over islets and rocky outcrops. Furthermore, no other arrangement binding Turkey had been reached since the Treaty of Lausanne. Finally, the Tittoni-Venizelos and Bonin-Venizelos agreements concluded prior to Lausanne, funder which

some of the Dodecanese Islands were transferred to Greece, never came into force.

The Ankara Convention between Turkey and Italy Dated 4 January 1932 and the Exchange of Letters and the Document Dated 28 December 1932

The convention of 4 January 1932 determined that Karaada, the island located in the Bay of Bodrum, belonged to Turkey. The convention also delineated the territorial waters between the Anatolian coast and the island of Kastellorizo (Megisti).

The Italian and Turkish delegations met on 28 December 1932 and drafted a text that established the areas of competence in the region in which the Kardak rocks were located. In this text, Kardak was left in the Italian zone. Turkey and Greece did not agree, however, on the legal validity of this text. Greece described this text as the annex to the convention of 4 January 1932. Turkey considered the text to be merely a record of the meeting, which—hever having been formally ratified or approved—had no legally binding effect. The treaty of 28 December 1932 was ratified neither by Turkey nor by Italy and never came into effect: in fact, Greece applied to Turkey on two separate occasions after 1947 and asked Ankara to ratify the treaty.

The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty

Article 14 of the treaty named the thirteen Islands under Italian sovereignty and stated that these Islands and the adjacent islets would be transferred to Greece, Greece regarded this article as a repetition of the Treaty of Lausanne and considered the terms "dependent" and "adjacent" to mean the same thing, Repeating the arguments employed in the case of Treaty of Lausanne, Greece claimed that sovereignty over the Kardak rocks had been transferred from Italy to Greece in fact, Greece enacted legislation confirming its sovereignty over Kardak at the time, and Turkey never made objections to this until 1996.

Although Italy transferred the Islands and adjacent islets under its sovereignty to Greece in 1947, Turkey argued that the transfer did not apply to the Kardak rocks because they were not under Italian sovereignty. Turkey also pointed out that the Soviet representative had expressed doubts about the legal status of the document of 28 December 1932 at the Paris Peace Conference and Insisted that Kardak continued to remain under Turkish sovereignty.

(M. FIRAT)

over the Aegean Sea should be settled in a comprehensive and lasting fashion.

- Turkey would be prepared to consider suitable settlement procedures that might come from third parties.
- 3. Agreement had to be sought rapidly on a set of comprehensive confidence-building measures with respect to the military activities of the two countries.
- 4. Ankara was ready to negotiate a political document or a friendship and cooperation treaty that would set the course of the relations between the two neighbors in the right direction.

To reach these objectives, Prime Minister Yılmaz enumerated the following procedures.

- 1. Turkey and Greece would engage in talks without preconditions.
- 2. Should the two reach agreement at the talks, they would resort to one or several of the procedures that would be most appropriate to the characteristics of the dispute: mediation, arbitration, or adjudication at the International Court of Justice.

Yılmaz made these proposals to free Turkey from the image of a country that was avoiding recourse to legal procedures and relying on military power in the conduct of its foreign policy. He also wanted to alleviate the pressure that was being exerted on Turkey to be more conciliatory. The proposals did not have the expected effect on Greece, however. The government spokesperson, Dimitris Reppas, responded by declaring that speeches were not enough and that Turkey would have to take concrete action to prove its goodwill.

Greece appeared to be cornered. Up to the time when Yılmaz made his announcement, Athens had been successful in its policies and had been able to expose Turkey as the bellicose side. It obtained a statement of support from Brussels and a warning that the frontiers of the EU and Greece coincided in the southern region. Now the Turkish prime minister's announcement would block the Greek policy of forcing Turkey and the EU into a confrontation. Minister of defense Gerasimos Arsenis, a rival of Simitis within the party, made a statement in which he proposed that Greece enter into military cooperation with Bulgaria, Russia, Syria, Armenia, Iran, and Iraq, countries that had outstanding problems with Turkey. He added that such cooperation already existed with Syria, which had made its air bases available to Greek aircraft. This statement was designed to score points for Arsenis in his political struggle with his rival, Simitis. It also revealed the second pillar of Greek regional policy, however, which consisted of cooperating with countries and organizations, including the PKK, that had contentious issues with Turkey in order to encircle and isolate Ankara.

Although tough anti-Turkish speeches were made prior to the PASOK party congress in June 1996 in order to pander to Greek public opinion, the dialogue with Turkey did get underway. The two foreign ministers, Emre Gönensay and Pangalos, met on 27 April on the occasion of the ministerial meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation held in Bucharest. They agreed to meet again on the occasion of the NATO meeting to be held in Berlin in June. But this meeting failed to take place. The ostensible reason given by Greece was that the PASOK party congress would coincide with the Berlin talks and the political situation in Turkey was too unstable.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been pursuing policies of relieving tensions and keeping the door to dialogue open ever since the Kardak crisis, but these policies had failed to yield results. In June the Turkish armed forces took a new initiative, which, although less serious than the Kardak crisis, brought about renewed tension, this time in the Mediterranean instead of the Aegean Sea.

## The Island of Gaudos Crisis

At the meeting held on 31 May 1996 in Naples, NATO military planners were preparing for the NATO exercise that would be held in September. When the Greek representative asked for the inclusion of the island of Gaudos (located southwest of Crete) in the exercise, the Turkish representative objected on the grounds that the status of the island was under dispute.

This caused an uproar in Greece. Reppas, the government spokesperson, declared that this time Turkey had gone beyond the limit in its provocations and that Turkey's problems as a troublemaker were not with Greece so much as with international law and international order. Pangalos spoke in his particular style when he resorted to insults and declared that the Turkish officer who made the claim about Gaudos was probably mad and should be instantly dismissed if that was the case.

This subject did not agitate the Turkish public as much as Kardak did. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught unaware; Ömer Akbel, the ministry's spokesperson, declared that the military delegation's statement in Naples had been technical rather than political in nature, that Turkey had made no specific claim, and that the matter would be examined further. He was trying to calm things down but went on to add that the status of some patches of land in the Aegean was not clear and that the question of whether Gaudos was among these would be investigated. This was a way of reminding everyone that Turkey had not abandoned its thesis about islets and rocky outcrops in the eastern Aegean.

Gaudos was closer to Libya than to Turkey and was uninhabited. Why had it become the focus of a crisis? Actually, both countries were suspecting a hidden objective behind the action of the other and trying to block it. After the coming into force of the Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982, Greece was seeking to have a great number of uninhabited islets and rock formations formally confirmed as belonging to Greece in order to lay claim to larger tracts of the continental shelf. Athens was pursuing this aim through two methods. One was to include these formations in NATO exercises and thereby ensure that NATO recognized them as belonging to Greece. The second method was to open these islets to Greek, and therefore EU, habitation. To secure this, Greece even undertook to provide water and electricity free of charge to would-be settlers, but this was never implemented. This was a sure if roundabout way to overcome the provisions in paragraph 3 of article 121 of the 1982 convention. According to this paragraph, "Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."

Turkey was seeking to prevent this game from being played out and was contesting the sovereignty of these islets and rocky outcrops by advancing the thesis of the "gray areas." It should be admitted, however, that raising the issue in connection with a rock/islet to the southwest of Crete was going a bit too far.

The question of Gaudos was settled by the U.S. when it declared that there had been a misunderstanding between the two neighboring NATO countries and confirmed that Gaudos belonged to Greece.

But the dispute over islets and rock formations remained unsettled. The War Academy in Turkey prepared a confidential report entitled "The Geographic, Historical, and Legal Status of Islands, Islets, and Rock Formations in the Aegean Sea and the Policies Pertaining Thereto." This confidential report was leaked to the press in August. The report laid claim to all of the islets and rock formations located within six miles from the Turkish coast. The report caused a commotion in Greece and also led to arguments between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in Ankara. The MFA disagreed with the content of the report as well as the way it was leaked to the press. The report also reflected the difficulties Ankara was having in formulating its policies.

In 1996 Turkish-Greek tensions, which had been focused on the Aegean for a number of years, suddenly shifted to Cyprus.

### 2. Tension in Cyprus

## a. Infringements of the Green Line

The strains between Turkey and Greece also began to affect the situation in Cyprus. When it was announced in August 1996 that a group of Greek-Cypriot motorcyclists would attempt to cross the Green Line, the ultranationalists in Turkey known as the Idealists began to go to the island in large numbers. When these men were received in the presidential palace by Denktas, it became clear that there would be violent incidents. On 11 August 1996 Turkish and Greek fanatics converged on the Green Line at Darinia and began to hurl insults and stones at each other. Both sides made attempts to breach the dividing line. When Thasos Isaak got snarled in the wire after crossing the line, he was beaten up by the Turks. The situation grew very tense after Isaak died in the hospital.

After the funeral of Thasos Isaak on 15 August, the Greek fanatics converged on Darinia once again. One of these fanatics, Spirou Solomon Solomou managed to cross the barbed-wire fence and began to climb the flagpole in order haul down the Turkish flag. Solomou was shot dead on the Turkish side by someone who was allegedly a former Turkish-Cypriot minister. These events took place under the scrutiny of television cameras and helped rivet the world's attention on Cyprus. Although the Turkish-Cypriot side came under severe criticism by the Greek-Cypriot government and Greece, contrary to expectations, the funeral of Solomou took place without any violent acts directed against the Turkish side.

Although the action to breach the Green Line had resulted in two deaths, it did not lead to major clashes. Violators of the Green Line from both sides, however, continued to be the targets of gunfire throughout the autumn of 1996.

#### b. The Loizidou Case

A decision made on 18 December 1996 by the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg helped draw attention to Cyprus once again. The court decided by eleven votes to six that a Greek-Cypriot national, Titina Loizidou, had been prevented by Turkey from gaining access to her property in the Turkish zone of Cyprus.

Wanting to draw attention to the plight of the Greek Cypriots who had been forced to abandon their homes and move to the south, in 1989 Loizidou entered the Turkish zone, where she was arrested by the Turkish-Cypriot police and deported. She lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights that she had been prevented by Turkish-Cypriot police from going to her home located in Kyrenia.

What made the case interesting was that, because the TRNC was unrecognized, it was Turkey that was found to be at fault. Ankara issued a statement declaring that the events that led to the complaint occurred outside the borders of the Republic of Turkey, that Turkey had nothing to do with the case, and that, when Turkey recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, it specified that this would be valid only within Turkey's borders. The court rejected these arguments, stating that Northern Cyprus was under the control of the Turkish army.

On 28 July 1998 the court decided that Turkey was to pay Titina Loizidou 300,000 Cypriot pounds in material damages and 20,000 Cypriot pounds as moral compensation. Following the Loizidou case, thousands of Greek Cypriots applied to the court for compensation. The case helped reignite the idea that the time had come to settle the Cyprus issue.

#### c. The S-300 Missile Crisis

At a time when Cyprus was the scene of political, social, and legal tensions, the S-300 crisis added a military dimension.

An agreement was concluded on 5 January 1997 between the Greek-Cypriot government and Russia for the purchase and installation in Southern Cyprus of Russian-made ground-to-air S-300 missiles. These missiles had a range of 140 kilometers and were superior to American Patriot missiles according to some claims. The newspaper Financial Times wrote that the air superiority that Turkey had enjoyed in Cyprus since 1974 was coming to an end.

. But the issue was broader than the military balance in Cyprus that was being upset. Commentators in Turkey were declaring that henceforth Turkey itself would be open to attack. This implied that the balance of power between Greece and Turkey was shifting, and there was no way Ankara could accept such an outcome. Denktaş declared that the island was being dragged toward war. Demirel declared that Turkey would not allow the citizens of the TRNC to come under threat. The minister of defense, Turhan Tayan, went even further and declared that Turkey would do everything to prevent the installation of the missiles but would not hesitate to repeat the 1974 intervention if the missiles became a real threat.

This tough talk forced the U.S. and Britain into action. The pressure applied on Clerides began to produce results. At first he made defiant statements that it was the natural right of the Greek Cypriots to strengthen their defenses at a time when they were under the threat of the Turkish occupation forces. Later he declared that no date had been set for the emplacement of the missiles and that their objective was to draw attention to the urgent need to find a solution in Cyprus.

The S-300 crisis was particularly serious because it had the potential to change the regional balance of power. This is why the U.S. felt it necessary to get directly involved. After remaining on the agenda for about two years, the question was resolved when the missiles were transferred to Greece and deployed on Crete. Turkey was well beyond the range of the missiles at their new site. The series of crises in Cyprus until 1999 led to the acceleration of the process of admitting Cyprus into the EU and convinced international public opinion of the urgent need to find a solution to the question of Cyprus. Membership in the EU would remove Cyprus from the orbit of Turkish-Greek relations and place it firmly in the orbit of Turkish-EU relations.

Russia was the biggest winner in the crisis. It man-

aged to sell its weapons, created headaches in NATO, asserted itself in the international scene, and disturbed Turkey, its rival in the former Soviet lands.

## d. The Search for a Cyprus Settlement

The successive crises in Cyprus had the effect of accelerating the search for a settlement. The U.S. began to seek a resumption of the intercommunal talks, while the EU initiated the process of negotiations for the membership of Cyprus.

#### The Intercommunal Talks

After securing the termination of the war in Bosnia, the U.S., as the leader of the New World Order, began to tackle the unresolved disputes of the world that had the potential to lead to conflict. Top on this list of problems was Cyprus, which had been festering for forty years. On 4 June 1997 President Clinton appointed Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton agreement, as special representative for Cyprus. There was a conviction that this able diplomat was the most suitable person for securing a settlement in Cyprus. At first the Turkish side was apprehensive about this appointment, fearing that the system of marathon negotiations applied in Dayton might be used in this instance; but after receiving assurances that this would not be the case, it responded positively to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan's invitation of 9 June to resume the talks.

Denktaş and Clerides sat at the negotiating table in New York on 9 July for the first time since October 1994. At the talks that went on for four days, Holbrooke chose to remain in the background. The two leaders ended their session with the decision to meet again in August. In the meantime the two sides would study the UN plan. These were the main features of the plan.

- 1. There would be two federated states with political equality, and neither community would be able to make decisions detrimental to the other.
- 2. A mechanism would be established to settle disputes that might come up.
- 3. The federation would have a single sovereignty emanating from the two communities.
- 4. The Constitution that would be drawn up would come into force when approved by the two communities in separate referendums and would not be amendable without the agreement of the two federated states.
- 5. The Cyprus Republic to be established would be a secular state, and no one with a religious title would be able to assume public office in the new state.

- 6. The two federated states would be free to establish special relations with Turkey and Greece.
- 7. The Republic would have a single flag, but the federated states would be able to continue using their respective flags.
  - 8. Turkish and Greek would be the official languages.

Although the Turkish side did not approve of the UN submitting a plan once again, the process was not interrupted. The second round took place, as agreed, on 11 to 15 August at Glion, a locality in the vicinity of Montreux in Switzerland. Denktaş opposed to idea of a single and indivisible sovereignty for the new Republic. He also called for the suspension of the process to admit Cyprus to the EU as a member. The talks became stalled, and the third round of talks scheduled for October was called off.

It can be said that the Glion talks failed mainly because of the deterioration in EU-Turkish relations that occurred at that time. The EU was seeking to accelerate the process of EU membership for Cyprus at Greece's behest. At the same time, it was in the process of freezing Turkey's membership after having obtained the benefits of the recently established Customs Union. At this point Turkey was grappling with the problems of human rights and political Islam. This situation was forcing Turkey to bring the question of Cyprus to the fore.

### The EU, Cyprus, and Turkey

Turkey's Customs Union had created disappointment in 1996. The economic indicators proved that Turkey had not benefited from this union and the political situation was not encouraging. At the Intergovernmental Conference, the preparations for the accession of Cyprus were initiated, while there was no mention of Turkey's candidacy. Prime Minister Çiller was confronted with domestic political difficulties and was seeking to overcome them with a foreign policy success. She began to convey the message to the Europeans that, if Turkey was given a firm calendar for accession, Turkey would be somewhat flexible regarding the joint Demirel-Denktaş Declaration of 1995 that demanded the simultaneous accession of Turkey and Cyprus to the EU.

Çiller's policy began to give rise to concern in some quarters in Turkey and made Denktaş uneasy. On 20 January 1997 President Demirel and Denktaş responded to the Çiller policy with a new declaration containing the following elements. Regional peace was being threatened by the military cooperation of the Greek-Cypriot government with Greece; to counter this policy, Turkey and the TRNC would continue to ensure an effective guarantee

based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; an attack on the TRNC would be seen as an attack against Turkey; joint military coordination and planning would be undertaken to deter such an attack; a common defense doctrine would be drawn up; in the event that Greece continued its activities aimed at setting up air or naval bases in Cyprus, similar facilities would be set up by Turkey in the TRNC; and the deployment of multinational forces to the island designed to dilute Turkey's guarantee would not be allowed. The declaration added that the green light given to the Greek-Cypriot government on the road to accession to full membership by the EU at Greece's prodding was a historic error that would destroy the process of intercommunal negotiations. The declaration stated that under the existing international treaties (see Box 7-38 above) Cyprus could only join an organization in which both Turkey and Greece were members, that membership of the EU could only come after a settlement of the Cyprus question, and that a decision to this effect had to be approved by the two peoples in separate referendums. It was also stated that each step that the Greek-Cypriot government took in the direction of EU membership would result in an acceleration of the process of integration between Turkey and the TRNC.

In addition the declaration affirmed that the representatives of the TRNC would form part of all Turkish delegations attending international meetings dealing with Cyprus where the TRNC was denied representation. Economic cooperation between the two countries would be expanded, and the economy of the TRNC would be strengthened with new cooperation projects. Finally, it stated that the mechanism for political consultation foreseen in the 1995 Demirel-Denktaş declaration would be expanded by including defense matters within its area of competence.

This step in the direction of integration with Turkey drew fire from the opposition in the TRNC. As Turkey hardened its policy, the EU responded by softening its approach to Turkey. The EU's Council of Ministers declared at its meeting of 24 February that talks and preaccession negotiations could not begin before there was a settlement in Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriots would also take part when the talks and negotiations did take place. A divided Cyprus could not be admitted to the EU, and membership could be contemplated for the whole island only after a settlement.

But this softened tone was to prove temporary. The European Commission's report dated 15 July 1997 entitled Agenda 2000 did not include Turkey among the new candidates. The report also ignored the decision made in February by including Cyprus in the list of candidates.

This report was issued at about the same time that a new coalition government, the fifty-fifth government, assumed office in Turkey. It consisted of the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party, and the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP: Demokrat Türkiye Partisi) and included Bülent Ecevit and Şükrü S. Gürel, who were known for their hawkish views on Cyprus. The new government's program stated that the TRNC would continue to be supported in all fields and that the Cyprus issue involved not just the security of the TRNC but also the security of Turkey itself. The program stressed the principle of equality and confirmed that Turkey could not renounce Cyprus. This was the new government's response to the EU. The process of integration with the TRNC would begin.

Parallel to Turkey's new policy, Denktaş had developed a new thesis as he headed for New York to meet with Clerides on 9 July. Although the talks would ostensibly be based on federation, in reality they would be aimed at achieving a loose confederation in Cyprus.

Ankara's plans were put into implementation immediately. Gürel, the minister of state responsible for Cyprus, went to Nicosia in early July with an economic aid package. This was followed with a visit by Prime Minister Ecevit, who went to Cyprus in the company of seven ministers to participate in the commemoration of the Turkish operation in 1974.

A joint communiqué was issued following the talks held with the representatives of the TRNC. The communiqué dealt with the implementation of the policies that had been agreed upon. The TRNC would maintain its independent existence; but pending its recognition a special relationship would be established between the two countries in order to safeguard the TRNC's international interests. A framework agreement would be signed by the two countries for this purpose, and the functional and structural cooperation between the two foreign ministries would be regulated by a protocol. In addition, a joint defense doctrine would be formulated, a council of association would be set up that would bring together the two countries' parliaments and ministers, economic and technical cooperation would be expanded, the TRNC would have access to the TÜRKSAT satellite, and the two countries would work together in the fields of water management and the implementation of development plans.

The policy of integration received negative reactions both at home and abroad. It was argued that the TRNC would lose credibility if it transferred its sovereignty to Turkey while defending the principles of political sovereignty and equality at the negotiating table with its Greek counterpart. In the face of this criticism, the word "integration" was dropped and replaced with "special relationship."

At the EU's Luxembourg summit of 12 December 1997 it was decided to admit ten new countries into the EU. The expansion of the EU would include countries from Central and Eastern Europe as well as Cyprus; and accession negotiations with six of them, including Cyprus, would start on 31 March 1998. The decision on expansion did not include Turkey but mentioned a European strategy that would prepare Turkey for membership and a European Conference that would be convened for this purpose.

The decision of the Luxembourg Summit caused outrage in Turkey. Turkey decided to suspend the political dialogue with the EU and stay away from the European Conference. No meeting would be held with the EU if the subjects of Cyprus or Turkish-Greek relations appeared on the agenda. When accession negotiations with Cyprus began, the process of partial integration between Turkey and the TRNC would begin. When accession talks with the Greek-Cypriot government, claiming to be representing the whole island, did get underway on 31 March, the Turkey-TRNC Council of Association held its session and issued a declaration stating that Turkey and the TRNC would not accept the economic, political, and legal consequences ensuing from the accession talks with the Greek-Cypriot government, that the nature of the Cyprus question had changed and the formerly accepted framework and parameters for a settlement no longer applied, and that it would not be possible to advance toward a settlement unless the reality of two states on the island was recognized. The declaration also spoke of deepening bilateral relations in the political, economic, cultural, security, and educational fields and mentioned a number of specific projects.

The Luxembourg Summit brought fundamental changes not only to Turkey's relations with the EU but also to Turkey's Cyprus policy. As Turkey tightened its security relations with the U.S., it was also giving signs that there was going to be a parting of ways with the EU. This was hardly in conformity with the Turkish policy of Simitis. Actually, the Luxembourg Summit revealed that Greece was not the sole obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. The chief opponent of Turkish membership was Germany, but Greece continued to be seen as the villain in Turkey. Athens did not want to see a Turkey estranged from the EU and increasingly within the U.S. sphere when so many bilateral issues remained unresolved. It would

take the Abdullah Öcalan crisis to bring about a thaw between Athens and Ankara.

## 3. The Öcalan Crisis

Since the 1980s Turkey had been involved in a "lowintensity war" with the PKK. This was the main reason for the international perception of Turkey as a politically and economically unstable country. The countries with which Turkey had disputes were in the process of forming alliances with one another, while they were all using this weakness for their own purposes. Obviously, one of these countries was Greece. Since the 1980s Greece had made the Lavrion camp available to PKK militants. This was a camp operated by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Greece also maintained good relations with countries like Syria and Iran, which were pursuing similar policies. After 1996 these relations developed into alliances. Ankara kept complaining that PKK militants were being given shelter and military training and that Greece was providing military and economic assistance to the PKK, but these warnings and protests went unheeded. In rejecting Turkish protests, Athens claimed that it was supporting the rightful claims of the Kurdish people and insisted that the Lavrion camp was under UN control and harbored only political refugees. The issue of the PKK had become a persistent irritant and remained unresolved, plaguing relations between Greece and Turkey.

Interestingly enough, it was the PKK issue, and more specifically the Öcalan crisis, that brought about a thaw in bilateral relations.

When a covert operation was mounted on 16 February 1999 and the leader of the PKK was apprehended as he left the Greek Embassy in Kenya and brought to Turkey, this precipitated an economic and political crisis in Greece. It was later revealed that Öcalan went from Italy to Minsk. When he found out that he would not be able to stay there, he contacted Greek officials who arranged for him to be placed in a house 25 kilometers out of Athens on 29 January. When he ran into opposition from official quarters, he left Greece on 31 January. After failing to obtain landing rights in Belarus and the Netherlands, however, Öcalan's aircraft returned to Athens on the morning of 1 February.

Prime Minister Simitis was strongly opposed to admitting Öcalan to Greece on both occasions and ordered his immediate deportation. The revelation that Öcalan was in Greece would seriously damage relations with Turkey and confirm Ankara's long-standing allegations that Athens supported terrorism. It would also be a serious blow to Greece's international standing. Having been sent

to Nairobi, Kenya, Öcalan refused to take up the offer to stay in the house of a Greek businessman and went to the Greek Embassy instead. When the CIA located Öcalan through his cell phone, the U.S. began to press the Kenyan government. As a result, the embassy was surrounded by the Kenyan police and Öcalan was asked to leave the country. When Öcalan left the embassy to proceed to the airport, he was apprehended and placed in a Turkish aircraft and flown to Turkey.

Greece's role in the process of Öcalan's seizure had greatly strengthened Turkey's hand. Ankara had harsh words for Greece, and Demirel made a statement warning Athens in a tone similar to the tone of the warning sent to Syria in October. In response, the Greek armed forces were placed on alert. Greek prestige was dented, with both the U.S. and the EU reproaching Athens. The reaction in Greece was mixed: one group declared that it had been a mistake to get directly involved in this episode and that it had always been wrong to give support to the PKK. The other group criticized the government for betraying the Kurds and surrendering Öcalan. Demands for the resignation of Simitis were coming from both camps.

Öcalan's capture sent shock waves through the Greek political establishment. Simitis announced that he had been kept in the dark. Instead of resigning, he dismissed minister of foreign affairs Theodoros Pangalos, minister of the interior Alekos Papadopoulos, and minister of public order Philipos Petsalnicos. He launched a thorough investigation to determine those who were involved in the case and dismissed a number of officials, starting with the head of the Greek Secret Service. The ministers of public order and the interior placed the blame for the affair on Pangalos, while Pangalos claimed that he only knew of Öcalan's whereabouts after he had entered Greece and that his only concern was to get rid of the man. Pangalos declared that the best way to do this was to dispatch him to Kenya. These events pointed to the existence of rogue elements within the Greek state acting on its behalf. The arguments over this were very similar to those in Turkey over the issue of the so-called Deep State.

This big row also had a positive aspect, however. The powerful figures in the cabinet of Prime Minister Simitis (whom he had not been able to get rid of due to political considerations within PASOK) had been undermined. Now Simitis had eliminated these politicians who wanted to maintain Papandreou's policy of confrontation with Turkey. Simitis was greatly relieved to be rid of the powerful nationalist-populist politicians, particularly Pangalos. These were the people who had been undermining the policies that Simitis was seeking to implement vis-à-vis

Turkey and the EU, and now his hand had been freed. Simitis appointed Georgios Papandreou as minister of foreign affairs. He was the son of Andreas Papandreou and the grandson of Georgios Papandreou. From the very beginning he had been aligned with Simitis rather than with his father.

From then on, the policy toward Turkey took shape, including improvement of bilateral relations and allowing the Öcalan episode to recede. The dialogue would be resumed, and Turkish-Greek issues would be brought within the framework of the EU. The first fruits of the new policy would be gathered at the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

## B. The Rapprochement from the Earthquake of 17 August 1999 to the Helsinki Summit

Two Greek politicians made the resumption of dialogue between Turkey and Greece possible at a time when tension between the two countries had reached a breaking point: Simitis and Papandreou. At the time of the Öcalan crisis Georgios Papandreou was deputy minister of foreign affairs. He wrote a letter to Simitis from Brussels, calling for the resignation of those who were responsible for the episode. As soon as he became foreign minister after the resignation of Pangalos, Papandreou made statements calling for a dialogue with Turkey without regard to Greek public opinion. He declared that dialogue should not be made a hostage to provocations and obstruction. Simitis and Papandreou were convinced that a new approach was needed to Turkish-Greek relations and signaled their intention to undertake new diplomatic initiatives toward reconciliation.

The new approach from Athens was well received in Ankara. At a time when Öcalan was being tried and his statements about his Greek connection were constantly drawing hostile comment from the Turkish press, the official Turkish position was decidedly in favor of dialogue with Greece. This brought about a change in the anti-Greek position of the Turkish press. The provocative news and comment in the press gradually gave way to articles on the need to improve relations with Greece. In April Papandreou met with İsmail Cem, the Turkish foreign minister. This meeting gave the green light to the dialogue and established a new personal friendship between the two men, which would symbolize the new atmosphere between the two countries.

The Marmara earthquake that occurred on 17 August in Turkey accelerated the process of détente that was already underway. When the scenes from the earthquake region began to be aired on Greek television, there was a

## Box 7-40. The Process of Détente and Greek Public Opinion

The thaw in Greece's policy toward Turkey during the tenure of Costas Similis was based on rational grounds, just as the softening of the Greek public mood toward Turkey was also based on rational grounds.

For centuries the Greek people had identified themselves as anti-Turkish. In a sense this was the social cement that kept them together. This negative identification of an individual or nation based not on what it is but on its antagonism against somebody or something, however, could have a corrosive effect. Nevertheless, given the obvious disparity between the size of the two countries and their populations, and given the threats coming from various quarters in Turkey from time to time, it was easy to understand why there was such an identification, compounded with fear, even if its effect was debilitating.

The accession of Greece to the EU in the early 1980s had the effect of bolstering Greek self-confidence. Europe was a shield against a threat from a nation that was bigger and more populous than Greece: Furthermore, the Simitis policies were no longer focused on conditioning the Greeks negatively, which was also having its effect. But the groundswell of support for the Turkish people after the 17 August earthquake was fed by the new self-confidence of the Greeks and at the same time helped to consolidate it.

As this self-confidence took root, it became more difficult for fanatical groups to harp on the "Turkish threat" despite the efforts of the Orthodox Church. Turkey will no doubt gain much from this change in Greece's mood.

(B. ORAN)

spontaneous movement among the Athenians to provide assistance to the victims. Soon the campaign spread to the rest of Greece. One of the first countries to send a rescue team to Turkey was Greece. When the Greek press (led by the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, *Rizopastis*) began to send messages of friendship to Turkey, the Turkish press reciprocated. The message was that the people were ahead of their governments in their yearning for peaceful relations between neighbors.

The action of the Greek NGOs had been quite spontaneous. It should not be forgotten, however, that the two governments had started a dialogue that had been going on for six months. What was important was that the people were tired of hostile statements and were prepared to help one another in difficult times if governments did not get in the way. The policies of nation-states that had been stressing differences for 200 years had not been able to obliterate the friendship between peoples, which drew its strength from 1,000 years of coexistence in the same region and the shared culture and memories that bound them together (Box 7-40).

The first tangible benefit of the new relationship with Greece was obtained at the Helsinki Summit of 10 December 1999, when Greece did not oppose the inclusion of Turkey among the candidates for membership of the EU.

The final document issued after the Helsinki Summit also included references to the question of Cyprus and the differences over the Aegean.

Paragraph 4 of the report dealing with the Aegean read as follows:

The candidate states are participating in the accession process on an equal footing... In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this, they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process... at the latest by the end of 2004.

Thus the need to find peaceful solutions to the differences between Greece and Turkey over the Aesean was being emphasized. If this proved impossible, the need to refer the issues to the International Court of Justice was reiterated. Turkey objected to the part dealing with the court but after clarification agreed that this was not an imperative but something to consider along with the other methods to be used when seeking solutions.

Paragraphs 9a and 9b of the Helsinki Summit's final document read as follows:

The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion. The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this case the Council will take account of all relevant factors.

This signified that the decision on the accession of Cyprus would be made in 2002. Although this was qualified with the phrase "bearing in mind all relevant factors," Turkey objected. The most serious objection came from the TRNC delegation that had been carrying out bilateral negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot delegation in New York since 3 December. The TRNC delegation had gone to New York with the intention to press for a solution based on confederation. They declared that they were deeply disappointed by Turkey's decision to accept the EU Helsinki document, which meant they had lost an important bargaining chip.

Although the Helsinki decisions gave rise to arguments in Turkey, it was generally accepted that they were a step in the direction of membership and were considered a diplomatic success for Turkey. In Greece the government was declaring a victory. The Simitis government was reaping the benefits of its successful policies. The disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus had been linked to Turkey's membership in the EU. Both issues had been removed from the Turkish-Greek orbit and placed in the Turkish-EU orbit. The foundations of the policies that Greece would pursue in the twenty-first century were laid as far back as 1995. Now Turkey would have to bear this in mind and revise its traditional policies to conform to the new circumstances.

MELEK FIRAT

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### Relations with the Balkans

### I. THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIALIST REGIMES IN THE EASTERN BLOC, THE BALKANS, AND TURKEY

The Balkans in the 1990s

The socialist regimes of Eastern Europe were collapsing in quick succession toward the end of 1989. The socialist regimes in the Balkans also met the same fate. Todor Zhivkov, who had ruled Bulgaria for thirty-five years, resigned and was replaced by foreign minister Petar Mladenov. Mladenov was the bridge to a more liberal sort of government and was soon replaced by Zhelu Zhelev and the government of the Union of Democratic Forces.

Romania's transition did not prove as smooth as Bulgaria's. Nicolae Ceausescu had been in power for twenty-five years and sought to resist the wave of changes sweeping across the Eastern Bloc. This led to a popular uprising. Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, a powerful figure in the administration, were apprehended as they sought to flee and were executed. The National Salvation Front, the left-of-center movement consisting of those who were in favor of change, came to power under the leadership of Ion Iliescu. It won the majority of the seats in the elections held in 1990 and formed the government.

When Enver Hoxha died in 1985, he was replaced as Albania's leader by Ramiz Alia, who undertook a series of economic and political measures in early 1990. Clearly, Albania had not escaped the changes taking place in the region. As a consequence of the violent demonstrations and uprisings that began in April 1990, relations were established with both the U.S. and USSR, and a multiparty system emerged within the country.

The change of regime in Yugoslavia followed a different pattern because of the special nature of this country's structure. Yugoslavia differed from the other Eastern European and Balkan countries in a number of ways. Its economic system was based on self-management and had been liberalizing gradually since the 1960s. Its ethnic makeup and federal structure and its foreign policy were also distinctive. The country rested on a delicate balance;

with regime change, the process of disintegration set in. We shall examine the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration and its aftermath below.

The Balkan countries went through different experiences domestically in the process of change, but they all shared the following features.

1. They were all witnessing a strong resurgence of nationalism, which affected their foreign and domestic policies. Nationalism was a carryover from the nineteenth century and was the cause of much ethnic strife. The events of the 1990s helped cement the Balkans as an unsettled region of ethnic tension. Both the Balkan countries and the nonregional powers sought to avoid the negative associations that came with the term "Balkan" by coining the term "southeastern Europe."

This also meant that the Western countries were beginning to see the Balkans as a part of Europe. Although there was some unhappiness in Turkey over the discarding of the term "Balkan," which was a Turkish word, all of the regional initiatives and projects launched in this period carried the geographic term "southeastern Europe." Alongside this, however, the adjective "western Balkan" also began to be employed in the 1990s.

2. In a good number of Balkan states the former Communist leaders changed the label of their parties to "socialist" and sought legitimacy for their governments by embracing nationalist causes. Since these countries had no tradition of organized political opposition, the parties that came to power on a liberal platform were unsuccessful, due to their inexperience as well as the difficult conditions they faced. This brought the newly created socialist parties back to power. This cycle occurred in Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. Slobodan Milosevic, the former leader of the Serbian Communist Party in Yugoslavia, was the sole leader who managed to stay in power continuously during both periods.

3. As a result of the transformation that took place in the Balkans during the 1990s, there was a noticeable rise in the international struggle for power over the region. In this period the Soviet/Russian influence began to fade. Russia sought to maintain a foothold in the region by focusing on the new Yugoslavia and Greece, while Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy, the U.S., and Turkey managed to increase their influence.

Germany became influential economically and politically in Croatia and Slovenia, while the U.S. was able to insert itself into the region as a new factor after the Cold War, its influence being primarily in the military field. Washington established its military ties with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia and cooperated closely with Turkey in the process.

- 4. There was a proliferation of independent states in the region after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The newcomers on the scene were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, in addition to Moldova.
- 5. During the Cold War, ideologies and political models had proliferated in the Balkans. Now the situation had altered; except for Yugoslavia, all were seeking to liberalize, privatize, and join Western organizations and institutions.
- 6. All of the countries were afflicted with the problems of transition. These included a serious weakening of the state and its institutions, a siphoning off of foreign aid funds to those close to the wielders of power, a shortage of entrepreneurs, a political process serving the interests of ethnic groups or special interest groups, and a climate that encouraged corruption, cronyism, and organized crime.

### Turkey and Developments in the Balkans

Turkey was generally satisfied with the developments in the Balkans during the 1990s, so long as they did not lead to instability. Turkey hoped that henceforth there would not be a paramount power like the USSR wielding influence in the region. The breakdown of ideological rivalries would lead to greater regional cooperation. The economic and political difficulties confronting the region because of regime change as well as the disintegration of the USSR had left a power vacuum in the area, and Turkey had aspirations to fill this vacuum both politically and economically. Furthermore, the collapse of Yugoslavia had led to the emergence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, countries that wanted closer ties with Turkey. Albania was already on the best terms with Turkey, and even Bulgaria had shifted its course toward cooperation with Ankara.

Turkey had opened up its economy ten years earlier and had covered much ground in integrating itself with the global economy; now it planned to take advantage of this in its relations with its Balkan neighbors. Moreover, the presence of close to 10 million Muslims in the Balkans helped Turkey to make its influence felt in the region. These Muslims were distributed in the following manner: 3.5 million in Albania, 1.5 million in Kosovo, 1 million in Bulgaria, 2 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 350,000 in Macedonia, and 120,000 in Western Thrace. However, as in the case of the Turkic republics after the collapse of the USSR, especially the Turkish public's approach to the Balkans in the initial stages was emotional rather than realistic.

Turkey followed a policy in the Balkans that aimed at contributing to stability in the region, making its presence felt, and drawing the Balkans into projects that Ankara had initiated to provide Turkey with economic advantages. It went so far as inviting countries that were not coastal states of the Black Sea to participate in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project.

The developments in the Balkans in the post–Cold War period were not all favorable to Turkey, as it appeared at first. They also produced ethnic strife, political turmoil, the rise of organized crime, and an environment that allowed the PKK to become active in the region. In other words, when the Cold War ended in the Balkans in the 1990s, hot wars broke out, creating instability in the region.

Before analyzing the effects of this situation on Turkey's Balkan policy, we shall examine the developments in Bulgaria after regime change and how they affected Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

# II. REGIME CHANGE IN BULGARIA AND TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

# A. The Effects of Regime Change on Bulgaria's Domestic and Foreign Policies

As in the case of other Eastern Bloc countries, Bulgaria adopted the multiparty way of life in early 1990; the Communist Party reappeared as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Meanwhile the country's dissidents organized themselves as a political party and took their place within the political system as the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF).

In November 1989 a group under the leadership of foreign minister Petar Mladenov carried out a putsch within the Communist Party and overthrew Zhivkov. At the end of December they stopped the campaign of intimidation and assimilation against the Turkish community. With the coming of political freedom to Bulgaria, the Turkish minority got organized. On 4 January 1990 the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was established under the leadership of Ahmet Doğan (Box 7-41).

#### Box 7-41. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)

The Bulgarian Turks set up the National Salvation Movement to counter the campaign of repression that got underway against the minority in 1984. When the socialist regime collapsed, the minority transformed the dissident organization into the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) in January 1990 under the leadership of Ahmet Doğan. Although originally a movement, in March 1990 the organization turned itself into a regular political party.

In the Bulgarian Constitution it was forbidden to set up political parties on the basis of ethnicity. For this reason, and in order to contribute to social and political stability, the MRF-declared that it was not exclusively the party of the Turkish minority and accordingly admitted Bulgarians, Pomaks, and Gypsies as members. At the election held in July 1990, the MRF gained a total of twenty-four seats. Seventeen of these went to ethnic Turks, two to Pomaks, and four to Bulgarians. This indicated that the MRF did indeed represent the Turks as well as other minorities.

The party's statute declared that it did not advocate autonomy or independence and that it was against Islamic fundamentalism and religious fanaticism. The MRF made every effort not to appear to be a Turkish fifth column and sought to fit into Bulgaria's political landscape. It took initiatives to improve the condition of the Turkish minority and contributed to the improvement of Bulgaria's relations with Turkey. With its positive and moderating role in Bulgaria, the MRF was viewed as a model for the other regions in the Balkans that had problems with minorities, in particular for the Albanian minority of Macedonia.

Early in the 1990s the MRF enjoyed broad support among Turks and Pomaks because of its policies of upholding the rights of Turks and minorities. Subsequently the MRF failed to live up to the expectations of the Turks. The Turks also started forming new political parties. As a result, the MRF started losing support and was able to hold onto only fifteen members of parliament in the election held in 1994. The MRF participated in the election of 1997 in alliance with other parties. This alliance, the Union of National Salvation, obtained only 7.6% of the votes and got nineteen of its candidates elected to parliament.

(İ. ÜZĞEL)

In this way the Turkish minority in Bulgaria acquired political clout that enabled it to become a significant factor in Bulgaria's political scene.

In the election held in October 1991, the Union of Democratic Forces won a plurality and came to power. In the presidential election held in January 1992, Zhelu Zhelev was elected president with the support of the MRF. Zhelev was known as an opponent of the socialist regime in Bulgaria and the repression of the Turks. He strove to secure structural changes and strengthen democracy and to prevent vindictive measures being taken against the members of the previous regime. His objective was to achieve reconciliation in society.

In the 1990s Bulgaria faced political turmoil as well as serious economic and social problems. Power kept changing hands between the UDF and the BSP. During the Cold War, Bulgaria had been a predominantly agricultural country within the Eastern Bloc. Now it had lost both its markets and its protector, the USSR. The forced migration of 300,000 Turks in 1989 had been detrimental to agriculture. The imposition of economic sanctions on Yugoslavia was also causing hardship to Bulgarians. The economic difficulties had resulted in a weakening of the Bulgarian armed forces.

It was against this background that Bulgaria was formulating its domestic and foreign policies. The tendency of the BSP was to cultivate close ties with Russia and Greece while maintaining its distance from Turkey. On the other side, the UDF tended to be oriented toward the West and friendlier toward Turkey. Despite these tendencies, the circumstances were such that Bulgarian govern-

ments were compelled to entertain friendly relations with all the neighboring countries. This is why Bulgaria concluded friendship and good neighborliness agreements with all of its neighbors and supported disarmament projects in the Balkans.

Bulgaria sought to remain outside the rival camps that had been formed in the Balkans during the 1990s. Although the majority of Bulgarians belonged to the Orthodox Church and the country had close historical ties with first Russia and then the USSR, Bulgaria did not side with Yugoslavia and Greece during the war in Bosnia. Bulgaria did not respond to Greek efforts to draw it into the Athens-Belgrade axis and remained equidistant in its relations with Turkey and Greece. Its main foreign policy goal was membership in NATO and the EU. In 1993 parliament adopted a resolution requesting membership in NATO. To achieve this goal, Bulgaria gave emphasis to the protection of the rights of minorities, abolished the death penalty, and turned its face toward the West.

### B. Developments in Turkish-Bulgarian Relations

Military Relations

Following regime change, Bulgaria faced serious economic difficulties. It began to seek a rapprochement with the West and made efforts to develop relations with Turkey. An important step in this direction was the visit of the Bulgarian chief of General Staff to Ankara in 1991. General Doğan Güreş, the chief of the General Staff, made a return visit to Sofia in December 1991, when he signed an agreement identified as the Sofia Document. This was followed

by the Edirne Document signed at Edirne in May 1992. These provided for cooperation in military training and contained an understanding not to conduct military exercises within fifteen kilometers from the border. The two sides agreed to take confidence-building measures in the military field, and in 1992 they redeployed their troops away from the border. On 6 May 1992 the two countries signed an agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Security. It should be noted that Bulgaria had signed a similar agreement with Greece in October 1991. This was in conformity with Bulgaria's policy aimed at achieving talks among the three countries. While Bulgaria sought to get closer to the EU through its links with Greece, it sought to approach NATO through Turkey. During a visit to Bulgaria in March 1992, foreign minister Hikmet Çetin announced that Turkey supported Bulgaria's membership in NATO and declared that Turkish-Bulgarian relations should serve as a model for the other Balkan states.

#### Points of Disagreement

While Turkey and Bulgaria held similar views on the issue of Macedonia as well as on other Balkan issues during the 1990s, they diverged on the Yugoslav crisis. Both countries recognized the republics that broke away from Yugoslavia. Bulgaria did this in January 1992 and Turkey in February. By recognizing Macedonia, Bulgaria was diverging from Greece and getting closer to Turkey's position.

The two countries followed different courses in the Bosnian war, however. Turkey wanted the international community to intervene in the war, while Bulgaria defended a hands-off policy. In addition, the passage through Bulgaria of Turkish peacekeeping forces on their way to Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 created problems because of the opposition of anti-Turkish elements, especially among BSP members of parliament.

In July 1991 Greece made a proposal to demilitarize the border in Thrace, to which Bulgaria gave its consent. Turkey rejected the proposal, however, on the grounds that it did not include the Aegean islands.

There were some disagreements between Turkey and Bulgaria at the time when the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization was being set up. Bulgaria wanted the BSEC to confine itself to the economic field, whereas Turkey envisaged that it also would have a political dimension. Bulgaria feared that this type of organization might serve as an alternative to its general policy of orientation toward the West. That is why Bulgaria did not sign the convention on culture within the BSEC and, along with Greece, refused to join the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (see Box 7-48 below). Bulgaria also objected to free circulation among member states and the

membership of Central Asian states. Although Bulgaria favored close relations with Ankara, it clearly had misgivings about contributing to the strengthening of Turkey's position in the Balkans.

From 1994 to 1997 the BSP had an absolute majority in the parliament. During this period there was a perceptible increase in PKK activities in Bulgaria, which began to irk Turkey. The PKK was using Bulgaria as a staging post for the Middle East, Turkey, and Western Europe. A Kurdish Cultural Study Association had been set up in Bulgaria along with other such organizations. Conferences were being organized, and these activities were being supported especially by BSP members of parliament. Turkey's complaints were being brushed aside with the explanation that the associations were not related to the PKK and that they had not committed any criminal act. Despite persistent requests made by Turkey, Bulgaria also refrained from declaring the PKK a terrorist organization. At Turkey's initiative, an agreement on combating narcotic drugs and terrorism was signed when the Turkish minister of the interior, Nahit Menteşe, visited Sofia in 1995.

Turkey was also upset when, during the BSP government's term in office, Bulgaria joined the project to build an oil pipeline from Burgaz in Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis in Greece for the purpose of transporting Caspian oil to the Mediterranean. The other partners in the project were Russia and Greece. The three countries signed a memorandum in June 1995 setting up the Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline Company. The pipeline would be 320 kilometers long and would transport oil flowing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which then would be shipped by tanker to Burgaz.

The company would be owned by Russia with 50% of the shares and Bulgaria and Greece with 25% each. This link appeared as an alternative to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. It also countered Turkey's objection based on the argument that the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline formula constituted a serious ecological hazard to the Turkish Straits. Although this project has not been implemented, it was kept on the agenda by the multinational companies in conformity with their policy of transporting oil and gas over several different routes. In addition to this project, there was the Balkan Pipeline Consortium set up by the multinational oil companies. In this case, the oil would be transported over a distance of 890 kilometers from Burgaz all the way to the Albanian port of Vlore.

The disadvantage of these lines is that they require two extra marine terminals in the Black Sea and the extra expense of loading and unloading the oil on tankers plying between Novorossiysk and Burgaz. Improved Relations under the Kostov Government The BSP was unable to overcome Bulgaria's economic difficulties. Inflation became rampant, and corruption was on the rise. In 1997 the BSP lost power to the Union of Democratic Forces under the leadership of Ivan Kostov. With the change in government, relations with Turkey began to improve.

Both sides contributed to this improvement. As a consequence of the repression of the Turkish minority, Bulgaria had been placed on the Organization of the Islamic Conference's blacklist in 1986. Sofia needed Ankara's help in freeing itself from this burden (Demirtaş-Coşkun, p. 88). Turkey took action in the OIC after the BSP government fell in 1997 and Bulgaria was removed from the blacklist. Relations improved rapidly after that. In July 1997 Bulgarian president Petar Stoyanov visited Ankara, where he apologized for the repression of the 1980s without regard to the reaction of nationalist circles back home. In December prime minister Mesut Yılmaz visited Bulgaria, where he signed an agreement relating to the frontier. Yılmaz declared that never in history had bilateral relations been better. As a result of this friendship, Turkey engaged in tripartite cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania in 1997.

The situation in southeastern Turkey was unsettled at this time, and the same thing was true for the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In these circumstances, Ankara welcomed the new atmosphere of friendship with Bulgaria and was pleased to note the improvements in the lives of the Turkish minority in that country. Bulgaria's decision to redeploy its troops away from the border was also seen as a contribution to Turkey's security.

Unlike the 1980s, when it was in close alliance with Greece, now Bulgaria was avoiding getting too closely involved with Greece, perhaps because in its situation it depended on Turkey's help and support. It can be said that relations with Bulgaria were one of the few foreign policy success stories for Turkey in the 1990s.

Economic relations between the two countries were also developing well. Turkey was Bulgaria's third largest market and its eighth largest supplier. By the year 2000 the volume of trade had attained \$710 million. Turkey's exports to its neighbor amounted to \$251 million, while its imports reached \$460 million. Turkey's agreement with Bulgaria, alongside Romania, to lower tariffs on imported industrial products contributed to the rising volume of trade.

With the simplification of formalities, 2,600 Turkish firms were established in Bulgaria, of which 1,000 proved durable. Some Turkish companies undertook the construction of large projects like the motorway from the

Turkish border to Orizova and the construction of a dam within the upper Arda River project.

But the most significant change in Turkish-Bulgarian relations occurred in the situation of the Turkish minority.

### Changes in the New Bulgarian Administration's Policy toward the Turkish Minority

The collapse of the socialist regime in Bulgaria brought a sharp change of policy toward the Turkish minority. In December 1989 a large number of imprisoned Turkish Bulgarians were released as a result of the amnesty law. The Bulgarian government set up a "round table" consisting of the representatives of all parties and social organizations in order to find a solution to the minority question. In March 1990 a law was adopted that allowed Bulgarian citizens to have Turkish names if they so wished.

With the changed conditions in Bulgaria, 154,000 ethnic Turks out of nearly 300,000 who were forced to leave in 1989 decided to return (Demirtaş-Coşkun, p. 33). Early in 1991 new legislation was enacted that allowed those who returned after migrating to Turkey in 1989 to recover their properties and receive help in finding jobs and being resettled. This legislation was known as the Doğan Law because it was enacted at the initiative of Ahmet Doğan, the leader of the MRF. The restitution of property did not go very smoothly, however. There was much friction between the returnees and the Bulgarians who had taken over the properties, and the ethnic Turks had to resort to protest demonstrations and school boycotts to recover their rights. The main opponent of the transfer of properties was the ultranationalist platform for the Defense of Bulgarian National Interests, which also opposed the restoration of the minority's political and cultural rights.

The Bulgarian Turks saw significant improvements in the enjoyment of their political, educational, religious, and cultural rights. In the 1990s eight Turkish newspapers started publishing, including Zaman, which published in Turkey. Education in Turkish, formerly forbidden, returned to schools. The printing of books in Turkish was also allowed. In 1990 the Islamic Institute was opened in Sofia, as well as three preacher schools in Turkish-populated areas and pedagogical institutes in Shumen and Kurdzhali to train schoolteachers. By the end of the 1990s Turkish deputy governors had been appointed to districts that were densely populated with Turks (such as Razgrad, Kurdzhali, Haskovo, Shumen, and Blagoevgrad), and more programs in Turkish were being broadcast by Radio Sofia.

The most significant indicator of the change in the official attitude to the Turks in Bulgaria was their freedom to organize political parties like the MRF and others. This allowed the Turks to integrate themselves into the political system. Although the MRF gave rise to opposition in Bulgarian nationalist and conservative circles amid claims that it was an ethnic party, the party took its place in the Bulgarian political system, thanks to its policies of steering clear of nationalist or religious themes, fielding non-Turkish and non-Muslim candidates, respecting the laws, and adopting moderate positions. Turkey also helped by refraining from actions that might stir up suspicion or fear among Bulgarians.

The ethnic Turks in Bulgaria established other political parties in addition to the MRF: the National Rights and Freedoms Party founded by a group that broke away from the MRF under the leadership of Güner Tahir, the Democratic Change Party under Mehmet Hodja, the Democratic Justice Party under Nedim Gencev, the Turkish Democratic Party under Adem Kenan, the Union Party established by Halis Okan, and the Turkish Democratic Rebirth Party established by Sabri Hüseyin. Although the parties reflected the political vitality of the Turkish minority, this situation led to the splitting of the Turkish vote and a consequent fall in the level of their representation in the parliament. In the election of June 2001, in which forty thousand Bulgarian nationals of Turkish stock living in Turkey also took part, the MRF was able to obtain nineteen parliamentary seats. Because of the two seats obtained by the MRF in the late count of votes, the Simeon II National Movement Party backing former king Simeon II failed to get an absolute majority in parliament. This turned the MRF into a key party for the second time.

Despite these positive developments resulting from the change in the Bulgarian government's approach, the Turkish minority faced some problems. One of them was that the country's economic problems affected the Turkish minority disproportionately, because most of the Turks were concentrated in the agricultural sector. In 1992 Turks replaced their mufti Nedim Gencev with Fikri Salih Hasan. The Bulgarian authorities refused to accept the newly elected mufti, however, and continued to recognize Gencev as mufti. This was a cause for unhappiness in the Turkish community (Özgür, pp. 201-3). Although the Turkish minority wanted to bring those responsible for the repressive measures of 1984 to 1989 to justice, neither Turkey nor the MRF wanted to see a settling of accounts that might affect bilateral relations. Indeed, these minor questions did not have any damaging effect on the course of relations. But the Turkish minority also had grievances against Turkey. The minority was unhappy about the visa formalities and the procedures for entering Turkey. This

question was settled when Turkey lifted the visa requirement for Bulgarian nationals in July 2001. When Bulgarian nationals obtained the right to travel to EU countries without a visa starting in 2000, a considerable number of Bulgarian Turks in Turkey decided to return to their country of birth.

The changes in the treatment of the minority made a major contribution toward improving bilateral relations. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria was one of the rare and special cases where a minority helped improve relations between two countries.

In the 1990s Turkish-Bulgarian relations were exemplary, and this was in a region like the Balkans where disputes and conflicts were the norm. Compared to the fractious relationship of just a few years earlier, it was remarkable that relations were so good. There was so much trust between the governments that, even at a time when Turkey was going through a period of tension during most of the 1990s (like the Kardak crisis) with Greece and when the arms race between the two Aegean neighbors was increasing, Turkey and Bulgaria were able to move their troops away from their border areas.

The improvements in the condition of the Turkish minority and the resulting friendly relations between the two countries now constitute a model for the other Balkan countries struggling with minority questions. This situation was made possible thanks to the efforts and contributions of all three parties involved.

# III. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND TURKEY

Turkey and the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia found themselves in opposing camps on the questions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (see Box 7-44 below). In addition, reports that an "Orthodox axis" was being formed in the Balkans and that the Serbs were helping the PKK only made relations worse.

The instability caused by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and examples of ethnic groups succeeding in their separatist aspirations were causing concern in Turkey. That is why at the initial stage Turkey was among those defending Yugoslavia's integrity.

In the process of disintegration, the leaders of both the Yugoslav Federation and the breakaway republics were visiting Ankara to seek support. In April 1991 Özal told the federal head of state that Turkey supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Macedonia's president Kiro Gligorov came to Ankara on 9–11 July and the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izzetbegovic, followed

him on 15 July, both soliciting Turkey's recognition of their independence.

When the EU recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, followed by Bulgaria's recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the process of disintegration reached the point of no return. Not wanting to be completely left out, Turkey recognized all four newly independent republics on 6 February 1992. Previously Milosevic had visited Ankara on 22 January to dissuade Turkey from recognizing the foursome, but he failed in his mission. Soon after Turkey's act of recognition, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, came to Ankara on 11 February and had the opportunity to be received by a president of a foreign country for the first time when he met Özal. Although Turkey did not recognize Kosovo, Ankara did sign a security protocol with Macedonia. This precipitated the final break with the new Yugoslavia. These visits demonstrated how much the regional peoples valued Turkey's support.

As we shall examine in greater detail below, Turkey subscribed to the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN because of the war in Bosnia. As a consequence, all trade with Yugoslavia came to an end, and Turkish workers in Europe had to find alternative routes bypassing Yugoslavia when traveling to Turkey. Turkey sided with the Muslims in the war in Bosnia and sought tougher measures against the Bosnian Serbs. When the chief of the Turkish General Staff, Doğan Güreş, retired in December 1994, he revealed that Turkey had been secretly providing weapons to the Bosnian side. This prompted the Yugoslav foreign minister to protest Turkey's action in a letter addressed to the UN secretary-general.

Turkey supported the Dayton Agreement ending the war in Bosnia and tried to improve its relations with Yugoslavia, in the conviction that Yugoslavia could be a key player in the restoration of stability in the Balkans. Furthermore, Ankara was uneasy about the close relations that Greece had built up with Belgrade and felt that Athens must not be allowed to establish an alliance with Yugoslavia. Turkey was not able to go very far in improving its relations with Yugoslavia, however, when the events that broke out in early 1998 in Kosovo degenerated into open war.

On the question of Kosovo, Turkey was once again aligned against Yugoslavia. When clashes first broke out, minister of foreign affairs Ismail Cem flew to Belgrade and counseled a peaceful resolution of the issue, but it was to no avail. Yugoslavia accused Turkey of helping the Albanian armed groups in Kosovo, while Turkey claimed that Yugoslavia was backing the PKK.

Turkey took part in the military action against Yugoslavia. In addition to enforcing the no-fly zone over that country and participating in the naval blockade, Turkish F-16 aircraft were also taking part in the bombing of Yugoslavia, according to press reports. Unlike NATO's intervention in Bosnia, Turkey had approved NATO action against Yugoslavia with reluctance. There were allegations that Turkey's participation in the military action was really prompted by Yugoslavia's supplying of PKK militants with missiles. When Yugoslavia declared war on NATO members, Turkey found itself in a state of war with that country.

When Milosevic lost his majority in the election of October 2000 and was replaced by Vojislav Kostunitsa, Yugoslavia returned to international organizations, including the UN, and was admitted to the Southeast Europe Stability Pact. Yugoslavia was gradually returning to stability. Turkey's relations with Yugoslavia began to improve, and foreign minister Ismail Cem visited Belgrade in better conditions.

### IV. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND TURKEY

Turkey's Active Diplomacy during the Bosnian War

When Slovenia and Croatia broke away from Yugoslavia and were recognized by first Germany and then the rest of the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia did not want to remain in a federation dominated by Serbia and opted for independence. At the referendum held on 1 March 1992, the Bosnian Serbs kept away from the polls, and participation fell to 64%. But 99% of the votes cast were for independence, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on 3 March. The Bosnian Serbs did not recognize this outcome and proclaimed the Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska) at the end of that month, with the capital at Pale.

When the EU recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence on 6 April 1992 (followed by the U.S. on 7 April), the Bosnian Serbs—supported by the Federal Yugoslavian army made up mostly of Serbs—invaded Bosnia. Having prepared for war earlier on, the Serbs were able to overrun 70% of Bosnia in a relatively short time.

Turkey was greatly upset by the war, and throughout the 1990s Ankara pursued a long-lasting and active diplomatic campaign to involve the international community in the war and to seek effective action to end hostilities.

Turkey took the following initiatives.

1. Ankara roused all the international organizations to which it had access into action. Among these were the

UN Security Council, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and the OIC. Turkey's most notable success was in getting the international community involved in the question.

Turkey made its greatest efforts to stop the war within the OIC, because Turkey held the rotating presidency of the OIC at the outbreak of the war. Turkey expected the Islamic countries to support the Bosnian Muslims out of religious solidarity and to apply pressure on the Western countries to adopt tougher measures against the Serbs. Turkey was also instrumental in setting up a contact group within the OIC to deal with this issue.

When Turkey assumed the presidency of the Council of Europe in May 1992, it fought within this organization to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkey submitted an "Action Plan" for Bosnia to the UN in which it urged military measures to supplement the diplomatic pressure and humanitarian measures that were already in place. Turkey also sought to have the arms embargo on the Bosnians lifted.

One of Turkey's proposals to end the war and secure the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina called for NATO to intervene and mount military operations against the Serbs. Turkey advocated the aerial bombing of Serbian positions. NATO's action in this direction would come only in the summer of 1995 after the U.S. decided to intervene directly in the Bosnian war.

2. Turkey chose to pursue its diplomatic and military efforts on behalf of the Bosnians through international organizations and contributed to the forces established by the UN and NATO. Despite domestic pressures it refrained from unilateral actions. On 8 December 1992 the Turkish government obtained authorization from the TGNA to contribute forces to UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) to carry out international military action. Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution required such authorization before troops could be committed to operations beyond Turkey's borders. Turkey contributed eighteen F-16 aircraft to help enforce the no-fly resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on 31 March 1993. Naval units were also dispatched to the Adriatic Sea to enforce the blockade against the Serbs.

3. Turkey also acted in partnership with the U.S. to secure the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which came into being in March 1994. Ankara's contribution to this was very substantial.

During the Bosnian war, Turkey had a coalition government led by Demirel. Hikmet Çetin, the minister of foreign affairs, was personally committed to the Bosnian cause and visited Bosnia repeatedly in the course of the war. He also visited different capitals seeking backing for

the Bosnians and raised the issue at international organizations.

Turkey's active diplomacy was not well received in Yugoslavia or for that matter in Greece, Russia, and Bulgaria. These countries defended a hands-off policy for the international community. The new Yugoslav prime minister, Milan Panic, came to Ankara on 12 August 1992 to plead his country's case.

Turkey was making a major effort to safeguard the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey was the first country to establish an embassy in Sarajevo. Nevertheless, Ankara kept its cool and refrained from unilateral intervention in that country without being influenced by the events in the region and the Islamist pressures coming from some segments of the Turkish public. Ankara was making every effort to keep in step with the other Western countries and in particular the U.S.

Turkey refrained from unilateral military intervention for the following reasons.

- 1. Turkey was maintaining troops in Cyprus, engaged in a low-intensity war in its southeastern provinces, and conducting military operations in northern Iraq from time to time. In these circumstances, it would be difficult for it to take on additional engagements in regions like the Caucasus or the Balkans.
- 2. It was evident that a Turkish intervention in the Balkans would not go down well in the region. When the rhetoric about "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" emerged following the collapse of the USSR and the changes in regime in Eastern Europe, this had negative repercussions in the Balkans: every Turkish initiative was interpreted as an attempt to resuscitate the Ottoman Empire. Against this background, a unilateral Turkish military intervention would stir up not only its regional rivals Yugoslavia, Greece, and Russia but also countries like Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia, and Macedonia, with which it was in the process of developing cordial relations.
- 3. Furthermore, Turkey did not have the technical means to carry out a military intervention. Turkish aircraft were not allowed to use Greek airspace. Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania were also against the use of their airspace. Even if the airspace had been accessible, the range of Turkish aircraft would allow them just a few minutes to carry out any mission in Bosnia. Turkey would only acquire the capability to project its power in 1995, when it took delivery of tanker aircraft that extended the range of its combat aircraft.

In its diplomatic contacts, Turkey advocated the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia selectively in favor of the Bosnians because they had been the victims of aggression. Ankara also defended this view in international forums. But the Western countries opposed such a move, fearing that a lifting of the arms embargo would lead Russia to step up its arms deliveries to Serbia and thereby intensify the conflict. It was revealed after the war, however, that in the course of the conflict even the Iranians had been supplying arms to the Bosnians with the connivance of the U.S. As to the Bosnian Serbs, they were receiving their arms from Serbia as well as Greece, Romania, and Russia.

The U.S. came up with a six-point action plan in 1993, but Turkey did not consider this sufficient to put an end to the conflict. This plan was broader than the Vance-Owen Plan (put forward by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen) and contained new elements such as the establishment of a war-crimes tribunal and the stationing of troops in Bosnia. Turkey was not satisfied, because it did not include direct military intervention.

The Geneva Plan of July 1993 was a modified version of the Vance-Owen Plan. It envisaged the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic zones and would allow the Bosnian Serbs to establish close links with Serbia. This plan would award 52% of the land to the Serbs, although they accounted for 31% of the population of Bosnia. Turkey was opposed to this plan, because it legitimized the acquisition of land by the use of force.

The Bosnian-Croat federation established in March 1994 with the coaxing of the U.S. and Turkey had the effect of changing the course of the war. A number of developments brought about the end of the war. The arms embargo was being ignored to benefit the Bosnians and Croats, Belgrade had cut down its support for the Bosnian Serbs because of the effects of sanctions, the Bosnians and Croats were now putting up a united front against the Serbs, and finally the American attack on Serbian targets brought hostilities to an end.

In November 1995 an agreement on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina was reached in Dayton, Ohio, through the efforts of the American special representative, Richard Holbrooke. The Bosnian Serbs were represented by the Yugoslav head of state, Slobodan Milosevic; the Croats by Franco Tudjman; and the Bosnians by Alija Izzetbegovic. As a result of the agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity was preserved; but the component entities of the state, and particularly the Serbian Republic, were given a wide range of rights and powers.

Turkey felt deep satisfaction over the ending of the war in Bosnia, which was consuming much of its energy in the foreign policy area. There was also relief that the war had not spread beyond Bosnia and Turkey did not have to face a wave of refugees seeking asylum. About twenty thousand Bosnians had sought refuge in Turkey in the course of the war.

# Factors Motivating Turkey's Policies and Their Consequences

Although Islamist circles in Turkey kept criticizing the government for not being active enough, Turkey had acted with so much drive and determination during the war that it also came under criticism for concentrating its efforts too much in Bosnia, to the detriment of the Caucasus and other problem areas.

There were a number of reasons for the government's strenuous efforts in the Bosnian conflict.

- 1. It was important for Turkey to help preserve the Muslim Bosnian presence in Bosnia (Box 7-42). This had to do with Turkey's Europeanness and its European identity. The Bosnian Muslims were secular and close to Western culture. If Europe did not accept them, it would be difficult to see how Turkey itself could be accepted into Europe. That is why Turkey defended a Bosnian model that was multiethnic and multireligious.
- 2. After the Cold War, Turkey's strategic value had diminished. It had come to the fore during the Gulf War of 1991 and was now seeking to assert itself in the international arena as a regional power and make its presence felt in the Balkans. Turkey was supporting the side that enjoyed the sympathy of the Islamic and some Western countries as well as the general public and therefore enjoyed the advantage that came from being on the side of the victim.
- 3. Turkey was unhappy that its geographical link with the West was a theater of instability. Half of Turkey's foreign trade was being conducted with the EU; and during the troubles in Bosnia it had been compelled to use the longer and therefore more costly route through Romania and Hungary. Furthermore, the roughly 2 million Turkish workers in Western Europe and their families found it difficult to travel to and from Turkey because of the hostilities in Bosnia.
- 4. Because of its Kurdish question, Turkey was against the acquisition of territory by the use of force and against separatist movements started by particular groups. If the Bosnian Serbs had succeeded in breaking away through the use of force, and if this was acknowledged by the international community, it would set a bad precedent from the perspective of Turkey's internal situation.
- 5. It was a generally held view in Turkey that the Muslim Bosnians had been treated unfairly and that Turkey

#### Box 7-42. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Its Peoples in History

The Bosnians along with their other fellow Slavs started arriving in the Balkans in the seventh century. Starting in the ninth century, missionaries from Rome and the Byzantine Empire spread Christianity in the region. Those that adopted the Bogomil sect flourished in the fourteenth century and established a large state under the leadership of Ban Kulin. The Bogomil sect was considered heretical by mainstream Christians. In the period from 1461 to 1483 the Ottomans overran Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 1580 turned it into a dependency under a governor-general. The region was the Ottoman Empire's gateway to the West and as such had great strategic importance. By the sixteenth century 40% of the Bosnians had converted to Islam. The Bogomil faith is supposed to have made it easy to convert to Islam because the sect, which originated in Bulgaria, had no clerical establishment and did not require a specific place of worship. It is generally accepted that the Slavs of Bosnia converted to Islam of their own accord, because the Sufi sect, which adhered to a moderate interpretation of Islam, was dominant in the Balkans.

When Bosnia-Herzegoviria came under the control of Austria-Hungary, the Croatian element gained the ascendancy and there was much tension between Croats and Serbs. In this situation of intense rivalry between two opposing national groups, the Bosnian Muslims in general cooperated with the Croatians to preserve their identity.

The Serbs, along with the Ottomans, opposed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908. When the crown prince of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Franz Ferdinand, visited Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, he was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist, Gavril Princip, a member of the Black Hand organization.

After World War I, Bosnia Herzegovina became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Bosnians found themselves trying to maintain their identity in the face of Serbian pressure. Their separate identity and their right of self-determination were only acknowledged in 1944 during the Tito era. The 1974 Constitution recognized the Muslim Bosnians as one of the constituent nations of Yugoslavia.

The Bosnians are mostly urbanized and fairly well educated. Although Islam did not play a large part in their daily lives, there was a rise in religious fervor among the Bosnians during the 1980s and 1990s, when nationalism was on the rise in Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general.

Upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence and was the scene of bloody ethnic conflict lasting for three and a half years.

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must pursue an active policy on this issue, even though there were differences over the degree of involvement that this situation warranted. Islamist quarters and those that had Balkan ancestry advocated a more active policy in this area and even urged unilateral intervention. In response to these tendencies, the coalition government felt that it could not remain passive.

But there was also a price to be paid for an active policy.

- 1. Turkey had to sever all links with the new Yugoslavia. Soon Yugoslavia was among the countries that were supporting the PKK against Turkey.
- 2. Even if Ankara did not wish it, Turkey's stand led to an impression of polarization in the Balkans.
- 3. On this question, Turkey found itself in the camp opposing Britain, France, and Russia. The rivalry with Russia in the Balkans, however, never attained the level it had reached in the Caucasus.

Turkey registered the following gains as a result of its Bosnian policies.

1. Ankara's active policies demonstrated that Turkey was an important actor in the Balkans. Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance visited Ankara for consultation with the government before releasing their plan, and President Clinton sought the Turkish government's advice on a number of occasions. Turkey participated in UNPROFOR over the objections of Greece and Russia and sent aircraft to enforce the no-fly zone over Yugoslavia.

2. In its competition with Greece in the Balkans, Turkey found itself on the side of the oppressed and victims, earning the sympathy of others. Greece found itself outmaneuvered when it brazenly backed Yugoslavia and created the imbroglio in Macedonia.

### Turkey's Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton

Turkey continued to have cordial relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war. For the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most important postwar question was to devise ways to secure the functioning of the newly created, *sui generis* system of government. For this to happen, a balance had to be struck between the Serbs on the one hand and the Bosnians and Croats on the other. In this framework, Turkey started developing its military cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina jointly with the U.S., and this soon became the most important element of its bilateral relations with Sarajevo.

When the peace Implementation Force (IFOR) was established to secure the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, Turkey was quick to contribute a unit to the force. In addition to making a substantial contribution to the county's security, the Turkish unit earned the gratitude of the local population by engaging in the repair of damaged bridges, schools, and public buildings.

A second element of Turkey's cooperation was the military training program. This was part of the train and

equip program initiated by the U.S., which was seeking to preserve the balance of power within Bosnia-Herzegovina through military aid. Starting in May 1996, soldiers and officers from the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina began to receive training in Turkey.

Furthermore, Turkey took part in the Steering Group of the Peace Implementation Council set up within the OIC.

Thanks to its military and political links with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey increased its effectiveness in the Balkans and also gained an advantage over its rival Greece. As Bosnia-Herzegovina developed its relations with the EU and Greece in the economic and restructuring areas toward the end of the 1990s, however, Turkey's influence began to wane. The decision of Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish an embassy in the Greek-Cypriot sector in early 2000 caused bitter disappointment in Turkey, even though the decision was not implemented.

Turkey's economic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina did not match its political and military relations. This was not because Turkey neglected Bosnia-Herzegovina's restructuring efforts after the war but rather due to scarcity of resources. Following the war, Turkey extended loans in the amount of \$80 million through the Turkish Eximbank, of which \$26 million was converted to a grant.

Bilateral trade remained limited, reaching a peak of only \$50 million in 1999. The Foreign Economic Relations Council (DEIK) established a Turkey-Bosnia Business Council in May 1996 for its members. But Turkish businesses were short of financial resources and found it difficult to compete with EU members like France and Italy in that market. Turkish contractors and traders were confronted with an array of EU formalities. Nevertheless, Turkish construction firms like ENKA and Tekfen did manage to win some medium-sized contracts in Bosnia.

### V. ALBANIA AND TURKEY

During the Cold War, Turkey had managed to entertain good relations with Albania. In the 1970s Albania pursued a policy of isolation, turning inward and closing itself off from the outside world. When the socialist regime collapsed in 1991, it found its economy and its social fabric in a very fragile condition. Albania was also plagued by problems with its neighbors: the Kosovo issue with Yugoslavia, the Albanian minority in Macedonia, and the issues of Northern Epirus and the Albanian minority with Greece.

### Political Relations

Being surrounded with these problems, Albania was in search of an ally it could rely on to provide support. With

a population that was about 70% Muslim and with many close ties going back in history, Albania saw Turkey as a reliable ally in the Balkans. Turkey viewed Albania as a secular country that was suspicious of Greece and began to cultivate its relations with Tirana.

At that time Turkey supported Albania's bid to join international organizations. Turkey played a major role in getting Albania into the Black Sea Economic Cooperation project. In December 1992 Albania applied for membership in both NATO and the OIC and managed to get admitted to the OIC despite the opposition of certain groups in Albania. It relied on Turkish support, especially in its NATO membership bid. When Albania joined the OIC, Turkey was no longer the sole country in the organization that was located in Europe and also secular, despite having a population that was predominantly Muslim. Albania and Turkey were also brought closer together by Ankara's participation in the measures taken against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis, the refuge it provided to some of the displaced people of Kosovo, and the humanitarian aid that it furnished to the victims.

### Military Relations

Political and military relations with Albania developed rapidly starting in the early 1990s. In November 1991 the chief of the General Staff paid a visit to Albania, and a military cooperation agreement was signed on 29 July 1992. In January 1993 the Albanian minister of defense came to Turkey, where he met his Turkish counterpart and the chief of the General Staff. The Albanian minister solicited Turkey's aid in restructuring the Albanian army and meeting its weapons requirements. These requests met with a favorable response from Turkey, which initiated a training program. Some Albanian officers came to Turkey for training, while Turkish officers undertook the training of a commando brigade and the presidential guard in Albania. Six hundred Albanian military personnel were trained in Turkey within the framework of this program, and joint naval exercises were also held.

Another military link between the two countries was Turkey's decision to contribute 800 troops to the Multinational Peacekeeping Force (ALBA) in April 1997. This force was formed by the UN to cope with the social turmoil that occurred in Albania following the eruption in early 1997 of the scandal caused by the pyramid schemes.

In March 1998 a protocol was signed by the chiefs of the General Staff of the two countries. Known as the Vlore project, it involved the modernization of the naval base at Pashalimani by Turkey and the construction of a school for training naval officers. The construction of the

base was completed in 2001, and it was handed over the Albanian authorities.

#### **Economic Relations**

Economic relations with Albania did not attain the expected levels. The Albanian market was relatively small, and Turkey found it difficult to compete in this market with Italy and Greece. Turkey made available Eximbank loans in the amount of \$50 million, but the first installment of \$15 million remained unrepaid and the rest was never utilized.

Starting in 1995, Greece began to mend its relations with Albania. When the Greek president visited the country in 1966, an agreement was signed. After this, Albania relaxed the measures that had been in force in Northern Epirus, home to the Greek minority, and there was a noticeable improvement in relations. This also reflected in the economic relations between the two countries: Greece became Albania's second largest trading partner, after Italy.

As in the Bulgarian case, Albania distanced itself somewhat from Turkey when the Socialist Party came to power and moved closer to Greece.

# VI. THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND TURKEY

Macedonia was the only republic that became independent during the first phase of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. The country's domestic situation and its foreign relations rested on precarious balances. Macedonia's population consisted of a complex ethnic mix and was surrounded by neighbors that refused to acknowledge its name, its identity, and its claim to be a separate nation (Box 7-43). The country's chief domestic problem was the Albanian population (about a quarter of the total population). The minority was the determining factor in Macedonia's relations with Albania. The population also included some Serbs and Bulgarians as well as about 100,000 ethnic Turks.

Although Macedonia faced difficulties with all of its neighbors, its worst problem was Greece. Greece prevented Macedonia from being recognized by the EU or from receiving economic aid from that source. Furthermore, Greece blocked its economic lifeline by closing the port of Thessaloniki to Macedonia's transit trade and carried out an economic embargo from the end of 1993 to 1995.

Being surrounded by Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania, Macedonia found it expedient to cultivate

#### Box 7-43. The Macedonian Question

Macedonia is one of the problem areas of the Balkans because of the complexity of its ethnic mix (the French call dishes containing different ingredients and mixed salad *macedonia*). At present Macedonia is geographically divided into three regions with the Aegean part located in Greece, the Pirin part located in Bulgaria, and the Vardar part making up the independent republic of Macedonia.

Under Ottoman rule, Macedonia was an administrative region. After the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877–78, all of Macedonia was awarded to Bulgaria. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, however, Macedonia was restored to the Ottoman Empire on the condition that reforms would be carried out. Following this, Bulgarian foreign policy acquired a revisionist taint, pursuing the aim of recovering Macedonia.

In Macedonia itself, a movement known as IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), led by Intellectuals and motivated by nationalism, arose. Its motto was "Macedonia for the Macedonians". On 2 August 1903 the movement started an unsuccessful uprising, known as the linden uprising because it coincided with St. Ilinden's day.

With the Bucharest Treaty concluding the Second Balkan War in 1913, Macedonia was partitioned among Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The portion allocated to Serbia came to be known as Southern Serbia, and it was only after World War II under Tito's rule that the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic came into being. This development upset Bulgaria and Greece, which both saw the entity as artificial and considered the move to be politically motivated

When Macedonia became independent following Yugo-slavia's disintegration, a new "Macedonian question" emerged. Bulgaria recognized the new state but denied the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. Greece went further and objected to the new state's name, its Constitution, its history, its flag, and the symbols on its currency, it was actually objecting to the existence of the state itself. The U.S. eventually acted as mediator, and an agreement was reached in New York in September 1995. Macedonia made adjustments to its flag, its name, and its Constitution to overcome Greek objections and was able to gain membership in the UN under the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." A good number of states (including Turkey, Bulgaria, the U.S., and Russia) recognize the country as the Republic of Macedonia. Macedonia has a domestic problem in the form of the Albanian minority.

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its friendship with Turkey, the region's major actor. Turkey had found a new ally in the Balkans and was quick to start developing its relations with Skopje. After Turkey's recognition of Macedonia, the two countries signed a security protocol in Ankara on 18 May 1992. There were also advances in military relations. In March 1994 a delegation from the Turkish General Staff went to Macedonia to sign the Agreement on Cooperation in Military Training. This was followed by the Turkish minister of defense's visit in April 1994, and in April 1995 the Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Production was signed. Macedonia's mili-

tary personnel were trained in Turkey under the terms of the 1994 agreement.

Turkey considered it imperative for Macedonia to survive from the perspective of both the security of the Turkish minority and the preservation of stability in the Balkans. That is why Turkey sought to get the EU and the U.S. to recognize Macedonia and was the first country to establish an embassy in Skopje in 1993.

Whenever foreign minister Hikmet Çetin went on visits to the countries of the region, Macedonia was included in the program. President Özal also visited Macedonia in February 1993. President Demirel signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation in Skopje in July 1995.

Turkey supported Macedonia's bid to become a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the period when the Greek embargo was in effect, Turkey provided petroleum and humanitarian aid and assisted Macedonia in the repayment of its debt to the World Bank. Macedonia was also included in the East-West Motorway leading to the port of Durres in Albania.

Turkey's trade relations with Macedonia (a country of 2 million inhabitants) remained limited despite the existence of a Turkish-Macedonian Business Council. Total trade fluctuated between \$80 million and \$120 million. Turkish contractors expressed an interest in the \$3.2-billion Vardar Valley Project, involving the construction of dams and irrigation systems.

One of the most important reasons for Turkey's close links with Macedonia was Ankara's rivalry with Greece in the Balkans. In this way, Turkey strengthened its hand visà-vis Greece by increasing its influence in the area. At the same time, in strengthening its ties with a country with a predominantly Orthodox population, Ankara was able to refute the criticism that it was using Islamic elements to further its ends in the Balkans.

### The Turkish Minority in Macedonia

In the 1990s nationalism was rampant in the Balkans. Yet Macedonia was able to remain peaceful by pursuing policies of moderation toward its minorities until armed clashes broke out in early 2001. The leadership of a seasoned politician like Kiro Gligorov was largely responsible for this. Domestic tension and potential conflict were defused to some extent by measures such as the establishment of a special committee to deal with nationalities issues, allowing Albanians and Turks to set up their own parties, and admitting them into the government.

According to the 1994 census, the Turkish minority

consisted of about 100,000 people. In the past, Turkish culture and the language had been well preserved in Yugoslavia. The Turkish-language newspaper *Birlik* had been published uninterruptedly since 1944.

An important first step in the political life of the minority was the establishment of the Turkish Democratic Union during the transition to a multiparty system. This organization became a political party in June 1992 under the leadership of Erdoğan Saraç. In the election of October 1994, the Turkish Democratic Party was able to obtain only one seat in the parliament. This was due to the electoral system and the fact that the Turks were scattered throughout the country. The Turks were also unsuccessful in the 1999 election, but Adnan Halil did manage to obtain a cabinet post as the representative of the Party of the Democratic Alternative. He soon lost his job, however, when the government fell.

The Turkish minority was underrepresented in the civil service and faced problems in the field of education. Although the Turkish minority, unlike the Albanian minority, did participate in the referendum of September 1991 and voted for independence, it was not considered one of the founding elements of the state by the Macedonian authorities. Another difficulty was that the Turkish minority was caught in the middle whenever there was tension between Albanians and Macedonians in the country.

In the 1990s Macedonia was one of the countries with which Turkey had good relations. When relations between Skopje and Athens improved after 1995, the Greek economic presence in Macedonia began to make itself felt. Greek firms were very active in the course of privatizations and were able to take over enterprises in strategic sectors like communications and oil refining. Macedonia followed a course similar to Bulgaria's: by entertaining good relations with both Greece and Turkey, it was able to gain the economic and political support of both neighbors.

### VII. ROMANIA AND TURKEY

Turkish-Romanian relations were trouble free even during the Cold War, and in the 1990s Romania became one of the countries in the Balkans with which Turkey had close ties. During this period Turkey supported Romania's membership in NATO, and bilateral relations revolved around the PKK's activities in Romania, dealing with organized crime, investments, and trade.

Turgut Özal was the second head of state to visit Romania after the fall of communism, where he signed an

Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in September 1991.

Romania was burdened with the issue of Dobruja with Bulgaria and the dispute with Hungary over the Hungarian minority and also suffered from serious economic problems. It was one of the first countries to take part in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative (see Box 7-17 above). When Romania signaled its wish to join NATO, Turkey supported this bid at all levels. Turkey made a special effort on behalf of Romania, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in NATO's 1999 expansion. This support contributed to the development of bilateral relations.

In the 1990s PKK activities in Romania were on the increase, and this was affecting relations. The PKK had chosen Romania because, like Bulgaria, it was a stepping stone between the Middle East and Europe and a convenient place for trafficking in weapons, humans, and drugs. Furthermore, the PKK was extorting money from the great number of business owners from Turkey operating in Romania. Turkish representatives visiting Romania frequently raised the issue of the PKK's activities there, and Bucharest agreed in May 1998 that the PKK was a terrorist organization.

The very substantial economic and trade relations with Romania constituted an important dimension of bilateral relations. In 2008 there were about seven thousand registered Turkish firms operating in Romania. This is because the country offers numerous incentives to investors and (with a population of around 20 million) constitutes a larger market than the other Balkan countries. In 1998 the volume of trade reached \$800 million, with the target set at \$1 billion. Turkish banks have set up branches, and Botaş (the Turkish pipeline company) has started cooperating with the Romanian gas company.

Starting in 1997, Turkish-Romanian relations have developed further through a tripartite cooperative arrangement that includes Bulgaria. The three presidents held meetings in Varna in October 1997, Antalya in April 1998, and Bucharest in 1999. At the Antalya meeting, the three foreign ministers signed an agreement on Terrorism, Organized Crime, Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs, Money Laundering, and Trafficking in Arms and Humans. With a view to developing their economic cooperation, the three countries removed customs duties on industrial products. In 1999 Turkey's trade with these countries made up 76% of its trade with all Balkan countries.

Turkey's economic crisis at the end of 2000 shook the Turkish banking system, and banks like Demirbank and Bayındırbank operating in Bulgaria and Romania were taken over by the state. These developments had a very negative effect on the image of Turkish business in the Balkans. When contracting firms also began to fail along with the banks, the situation grew worse.

# VIII. THE KOSOVO QUESTION AND TURKEY

One of the most complicated and difficult questions in the Balkans for Turkey was the dispute over Kosovo (Box 7-44). On previous occasions (whether it was the oppression of the Bulgarian Turks, the Bosnian war, or the problems facing Macedonia) Turkey had known exactly where it stood and was able to take effective action to deal with the issue. The question at issue in Kosovo, however, was the desire of an ethnic and religious group to break away from the central authority and unite with a kindred neighboring country. This left Turkey in a quandary. It would have been natural for Turkey, faced with a separatist movement at home, to support Yugoslavia. Furthermore, members of the Turkish minority living in Kosovo (12,000 people according to the disputed last census and 30,000 according to their own claim) were complaining that the Albanians were applying policies of assimilation (see Box 6-23 in Section 6). Turkey was also seeking to improve its ties and restore its trade with Yugoslavia after the estrangement caused by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But when the tension in Kosovo degenerated into armed conflict in March 1998, Turkey found itself in opposition to Yugoslavia and backing the Kosovar Albanians for the following reasons.

- 1. Most of the Kosovar Albanians were Muslims, and the Turkish public supported them. Furthermore, the image of the Serbs was very poor since the Bosnian war. No Turkish government could take the Serbian side in a Serb-Muslim confrontation in the Balkans. Even neutrality was out of the question.
- Turkey and Albania had close relations. The friendship of Albania was important for Turkey in the context of Ankara's relations with Greece.
- 3. Yugoslavia was committing serious violations of human rights in Kosovo, and its standing in the international community was extremely low. Even Britain and France were now aware that the Milosevic administration was a source of trouble in the Balkans.
- 4. Washington was in favor of taking drastic steps against Yugoslavia on the issue of Kosovo, and the U.S. stand was an important consideration for Turkey.

Turkey's first official contact with the Kosovo question occurred in 1992 when the leader of the Kosovar

#### Box 7-44. The Kosovo Question

Kosovo is one of the most intractable questions in the Balkans Serbia's King Lazar was killed at the battle that was fought with the Ottomans in June 1389 at Kosovo Plain, a short distance from Pristina, and the Serbis were crushed. The Ottoman Sultan Murat met his death on the battlefield at the hands of Milos Obilich. These events left a deep mark on the Serbian psyche. Kosovo remained under Ottoman rule until 1912, when it came under Serbian sovereignty. In the interwar years there was an intensive effort to Serbianize the province. After being under Italian occupation in World War II, Kosovo reverted to Yugoslavia. Under the 1946 Constitution, it became an "autonomous territory." The Albanians were unhappy to see Kosovo kept within the borders of Yugoslavia. In reaction, they became the first to rebel in Tito's Yugoslavia.

The demonstrations and disturbances that took place in 1968 enabled the Kosovar Albanians to obtain certain concessions like education in their mother tongue and having their own university. These rights were extended under the 1974 Constitution. Now the Kosovar Albanians were allowed to establish cultural ties with Albania, display their own flag next to the federal flag, have the right to veto decisions made by Serbia when they related to Kosovo, and have representation in the Presidential Council and other rights that flowed from their autonomous status. After that, the situation was reversed: there was a period of intense Albanification.

Kosovo's autonomy was brought to an end by Serbia toward the end of 1989, and the Albanians lost their rights. They responded by proclaiming the Kosovo Republic and cutting off all contacts with Serbian officials. The Kosovo Albanians started a campaign of passive resistance under Ibrahim Rugova and organized their own educational and health services, thereby creating a parallel state system.

This system lasted for about ten years but failed to yield the expected results. Then the Kosovo Liberation Army (Usktria Clirimtare Kosoves; UCK) resorted to armed struggle. The Serbs responded with ethnic cleansing. At Rambouillet, the U.S. proposed the stationing of NATO troops in Kosovo and a referendum on independence within three years, but that was rejected by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This led NATO to start bombing Yugoslavia from the air on 24 March 1999 without the approval of the UN Security Council. Yugoslavia was eventually forced to submit to the U.S. plan. According to the plan, a peacekeeping force with NATO participation (Kosovo Force: KFOR) was deployed in Kosovo, and Yugoslav security forces withdrew from Kosovo except for the districts where the Serbian historic and religious sites were located. The Albanians who had been ejected from their homes began to return to their land.

The civilian administration in Kosovo was temporarily taken over by the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with security coming under the responsibility of KFOR. Unlike the situation in Bosnia, the number of Serbs in Kosovo was dwindling, and KFOR was unable to prevent Albanian attacks on them.

Kosovo was declared independent on 17 February 2008. The U.S. and Turkey Were among those who recognized the new republic.

(l. Uzgel)

Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, visited Ankara. On that occasion he was received by Turgut Özal, his first audience with a head of state. Rugova called on Turkey to recognize the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo during his meeting with Özal. Although his call for recognition remained unheeded, he did receive promises of political support.

The Kosovo question posed a number of problems for Turkish policy-makers in charting their course in the Balkans.

- 1. When the issue turned into armed conflict in 1998, it upset regional stability, which was highly valued by Turkey.
- 2. The Kosovo question was creating tension between Albania and Macedonia, two countries with which Turkey had good relations. This confronted Ankara with difficult choices.
- 3. As an important regional power, Turkey wanted to make its weight felt in this issue but was only able to support the separatist Albanians at the last minute because of its own difficulties with its separatist Kurds.

When tension in Kosovo led to armed conflict in February 1998, the international community's attention turned to the region. Ankara could not remain indifferent. An important Turkish initiative was foreign minister Ismail Cem's visit to Belgrade on 7 March 1998, after consultations with the UN secretary-general and the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. Cem submitted a three-stage plan to Yugoslavian president Milosevic in Belgrade. According to the plan, hostilities were to cease forthwith, the agreement on education concluded in 1996 was to be implemented, and the rights provided in the 1974 Constitution were to be restored and brought up to date. In any case, autonomy had to be restored to Kosovo. Bearing in mind its own situation, Turkey reiterated its desire to see a solution that did not infringe on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Turkey's policy in the 1990s sought to reconcile the autonomy of the Albanians with Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. Subsequently Ankara felt the need to add a further element to the equation: the principle of respect for the rights of all minorities in Kosovo. Belatedly, Turkey was seeking to ensure that the rights of the Turkish minority in Kosovo would be respected.

The Kosovo question led many in Turkey and elsewhere to draw parallels with the Kurdish question facing Turkey, mostly in quarters that were opposed to NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia and were seeking to draw attention to the inconsistency in America's policy. The debate

### Box 7-45. Kosovo and the Turkish Southeast: Similarities and Differences

At the time when Yugoslavia was being bombed by NATO under U.S. leadership in March 1999, the media (both in Turkey and elsewhere) began to draw parallels between the Kosovo question and the Kurdish question in Turkey. Although the two issues have a number of similarities, there are also significant differences.

First, the similarities: (1) Both cases involve an ethnic group concentrated in a particular region that is different and considers itself different from the majority population. (2) This ethnic group is divided among more than three different countries in both instances and nurtures the long-term goal of bringing the three parts together. (3) In both countries there is a separatist movement (the PKK in Turkey, the UCK in Kosovo). The central authority seeks to suppress this movement, although the methods used differ in each case. (4) The affected regions in both countries are economically depressed areas. This means that the local populations are deprived, which leads to complaints that the economic hardship is deliberately induced by the central authority. The result is a general feeling of malaise that fuels separation.

Let us also examine the differences: (i) Albanians in Yugoslavia are concentrated mostly in Kosovo, where they make up 90% of the population. The Kurds are dispersed throughout Turkey.

especially since 1980. About half the people of Kurdish stock pres ently live in the major urban centers, and most notably in Istanbul, which is the city with the largest Kurdish population anywhere. (2) Although the Albanians have a kindred state in Albania, the Kurds have no such kindred state. (3) The Kosovar Albanians are completely different from the Serbs in their language, religion, and culture. Intermarriages between Serbs and Albanians were the lowest among interethnic marriages in the former Yugoslavia. In Turkey, however, there are great similarities between Turks and Kurds in their religion, sect, and culture. Also, intermarriage is a commonplace event. (4) Yugoslavia was a federal state during Tito's rule (and Kosovo enjoyed autonomy until it was abolished in 1989), whereas Turkey has always been a unitary state: (5) There was heavy repression in Kosovo from 1989 to 1999 in all walks of life and Albanian teachers, police officers, judges, and other public officials were sacked. As a consequence, the Albanians established their alternative administration with an education and health service and levied their own taxes. There was nothing akin to this in Turkey.

(İ. UZGEL)

in Turkey centered around the dissimilarity between the two situations, and an effort was made to reassure Turkish public opinion that as a member of NATO Turkey could not be faced with the kinds of international pressure facing Yugoslavia (Box 7-45).

As in Bosnia, Turkey's general line in this case conformed to the policies of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. In conformity with its general policy, Ankara supported the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and participated in the NATO air exercises over Albania and Macedonia, which were carried out earlier than originally scheduled because of the events in Kosovo.

When the diplomatic contacts between the U.S. and Yugoslavia seeking a way out of the Kosovo impasse broke down, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia began on 24 March 1999. This made a great impact on the course of the Kosovo problem and rendered Turkey's position even more delicate. As a member of NATO it had—even if reluctantly—endorsed the principle of bombing a sovereign country in violation of international law because that country had committed massacres among its minority group (Box 7-46). When some NATO military personnel that served in the region started developing cancer a year later, it became clear that NATO forces had used bombs containing depleted uranium, thus creating a hazard to both humans and the environment.

Turkey not only supported the decision to bomb Yugoslavia but also participated in the operations by sending eleven and later eighteen F-16 aircraft. At first the Turkish

jets were engaged only in patrolling, but in the later stages they took part in the actual bombing. Turkey also sent a warship to the Adriatic Sea to enforce the blockade that was in force.

NATO kept up its operations throughout April 1999. When NATO sought permission to use Turkish air bases to enhance the effectiveness of the operations, Turkey agreed. On 27 April 1999 the cabinet decided to place the bases at Balıkesir and Bandırma at the disposal of NATO's combat aircraft, while the base at Çorlu was opened to aerial refueling tanker aircraft. Starting on 3 June, American aircraft and personnel began to arrive at these bases; but when Yugoslavia and NATO reached agreement in mid-June, the need to shift some of the operations to Turkish bases no longer existed.

The UN secretary-general set up a seven-nation group known as the Friends of Kosovo with which he could consult in the process of deciding Kosovo's future. The G-7 countries, Russia, China, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey were included in this group.

Turkey decided to contribute a force of 1,000 troops to serve in the multinational peacekeeping force (KFOR) that would be deployed in Kosovo. As a result of consultations with NATO officials, it was decided to deploy the Turkish contingent in the vicinity of the districts of Mamusa, Dragos, and Prizren, where the Turkish minority was concentrated. As the multinational force began to arrive in Kosovo, the Turkish contingent was able to get underway only on 30 June 1999, due to the delays caused

# Box 7-46. The Bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO Forces and International Law

According to article 39 of the UN Charter, intervention such as bombing in a country can only occur if the UN Security Council determines that a breach of the peace, a threat to the peace, or an act of aggression exists. According to article 42, the UN Security Council must authorize all use of force.

The Security Council adopted three main resolutions with regard to Kosovo. With its resolution 1799, the council determined that in Kosovo there was a threat to the region's peace and security, as described in article 39 of the charter. It did not take the second step, however, calling for action as prescribed in article 42. Consequently, it cannot be claimed that NATO was acting in compliance with the UN Charter on the basis of resolution 1799:

An alternate view has been advanced that the action taken was humanitarian intervention. According to this view, if a state intringes on the fundamental humanitights of its own citizens and acts in a manner that affronts the collective conscience of humanity, the matter ceases to be an internal affair and intervention becomes justified. Furthermore, what was demanded in Kosovo was autonomy and not independence, so Yugoslavia's territorial integrity was not violated. The upholding of human rights is one of the main purposes of the UN

No rule that would make humanitarian intervention legal yet exists, however. There is no example of a clear out intervention based solely on humanitarian grounds, and such a rule would open the door to abuses. That is why most states and scholars reject this type of intervention. Consequently, it would be difficult to justify the Kospvo intervention on this basis.

(F. KESKIN)

by disagreements between NATO and Bulgaria over the passage of troops.

The result was that the Russian and Greek troops arrived earlier, giving these countries a tactical advantage. Critics in Turkey began to lament that their country's standing in the Balkans was declining. Turkish units were greeted with great enthusiasm in Prizren as they moved in to take up their positions. Following the restoration of order and notwithstanding Turkey's active role on behalf of the Kosovars during the crisis, the leaders of the Turkish community and Ankara were obliged to make a major effort to secure improvements in the condition of the minority. Turkish was no longer one of the official languages of the autonomous region, even though this right had been granted in the 1974 Constitution. The United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the administering authority, reduced the number of Turkish-language classes and dropped the use of Turkish in electoral documents on the grounds that funds were lacking. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to intervene to reverse these decisions. Despite Turkey's efforts, Turkish was

accepted only as a semiofficial language in Kosovo. The main party of the minority, the Democratic Unity Party, refused to take part in the election of October 2000 in protest.

# IX. ALLEGATIONS ABOUT ORTHODOX AND MUSLIM BLOCS IN THE BALKANS AND TURKISH-GREEK RIVALRY

In the 1990s Turkey emerged as a major political and military power in the Balkans and began to develop its relations with most of the countries in the region. This led to a perception (particularly in Greece and the new Yugoslavia) that an Islamic axis was in the making. Before considering whether this perception was based on reality or was consistent, it should be noted that it was grounded on two developments.

In the 1990s new countries allied to Turkey emerged in the Balkans and the Central Asian republics gained their independence. This created much excitement in Turkey. Carried away by this excitement, president Turgut Özal and prime minister Süleyman Demirel frequently used the rhetoric of "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China," giving rise to concern in Russia and a number of Balkan countries. There was already a certain concern over Turkey's rising influence in the region, and the rhetoric that accompanied this only compounded the concern. Although it never became Turkey's official policy, it was known that some of the people in President Özal's inner circle harbored notions of Neo-Ottomanism and sought to apply these notions to Turkey's Balkan policies (Box 7-47).

The second reason was Turkey's developing relations with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia and the apprehension this was causing in both Greece and Yugoslavia. In particular, Greek and Serbian writers and politicians were claiming that a sort of "Islamic axis" was being created that included the three countries plus the Turkish and Muslim peoples of Greece, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and the district of Sanjak. The admission of Albania as a member by the OIC in December 1992 was perceived as a step in this direction. According to this approach, Turkey was revising Islam in the region under its leadership and using this as a vehicle to encircle the Orthodox countries.

Throughout the Yugoslavia crisis, Greece backed the Serbs in the name of historic friendship and Orthodox solidarity. Russia was backing these two countries; and as relations among the three got closer during the 1990s, speculation began to grow that they were out to create a

#### Box 7-47. Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy

Neo-Ottomanism is a wave that came to the fore in Turkey during Turgut Özal's presidential term. This wave had its roots in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that was being developed as of 1980. It has both domestic and foreign policy implications:

The idea stems from the notion that Turkey must come to term with its history and questions the break with the Oftoman past in the form of the Republic and the achievements of the Turkeish revolution. According to the holders of this view, Atatürk's reforms came from the top and destroyed the Turks' links with their own past. Concepts and practices relating to state-society and state-religion and secularism have been imposed by the civilian-military bureaucracy with a rigid statist mentality and need to be reinterpreted and redefined. The role of the state in the political and social spheres must be reduced, restrictions on religious orders must be lifted, civil society must be developed, the approach to ethnic and religious questions must be made more flexible, and the less confrontational Ottoman model should be employed in dealing with these issues.

The advocates of this approach had the feeling that not just the Turks but also people like the Bosnians in the Balkans and the Turcomans in northern Iraq recalled the Ottoman period and yearned to return to this past era.

In the sphere of foreign policy, this approach called upon Turkey to invoke its Ottoman past in dealing with the countries of the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia and to play the role of their protector. A vacuum appeared in these regions at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, and Turkey was the only country that

could fill this void. In the turmoil that characterized the Balkans in the 1990s, Turkey recalled the roughly five hundred years of Pax Ottomanica in the region and assumed the role of peace-maker. This held true not only for the Balkans but also for the Middle East. Here too, Turkey was expected to play an active role and exert its influence at least in its periphery in places like northern irag.

In this context, maintaining the frontiers defined by the National Pact and the status quo, the foundation of Ataturk's foreign policy, was considered unimportant and too restrictive. This approach was obviously expansionist: its first target appeared to be Mosul, a region from which traditional Turkish foreign policy had stood aloof.

Neo-Ottomanism was espoused by certain marginal commentators and the racist Right in particular and remained a dream without finding its reflection in Turkey's foreign policy. The dream was effectively blocked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military establishment, the upholders of the traditional foreign policy. When Ozal's expansionist Mosul policies came to light, they were blocked by the chief of the General Staff, Necip Torumtay, who resigned in protest.

The novel and unusual foreign policy rhetoric coming from Turkey also stirred much suspicion and concern in Russia and among the Orthodox in the Balkans and gave rise to speculation in the Middle East that Turkey was being dragged down adventurist paths.

(İ. Uzgel)

"Slav/Orthodox axis" to which Romania and Bulgaria would also be drawn.

This polarization along religious lines was mainly based on history and the political conditions prevailing at that juncture.

True, in the 1990s there was a polarization in the Balkans, but it was difficult to argue that this was based on religion. First, contrary to Greek claims, the so-called Islamic axis was not homogeneous. For example, Macedonia had a population that was predominantly Orthodox and had approached Turkey to counter Greek pressure and to a certain extent because of problems with its other neighbors.

Second, it would be very difficult for Turkey to use the Turkish/Muslim minorities in the region for its purposes, and the condition of the minorities would hardly allow such a course to be taken. The only substantial Turkish minority in the region was in Bulgaria, but this minority was well integrated in Bulgaria's political life and was playing a positive role in the development of Ankara's relations with Sofia. As for the Bosnians, they were fighting for their own survival until the mid-1990s and were in no condition to become a part of any axis.

Finally, policies based on religion were incompatible with the nature of foreign policy. Policies were based

not on the religion of a country but on the dictates of national interest. This is borne out by the close relations between Orthodox Macedonia and Turkey, while Bulgaria and Romania (both Orthodox) kept out of any bloc and maintained good relations with Turkey as well as with Greece and Yugoslavia. In fact, eager to become members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania supported the alliance's military operation against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1999.

Turkey's rivalry with Greece in the Balkans was based not on religion but on economic and political considerations. When the Costas Simitis government came to power in Greece in 1996, Greek foreign policy was revised and relations with neighbors were mended. An agreement was reached with Macedonia; and relations with Albania, which had been under strain because of the questions of Northern Epirus and migrant workers, began to improve. There was a noticeable increase in high-level visits. Greece's new diplomatic initiatives were accompanied by intensified economic activities. In the case of Albania, Greece became the second most important partner (after Italy) in the fields of trade and investments. Greece became the top country in foreign investments in Macedonia. Greece overtook Turkey to become Bulgaria's fourthlargest trading partner, pushing Turkey into fifth place.

In Romania, however, Turkey was seventh, while Greece trailed in seventeenth position as a trading partner.

Greek investments in the region reached \$3 billion. This dazzling economic and diplomatic performance was in large measure due to Greece's membership in the EU. As a result of the changes made by Simitis in Greek foreign policy, the EU began to see Greece as its representative in the Balkans. To cite an example, the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Economic Restructuring Program (PHARE) program, designed to help the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, provided funds to carry out infrastructure projects. The EU frequently placed the contracts for these projects with Greek firms. In the fields of energy, transport, and communications, Greece was used as the link to bind the future members to the EU. Greece used the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE) to take over telecom operations in the Balkans. In the privatization of refineries and other strategic public enterprises, Greek firms took an active part, with the backing of their government and the EU. Furthermore, Greece undertook to facilitate the accession of Balkan countries to the EU, promised to back their membership in EC councils, and took a leading role in the EU's regional initiatives backed by France. In October 1999 a meeting on the subject of Fields of Cooperation between the BSEC and the EU was held in Athens. At this meeting, Greek representatives proposed to take over the function of providing the link between the BSEC and the EU. Greece's efforts paid off when Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to recognize the Greek-Cypriot administration. This was a great disappointment for the Turkish public, which looked upon Bosnia-Herzegovina with much sympathy, and for the Turkish diplomats who had made such strenuous efforts to ensure the existence of that country.

Mostly in cooperation with the U.S., Turkey was active in the region in the political and military spheres. As conflict and instability in the region were gradually being overcome, Turkey's influence began to wane. The Turkish private sector was not much interested in the region (Romania being the exception). The share of the Balkan states in Turkey's foreign trade remained at 2.6% in the late 1990s. The Turkish Eximbank's loans to the region remained at a very low level and therefore proved inadequate to underpin Turkey's political and military influence. There were a number of causes for this.

- 1. For political reasons, Turkey's main effort was concentrated in the regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and there were serious difficulties in recovering the credits extended to the states of this region.
- The private sector was reluctant to invest in Balkan markets because of their relatively small size.

3. The EU had a negative approach to Turkish firms in the awarding of contracts and was prone to creating difficulties. Turkey sought to maintain its political influence in the region through its participation in the U.S.-led Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative and the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe.

In the second half of the 1990s Turkey also undertook diplomatic initiatives to supplement its efforts to overcome ethnic conflicts and engage in military cooperation. Among these were the meetings of foreign ministers of southeastern Europe.

The Southeast European Countries Cooperation Process held in Istanbul in June 1998 was followed by a summit meeting in Antalya in October 1998. Turkey also took the initiative to bring the prime ministers together in Bucharest on 12 February 2000, where they signed the Charter of Good Neighborliness, Stability, Security, and Cooperation in Southeast Europe. After the Balkan Pact of 1934, this was the second document of this nature signed by the countries of the region.

Following the bombing of Yugoslavia, the Western countries were seeking to restructure the whole region. In this framework, Germany took advantage of its presidency of the EU to propose the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, which received the backing of the EU. The Stability Pact was launched at the summit held at Sarajevo in July 1999, attended by over thirty heads of state and government. Turkey participated at the level of head of state. At the meeting, Turkey secured the inclusion of two items in the final declaration of the summit: that regional firms should also be awarded contracts in restructuring projects and that measures should be taken to combat terrorism. With the coming into effect of the Stability Pact, the process of turning the region into Europe's hinterland and incorporating it into the European system got underway. Turkey declared its support for the pact in its official pronouncements. Starting in July 2000, Turkey assumed the co-chairmanship of the Second Working Table dealing with Reconstruction, Development, and Cooperation in the Economic Field for six months. But Turkey had certain reservations arising from the likelihood that the countries of the region would neglect cooperation among themselves in their enthusiasm for early membership in the EU and NATO. Turkey was stressing the need for the regional countries not to forget the Process of Cooperation of the Southeast European States that was launched in 1988.

In the post—Cold War era, when Turkey found itself encircled in turmoil and conflict, Ankara was most active in the Balkans and experienced its most notable foreign policy successes there. This was due to a number of factors.

- 1. Turkey was more familiar with the Balkans than it was with the Caucasus, and Russian influence in this region was more indirect.
- 2. Turkey benefited from Greek pressure on Macedonia and the difficulties confronting Albania, although it had nothing to do with these developments.
- Turkey was finding itself on the side of the downtrodden, the victims of aggression, and the weak in the Balkans.
- 4. Turkey avoided injecting a religious dimension into its foreign policy and tried its best not to give a Muslim-Christian tinge to the conflicts in the region. This gave its foreign policy a modern look.
- 5. Turkey avoided the traps of pursuing adventurist policies or using Turkish or Muslim minorities for its own purposes when dealing with their host countries. It counseled a law-abiding course to its kin and resorted to diplomatic action only when the minority's rights stemming from international law were infringed.

6. Turkey cooperated with the West even though this did not go down so well with the Turkish public. In this framework, Turkey's cooperation with the U.S. held a special place. This became very clear in Ankara's relations with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, particularly in the political and military fields. Turkish-U.S. cooperation went smoothly because the interests in the region of the two countries were convergent. Both were against the spread of Russian influence in the Balkans. As the superpower of the post-Cold War period, the U.S. was asserting itself in the Balkans and found it opportune to cooperate with Turkey, a country that pursued similar objectives even though its concerns were different. As Turkey increased its political and military influence in the Balkans as a regional country, it found it convenient to take advantage of the American capacity to get things done in this area.

# X. BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION (THE BSEC)

The Establishment of the BSEC

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation project was first mooted by the former Turkish ambassador to the U.S. in January 1990. The bureaucracy remained cool to the idea; but when president Turgut Özal took the idea up, the necessary demarches began to be made. Originally the project included the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania in addition to Turkey. When these countries proved receptive to the idea, preparatory meetings were convened, first in Bucharest in March 1991 then in Sofia in April 1991 and in Moscow in July 1991.

When the USSR came apart in the middle of 1991, the newly independent states of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia displayed interest in the BSEC. Greece and Yugoslavia also participated in the preparatory meetings as observers.

A meeting was held in Istanbul in February 1992 to get the former Soviet republics involved in the process. Eventually the BSEC came into being with the signing of the Istanbul Declaration on 25 June 1992 (Box 7-48). Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russia Federation, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia became members of the BSEC. Israel, Slovakia, Austria, Italy, Egypt, Poland, and Tunisia became observers.

The purpose of the BSEC is to develop cooperation among its members in the fields of trade, economy, the environment, and science and technology. In this way, economic relations in a region encompassing 350 million people were to be revitalized. Furthermore, a platform would be created to help settle problems among the members of the Black Sea community. Article 5 of the declaration read as follows: "[the member states] confirm the intention to develop economic cooperation as a contribution to the CSCE process, to the establishment of a Europe-wide economic area, as well as to the achievement of a higher degree of integration of the Participating States into the world economy." Article 7 declared that the parties "[a]gree that their economic cooperation will be developed in a manner not contravening their obligations and not preventing the promotion of the relations of the Participating States with third parties, including international organizations as well as the EC and the cooperation within the regional initiative."

Article 11 of the Summit Declaration affirms that "the entire economic cooperation among their countries is open for the participation of other interested states recognizing the provisions of this Document." Article 14 declares that "the Participating States will act to improve the business environment…by facilitating…the prompt entry, stay, and free movement of businessmen,…providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises,…ensuring appropriate conditions for investment, capital flows, and different forms of industrial cooperation." Turkey was the country that stood to benefit most from these provisions

Originally, one of the important objectives of the BSEC was the establishment of a free trade area. At the initial stages Turkey was seeking to further this objective but was not able to obtain the support of other participating states. It was not possible to conclude an agreement or a convention at the meeting in Istanbul to consider this issue, and the meeting ended with just a declaration.

As time went on, however, the BSEC became more institutionalized. The Secretariat started functioning in March 1995. In June 1998 a charter was signed at Yalta. With the ratification of the charter by members, the BSEC gained an international legal personality and turned into a regional economic organization. Henceforth it became known as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO).

The efforts to develop cooperation among BSEC members were not confined to trade but also encompassed financial cooperation, especially in the fields of transport and energy. Among the notable projects receiving support were the Black Sea Ring Corridor and the Black Sea Electrical Ring.

### The BSEC's Place in Turkish Foreign Policy

The BSEC is important for Turkey because it was a Turkish initiative from the very beginning. Turkey was in a position to take this initiative as a result of its economic development during the 1980s. The changes occurring on the international scene were also propitious for such a political initiative.

The timing of the BSEC initiative must also be noted. Until the mid-1980s Turkey had sought to penetrate Middle East markets, but the drop in oil prices prevented this from happening. In these circumstances Turkey made its membership application to the EC in 1987. The EC informed Turkey in December 1989, however, that Turkey could not hope for membership in the near future. It was at this juncture that the BSEC project was taken up.

Turkey gave assurance both to the EU and to the members of BSEC that the project was not an alternative to the EU. On the contrary, the project would allow the former socialist countries to get involved in regional economic cooperation and gain experience. This would make it easier for them to integrate, should they become members of the EU one day.

For the foregoing reasons, Turkish business circles were enthusiastic supporters of the BSEC project. To a certain extent, this was due to the disappointment over the EU's decision and the desire to gain priority access to markets that were perceived as promising.

One of the features of the project was that Turkey had the upper hand politically and economically. Turkey had a ten-year lead over the other members in the field of economic liberalization and might be able to capitalize on this lead to gain political advantage in the region.

At first it was expected that Western firms would seek access to the new markets through Turkey and that the new structure would serve as a platform for penetrating these markets.

### Box 7-48. The Organs of the BSEC

The chairmanship of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) rotates among members in alphabetical order. The most important organ is the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The meetings are held once every six months. The Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MMFA) is responsible for the functioning of the BSEC, the establishment of subsidiary organs, and the admission of observers.

Another important body of the BSEC is the Parliamentary Assembly, which was established in February 1993 by all BSEC participating states other than Bulgaria and Greece. Greece Joined the assembly in June 1995 despite Turkey's opposition

In December 1992 the decision was made to establish a BSEC International Secretariat in Istanbul. The secretariat began functioning in March 1995,

Although the BSEC is an intergovernmental organization, the private sector is also expected to participate in its cooperation activities. Special attention is given to supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and developing links among them and facilitating the free circulation of businesspeople. A BSEC Business Council has been established, consisting of the representatives of the business communities. The BSEC Business Council is a related body of the BSEC, with its secretariat in listanbul.

The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank is an important body within the framework of Black Sea cooperation. The bank is designed to provide financial resources to its members its headquarters is located in Thessaloniki, its president, is a Turkish national, and his deputy is a Bulgarian national. The bank began its operations on 1 June 1999.

In addition, the BSEC has Working Groups dealing with sectors like the environment, transport, tourism, science and technology, and telecommunications. There is also a center in Ankara dealing with statistics and the exchange of economic data.

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Turkey was quick to note the political and economic vacuum in the region and sought to exploit the opportunities in good time. The Black Sea region had been neglected by Turkey until then, but now it was firmly on the agenda of policy-makers in its institutional dimension.

At the 1999 Istanbul Summit of the heads of state and government of the BSEC, it became clear from Demirel's statements that Turkey still harbored hopes of establishing a free trade area among member countries.

# The Performance Record of the BSEC as an International Initiative

The BSEC remained an institution that failed to live up to expectations. It was an international organization in which all of the regional countries wanted to participate at the time of its inception; but once it was established, the members were reluctant to make the effort needed for the BSEC to achieve its ambitious goals.

The BSEC never came close to achieving the free trade area proposed by Turkey and remained a loose political and economic association. There were a number of reasons for this.

The members appeared to have no political will to ensure the success of the BSEC. A sign of this was that the BSEC Declaration was never approved by parliaments. Therefore the BSEC could not be registered with the UN as an international organization, making it impossible to tap the resources of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. When the BSEC managed to become an international organization in 1999, this handicap was finally overcome.

Another sign of the lack of political will among members was their tendency to send representatives to meetings of working groups who were not in positions of responsibility. This showed that they did not expect the BSEC to produce worthwhile results. Furthermore, given the internal and external problems confronting them, they had different foreign policy priorities. None of them wanted to be left out, however, so they considered it preferable for the BSEC to continue as it was, even though it was ineffective.

Some members suffered from internal strife, while others had disputes and in some cases armed clashes with fellow members. Georgia went through a civil war; in Albania the central government collapsed; Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war; Greece and Turkey were in open rivalry; Ukraine and Russia were feuding over the Black Sea fleet; and Russia was fighting separation in Chechnya. As these countries focused on these pressing issues, they were unable to turn the BSEC into an effective vehicle for regional cooperation.

Other negative factors were the policies of Greece and Armenia that were blocking the BSEC's development. This is why complaints were voiced in Turkey that Greece had been admitted to BSEC membership even though it was not a littoral state of the Black Sea. Setting up the headquarters of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki was also a cause for grumbling in Turkey.

From an economic perspective, none of the members (with the exception of Greece and Turkey) had complementary economies. All except Greece and Turkey were former socialist economies struggling with the same difficulties. Neither the international organizations nor Greece and Turkey were in a position to provide the financial resources that these countries required, leading to expectations that remained unfulfilled. The BSEC countries failed to achieve relatively simple objectives like eliminating double taxation.

### The Black Sea Peace Force (Blackseafor)

A second Turkish initiative in the Black Sea region was the proposal to establish a Black Sea Cooperation Task Force among the littoral Black Sea states. This project's extent was narrower than the BSEC's and involved Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Their representatives met in Ankara in October 1998 and decided that a multinational force would be set up to engage in search and rescue missions, mine sweeping, environmental protection, and maintaining security. The agreement for the establishment of the force was signed in Istanbul on 2 April 2001. According to the agreement, Blackseafor would not be a permanent arrangement but would come into being once or twice a year when its services were required or for training purposes. It would be commanded during the first year by a Turkish admiral, with the command rotating among the different members in alphabetical order.

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# The Issue of Human Rights

### The International Environment

During the 1980s the issue of human rights was shaking Turkish foreign policy but remained manageable. In the 1990s this issue turned into a permanent crisis and became an important factor in foreign policy. There were four notable developments in the 1990s.

- 1. During the 1990s Turkey gradually began to be faced with the consequences of the responsibilities assumed previously, when (according to international conventions) Ankara had accepted the jurisdiction of the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) in 1987 for individual applications and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1990. As the ECmHR began to accept applications by individuals and refer them to the ECtHR, judgments finding Turkey responsible for violations began to be passed as of 1995. In the 1990s, in addition to their decisions, the new organs established under the conventions against torture were also beginning to find Turkey in breach of its international commitments and were placing it in an embarrassing legal situation.
- 2. In the 1980s the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP) were taking Turkey to task on the issue of human rights. Gradually these organs began to focus on the Kurdish question. Turkey's practices with respect to human rights and minority rights were being questioned, and the appeals to Ankara to abide by its international commitments were making it difficult for Turkey to put up a credible legal defense.
- 3. As a result of these developments, the western and northern European countries began to look upon the Kurdish question as the determining issue in their relations with Turkey and began to use their financial and military aid as a lever to influence Turkey's behavior.
- 4. The U.S. attitude toward Turkey and its record on human rights also began to shift. During the 1980s the U.S. ignored Turkey's violations and gave it full backing, whereas in the 1990s Washington assigned Turkey a new

role and began to insist on behavior that matched: compliance with democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

The reason for this was that the 1990s were considered to be the beginning of "a new age" in the field of human rights. This was solemnly proclaimed in the Charter of Paris signed in November 1990 by the heads of state and government of the participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1990 the Soviet bloc came apart and the triumph of capitalism was acknowledged. The Charter of Paris proclaimed this triumph by asserting the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. During the 1990s these principles became the tools for determining the legitimacy of governments. The principles were recognized as the condition for securing order and stability on both the national and international levels. As a consequence, the violation of human rights began to be perceived as an international question.

Another development of the 1990s was the reemergence of minority rights as a major issue. This was closely linked with human rights but differed in some important ways. As the former socialist countries went about establishing their national states, action began to be taken at the international level to establish legal arrangements that would protect minorities and the rights of individuals belonging to minority groups. Measures were also taken at the institutional level to ensure the implementation of these arrangements (Box 7-49).

As the principles of respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law gained ascendancy politically and ideologically, they began to dominate the agendas of international organizations. The UN Commission on Human Rights intensified its control and follow-up activities through its working groups and rapporteurs. Although its decisions were not binding, they carried great political weight. The CSCE intensified and diversified its activities (after 1994 it became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: OSCE) and established

# Box 7-49. Developments Relating to Minority Rights in the 1990s

During the 1990's minority rights (or rather the rights of individuals belonging to minority groups) were the fastest developing branch of international law. Minority rights came to the fore after World War I and remained more or less fixed after the adoption of the broad principle of respect for human. rights after World War II. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, there was a resurgence of nationalism. This created an urgent heed to address the questions confronting ininorities in a manner that would safeguard peace and stability. The rights of individuals belonging to minority groups had already been raised within the CSCE since the 1975 Final Act of Helsinkl, But the Copenhagen Document adopted at the Human Dimension Conference in 1990 dealt with the issue in the most comprehensive manner. This was followed by the Report of the Meeting of Experts held in Geneva in 1991. The report dealt with the subjects relating to national minorities and the rights of individuals belonging to national minority groups and concluded that these issues did not constitute the exclusive internal affair of the host state. In 1992 It was decided to set up the post of high commissioner of national minorities. The high commissioner would have the responsibility of dealing with minority issues in the CSCF countries before they turned into armed conflicts

The rights of individuals belonging to minority groups were also taken up by other organizations. In 1992 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Individuals Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities. The Council of Europe prepared two international conventions on the subject. One was the European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages, adopted in 1992. The other was the Framework Convention on National Minorities of 1995, which came into effect in 1998.

All of these arrangements had the same objective, to allow individuals belonging to minority groups to enjoy their human rights fully and to preserve their distinctive ethnic, religious, or linguistic identities. The minorities were not granted political rights as a group, and it was reiterated that they had duties toward the country of which they were citizens. This demonstrates that these rights were not meant as a first step toward the independence of minorities and were conceived as a matter of imperative necessity to safeguard national and regional peace and stability.

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new bodies such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly. It developed its ability to intervene in disputes relating to national minorities by appointing a High Commissioner for National Minorities. The Council of Europe increased its membership and introduced comprehensive aid programs designed to assist the new democracies in this field. The PACE also expanded its activities in the field. Above all, the ECtHR was turned into a permanent and mandatory court in 1998 (Box 7-50).

### Box 7-50. The Eleventh Protocol and the New ECHR

The Eleventh Protocol that came into force in November 1998 made important changes in the system of oversight in the European Convention on Human Rights (see Box 6-27 in Section 6). The previous system was ineffective because it was slow. It involved the decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers, bodies with no judicial identity (see Box 6-28 in Section 6), and it was optional and not mandatory. In the new system, the European Commission on Human Rights was abolished, the role of the Committee of Ministers was ended, and the court was restructured as a permanent body with compulsory jurisdiction. This meant that the optional system came to an end; all of the parties to the European Convention on Human Rights now came under its juridical oversight.

Under the new system, individual applications are first referred to a committee of three judges for scrutiny, if the committee decides that the application is receivable, it goes on to one of the seven chambers (lower courts in EGHR parlance), consisting of seven judges. If the chamber decides that the application can be received, it goes on to examine the substance At this stage, the ECHR carries out the only nonjudicial function within its purview and seeks a "friendly settlement" between the parties: if a friendly settlement cannot be reached, the chamber concludes the consideration of the case and decides whether the state concerned has or has not violated the ECHR. The decision is final, but in exceptional cases one of the parties can send the case for review by the Grand Chamber, the full court, consisting of seventeen judges: if the Grand Chamber agrees to consider the case, its decision is final. In the new system, the possibility for states to lodge an application has been preserved. When this happens, the case goes directly to a chamber without going through the committee stage, as is the case for individual applications

With its permanent and mandatory judicial oversight, the new system constitutes the first stage in the transition from an international to a supranational system of overseeing the protection of human rights:

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These developments had a very significant effect on the EU. The Maastricht Treaty proclaimed that respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law were the basic principles of the EU and membership in it and relations with it were made conditional on respect for human rights.

Throughout this period the activities and the influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of human rights were registering significant gains. The human rights organizations operating at the national level tightened their links with international NGOs and provided a constant stream of facts and opinions to individuals and organizations active in the field. They also became effective in acting as a pressure group to influence government policies.

### The Situation in Turkey

As these developments were taking place, Turkey was still under the legal system imposed by the 12 September coup. This by itself was enough to focus international attention on Turkey. In addition, there were the difficulties caused by the PKK. During the 1990s the situation in Turkey with respect to human rights could be summarized as follows.

- 1. The struggle against the PKK resulted in new restrictive provisions being added to the 12 September legislation in the early 1990s. Among these, the Law to Combat Terrorism (TMK) had a special place (Box 7-51).
- 2. This situation not only led to massive violations of human rights in the southeastern region but also contributed to spreading and diversifying of human rights violations in the rest of the country. New restrictions were imposed on the freedom of thought, expression, assembly, and association; the right to enjoy due process of law was curtailed; and deaths from torture, extrajudicial executions, and cases of disappearing persons became everyday occurrences.
- 3. Toward the end of the decade it became apparent that the military operations to suppress the PKK had succeeded. In early 1999 Öcalan was captured and brought to trial. These developments removed terror as a pretext for legitimizing human rights violations. Furthermore, the accident that occurred at Susurluk in 1996 revealed the urgent need to convert Turkey to a nation under the rule of law and respectful of human rights as advocated by the U.S. and Europe (see Box 7-6 above). These developments arrested the rise in human rights violations and led to a diminution in the number of torture allegations. Turkey entered the new century as a country that was under an autocratic legal order, however, where human rights were being routinely violated. We shall now examine the place of human rights in the foreign policy of Turkey during the 1990s.

### Human Rights and Turkish Foreign Policy

In 1990 Turkey took some positive steps that had international repercussions. One of the most important was to recognize the mandatory jurisdiction of the ECtHR. It was thereby accepted for the first time that human rights violations could be referred to an international legal body for a decision. The European Social Charter was also ratified in 1990, and a committee to look into human rights was established in the TGNA. Another development was the abolition of the death penalty for thirteen categories of crimes. There was also a negative development that year, however, when the State of Emergency decrees were promulgated (Box 7-52). These decrees applied in the re-

#### Box 7-51. The Law to Combat Terrorism (TMK)

The Law to Combat Terrorism (TMK: Terorie Mücadele Kanunu) came into effect on 12 April 1991 and left its mark on the 1990s. This law gave the most trouble to Turkey in the international sphere: It supplanted articles 140, 141, 142, and 163 of the penal code, which had been restricting freedom of expression for more than half a century, It also supplanted the law that forbade the Kurdish language (see Box 6-4 in Section 6). The TMK introduced the "crime of terror" in the broadest terms (also including the supplanted articles mentioned above), however, and imposed an even more restrictive regime. The law was severely criticized for violating the principle of equality and for blurring the legal definition of criminal acts. In 1992 the Constitutional Court invalidated the provisions that granted broad rights and conferred immunities on the police. In international platforms, the brunt of the criticism was directed at article 8 of the law: "Regardless of the method, purpose, or reason, no written or oral propaganda can be made or meeting, demonstration, or march organized with the aim of de stroying the indivisible unity of the Turkish State with its country and its nation" (Resmi Gazete Official Journal), 12 April 1991). This article made it possible to define all kinds of expression of opinion within the context of a "crime of terror" and therefore punishable. In this period the article was used primarily to prosecute any kind of thought or expression relating to the Kurdish question. A great number of intellectuals and dissidents who adopted critical attitudes on the issue of democracy or the Kurdish question along with those publishing their views were tried and condemned under the TMK. When these cases were referred to the ECtHR, it found violations in most of the cases on the grounds that these restrictions on the freedom of expression could not be considered to be justified in a democratic society. Under international presture, article 8 was amended in 1995 and was only repealed on 19 July 2003 under the sixth Adjustment Reform Package (to adjust Turkish legislation to EU norms) and by overriding a presiden-

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gion that was under a State of Emergency (OHAL in the Turkish acronym). The government used these decrees to deal with the Kurdish question, but their effect was immediately felt in Turkey's foreign relations. In May 1990 Austria announced that it was suspending arms sales to Turkey on the grounds that they might be used in the southeast.

Another cause for international concern was the lack of progress in combating torture either in the legislation or in practice. In 1990 Turkey was high on the agenda of the bodies established by two conventions that Turkey had ratified two years earlier. The Committee against Torture (CAT) established under the UN Convention against Torture decided in 1990 to conduct a confidential investigation on Turkey. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) set up under the European Convention

#### Box 7-52. The State of Emergency Decrees

These decrees had the force of law and were known as the SS decrees because they frequently called for censorship and exile (in Turkish sansür ve sürgün). The decrees resulted in massive and systematic violations of human rights in the State of Emergency (OHAL) region. To cite one instance, decree 430 reads as follows: "The governor of the OHAL region or the governor of a province is empowered to ban the printing, copying, distri bution, or introduction into the region of any printed material that misrepresents activities in the region or causes a serious disturbance of public order or causes excitement among the people or prevents security forces from performing their duties through false information. They can also request the Minister of the Interior to ban such material without regard to whether it originated in the region or not" (Resmî Gazete, 16 December 1990). Also: "Individuals or groups that give the impression that they might disturb public order can be exiled from the region at the discretion of the governor of the OHAL region. More importantly, the decree states that "Inlo criminal, financial, or legal responsibility can be imposed on the Minister of the Interior, the governor of the OHAL region, or the governors of the provinces in the OHAL region for carrying out the duties foreseen by the present decree, nor can there be recourse to any judicial body against these officials. Individuals who suffered unjustified damage can demand compensation from the state."

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for the Prevention of Torture carried out its first ad hoc visit to Turkey in 1990 and thereby started a monitoring process that would go on throughout the 1990s (Box 7-53).

The 1991 Gulf War created a climate that facilitated Turkey's military operations in the southeast and opened the way to operations conducted in northern Iraq. But in particular the European reaction to this was very sharp. Shortly after President Bush's visit to Turkey, an air and land operation was launched against northern Iraq in August 1991 that lasted fourteen days. This led Switzerland to suspend arms sales, while Germany condemned the operation for being directed against civilians. This was followed by the suspension of German military aid to Turkey. That did not stop Turkey from carrying out further operations, however. In 1991 Vedat Aydın, the chairman of the Diyarbakır branch of the People's Labor Party (HEP), was abducted. His body was found two days later. That year the United Communist Party of Turkey was banned by the Constitutional Court for having the word "Communist" in its title and for being engaged in separatist activities because of its views on the Kurdish question. Many other such violations would occur during the 1990s.

Ten years after the military coup, in the election of 20 October 1991, the Demirel-İnönü coalition govern-

### Box 7-53. The UN and European **Committees on Preventing Torture**

The Committee against Torture is the body set up under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment that was approved in 1984 and came into effect in 1987. The committee looks into and decides on individual applications regarding infringements of the convention and also examines cases brought to its attention by states. In situations where there is credible information about systematic torture taking place in one of the parties to the convention, the committee can appeal to that state to cooperate, carry out confidential investigations (including visits to the state), report on the case, and make its report public The committee exercised this function for the first time against

Similarly, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish ment that was approved in 1987 and went into effect in 1989 established a Committee for the Prevention of Torture. This committee carries out visits, prepares reports, and makes recommendations for preventing torture through international inspections and cooperation; in the event that a party to the convention should withhold cooperation or refuse to heed the recommendations to improve its practices, the committee can make its findings public. It did this twice (in 1992 and 1996) in the case of Turkey.

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ment came to power on a platform of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Within the ranks of the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) there were eighteen newly elected HEP deputies representing the southeastern (Kurdish) region. At the inaugural session of parliament, these deputies insisted on taking the oath in the Kurdish language. They were prevented from doing so, and this triggered a crisis in the TGNA that escalated until it reached a peak in 1994.

In March 1992 almost a hundred people in the towns of Cizre, Şırnak, and Nusaybin died in disturbances in connection with the Newroz festival. As a result of these incidents the Kurdish question became one of the major headaches of Turkish foreign policy. Germany imposed an arms embargo on Turkey; and, on Germany's initiative, the EC troika's ambassadors in Ankara expressed their concern to the minister of foreign affairs. Austria invoked the Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE, and Turkey was called upon to provide explanation within ten days. This was a mechanism that had been established four years earlier but had never been put into operation against any Western state. Austria's action forced Deputy Prime Minister İnönü to go to Austria to explain the Turkish position. The visit proved fruitless; Ankara then used the same mechanism to lodge claims against Austria, thereby preventing the CSCE from taking further steps.

As a result of these developments in June 1992 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the "Rights of the Kurdish People" and the PACE adopted, for the first time, a comprehensive resolution on the Kurdish question. The resolution declared that the steps taken by Turkey in its legislation and at the international level were noteworthy developments but also noted that (despite the government's good intentions) serious violations of human rights continued to take place, including torture and disappearances. The resolution went on to state that the economic situation in the southeast was unstable and expressed concern over the increase in violence in the region. The PACE condemned the PKK's violence and noted that any response to terrorist provocation in a democratic state must remain within the rule of law. The PACE called on Turkey to heed its advice on preventing torture and to lift the state of emergency in the southeast. Turkey was also asked to withdraw its notification of derogation under article 15 of the ECHR, to respect the identity, the freedoms, and the rights of the Kurdish population (including the right to use the Kurdish language in television and radio broadcasts), and to initiate genuine political dialogue with people who considered themselves Kurds and wished to develop their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity peacefully and to obtain more political rights. directive was also adopted, empowering the Committee on Political Affairs and the Committee on Legal Affairs to monitor the state of human rights in Turkey and asking them to report to the PACE on their findings. When the Constitutional Court decided (within a fortnight of the adoption of the resolution) to ban the Socialist Party on the grounds that it was seeking "to create a minority within the nation" (Constitutional Court, Decision 1991/2, 10 July 1992), this was perceived as Turkey's determination not to change its course.

Certain amendments were made in the Turkish Penal Procedural Law in December 1992 to prevent torture, which was generally well received as a positive development. But this did not prevent the CPT from making a "Public Statement." This was the most severe sanction that the committee could apply, and it was exercising this sanction for the first time against Turkey. The committee announced that—notwithstanding the changes made in legislation and the promises given by the authorities—torture and mistreatment were widespread in Turkey, particularly in places under police control.

In 1993 human rights violations continued unabated, including forcible evacuation of villages. Typical viola-

tions of human rights were the cases of Metin Can and Hasan Kaya in Elazığ, who both disappeared; subsequently their bodies were found. The ECtHR decided in 2000 in these cases that Turkey was responsible for violating the right to life and the prohibition of torture. The court also determined that an effective investigation had not been carried out and that effective ways for seeking legal redress did not exist. Turkey had been found to be in breach of the provisions of the convention. The incident at Lice in October 1993 was also a typical case of the mass violation of human rights. Proper light still has not been shed on this case, where the town was under gunfire for two days. It was alleged that scores of people were killed or wounded and hundreds of homes and businesses were destroyed. In a report (dated July 1997) on human rights problems in Turkey and their international repercussions sent to the interested authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the following opinion in connection with the appeal made by the inhabitants of Lice to the ECmHR:

It is to be expected that we shall lose most of the cases relating to the southeast. To minimize our liabilities, the proper course is to aim for a friendly settlement. In this way Turkey will not be found to be at fault...and will end up paying a lower compensation... There are 208 appeals coming from 257 individuals in connection with the events that took place at Lice in October 1993. It will be advisable to seek a friendly settlement in connection with these appeals... Furthermore, ways should be sought to pay damages to 200 of our citizens who suffered losses in the events but did not appeal to the European Committee on Human Rights. ("Dışişleri Bakanlığı İnsan Hakları Raporu")

This advice was heeded: following a friendly settlement, on 22 March 2001, Turkey paid compensation in the amount of 4 trillion 160 billion liras to appellants from Lice.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe concluded in its decision of June 1999 that during the period from 1991 to 1993 the security forces and their paramilitary auxiliaries such as the village guards had violated human rights in the course of combating terrorism and that the investigations in connection with these violations had not been properly conducted up to that time. In the cases that went to the court, most of the complaints dealt with events that took place during this period. As a

rule, the court's findings were that Turkey had committed multiple violations of the convention.

In November 1993 the (UN) Committee against Torture issued its "Summary Account." The document stated that there was credible evidence of widespread and systematic torture in Turkey. These findings caused a sharp reaction from Turkey. Turkey argued that the reference to the "Kurdish minority" in a confidential report was an indication that the rapporteur was not impartial. It also argued that the allegations of torture referred to isolated cases resulting from the fight against terror. Despite all these negative factors, the internal events of 1993 had little impact on Turkey's foreign policy.

Unlike 1993, 1994 was a year of acute crisis for Turkish foreign policy. The People's Labor Party (HEP), which was perceived as the political representative of citizens of Kurdish extraction, was banned by the Constitutional Court in July 1993. When this happened, the ethnic Kurdish deputies belonging to HEP joined the Democracy Party (DEP). Lifting the parliamentary immunities of these deputies and subsequently arresting them triggered the crisis. Both the EP and the PACE adopted resolutions in April 1994, condemning the arrest of the DEP deputies and demanding their immediate release. The Turkish government responded to this by announcing a new "Democratization Package" on 18 May. The crisis continued to escalate, however, when the Constitutional Court decided to close down the DEP (Box 7-54).

In June the PACE adopted a resolution that concluded that the situation in Turkey had become even graver with the closing down of the DEP by the Constitutional Court and the trial of the DEP deputies in the State Security Court, where the prosecutor was demanding a death sentence. In its resolution, PACE reiterated that it was "fully conscious of the need to preserve the unity and the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic" and accepted that "the task of finding a peaceful and democratic settlement that excludes separatism belongs to the citizens of this republic." The assembly noted that the solution to the serious problems and the grave situation in the southeastern region of Turkey had to be achieved by peaceful means. It added that it was of the opinion that "the Turkish authorities are committing a serious political error when, instead of seeking a dialogue with the elected representatives of a part of the Turkish people, they choose to eliminate them." The resolution also recalled that the Turkish authorities interpreted the request for constitutional reform to ensure cultural autonomy as "separatism" and "encouragement and support for terrorist activities" and drew attention to the fact that the measures taken

#### Box 7-54. The DEP Crisis

Starting in 1993, the struggle against the PKK was extended to include those legal organizations that were suspected of having links to the PKK. First the newspaper Özgür Gündem was targeted: a number of its employees were killed or went missing. The newspaper was prevented from functioning with repeated bans on its publication. This was followed by increased harassment of the Democracy Party (DEP). In February 1994 the party's secretary-general, Murat Bozlak, was attacked In his house and received seven gunshot wounds. This was followed by the bombing attack on the party's headquarters. The press began to carry statements indicating that the army was uncomfortable with the DEP. The DEP declared that the party would boycott the local elections due to take place on 27 March because of the campaign against it. The TGNA considered the issue of lifting the parliamentary immunity of the DEP deputies. Some of the deputies were taken under custody at the gate of the parliament building after they were stripped of their parliamentary immunity on 2 March. Others stayed in the building for two days and thereby delayed their detention until 4 March. The deputies were placed under arrest on 17 March. In June 1994 the Constitutional Court-banned the DEP. The trial of the arrested deputies got underway in August at the State Security Court, and in December they were condemned to serve prison terms of fifteen years. A number of complaints were lodged with the ECmHR. In March 2000 the ECtHR reached a verdict in connection with the appeal of Ozgur Gündem. The court decided that the campaign of intimidation waged against the newspaper and its personnel Infringed on article 10 of the ECHR It also decided in 1997 that there had been a violation in the length of the period that the DEP deputies had been kept under detention. The banning of the DEP also went before the court. Its decision, issued on 10 December 2002, was that the ban was in violation of article 11 of the convention dealing with freedom of association. Turkey was condemned to pay compensation in the amount of 200,000 euros

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against the DEP deputies threatened to lead to new violations of legality and human rights in a democratic society. The PACE called for changes in the Constitution to make it compatible with the Council of Europe's norms, decided to send a delegation to Ankara, and expressed the hope that Turkey would receive OSCE delegations to secure the implementation of human rights mechanisms.

This resolution was followed by a resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE (PA-OSCE) in July. The resolution called for releasing the six Kurdish members of parliament, sending a PA-OSCE delegation to Turkey to secure their release, and activating OSCE's Moscow mechanism against Turkey.

The EP declared in September 1994 that the developments in Turkey were an attack on pluralistic democracy and decided to suspend the activities of the Joint

Parliamentary Committee until the end of the DEP trial. The EP adopted a further resolution in December 1994 in which it referred to these developments, cited the new violations, and called for the suspension of the negotiations on the Customs Union and the postponement of the Council of Association meeting scheduled for 19 December. The Council of Association met anyway, but its decision was postponed to 6 March 1995.

In February 1995 the EP declared that the human rights situation in Turkey was so serious that the recommendation for a Customs Union could not be implemented. It went on to recall that the decision to establish a Customs Union depended on EP's ratification and added that this ratification would depend on the European Commission's reports regarding the measures taken in Turkey to ensure the rule of law. Nevertheless, on 6 March 1995 the Association Council adopted its decision 1/95 on the completion of the Customs Union.

Two weeks after the Customs Union went into effect, Turkey launched a major operation with 35,000 troops in northern Iraq, causing a great deal of commotion in European circles. The EU troika called for Turkey's immediate withdrawal, and Germany suspended the delivery of weapons to Turkey as well as the military portion of its financial aid. The EP also called on Turkey to withdraw and instructed the European Council and Commission to develop rules that would prevent the use of weapons originating in the EU in such operations.

The PACE adopted a resolution in April 1995 in which it condemned the Turkish operation in northern Iraq and called for a political solution to the Kurdish problem. Stressing that Turkey had made no substantive improvements in either its Constitution or its legislation, the assembly concluded that Turkey had not complied with its commitments under the Statute of the Council of Europe. The PACE recommended that the Committee of Ministers should call on Turkey: (1) to withdraw from northern Iraq; (2) to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in keeping with the statute of the Council of Europe and the principles contained in the Conventions of the Council of Europe; and (3) to establish a calendar for the revision of its Constitution and its legislation to conform to the principles and the norms of the Council of Europe. The PACE advised the Committee of Ministers to consider suspending Turkey's right to be represented, to ensure that Turkey gave an account of its progress in these three areas to the June session of the Parliamentary Assembly.

In June it was the turn of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) to take up the

issue of a solution to the Kurdish question when it called on Turkey to consider a formula that would provide a form of autonomy within the framework of Turkey's territorial integrity. The U.S. suspended the delivery of cluster bombs to Turkey, citing the human rights situation. These moves were indications that the pressure on Turkey was growing. Turkey responded by rejecting the criticism directed at it. The minister of state, Ayvaz Gökdemir from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), even insulted three female members of the EP by labeling them "whores." At the same time, Ankara sought to ease the pressure by making some minor improvements in its legislation. In this framework, some articles of the 1982 Constitution were also changed.

Most of the changes in the Constitution related to the Turkish Grand National Assembly or the political parties. The number of deputies was raised from 450 to 550. It became easier for deputies to change parties. The rule by which deputies belonging to parties that had been banned would lose their seats was repealed. The leaders whose parties were being tried at the Constitutional Court under the threat of closure were allowed to speak at the trial. The opening date for parliamentary sessions was moved from 1 September to 1 October. It was decided that local elections would be held simultaneously with general or by-elections. The minimum age for voters and for membership in parties was lowered to eighteen. Citizens living abroad or under detention or arrest would be allowed to vote. Parties were free to establish women's or youth branches. University professors and students could now become political party members. The rules preventing associations, unions, foundations, cooperatives, and professional associations from establishing links with parties or cooperating with them were repealed. All of these changes moved in the direction of democratization, but the only amendment dealing with human rights was the lifting of the ban on the establishment of unions by public servants. Another change was the removal of the portion of the Constitution's preface that praised the 12 September coup and its authors.

These amendments came into effect in July 1995. It was obvious that these changes were designed to alleviate the pressure on Turkey and secure the approval of the Customs Union by the EP. This is proven by the fact that most of the legislation that would make possible the implementation of the few improvements made in the area of human rights was not enacted during this period. In October 1995 the notorious article 8 of the Law for Combating Terrorism was partially amended (see Box 7-51 above).

These initiatives were generally accepted as signs of sufficient goodwill. The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE adopted a balanced resolution in July 1995, based on the report of the OSCE team that had been to Turkey two months earlier, that cited allegations of violations and the explanations provided by the authorities. The PACE postponed the consideration of the situation in Turkey to 1996. After awarding the Sakarov Prize to Leyla Zana, the Democracy Party deputy who was serving a prison term, the EP canceled its previous decision to suspend the meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee and in December 1995 gave its approval to the Customs Union with Turkey. In giving its approval, the EP laid down the conditions of improvement in four major problems: human rights, democratization, the Cyprus question, and the Kurdish question. In addition, the parliament asked the European Commission to prepare an annual report on human rights in Turkey and the development of democracy.

In April 1996 the PACE adopted a resolution in which it noted that the amendments to the Constitution and the Law on Combating Terrorism were in keeping with the assembly's previous recommendations but insisted on the elimination of article 8 (which restricted freedom of expression), on finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, and on the release of the jailed DEP deputies. The resolution placed Turkey under the monitoring procedure of the Committee of Ministers and called on the committee to encourage Turkey to adjust its legislation and its practices to the norms and principles of the Council of Europe. It also mentioned that the Committee of Ministers was not informing the assembly of the substance of its dialogue with Turkey. This indicated that diplomatic pressure was being applied on Ankara without the public being informed.

The Committee for the Prevention of Torture released its second "Public Statement" in December 1996. The committee made a general appraisal of the past four years that mentioned the torture implements that were found, the statements of victims, and the ineffectiveness of the succession of government directives and concluded that Turkey could bring the question of torture to an end by effectively controlling its security forces. The committee claimed that public prosecutors were in the habit of protecting the police against the allegations of torture victims. It stressed the need to allow those who had been detained to talk to their lawyers immediately and to be medically examined by an independent doctor and rejected the claims that torture incidents were isolated cases and the attempts to justify torture on the pretext of combating

terrorism. After noting that torture was applied not just to these detained for political reasons but also to those detained for common crimes, the committee came to the conclusion that torture in Turkey had much deeper roots.

After the "Public Statement," Denmark lodged a complaint with the ECmHR in January 1997, accusing Turkey of torturing a Danish citizen of Kurdish extraction.

In 1997 Turkey made a special effort to take effective measures to improve its performance in the fields of human rights and establishing the rule of law. The fatal traffic accident at Susurluk that occurred in November 1996 had a strong influence in turning Turkey in this direction. In March 1997 the period of detention was shortened, and in April the committee that had been set up within the TGNA to investigate the Susurluk accident issued its report. The report contained a number of very important revelations about human rights violations. The Upper Council Coordinator of Human Rights was established in April (in April 2001 a law renamed it the Upper Council on Human Rights), and in July 1997 the MFA submitted to the government its already mentioned Report on Human Rights, containing recommendations for further improvements in the area of human rights,

It was expected that Turkey would be declared a candidate for accession to the EU at the Luxembourg Summit. The democratization package had been adopted to fulfill this expectation, but the summit was a disappointment for Turkey. Thus the democratization package was withdrawn, and relations with the EU were confined to the requirements of the Association Agreement.

In June 1998 the PACE adopted a resolution that was striking because it contained recommendations to Turkey that resembled proposals for postconflict rehabilitation at a time when Ankara was in an intensely introspective mood. The PACE called on the Ministerial Committee to make an appeal to Turkey to adopt the following measures, among others:

- A. to find a nonmilitary solution for the existing problems in the southeastern provinces;
- B. to protect the civilian population of the regions concerned against any kind of armed violence;
- C. to expedite and intensify its efforts to promote the economic and social development and reconstruction of the southeastern provinces;
- D. to sign and ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and apply its provisions to the Kurds;
- E. to bring to light the fate of the missing persons;
- F. to adopt policies and take adequate measures to



- enable Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin to exercise their cultural and political rights;
- G. to restore the rule of law in the southeast of the country and in particular to lift emergency rule in the southeastern provinces, to ensure effective protection of villages, to exercise civilian control over military activity in the region, including the keeping of records and observance of human rights, and to prosecute anyone who violated human rights;
- H. to abolish the village guard system;
- I. to undertake additional effective measures aimed at the reconstruction and revival of the economy in the southeastern provinces;
- J. to take further steps to reconstruct schools and hospitals in the area.
- K. to implement in cooperation with international humanitarian organizations a comprehensive program designed to facilitate the return of the Kurdish population wishing to go back to their villages.

The PACE called for cooperation with international humanitarian and financial institutions to carry out these and the other recommendations made to Turkey. The PACE also adopted a directive on that date whereby it charged the committee to monitor the question of the "Kurdish minority" within the framework of the procedure to monitor compliance with the provisions of the convention.

There was also a noticeable change in the EP's approach to Turkey toward the end of 1998. In a resolution adopted in September, the EP called for the resumption of the political dialogue with Turkey and elimination of the measures to isolate Turkey that prevented it from making progress in its political system, in the living conditions of its people, and in the state of its human rights. This was to be done without prejudice to the criticism and warnings sent to Ankara on the subjects of human rights, democratization, and the Kurdish question.

The final crisis with Europe came at the end of 1998, with the departure of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria and the sequence of events that followed.

When Öcalan was captured in February 1999 and brought to Turkey (see Box 7-16 above), numerous warnings were issued to Ankara about the need for a fair trial and the need to avoid a death sentence, which was regarded as a certainty. Turkey had been condemned by the ECtHR in the case of the State Security Courts, which were found to be neither independent nor impartial, but Ankara did nothing about this finding. When Öcalan appealed to the ECtHR, Turkey acted quickly. In order to avoid being condemned once again, it amended its Con-

stitution and the law governing State Security Courts in June, one month after Öcalan's trial had gotten underway. The amendment replaced the military judge in the State Security Courts (made up of three judges) with a civilian judge. This was followed by a guilty verdict against Öcalan and a death sentence issued by the court, which was upheld by the Court of Cassation in November. In December 1999 the ECHR issued a stay of execution order, whereupon the government delayed sending Öcalan's sentence to the TGNA for approval. Following the ECtHR's decision of interim measures, the issue was frozen for an indefinite period. Öcalan's appeal for an end to armed struggle and the compliance of the PKK ushered in a new era in which it would be very difficult for the government to use the terror argument to explain infringements of human rights. Furthermore, new international dynamics were taking shape that had a direct effect on Turkey and compounded its difficulties. For example, the European Committee against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) had begun to equate infringements of human rights in Turkey with racism.

In 1998 there were strong indications that, given the role that Turkey was expected to play in the new era, the question of human rights would somehow be overcome whether Ankara liked it or not. The North Atlantic Assembly, consisting of NATO parliamentarians, issued a report in 1998 expressing the view that if Turkey wanted to become a modern democracy it must separate domestic security issues from national security and ensure that the army devoted itself exclusively to national security. This was one of the many criticisms directed against Turkey in connection with human rights, but it was perhaps the most interesting one.

Throughout the 1990s Turkey had been supported in its fights against terrorism even as it was criticized for conducting the struggle without always heeding the principles of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. After Öcalan was captured and the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate for accession in 1999, the criticism directed at Ankara turned into the conditions for membership in the EU. The new expectations were that the regime in Turkey would become more civilian and less military, that the rule of law would prevail, and that human rights would be respected.

Turkey's response to these expectations was uneven. Some timid steps were taken to adjust the legislation. The most notable was the amendment in December 1999 of the law (dating from 1913) regulating the trial of civil servants. Another important policy change with international implications was the decision in February 1999

to allow the Committee for the Prevention of Torture to publish its report. This was done to preclude the committee from putting out another public statement. In fact, at Ankara's request, the committee also published the preceding reports on Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in August 2000. This was a major step forward for Ankara.

With the approval of the Accession Partnership Document and the adoption of the National Program, the process of amending the legislation dating from the 12 September coup began to gather pace. In October 2001 a constitutional amendment package was adopted. This was followed by a succession of amendment packages to the existing legislation, starting in February 2002. The first package made changes in the Turkish penal code, the Law to Combat Terrorism, and the law regulating the State Security Courts. The second adjustment package (adopted in April 2002) amended the legislation governing associations, political parties, and the press. The third package (adopted in August 2002) abolished the death penalty in peacetime and allowed for the teaching of Kurdish and publications in that language. The fourth and fifth packages (adopted in January 2003) broadened the scope of the changes introduced in the previous packages and made allowance for retrials in conformity with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In January 2003 the Sixth Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights abolishing the death penalty was signed. In addition to these comprehensive changes, the State of Emergency (in effect since 1987) was lifted on 30 November 2002. This was another important step forward for Turkey. Despite these changes, it is obvious that implementation will determine whether the question of human rights will cease to be a contentious issue in Turkish foreign policy.

GÖKÇEN ALPKAYA

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### Relations with Russia

### FROM THE USSR TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In 1991 the USSR collapsed and the Russian Federation came into being. The most important event in Turkish-Russian relations that year was the visit of president Turgut Özal to Moscow from 11 to 16 March. This was the first presidential visit after Cevdet Sunay's visit back in 1969. Özal had lengthy talks with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and met with the representatives of the Ahiska and Gagauz people (Turkish ethnic groups living in the Soviet Union). This visit coincided with the seventieth anniversary of the 1921 treaty and was the occasion for discussing the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the issue of the BSEC. At the end of the talks, three important agreements were signed on 12 March. These were the Agreement for the Elimination of Double Taxation, the Agreement on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, and the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, with a duration of twenty

The Agreement on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation established ambitious targets for bilateral trade in the coming years. Article 2 read as follows:

The contracting parties will strive to attain a volume of trade of 3 to 5 billion U.S. dollars in the coming years and 9 to 10 billion U.S. dollars toward 2000. To this end, they will take the necessary measures to use their resources more effectively and expand their long-term trade relations in a balanced and diversified manner. They will also facilitate the creation of favorable conditions for the development of trade relations between Turkish and Soviet institutions, enterprises, and firms within the framework of the legislation of the two countries.

The Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation was a reaffirmation by both countries of the principles of the Paris Charter. The treaty contained the mutual obligation to respect territorial integrity and political independence, to consult on regional issues, to communicate on military matters, to cooperate in the broadest way in the economic, cultural, and other fields, and to act in unison in combating terrorism. It showed how far relations between the two countries had come in recent years. The treaty was important because, in addition to dealing with relations with the USSR as a federation, it paved the way for cooperation with the individual federated units. Article 16 stated: "The parties are agreed that the development of the elations of the Republic of Turkey with the component republics of the Soviet Union will add substance to and broaden their bilateral relations. The Parties shall also encourage contacts and cooperation between cities and local administrations." Article 17 provided that "the Parties shall encourage the learning of the languages of the peoples of the USSR in Turkey and the Turkish language in the USSR."

After Moscow, Özal visited the Soviet Socialist Republics of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, where he signed various agreements and established bilateral relations with these republics. During his visit to Azerbaijan, Özal opened the Turkish Consulate General in Baku and inaugurated direct air links between Istanbul and Baku and automatic telephone links between Azerbaijan and Turkey. A new leaf had been turned in Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan.

With the collapse of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, the international system went into a process of restructuring. This process involved changes in production methods resulting from a scientific and technological revolution and the increasing importance of information. The Russian Federation declared its sovereignty on 12 June 1990. After the USSR left the international scene

## Box 7-55. The Russian Federation's Foreign Policy: The "Near Abroad" and the Military Doctrine

At first the Russian Federation (RF) was in turmoil, and its policies were not just convergent with the policies of the U.S. and Europe but actually in their orbits. Starting in 1994, however, Russia also began to turn toward Asia and sought to free itself from thralldom to the West.

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The cleavage between Atlanticists and Eurasians that existed in domestic politics also manifested itself in foreign policy. But the RF's foreign policy did not seek confrontation with the West. Although it opposed the Partnership for Peace project signed in Brussels in 1994 that was designed to bring Eastern Europe within NATO's umbrella, eventually the RF did come to terms with NATO Undoubtedly, this was also a result of its need for IMF and World Bank loans.

The most stilking sign of a change in Russia foreign policy was the policy of the "Near Abroad" enunciated in February 1993. This policy was described as the RF's Monroe Doctrine. Russia claimed that the territories of the former USSR were areas of vital interest for the RF from the economic and security perspectives and sought to influence and control developments in these countries.

The Military Doctrine announced in November 1993 was an important element of this new policy. The document that contained the Military Doctrine was known as the Karaganov Doctrine. The army was also made responsible for internal security, and the principle that the RF would not be the first country to

resort to nuclear weapons was abandoned. If was also announced that Russian troops could be stationed outside the country in order to ensure the security of the RF and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The sale of arms would be accorded priority in order to obtain financial resources for security requirements.

Russia established military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia within the framework of the Near Abroad and Karaganov Doctrine. The West did not appear to object to the Russian troops guarding the borders of the countries in these regions, having in mind that it was not easy to establish stability in these countries. Taking advantage of this situation, Russia bolstered its control in the Caucasus by exacerbating regional disputes.

On 21 April 2000 Putin released the new Military Doctrine, which had taken three years to prepare.

Russia's Near Abroad policy and Military Doctrine were pursuing a number of objectives. One was to restore the economy, which had been shattered with the disintegration of the USSR. Another objective was to protect the Russian diaspora of 25 million people who remained beyond the RF's borders. The third objective was to prevent outside powers from gaining influence in these underdeveloped countries with rich energy resources.

(E: Tellat)

on 31 December 1991 when its legal existence came to an end, the Russian Federation succeeded the defunct state as its natural heir. In this process of succession, both Russia and Turkey were in search of new roles for themselves. This should not be forgotten in examining their bilateral relations. Another important point that must be borne in mind in appraising these relations is the political structure of the Russian Federation.

With the disintegration of the USSR, fourteen new states emerged to join the community of nations, in addition to the Russian Federation (the successor of the USSR). The RF's land area was twice the size of the combined surface of the other fourteen states, and its population was more than half of the total population of the USSR. Most of the natural resources were also located in the RF: 90% of the oil, 80% of the gas, 70% of the gold, and 62% of the electricity produced in the USSR came from the RF. Among the successor states, the RF had the most homogeneous population after Lithuania and Armenia. Unlike the USSR, the RF could count on the support of the West, because it no longer posed an ideological threat and had ceased to be a destabilizing element on the international scene. Furthermore, the RF was seeking to integrate itself with the capitalist world and was an important market for the products of the West.

During the 1990s the RF under Yeltsin's leadership was striving to join the international community by

adopting the free market economy and the democratic parliamentary system. The efforts to establish the market economy, however, were often leading to oligarchic structures. In the early years of the twenty-first century the RF had lost the support of the West in its efforts to integrate and was now proceeding on its own in defiance of the West.

By the year 2000 Russia had a new president in Vladimir Putin. It continued to maintain friendly ties with the West while developing its relations with countries like China and Iran and seeking to maintain its predominance in the Near Abroad (Box 7-55). Armed with nuclear weapons, Russia continued to be a major actor on the global scene. This was also because it would be difficult to maintain stability in the Caucasus and the Balkans without Russia.

With the transformation of the USSR into the RF the region's importance for Turkey increased significantly. While new clashes of interests appeared with the RF and the new republics, new opportunities for cooperation had also emerged.

### II. SOME OF THE PROBLEM AREAS

With the collapse of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, Turkey lost the major card that it had been using for fifty years: namely, its strategic importance. Although this was a matter for concern, it rediscovered kindred peoples in Central Asia, which led it to entertain a dream that it had forgotten for three-quarters of a century. But Turkey's concern over its strategic position was groundless; nor was there much to rejoice about in the rediscovery of kindred peoples. The Gulf crisis and the developments in Yugoslavia caused Turkey to become a responsible ally of the U.S. in a region that was in turmoil. Moreover, as the RF recovered from the debacle of the USSR, it reasserted its primacy in the former Soviet territories, starting in 1994, and repositioned itself in confrontation with Turkey and other countries.

- , 1. At first the catch phrase "the Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" uttered by Prime Minister Demirel in February 1992 and the attempt to introduce an expanded Turkish alphabet to Central Asia created uneasiness in the RF, a country with Muslim and Turkic populations. But rivalry gradually gave way to cooperation.
- 2. Turkey and the RF were also in confrontation in the Balkans. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Turkey and Russia supported opposing factions. There was a tendency for those of the Orthodox faith (Russia, Yugoslavia, and Greece) to band together, which led to speculations that they were forming an axis against Turkey, Macedonia, and Albania.
- 3. When the USSR broke apart, the route through which the energy resources of the Caspian basin and the Caucasus would flow to global markets became a burning issue. In the ensuing competition between Turkey and the RF, both claimed that routes going through their respective territories were the sole option. The country that hosted a pipeline would enhance its strategic position and derive substantial financial rewards. The routes of the pipelines became a subject of intensive debate in both countries, even though ultimately the trajectory of the pipeline would be determined by the companies exploiting the oil and gas fields. When it became clear that the early oil would be piped to the Russian oil terminal of Novorossiysk (see Box 7-35 above), Turkey began to stress the danger this would pose to the Turkish Straits and issued two sets of regulations in 1994 and 1998 to regulate navigation. These also created difficulties between the two countries.
- 4. Another issue marring relations was the arms reductions in the northern Caucasus as agreed to by the USSR in the Treaty to Reduce Conventional Forces in Europe. On 17 September 1993 Russia sent a note to the signatories informing them that conditions had changed and that consequently it would not implement the reductions called for the treaty. Eventually new arrangements

were negotiated in the treaty in May 1997, and Russia was given satisfaction.

5. Defense industries in Russia provided employment for large numbers of workers. After a period of uncertainty following the collapse of the USSR, these industries began to recover their former position. Soon Russia found itself exporting arms to fifty-one countries, including Turkey. Under an agreement signed on 30 October 1993, Turkey purchased armored vehicles, rifles, night-vision binoculars, and nineteen helicopters from Russia. These weapons proved highly useful in the struggle against the PKK at a time when Germany and the West had cut off the sale of weapons to Turkey because of violations of human rights. Turkey was the first NATO member that purchased arms from the RF.

The sale of Russian weapons to its neighbors, however, was a source of apprehension for Turkey. The most striking example was the S-300 crisis over the sale of missiles to Southern Cyprus. Following negotiations that began in 1995, an agreement was signed by Southern Cyprus on 4 January 1997 with Rosvooruzhenie (a Russian arms company) for the sale of S-300 missiles. Turkey declared that it could not remain indifferent to this sale. This was not the first time that Russia was selling arms, including missiles and planes, to Cyprus. This particular sale, however, had the potential to change the military balance on the island. With U.S. support, Turkey prevented the installation of these missiles. The problem was overcome with the installation of the weapons system in Crete.

6. The most serious issue between the two countries was their respective positions on the Chechen resistance and the PKK problems, which threatened their territorial integrity. As the PKK dimension appeared to come to an end in 1999, the Chechen war flared up once again that year.

The question of Chechnya came up when the territory declared its independence on 2 November 1991 during the Soviet period. In the summer of 1994 the pro-Dudayev forces captured Grozny. When Dudayev was killed on 21 April 1996 in a missile attack, it became possible to make peace. Russian forces withdrew, and an agreement was signed on 12 May 1997 (postponing until 31 December 2001 a permanent settlement of the question). Russia promised to make payments to Chechnya for the oil pipeline that crossed its territory and provide financial assistance. The first round of fighting had cost Russia \$6 billion and ended with its forces defeated.

By the summer of 1999 the fundamentalist Muslims under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Emir Hattab had established autonomous districts in Daghestan. Moscow held the Chechen administration accountable for these developments and launched an operation in Daghestan in September that led to the destruction of Chechnya and paved the way to Putin's presidency.

Chechnya is important for the RF in a number of ways. (a) Economic: a number of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia go across Chechnya, and at this period there was an oil refinery in Grozny. (b) Strategic: Chechnya's independence could well result in Russia losing control over the Caucasus. (c) Territorial integrity: Chechnya could set a dangerous precedent for the 30 million people with different ethnic backgrounds living in the RF. (d) Security: the activities of Chechnya guerrillas were increasingly turning to terrorism, which could easily spread to other parts of the RF. (e) Internal politics: the administration of the RF was setting the clans in the country against one another. By supporting Doku Zavgayev, Yeltsin was seeking to score points over Gorbachev, who was supporting Dudayev. (f) Religion: growing fundamentalism could create serious problems for the RF and, by provoking Orthodox fanaticism, could lead to disintegration of the country. (g) Social: after Afghanistan, the country was now afflicted with the Chechnya syndrome, Families that had lost sons in Chechnya and wounded veterans who had not been rehabilitated were beginning to affect society, leading to a clamor to bring the fighting to an end somehow.

The RF began to fault Turkey for allowing Chechens to use its territory, for not preventing its citizens from fighting in the Chechen ranks against Russia, and for not stopping the flow of aid money to Chechnya. The hijacking of the ferry Avrasya in January 1996 provoked a major crisis in relations. The Chechens and their Turkish collaborators claimed that it was hijacked "for the freedom of the Caucasus people" (Hürriyet, 12 January 1996). When they were apprehended, they were tried not for hijacking the vessel but for forcing it to change course. Subsequently the culprits were allowed to flee from prison after they had been sentenced. A park in Istanbul was named after Dudayev, and a square in Ankara was renamed Dudayev Square. Dudayev was twice received by the prime minister in Ankara. Ankara claimed that this was the work of Chechen and Caucasus NGOs operating in Turkey, but nothing was done to check these activities. In the contrary, with the support of the local press, the government looked the other way.

When the second Chechen war flared up in the summer of 1999, Turkey followed a more cautious course. There were fewer mass protests like the ones that took place during the first war. As the Russian operation went on, Prime Minister Ecevit visited the RF from 4 to 6 November 1999. But when the minister of state, Abdülhaluk

Çay (who belonged to the right-wing Nationalist Action Party), made a speech in which he declared: "The war is only beginning, now that Grozny has fallen. There is no way to deprive a freedom-loving nation of its freedom" (Hürriyet, 23 February 2000; Yeni Şafak, 25 February 2008), Russia promptly sent a note of protest to Ankara.

A parallel could be drawn between Russia's approach to the PKK question and Turkey's approach to Chechnya. The approach of both governments was measured. But the Duma, which lacked real power, acted more emotionally. At its initiative, a Conference on Kurdistan's History was convened in Moscow on 22 February 1994. Subsequently a Kurdish House was opened on 25 January 1995 at Yaroslav (300 kilometers from Moscow). A Russian delegation visiting Ankara in February 1995 asked Turkey to stop supporting Chechnya, prevent the flow of arms and volunteers to the territory, and close down the Caucasus-Chechen Associations operating in Turkey. The delegation also drew attention to the 500,000 ethnic Kurds living in Russia. But Turkey was reluctant to heed these requests. The Kurdish Parliament in exile held its third meeting in Moscow from 30 October to 1 November 1995, with the permission of the Russian Duma. This in turn drew a protest from Turkey. The Duma went further and arranged for two Kurdish conferences to be held in Moscow in 1997. On 26 September 1997 the Duma issued a statement in which Turkey was accused of committing genocide against the Kurds.

The difficulties created by the PKK in Turkey's relations with the RF reached their climax when the leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, left Syria on 17 October 1998 and sought refuge in Russia. On 4 November the Duma made an appeal to Yeltsin for Öcalan to be granted the status of political refugee in Russia. Owing to Turkey's sensitivity on this issue, Öcalan left Russia on 12 November and proceeded to Italy, where he was well received. His subsequent capture spared Turkey's relations from further deterioration (see Box 7-16 above). After the crisis blew over, it was noted that bilateral relations had been severely tested on the issue of the approach to terror and separatism but that they had withstood the test and went on to develop further.

# III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION

Despite the many disagreements enumerated above, Turkey's political, economic, and military relations with the RF continued to develop as bilateral contacts intensified. The basis for the developing relations was the Treaty on the Principles of the Relations between the Republic of

Turkey and the Russian Federation signed in Moscow by Prime Minister Demirel on 25 May 1992, which came into force on 19 July 1994. During the talks held by Demirel on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, the Armenian attack on Nagorno Karabakh was condemned and the resolution of disputes through negotiations was proposed. In the joint communiqué, Demirel and Yeltsin affirmed that "they noted with satisfaction that Turkey and Russia shared the same views about relations with the CIS and notably the countries of Central Asia and felt the desire to contribute to the economic and social development of the CIS through joint action." Russia's ambassador in Ankara, Albert Chernishev, declared that Turkey's special interest in Central Asia was understandable.

Although the treaty signed in 1992 had the same content as the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed in Moscow by Özal in March 1991 with the USSR, there were two differences. The preamble of the 1992 treaty contained a phrase that did not exist in the 1991 treaty: "aiming to contribute to peace and stability in the region where the continents of Europe and Asia meet, in which Turkey and Russia are located as neighbors." It was important for Turkey and Russia to underline that they were the two genuine Eurasian states. This indicated that they were confronted with similar problems and would resolve these problems through cooperation. Bilateral relations in subsequent years would be guided by this reality. In article 16 of the 1991 treaty there was a reference to developing relations between Turkey and the component Soviet republics that was dropped from the later treaty because they were now independent. This article was replaced with a reference to contacts and cooperation with "regions, cities, and local organs and administrations."

The 1991 treaty had little effect on relations, because the USSR collapsed soon after it was signed. The content of the 1992 treaty was similar to the content of the 1991 treaty but was quite different from the 1972 and 1978 agreements. A comparison of the two sets of documents can shed light on the state of bilateral relations in the 1990s.

- 1. The 1991 and 1992 documents were treaties and therefore had a binding effect that a document or a declaration would not have.
- 2. For the first time since 1925, the parties were described as "friends."
- 3. The parties undertook not to support the aggressor in the event of an aggression against one of the parties and to eliminate the consequences of aggression by working together in the UN and other international organizations. This implied solidarity in the face of aggression.

- 4. The two sides undertook to consult in the event of a threat to peace and security even if the threat was not directed at one of the parties. In addition, the parties agreed to hold periodic consultations on international and regional issues.
- 5. The parties agreed to encourage their parliaments, political parties, media organizations, trade unions, educational institutions, and local administrations to cooperate and establish contacts with their opposite numbers.

In addition to this basic document upon which bilateral relations were constructed, a steady stream of highlevel visits in both directions took place. During these visits, agreements were signed to regulate economic relations. The Foreign Economic Relations Council, established in 1986 to coordinate the private sector's foreign contacts, set up a number of bodies that made a significant contribution to the development of economic relations. Among these were the Turkish-Russian Business Council, the Turkish-Russian Association of Businessmen, the Laleli Association of Industrialists and Businessmen, and the Merter Association of Industrialists and Businessmen. The real driving force behind the expanding economic relations was the energy sector and the contracting business.

With the 1984 agreement Turkey had agreed to purchase natural gas from the USSR. The delivery of gas began in 1987 and increased gradually during the 1990s. An agreement was signed on 10 December 1997 to step up the delivery of gas, then running at 6 billion cubic meters, by a further 8 billion cubic meters by 2002. A subsequent agreement was concluded on 29 August 1997 to lay a natural gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea. This would boost the delivery of gas from Russia by a further 16 billion cubic meters. This was known as the Blue Stream project and involved the laying of pipes along 392 kilometers through the Black Sea from Russia to the Turkish port of Samsun. Turkey planned to boost its power-plant capacity by 20% with natural gas supplied by Russia (Box 7-56).

Starting in 1987, Turkish contracting firms obtained contracts for construction jobs in the amount of \$9.5 billion, half of which had been completed by the end of 1998.

Another sector that registered healthy growth was tourism. Turkey became the first foreign destination for Russian holiday-makers. After Germans, the Russians made up the largest number of visitors in 1997.

As a consequence of such developments, the RF became Turkey's second trading partner (following Germany) in 1997. In addition there was the unregistered trade as well as the gradually diminishing "luggage trade" through which Russian visitors imported large quanti-

#### Box 7-56. The Blue Stream

Always on the lookout to diversify its sources of energy. Turkey began to import natural gas from the USSR and later Russia Russia provided 50 to 60% of its natural gas by 2000, with the

rest coming from Nigeria, Algeria, and Iran.

On 15 December 1997 an agreement was signed with the RF under which Turkey undertook to purchase 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually for twenty five years. The gas would be delivered by a pipeline laid on the seabed of the Black Sea, under a project named Blue Stream. The pipeline would have a total length of 1,213 kilometers of which 373 kilometers would be in Russia, 396 kilometers under the Black Sea at a depth of 2,150 meters, and 444 kilometers in Turkey from Samsun to Ankara. The Turkish portion would be build by Botas. There were also plans to extend the pipeline further to Israel and Egypt, Whereas Turkey was the seventh-ranked customer of Russia in natural gas in 2000, it would move up to second place after Germany when the Blue Stream came into operation.

In Turkey there was widespread criticism of the project on the grounds that it would prevent the import of much cheaper gas from Turkmenistan, that it would adversely affect relations with that country, that it would create excessive dependency on the RF, and that the decision had been influenced by Turkish contractors who stood to gain from the construction work. The project was completed in 2003, and its cost

became a more heated issue.

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ties of Turkish products as accompanied baggage. The Istanbul Stock Exchange became more sensitive to economic developments in Russia than to other Eastern European markets.

In June 1999 TÜSİAD commissioned Mensur Akgün and Turan Aydın to prepare a report on Turkish-Russian bilateral economic relations. The report's findings were as follows. (1) The RF was a large market in close geographic proximity to Turkey. (2) Of Russia's population, 11% (16.2 million people) were of Turkic stock. (3) Unlike the U.S. and the EU, Turkey gained access to the RF through interstate agreements. That is why economic relations were very much influenced by political considerations. (4) The RF's economy was going through a transition, which had an effect on relations. (5) The RF had provided new markets for Turkey in many sectors where Turkish products faced difficulties in EU markets. Whenever Turkey ran into difficulties in EU markets, it would have to turn increasingly to non-EU markets. (6) The relations with Russia were asymmetrical. While Russia was Turkey's second largest economic partner, Turkey was not among the first ten economic partners of Russia. But Turkey's place in Russia was rising fast. Turkey was Russia's sixth largest customer for natural gas and was expected to occupy second place by the early years of the new century.

Another platform where relations were developing was the regional cooperation project known as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The project had its legal basis in article 12 of the above-mentioned 1991 and 1992 treaties: "The Parties shall expend joint efforts to develop economic, trade, scientific, and technical cooperation between themselves and in the Black Sea region in order to achieve stability and prosperity in the region." In this framework, President Yeltsin's visit to Istanbul on 25 June 1992 was followed by President Demirel's visit to Moscow on 24 and 25 October 1996. The BSEC was established on 25 June 1992. When the eleven heads of state/government signed the BSEC Charter in June 1998 at Yalta and it obtained national ratifications afterward, the BSEC became a full-fledged international organization.

The visit of prime minister V.S. Chernomyrdin to Turkey on 15 and 16 December 1997 was a turning point in the development of bilateral relations. This was the first visit by a prime minister of the RF to Turkey. An effort was made during the visit to chart the course of bilateral economic relations over the next fifteen years. Seven important agreements were signed, including a long-term economic cooperation agreement, a protocol on cooperation in the field of energy, an agreement on the purchase of natural gas, an agreement on cooperation in the field of high technology, an agreement on mutual judicial assistance, an Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. The latter two agreements came into effect in 2000.

Chernomyrdin's visit was followed by Prime Minister Ecevit's visit on 4 to 6 November 1999. This visit, which coincided with the intensification of the operation in Chechnya, was an indicator of the stability achieved in relations. Five separate documents were signed during this visit, including the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism. Turkey reiterated its interest in going ahead with the Blue Stream project, and measures to develop economic relations further were considered.

From 1992 to 1998 the volume of trade grew steadily, but the balance of trade was permanently in Russia's favor. During the 1990s the volume of trade, including the unregistered luggage trade, attained \$15 billion. With the restrictive measures adopted by Russia in August 1996, however, there was a significant drop in the luggage trade.

When the RF entered a period of economic crisis on 17 August 1998, bilateral economic relations also suffered, as did the Turkish economy. In 1999 and thereafter, efforts were made to overcome the difficulties. Turkish businesses did not follow the example of others and did not abandon the Russian market. Russia's experience in 1998 was similar to Turkey's travails in 1994 when it was in the grip of an economic crisis, and both countries were learning to cope with the consequences of an economic slump.

Another important development was the five-day visit of the chief of the General Staff, Ismail Hakkı Karadayı, to the RF on 18 May 1998 at the time when the S-300 missile crisis was at its height. One of the items discussed during the talks was Turkey's \$150 billion equipment modernization program and the possibility of cooperation with the RF in carrying out the project. It was decided to start preparations for the two countries to conclude an agreement on military cooperation. The visit was important not only for its security aspect but also for its political significance.

It is usual to attribute the development of Turkey's relations with the RF during the 1990s to the ending of the Cold War. Although this is true, it is not the full story. As we have already seen, relations began to develop after 1965, and a new phase was reached in 1980s when the stage was set for the developments of the 1990s. These developments were made possible by the CSCE process that got underway during the Cold War and the ensuing détente between the East and West.

In summary, although relations between Turkey and the RF are negatively affected by some problems, there is a great potential for expanded cooperation. During the Cold War, it was possible to overcome the political difficulties with the USSR through economic cooperation. In the new era similar developments in bilateral relations can be expected.

EREL TELLAL

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## Relations with the Middle East

#### RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

The changes occurring in the international scene and Turkish internal developments during the 1990s had the result of drawing Turkey into the problems of the Middle East. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. began to focus its attention on the Middle East. Washington's main objective was to control the rich oil resources of the region and ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil to the West at stable prices. Against this background, the insecurity and instability that reigned in the region following the 1991 Gulf War combined with the Kurdish question and the danger from reactionary religious forces compelled Turkey to review its threat assessment. During the Cold War, Turkey viewed the main threat as coming from the north, while after 1974 the main threat was seen as coming from the west. Now Turkey was forced to reassess its position and began to stress the threat that came from the south. During the 1990s Ankara's relations with Middle Eastern states were governed by regional security concerns that were compounded by Turkey's own internal problems.

## A. The First Gulf War and Its Influence on Relations with Arab States

At the end of the Cold War, Turkey began to feel concern that its strategic importance to the West was diminished. These concerns were dissipated with the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War, which started with the allied attack on Iraq led by the U.S. President Özal felt that the opportunity should be seized: everyone must be made to see that, far from diminishing, Turkey's strategic value to the West had become even greater. Unlike the cautious group of decision-makers that included prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut, foreign minister Ali Bozer, and chief of the General Staff Necip Torumtay, Özal was convinced that Turkey should take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the Gulf crisis and pursue an active foreign policy. He

sought to give direction to Turkey's foreign policy by means of telephone conversations with U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

Regardless of the differences among the decisionmakers, it can be said that Turkey pursued a moderate line in the early stages of the Gulf crisis. In the first official statement following Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Ankara confined itself to calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. This course must have heartened Baghdad, which sent its first vice-president, Taha Yasin Ramadan, to Ankara in August, one day before the UN Security Council adopted the resolution imposing sanctions on Iraq. He was the bearer of a message from Saddam Hussein to Özal containing two requests: that Ankara remain strictly neutral in the crisis and that it not implement the UN Security Council's economic sanctions. This meant that Ankara was being asked to continue operating the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. Özal refused to accede to either request. Turkey complied with the sanctions imposed by the UN on 6 August by shutting down the pipeline two days later. It also moved troops up to the Iraqi border and opened its bases to U.S. aircraft.

Özal was seeking to demonstrate Turkey's strategic value by aligning it firmly with the West in the course of the crisis. He was also seeking to ensure Turkey's national security by helping in restoring stability in the Middle East. But Özal's ambitions went beyond these goals. He had a broad plan that included repossessing Mosul and Kirkuk, developing economic and trade ties with the region's Arab states, and making Turkey an effective member of the new security system that would be established there. Early in the crisis, the circumstances were propitious for considering such plans. Kuwait's occupation was bound to strengthen Iraq in the region, and this did not suit Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, or Iran. This convergence of interests enabled these countries to cooperate among themselves as well as with the West and Turkey. But their cooperation was far from corresponding to Özal's expectations. Although Turkey's actions in providing military

facilities and other support during the crisis were appreciated by the Arab states, they were not prepared to see Turkey included in the new security arrangements; nor would they contemplate any assertion of Turkish leadership in the region. Turkey considered the Gulf countries (in particular, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) to be potential markets. It had plans to sell F-16 aircraft and armored vehicles to these countries and to enter into cooperation in defense industries with them. They were well disposed toward these plans while the crisis lasted but took no steps after it was over.

On 14 November 1991 the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah, visited Turkey. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit stated that there was an identity of views on the need to expand trade and develop transport links between the two countries, to hold periodic political consultations, and to develop the possibilities for cooperation in the field of defense. When Prime Minister Demirel visited Kuwait in 1993, however, he was informed by his hosts that there would be no purchases of arms from Turkey. Similar disappointments came from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and the negotiations for the sale of F-16s and armored vehicles ended inconclusively in 1997. Although Turkey had seen the Gulf states as potential markets, it was unable to conclude any defense deals with them. These countries were also extremely slow in providing the \$3 billion in aid that they had promised at the time of the crisis to defray Turkey's losses. The UAE paid only \$150 million out of the \$500 million it had pledged. This indicated that they did not regard Ankara as a potential ally in preserving the stability of the Gulf region. Certain Arab countries went further and began to criticize Turkey's policy line. When the U.S.-led multinational force went into action against Iraq on 16 January 1991, the air base at İncirlik was at the disposal of the U.S. Air Force; and there was talk of making other Turkish bases available. This elicited negative reactions from Iran, Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria that openly condemned Ankara in official statements, while Syria conveyed its concern in a more discreet way. The foreign minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, described Turkey's action as "shameful" and blamed Ankara for "bowing before the Americans as they pursued their treacherous aggression against the Iraqi nation" (Ayın Tarihi, January 1991). He also blamed Özal for dragging Turkey into the American camp and pursuing policies that were incompatible with good neighborly relations.

Özal's policies did not draw fire exclusively from the Arab side and from Iran. There was little agreement among the Turkish public about Özal's actions. A good number of people, and notably the leader of the Democratic Left Party, Bülent Ecevit, declared that Turkey would always remain a neighbor of Iraq and therefore should pursue policies toward its neighbor that differed from Western policies. Shortly after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Ecevit had gone to Baghdad in his capacity as a journalist. Upon his return, he published a series of articles in the newspaper Milliyet in which he reflected the Iraqi explanation for the occupation of Kuwait and sought to show that the actions of Baghdad might be justified. When the U.S.-led action against Iraq got underway, the most realistic appraisal came from Ecevit. He declared that the U.S. used Iraq's occupation of Kuwait as a pretext and took advantage of the fact that the USSR was no longer in a position to check it in order to entrench itself in the region and become a de facto Middle Eastern state. Even if Iraq evacuated Kuwait, Ecevit claimed, the U.S. would not leave the Middle East. He also voiced his concern about the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and underlined the need for Turkey to do all it could to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, Ecevit's views would soon become Turkey's official policy.

## B. Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi Relations (1990–1995) in the Context of the Kurdish and Water Questions

The Gulf crisis did not lead to the fulfillment of Özal's expectations in the Middle East. Over the long term, the crisis had harmful effects on Turkey's interests. Above all, the local Kurdish question became an international issue. The vacuum of power that came into being in northern Iraq allowed the PKK to gain strength there. Turkey suffered material losses amounting to billions of dollars and began to worry about its territorial integrity as the U.S. gradually started to pursue a policy of setting up a Kurdish state. The PKK's strength attained its peak between 1991 and 1993, with a corresponding intensification of its activities in Turkey.

## 1. The Period from 1991 to 1993

When Turkey amassed troops on the Iraqi border following the eruption of the Gulf crisis, the PKK was forced to reduce its armed activities. The arrival of winter also contributed to this reduction. At this point the PKK held its Fourth Congress on 26–31 December 1990 to appraise the latest developments and readjust its policies. The new policy would shift the priority from armed military activities to political activities. This meant that the PKK would now seek to win the people of the southeast over to its side instead of using coercion against it. The peasants would be

organized in order to provoke a popular uprising in the provincial centers and towns.

In the new circumstances, Turkey sought to find a way to settle the Kurdish question. Efforts were made to improve relations with the countries of the Middle East that were anxious to see Iraq weakened, especially Syria, which moved closer to the West and to Turkey for this reason. On 12 February 1991 the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, started a week-long trip to Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Alptemuçin held talks in Damascus with Syrian president Hafez Assad and foreign minister Faruq al-Shara, with whom he took up the situation in Iraq, the sharing of regional rivers, and border security. The joint communiqué released at the end of these talks clearly revealed the concern of both sides to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. They expressed the desire to see no changes in the geography of the Middle East in the aftermath of the war and underlined that the nature of the future government of Iraq was up to the Iraqi people. The joint communiqué stressed the need for Turkey and Syria to increase contacts in the future and the need to establish mechanisms for more coordination and cooperation.

According to the communiqué, steps were taken toward improving border security. The Syrian leaders conveyed the message to Alptemoçin that they valued Turkey's stability and believed that it would contribute to the stability of Syria.

It became apparent, however, that the two countries remained far apart on the issue of sharing the waters of the regional rivers. Alptemoçin communicated Özal's proposal to hold a water summit in Istanbul in November. He also made an effort to ensure that the water issue did not poison relations with Syria. Nevertheless, the communique's language indicated that both sides had stuck by their respective positions. Syria wanted to see the waters allocated on the basis of quotas, while the Turkish position was that the waters should not be shared on the basis of allocation but should be used through joint projects. Turkey held that this would be the most rational way to utilize water and indicated its readiness to develop a variety of projects.

While Turkey sought to persuade Syria to stop assisting the PKK and stressed the need to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity, news began to be received that an independent Kurdish state might come into being in northern Iraq. Jalal Talabani was in the U.S. at the time to discuss the future of the Kurds, which led to the impression that the source of the news was in Washington. At this stage, President Özal got in touch with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq in an effort to curb the activities of the PKK

in the region. Without advising either the General Staff or the MIT (the Turkish intelligence agency), he sent messages to Barzani and Talabani on 20 February 1991, calling for a dialogue. On 8 March the undersecretary of the MFA, Tugay Özçeri, held a meeting with Talabani and the representative of Barzani. Özal wanted to assume the role of protector of the Iraqi Kurds. His approach was the subject of heated debates at the meetings of the National Security Council. Those who advocated a "tough" line were convinced that Özal's policy of acting without consulting them might well hurt the interests of the state.

In March the Kurdish groups claimed to be in control in northern Iraq. But after surrendering on 28 February, the Iraqi army directed its attention to domestic foes. After first suppressing the Shiite uprising in the south, it turned its attention to the Kurdish uprising in the north. Half a million Kurds out of the million and a half that fled from the attack of the Iraqi army pushed their way to the Turkish border. In the face of international pressure, Ankara was forced to open the border to these refugees.

When the Kurdish groups loyal to Barzani that were in control of northern Iraq evacuated the region, the PKK got in touch with the government of Iraq, moved in, and took possession of the weapons and ammunition left behind. Baghdad was worried that the power vacuum in northern Iraq might be filled by Turkey. Consequently, Iraq was encouraging the PKK to take over the area and thus ensure the safety of its border with Turkey as well as the Mosul-Kirkuk region, which was frequently on the international agenda.

On 14 June President Özal had his first direct talk with Talabani, releasing a storm of protest in Ankara. Those who opposed Özal's move went as far as accusing him of treason and the followers of a tough line eventually prevailed. As a result, three operations were conducted against northern Iraq on 5 August and 11 and 25 October 1991. These operations met with a very negative reaction from the Kurds of northern Iraq, who accused Turkey of seeking to force them to get the PKK out of northern Iraq by inflicting punishment on them rather than on the PKK itself. The international reaction was equally negative, with protests coming from Russia, Germany, Greece, and Iraq.

Despite their negative reactions to the Turkish operations, the KDP and the PUK were convinced that they could not set up a Kurdish state in northern Iraq without Turkish approval and consequently continued to develop their relations with Ankara. That is why they sought to limit the activities of the Baghdad-supported PKK in their region. After his visit to Ankara in November 1991,

Talabani sent a letter to Abdullah Öcalan, calling on him to declare a unilateral cease-fire for six months. Öcalan was in the political ascendancy at this point, and his reply was categorical: nothing could drag him down such a defeatist path.

While Turkey carried out its operations in northern Iraq, it also sought to get Damascus to cut off its support for the PKK. During his visit to Damascus on 14 April 1992, the minister of the interior, İsmet Sezgin, submitted the evidence of Syria's support for the PKK to his Syrian counterpart. The evidence submitted included the documents proving that Öcalan lived in Damascus and was protected by the Syrian secret service, the false identity papers found on PKK members, the locations of the PKK camps and training centers in the Bekaa Valley under the protection of Syrian Sam-7 missiles, the photographs of Syrians killed while fighting with the PKK, and the statements of twenty-five Syrian nationals that had been captured. Sezgin demanded that Syria honor its obligations under international treaties and prevent infiltrations across the border and other terrorist activities. The Syrians denied that Öcalan was in Syria but accepted that he might be in the Bekaa Valley. They also claimed that their responsibility in the Bekaa Valley was confined to keeping the peace among the different groups there. The Syrians pointed out that completely preventing infiltrations across the Syriah-Turkish border, which extended over 800 kilometers, would be extremely difficult.

After the talks, a security protocol was signed by the two countries on 17 April 1992. The protocol provided that the parties would cooperate in combating terrorism and prevent terrorists from moving across their common border; that members of groups proscribed by the other country would not be allowed to reside, organize, or engage in training and propaganda; that the members of proscribed groups that were apprehended would be deported to the other country; that information about prescribed groups would be exchanged; that the required measures would be taken to prevent illegal border crossings and smuggling; and that the two sides would cooperate to prevent armed incidents along the border. After the signing of this protocol, Syria closed down the camps of the Dev-Sol organization immediately and the Mahzum Korkmaz Academy belonging to the PKK in the autumn.

When foreign minister Hikmet Çetin visited Syria on 3 August 1992, Turkey's policy was clearly revealed. In his talks with Syrian president Hafez Assad and foreign minister Faruq al-Shara, Çetin made clear that, if Syria carried out all of its undertakings under the security agreement signed in April, Turkey would carry out all of its responsi-

bilities and promises with respect to the Euphrates. Once again Ankara was underlining the linkage between the water question and PKK terror. As a matter of fact, as the intensity of terror mounted, so did the pressure of Turkish public opinion, which wanted to see the water flow in the Euphrates cut off to punish Syria for its support of the PKK.

In September 1992 a tripartite technical committee consisting of Syrian, Iraqi, and Turkish experts met in Damascus. The committee considered the climatic conditions and the hydraulic data relating to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, exchanged information about the dams on the Euphrates River, and assessed the technical projects and proposals of the three countries to ensure the fair sharing of the waters of these two rivers in a manner that would satisfy all parties. No agreement was signed, however, because the Turkish delegation expressed the need to consult its government before consenting to a date for the agreement.

On 19 November Hikmet Çetin claimed that Syria was using the terror card in the negotiations on the water issue and went on to remind Syria of its vulnerability by declaring that Turkey could overcome terrorism through its own efforts but Syria needed Turkey's cooperation if it wanted to solve the water issue. Prime Minister Demirel made similar arguments, provoking an outcry in Syria. Syrian officials declared that talk about sovereignty over shared natural resources was unfair and violated international law, which called for the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates. They claimed that Turkish statements on the subject gave rise to concern about Turkey's intentions and projects and that these concerns were not confined to Syria but were spread across the Arab world. In December Syria's statements hardened in tone. In avoiding an agreement, Turkey was accused of violating international law, abusing its rights and appropriating what belonged to others, and being unwilling to develop relations. Syria referred the issue to the Arab League and called on Arab states to put pressure on Turkey. As relations became more strained, Syria began to revive old claims that Hatay was Syrian territory under Turkish occupation.

At the beginning of the First Gulf War, Syria had been in the process of mending its relations with Turkey. Subsequently, however, as the U.S. started to implement its plans to set up an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and Turkey appeared not to oppose these plans, Syria reversed its course. From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, Turkey had been stressing the need to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. But when Talabani and Barzani united their forces, elections were held in northern Iraq in May

1992, a parliament and a government were set up, and the first steps toward a federated state were taken, Turkey adopted a new policy and sought to take advantage of the new circumstances prevailing in the region (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in this section). As the first president of the Kurdish government in northern Iraq, Talabani paid a visit to Turkey on 9 June 1992 and declared that the PKK might have crossed into Iraq but was not in Kurdistan. In July 1992 Talabani and Barzani came to Ankara at Özal's request and went on to the U.S. after receiving Turkish diplomatic passports. It was now obvious that Turkey wanted to be involved in the developments taking place in northern Iraq. In response, the KDP and the PUK revised their policies toward the PKK in order to soften Ankara's opposition to a federated state and also to eliminate the PKK as a force in northern Iraq. They not only excluded the PKK from the political process that led to a federated state (including elections) but actively fought the PKK after making the decision in October to join their armed militias into a single force. When Turkey launched a new military operation at this point, the PKK was caught between two foes and was forced to retreat southward to the area under Iraq's control.

While Turkey appeared to be a part of the American attempts to set up an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, it was also pursuing its efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. On 4 November the commander general of the Genharmerie, Eşref Bitlis, came to Erbil and reached an agreement with the Kurdish administration. The Turkish forces would be withdrawn from the region, and the Kurdish side would undertake to prevent the PKK from entering Turkey. On 14 April the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Syria met in Ankara and affirmed their intention to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state in the region. They gave the impression that they had set up a regional alliance to oppose the American plans to establish a Kurdish state. In response, the Kurdish parliament in northern Iraq sent letters to the parliaments of the three countries, stating that they had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of neighbors and would refrain from provoking the Kurdish populations of the three countries (Özdağ, p. 98).

At this juncture, the PKK was being squeezed by Turkey's developing relations and joint military operations with the region's powers and, not wanting to weaken its position further, declared a unilateral cease-fire on 20 March 1993. In the meantime the PKK took advantage of the rift between the KDP and the PUK because of the disagreement over the sharing of taxes derived from the border trade with Turkey to regain the support of Talabani. It

also abandoned the strategy of seeking a peasant war that would result from popular rebellion and returned to the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

## 2. The Period from 1993 to 1995

For Turkey, 1993 was a turning point in the way it dealt with the Kurdish problem. Upon the death of Özal, Demirel became president and Çiller prime minister. A decision was made to deal with the problem by military means. The chief of the General Staff announced that Turkey was faced with a "low-intensity war" in the southeast region and affirmed that a military solution to the problem would be found. Despite the negative reactions of the Arab states to Turkey's rapprochement with Israel, there were signs of a major shift in Turkey's Middle East policy.

In November 1993 the Syrian prime minister refused to participate in a meeting with the prime ministers of Turkey and Iraq, declaring that no agreement had been reached on the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates River. Notwithstanding the disagreements over the question of water sharing, a protocol on security was signed by Turkey and Syria in that same month. The document signed bore the title "Joint Memorandum on Security Questions." In this document Syria described the PKK as a terrorist organization for the first time. The meeting on water sharing that had been postponed was held on 5 February 1994. At the meeting, Syria declared that there were no PKK camps in Lebanon, that Öcalan was not in Damascus, and that it would not allow the PKK to be active in Syria and called on Turkey to engage in bilateral talks to deal with the water issue. Turkey turned down the request, claiming that no agreement on the water issue could be concluded with Damascus without an atmosphere of cooperation that would allow the terror problem with Syria to be ended, even though the MIT had confirmed that there had been a drop in PKK members in Syria.

Meanwhile the U.S. was pursuing its double-track policy of establishing a Kurdish state and eliminating the differences between the KDP and PUK. These intensive efforts reached a peak with the Paris meeting of 23 July 1994. The agreement reached made no reference to Turkey's security concerns and said nothing about Iraq's territorial integrity or the situation of the Turcomans and Arabs in northern Iraq. The response to the Paris agreement came from foreign ministers Ali Akbar Velayeti, Faruq al-Shara, and Mümtaz Soysal at the meeting they held in Damascus on 23 August. All three countries declared that they were opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish state. Turkey went a step further and declared that the border crossing at Habur would be closed to the

representatives of international NGOs and members of foreign parliaments.

The Paris agreement proved short-lived, owing to the clashes between the KDP and PUK. To prevent the PKK from getting fresh support from northern Iraq, Turkey undertook a cross-border operation in March and April 1995 code-named Operation Çelik. This was the largest such operation undertaken by the Turkish army and involved 35,000 troops. Although Turkey met with international criticism (from the U.S. and the EU, among others), another operation was launched in July.

Notwithstanding the security protocols and Syria's listing of the PKK as a terrorist organization, the PKK infiltrated the Turkish border in the summer of 1995 and attacked in Hatay, demonstrating that Damascus had not taken adequate measures. Turkey suspended the meetings on security and cooperation that had been scheduled to be held every three months. Although Syria appealed for the meeting to be resumed, Turkey refused. As a precondition, Ankara wanted Öcalan extradited to Turkey or deported to a third country and a tripartite meeting on security cooperation among Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon designed to end PKK activities in Lebanon. Meanwhile Turkey would keep on refusing to hold meetings on the water issue. But the Syrian-Greek defense agreement was seen in Turkey as the last straw. Under the terms of this agreement, in the event of an armed conflict between Syria and Turkey, Damascus would allow the use of its airspace by the Greek air force. Another issue that caused apprehension in Turkey was the expectation that the ongoing talks between Syria and Israel might lead to positive results. A possible peace between Syria and Israel might allow Syria to direct all of its attention to the north. While Turkey was hardening its stand against those countries that supported the PKK, starting with Syria, it was also busy improving its relations with Israel.

Faced with Turkey's inflexible stand on the water issue, Syria began to raise the issue in international forums. In December 1995 the question was brought to the attention of the Arab states. Having obtained the backing of eight countries (including Egypt and Saudi Arabia), Damascus delivered a note to Turkey, demanding the immediate resumption of bilateral talks. The note claimed that Syria was being harmed by Turkey's dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, that Turkey's activities were polluting the water that was being released to Syria, and that this was contrary to international law. Immediately after the delivery of the note to Turkey, some members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt) met in Damascus

and released the Damascus Declaration. It called for a fair sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and took a critical stand on the construction of the Birecik Dam, which was part of the Southeast Anatolia Project. The criticism was rejected by the minister of foreign affairs, Deniz Baykal, who added that so long as Syria played host to the head-quarters of a terrorist organization it could expect no increase in the waters of the Euphrates.

Following the election of 24 December 1995, Turkey was grappling with the process of forming a government while its foreign relations were going through a difficult period. Stung by the pressure exerted by the PKK, Turkey sent a stern note to Syria on 23 January 1996, demanding the extradition of Öcalan. This was followed by the signing of the military cooperation agreement with Israel on 23 February 1996. Israeli pilots arrived in Turkey in April to conduct training exercises. Syria's response to these developments came at the meeting of the Arab League in Cairo on 13 March 1996, where it inserted the water issue in the agenda and thereby stepped up the pressure on Turkey. It was easy for Syria to get the Arab states aligned with it, in view of Turkey's close relations with Israel. The signature of the military cooperation agreement with Israel had provoked anger in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Arab states as well as in Iran. Turkey received letters of warning, and Egypt's foreign minister Amr Musa paid a visit to Ankara but declared afterward that he was not satisfied with the explanations given to him.

In June the Motherland-True Path coalition government resigned and was replaced by the Welfare-True Path coalition government. This led to expectations that a new era might be dawning with respect to the Kurdish question and relations with the Arab states.

## The Welfare–True Path Period When Relations Remained Unchanged (1996–1997)

The coalition of the Welfare and True Path parties was known as Refahyol in its Turkish acronym. Refahyol obtained a vote of confidence on 8 July 1996 and had the potential to repair Turkey's frayed relations with Arab states. However, this was not to be. The new government's foreign minister was Tansu Çiller. The senior partner in the coalition, the Welfare Party, regarded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as too conservative and was not ready to allow it free rein in the conduct of foreign policy. Çiller was in a weak position politically because of the parliamentary investigations she had to face in connection with allegations of corruption. In a sense, she was a hostage to the Welfare Party. Furthermore, she was often absent from her office,

and foreign relations were not high on her list of priorities. The minister of state, Abdullah Gül, had assumed a number of the MFA's responsibilities, while Necmettin Erbakan had placed relations with Sudan and Iran under the responsibility of the minister of state, Rıza Güneri. Another minister of state, Ahmet Cemil Tunç, was in charge of relations with Iraq and the Middle East.

The slogans of the Welfare Party had been "Turkey the leader" and "a foreign policy with character." When it assumed the reins of power, its stated aim was "to free Turkey from the exploitation of the West" and to align it with the Islamic countries with which it shared historical and cultural ties. In addition to realigning Turkey's foreign policy, the Welfare Party had the objective of turning the party into a political force that would carry weight in international Islamic political organizations. Soon after he assumed power, Erbakan held talks with one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Seiful Islam al-Banna, on 29 July 1996. This was followed by a meeting with the leader of the Nedva movement, Rashid al-Gannushi. These contacts met with a negative reaction in Egypt and Tunisia. Relations with Egypt became even more strained when Erbakan met with president Hosni Mubarak on 6 August and asked him to show greater understanding for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erbakan had no inhibitions about meeting with representatives of foreign Islamist organizations during his foreign visits. The Welfare Party's deviation from the traditional foreign policy of the state was quick to draw fire from both the public and the institutions involved in formulating foreign policy.

The Refahyol government's program contained a section dealing with foreign policy that had been very carefully drafted. Although it announced that relations with Islamic states would be developed, an effort had been made to allay fears that radical changes would take place in relations with the West. It did not mention Operation Provide Comfort and stated that the obligations undertaken within the Customs Union would be honored to the extent that the EU carried out its obligations. The program included an undertaking to remain faithful to all strategic agreements but specified that these would not be allowed to encroach on national security or national interests. This was a way of saying that there would be no radical departure from existing relations with the West and with Israel while giving satisfaction to the Welfare Party's constituency. It was also underlined that the struggle against foreign-supported separatist terror would be pursued within the framework of the Constitution and the unitary structure of the state.

Prime Minister Erbakan's first trip abroad was to the

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on the twenty-second anniversary of the Cyprus operation. Immediately after that, Erbakan went off on his Asian tour in August, when he visited Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The MFA was kept out of the preparations for this trip. In addition to the official meetings there were many informal tête-à-tête meetings, which gave the impression that this was a private trip. During his talks with Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, Erbakan declared that Turkey's intelligence agency MIT might be under the influence of the CIA and Mossad. This created an uproar in Turkey and turned the visit into a complete fiasco.

As Erbakan set off on his Asian tour, the minister of justice, Şevket Kazan, went to Baghdad accompanied by the minister of education, Mehmet Sağlam. During this visit, from which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was excluded, Kazan proposed the holding of a terror summit to bring together Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Iraq turned down this proposal, pointing out that it would not hold talks with Syria. Iraq also asked Turkey not to extend the term of Operation Provide Comfort, to resume trade with Iraq as Jordan had done, and to restore the border trade. Kazan's visit to Iraq produced nothing tangible. When Kazan praised Iraq's legal system for reducing the prison terms of convicts who memorized the Quran, however, he contributed to the loss of prestige for the Welfare Party that had begun with Erbakan's gaffe in Iran.

But there was worse to come when Erbakan undertook his trip to Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria in October. This trip revealed the perils of a foreign policy that was conducted by several centers of power in the country. Furthermore, the differences between the armed forces and the government and between the coalition partners became more noticeable. Difficulties cropped up at the preparatory stage. Preparations for the trip, which was to cover Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa, started in September. While the MFA was not involved in the preparations, Erbakan was in constant contact with the Libyan and Sudanese ambassadors. In response to the public clamor, Foreign Minister Ciller announced that the purpose of the trip was to secure the payment of overdue Libyan debts to Turkish contractors and added that the prime minister was free to go to any country he chose. Despite Ciller's announcement, the minister of the interior, Mehmet Ağar of the True Path Party, declared that he would not sign the cabinet decree authorizing the trip to Libya because of the statements that Khaddafi had made in support of the PKK and the Libyan policies that went against Turkey's interests in the southeast. Other deputies within his party supported Ağar's stand. The True Path Party (DYP) joined the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Republican People's Party (CHP) in not sending any of its deputies on this trip (they had not been invited, in any case, and did not approve its program). These rows were not enough to deter Erbakan from proceeding with the visit.

Erbakan's tour was to begin in Egypt. Last-minute changes in the Egyptian prime minister's schedule led Cairo to ask for a postponement that forced Erbakan and his delegation to turn back when they were on the road to the airport in Ankara. This led to complaints in Turkey that Egypt was not taking the visit seriously. Erbakan finally went to Egypt on 4 October and proposed the creation of a group of Muslim countries that would engage in closer cooperation, to be known as the M-7 project. President Mubarak did not agree to the proposal. He wanted priority to be given to cooperation at the bilateral level and pointed out that the label "Muslim" applied to such cooperative groups might lead to misunderstanding. At the meeting in the presidential palace, the accompanying deputies were not admitted through the main gate. The Turkish flag was not hoisted at the airport during either the receiving ceremony or the departure. This was a visit full of scandals that produced no positive or tangible result.

The second leg of the trip was Libya and resulted in even worse scandals. On 6 October, following the meeting with Erbakan, Khaddafi held a press conference in his tent in the presence of his guest. His criticism of Atatürk and his reforms bordered on insult. Khaddafi then went on to comment on Turkey's domestic politics and declared that a Kurdish state should be created. This caused a diplomatic scandal that could not be easily explained or dismissed. These were Khaddafi's words:

It is only natural for Kurds to be independent, in Libya, in Iraq, and everywhere. It is futile to fight the nations seeking independence. Turkey has tried this in vain. The Arabs, like the Kurds, have fought in this region and earned their independence... I am now referring to the nation of Kurdistan. There must be a place under the Middle Eastern sun for this nation... After the First World War, Turkey lost its free will. Turkey has been invaded, bases have been established there, and these bases have been used against Iraq... We must all struggle until Turkey is able to regain its free will. (Hürriyet, 7 October 1996)

Khaddafi added that only the Welfare Party could secure the liberation of Turkey's will. Taking the floor, Erbakan refrained from rebuking his host. Instead he declared that Turkey was confronted not with a Kurdish question but with a terrorism question and added that the West and the Westerners were seeking Turkey's dismemberment. After the press conference, Khaddafi left for a meeting of the Islamic People's Command in the company of Erbakan. His offending remarks were not translated into Turkish. An anomalous situation had come about: the two leaders were going to hold a bilateral meeting, with Khaddafi participating as the head of the Islamic People's Command and Erbakan as a member of it. The talks went on for seven hours. When Khaddafi refused to agree to the insertion of the phrase "The PKK is a terror organization and we reject the terror of this organization and condemn it" in the final communiqué, Erbakan brought the meeting to an end.

Politically, this had been a debacle for Turkey. Nor had any progress been made in securing the payment of overdue Libyan debts to Turkish contractors. Libya proposed to settle the debt in the amount of \$165 million with a down payment of \$40 million, with the remainder to be paid in installments of \$4 million. This was far from satisfying Turkish businesses.

While Erbakan remained silent in response to Khaddafi's provocations, the other delegation members (including the Welfare Party's minister of state, Abdullah Gül) were furious. The reaction in Turkey was even greater. Foreign Minister Ciller called on Khaddafi to watch his step and conform to the norms of friendship. She reminded him that Libya was one of the thirty-five states that emerged from the Ottoman Empire and added that Turkey was not about "to deny the history of our republic, or bring changes to our policies, or make concessions on the issue of the unity and integrity of our country upon the remarks of a Bedouin from the desert" (Hürriyet, 8 October 1996). Immediately after Erbakan's departure from Libya, Turkey's ambassador in Tripoli, Ateş Balkan, was recalled to Ankara for consultations. This decision was made by Çiller. The press claimed that either President Demirel or the chief of the General Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, was behind the decision.

Erbakan left Libya on 7 October and proceeded to Nigeria. This trip was uneventful but remained under the shadow of Libya. To sum up, the initiative, dubbed "the landing of Africa," had not opened new vistas for Turkish foreign policy as expected. It had been a disaster and caused the Welfare Party to lose much ground in Turkey.

During the Refahyol government's term in office, there were no changes in the armed struggle against the PKK; but important developments took place in northern Iraq.

Taking advantage of the differences between the KDP and PUK, Baghdad reached an agreement with the KDP and launched an operation against the PUK in northern Iraq on 31 August 1996. This evoked a positive response in Ankara, where it was seen as reaffirmation of the unitary structure of Iraq. These developments disturbed Washington, which took the initiative to bring the two parties together in Ankara. This brought the KDP, PUK, and Turkey together in what came to be known as the Ankara process. During these talks, differences emerged between Ankara and Washington. While Ankara supported the rapprochement between Barzani and Baghdad, Washington was seeking to bring the two Kurdish factions together in an alliance against Saddam Hussein.

The second round of talks in the Ankara process took place in October. Washington pressed the KDP and PUK to respond to Turkey's security concerns and obtained a promise from the factions to fight the PKK. Washington also got Ankara to recognize the legitimacy of the "provisional regime" in northern Iraq. It looked as if Turkey was departing from its policy of defending Iraq's territorial integrity that it had been pursuing since 1991. Nevertheless, its relations with Iraq were also getting warmer.

Following two operations that the Turkish army conducted in northern Iraq in November, talks were undertaken with Iraq to renew the agreement that allowed for hot pursuit, which had lapsed in 1988. Upon the instruction of UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline resumed operations on 10 December 1996. Turkey announced that it intended to raise the volume of its trade with Iraq to \$500 million. Tariq Aziz responded by reminding Turkey that it would not be easy to enter the Iraqi market so long as its products remained overpriced. This was a sign that developing economic relations with Iraq would not be an easy task.

# D. The Aftermath of the 28 February Episode and the Capture of Öcalan

As a result of developments in domestic politics during the Refahyol government's term in office, the National Security Council made a number of decisions on 28 February 1997. On 29 April the General Staff held a meeting with members of the media at which the new National Military Strategic Concept was announced. Under the new concept, reactionary religious movements and separatist terror were described as greater threats than foreign threats. Syria and Iran were identified as the powers supporting these threats. It was also announced that it might become necessary to apply political, economic, or even military measures against these states.

In the period under review, Turkey's Middle East

policy had been based on improving relations with Israel while distancing itself from the Arab states, and the Refahyol government had not managed to change this orientation. Syria, Iran, and Iraq were identified as constituting the common threat to both countries when the minister of defense, Turhan Tayan, visited Israel in April 1997, and joint military exercises were scheduled. General Cevik Bir, the deputy chief of the General Staff, visited Israel in May, holding meetings with Israel's deputy minister of defense, David Ivry, and American officials. At these meetings, the steps that would be taken against Syria and Iran were considered, including the creation of a joint force to deal with a threat coming from these countries. The three countries would hold joint exercises, establish arms depots and stores in Turkey to deal with emergency situations, exchange communications codes and develop joint codes, and share intelligence.

As soon as these measures were announced, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Arab League expressed their concern over the tripartite alliance and the plans for joint exercises in the Mediterranean. The representative of Palestine in Ankara, ambassador Fuad Yassin, was more moderate in tone when he declared that they would accept the claim that the exercises were not directed at any other country until the opposite was proven.

The Arab states did not confine themselves to verbal protests. They also took initiatives to neutralize the effects of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. Despite its strained relations with Egypt, Iran sent its foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayeti, to Cairo. Syria sent a delegation to Iraq for the first time in eighteen years. Syrian vice-president Abdulhalim Haddam went to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates and asked for a determined stand to deal with the threat from the Turkish-Israeli alliance to the Arab nation. Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Shara voiced similar concerns during his visit to Moscow.

Differences were beginning to emerge in Turkey about the course to follow in the Middle East. Just as there were those who advocated developing relations with Israel, others claimed that relations with the Arabs were being neglected and that ignoring regional balances would have undesirable consequences over the long run. The process unleashed by the 28 February decision had its own logic in domestic as well as foreign policy, however. The main threat was religious reaction and separatist terror, which inevitably called for tough policies toward the Arabs and particularly Syria. The first domestic consequence of this process was the replacement of the Refahyol government by the coalition made up of the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Democratic Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi:

DTP; founded in 1997 by people who resigned from the DYP, it later joined another party in 2008—not to be confused with Demokratik Toplum Partisi: DTP, a Kurdish party founded in 2005).

From 1991 to 1993 the PKK's strength was at its peak. But after Turkey decided in 1993 to reject all compromise and adopted the policy of military repression, the PKK grew progressively weaker. As it lost ground militarily, the PKK compensated by developing its political side and began to win over the grassroots of the PUK, which was backing the PKK anyway. In the course of this process, the PKK was also undergoing a transformation. Its Marxist ideology was gradually yielding to a more pronounced Islamic identification. Ideological and personal differences were also beginning to surface among the PKK's leadership. The organization's second in command, Şemdin Sakık, was in conflict with Öcalan and had taken refuge with the KDP. When Iran entered northern Iraq on 2 March 1998, Turkey began to tighten its relations with the KDP and was thus able to capture Sakık after an operation conducted on 13 April.

As Ankara's relations with Israel developed and the PKK became weaker militarily and as Turkey increased its influence with the KDP and became a major player in the politics of northern Iraq, alarm bells began to ring in Syria and Iraq. This drove the two countries closer to one another. In response, Turkey took the initiative on 2 July and submitted a document to Damascus that was known as the Forum of Good Neighborliness, containing ten principles. Turkey indicated that its relations with Syria would improve and economic, cultural, and other forms of cooperation could take place if these principles were respected: preserving the inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, cooperation against terror, respect for human rights, noninterference in domestic affairs, not resorting to force, undertaking to resolve differences through peaceful means, not allowing terrorist organizations to be used against the other party, respect for territorial integrity and independence, and not engaging in activities harmful to the other side in order to prevent disputes and misunderstandings.

Syria took no tangible steps to improve relations with Turkey. In August 1998 its minister of petroleum visited Baghdad and announced the decision to resume oil shipments through the pipeline leading from Iraq to Banias that had remained inoperative since 1982, when Iran and Iraq were engaged in war. This decision was seen as a first step toward an alliance to counteract the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement.

In the autumn of 1998 relations between Ankara and

Damascus took a turn for the worse. In September 1998 Washington finally persuaded the representatives of the KDP and PUK to talk to each other after four years. The final communiqué released after the meeting revealed the differences between the policies of the U.S. and Turkey. The U.S. seemed determined to set up a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, while Turkey was not prepared to depart from its policy of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq; the PKK's terror remained Turkey's principal concern, even if it occasionally appeared to give the green light to Washington's objective. Turkey had been excluded from the process set in motion in Washington and was expected to act with Syria and Iraq and oppose the U.S. policy. Instead Turkey hardened its line toward Syria.

Gen. Atilla Ateş, the commander of the land forces, delivered a speech in Hatay on 16 September 1998 in which he said: "Turkey has made every effort to establish good relations with Syria, but our patience is running out. Syria is a source of untold evil. Turkey has the power to deal with this evil. If Turkey does not get the response it has a right to expect, it will be free to take whatever measure it may deem to be appropriate" (Hürriyet, 17 September 1998). This was a sign that the crisis management mechanism was put in operation against Syria. Given that Ateş was a member of the National Security Council, it was obvious that he was voicing the official policy line and not expressing his personal views.

On 1 October President Demirel delivered a speech at the inauguration of the new session of the TGNA. The speech contained the following passage: "Syria is following a policy toward Turkey that is openly hostile. I declare to the world that we reserve our right to respond to Syria as it continues to provide active support for the PKK terror. I want to declare to all that our patience is about to come to an end" (Hürriyet, 2 October 1998). The message was that Turkey would resort to arms if it became necessary. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the chief of the General Staff, made an even tougher statement the same day: "We are in a state of undeclared war with Syria" (Hürriyet, 2 October 1998). Ankara's warning to Damascus was not confined to the statements of high-ranking individuals. Military units were deployed to the regions adjacent to Syria, and preparations were launched for holding military exercises. By 5 October all diplomatic contacts with Syria had come to an end.

The first reaction to Ankara's tough stand came from Israel. Contrary to the expectations of Ankara and the Arab states, the Israeli administration declared that it would give Ankara neither political nor military support in the crisis between Turkey and Syria. Israel felt that the

situation might harm the Middle East Peace Process, so it canceled the planned military exercise at the Syrian border and even deployed some troops away from the border. Among the Arab states, Iraq declared that it was standing by Syria, while Jordan and Saudi Arabia, along with Iran, counseled moderation. Muammar Khaddafi declared that he would consider an attack against Syria to be an attack against Libya. When the U.S. failed to give Turkey its backing, Ankara gave the green light to diplomatic initiatives after having completed its military preparations. Egypt's President Mubarak and Iran's foreign minister Kemal Kharrazi took up the role of mediators and engaged in shuttle diplomacy.

Positive developments were set in motion with this diplomatic engagement, and on 17 October 1998 Abdullah Öcalan left Syria. With this step in the right direction, the officials of the two countries met in Adana on 19 and 20 October. Following the talks involving the deputy undersecretary of the MFA, ambassador Uğur Ziyal, and the Syrian president of political security, Maj. Gen. Adnan Badr al-Hassan, they signed a document known as the Adana Agreement, in which Syria made the following commitments.

- 1. Öcalan was not in Syria at the time and would not be allowed to enter the country. Nor would elements of the PKK be allowed to enter Syria.
- 2. There were no active PKK camps in Syria at that time, and they would be prevented from reestablishing themselves in the future. Many members of the PKK had been arrested and brought to trial. The lists containing the names of these individuals had been handed over to Turkey.
- 3. Within the framework of reciprocity, Syria would prevent all activities on its territory that might be directed against Turkey's security and stability. Syria would not allow the PKK to secure arms, supplies, or funds from within its territory or to engage in propaganda activities.
- 4. Syria accepted that the PKK was a terrorist organization. Syria prohibited the activities of the PKK and its subsidiaries along with all other terrorist organizations.
- 5. Syria would not allow its territory to be used by the PKK for training or for shelter in camps or any other installations; nor would the PKK be allowed to engage in commerce. Members of the PKK would not be allowed to transit Syria on their way to a third country.
- 6. Syria would take all the necessary measures to prevent the head of the PKK terror organization from entering its territory and would instruct the border crossing points to ensure that this did not happen.

The agreement also provided for the creation of

mechanisms that would ensure the effective and transparent implementation of these measures by the parties.

- 1. Direct telephone links would be set up immediately to connect the high-level security officials of the two countries and would be put to use right away.
- 2. The two countries would send two special officers each to their respective diplomatic missions, and these officers would be introduced to the local authorities.
- 3. Turkey proposed that a system be set up through which security would be increased within the context of combating terrorism. The Syrian delegation replied that the proposal would be submitted for the consideration of the Syrian authorities, and a reply would be given at an early date.
- 4. The parties decided to deal with PKK terrorism at a tripartite level, with the proviso that Lebanon would agree to such a course.
- 5. Syria agreed to implement the commitments contained in the document and to take the necessary steps to obtain concrete results.

As a result of this crisis, Öcalan had left Syria; but it was still debatable whether Turkey had been able to achieve the objectives it was seeking in its policies on dealing with the PKK. Since 1993 Turkey had gained the upper hand in its struggle with the PKK from the military point of view, but an important dimension of Ankara's policy was to prevent the organization from achieving its objective of politicizing its rebellion. When Öcalan left Syria and went to Greece, Russia, and then Italy, however, the process of politicization of the PKK was accelerated, and the issue became firmly embedded in the international political agenda. But Turkish-Syrian relations began to improve at a slow but steady pace after the Adana Agreement.

At first Turkish officials made cautious statements, declaring that Syria's actions would be closely watched to see whether it would honor its obligations. The diplomats of the two countries were discussing the principles that would be adhered to in their political relations. Much faster progress was being made in economic relations and on technical questions, however. In March 1999 draft agreements were prepared to eliminate double taxation and to promote cross-border investments, meetings of the Joint Economic Committee were held, and the volume of trade reached \$700 million.

When President Hafez Assad died on 10 June 2000, the question arose whether the recent revival of Turkish-Syrian relations could be maintained during the succession. The deceased president's brother Rifad Assad had personal relations with the PKK, and Ankara distrusted

him. But when the late president was succeeded by his son Bashar Assad rather than by his brother, Ankara was greatly relieved. Overriding objections, the new Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer carried out his first foreign visit to Damascus to attend the funeral. With Turkey represented at the funeral at the highest level and with Bashar Assad displaying maximum hospitality to his Turkish host, it became clear that there would be no radical changes in Turkish-Syrian relations as a consequence of the change of leadership in Damascus.

Although Turkey had defeated the PKK militarily, it was still grappling with the Kurdish question, both domestically and in northern Iraq. The water issue still had not been resolved, even though Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria were gradually being normalized. Although relations with Israel had been greatly developed, Turkey had not been able to turn this to its advantage in dealing with the balances in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Turkey's position in the Middle East in 2000 was much more comfortable than it had been in 1990. As a matter of fact, although Turkey's attention had been fixed almost exclusively on the Middle East in 1990, by the year 2000 the priority in foreign policy had shifted to Europe.

Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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#### II. RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB STATES

### A. Relations with Israel

### 1. The Revival of Relations

In 1990 Turkey raised the level of its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv to an embassy. Following the Madrid Conference, an important milestone in the Middle East Peace Process (Box 7-57), the representations of Palestine and Israel in Ankara were raised to embassy level on 31 December 1991. The Turkish Consulate General in Jerusalem, closed since 1980, was reopened in 1992. There were five basic reasons for these changes in bilateral relations.

- 1. The newly initiated dialogue between the Palestinians and Israel, even though it was proceeding with great caution, had raised hopes that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East might finally be at hand. In these circumstances, Turkey was eager to establish a firm place for itself in the new Middle East by developing its relations with both sides.
- 2. As relations with the U.S. reached a high level of cordiality during Özal's term, there was a parallel effort to maintain close contacts with Israel. During the 1950s a

#### Box 7-57. The Middle East Peace Process

The initiative to eliminate the differences between Israel and the Arabs and to establish a lasting and just peace in the region under the influence of the U.S. is known as the Middle East Peace Process.

The peace process was initiated by the rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. Following the war of 1973, secret talks began in Morocco under the auspices of the U.S. in September 1977, leading to the Camp David agreements of 17 September 1978. These were the Framework Agreement for a Middle Eastern Peace and the Framework Agreement for Peace between Egypt and Israel. According to these documents, the parties had agreed to meet, along with the representatives of Jordan and the Palestinian people, in order to establish an autonomous Palestinian Administration in the West Bank within five years. The Camp David Accords were followed by a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on 26 March 1979. This signaled the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and an Arab state for the first time in Israel's history.

It proved impossible to implement the Camp David decisions fully, because the Arab states ostracized Egypt and because of Israel's treatment of the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanese camps in the course of the Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1982.

The Palestinian Intifada that erupted in the occupied territories in 1987 and the warm relations between the U.S. and the Arab states that emerged from the Gulf crisis of 1990 and 1991 led to a revival of the Middle East Peace Process. Through a U.S. led initiative, the Arabs, Israel, and the Palestinians got together at the Madrid Conference on 30 October 1991. The peace process involved both multilateral and bilateral contacts. On the multilateral plane, cooperation in the areas of the economy, the environment, water, refugees, and regional security was discussed. It was also intended to conduct bilateral talks between Israel on the one hand and Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon on the other.

The negotiations between Israel and Jordan led to the signing of a peace agreement on 26 October 1994 and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The talks between Israel and Palestific were conducted in secret in Oslo, beginning in January 1993. The Oslo agreement, known as the Declaration of Principles, was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 by Israell prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO.

Under the terms of the agreement, in the first stage, Israel would gradually evacuate Gaza and Tericho by 13 April 1994 and an Autonomous Palestinian Administration (APA) would be set up in the region. In the second stage, the responsibilities in the fields

of education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism in the rest of the West Bank would be transferred to the APA. Following the elections to the Palestinian Council and the establishment of the Palestinian Police Force, the Israeli army would evacuate the remainder of the West Bank, and a final status agreement would be signed no later than May 1999.

The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was concluded on 4 May 1994. Israel subsequently began to pull out from the rest of the occupied territories as the transfer of power proceeded. But the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a Jewish fanatic on 3 November 1995 and the subsequent electoral victory on 29 May 1996 of the hard-line Likud Party under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu dealt a serious blow to the peace process.

Netanyahu's tough stance on the issue of peace prevented the final status agreement from being signed in May 1999 as planned. The agreement was also losing ground with the Israeli electorate. In the election held in May 1999, the pro-peace Labor Party came to power, under its leader Ehud Barak. On 4 September 1999 Barak signed the Sharm el-Shelkh Memorandum with Arafat. Within the framework of this agreement, Israel would speed up the evacuation of forces, release arrested Palestinians, and sign the final status agreement by September 2000. Nevertheless, the talks, that took place at Camp Bavid in August 2000 ended in deadlock, and the peace process got stalled.

At the Israeli-Syrian peace talks, no progress was achieved on the future of the Golan heights and the question of Lebanon. To signal his goodwill on the question of peace, Barak pulled back the Israeli army from southern Lebanon in May 2000 and expected Syria to do likewise in northern Lebanon, which was under Syrian control. With the death of Hafez-Assad in June 2000 the Israeli-Syrian peace process also stalled, because the new leader, Bashar Assad, was not ready to sit for peace talks with Israel before consolidating his power at home.

After the provocative visit of Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem on 23 September 2000, a second Intifada erupted among the Palestinians, completely blocking the Israell Palestinian dialogue. At the same time, Israel entered a period of political turmoil at home. In this situation Barak stepped down as prime minister, and the election of 6 February 2001 brought the hawkish Ariel Sharon to power. The peace process, was entering a difficult phase.

(Ç. ERHAN).

similar course had been followed by Prime Minister Menderes. One reason for this was the desire to gain the backing of the powerful Jewish lobby to counter the influential Greek and Armenian lobbies in the U.S. Congress. Turkey also needed the Jewish lobbies to improve its relations with Europe.

A number of activities were organized in Turkey, Israel, and the U.S. to mark the 500th anniversary of the events of 1492, when the Ottoman Empire granted refuge to the oppressed Jews of Spain. Contacts with the Jewish lobbies in the U.S. were greatly intensified within the

framework of these celebrations, which were led by the 500th Anniversary Foundation established by the Jewish community of Turkey. As the volume of trade between Turkey and Israel expanded and the diplomatic rapprochement between them gathered pace, the support for Turkey by the Jewish lobby organizations also increased.

3. Syria, Iran, and Iraq were supporting PKK activities in Turkey. Turkey also had differences with Syria and Iraq over the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. The nature of the regime in Iran was a source of concern. All of this led Ankara to reach out to countries:

in the Middle East with which it could cooperate. Israel had serious problems with these three countries and no direct disputes with Turkey, so it was natural for the two countries to come closer.

4. As the Welfare Party gained strength in Turkey, the idea of developing economic and political relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East was also gaining ground. Those who were opposed to the rising force of the Islamist movement in Turkey felt that by developing relations with the only Middle Eastern country that had a political and economic structure similar to Turkey's a dangerous drift toward the unknown in foreign policy could be reversed. As a result, the view began to gain strength that Turkey's basic goal of Westernization and modernization, pursued since the early days of the Republic, might be weakened if Turkey turned toward the more backward Islamic countries. It also began to be stressed more often that, instead of intensifying relations with Islamic countries that often let Turkey down in international platforms, it would be preferable to develop relations with Israel, a country that was ready to back Turkey in formal and informal ways.

5. Most importantly, to establish the "New World Order," the U.S. needed reliable allies in the region. Washington had been in close political and military cooperation with both Turkey and Israel for many years, and it was natural for the U.S. to encourage these two countries to intensify their relations so that it could rely with greater assurance on the support of the two pro-Western democracies in the region. With the termination of the Cold War, both Turkey and Israel were fearful that their strategic importance might be diminished in the eyes of the U.S. This led them to step up their cooperation with the U.S. as well as with each other in order to ensure an effective role for themselves in the U.S.-led New World Order in the Middle East.

Progress in Turkish-Israeli relations began to accelerate in 1992. The first high-level visit to Israel from Turkey was made by the minister of tourism, Abdülkadir Ateş, in June 1992. In the course of the visit, an agreement for cooperation in tourism was signed. This was followed by the visit of foreign minister Hikmet Çetin in November 1992, when he signed the memorandum containing the principles of mutual understanding and cooperation. This document provided the basic structure for future expanded cooperation.

These high-level visits were followed in 1994 and 1995 by the visits of Israeli president Ezer Weizman and foreign minister Shimon Peres and prime minister Tansu Çiller and president Süleyman Demirel. In the course of the visits, it was agreed that the two countries should cooper-

ate to achieve a lasting and just peace in the region and that the necessary measures should be taken to prevent Iraq from again posing a threat to the region. It was also agreed that bilateral cooperation should be developed in the fields of trade, defense, tourism, agriculture, combating terrorism, and security. During her visit to Israel in 1994, prime minister Tansu Çiller described Turkey's cooperation with Israel as a "strategic relationship" (Hadar, p. 10). This demonstrated the multidimensional nature of relations between the two countries.

Despite this intensification of relations, Turkey's actions were still guided by the principles of balanced diplomacy in the first half of the 1990s. At a time when the Middle East Peace Process had been launched but a final settlement was still not in place, Turkey was reluctant to take concrete steps to give substance to the cooperation that had been proclaimed. Ankara condemned Israel's action in expelling a number of Palestinians in 1992. Turkey also reacted to Israel's bombing of Lebanon in 1993 by postponing the visit of foreign minister Hikmet Çetin to Israel. Furthermore, Turkey pursued its traditionally friendly relations with the PLO and extended a loan of \$50 million to the Palestinian Authority in 1993.

As the peace process began to make good progress in the second half of the 1990s and Turkish misgivings over Syria began to rise, Turkey started getting closer to Israel in all the fields of cooperation.

## 2. Turkish-Israeli Cooperation

## a. The Dimensions of Cooperation

Cooperation between the two countries was mostly concentrated in the military and economic fields. It was underpinned by the Framework Agreement on Military Training and Technical Cooperation of 23 February 1996 and the Free Trade Agreement of 23 December 1996.

Based on the Framework Agreement, Turkey and Israel had signed eleven separate agreements by 2000. Under the terms of these agreements, Turkey made its airspace available for the training flights of the Israeli Air Force, joint exercises were held, exchanges of students and instructors took place between the military academies of the two countries, joint activities were carried out in the area of protection from chemical weapons, and Turkey's radar facilities were made available to Israel to allow it to monitor in particular activities in Iran and Iraq.

The Turkish public took a close interest in the Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Industries signed on 28 August 1996. This agreement provided for the exchange of defense information and the training of Turkish and Israeli technical personnel. Simultaneously, the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) undertook the modernization of fifty-

four Turkish F-4 combat aircraft at a cost of \$632.5 million. Satisfied with this work, Turkey awarded the contract for the upgrading of forty-eight F-5 aircraft to the same firm at a cost of \$75 million. The first modernized aircraft were delivered to the Turkish Air Force in early 2000.

When the commander of the Land Forces, Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, visited Israel in February 1998, one of the items on the agenda was Turkey's purchase of 1,000 Merkava tanks as well as Popeye-I air-to-land missiles. Turkey later decided not to purchase the Israeli tanks, which were considered unsuitable for Turkish terrain. Instead Turkey purchased fifty missiles worth \$25 million plus night-vision binoculars and other electronic equipment. Israel purchased forty armored vehicles worth \$12 million from Turkey.

Turkey was planning to spend \$150 billion on defense by the year 2020. This naturally attracted the attention of Israel, which had a highly developed military-industrial capability. Israeli firms took advantage of the close relations with Turkey to bid for Turkish contracts for weapons systems. When Turkey entered the market for the purchase of attack helicopters in 2000, the IAI submitted a bid to supply these helicopters, which it had given the Turkish name of Erdoğan. But the contract was awarded to American firms. After this, there was talk of awarding Israel the contract for the upgrading of American-built M-60 tanks. The contract would involve the modernization of 160 tanks for \$25 million. No progress had been made on this issue, however, by the end of 2000.

Another dimension of military cooperation was the holding of joint exercises. In April and August 1996 Turkish and Israeli aircraft carried out joint aerial-refueling exercises. In early 1998 the two countries' navies conducted a joint search and rescue operation code-named Reliable Mermaid in the Mediterranean with the participation of units of the U.S. Navy. Small-scale joint exercises were carried out by the two navies in the Aegean and Marmara seas throughout 1999. Although these exercises were suspended following the Marmara earthquake of 1999, further exercises were planned for 2001.

Concurrently with the intensified military cooperation between the two countries, a number of high-level military contacts took place. In February 1997 the chief of the General Staff, Ismail Hakkı Karadayı, visited Israel; his Israeli counterpart, Amnon Shakak, visited Turkey in October 1997. In the talks that took place in the course of these visits, two joint working groups were established to institutionalize military cooperation: the Defense Industries Working Group and the Political-Military Working Group. These groups met once every six months, alternatively in Turkey and Israel. The number of military

attachés in the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv was raised to three.

During the second half of the 1990s significant progress was also made in economic and trade relations. The driving force behind this progress was the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in 1996 that came into effect on 1 May 1997. This agreement was signed at a time when relations between the countries were very close. But the real reason for the agreement was the decision of the Council of Association of the EU dated 6 March 1995 with the title "Customs Union." The decision required Turkey to sign FTAs with all countries with which the EU had concluded an FTA, and Israel happened to be one of these. Under the terms of the FTA signed with Israel, the two countries had to lower customs duties by 12% immediately and by 40% by 1998, with all customs duties eliminated by 2000.

In addition to the FTA, the two countries signed an Agreement on Trade, Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, an Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion of Investments, and an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. These agreements were the infrastructure of bilateral economic cooperation.

The Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in the course of Prime Minister Yılmaz's visit in September 1998. Under the terms of this agreement, arrangements would be made to expand the volume of trade between Turkey and Israel. These arrangements included use of the port of Haifa by Turkish transport firms to gain access to the Middle East, raising the volume of trade to \$2 billion in one year, bidding by Turkish and Israeli firms for contracts in one another's countries, undertaking of joint projects in the countries of Central Asia, and cooperation and exchange of information in agriculture and technology.

The major benefit of the FTA for Turkey was the possibility of selling textile products to the U.S. via Israel that could not be sold directly because of American quota restrictions. These products could be marketed in the U.S. as Israeli products if they had a 35% Israeli content. Furthermore, the special-status industrial zone of Irbid on the Israeli-Jordanian border was also being used to transship Turkish products to the U.S. The effects of the FTA can be clearly seen in the trade statistics. The volume of bilateral trade was \$91 million in 1989. This climbed to \$446 million in 1996 and reached \$625 million in 1997 after the FTA came into effect. By 1998 the figure had reached \$800 million.

In 1999 Turkey's exports to Israel amounted to \$580 million and imports stood at \$300 million, with the total volume of trade attaining \$880 million. Turkey's exports consisted mostly of iron and steel products, copper and copper products, knitted products, cement, and synthetic

yarns, while imports consisted of chemical products, plastics, cotton, electrical machinery and equipment, and vegetable seeds.

Economic relations were not confined to trade. Starting in the 1990s, investors in both countries began to invest in the other country. By 2000 the number of Israeli investments in Turkey had reached seventy-two. Although these investments accounted for only 0.6% of total foreign investments in Turkey, they represented a substantial share of investments in the GAP region. Turkish firms undertook construction work in Israel amounting to \$200 million in 2000. Among these was a \$75-million construction job at Ben Gurion Airport. This was the largest contract ever awarded to a non-Israeli firm.

After 1996 cooperation in the fields of education, culture and tourism also began to grow. From 1996 to 1990 close to twenty agreements were signed in these fields. Turkish and Israeli universities were granting scholarships to students from the other country, and the number of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey rose sharply. The decision to close down casinos in Turkey, however, led to a drop in the number of Israeli visitors from 300,000 to around 50,000 in 1999.

In the summer of 1999 President Demirel visited Israel, and decisions were made to develop relations in all fields to a higher level. When the Marmara earthquake hit on 17 August 1999, the work of the Israeli rescue teams in the stricken areas drew praise and admiration in Turkey. Israel's channel I TV station organized a campaign in September that netted \$1,340,000 for the victims. On 25 October 1999 prime minister Ehud Barak came to Turkey and handed over the "Israeli Village" (consisting of 320 prefabricated homes) to those left homeless in the earthquake. These activities reflected the warm friendship that had developed between the two countries.

These relations received a setback in April 2000 when the Israeli minister of education announced in the Knesset that Israeli school textbooks would henceforth contain information on the Armenian Genocide. Turkey reacted negatively to the announcement, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made sure that no member of the Turkish cabinet attended the National Day reception of the Israeli Embassy in Ankara on 10 May 2000.

## b. The Repercussions of Cooperation

The growing cooperation with Israel had differing repercussions in Turkey, in Israel, and in the rest of the Middle East.

In Turkey, one group (led by the military) had always been in favor of close relations with Israel. As cooperation intensified, this group welcomed the development. The press frequently carried comments on the need for Turkey and Israel to be on the best of terms. Another group (represented by the Welfare Party) looked upon traditional Zionism with suspicion and concern. This group opposed cooperation with Israel because it feared that it would alienate Turkey from the Islamic world, with which it wanted to be closely integrated. The group's sincerity was questioned, however, after two important agreements with Israel were signed in 1997, when the Welfare Party was in the government as the senior partner of the coalition.

Meanwhile the military cooperation with Israel began to draw fire in Turkey when it became apparent that Israel's sales included obsolete equipment. There was particular opposition in Turkey to Israel's efforts to sell Merkava tanks, which were designed for desert warfare and lacked maneuverability.

The sharpest criticism came from those who felt that Turkey had strayed too far from the policy of balance in the Middle East in favor of Israel. As a matter of fact, Turkey's relations with the other regional actors were either stalled or in regression. At a time when the Middle East Peace Process was underway, it was felt that this excessive concentration on Israel might produce undesirable consequences in the event of a shift in regional balances when the peace process succeeded. This had happened in the past in connection with the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact, when regional balances had been ignored; and it looked as if it was happening again, with Israel and Turkey following in America's footsteps. There were comments in the Western press about the parallels between the Baghdad Pact experience and the current cozy relationship between Turkey and Israel.

Ankara began to perceive the dangers posed by the current policies and started to take steps to restore the former balance by taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the death of Hafez Assad on 10 June 2000. Turkey was represented at his funeral by a high-level delegation led by President Sezer. Turkey also joined the other Islamic states in displaying a pro-Palestinian position when the Second Intifada erupted in the Palestinian territories. Turkey's policy of balance was formalized when former president Süleyman Demirel became a member of the UN's Investigation Committee to report on the events in Palestine.

The fact that the Turkish-Israeli relations reached a high level also met with different responses in Israel. Although Israel's business community and military establishment maintained their positive approach to Turkey, liberal politicians began to voice misgivings that were finding increasing support among the public.

- 1. The developing relations with Turkey might draw Israel into the disputes between Ankara and Damascus. This would be contrary to Israel's policy of normalizing its relations with Syria over the long term.
- 2. Israel was already the target of a number of terror organizations, and its relations with Turkey could turn Israel into a target for the PKK. In fact, actions against Israeli missions in Europe increased due to rumors that Israel had assisted Turkey with intelligence in the operation that resulted in the apprehension of Öcalan. Israel was wary of adding new issues to its long list of existing problems.
- 3. Israel's close relations with Turkey might have negative effects on its relations with Greece and the Greek part of Cyprus. As Israel's President Weizman declared during his visit to Cyprus at the end of 1998, Israel sought no confrontation with either Greece or Cyprus.

In the light of these considerations, Israel had good reasons to downgrade the strategic dimension of Turkish-Israeli relations and give more weight to the commercial and cultural aspects of the relationship. When Ehud Barak of the Labor Party became prime minister in May 1999, he declared to Turkish newspaper reporters that his priority was to achieve peace with Syria. Barak did not want Israel's relations with Turkey to worsen its relations with the other countries of the region.

The most negative reactions to Turkey's ties with Israel came from the Islamic countries of the region. Notwithstanding Turkey's declarations that its cooperation was not a pact directed against them, Ankara was unable to blunt the criticism that its policies kept generating. Starting in 1996, all the Arab League summits voiced the concern of the Arab world over Turkey's close ties with Israel, with Egypt and Syria leading the chorus. When six Israeli aircraft undertook training flights in Turkish airspace in April 1996, Egypt's foreign minister, Amr Musa, came to Ankara to obtain the details of the military cooperation agreement. Following Musa's trip, President Mubarak declared that he was not satisfied that the Turkish-Israeli military agreement was merely a training agreement and that it had no aggressive objectives. Syria used this opportunity to obtain the support of the other Arab states with regard to its differences with Turkey. In 1997 Syria's official mouthpiece, the newspaper al-Baath, criticized Turkey's cooperation with Israel in the following terms: "This undeclared alliance is seeking new gains at the expense of the Arabs and their legal rights in addition to undermining the peace process" (Bölükbaşı, p. 148).

These criticisms reached their peak in early 1998 in

the course of the Reliable Mermaid exercise. Syria described it as "an element that will upset the balance in the region," while Iran claimed that it was "the product of the plan to develop the Zionist expansionist policies that were leading to permanent crisis in the region." Egypt accused Turkey and Israel of provocation and, after claiming that Turkey had entered an alliance with Israel, warned that "Turkey must know that all alliances beget counteralliances" (Bölükbaşı, p. 149).

Given the reactions from the countries of the region, the opposing voices heard in Israel, and the cooling off in relations in 2000, it can be assumed that the strategic dimension of Turkey's relations with Israel will begin to recede and the impression that the relationship has the nature of a military pact will be dissipated.

## The Period of Stagnation in Strategic Cooperation

As noted above, the speech of an Israeli minister regarding the Armenian allegations of genocide brought about a crisis in relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. As a result, no high-level Turkish representatives participated in the reception offered on 10 May 2000 by the Israeli Embassy in Ankara on the occasion of the founding of the state of Israel. This was the first sign that the development of relations that had been gathering pace since the mid-1990s had stalled. Throughout 2000 other signs followed, influenced by three separate factors.

1. After Öcalan was forced to leave Syria and was brought to Turkey after his capture in Kenya, a new dialogue was established between Damascus and Ankara. Turkey began to return to its old policy of maintaining a balance in the region; inevitably, this resulted in a review of the policy of intensive relations with Tel Aviv. Ankara saw the succession of Hafez Assad by Bashar Assad as a positive development for the peace of the Middle East as well as for Turkish-Syrian relations and demonstrated its desire to further the dialogue and economic relations with Syria.

A positive atmosphere had emerged at the talks held in Washington between Israel and Syria in 1999, and this also helped nudge Turkey toward a balanced policy. The possibility of peace between the two adversaries under U.S. prodding was a factor leading Ankara toward evenhandedness.

2. No more progress was made in the field of defense industries, where cooperation had been most intense. The contract for attack helicopters went to an American firm after the elimination of the Israeli-Russian consortium, and the tank modernization project was making no

progress, following much talk that the contract would be awarded to Israeli firms. This caused considerable uneasiness in Israel. Prime Minister Barak came to Ankara on 28 August 2000 in the company of the defense ministry's undersecretary and officials responsible for defense industries to eliminate the hurdles; but Turkey refused to budge, conveying the message that relations with the U.S. had precedence over relations with Israel.

Israel's reaction to these developments came in the fall of 2000, when the Armenian allegations of genocide were placed on the congressional agenda in Washington. The Jewish lobby formerly had worked hand-in-hand with Turkey to prevent the genocide bills from reaching the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This time, in parallel with the reluctant attitude of Tel Aviv, the lobby remained aloof until the last moment. The Jewish lobby took action only when President Clinton sent a letter to the Speaker of the House and the bill was removed from the agenda, demonstrating to Turkey once again that the course of Turkish-U.S. relations was intimately linked with the course of Turkey's relations with Israel.

Ankara's position vis-à-vis the Second Intifada (also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada) that broke out in the occupied territories was another factor. Following the talks held between the Israeli and Palestinian sides in 1999, it was decided to reach a final agreement by Octbber 2000. But it proved impossible to achieve an agreement on the basic issues. Tension began to rise as an agreement proved elusive, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state was postponed indefinitely. The situation exploded when the leader of the Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, provocatively visited the Masjid al-Aqsa, a Muslim holy site in Jerusalem. This was the man who had overseen the massacre at the Palestinian camps in Lebanon in 1982, earning for himself the title of "the Butcher of Lebanon" among the Arabs. As in 1987, the Intifada began with isolated protest demonstrations and soon escalated into a general uprising throughout the occupied territories. The Second Intifada was no different from the First Intifada in its origin and development and in the harsh Israeli reaction it provoked. By the fall of 2001 about eight hundred Palestinians had been killed by the Israeli army. Scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians lost their lives as a consequence of Palestinian suicide attacks.

The Second Intifada demonstrated two things. One was the strength of those who opposed peace among both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Likud Party, supported by the ultrareligious and nationalist elements as well as the Jewish settlers, displayed its utter opposition to the principle of "land for peace." On the Palestinian side, the terror organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad,

defying the leadership of Yasser Arafat, wanted a return to the objective of destroying Israel. The second thing it demonstrated was that peace in the region would not be reached without first settling the basic questions. The events showed that the final status of Jerusalem was the key to the whole peace process.

During the Second Intifada, the Israeli army responded to the Palestinian demonstrators with automatic weapons and attacked the buildings and coastal patrol vessels of the PLO in Gaza with helicopters. These actions got a very negative reaction from Ankara. Turkish leaders, including President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit, called for restraint and underlined that this was essential for the peace process to continue. Ankara's concern intensified when the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians became even tougher after Ariel Sharon became prime minister on 6 February 2001, following the election.

At this point Ankara made an effort to help in reaching a solution to this question. Although this was not a mediation effort in the formal sense, foreign minister İsmail Cem undertook shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Palestine and Egypt. Ankara was aware that its intensified cooperation with Israel was seen among the Arabs as a pact directed against themselves. Turkey also knew that this cast a shadow on the credibility of the role that it sought to assume in the Middle East and undermined its neutrality. That is why Ankara sought to diminish its visibility in Tel Aviv by calling for a postponement of the meeting of the working group on strategic and security cooperation scheduled to take place in the autumn of 2000. The group had been set up under the military cooperation agreement and was supposed to meet once every six months, but the meeting had not taken place by the end of 2000.

After this postponement, Turkish-Israeli relations received a second shock when President Sezer made a speech at the meeting of the Permanent Council for Economic Cooperation of the Islamic Conference, where he had harsh words for Israel's actions in the occupied territories.

Finally, a meeting was held in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on 17 October 2000 to end the turmoil in the occupied territory. At the meeting, it was decided to set up an Investigation Committee under the aegis of the UN. When former president Süleyman Demirel was included in the committee, this restored Turkey's neutrality on the issues separating Israel and Palestine. Fifty-two years earlier Turkey had been made a member of the UN's Palestine Conciliation Committee; this helped to steer Ankara toward a neutral position, whereas previously it had been siding with the Arabs. The membership in the

Investigation Committee had a similar effect in drawing Turkey toward more evenhandedness. After holding two meetings on 26 and 27 November, the committee went to the region in December to hold talks with the contending sides and issued its report on 30 April 2001. The report underlined that the events were unleashed by Sharon's visit to the Masjid al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000 with 1,000 followers and called for a cease-fire so that the parties could resume their peace talks. The report also listed the actions that needed to be taken to restore confidence between the two sides.

The events that took place from 1999 to 2001 showed that Turkey had abandoned its one-sided policy in the Middle East that it had been pursuing from 1995 to 1999. Henceforth it would follow a more balanced policy, bearing in mind its national interests. Nevertheless, relations with Israel did not stray too far away from their general course. High-level Israeli visits to Ankara continued as before. In April 2001 foreign minister Shimon Peres visited, and in July defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and chief of the General Staff Shaul Mofaz were in Turkey for contacts. Most controversial was the visit to Ankara of prime minister Ariel Sharon on 8 August 2001, which drew anti-Turkish reactions in Arab capitals.

During Sharon's visit in Ankara, Turkey called on Israel to take the necessary steps to restart the Middle East Peace Process, while Israel asked Turkey to persuade the Palestinians to abandon their armed struggle. This visit clearly showed Turkey in its role of facilitator in the Middle East Peace Process. At the same time, it indicated Turkey's determination to continue to develop its relations with Israel when the Turkish leadership played host to Sharon, a man that the Arab world regarded as the "Milosevic of the Middle East."

ÇAĞRI ERHAN AND ÖMER KÜRKÇÜOĞLU

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### B. Relations with Iran

#### 1. Political Relations

#### The Clash of Ideologies

As pointed out in Section 6 (dealing with the 1980s), the real factor leading to a crisis in Turkish-Iranian relations based on ideological grounds was the Iranian administration's need to satisfy domestic public opinion. When Khomeini died in 1989, he was succeeded as president by Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was in favor of following a more moderate line in foreign policy. Ankara saw this as a positive development, and prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut's visit to Tehran in March 1990 helped in improving the atmosphere between the neighbors. When Khomeini was succeeded in the Supreme Leadership (Velayet-e Faqih) by the hard-liner Ali Khamenei, however, who led a group that supported the continuation of Khomeini's tough policies, Iran acquired an administration that was tugging in opposite directions (Box 7-58).

Ankara attributed Iran's support for the PKK (through the Guardians of the Revolution) and the periodic crises between the two countries over religious symbols to the activities of the conservative faction led by Khamenei and refrained from taking forceful counteraction in order to avoid embarrassing the moderates in Tehran. In April 1991 Rafsanjani came to Ankara but did not visit Atatürk's tomb and lay the customary wreath. When Turkey decided to overlook this breach of etiquette, it was seen as confirmation of Ankara's desire not to undermine the position of the moderates as well as its decision to freeze the

# Box 7-58. The Structure of the Clergy and the State in Iran

Iran's political structure is reminiscent of the former USSR, which had a dual structure consisting of the party and the state. In Iran, the dual structure was made up of the state and the Shiite clergy. Historically, the Shiite clergy steered away from the state structure and tended to rely on a social and economic power base rather than a political power base. But it has currently become impossible for the clergy to stay clear of the political structure, because the ruling elite is now selected from among the clergy. All the key positions of the state are occupied by the clergy (usually the lower-ranking clergy), so the administration is structured not on the state but on the Shiite clergy. This dual structure went through two distinct phases:

In Khomeini's period from 1979 to 1989, the Supreme Leadership (Rahbar-e Engelab) was at the pinnacle of the state and had absolute control over everything. The top post of the religious hierarchy (Marja al-Taqlid) and the Supreme Leadership were both held by Khomeini. As a consequence Khomeini's religious rulings and political decisions were enmeshed; as the state came under the influence of religion, the clergy became politicized. The two wings started to merge in an inextricable manner.

In Ali Hosayni Khamenel's period after 1989, the Supreme Leadership was taken over by someone who was not at the top of the hierarchy. Consequently, Khamenel's pronouncements were considered to have only political significance, the position of Supreme Leader clearly took on a temporal character, and the process of politicization of the clergy was reversed. Twenty years after the proclamation of the Islamic republic in Iran, the religious standing of the clergy in the state administration has been diminished. They are perceived as politicians and bureaucrats, while the political influence of the clergy outside the administration has been eroded, with their effectiveness confined to religious affairs. As a result, the dual structure is now turning increasingly into a structure consisting only of the state.

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ideological tug-of-war between the two countries in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis.

A similar development was observed in Iran during the Refahyol government. Refahyol was perceived in Iran as representing Islamism in Turkey and as struggling against the army and secular circles. Consequently, Iran decided to support the Refahyol government, which was busy trying to form the D-8 group (Box 7-59). Erbakan's first foreign trip was to Iran in August 1996, and Rafsanjani paid a return visit to Turkey in December.

Relations with Iran had taken a turn that made the Turkish bureaucracy very uncomfortable for three reasons. (1) Turkey had signed a military cooperation agreement with Israel in February 1996, and Iran was conveying to Turkey its growing concern as Turkey and Israel drew closer. In these circumstances no rapprochement with

#### Box 7-59. D-8

The idea of setting up a group to promote cooperation among developing Islamic countries was first put forward by Turkey when Erbakan was prime minister, and the organization known as the Developing 8 (D-8) came into being in October 1996. Upon Turkey's initiative, the following countries became founding members: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria. The first summit meeting of the organization took place in Istanbul in June 1997. At the meeting, it was announced that the organization was now functioning and that membership was open to all developing Islamic countries. The main decision-making organ was the council made up of the ministers of foreign affairs. The organization described itself as a forum and defined its objectives as raising the economic prosperity of its members, developing democracy, developing trade among its members, and so forth. To achieve its objectives, the group was to lobby in other international organizations while also engaging in activities itself. Although nothing concrete has emerged from the organization's activities, the organs of the organization meet regularly. 🚐

(A. AKDEVELIOĞLU)

Iran could take place, especially as Iran and Syria drew ever closer. (2) There was a general impression in Turkey that Iran was behind the assassination of Çetin Emeç, a journalist with secular views. (3) The support provided by Iran to the PKK was a constant source of irritation for Turkey. Iran was deliterately seeking to exploit the cleavages in Turkish society and precipitated a crisis on the occasion of Jerusalem Day, which was being marked every year in Iran. A function to mark this day was organized by the mayor of Sincan, a suburb of Ankara, to which Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Baqeri had been invited. In the course of the event, Baqeri made a speech in which he condemned Turkey's relations with Israel. This infuriated the Turkish army. The tension reached a peak in February 1997, when both sides recalled their ambassadors. Relations were normalized toward the end of the year, when Turkey had a new prime minister, Mesut Yılmaz. In March 1998 the two newly appointed ambassadors presented their credentials and assumed their duties.

The ideological rivalry acquired a new dimension in 1993 when it was alleged that Iran was involved in the serial assassination of Kemalist intellectuals in Turkey. In January the chief prosecutor of the State Security Court officially announced that the murderers of the journalist Uğur Mumcu had links with Iran. Slogans were heard accusing Iran of the crime at the funeral of Mumcu (attended by a large number of mourners), and an anti-Iranian wave swept through the press. The Iranian minister of the interior, who was visiting Turkey at the time, cut short his

visit and returned home to express his disapproval, In February both Rafsanjani and Demirel released messages of mutual recriminations. The U.S. State Department supported Turkey by declaring that Iran might well have been involved in the murder of Mumcu. The Welfare Party alleged that this was a U.S. conspiracy to block the positive development of Turkish-Iranian relations that had been progressing since mid-1992. When the Turkish Eximbank announced in February that it would extend no more loans to Iran to finance Turkish exports, economic relations also began to deteriorate. In July Iran banned the sale of prominent Turkish writer Aziz Nesin's books when he sought to get the Turkish translation of Salman Rushdie's book The Satanic Verses published in Turkey. When Turkey stopped Iranian trucks from entering the country in August, the crisis reached its peak. The crisis was overcome with the signing in October of the Joint Turkish-Iranian Security Protocol.

The series of crises that began with the murder of Uğur Mumcu continued throughout the 1990s with the assassinations of more Kemalist intellectuals; but by 2002 the Turkish judicial system had not been able to reach a conclusion about the existence of a link between the murders and Iran.

The last ideologically rooted crisis in bilateral relations occurred in July 1999. Iran's university students had been protesting the conservative policies of the government by occupying university buildings when they were brutally dispersed by the security forces. Soon the student demonstrations degenerated into antiregime street fighting. When Prime Minister Ecevit spoke in support of the demonstrators, relations became tense. After it became known that the leaders of the demonstrations had been in contact with members of antiregime organizations in Turkey and the U.S., Iran's accusations against Turkey increased. As in the case of the previous crises, after a while relations returned to their normal course.

The periodic crises in bilateral relations were always used by both sides as a means for dealing with the disenchantment with the official ideology in their domestic politics.

#### The PKK Factor

At this time, the Turkish authorities frequently raised the issue of the alleged support that Iran was providing to the PKK. In April and May 1990 Iran's Ambassador Baqeri in Ankara called on all the party leaders to inform them of the good intentions of the Iranian regime. The party leaders (except for the leaders of the Welfare Party) all responded by voicing their concern over Iran's support

for the PKK. In October 1990 a ship bearing the Greek-Cypriot flag carrying arms belonging to Iran was detained as it sailed through the Straits, and its cargo was confiscated. The Turkish authorities claimed that the arms were destined for the PKK. This precipitated a crisis that lasted for six months. The ultranationalist elements of the Turkish press asked why Turkey remained passive while Iran supported the PKK.

As the activities of the PKK in Turkey grew in 1992, Turkish-Iranian relations deteriorated further. Although there was no agreement on hot pursuit, Turkish units chasing a PKK group penetrated Iran up to a distance of four kilometers in August. Özal confirmed that Turkish units would enter Iran without hesitation. When Iran sought clarification on this statement, the minister of the interior, İsmet Sezgin, went to Tehran in September with a file containing evidence of PKK's ties with Iran. He accused Iran of allowing its territory to be used by the PKK and of providing logistic support for the terrorists. Sezgin also confirmed that Turkey had nothing to do with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI: People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran), the group opposing the Iranian regime. On 16 September 1992 the two ministers of the interior signed the Turkish-Iranian Security and Cooperation Agreement in Tehran. The agreement provided for the establishment of a joint security committee at the level of minister of the interior. After this reduction in tension, Iran delivered some PKK militants to Turkey. This was followed by Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Tehran in October. When Demirel returned, the Greek-Cypriot ship, along with its cargo of arms, was released by the Turkish authorities.

Each time the issue came up, Iran denied that it was supporting the PKK and responded by accusing Turkey of providing shelter to the regime's opponents. There were incidents that aggravated Iran's suspicions: former Iranian premier Shahpur Bakhtiar was killed in Paris in 1991 and five individuals related to the Iranian regime were arrested in İstanbul for involvement in the assassination. Nevertheless, Mujahedin-e Khalq members were never deported from Turkey. In turn, Turkey complained about the actions of Iranian agents on Turkish territory directed against opponents of the Iranian regime, similar to the ones that had occurred in the 1980s. In spite of these complaints, an Iranian dissident was killed in İstanbul in May 1990. This was followed by similar incidents on a number of different occasions.

Starting at the end of 1992, Iran began to arrest members of the PKK and Turkey did the same to the Iranian dissidents. Some of the arrested individuals were handed over to their respective authorities. When Demirel went to Tehran in July 1994, relations had been restored to a positive state.

The mutual accusations of support for the PKK and the Mujahedin-e Khalq continued throughout the 1990s; despite the agreements signed, no definitive outcome was in sight even in 2002. As the PKK lost its effectiveness in the first half of the 1990s, however, this issue, which had been poisoning relations, began to recede.

It is likely that the existing ideological rivalry will also recede as the moderates gain ground in Iran and as bilateral economic relations develop further.

#### . Competition and Cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia

When the USSR disintegrated in 1991, there was a race between Turkey and Iran to become a role model and to establish a zone of influence. But this did not last for long. When Russia reasserted itself in 1993, Iran and Turkey were pushed aside. Furthermore, the U.S. withdrew its support for Turkey in this area. Iran was not ready to see its relations with Russia deteriorating. Turkey had adopted the slogan "the twenty-first century shall be the Turkish century," while Iran's slogan was "the twenty-first century shall see the reawakening of Islam." But neither country had the financial and technological clout to establish its preeminence in the region.

In 1992, before Russia had staged its comeback in the region, all of the Central Asian countries plus Azerbaijan had become members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). This signified that Iran and Turkey had opted for cooperation in Central Asia rather than competition, because the mutual suspicions caused by the Western media had been in large measure dispelled. It became obvious that Iran was not about to export its regime to the region; nor was Turkey pursuing Pan-Turkic goals. From this point on, the two countries would engage only in economic competition in Central Asia, along with economic cooperation. That is why problems caused by Iranian actions such as creating difficulties for Turkish trucks on their way to Turkmenistan should be seen in an economic rather than political context.

While the two countries were acting constructively in Central Asia and pursuing conciliatory policies, the same could not be said for the Caucasus. From 1992 to 1993, when the Popular Front was in power in Azerbaijan under the leadership of Ebulfez Elchibey, Iran perceived a direct threat from that country; this also cast a shadow on Turkey's relations with Iran. Iran was justified in feeling threatened. One of Elchibey's foreign policy goals was the

annexation of Iran's province of Azerbaijan. This drove Iran to side with Armenia on the dispute over Karabakh. Tehran viewed Turkey's support of Azerbaijan and especially of Elchibey with deep suspicion.

When Elchibey was toppled in a coup in June 1993, his successor, Heydar Aliyev, pursued a conciliatory policy toward Iran and sought to restrain the ultranationalists. This allowed Iran to adopt a more balanced position on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and also made it possible to remove the Azerbaijan hurdle in Turkish-Iranian relations. But the removal of the hurdle did not automatically lead to cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Iran still looked upon Turkey's close cooperation with Azerbaijan with some suspicion and continued its activities that were detrimental to Azerbaijan's interests and therefore to Turkey's. To counter Turkey's initiative in establishing the BSEC in the Black Sea region, Iran helped establish the Organization for Caspian Sea Cooperation and pursued policies that conflicted with Turkish interests on questions related to the status of the Caspian Sea and the transport of the region's oil. In the course of the twenty-first century, it can be expected that Iran will adopt a tougher line so long as Turkey and Azerbaijan keep getting closer and if nationalistic motives play a larger role in the rapprochement.

#### Uncertainty in Iraq

The crisis that erupted in the Gulf in August 1990 brought Turkey and Iran closer together. In November 1990 President Özal went to Tehran to appraise the situation with Rafsanjani. In December Ali Akbar Velayeti, the Iranian foreign minister, came to Ankara and proposed that Iran and Turkey adopt a common stand vis-à-vis the crisis. He came to Turkey once again in August 1991. The high point of the exchange of visits came when Rafsanjani visited Turkey in April 1991.

In the course of the Gulf crisis, Turkey participated actively in the UN embargo on Iraq and allowed the bases on its territory to be used against its neighbor. Iran was satisfied to see the worsening of Turkey's relations with Iraq. During the war, Iran preferred to remain neutral and took advantage of Iraq's weakened position to settle most of the outstanding questions left over from its war with Iraq to its own satisfaction. In the aftermath of the war, there were a number of questions with regard to Iraq that still remained unresolved in 2002. In this unsettled environment Turkish-Iranian relations were focused on three main issues.

1. Iraq's territorial integrity: this was the only issue on which the two countries pursued a common policy. Both

countries harbored suspicions that the U.S. might be pursuing a long-term strategy that would lead to the breakup of Iraq into two or three separate entities. This compelled both countries to keep on stressing that they stood for the territorial integrity of their neighbor. At a meeting of foreign ministers in which Syria also participated, the three countries once again confirmed their support for Iraq's unity in their joint declaration.

Although no country, including the U.S., ever spoke against Iraq's territorial integrity, the uncertainty in Iraq kept Turkish and Iranian suspicions about the integrity of Iraq alive. Despite this identity of views, their relations with the Baathist regime differed markedly. Iran saw a replacement of the Baathist regime as a precondition for resolving the Iraqi question, while Turkey was prepared to collaborate with any regime in Baghdad that could maintain stability in the country. In other words, the two countries were united about the need to preserve the Iraqi state but divided over the regime.

- 2. The U.S. presence in the region: the Iraqi Kurds revolted once again after the defeat of Iraq at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition. But this time their support was not coming from Iran as in the past but from the U.S. Iraq succeeded in suppressing this uprising in a bloody way, leading to the uprooting of 1.5 million Kurds, who sought refuge in Turkey and Iran. Both countries agreed that the Kurds must be able to return to their homes in Iraq in full security. Up to this point, there was an identity of views between Ankara and Tehran. But Iran disapproved of Turkey's approach when Ankara got the Americans involved in returning the Kurds to their homes and then institutionalized the U.S. presence in northern Iraq through Operation Provide Comfort (see "Relations with the USA and NATO" in this section). Actually, the Turkish opposition parties and the public were also critical of this arrangement, even though neither the Welfare Party nor the parties of the Left were able to get rid of it when they were in the government. Turkey's support for the U.S. presence in Iraq enabled Iran to describe Turkey as "Satan's lackey."
- 3. The northern Iraq equation: Turkey and Iran were in different camps on this issue. Turkey's main concern was to get the PKK out of northern Iraq. For this it was necessary to get rid of the power vacuum there. To secure this Turkey was encouraging the two main Kurdish groups and the Turcomans to reach an accord with Baghdad while it conducted operations against the PKK. Iran was seeking to establish control over the Kurdish groups while it also carried out operations against Iranian dissident groups based in the region. The Kurdish groups were using Turkey and Iran to gain advantage against one

another in their struggle for supremacy. As northern Iraq entered the twenty-first century in this environment of confusion, the two countries were on the alert and following one another's moves in the region with suspicion. When the U.S. occupied Iraq in 2003, Operation Provide Comfort came to an end, and the Iraqi factor in Turkish-Iranian relations took on a totally new shape.

### 2. Economic Relations

Economic relations became stagnant after the Iran-Iraq War but revived again when the Central Asian republics gained independence. Formerly, only Turkey was in the position of a transit country, but now Iran assumed this role for Turkey as Ankara sought to gain access to Central Asia.

The most important event in Turkey's economic relations with Iran in the 1990s was the signing of the agreement on the natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, a project that had been under consideration since the 1960s. The agreement was given its final shape in 1996, when the Refahyol government was in power. Under its terms, Turkey committed itself to purchase 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year from Iran, which possessed the world's second largest reserves of this commodity. Botaş (the gas distributing company in Turkey) would finance only the construction of the Turkish portion of the pipeline, while Iran financed its portion. This arrangement was designed to evade the D'Amato Act, which imposed a U.S. embargo on companies investing more than \$20 million in the Iranian hydrocarbon industry.

Iran concluded a similar agreement with Armenia. Owing to the lack of investments, Iran could only produce enough gas to meet its own domestic requirements. That is why it was planned for Iran to pipe natural gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey in the first few years of the contract, with Iran supplying its own production after the necessary investments in the gas industry had been made.

The implementation of the deal went on after Refahyol left the government; by 2001 the Iranian portion had been completed except for the measuring stations, while the Turkish portion was on the point of completion. Actually, the agreement had a "take or pay" clause that required the two portions of the pipeline to be completed simultaneously so that when Iran made the gas available Turkey had to buy it or pay for it anyway. Despite this clause, talks were held with Iran (of which the public was kept uninformed), and Tehran was prevailed upon to forgo Turkish payments for gas that had not been purchased. It was claimed that Turkey had been dragging its feet in the completion of the gas pipeline despite its need for gas

because of the negative U.S. approach to this project as well as the unenthusiastic attitude of some in the Turkish bureaucracy. It was also claimed that Iran showed understanding because it was aware of Turkey's difficulties.

The delivery of Iranian gas, commencing in 2001, should gradually be built up to the level of 10 billion cubic meters per annum. This is expected to have a permanent positive effect on bilateral relations, similar to the temporary boost that the Iran-Iraq War gave to bilateral relations. This in turn should allow the two countries to place their relations on a sounder footing and to avoid the periodic crises of the past. This expectation was borne out by the positive developments in relations in the first half of 2001, which became manifest during the visit of foreign minister İsmail Cem to Tehran.

The second important event in economic relations after the gas pipeline project was the extension of the ECO. Notwithstanding the hopes raised by the increased ECO membership, however, there was widespread disappointment because the organization was unable to overcome the torpor of the 1980s. The failure of the ECO (and of its predecessor, the RCD) to achieve the long-term objective of setting up a common market was not due to the lack of political will among its members. The real problem was structural. The members were developing countries, exporters of raw materials and semifinished products. That is why their intraregional trade corresponded to only a small fraction of their total foreign trade. Actually, Turkey and to a some extent Iran had a certain industrial capacity that could enable them to break free from this structure. When they undertook the extension of the ECO to include more countries, they expected to exchange the raw materials of the new members for their industrial products. These hopes remained largely unfulfilled, however,

due to lack of financing security and standardized products in the ECO. At the threshold of the twenty-first century, the ECO's realistic objective is not the achievement of a common market but rather the achievement of institutionalization to overcome the shortcomings referred to earlier.

## Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

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## The Issue of the Turkish Straits

## I. POSITIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE 1994 TURKISH STRAITS REGULATION

Technological developments after 1936 led to an increase in the size of ships. There was also an alarming rise in the number of vessels using the Turkish Straits. These developments made it necessary to seek new arrangements to ensure the safety of navigation and of life and property and to protect the environment in the Straits and the region of the Marmara Sea. There were two differing positions about what these arrangements should be.

One was to repeal the Montreux Straits Convention and to replace it with a system that did not contain elements that could be used against Turkey. According to this view, the main source of trouble lay in article 2 of the convention. The terms of this article were so clear that it was impossible to evade them through internal legislation without violating the convention. Consequently, it was essential to change certain parts of the convention, starting with this article 2. This position was not adopted for the reasons that will be explained in connection with the Russian thesis regarding the 1994 regulation (see "The Views of the Parties on the 1994 Regulation" below).

The second position was to clarify imprecise portions of the Montreux Straits Convention with internal legislation without, however, violating it. This was the position that was preferred by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs of the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Transport. As a result, the Regulation on Maritime Traffic in the Straits and Marmara Region came into effect on 1 July 1994.

This regulation did not come about suddenly. Previously reports had been prepared by individuals, and particularly sea captains, who were familiar with the problems of navigation in the region. Only some of these reports reached those holding positions of responsibility and can be regarded as forming the preliminary basis of the 1994 regulation.

The first report was authored by captains M. Efruz Ineceli and Gündüz Aybay in 1968 and bore the title "Safety of Life and Property in the Istanbul Strait and Its Environment." It was submitted on behalf of the Graduates' Association of the Maritime High School. Some of the report's recommendations were incorporated in the Regulation of the Port of Istanbul of 1982 as well as the regulation of 1994. Among these were the limitations of the speed of ships to ten knots in order to avoid accidents and excessive bow waves and the establishment of two traffic lanes in order to separate north-bound and south-bound shipping.

A second report was prepared by the Association of Turkish Ocean-Going Captains and submitted to the Ministry of Transport in 1987. It bore the title "System for Separating Traffic in the Straits and the Sea of Marmara." This report (issued about five years after the Regulation of the Port of Istanbul) explained the advantages of the System for Separating Traffic (SST) and recommended that it be enforced in the entire region of the Turkish Straits.

The most controversial provision of the 1994 regulation was the rule for the temporary suspension of traffic. This rule was not foreseen in the above-mentioned reports, but it existed in the Regulation of the Port of Istanbul of 1965 as well as in the Regulations of the Ports of Istanbul and Canakkale dated 1982.

## II. THE NEW REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE 1994 TURKISH STRAITS REGULATION

The Regulation on Maritime Traffic in the Straits and the Marmara Region was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 23 November 1993 and came into force on 1 July 1994. The term "the Turkish Straits Region" used in this text means the Bosphorus (i.e., the Strait of Istanbul, the Sea of Marmara, and the Strait of Çanakkale or Dardanelles). It consists of seven chapters and six annexes describing the SST.

Article 1 of the 1994 regulation read as follows: "This Regulation has been prepared to regulate...maritime traffic in the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region and applies to all shipping in these waters." This meant that it would apply to warships as well as merchant vessels. Article 2 contained definitions of some of the terms used in the regulation. For example "large ship" meant one that was 150 meters or longer.

Chapter II contained the General Principles and consisted of the rules that had to be observed by ships before they entered or passed through the region of the Straits. Some of the rules dealt with the criteria regarding the technical capabilities of vessels. The ships that did not conform to the criteria had to transit the Turkish Straits under the rules established by the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs (articles 6 and 10/2). The other rules dealt with the various notifications that ships had to make before entering the region.

Chapter III regulated navigation through the Straits region and contained the rules that ships had to observe once they were in the region of the Straits. Article 17 stipulated: "The normal speed of vessels in the Straits shall be 10 knots. However,... this speed can be exceeded to prevent collisions, making every effort not to cause waves that might inflict damage to the adjacent areas." Article 18 provided that, unless absolutely necessary, ships should not overtake the ships sailing ahead of them and should maintain a distance of at least eight cables (one cable = one-tenth of a nautical mile) from the ship in front. In addition, there were rules about notifications that had to be made during transit through the Straits.

The most significant rule in this chapter was contained in article 24, which stated: "Maritime traffic in the Straits can be temporarily suspended by the Administration [the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs] in order to allow construction work over the water or under, drilling work, firefighting, scientific work, sports activities, salvage and rescue operations, activities to prevent or eliminate marine pollution, operations related to accidents or pursuit of criminals, and similar situations to proceed."

The most noteworthy provision of chapter IV (entitled "Common Provisions for the Straits and the Marmara Region") was the one relating to large ships, because it also included oil tankers. Article 29 stated: "The owners or operators of large ships must notify the Administration at the planning stage of the voyage about the ship and its cargo if the ship is going to sail through the Straits and the Marmara Region. The Administration shall inform the applicants of its decision, which will be made in the light of the morphology and physical condition of the Straits,

the dimensions and maneuverability of the ship, the safety of life, property, and the environment, and the conditions of maritime traffic." From this wording, it could be understood that permission might be denied in certain circumstances.

Article 30 provided that "nuclear-powered vessels or vessels carrying nuclear cargos or wastes that intend to sail through must obtain permission at the planning stage of the voyage from the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs and, if the ships are carrying dangerous or harmful substances, from the Ministry of the Environment."

Article 31 stated that "Turkish ships 150 meters long and longer that sail into the Straits must take on pilots. Foreign vessels will be warned to take on pilots for safety reasons." This meant that pilotage was not mandatory for foreign-flag vessels.

Chapter V of the regulation established rules that would minimize the risks posed by natural and constructed hazards and obstacles. Article 40 stated: "When the speed of the main upper current in the Istanbul Strait exceeds 4 miles per hour or when there are currents induced by strong southern winds, ships with a speed of less than 10 miles an hour, ships carrying dangerous cargos, large ships, and ships with a deep draft shall not enter the Straits and shall await the ending of these conditions." Article 38 placed a restriction on 58-meter and higher ships, declaring that they would not sail through the Istanbul Strait. Ships from 54 to 58 meters high would be escorted by the required number of tugs to ensure that the ships maintained their assigned course. The number and the power of the tugs would be determined by the administration.

Article 42 provided that, when large ships with dangerous cargos (including tankers) sailed through the İstanbul Strait, another ship with the same characteristics would not be admitted into the Straits before the first ship had exited.

Chapter VI dealt with the system of separating traffic at the Çanakkale Strait (Dardanelles). The main difference between the regulations that applied to the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorus) and those that applied to the Dardanelles related to large ships carrying dangerous cargos. Article 52 stated: "When a large ship with dangerous cargo enters the Çanakkale Straits, no ship in the same category will be allowed to enter the Straits from the opposite direction until this ship exits the Straits. If a ship in this category enters the Straits in the same direction, it will have to maintain a distance of 20 nautical miles from the ship ahead of it." In the case of the Istanbul Strait the second ship would not be permitted to enter from either direction.

# III. REACTIONS TO THE 1994 TURKISH STRAITS REGULATION

Before making the 1994 Straits regulation effective, Turkey sought to prevent adverse reactions by informing the international community of the new rules that it was contemplating. Turkey also referred the matter to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in order to be able to exercise its rights under the Convention on the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions of Sea of 1972 (COLREG 72), of which it was a signatory. Articles 1/d and 10 of COLREG 72 authorized its signatories to establish an SST but made this conditional on IMO's approval.

The sketches relating to the SST that were submitted by Turkey were approved, after some technical changes, in September 1993 by the Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation.

Actually, Turkey should have submitted to the IMO a few rules that would apply only to vessels of limited maneuverability. Instead it submitted the full range of rules contained in the 1994 Straits regulation. It even submitted the rules that were not included in the regulation but were being applied in practice. Ankara's intention in doing this was to ensure that ships sailing through the Straits were fully informed. But the IMO as well as the Russian Federation decided to start a debate on Turkey's document, which had been submitted only for information purposes. Shortly thereafter, the RF objected to the Turkish document, claiming that it contravened the Montreux Straits Convention, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and customary rules of the law of the sea. Turkey refrained from responding to this action. Russia's views, which were supported by Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Oman, were incorporated in the final docu-

At the sixty-third session of the Maritime Safety Committee, held in May 1994, Turkey's scheme for separating traffic was approved, along with a document entitled "the IMO Rules and Recommendations."

Like the 1994 regulation, the IMO Rules and Recommendations contained the rules relating to navigation in the Turkish Straits region. In other words, there were two different sets of rules: the national 1994 regulation and the international IMO Rules and Recommendations. The second document created some problems for Turkey, because it differed from its national document. To cite an example, whereas Turkey's 1994 regulation contained rules that were mandatory, the rules in the IMO's document were optional. Another drawback of the IMO document was that it contained provisions that restricted Turkey's

competence as the state bordering the Straits. For example, instead of referring to article 10 of the COLREG 72, which had been formulated according to Turkey's views, the IMO Rules and Recommendations referred to article 9, which restricted the competence of the state bordering the Straits in favor of the ships' masters.

At the debates on the item at the IMO, the RF claimed that the passage of certain Russian-flag vessels through the Turkish Straits was being delayed because of the rules of the 1994 regulation and submitted statistics proving its claim. The Russian delegation called for Turkey's Straits regulation to be disregarded.

The Turkish delegation drew attention to the large number of accidents in the region and claimed that the effectiveness and value of the traffic rules thus would be easily appreciated. The delegation pointed out that in the ten years prior to the coming into effect of the regulation there had been an average of twenty accidents at sea per year. In the first six months prior to the regulation twenty-two accidents had occurred. In the second half of 1994, after the regulation came into effect, the number of accidents had dropped to two.

After this, Turkey withdrew the issue from the IMO and sought to negotiate directly with the RF. Four meetings were held from 1994 to 1996 without making any progress. Russia kept insisting on either amending or removing the rules regulating the passage of large ships, while Turkey sought to keep the proposed changes at a minimum level.

When bilateral negotiations failed to yield results, the RF reintroduced the issue to the IMO in December 1996. The sixty-seventh session of the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee was the scene of heated debates between the RF and Turkey. Russia called for a "mission" to be sent to the Straits, while Turkey took this as an infringement of its sovereignty and rejected the proposal. At this point the Turkish representatives walked out of the meeting. Bulgaria supported the Russian proposal for a mission, claiming that its vessels were being unjustly delayed.

The OCIMF (Oil Companies International Maritime Forum) also submitted a paper at the meeting. This was the most comprehensive objection to the 1994 regulation. The paper argued that two large ships carrying dangerous cargos like petroleum should be allowed to navigate in the Straits simultaneously and that it would be enough to allow a sufficient distance between the two ships to ensure safety. This proposal was designed to weaken Turkey's case and increase the capacity of the Turkish Straits to handle more oil traffic. It can be presumed that such proposals were being made at the instigation of the oil

companies that wanted to ship the oil produced in Central Asia to global markets through the Straits.

In spite of these unfavorable developments, the Maritime Safety Committee favored a continuation of the dialogue with Turkey and decided to form a working group of experts to consider the issue.

The subject was then taken up at the May 1997 meeting of the Working Group on Charting Ships' Courses. Although the Turkish view at the IMO had been that the issue of the Turkish Straits should be taken up only at a technical level, Turkey was not represented at the meeting of the working group. It merely sent two documents containing basic data on the Turkish Straits and statistical information. Some of this information was to prove troublesome for Turkey later on, because it showed that in practice Turkish-flag vessels were being held exempt from some of the rules of the 1994 regulation. Perhaps because of this finding, the working group prepared a draft report on the Turkish Straits that could have negative consequences for Turkey.

At the sixty-ninth session of the Maritime Safety Committee, held in May 1998, Turkey indicated that it was prepared to make certain changes in the 1994 regulation.
(1) Henceforth "deep-draft ships" would be 15 meters instead of 10 meters. (2) The minimum length for large ship would be raised from 150 meters to 200 meters. (3) Under article 21 of the 1994 regulation, only tugs could tow ships or other floating objects through the Straits. The amended text provided that other vessels registered as conforming to IMO standards and having the capacity to tow could also be used.

Another information sheet submitted by Turkey concerned Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). Turkey would establish a VTS system that would come into operation in 2000. With this system an electronic navigation center would be established to monitor and direct shipping through the Straits. The purpose of the center would be to ensure that ships did not come close to one another at dangerous turning points in the Straits.

The debates showed that the new situation represented a compromise between Turkey and the other members of the IMO whose ships utilized the Turkish Straits. The new Maritime Vessel Traffic and Information Control System in the Turkish Straits came into operation on 1 July 2003, at a cost of \$45 million.

The subject of the Turkish Straits also came up at the seventieth session of the Maritime Safety Committee, held in December 1998. At this meeting, Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece continued their opposition to the principles of the 1994 regulation and their enforcement. Turkey responded by reminding the members that the IMO was

intended to be a vehicle for cooperation and that the organization was being abused when it was turned into a political forum. Turkey also argued that the IMO could not be made to serve as a vehicle for discussing national legislation; nor could it be used to pass judgments on alleged violations of international law. It emphasized that not a single accident involving loss of life had occurred following the implementation of the 1994 regulation and the SST. This demonstrated the utility of the arrangements that were put in place. The Turkish delegation added that only 3.7% of the 50,942 ships that sailed through the Bosphorus had strayed out of the navigation lanes fixed by the SST. The delegation was stressing that the system was workable.

At the seventy-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee, held in May 1999, the Working Group on Charting Ships' Courses adopted the following decisions. (1) Within the framework of the maritime traffic system already in effect, two-way traffic for large ships would be suspended so that they did not meet at the narrow points of the Straits where they had to change course. (2) Ships transiting the Turkish Straits should be encouraged to comply with the Reporting System of the Turkish Straits and to take on pilots. (3) Turkey should be encouraged to set up its VTS system at the earliest possible date. (4) The traffic system approved by the IMO that was being implemented at the time was effective (in other words, the SST introduced in the 1994 regulation would be maintained). (5) No agreement had been possible on changing the system currently in effect, owing to Turkey's reluctance (this implied that Turkey would not be asked to change or drop any of the provisions of the 1994 regulation).

At this point the negotiations ended when Turkey was asked to inform IMO about the improvements to be made in its Vessel Traffic Services and its system of providing pilotage services.

At the conclusion of the seventy-first session of the committee, the negotiations within IMO over Turkey's internal legislation for regulating traffic in the Turkish Straits came to an end. The item had been dealt with in a manner that suited Turkey, and the issue was removed from the IMO's agenda, even if temporarily.

# IV. THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES ON THE 1994 REGULATION

The strongest opposition to the implementation of the 1994 Turkish Straits Regulation came from Russia. It felt that the regulation was designed to restrict navigation through the Straits in order to eliminate the possibility of transporting Central Asian oil with tankers via the Straits.

Turkey, however, insisted that the arrangements were intended to ensure the safety of life and property and to protect the environment in the face of growing maritime traffic.

In spite of this divergence of views, Russia did not invoke article 28 of the Montreux Straits Convention, which allowed parties to give notice of denunciation of the convention. It can be presumed that Russia did not take this course because of the provisions dealing with the transit of warships. These provisions were designed to uphold the interests of the riparian states of the Black Sea by placing restrictions on the passage through the Straits of warships of states other than riparian states and the time they spent in the Black Sea. If the convention were to come to an end and it proved impossible to replace it with another arrangement at an international conference, the general rules of international law applying to straits would also be applicable in the Turkish Straits. This would mean no restrictions on the passage of warships. A second reason for Russia's action might be that the current situation differed markedly from the international environment of 1936, when the convention came into force. At a conference that would be convened following a possible termination of the Montreux Straits Convention, there would be no way to keep out big powers like the U.S. and Germany. It was well known that the U.S. strongly favored the principle of free passage of warships through international straits.

In summary, Russia did not make any attempt to bring the Montreux Straits Convention to an end. Although at first there were claims at the IMO that Turkey had no right to impose its control over the Straits with its internal legislation, in the end the members accepted that Turkey did indeed have this right as a matter of principle.

In any case, Turkey had already established rules for separating traffic with its Regulation of the Port of Istanbul (adopted on 25 December 1965), such as setting a maximum speed of ten knots and establishing the principle that traffic could be suspended for imperative reasons. No objections had been made to these rules; nor had they been violated in practice.

The debates at the IMO centered on the argument that the rules contained in the 1994 regulation violated the Montreux Straits Convention. The respective positions of the parties in regard to the provisions of the 1994 regulation were as follows.

Large Ships (Article 29): according to article 29, for large ships to transit the Straits, it was necessary to provide information to the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs about the ship and its cargo at the stage when the voyage was being planned. From this wording it could be

deduced that permission to transit the Straits might be denied. Those states that were against the 1994 regulation were advancing two objections. (1) Under the Montreux Straits Convention, merchant vessels passing through the Straits only needed to communicate to local officials their name, nationality, tonnage, destination, and last port of call in order to facilitate the collection of certain taxes or charges. It did not mention cargo among the information to be provided. Consequently, to ask for information about the vessel's cargo was contrary to the convention. (2) The convention provided for no formality other than sanitary control for merchant vessels. The information required by Turkey prior to passage, however, was an extra formality.

Turkey's position with respect to article 29 was the following.

- 1. According to IMO's Rules and Recommendations Turkey had the right temporarily to suspend two-way traffic when ships that did not have the capability to navigate in compliance with the system of traffic separation were sailing through the Straits. In such cases the System for Traffic Separation could also be suspended temporarily. For Turkey to be able to exercise this right in order to ensure the safe transit of such ships, it needed to have prior information about the ship and its cargo.
- 2. The passage of ships over 150 meters in length through the Straits significantly increased the existing risks. Therefore it was of vital importance to have the information with reference to large ships as described in article 29. Since the 1994 regulation had come into effect, such ships navigated accompanied by tugs and traffic in the opposite direction was suspended during their passage through the Straits. Turkey needed to possess the necessary information to be able to implement these rules.

Nuclear-Powered Ships or Ships Carrying Nuclear or Dangerous Cargos and Waste Materials (Article 30): under this article, such vessels must seek permission at the planning stage of their voyages. In other words, Turkey might deny freedom of transit to such vessels.

The states that opposed the 1994 regulation relied on article 2 of the Montreux Straits Convention, which provided that "merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits...under any flag and with any kind of cargo." In view of this provision, these states argued that the prevention of ships carrying such cargos from transiting the Straits would be contrary to international law.

Turkey based its arguments about providing prior information on article 30 on the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Transportation and Elimination of Dangerous Wastes. Turkey had adopted

the provisions of this convention in its legislation. Based on the Basel Convention, ships carrying dangerous wastes could not pass through the Straits without obtaining Turkey's written permission.

But Turkey's argument was weakened by the fact that all of the signatories of the Montreux Convention were not parties to the Basel Convention. In addition, the Basel Convention related only to "wastes" and included no provisions regarding nuclear, hazardous, or harmful cargos.

Ships That Had to Take On Pilots (Article 31): under this article, Turkish flag vessels over 150 meters in length passing through the Straits must take on pilots. Foreignflag vessels should be advised to do likewise. Although pilotage was not made mandatory for foreign-flag vessels because of the provisions of the Montreux Convention, it made pilotage and towage optional for all merchant vessels without distinction of nationality. This article discriminated against Turkish-flag vessels and constituted a breach of the Montreux provision.

Prior Notification Relating to Navigation Plan I and II (Articles 7 and 8): the regulation required all ships carrying dangerous cargos and ships of over 500 gross tons to submit a Navigation Plan I to the traffic control centers twenty-four hours prior to entering the Straits and subsequently a Navigation Plan II. The Navigation Plan I contained information on the ship's name, flag, call sign, tornage, last port of call and destination, and cargo and whether it would request pilotage or not.

Those states opposing the 1994 regulation declared that, according to article 2 of the Montreux Convention, the communication required of ships entering the Straits should not include the nature of the cargo carried by the ship. For them, this too was contrary to the convention.

Turkey argued that it needed to obtain the information contained in Navigation Plans I and II beforehand in order to be able to exercise the authorization it had from the IMO to impose a one-way rule on traffic temporarily or to suspend the system of traffic separation completely. The Turkish authorities made clear that the IMO had already granted Turkey this right through the Rules and Recommendations relating to the Straits, so that it could ensure safe passage through the waterway.

The Suspension of Traffic for Emergencies (Article 24): this article drew the most criticism during the debates at the IMO, especially from Bulgaria and Russia. These countries claimed that traffic was interrupted for unacceptable reasons, causing serious financial losses. They also drew attention to the increased risk of accidents arising from the accumulation of ships at the entrance of the Straits when traffic had been interrupted.

Those opposed to the 1994 regulation made the fol-

lowing points about the suspension or interruption of the traffic.

- 1. The Montreux Convention contained no specific provision on interruption of traffic. But according to the usage in international law, traffic through international straits cannot be interrupted, even if only on a temporary basis. Furthermore, an attempt to delay traffic would be contrary to the principle of freedom of navigation contained in the Montreux Convention.
- 2. Use of the phrase "without any formalities" when describing freedom of navigation in the convention meant that passage could not be delayed for any reason.

Turkey advanced two arguments when defending the legality of this article.

- 1. Delaying traffic was obviously a restriction of the freedom of passage. But it must not be forgotten that freedom of navigation might be completely interrupted for long periods owing to an accident that could occur if such measures were not taken.
- 2. Since 1982 the Regulation of the Port of Istanbul (article 13) and the Regulation of the Port of Çanakkale (article 21) had both contained provisions that allowed traffic to be temporarily suspended for emergency reasons. In fact, this provision had already existed in the Regulation of the Port of Istanbul since 1965. In other words, Turkey had been exercising this right for fifteen years on the basis of its internal legislation. According to the available information, no objection had been made to this implementation until 1994.

## V. THE TURKISH STRAITS REGULATION OF 6 NOVEMBER 1998

On 6 November 1998 Turkey adopted a new Straits Regulation that replaced the 1994 regulation. The new regulation contained a number of provisions that differed from those in the previous one. In some respects the new regulation had made passage easier, but in some areas the provisions were stricter.

The first noticeable change was in the title. The 1994 regulation's full title was "Regulation on Maritime Traffic in the Straits and the Marmara Region." The 1998 regulation bore the title "Regulation on Maritime Traffic in the Turkish Straits." The Montreux Straits Convention referred to the Straits. The name change was more in keeping with international law, because the 1994 document could mislead people into thinking that the Marmara Sea was distinct from the Straits. The new title was more in line with the Montreux Straits Convention, which declared that "Straits" stood for the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus.

The new regulation contained other changes in terminology. The 1994 document referred to ships that did not intend to call in any port along the Straits as "ships in transit." The 1998 document referred to them as "ships in passage without stopover." The "transit passage regime" that became mandatory in 1982 when the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea came into effect placed additional restrictions on the competence of the littoral state controlling the waterway compared to other regimes. It is very likely that the term "transit" of the 1994 document was changed to "without stopover" in order to ensure that it did not coincide with the term "transit" in the 1982 convention.

Another change in terminology involved the nature of the passage of ships through straits. The 1998 regulation (article 50) declared that ships other than those that would pass without making a stopover would be exercising the right of innocent passage. Article 50 also declared that ships intending to pass without a stopover would be exercising the right of free passage as foreseen in the Montreux Straits Convention.

The regime of innocent passage is the one described in the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Waters and Adjacent Areas and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In international law there is no such thing as "free passage" through straits. Perhaps the intention in using this term was to underline that the status introduced at Montreux for passage was *sui generis*.

But the real problem posed by article 50 was not the terminology used but the phraseology. This is how the article was worded: "Ships passing through the Turkish Straits without stopover shall be exercising the right of free passage provided in the Montreux Convention; the other ships will be in the innocent passage category and will have to comply with all provisions of Turkish legislation, including the obligation to take on pilots."

From this language, it can be deduced that ships passing through the Turkish Straits without making a stop-over would not have to comply with all the requirements imposed by Turkish legislation. But when all of the provisions of the 1998 regulation were taken into account, it would be seen that Turkey did not have this intention.

As explained earlier, the 1998 regulation contained some changes that were more in favor of merchant vessels than those in the 1994 regulation. The definition of a large ship was 150 meters and over in the earlier regulation; this figure was raised to 200 meters in the later regulation. This demonstrated that Turkey had taken into account the criticism it faced at the IMO. Similarly, to come under the category of "deep-draft vessel" a ship had to have a draft

of 10 meters or over. Today this figure has been raised to 15 meters. Since deep-draft vessels faced greater restrictions when sailing through the Straits, it can be said that the new regulation allowed a greater number of ships to go through without facing such restrictions.

The new regulation also contained provisions that would facilitate and accelerate the passage of oil tankers through the Straits. The 1994 regulation had provided that, once a large ship carrying dangerous cargo was in the Straits, no other vessel in a similar category would be allowed into the Straits until the first ship had left the waterway. But article 25, paragraph (d), of the 1998 regulation provided that in such circumstances a similar vessel would be allowed to enter the Straits after a certain distance had been covered by the first ship.

In addition, an infringement on international law that had slipped into the 1994 regulation was put right in the 1998 regulation. Although the Montreux Straits Convention had decreed that "pilotage and towage were optional" for merchant vessels, article 31 of the 1994 regulation had made it mandatory for Turkish flag vessels over 150 meters in length to take on pilots. This clear violation was corrected in article 27 of the new regulation, which stated that it was "strongly advised" that ships passing through "without stopovers" take on pilots whether they were foreign-flag vessels or Turkish.

Bearing in mind the criticism directed at article 7 of the 1994 regulation regarding the requirement to provide a navigation plan, Turkey introduced article 6 in the 1998 regulation. This article rendered the matter more complex, however, and even more difficult to understand. It stipulated in paragraph (a) that ships conforming to certain specifications had to provide "Navigation Plan I as fixed by the Administration in accordance with the standards of the IMO" at least twenty-four hours prior to entering the Straits. The new arrangement, unlike the previous one, did not give details about the information required from ships. Compared to the previous arrangement, the language of the new version was less clear. For instance, it was not clear whether the data to be provided by ships included information about their cargos.

The new regulation of the Straits that came into effect on 6 November 1998 took into consideration the natural hazards that rendered passage more difficult to a greater extent than the older one did. New rules were introduced that might slow down navigation or at times interrupt it altogether. It is obvious, however, that the new rules would also make navigation safer. Article 41, paragraph (d), of the 1994 Regulation provided that traffic would be restricted to one way and traffic in the opposite direction would be stopped whenever visibility in

any portion of the Bosphorus fell to less than half a mile. The new regulation provided in article 36, paragraph (b), that this measure could come into effect if visibility fell to one mile. But it also made the measure more restrictive, declaring that traffic would be stopped in both directions when visibility fell to less than half a mile (article 36/c).

A similar situation existed with regard to currents. The 1994 regulation had introduced certain restrictions according to the difference between the speed of the ship intending to pass through the Dardanelles and the speed of the current. If the difference in the speeds happened to be under four miles per hour (in other words, if the ship did not have the capacity to increase speed), it was not allowed to proceed (article 50/a). Article 43, paragraph (b), of the 1998 regulation, however, provided that, when the current in the Dardanelles exceeded six miles per hour, ships carrying dangerous cargos, large ships, and deepdraft ships would be barred from the Straits irrespective of the ships' speeds and would have to wait until the current fell to under six miles per hour.

The changes made in the rules governing visibility and current speeds were based on the experiences of experts in Turkey over more than three years during which the 1994 regulation had been in effect. But how these changes will be received by the other states and mariners that are users of the Straits will only be known in the light of experience.

The 1998 regulation also introduced changes in regard to applicability of the rules. Article 1 of the 1994 regulation declared that the rules applied to all vessels in the region of the Straits. This meant that they applied to both warships and merchant ships. The likelihood that such a rule would be observed, however, was remote. The principle of the inviolability of warships, which had become an accepted practice over many years, rendered the rule inapplicable. The sole recourse that a state bordering the Straits had when dealing with war vessels was to appeal to them to observe its law and regulations and, if the appeal went unheeded, to seek compensation for any resulting damages from the state to which the warship belonged.

The Montreux Straits Convention had a good number of limitations with respect to type and tonnage and length of stay that applied to warships passing through the Straits. When the rules of the 1994 regulation were added to these, the passage of warships became quite complicated. The 1998 regulation solved this situation with article 49, which exempted warships, auxiliary warships, and other state-owned vessels that were not merchant vessels from observing most of the rules introduced by this new regulation. Furthermore, such vessels would

be exempt from the provisions of article 51, which stated: "The masters and members of the crew of ships that violate the provisions of this Regulation shall be subjected to the appropriate provisions of the legislation in force."

Kudret Özersay

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SECTION 8

# 2001-2006

Turkey in the Chaotic Aftermath of 9/11

Table 8-1. The Administration of the Period 2001–2006

| RESIDENTS   | GOVERNMENTS  | MINISTERS OF<br>FOREIGN AFFAIRS                     | SECRETARIES-<br>GENERAL OF MFA                   |  |
|---|--|---|--|--|
|   | Fifth Ecevit Government<br>DSP-MHP-ANAP                          | İsmail Cem<br>(30 June 1997–<br>11 July 2002)       | Faruk Loğoğlu<br>(1 Apr. 2000–<br>24 Sept. 2001) |  |
|   | (28 May 1999–<br>18 Nov. 2002)                                   | Şükrü Sina Gürel<br>(12 July 2002–<br>18 Nov. 2002) |  |  |
| Ahmet Necdet Sezer<br>16 May 2000–<br>28 Aug. 2007) | Gül Government<br>AKP<br>(18 Nov. 2002–<br>14 Mar. 2003)         | Yaşar Yakış<br>(18 Nov. 2002–<br>14 Mar. 2003)      | Uğur Ziyal<br>(1 Oct. 2001-<br>28 Nov. 2004)     |  |
|   | First Erdoğan Government<br>AKP<br>(14 Mar. 2003<br>28 Aug 2007) | Abdullah Gül<br>(14 Mar. 2003–<br>28 Aug. 2007)     | Ali Tuygan<br>(1 Dec. 2004–<br>2 Dec. 2006)      |  |
| Abdullah Gül<br>(28 Aug. 2007)                      | Second Erdoğan Government<br>AKP<br>(29 Aug. 2007)               | Ali Babacan<br>(29 Aug. 2007–<br>2 May 2009)        | Ertuğrul Apakan<br>(2 Dec. 2006–<br>6 Aug. 2009) |  |

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi): Justice and Development Party.
ANAP (Anavatan Partisi): Motherland Party.
DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti): Democratic Left Party.
MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi): Nationalist Action Party.
(Table by Atay Akdevelioğlu)

### The International Environment and Dynamics

The events of "9/11" heralded a new period in global politics. This period witnessed the efforts of the U.S. to establish a unipolar world where it would set all the rules. At that time, the EU was engaged in adapting itself to the changes brought about by expansion. The Russian Federation was still in the process of recuperation after the collapse of the USSR. In East Asia, China was busy trying to reconcile its regime with rapid economic growth.

### I. THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND U.S. HEGEMONY

There are differing views about the origins of U.S. hegemony.

One view is that this hegemony was established after World War II and that the U.S. has been in decline ever since the 1970s. Its present bellicosity is a consequence of the effort to arrest the ongoing decline. Another view holds that during the Cold War the USSR balanced the U.S. in the political and especially the military sphere for nearly half a century, allowing the U.S. to exercise its supremacy only in the economic and cultural spheres. According to this view, it was only after the collapse of the USSR that the U.S. emerged as a true hegemon or at least got seriously involved in establishing its hegemony.

This book is not a treatise on the theories of international political relations. It only seeks to place Turkey's foreign policy in its proper context by relying on these theories. Consequently, we are interested in these differing viewpoints for only one reason. As explained in the introduction, Turkey is a "strategic medium-sized power." States in this category do not like to see a single power dominating the region where they happen to be located. This is especially true for countries with fragile economies. Otherwise, they run the risk of losing their relative autonomy of action and becoming the outpost of the hegemonic power. To cite the example of the Ottoman

Empire, this state was able to use the balancing power of Russia, France, and especially Germany to extend its life by about a full century at a time when England was the hegemonic power. Consequently, the important issue for Turkey is not the exact time when the U.S. hegemony was established, developed, and went into decline. These are debatable issues that are relatively theoretical. For Turkey, the real issue is whether there was a balance of power in the region of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkan Peninsula and when the present situation came about.

This balance existed at the time of the USSR, particularly during the 1970s. With the disintegration of the USSR, the balance came to an end, because no other country had the military power to match the U.S. This was crucial for Turkey. That is why we must examine the post-9/11 period when the U.S. sought to impose its global hegemony through forceful means and consider Turkey's foreign policy from this angle.

The U.S. entered this course by taking advantage of the events of 9/11, because it was the country benefiting most from globalization and because it was indisputably the strongest military power. At this point the U.S. did not possess economic supremacy (which is still the case), the most important of the three factors necessary to become a hegemonic power. This will be explained in detail when discussing the invasion of Iraq below. To cite an example, the EU as a whole had an economy that was larger than the U.S. economy. Japan and some East Asian countries were giving their U.S. competitors a hard time in many sectors. The U.S. was also on shaky ground politically, because its policy of occupation of Iraq lacked legitimacy. The occupation was based solely on certain allegations that were proven to be groundless within a year. The policy was supported by the horrors of 9/11, which were kept fresh in minds by the U.S. media. At any rate, although the U.S. possessed the means to pursue the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq single-handedly, it found itself unable to do

so, pressing its strategic ally Britain and a large number of other countries to contribute to the operations, even if their contributions were often at a symbolic level.

The George W. Bush administration went about establishing and reinforcing its Pax Americana above all through U.S. military might, which was greater than that of its closest rival by a wide margin. But it is appropriate to separate this process into military means (that is, occupation) and other means.

### A. The U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq

The "post-9/11" era will probably be regarded not only as an important period of the "post-Cold War" world but as a distinct period of world history.

Actually, the supremacy of the U.S. in the new order was also beyond dispute during the Clinton administration, which lasted for two terms from 1993 to 2000. Clinton exercised this supremacy by means that did not cause hostility toward the U.S., however, and did not alienate countries. His policies of "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were based on multilateralism, close consultation with allies, and a stress on political legitimacy. Even when bombing Sudan and Afghanistan following the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, or Iraq when it expelled the U.N. weapon inspectors, the U.S. kept the concept of international legitimacy in sight. In Bosnia and Kosovo the U.S. had the backing of Islamic states for defending Muslims against Serbian aggression.

Even then, however, presidential advisor Anthony Lake came up with the concept of "rogue states," which meant that countries like North Korea, Iraq, Sudan, and Iran that opposed the U.S. had to be introduced to democracy. At the same time, a group of conservatives known as the neo-cons, operating under the banner of the "new American Century," was preparing the intellectual ground for the U.S. to become the undisputed hegemon. As explained in the assessment of the period from 1990 to 2001, Francis Fukuyama had already proclaimed the final global victory of the American system in 1989, and Samuel Huntington was presenting Islam in 1993 as the new enemy to compensate for the disappearance of communism as an adversary.

Even before efforts were made to put these ideas into practice, during the term of Clinton's predecessor, George H.W. Bush, who served from 1989 to 1992, the Defense Department had issued a report in 1992 stating that the U.S. political and military goal was to prevent the emergence of any possible rival to America. The report was not

implemented at the time, but it demonstrated that the hegemonic power had studied its history lesson and was determined to make history (see Box Intro-3 in the Introduction).

After George W. Bush prevailed in the contested election of November 2000, the neo-cons were able to put their ideas into practice. At a time when the USSR had dissolved, Bush announced that the "Star Wars" project of former president Ronald Reagan (1981 to 1988) would be revived. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Russian Federation was terminated. The concept of rogue states was developed with the addition of the "axis of evil." Countries that did not support U.S. policies such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Yemen were proclaimed to be America's enemies. This was followed by the concept of failed states. But no enforcement measures were taken against them by Bush because, with the end of the Communist threat, no purpose would be served by such action.

The brazen act of terrorism that occurred on 11 September 2001 transformed everything. The atmosphere of profound fear that gripped the whole U.S. after this unexpected act of aggression was so great that Bush was reelected for a second term in 2004, notwithstanding the failure of the Iraq mission.

In this post-9/11 atmosphere, it was announced that Osama Bin Laden had been given sanctuary in Afghanistan by the Taliban, a group that had attracted the world's odium by destroying the ancient statues of Buddha. The neo-cons were determined to attack. This would help to appease the anger of Americans while providing a new chapter for the Law of Intervention that the U.S. had been seeking to put into place ever since the Gulf War of 1991. Afghanistan was occupied following an aerial bombing campaign that began on 7 October 2001 and was placed under the control of an international force. For the first time, NATO invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty in reaction to 9/11, when the U.S. declared that it had come under attack and appealed to its allies to render all possible assistance. When Turkey sought to follow a similar course in connection with the PKK, it failed to obtain satisfaction. After the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) came into being and was placed under NATO control in August 2003, NATO undertook its firstever mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

Terrorism was identified as the most serious threat in the New National Security Document released in September 2002. To combat terrorism the U.S. would carry out "preemptive war." This meant that, even before there was an imminent threat, the U.S. would strike without delay if the possibility of a future threat of terrorism was perceived.

The Patriot Act was adopted in this atmosphere, including provisions that allowed information to be gathered, such as who was reading which books and magazines in libraries across the U.S. At the same time, a Department of Homeland Security was established. Detainees were sent to the U.S. base of Guantanamo in Cuba, where they were held under inhuman conditions and without any legal protection. Detainees who could not be tortured in the U.S. were later shipped off in CIA planes to countries where torture was a regular part of police interrogation. This practice, known as extraordinary rendition, created a great stir in Europe when it came to light. In September 2006 President Bush admitted publicly that there were secret CIA prisons in a number of countries.

Even as the attack on Afghanistan was being carried out, the Bush administration made ready to attack Iraq and gave signs that Iraq would be followed by the other countries designated as belonging to the "axis of evil." It was proclaimed that the war against international terror would be a long-term affair. The void left by the demise of communism as the adversary of the U.S. would now be filled by international terrorism, drawing its source from Islam. In these circumstances, the Bush administration launched a campaign for world domination, based on securing U.S. economic interests through military action. This policy came to be known as the New Imperialism.

After Bush declared that Iraq was a part of the axis of evil in February 2002, the occupation of that country began on 20 March 2003 with Operation Shock and Awe. This operation left Iraq shattered and divided. U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld described some countries, led by France and Germany, as forming part of Old Europe, while forcing the countries of Eastern Europe to side with its policies, causing a rift within the ranks of the EU.

The ostensible reason for the attack on Iraq was that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and was collaborating with al-Qaeda. All of the international search efforts following the occupation failed to yield any evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Eventually, the U.S. was forced to admit this and blamed George Tenet, the director of the CIA, for a lapse in intelligence gathering. The second pretext was also not sustainable, given that Saddam had never allowed al-Qaeda to operate in Iraq. It was essential for the U.S. to attack Iraq, however, in order to pursue its new policy not

just in the Middle East but throughout the world. The attack on Iraq was based on the following reasons.

The Psychological and Sociopsychological Reason The psychological reason had to do with President Bush's state of mind. Having adhered to a form of fundamentalist Christianity with close links to Judaism in order to overcome a drinking problem, Bush began to see himself as the world's savior. This state of mind suited the neo-cons perfectly.

In regard to the aspect of social psychology, the U.S. public felt traumatized by a fear approaching panic after the events of 9/11. The same mass terror psychology was seen in the U.S. during the McCarthy era of the late 1940s and early 1950s (see "Appraisal of the Period" in Section 4). That terror had been induced from the top. This time, although encouraged by the administration, the roots of the terror psychology were firmly embedded among the U.S. public.

Furthermore, consciously or subconsciously, Americans felt humiliated. For the first time in its history, the U.S. was being hit in a most sensitive place by its own aircraft. Moreover, the attack had been planned by terrorists that had been trained and nurtured by the U.S. itself in the 1980s in order to strike at the USSR in Afghanistan.

Having been led to believe in the blessings of the American Dream, the U.S. public had inherited the hubris of nineteenth-century British and French imperialism following the failure of the USSR. At a time when they were savoring the feeling of pride that comes with global domination, Americans had been stricken by a disaster coming out of the sky. This was more than enough for many Americans to give unquestioning support to the policies of the neo-cons.

#### The Economic and Systemic Reasons

For a good number of years, the U.S. economy had been facing difficulties. The markets were depressed, and the Federal Reserve had to lower the interest rate thirteen times. The interest rate had dropped from 7% in 2000 to 1.25% in 2003. Taxes were also lowered, but these measures failed to turn the economy around. In fact, the expectation of further decreases in prices reduced demand, causing prices to fall further. With competition from low-priced Chinese products, U.S. producers were under the pressure of declining profits and slow growth prospects. This led to further widening of the trade deficit and ever-increasing current account deficits. These developments were also a by-product of cheap credit facilities induced

by excess liquidity in the economy. At a time when taxes were being cut, the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11 were causing the budget deficit to rise at an accelerating rate. In these conditions, capital movements began to shift toward speculation, with investments based on irrational as well as rational expectations. This in turn led to scandals like the Enron affair.

Furthermore, the U.S. was used to registering a foreign trade gap of roughly \$150 billion every year; but because the U.S. was able to attract about \$200 billion of foreign investments every year, this trade gap was sustainable. As foreign investments dwindled after 9/11, however, the huge trade gap started causing concern. There was a diminution of funds coming in particular from the Middle East due to fear of having these funds frozen by the U.S. government. The budget, which had shown a surplus during the Clinton administration, registered a deficit of \$374 billion in 2003, when the trade deficit reached \$489.4 billion. The total debt passed the \$7 trillion mark. The trade gap climbed to \$782 billion in 2005, and the U.S. trade deficit was \$856.6 billion in 2006. This annual figure represented 6.5% of the U.S. gross domestic product in 2006, up from 6.4% in 2005 (BBC News, 14 March 2007). The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the federal budget deficit would attain \$1.7 trillion over the next ten years. If the tax decreases were maintained, the deficit was expected to double (Washington Post, 17 August 2006).

For the Bush administration, the way to revive the economy was through Keynesian policies of a military sort. In other words, instead of having people dig ditches and then refill them, they would produce missiles and launch them. The top figures in the administration had come from the oil, automotive, or defense industries, which had a lot to do with the adoption of this policy. A number of examples can be cited. Vice-president Dick Cheney came from Halliburton; Condoleezza Rice, the presidential advisor who would later become secretary of state, from Chevron; Don Evans, the secretary of commerce, who had been in charge of the president's election campaign, from Sharp Drilling; and Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense, from ABB (Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd.). All of the companies were related to the oil or defense industries or to both.

The Bush administration expected to derive two economic benefits from the war with Iraq. The price per barrel of crude oil produced by U.S. companies was expected to fall to \$20, while in February and March 2003 this price was above \$30 and was expected to rise drastically due to economic development in China and India. This would help revive the economy, and the defense industries would serve as a driving force for the other indus-

tries. Actually, the attack on Iraq was indirectly a war for oil. In addition to ensuring its own supplies of oil through control of Middle Eastern oil, the U.S. also wanted to squeeze its competitors, the EU and Japan, as well as the rising economic powers like China and India. All of them were dependent on Middle Eastern oil for meeting over 85% of their requirements. But the unexpected resistance of the Shia and the insurgency that resulted from the U.S. occupation of Iraq were to confound these calculations.

#### The Strategic Reason

The Bush administration was prepared to face the wrath of the masses on a global scale because it was pursuing the colossal goal of attaining permanent global hegemony. Because it was aware that a rival would emerge to challenge its hegemony at some point, it was determined to act as a "cycle breaker" to prevent this eventuality.

Both Iraq and the U.S. suffered from the occupation. Iraq lost because it was submerged in the chaos of civil war with no end in sight. The only success registered by the U.S. was getting rid of Saddam. It also succeeded for a while, thanks to the media, in hiding the true state of affairs from its own people. The lessons of allowing the public to see what was happening in Vietnam had obviously been learned. In all other respects, the U.S. was a loser. Once the war was ended, the U.S. found itself powerless, having lost control in Iraq. It could only attempt to have the soldiers and police of the Iraqi Civil Administration be killed in place of its own military personnel. This demonstrated that Iraq conformed to the Vietnamese pattern. Another effect was the massive loss of international prestige suffered by the U.S. because of the torture and sexual harassment that took place at the Abu Ghraib prison. This led to the announcement by Washington in August 2006 that the prison would be closed down. Then there was the unexpected rise in the price of oil to over \$77 per barrel at one point, with its dire effects on the U.S. economy. (In July 2008 it was over \$140.) Finally, perhaps the most telling adverse effect of the war was the tsunami-like rise in anti-Americanism on a global scale. This rise may have prepared the ground for terrorism to continue to rise in succeeding generations.

As a result of these negative developments, shortly after the invasion, the symbolic forces of America's allies in the coalition began to be withdrawn in 2004. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan described the occupation as illegal. In May 2006 the UN's Committee on the Prevention of Torture placed the U.S. on the list of countries that practiced torture.

The only winners in this situation were the Iraqi Kurds. A de facto state of Kurdistan, dependent on the U.S., had come into being even if it did not have a recognized legal status. This would have serious implications for Turkey in both its domestic and its foreign policies.

# B. The Other Means for the Pursuit of U.S. Hegemony

The occupation of Iraq was the first step toward achieving unchallenged hegemony. Other means were also being employed to achieve this goal, however.

#### The Greater Middle East Project (GMEP)

The project included the swath of predominantly Muslim countries stretching from the Maghreb states all the way into Afghanistan. Its main objective was to open up these lands to the global economy in accordance with rules set up by the U.S. The project was to be implemented with the help of Israel and Turkey, while Syria and especially Iran were to be excluded.

At the G-8 summit of June 2004, the U.S. proclaimed its "Greater Middle East and North Africa Initiative" and announced that democracy should be introduced into the region. The reason for this change in policy was that the cooperation with authoritarian regimes in this area that had proved useful during the Cold War was no longer producing the desired results. It was becoming harder to control the opposition of the masses to these regimes and their U.S. backers. This became very apparent after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

By "bringing democracy" it would be possible to deflect the public's anger toward the U.S. into relatively more democratic channels, while the regimes not under U.S. control (like those in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tripoli) would be overthrown. Obviously, it was possible that the successor regimes might put their national interests ahead of their relations with the U.S. But it was very likely that, as globalization progressed at an accelerating pace, the new regimes would improve their relations with the U.S. in order to keep their economies functioning smoothly.

The first country to submit to the pressure was Libya. In February 2004 it acknowledged its responsibility for the Lockerbie air disaster of 1988 and agreed to pay compensation to the victims. In May 2004 sanctions that were mostly economic were imposed on Syria for supporting terrorism, developing weapons of mass destruction, and destabilizing Iraq. In April 2005 Syria was forced to remove all of its troops from Lebanon.

In February 2005 local elections were held in Saudi Arabia, which announced that women might also be allowed to vote in the next election. In May 2005 Kuwaiti women were granted the right to vote and to be elected and a woman became a cabinet minister in charge of planning. Although these were preliminary timid steps, they were part of a long-term project that would yield fruits in the future. This project would create a middle class or bourgeoisie by supporting small-scale entrepreneurs with microcredits. It would also help in reinforcing nongovernmental organizations and civil society.

Naturally, intellectuals stemming from the lower bourgeoisie were likely to adopt anti-U.S. positions. But it can be presumed that Washington saw this as a preferable alternative to terrorism; in any case, it assumed that these intellectuals would mellow over time as they were increasingly exposed to globalization.

Resorting to force was a main pillar of the neo-cons' ideology, so it was inevitable that developments in the Middle East would lead to a violent outcome. In July 2004 Israel initiated the construction of a wall, similar to the former Berlin Wall, that would isolate the Palestinians. The UN General Assembly responded with a resolution that expressed disapproval of Israel's action, while the International Court of Justice declared the wall to be in contravention of international law. All of this did not prevent the U.S. from continuing to give Israel its unconditional support. The U.S. forced a suspension of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority when Hamas came to power following an election. The U.S. subsequently supported the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, ostensibly to punish Hezbollah. This action led to widespread destruction in Lebanon and many deaths among innocent civilians. The call for a cease-fire was delayed for as long as possible; and even after the cease-fire the U.S. allowed Israel to pursue its armed action. All criticism directed at Israel was immediately branded as anti-Semitism.

The world was united in condemning Israel's action, with even the opposition in Israel and the ultra-Orthodox American Jews protesting the war. It was pointed out that the objective of the invasion of Lebanon was not the destruction of Hezbollah, which had been in existence for many years. The real target was Iran, which had been challenging U.S. hegemony in the Middle East by declaring that it would not end its research activities in the field of nuclear energy. Meanwhile the U.S. tolerated the action of North Korea, which announced in December 2002 that it was reactivating its nuclear program, which had been suspended since 1994. North Korea also withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, declared that it would manufacture nuclear weapons in June 2003, and announced that it possessed such weapons in February 2005.

It is difficult to reconcile the prison conditions of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib and the mass killings in Lebanon with the concepts of democracy and human rights that represented the superstructure of globalization in the 1990s. The toppling of the Salvador Allende regime that had come to power in Chile through elections was explained with the logic of the Cold War. It would not be so easy to explain the grounds for the economic strangulation of Hamas, however, which had come to power through elections and had renounced terror.

Eventually it became obvious that in the neo-con vocabulary "bringing democracy" stood for "aggression and occupation." Although increasing numbers of Americans realized this and expressed their disapproval, the real power centers seemed confident that such reactions would be tamed in time by the "system."

#### Efforts to Take Control of Eurasia

Although Russia appeared weak at the moment, the main American objective in Eurasia was to keep Russia under control so that it would not emerge as a potential rival. The method used for this was preventing the neighboring countries from becoming dependent on Russia by securing outlets for their energy resources through friendly countries like Turkey. At the same time, the U.S. was busy in detaching the countries of Eastern Europe from Russia by means of "multicolored" revolutions even as it established military bases on the territories of the former allies of the USSR.

The multicolored revolutions broke out under the influence of the U.S. When the Revolution of Roses got started in Georgia, it went unnoticed. The neighbors, including even Russia itself, made cooperative efforts in order to prevent bloodshed. It emerged subsequently that the Georgian dissidents had been in the former Yugoslavia to be trained in the art of making revolutions by American NGOs and most notably by the Soros Foundation. That is why, when it became Ukraine's turn, Russia stood firmly against the revolutionaries. This time the EU was backing the U.S., however, and Russia was forced to give way.

Notwithstanding the U.S. efforts, this process did not spread into the countries east of the Caspian Sea, because there were practically no civil society organizations in this region. If everything had proceeded according to the neocon plans, at some point the Greater Middle East Project would have merged with the Wider Black Sea Project. But the sequence of multicolored revolutions was derailed and the Greater Middle East Project proved to be a failure. At this point, Turkey began to perceive the looming U.S. hegemony in the Black Sea as a threat and started to cooperate with Russia, as we shall see below. In these circumstances the U.S. was forced to put its Black Sea plans on hold, at least for the time being.

#### The Use of International Organizations as Tools

U.S. deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz was appointed president of the World Bank, a sister organization of the IMF, where U.S. influence is preponderant. The Bush administration was set on broadening its world hegemony. For this it reinforced NATO, which had been established to check the USSR, even though the USSR was no longer on the scene. In March 2004 the membership of NATO was expanded to twenty-six, with the admission of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia. As mentioned earlier, NATO would assume the command of the international force in Afghanistan in August 2003.

Meanwhile the U.S. was working on drawing Russia into its system by declaring in May 2002 that henceforth it would be a "limited partner" of NATO and would participate in its decision-making process but without the veto. The U.S. sought to press Russia in the Black Sea region, however, by concluding agreements with Romania in December 2005 and with Bulgaria in July 2006 to establish military bases on their territories. Against this move, Russia began to implement the pipeline project to ship its oil to world markets through Bulgaria and Greece.

As a result of these policies the U.S. has become such an unrivaled power in world politics that it is now impossible to examine international developments separately under the rubrics of "international developments" and "regional developments," as in previous sections.

#### c. Reactions to Bush's Policies

Although it was impossible to check Bush's policies (conceived by the neo-cons) by military means, there was much popular and political opposition to these policies.

#### **Domestic Opposition**

Having been terrified by events and kept jittery by the media, Americans gave strong backing to the Bush administration and granted him a second term as president. But a number of factors led to increased opposition among the public. First, the legitimacy of the Iraqi adventure was always perceived as somewhat doubtful. In addition there were the revelations about sexual depravity and torture in prisons and the growing number of casualties among U.S. military personnel. Then it became public that the CIA had fabricated the grounds (possession of weapons of mass destruction and so forth) advanced by the administration to justify the invasion of Iraq. The public disaffection was made worse by the rising price of oil during Bush's second term.

In June 2004 the U.S. Supreme Count ruled that detainees in Guantanamo suspected of terrorism had a right to a trial, where they would be charged and where they could properly defend themselves. Film director Michael Moore produced Fahrenheit 9/11, which revealed how the neo-cons used the attacks of 9/11 as a pretext for carrying out their plans that had been drawn much earlier. This film received the highest award at the Cannes Film Festival. In October 2003 the Iraq Study Group, which worked under the CIA, issued its first report, in which it was admitted that no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq. The group's director, David Kay, also declared that nothing was found to substantiate the alleged link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Kay resigned in January 2004. In May 2004 U.S. general Antonio Taguba issued his official report, in which he confirmed that sexual harassment and torture were systematically practiced at Abu Ghraib, One of the reasons for invading Iraq advanced by the Bush administration was Saddam's effort to procure uranium concentrate from Niger. Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had been charged with investigating the affair, reported four months after the invasion got underway that the threat from Iraq had been exaggerated by the Bush administration in order to legitimize the invasion. In response, the fact that his wife worked for the CIA was leaked to the press.

#### The International Repercussions

International public opinion began to perceive the U.S. as a "terrorist state" for pursuing a foreign policy that took advantage of America's unrivaled position in the world. This policy gave rise to much revulsion among developing countries, especially those with Muslim majorities.

Even before the occupation of Iraq, previous developments were having an effect, with a series of leftist and anti-American governments coming to power in Latin America. In January 2002 Honduras reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba after a break of forty years. Hugo Chávez returned to power in Venezuela that year following a coup and became a leader of the anti-Bush chorus. Left-leaning Lula da Silva assumed the leadership of Brazil. The first war-crimes court, which the U.S. had opposed, started functioning in July 2002 as the International Criminal Court. Japan joined the Kyoto Protocol (designed to forestall global warming) in June 2002, followed by Russia's signing of the document in November 2004. This caused embarrassment to Bush, who in 2001 had withdrawn from the protocol, a document that had been signed by his father back in 1992.

The anti-American wave gathered momentum fol-

lowing the occupation of Iraq. The antiglobalization movement selected the U.S. as its main target. As a result of the dollar's fall in value, some countries shifted their foreign exchange reserves to the euro and began to quote the price of oil in that currency. When it became known that the CIA was using European airports to move radical fundamentalists to face interrogation and possible torture in third countries, there was much anger in Europe. Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, was forced to visit these countries in order to contain the damage. In 2004 Spain, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines withdrew from the coalition and repatriated their troops from Iraq. In August 2004 the Supreme Court of Chile lifted the immunity from prosecution of the former dictator Augusto Pinochet. He was placed under house arrest in November 2005 for tax evasion and murdering his opponents. In October 2005 the socialist Tabare Vázquez was elected president in Uruguay. In December 2005 the leftist Evo Morales, an adversary of the U.S., was elected president in Bolivia. The Iraq Court held its final sitting in İstanbul. The Global and European Social Forums that opposed globalization held their meetings.

In this atmosphere, the U.S. was even held responsible for the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in gossip that circulated on the Internet.

## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In addition to being a candidate for accession to the European Union, Turkey was greatly concerned with developments in the EU for the following reasons.

- 1. The main thrust of Turkey's foreign policy had always been in the direction of the West and particularly Europe. This relationship was expected to lead to eventual membership in the EU. Any development or change in the EU was bound to affect Turkey's candidacy.
- 2. There was no alternative to the U.S.; but given that the Russian Federation was engrossed in its own affairs, the likeliest possible challenger of the U.S. was the EU. As the EU gathered strength, Turkey would be able to breathe easier in the new balance that might thus be established.
- 3. Both the U.S. and Europe represented the "West"; but after 9/11 the U.S. veered sharply away from Western values. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the Patriot Act, and the extrajudicial pressures on foreign nationals and even on U.S. citizens can be cited as examples of this veering away. These developments increased the importance of the EU for Turkey, which had been seeking modernization by adopting Western values ever since the reform period of

the Tanzimat in the nineteenth century. This modernization effort became more systematic with Atatürk's reforms.

The EU went through at least three critical changes during this period.

1. Deepening: on 1 January 2002 twelve EU members undertook the most significant currency change ever attempted and adopted the euro as their single currency. Britain, which led the countries supporting U.S. policies, stayed out of this arrangement. The Constitutional Treaty, designed to provide a true legal framework for the Union, was shelved following its rejection by France in May 2005 and the Netherlands in June. The EU had entered a slack period in its integration and deepening process.

This signified that the relief and room for maneuver that Turkey expected from the EU's development as a challenger to the U.S. on the world scene had been postponed indefinitely.

2. Expansion: despite this setback, ten new members joined on 1 May 2004, thus raising the EU's membership to twenty-five. The new members were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Republic of Cyprus. With this wave, the EU's population reached 450 million. Bulgaria and Romania were due to join in 2007.

This was a negative development from a Turkish point of view, because it raised the number of countries that had to consent to Turkey's membership. The new membership of the Republic of Cyprus would also pose serious problems for Turkey. The bill for admitting the new members was such that Turkey's membership could not be contemplated before about 2015.

3. Cleavage: the U.S. attack on Iraq caused a split within the ranks of the EU. France and Germany did not join the U.S.-led coalition. The former Communist countries of Eastern Europe probably felt that the EU would not be able to protect them from Russia despite their membership in the EU and chose to remain on friendly terms with the U.S. by following the superpower's lead. At first, even Italy and Spain took this course. From Turkey's perspective, this development led to two contrary results.

The first was that the EU's progressive strengthening had been checked: as a middle-sized strategic power, Turkey would find it harder to pursue a balancing act.

The second development involved the EU's lack of a military dimension, with no prospect for changing this situation in the foreseeable future. After 9/11 and the occupation of Iraq, it became apparent that the EU stood in need of a country with Turkey's strategic assets. This was articulated by the EU commissioner in charge of expansion, who declared in May 2003: "In the light of the developments in the crisis region, I consider it useful to include a secular and Muslim country in the EU" (Radikal, 8 May 2003). During 2003 and 2004 EU statesmen like Eneko Landaburu, Silvio Berlusconi, Joschka Fischer, Martin Schulz, Jack Straw, and Dominique de Villepin declared that Europe needed a military dimension, that this could only occur with the accession of Turkey, and that such a step would also help in cementing relations with Islam.

After 2004, however, these commonsense statements coming from the leadership of the EU began to dwindle, as the rising Islamophobia in European public opinion replaced the rational thinking of the leaders. Now there was an aversion toward all things Islamic. Obviously, this was also a very negative development for Turkey. Some of the changes occurring in Europe bordered on the irrational. For example, in January 2006 the municipality of one of the world's most cosmopolitan and civilized cities, Rotterdam, issued a "Code of Conduct" designed "to foster integration." It stated that people were disturbed to hear foreign languages in the streets and issued the following directive: "The burghers of Rotterdam shall henceforth use the common language, which happens to be Dutch" (Deutsche Welle, 25 January 2006).

If the level of paranoia can attain such heights in the Netherlands, it can be imagined how high the level was in Turkey. At about the same time, being prey to the fears described below in the subsection on "Politics," Turkey stopped the process of reform that came in the shape of EU Harmonization Packages. This, in turn, created tensions between Turkey and the EU.

### The Domestic Environment and Dynamics

#### THE ECONOMY

#### A Catalogue of Weaknesses

As we have already seen, after 1990 the Turkish economy was restructured to integrate it fully with the infrastructure of globalization (that is, international capitalism). This was a Turkey that had not yet been able to complete its basic capital accumulation. Because of this, Turkey faced increasing ills, such as a large informal economy, corruption, smuggling, and especially tax evasion. At the same time, the whole economy, including in particular the central government's consolidated budget, had become utterly dependent on ever-increasing domestic and foreign borrowing to function. This led to vulnerabilities, which shook the economy at the slightest hint of political difficulty. To cite an example, it will be recalled that an argument between President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit at a meeting of the National Security Council in early 2001 led to the collapse of the Istanbul Stock Market and the repatriation of more than \$6 billion in foreign-owned funds in just one week (see "The Domestic Environment and Dynamics" in Section 7). This led to a sharp devaluation of the Turkish currency and a serious slump in the economy.

In the course of adjusting to international market conditions, a dysfunctional and precarious economy that had not yet made the transition to a proper capitalist order was bound to run into severe turbulence in the 2000s.

#### The Bank Scandal

The Bank Scandal that occurred in 2000–2001 was much more serious than the Bankers' Scandal involving pyramid schemes that occurred during the Özal period. The Bank Scandal had two main causes. (1) In order to finance populist policies, politicians were resorting not to the treasury but to publicly owned banks to a degree that made their balance sheets unmanageable. The huge losses suffered by these banks forced them to borrow from other banks to manage their day-to-day operations. (2) Private banks

had been stripped of their assets by their owners. Among these were former state banks like Etibank, Sümerbank, and others that had been privatized in the course of carrying out structural adjustment.

The origins of this scandal can be traced on one hand to the decision made during the 1994 economic crisis to remove the limit of the guarantee provided by the state for saving accounts deposited in both Turkish lira and foreign exchange and on the other hand to the legal weakness of the banking decree law, due to the Constitutional Court's cancellation of an authorization law that would allow the government to amend the banking legislation by decrees. Because of the unlimited guarantees to bankaccount holders and because these guarantees had been extended to include foreign-exchange accounts, it became necessary for the Savings Accounts Insurance Fund to meet the obligations of the insolvent private banks that were taken over by the fund. Because the fund lacked the necessary resources to settle outstanding claims, however, ultimately it was the treasury that had to foot the bill. The treasury was also forced to cover the accumulated losses incurred by state banks. These were practically as high as the outstanding claims on private banks. In the process, the privatized banks reverted to state ownership. In January 2002 the Law on the Restructuring of the Debts of the Financial Sector came into effect. Through this law, around \$10 billion was transferred by the treasury to state banks. By April 2003 the owners of the failed banks had not repaid even 1% of the money they owed the Insurance Fund, but they still kept up their former luxurious lifestyle. In July 2003 a limit of TL 100 billion was set on savings accounts that were covered by insurance in order to appease public opinion. This coverage was subsequently lowered to TL 50 billion in July 2004.

In November 2003 the regulatory board of the banking sector revealed that the losses caused by the banking crisis amounted to a total of \$47.2 billion. At that time, Turkey's total foreign indebtedness amounted to \$144.3

Table 8-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 2001–2006

|          |  |                        |                     |   | :                      |                          |                    |                   |                     | CURRENT              |
|----------|--|------------------------|---------------------|---|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|          |  | EXCHANGE.              |                     |   | EXPORTS                |                          | IMPORTS            | EXTERNAL          | EXTERNAL            | ACCOUNT              |
| YEAR     | INFLATION<br>(PPI)   | rate*<br>(tl/\$)       | GNP<br>(MILLION \$) | exports<br>(million \$)   | AS %<br>OF GNP         | IMPORTS<br>(MILLION \$)  | AS %<br>OF GNP     | DEBT (MILLION \$) | DEBT AS %<br>OF GNP | DEFICIT (MILLION \$) |
| 2001     | 61.63  | 1,225,412              | 196,736             | 31,334  | 15.93                  | 41,399                   | 21.04              | 113,658           | 57.77               | 3,760                |
| 2002     | 50.11  | 1,505,839              | 230,494             | 36,059  | 15.64                  | 51,554                   | 22.37              | 129,700           | 56.27               | -626                 |
| 2003     | 25.56  | 1,493,068              | 304,901             | 47,253  | 15.50                  | 69,340                   | 22,72              | 144,300           | 47.33               | -7,515               |
| 2004     | 11.09  | 1,422,341              | 390,387             | 63,167  | 16.18                  | 97,540                   | 24.99              | 160,800           | 41.19               | -14,431              |
| 2005     | 5.89   | 1.344                  | 481,497             | 73,476  | 15.26                  | 116,774                  | 24.25              | 168,700           | 35.04               | -22,137              |
| 2006     | 9.34   | 1,435                  | 526,429             | 85,279  | 16.20                  | 137,321                  | 26.51              | 205,500           | 39.04               | -31,893              |
| Jume-Dat | harre Data collected from webwaces of the State Planning Organization. | oes of the State Plans | _                   | Indersecretarist of the Treasury and Statistics Institute of Turkey Ratios calculated by Hikmet Illushay. | ante, and Statistics I | netitute of Turkey Ratio | calculated by Hikm | ot I Iluğhav.     |                     |                      |

Yearly average exchange rates expressed in New Turkish Lira (YTL) after 2004, due to the deletion of six zeros from the value of the Turkish lira on 1 January 200, GNP: Gross National Product; PPI: Producers Price Index; TL: Turkish lira.

billion (Table 8-2). In other words, the total financial burden of the banking crisis amounted to more than a third of Turkey's foreign debts. This burden was the price of populist policies, delay in reenactment of the banking law, and even the corruption that had to be shouldered by state banks, while the media coined a special term to describe the crimes committed in private banks.

#### Prime Minister Ecevit's Illness

In May 2002 Ecevit was taken ill, but the nature of his affliction never became very clear. When he refused to transfer some of his powers to another cabinet colleague, the precarious balance of the economy became even more apparent. Each time there was a news item about the prime minister's health, this invariably led to a fall in the currency vis-à-vis the dollar, a further fall in stock markets, and a rise in the rate of interest paid by the treasury to domestic lenders. The interest rate jumped to 70% after having fallen to 52% at the end of April. When the treasury borrowed in July, the rate had risen to 79.2%. Standard & Poor's downgraded Turkey's rating from stable to negative. It has been reckoned that Turkey had to pay out an extra \$14 billion in the form of interest to its foreign lenders as a result of Ecevit's illness.

### The State of the Macro-Economy Hikmet Uluğbay adds the following comments on Table 8-2:

The most striking feature of Table 8-2 is the fact that during this period the GNP climbed from \$196,736 million to \$526,429 million. The figures indicate that in dollar terms there was an increase amounting to 167.6% in a period of just five years. The explanation for this unusually high rate of growth in the GNP is that the real increase in the value of the Turkish currency during the period accounted for most of this rise.

It will be recalled that in February 2001 the Turkish lira went through a steep devaluation, reaching a level of 1,600,000 to the dollar at one point and then falling back. It was this drastic devaluation of the currency that caused the GNP for 2001 to appear low in dollar terms. Whereas the Central Bank was selling dollars for TL 676,298 on 1 February 2001, on 9 November of that year the dollar had reached TL 1,557,240. This represented a devaluation of the Turkish currency by around 130%. This devaluation was much more drastic than warranted by economic facts; as a result, the market went through a

correction. It will be noted in Table 8-2 that, although declining, the producers' price index was still at a very high level. And yet the value of the lira kept on rising against the dollar. The cumulative revaluation of the lira led to the extraordinary rise of 167.6% in the GNP during a period of five years. In real terms, Turkey's GNP went through a contraction of 9.5% in 2001, followed by growths of 7.9, 5.9, 9.9, 7.6, and 6.0% in the years that followed in constant prices.

Another distorting effect of the rise in the value of the Turkish currency during this period was the diminution of the proportion of foreign debts to the GNP. Although Turkey's foreign debts grew from \$113,658 million to \$205,500 million (corresponding to an increase of 80.8%), the proportion of the external debt to the GNP declined from 57.77% to 39.04%. The distorting effect of the rising value of the TL, which inflated the increase in the GNP as expressed in dollars, was the cause of the falling ratio of debt to GNP.

The rising lira was also responsible for the rising trade gap, which in turn led to a rising balance-of-payments deficit. The overvalued lira caused imports to rise faster than exports. The ratio of exports to imports fell from 75.69% in 2001 to 62.1% in 2006. This deterioration was caused by the rising volume of imports, made even worse by the increased price of crude oil. Whereas Turkey's bill for its imported oil and oil products was \$8.3 billion in 2001, the bill in 2006 amounted to \$28.6 billion.

Along with the ever-rising trade deficit, the balance-of-payments deficit continued to grow at a rapid pace during this period. Turkey did not run into a foreign exchange shortage, however, despite the large current account deficit. This was due to the picture of stability perceived in domestic and foreign financial circles, thanks to the stand-by agreement reached with the IMF at the end of 1999. This agreement was of great help following the 2001 economic crisis and was renewed by the new government formed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after the election of 2002. This period was also one in which there was plentiful international liquidity. The return in dollars on the interest of debts incurred by the treasury in the local market was higher than the returns derived from alternative markets, thanks to the overvalued Turkish currency. This situation led to an increased flow of short- and medium-term funds into Turkey. For the first time, the global economy experienced continued economic growth, even though the price of oil had been rising since 1999, with the rise becoming very sharp in 2005 and 2006. As global liquidity continued to increase during the period, Turkey had no trouble in obtaining funds from international markets.

The surplus liquidity began to be absorbed, however, by the U.S. Central Bank (the Fed) as well as by certain European Central Banks when they raised their discount rates in 2006. This led to an outward flow of funds from emerging markets, a situation that also affected Turkey. In May 2006 the Turkish currency lost up to 20% of its value, with the dollar reaching 1.5 New Turkish Liras in September 2006. But in the following months the New Turkish Lira gained value as a result of rising expectations in world markets, which accelerated a capital flow to Turkey. In April 2006 the value of the dollar was between 1.36 and 1.37 New Turkish Liras.

Uluğbay's summary of economic conditions clearly reveals that after the shock of 2001 the Turkish economy recovered nicely in the following period.

- 1. Turkey continued to grow, even though the growth rates started declining in the following years. In fact, in July 2003 it was revealed that, with a growth of 7.4% in the first quarter, Turkey was second after China in the international growth league (*Milliyet*, 1 July 2003). Standard & Poor's raised Turkey's credit noting from B- to B and then to B+ in November. Eventually, in August 2004, it was raised again to BB-.
- 2. As interest rates began to fall, the flow of funds into investments would accelerate.
- 3. The persistently high rates of inflation of the past fell to single-digit figures. A new currency was introduced on 1 January 2005 by eliminating 6 zeros from the Turkish lira, facilitating the transactions and accounting practices and bringing much relief to the nation.
- 4. In the context of the adjustments to conform to EU legislation, Turkey began to change its laws regarding transparency and combating corruption. But old habits were harder to change. In June 2002 the leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan, declared that about half of his fortune came from the valuables presented as gifts at his son's wedding (Cumhuriyet, 12 June 2002). Legislation was also adopted in June by which the rules requiring taxpayers

to reveal the sources of their wealth were relaxed. It was decided that the sources of the capital of a company registered prior to 31 December 2002 would not be investigated.

On 1 January 2005 new measures were adopted to promote investments. Corporate taxes were reduced from 33% to 30%, the highest bracket of income tax was lowered by 5 points, and the VAT (Value Added Tax) rate on some products was lowered from 18 to 8%. The retail sale of petroleum products was thrown open to competition. It will be noted that all of these measures were designed to benefit the well-to-do.

- 5. The IMF has continued to provide much support, even if it is with the encouragement of the U.S.
- 6. The structural adjustments that were carried out have begun to yield the intended results. In addition to the short-term, speculative funds, foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased substantially. The treasury bulletins issued in June 2006 revealed that, despite the turbulence in financial markets experienced in May and June, 10,615 foreign firms got established in Turkey in the first half of 2006. In addition there was foreign participation in 2,338 Turkish companies, and 398 foreign companies established branches in Turkey. With the enactment of the Law on Direct Foreign Investments, the number of foreign firms that had set up operations in Turkey over the past fifty years grew by 130% in the three-year period from June 2003 to June 2006. Whereas actual foreign investment (which excludes commitments to invest) amounted to \$1.215 billion in the first semester of 2005, this figure rose by 626.6% in the corresponding period of 2006 and reached \$8.828 billion.

Furthermore, Turkish companies began to invest abroad. This was an indication that Turkish firms were abandoning the production of low-technology products in order to compete more effectively in international markets. Although this was a welcome move, there was a down side. Because it was necessary to keep real wages low in order to attract more FDI, this would have a depressing effect on wages, which were already much too low.

7. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was completed, contrary to the expectations of many. Similarly, the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline laid on the seabed of the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey came into operation. It is expected that these pipelines will be followed by others to transport energy to Greece, Italy, and Israel via Turkey. This has already increased Turkey's strategic importance as an international energy hub.

Other developments, however, gave rise to serious concerns during the period.

1. The overvalued Turkish currency had a braking ef-

fect on exports, while it led to increased imports, causing the trade gap to grow wider.

- 2. This situation led directly to a growing deficit in the current account deficit, signifying that domestic savings were insufficient and consumption was excessive. This in turn led to the need to obtain foreign loans in order to invest as well as for public and private consumption.
- 3. Because of internal migrations, the falling numbers of people engaged in farming, and the rapidly growing number of well-trained youths, it has not been possible to reduce unemployment, despite a growing economy. This could lead to future social upheaval.
- 4. For these reasons, it is not certain that the improvement seen in the economy is sustainable. It is true that the U.S. for strategic reasons needs Turkey to pursue its Middle Eastern policies; hence the IMF has supported Turkey under the prodding of Washington. This has allowed Turkey to service its foreign debts, but at the cost of bringing the economy under the sway of the IMF. The agreement with the IMF signed by the AKP government contains a calendar and goes into such detail that it has practically supplanted the government's program. It is the IMF that determines what items shall be taxed and the direction of employment policy. The IMF instructed the government to "take over Pamukbank and keep Yapı ve Kredi Bankası under surveillance" and (without even waiting for the government to inform the Turkish public about this) issued a statement at its Washington headquarters welcoming the government's bank operation. In one respect, this was a good thing: governments had resorted to the IMF whenever they ran into economic trouble but, once relieved, reverted to their old practices, compounding their structural maladjustments. But from another perspective this was very bad, because it made the economy utterly dependent on external factors. This was bound to influence the country's foreign policy.
  - 5. The volume of debt kept rising.
- 6. Social security was being eroded at an accelerating pace. On 1 January 2007 the law regulating the gradual transition of the pension system to a new setup came into effect. Under the new scheme, the retirement age is being raised and pensions are being reduced. In 2006 the state stopped covering the cost of key medication like cholesterol-reducing drugs, forcing patients to allow their cholesterol levels to reach new highs in order to requalify for free medicines.

To sustain the production and export of industrial products that have been expanding since 2003, it is necessary for the exchange rate, interests, and wages to fall. This is likely to lead to social upheaval in a country like Turkey, where conditions differ markedly from east Asia.

Table 8-3. Structure of External and Domestic Debt, 2001-2006

| YEAR | EXTERNAL DEBT (MILLION \$) | MEDIUM- AND<br>LONG-TERM<br>EXTERNAL DEBT<br>(MILLION \$) | SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT (MILLION \$) | SHORT-TERM<br>EXTERNAL<br>DEBT AS % OF<br>BXTERNAL DEBT | DOMESTIC DEBT (BILLION YTL) | DOMESTIC DEBT (BILLION \$) | domestic<br>debt as %<br>of gnp | INTEREST PAYMENTS AS % OF TAX REVENUES |
|------|----------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| 2001 | 113,658                    | 97,200  | 16,400                                | 14.44   | 122.2                       | 84.9                       | 50.9                            | 103.3                                  |
| 2002 | 129,700                    | 113,200   | 16,400                                | 12.64   | 149.9                       | 91.7                       | 42.8                            | 87.0                                   |
| 2003 | 144,300                    | 121,300   | 23,000                                | 15.94   | 194.9                       | 139.3                      | 42.7                            | 69.5                                   |
| 2004 | 160,800                    | 128,900   | 31,900                                | 19.84   | 224.5                       | 167.3                      | 40.2                            | 62.7                                   |
| 2005 | 168,700                    | 131,600   | 37,100                                | 21.99   | 244.8                       | 182.4                      | 37.7                            | 42.7                                   |
| 2006 | 205,500                    | 165,200   | 40,400                                | 19,66   | 251.5                       | 178.9                      | 33.2                            | 33.4                                   |

Source: Data collected from webpages of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury, Ratios calculated by Hikmet Uluğbay. GNP: Gross National Product; YTL: New Turkish Lira.

(Compiled and interpreted by Hikmet Uluğbay)

#### The Debt Situation

Hikmet Uluğbay's technical amplification on the state of Turkey's debts (Table 8-3) is as follows:

As the table reveals, the proportion of short-term external debts to total external debts rose rapidly until 2000, when it decreased by two percentage points. With the stability program that was put into effect at the end of 1999 with the financial backing of the IMF and the World Bank, the proportion of short-term external debt to the total external debt had fallen to 12.64% by 2002. It then began to rise again to over 20%, the levels attained prior to the stability program of 1999. In 1993, just before the economic collapse of 1994, this level stood at 27.51%.

Table 8-3 also reveals that the interest payments from the consolidated central budget were falling fast in relation to tax revenues. This was achieved at a time when the treasury's internal debts had grown by slightly over 100%. This was mainly the result of the fall in treasury borrowing rates in the domestic financial market. As explained earlier, substantial funds, both shortand medium-term, were flowing into Turkish financial markets as a consequence of the rises in international liquidity. This situation contributed to decreasing the interest rates for borrowing Turkish liras, making it possible to lower the proportion of tax revenues set aside to pay interest. But this positive development of course depended on the steady flow of foreign resources.

At a time when domestic and international debts were registering substantial real increases, the proportion of interest payments to tax revenues was falling. This did not signify that Turkey had finally overcome its problems. The downward trend could easily be reversed by negative internal or international developments. As a matter of fact, the contraction in international liquidity that took place in the first half of 2006 led to a flight of short-term funds from Turkey, which in turn led to a rise in the interest rate for domestic borrowing.

Uluğbay's analysis demonstrates clearly that the Turkish economy is still very vulnerable and highly sensitive to developments. The growth in the volume of short-term debts has a constraining effect on the country's relative autonomy (see Box 2-1 in Section 2). But the ratio of interest payments on the public debt to tax revenues has improved markedly. This ratio, which stood at 103.3% in 2001, had fallen to 33.4% by 2006. But this too depends on the international business cycle and faces the risk of changing for the worse when conditions deteriorate.

#### II. POLITICS

At a time when individual freedoms were being curtailed in Europe in the aftermath of 9/11, it would be hard to imagine that nationalism in Turkey, which had always kept individual freedoms under pressure, could be easily contained. As explained earlier, however, Turkey was under the influence of two opposing currents as a consequence

of its special relationship with the EU: (1) the reforms being carried out in the area of human rights in the period from 2001 to 2004; and (2) a rise in the level of ethnic Turkish nationalism, starting in the latter part of 2004. This rise of nationalism, which followed a pattern similar to those prevailing elsewhere after 9/11, had the effect of diluting the human rights reforms being carried out.

#### A. Political Developments

The illness and hospitalization of Prime Minister Ecevit in May 2002 and the absence of an alternate to take over his responsibilities gave rise to serious political turbulence. This in turn led to the decision to hold an early election. In the election that took place on 3 November 2002, the AKP obtained 34% of the vote, giving it 364 seats in the parliament. The rest of the vote was distributed as follows: the CHP got 19.3% with 179 seats, the True Path Party 9.6%, the Nationalist Action Party 8.4%, the Youth Party 7.2%, the Democratic Popular Party 6.3%, and the Motherland Party 5.1%. The minimum number of votes required for representation in parliament being 10%, only the AKP and CHP were represented in parliament, with an additional 9 seats going to independent candidates.

The AKP held enough seats to change the Constitution if it chose to do so. Bülent Arınç of the AKP was elected Speaker of the TGNA, and Abdullah Gül formed the fifty-eighth government. With a minor amendment to the Constitution, the ban on political activity imposed on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the AKP, was lifted. The ban had been imposed for an inflammatory speech he made in Siirt on 6 December 1997. With an election held in Siirt on 9 March 2003, Erdoğan won a seat in parliament and formed the fifty-ninth government on 14 March. At the local elections held on 28 March 2004, the AKP was able to increase its vote to 41%.

The newly formed AKP was able to come to power thanks mainly to the support of the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie that had benefited extensively from the credits provided by the publicly owned Halk Bankası during the Özal period. This class was more open to religious ideology, which it used to compete with the higher-level bourgeoisie of İstanbul. The Anatolian bourgeoisie was under the shadow of the İstanbul bourgeoisie until it started engaging directly in the export business and other economic activities. This meant that it would embrace political liberalism, even though it was based in conservative towns and had its roots in the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi: RP), an Islamist party, and its successor, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi: FP).

This is why, once in power, the AKP actively pushed through the reform packages called for by the EU and al-

ready initiated by Ecevit's coalition government. New legislation was adopted that would not normally be expected from a party that was being described as Islamist. This new legislation in areas such as privatization, promotion of foreign investments, human rights, and democracy was in line with both the infrastructure and superstructure of globalization. During this period much progress was made in the field of human rights, an area that had been a major hurdle in Turkey's accession road to the EU. But the AKP was operating in an environment in which it felt, on one hand, the constant pressure coming from secular institutions (particularly the army) and, on the other hand, the need to satisfy its religiously inclined constituents. The AKP was also failing to tackle the corruption in its own ranks effectively. Taking advantage of these difficulties, the opposition was busy undermining the democratization measures being pushed by the AKP.

Some circles labeled the government's efforts as insincere and deceptive and alleged that they were designed to pave the way for Islamism to take over. But, as indicated above, the AKP depended on the newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie that was opening up to the international trade, all the while respecting Islamic practice. This being so, it was not under the constraints of the nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s and was therefore capable of pursuing alternative policies and overturning long-standing taboos.

The AKP pursued a rational line until about the end of 2004. The refusal of the European Court of Human Rights to consider Leyla Şahin's application to wear the Islamic head scarf, however, led to political tensions that drove the AKP to abandon its conciliatory line. The AKP was also coming under the influence of rising ethnic Turkish nationalism and beginning to sound like the CHP and the MHP in its rhetoric. As a consequence, the reform process slowed to a crawl.

#### B. The EU Reforms

Examining the reform process that began with the amendments to the Constitution in 2001 before we take up the subject of human rights will be useful in order to provide the intellectual background against which Turkey's important issues are being addressed. This will also make it easier to trace the modernization of the Turkish Republic from a historical perspective.

To date Turkey has gone through two major modernizations. The first phase consisted of the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s. This revolution imposed from above was designed to achieve Atatürk's objective of attaining the level of "contemporary civilization." It was also designed to carry out the pledges made at Lausanne to Westernize the country. As a result of this revolution,

a semifeudal empire was transformed into a nation-state and the sultan's subjects in the *umma* society were transformed into citizens.

If the second phase or wave of modernization initiated in the 2000s and designed to prepare the country for accession to the EU achieves its goals, Turkey will make the transition from a nation-state that refuses to recognize the citizen's subidentity or ethnic identity to a democratic state and from a compulsory citizen to a voluntary citizen.

Following the confirmation of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999, the Accession Partnership Document (APD) was issued in December of the following year. In March 2001 Turkey issued its National Program, containing the reforms that it pledged to carry out. After this the TGNA decided to call early elections and enacted a number of reform packages.

#### The Constitutional Reform of October 2001

Historically, constitutions have developed to protect citizens from the state. The Constitution of 1982, however, commissioned by the coup of September 1980, sought to "protect the state from citizens." In the process of reform, 34 articles out of a total of 177 articles of the Constitution were amended. Among these were the amendments that reinforced freedom of expression and amendments making it more difficult to restrict fundamental rights and freedoms. The concept of "proscribed language" was removed altogether. Henceforth it would be easier to form associations and harder to close down political parties. It was confirmed that the decisions of the National Security Council were of an advisory nature.

#### The EU Harmonization Packages

Eight different EU harmonization packages were adopted. A good number of laws were amended in the course of adopting these packages. We shall examine the amendments that relate directly to the subject of this book.

The First Package (adopted on 6 February 2002): article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC), corresponding to article 216 of the reformed TPC, was amended to extend freedom of expression to cover speeches that did not incite violence and did not constitute a tangible danger. A phrase was added to the article prohibiting statements that "humiliated a part of the population or insulted it in a manner that would offend human dignity." This was designed to protect disadvantaged groups. Detention terms were shortened as well as the terms for banning publications. Henceforth the next-of-kin of detainees would have to be notified of their detention.

The UN's twin covenants of 1966 were ratified by Turkey on 4 June 2003. Article 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights kept outside of the framework of freedom of expression "[a]ny propaganda for war" and "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."

This provided the legal basis for penalizing those involved in making hate speeches in Turkey by excluding such activities from the protection afforded to freedom of expression.

The Second Package (adopted on 26 March 2002): formerly, the Law on Associations had not allowed the establishment of associations "that claimed the existence of minorities or that sought to preserve, develop, or disseminate languages and cultures that were not Turkish." The law was amended to lift this prohibition. Furthermore, the associations were now able to use posters in "languages forbidden by law." It became easier to organize meetings and demonstrations by removing some of the existing restrictions in the legislation governing such activities. In cases where the ECtHR imposed an obligation on the state to pay compensation to torture victims, the state reserved the right to claim this compensation from its agents who were responsible for the crime.

The Third Package (adopted on 3 August 2002): the death penalty was abolished and replaced with a life sentence for all crimes other than terror crimes and those committed in time of war or the threat of imminent war. The ban on the learning of languages and dialects "different from those traditionally employed by Turkish citizens" was lifted. It became possible to broadcast radio and TV programs in these languages. Non-Muslim foundations would be able to acquire real estate with the consent of the Council of Ministers and properties that were in their possession could be formally registered in the land register if they were not already registered. The possibility of having a retrial to comply with ECHR rulings was introduced.

The Fourth Package (adopted on 2 January 2003): a decision was made to enable Non-Muslim foundations to acquire real estate with permission from the Directorate General of Foundations, thus bringing them into line with other foundations. It became possible to prosecute agents of the state for torture without having to go through the procedure of an administrative investigation. Legislation was adopted that forbade the prison sentences imposed on those accused of torture from being converted into fines or postponed. Detainees held in prison had to undergo a medical examination before being interrogated and upon their return to prison after interrogation. The statements obtained from detainees without legal counsel would no longer be accepted as evidence in State Security Courts.

The Fifth Package (adopted on 23 January 2003): retrials would be allowed for those convicted up to that date and those facing trial after that date.

The Sixth Package (adopted on 19 June 2003; readopted upon the president's veto): freedom of expression was broadened by repealing the notorious article 8 of the Law to Combat Terrorism The definition of terror in this law was confined to acts involving violence or the use of force. Private radio and TV stations were allowed to broadcast in different languages. The terms of licenses granted to non-Muslim foundations for use of real estate were extended. Henceforth it would be possible to construct places of worship for all religions and denominations. All restrictions on giving certain names to children were lifted. The provision allowing for the shortening of sentences imposed for so-called honor crimes on the grounds of extenuating circumstances was repealed.

The Seventh Package (adopted on 30 July 2003): a change was made in the wording of article 159 in the penal code, corresponding to article 301 of the reformed penal code, dealing with "insulting Turkishness." If this act was committed purely with the intention of criticizing, it would be considered to be the exercise of freedom of expression and would no longer be a punishable offense. Article 7 of the Law to Combat Terrorism was amended to conform to the criteria of the ECtHR. This was done by adding the phrase "instigating violence." Provisions were introduced to accelerate the procedures for investigating and trying those accused of torture crimes. It became more difficult to try civilians in military courts. The learning of different languages was facilitated, and the NSC would no longer be consulted in the selection of these languages. Henceforth the secretary-general of the NSC would be appointed by the president upon the recommendation of the prime minister, thus opening the way for the appointment of civilians to this position. The provision obliging "Ministries and other public as well as private institutions to provide the secretariat general of the NSC with all the information and documents, both unclassified and classified, as requested" was repealed to protect the privacy of citizens.

#### The Constitutional Reform of May 2004

The AKP government introduced its last constitutional amendment on 7 May 2004. The death penalty was removed from the Constitution, and the State Security Courts were abolished. The representative of the General Staff would no longer sit on the Higher Education Council. The Court of Accounts was given the additional task of auditing public properties held by the armed forces.

One of the amendments was truly revolutionary. This

was the new paragraph added to article 90, dealing with the ratification of international treaties, which read as follows: "In the event of a conflict between the existing legislation and the provisions of duly ratified international treaties relating to fundamental rights and freedoms, the provisions of the treaty shall prevail." This meant that much existing legislation containing antidemocratic provisions would no longer apply if it did not conform to the provisions of international treaties on human rights to which Turkey was a party.

#### The Implementation of Reforms

These were truly bold steps, for many in Turkey were convinced that the recognition of cultural rights and more democracy would cause the country to come apart. This came to be known as the "Sèvres syndrome." In fact, both the bureaucracy and the judiciary were resisting the implementation of the reforms. To overcome their resistance, the legislature was forced to take up the same reforms in a number of successive packages. To cite some examples, two separate laws had to be adopted to regulate the teaching of languages in special language courses. In the case of radio and TV broadcasts and non-Muslim foundations, three separate laws had been adopted. Although it was perfectly clear that the Kurdish language was widely used in the southeastern region of Turkey, the bureaucracy sought written instructions from Ankara. When an English-language school decided to add the Kurdish language to its curriculum, it was ordered that this be done in separate premises with a different director and secretary. Although there was no chair of Kurdology in any of the Turkish universities, it was decreed that only those who had majored in this subject could teach Kurdish. The task of creating difficulties for non-Muslim foundations was carried out by the General Directorate of Foundations.

The official spokespersons of certain influential institutions took steps to obstruct the implementation of reforms through covert or overt interventions. Gen. Tuncer Kılınç (the secretary-general of the NSC), for example, sent a classified letter, subsequently leaked to the press, addressed to the prime minister, in which he voiced his opposition to three of the reforms in the sixth package. In another leaked letter, dated 7 April 2003, that was sent to the concerned agencies through the office of the prime minister, the NSC advised that the registration of real estate belonging to non-Muslim foundations be delayed through "various administrative procedures" (Radikal, 6 May 2003). The most obstinate opposition came from the judiciary. In most of the trials relating to freedom of expression that had taken place as of late 2004, the courts acted as if the amendment to article 90 of the Constitution did not exist. Similarly, judges ignored the phrase "for the purpose of criticizing" that had been introduced in article 301 of the new penal code (corresponding to article 159 of the old code). The prohibition imposed on "hate speeches" in the new article 216 (formerly article 312) was designed to protect disadvantaged groups and minorities. But courts continued to interpret this language as if it was designed to protect the state and the majority group and used this provision to prosecute those allegedly "insulting Turkishness." Each time someone was denounced for having insulted Turkishness, the public prosecutors invariably started an investigation procedure and often decided that there were grounds for an indictment and a trial. The judges frequently violated the law by upholding the denouncers' requests to take part in the proceedings on the side of the prosecution. All of this demonstrated that the judiciary also considered itself duty-bound to "save Turkey." This tendency compromised the impartiality of justice (as discussed below).

# C. Implementation in the Field of Human Rights

The Kurdish Question

Following the capture of Öcalan in February 1999 and the events of 9/11, it became much harder for the PKK to pursue its terrorist activities, forcing the organization to review its policies. Öcalan instructed his militant followers to leave the country. The armed wing of the organization changed its name from People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) to People's Legitimate Self-Defense Force (HSK). The political wing abandoned its label as the National Defense Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) and renamed itself the People's Democratic Units.

At its Eighth Congress held in April 2002, the PKK renamed itself the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK) and declared that it would pursue its activities for Kurdish rights through nonviolent means. Its spokesperson added, however, that the HSK would not be disbanded "for the purpose of legitimate selfdefense" (http://www.kurdistan.nu/psk/psk\_bulten/hy \_pkk\_ve%20\_kadek.htm). The organization changed its name once again to the Kurdistan People's Congress (KONGRA-GEL) at its Second Congress held on 11 November 2003. Notwithstanding this name changes, the U.S. included the PKK once more on the list of terrorist organizations in January 2004 under its new names. After the capture of its leader and the very unfavorable international environment that emerged for terrorism or armed struggle under any name, the PKK was left in disarray.

Logically, it would be expected that a country suffering from terrorism would take advantage of the weakness of the organization to take certain measures that involved granting some human rights like broadcasting in native languages or learning native languages in order to deprive the PKK of its propaganda tools. This would also involve promoting investments in the region to create employment opportunities and integrate the Kurdish demands into its political system by moving the scene of the struggle from the hills into the parliament.

But the country was able to tackle only the first part of these measures within the framework of EU reforms in the field of human rights. When even these reforms met with obstinate resistance from the bureaucracy at the implementation stage, citizens of Kurdish extraction, who had held high hopes for an improvement, were bitterly disappointed and angry. There was no mention of investments. Finally, the opportunity of redirecting Kurdish activities to the parliament was also missed when the Constitutional Court did the exact opposite in March 2003 by banning the Popular Democratic Party (HADEP). Previously formed "Kurdish parties" had met with a similar fate, The former deputies of the Democracy Party (DEP), banned in June 1994, had been imprisoned. As part of the EU reforms, they were given the right to a retrial in March 2003 but had to remain in prison until June 2004. As the ECHR kept deciding against the Turkish government and calling on Turkey to pay compensation to those whose villages had been burned down, Ankard began to resort to the friendly settlement procedure by compensating victims. In 2005 Turkey established Compensation Commissions for this purpose. In response, the ECHR ruled that, before resorting to the court, victims had to go through this procedure before they could be considered to have exhausted all the legal means at their disposal under their national legislation. By this ruling, the court decided to accept the new procedure as another means for legal redress.

The PKK, which had been without mass public support for a number of years, took advantage of the prevailing atmosphere and once again resorted to terror and mass demonstrations. In one instance, five thousand people fought the police at the funeral of four members of the PKK in Diyarbakır in March 2006, destroying seventy workplaces in the ensuing melee. The ambassadors of the EU countries in Ankara appealed to the Kurds to distance themselves from Öcalan, reminding them that the EU did not condone violence. The utterances of the mayor of Diyarbakır, however, were ominous: he said that Kurdish intellectuals would not condemn the PKK and that everyone must see that the Kurds had concluded for some time that coexistence had become impossible.

The milestones leading to this deplorable situation had been there for all to see. Among these were the trials

initiated to restrict freedom of expression and the efforts of some to prevent the presentation of a scholarly report on minorities even by resorting to violence.

#### Trials Relating to Freedom of Expression and the Incident of the "Minority and Cultural Rights Report"

While the AKP as a party was behind the adoption of new human rights legislation, minister of justice Cemil Çiçek was pursuing a different course and causing a public stir. When referring to the conference on the subject of the Armenians during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire scheduled to take place at Boğaziçi University from 25 to 27 May 2005, he described this event as a "stab in the back directed at the Turkish nation" in his speech at the parliament (Radikal, 25 May 2005). In these circumstances, the conference was postponed to 23 September. On the eve of the conference (in the late afternoon of 22 September) the Fourth Administrative Court of Istanbul forbade the event on the grounds that there was "no information on who would say what" (Radikal, 23 September 2005). Bilgi University, one of the organizers, held firm, however, and the conference was held there. In October the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court overruled the interim decision of the lower court.

In October 2005 the journalist Hrant Dink, a Turkish citizen of Armenian descent, was condemned to six months' imprisonment for "insulting Turkishness" under article 301, paragraph 1, of the Turkish Penal Code. The Court of Cassation upheld this verdict. When Dink criticized this verdict in the press, he was prosecuted once again in December 2005 for attempting to influence the course of justice. The novelist Orhan Pamuk, 2006 Nobel Prize winner, was also tried under this provision in December 2005, with the prosecutor calling for a three-year sentence for having made a statement to a foreign journal in February 2005 on the Armenian and Kurdish issues. During the trials, the nationalists protested by resorting to violence in the vicinity of the courthouse. The trial was dropped at the request of the Ministry of Justice. This was attributed to the fear that a conviction would worsen the reaction that was building up against such trials, especially in international circles.

In this atmosphere, even the report issued by a consultative body attached to the prime minister's office was made the subject of a trial. The Prime Ministry's Consultative Council on Human Rights had been set up by a law dated 12 April 2001. It was one of the measures that had been taken to carry out the political criteria of the EU (the Copenhagen Criteria). The Consultative Council was

called on to prepare studies and reports on ways to safeguard human rights and to serve the state in an advisory capacity when requested. "The Minority and Cultural Rights Report" (known as "The Minority Report") was issued in October 2004 and caused a big row, leading to subsequent complications. Professor Doğu Ergil's report of August 1995 and Professor Bülent Tanör's report of January 1997 on related topics had met similar fates (see "A Change in the Environment" in Section 7).

The Minority Report was a scholarly analysis that consisted of five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter was about the concept of minority and its development, while the second chapter described how Turkey had encountered human rights problems because it had remained trapped in the 1920s. This chapter also dwelled on the difficulties that Turkey had faced because of its failure to implement the Treaty of Lausanne fully. Chapter 3 recounted the conflicts between the existing Turkish legislation and the contemporary concept of human rights and cited examples of this conflict. Chapter 4 described the very strict and restrictive interpretation of legislation by the administration and the courts, with examples of how this interpretation was giving rise to discrimination and causing international embarrassment to Turkey. Chapter 5 dealt with the causes of this situation, with emphasis on two points. The first point was conceptual: the label "Turk" (or "Turkish" in some cases) was used as the supra-identity to denote the identity of the whole nation. But it also was the label used to denote the dominant majority ethnic/religious group. This led to the alienation of the other infra-identities in the country. To overcome this drawback, it was proposed that "Turk" be replaced with the territorial denomination "Türkiyeli" (meaning "of Turkey," coming from or belonging to the land of Turkey, a term comparable to "British" instead of "English"). It was argued that this would have a salutary uniting effect.

The second point was historical and political: even the most innocent references to infra-identities stirred up fears of dismemberment of the country on account of the so-called Sèvres syndrome. The concluding section described how the monolithic system that had been perfectly natural in the 1920s and 1930s had been superseded and overtaken by events. In conformity with the goal set by Atatürk, calling for the attainment of the standards of modern civilization, it was proposed that the Constitution and legislation be scrutinized and brought up to date.

Because of its scholarly nature, the report was not expected to receive much notice among the public. Consequently, a press conference was arranged to publicize

a summary of the report prepared for the benefit of the wider public. When disorder broke out during the proceedings in the presence of TV cameras and the summary report was torn up by a protester, the incident was fully covered in the press. Prime Minister Erdoğan then began to use the terms "supra-identity" and "infra-identity." Soon afterward, however, he was forced to reconsider and retract this due to the rising tide of ethnic Turkish nationalism. The official human rights body that had authored the report never met again. Minister of Justice Çiçek described the report as "intellectual nonsense" and "intellectual conspiracy" (Radikal, 19 November 2004). The author of the report, Professor Baskin Oran, and the president of the Prime Minister's Consultative Council on Human Rights, Professor İbrahim Kaboğlu, were indicted in November 2005 and accused of "insulting the judiciary" (article 301/2) and "sowing hatred and animosity among the public" (article 216). These crimes called for prison terms of five years. In May 2006 the court dropped the first charge and acquitted the two academics of the second charge. The chief prosecutor of Ankara appealed the court's verdict. (The report was finally acquitted by the Court of Cassation in July 2008.)

Although the report had not identified the Kurds as a minority, it nevertheless evoked the animosity of Turkish nationalists. But, more interestingly, it was also criticized by Kurdish nationalists, who argued that Kurds were not a minority but a founding and central element of the nation. Recalling the rights of non-Muslims indicated in the Treaty of Lausanne met with a strong reaction, however. All of this revealed how the mentality of the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, established in 1454 and formally repealed in 1839, was still very much alive. The millet system was based on the premise that Muslims were the "dominant millet." With the minority report, however, Turkey had been exposed to the concepts of supra-identity and infra-identity, which became regular features of ongoing debates on the nature of democracy in Turkey. (For the full story of the Minority Report case and its documents, see B. Oran, "The Minority Report Affair in Turkey," Regent Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 [2007]: 2–93.)

#### The Issue of the Deep State

In the trial on the Susurluk accident (see Box 7-6 in Section 7), the Court of Cassation upheld the convictions of fourteen defendants, including that of retired colonel Korkut Eken. The deputies Mehmet Ağar and Sedat Bucak escaped prosecution, thanks to their parliamentary immunity. The charges of murder and drug trafficking were dropped for lack of sufficient evidence. The cases of

the former deputy head of the Special Operations Branch of the General Directorate of Security, İbrahim Şahin, and nine other police officers who were accused of not being able to account for weapons in their possession were dropped because of the statute of limitations.

After the Susurluk accident, the Yüksekova Gang affair (also known as the Uniformed Gang) was exposed in 1996. The subsequent trial resulted in a number of convictions. An official report (the Kutlu Savaş Report) revealed that a number of officers up to the rank of colonel, noncommissioned officers, village guards, special team members, PKK turncoats, and local administrators were engaged in collecting extortion money on behalf of the PKK, abducting individuals for ransom, and smuggling drugs. These people were also charged with nine unsolved murders. In the investigation that followed, it became apparent that an officer with the rank of lieutenant general was also implicated in the affair. None of this had come to light until the abduction and murder of the nephew of a former deputy from Hakkari in January 1996. In March 2001 the State Security Court of Diyarbakır handed down prison sentences of up to twenty-five years for thirteen defendants. The Court of Cassation overturned these sentences in 2002, however, on the grounds that the investigation had not been conducted thoroughly and lifted the arrest warrant in absentia that had been issued against a major sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The objections of the chief prosecutor of the Court of Cassation were overruled, but the charge of conspiracy was proven, demonstrating that a crime gang indeed existed. When the case went back to the court in Hakkari, a retired major, a captain, a special-team member, a village guard, and a PKK turncoat were sentenced to prison terms ranging from thirty-one to four and a half years. Upon appeal, these convictions were also overturned.

The Hakkari court eventually brought the trial to an end in November 2005. This time there was no reference to forming a crime gang and the defendants in military uniform were acquitted for lack of evidence. Only the PKK turncoat who had exposed the gang was convicted, but he too was released by the Court of Cassation.

A very important new incident at Şemdinli, Hakkarı, came to light on 9 November 2005 and led to a reappraisal of many events taking place in Turkey. A bomb was hurled at the Umut Bookstore in Şemdinli, causing one death. The perpetrator was caught by the crowd and handed over to the police. It turned out that this individual was a PKK turncoat who worked in the intelligence branch of the Gendarmerie. Two noncommissioned officers of the Gendarmerie were sitting in a car close by, waiting for

the bomber. The car's trunk contained sketches marking the location of the bookstore that had been bombed as well as explosives and long-barreled guns. The two officers were detained. The prosecutor was conducting an investigation at the site when shots were fired at him by a technical sergeant of the Gendarmerie, killing and wounding people in the crowd that had gathered. The incident received wide coverage in the press and led to demonstrations and disturbances in the region. Protesters at Yüksekova attacked police officers and started a fire at the health center.

When Sabri Uzun, the head of intelligence at the General Directorate of Security, released a statement in March 2006 noting that "locks are useless if the burglar is within the house" (Radikal, 23 March 2006), he was removed from his post. His personal wealth subsequently came under investigation upon the receipt of a "letter of denunciation," but he was cleared of all charges in August 2006. When the prosecutor investigating the Şemdinli Affair, Ferhat Sarıkaya, prepared an indictment including the name of Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt (the commander of the land forces), he was fired and permanently banned from government employment and also from any sort of legal profession in April 2006. In the ensuing trial, the Van court sentenced the two noncommissioned officers to thirty-nine years in prison. This sentence was quashed by the Court of Cassation, which dedared that the defendants were fighting against terror; therefore they ought to be transferred to military court. That court released the two noncommissioned officers and the PKK turncoat at the first hearing in December 2007.

But retired lieutenant-general Altay Tokat made a statement to the weekly *Yeni Aktüel* that appeared on 27 July 2006. Even those who had doubts about the existence of the deep state had to reconsider their positions in the light of this statement. Tokat was already notorious for his assertion made on 12 August 1989, when he was stationed in southeastern Turkey, that "the state implements the same laws here as it does in Istanbul. Under my system, even grass could not survive, let alone people" (*Milliyet*, 13 August 1989). He speculated that the bomb that went off in Şemdinli was probably designed "to send a signal, to dissuade." He added that as a commander in the region he had ordered the use of explosives in the vicinity of newly appointed judges and prosecutors in order to give them a better grasp of the seriousness of the situation in the region.

All these incidents proved the existence of the "deep state," an open secret until then, and paved the way for a more transparent Turkey.

#### **Torture**

In this period a large number of public servants were put on trial for torture, but most of their cases were dropped because of the statute of limitations. Even when convictions were handed down to police officers, the sentences were suspended on the grounds that they were not likely to commit the same offenses again. Even when they turned out to be repeat offenders, they were not jailed, because "their past record could not be traced." The Bar Association of Diyarbakır took the Ministry of Interior to task for paying the lawyer fees of such accused policemen.

The only serious exception to such practices and abuses was the case of the "Children of Manisa," which had received much press coverage. Ten police officers were involved in this case, and all had been acquitted twice of torturing sixteen youths aged fourteen to twenty-six in a police detention center. After a long judicial process lasting seven years, the defendants were sentenced to prison terms of 60 to 130 months in October 2002.

The number of cases of torture and mistreatment that came before the courts increased by 3.3% in 2004 compared to the previous year. But the number of police officers under investigation decreased by 39.6%.

According to the 2005 report of the Human Rights Association, the practice of torture as well as the lack of accountability for committing torture persisted in 2005. Of the fifty-two cases of torture that had been referred by the lower courts to the Court of Cassation, about 69% ended with acquittals, 15% ended with suspended sentences, and only 15% resulted in convictions. Of the fifty-nine cases under the scrutiny of the association, thirty-five resulted in the case being dismissed due to lack of a ground for prosecution or lack of jurisdiction. Still, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture stated in its report of September 2006 that torture in Turkey had ceased to be systematic and was only practiced in exceptional cases.

#### Religious Matters

The head scarf and secularism: when the Welfare Party was banned, it was replaced by the Virtue Party, which was also closed down. The legal grounds for banning the latter were handed down by the constitutional court in January 2002. The winner of the election of November 2002, the AKP, appeared to be proceeding with extreme caution, especially on the issue of the Islamic head scarf.

The first incident occurred when the newly elected Speaker of the TGNA, Bülent Arınç, and his wife, who was wearing this type of head scarf, went to the airport to bid farewell to President Sezer. Sezer then began to send two categories of invitations to presidential functions: with or without spouse, depending on whether the spouse wore the head scarf or not.

Some excesses were also committed in this area. It was announced that those wearing the head scarf would not be admitted to the Beyazıt Tower of İstanbul after it was opened to tourists, on the grounds that this was considered to be an official precinct. The worst excesses occurred after November 2005, when the European Court of Human Rights rejected Leyla Şahin's petition to attend university classes wearing a head scarf. In February 2006 the Administrative High Court upheld the dismissal of the director of a kindergarten who wore a head scarf to and from work, even though she removed it in the school. That same month, a male teacher of religion was denied the right to take a foreign assignment even though he qualified in the exam, because his wife wore a head scarf. It should be recalled that the AKP also had a part in creating the atmosphere that allowed these excesses. The rector of the University of Van was harassed and even kept under arrest for a period. On Children's Day (celebrated on 23 April every year) children are allowed to sit at the desks of high officials in order to motivate them to aspire to high office in the future. At the celebration in 2006, Arınç ceded his chair to a "child" who was twenty-one years old and a student at a vocational high school for training Muslim clerics and preachers.

Concerning the Alevis, the Ankara District Court ruled that the term "Alevi" denoted a religious sect and could not be used in the title of an association. Based on this ruling, it ordered the closing of the Cultural Association of Alevi-Bektaşi Institutions in February 2002. This decision was overruled by the Court of Cassation in November. In October 2004 an individual's request that the denomination "Muslim" be replaced with "Alevi" on his identity card was denied. An Alevi father went to court to have his son excused from the required course in religion at his school that only covered the Sunni sect of Islam. After a complicated legal battle, the father lost his case in May 2006, and his son had to attend the course. (The Alevis obtained satisfaction when the ECtHR decided on 9 October 2007 that compulsory religion courses were a violation of the ECHR [Radikal, 10 October 2007].)

In regard to non-Muslims, on 24 January 2003 a new regulation was introduced that recognized (even if only indirectly) the existence of non-Muslim foundations other than the Armenian, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish community foundations. It now became possible for these foundations to register their real estate under their own names. Because the Ottoman Empire had not recog-

nized these foundations as legal persons prior to 1913, they had been unable to register their real estate acquired before that year.

Nevertheless, no substantial improvement took place in overcoming the practical problems of these foundations. The adjustment of legislation to meet EU standards ended the practice of preventing these foundations from acquiring new property and made it impossible for the state to take over their properties without compensation. In the draft law on foundations before the TGNA in 2006, however, three problems still remained unresolved: (1) the return of properties that had been taken over by the state; (2) the registration of unregistered properties; and (3) compensation for seized properties that had been sold to third parties. (This law was finally passed in February 2008 but brought no substantial improvement in regard to the grievances of the non-Muslim foundations.)

The draft law was unlikely to lead to a solution of the problem of compensation, which was the most intractable. Furthermore, there were signs that the government was not disposed to solve this problem in good faith. It became apparent in March 2006 that the orphanage belonging to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Büyükada (the island of Prinkipo), which had not been in use since 1964, was now the property of the Treasury. It also became apparent that before the enactment of the law the treasury had been transferring to third parties the properties in its possession that had been seized without compensation from the foundations in the past. In addition to an office building in the shopping district of Istanbul, the latest instance of this practice was the land (14,000 square meters) belonging to the Monastery of Haghie Yorgi Kapris located on the island of Burgaz that had been taken over by the treasury. On 1 June 2006 this property was registered in the name of a Muslim foundation, administered by the state.

In secular Turkey the non-Muslims were considered to be in the "others" category rather than "Turkish." This encouraged various acts of violence like the sporadic attacks on the premises of the newspaper *Agos*, published by Armenians in Turkey. An ancient Greek Orthodox ritual of retrieving the cross from the sea on the occasion of the Orthodox Christmas was disrupted with noisy protests by ultranationalists calling themselves Ülkücüler (Idealists).

The most recent example of considering the non-Muslim citizens to be foreigners came from the State Inspection Council attached to the President's Office when it categorized non-Muslim pious foundations as "foreign associations and foundations" in its report dated 5 February 2006, dealing with real estate sales to foreigners.

The Administrative High Court, however, ruled that the Directorate General of Foundations could not take over the administration of non-Muslim foundations that continued to function even if they had been considered closed.

Starting in early 2005, persistent claims were put forward that Turkey was being threatened by missionaries. This led the Ministry of the Interior to issue a report revealing that in the past seven years only 344 people had converted to Christianity in a country of 70 million inhabitants. Even so, a Catholic priest was killed on 4 February 2006 as he prayed, while another was stabbed and wounded on 2 July 2006.

As deplorable as these crimes were, another shock came from the judiciary, always considered a bastion of secularism. An Australian journalist sued those who had alleged that he was a religious impostor in a television program. When he lost his claim for compensation, the final verdict of the Court of Cassation was as follows: "as a general practice, the state may take certain measures to safeguard the religious faith of the vast majority of its inhabitants" (http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber .aspx?id=3623481&tarih=2005-12-09).

But there were also certain positive developments. The Administrative High Court overturned the conviction of a radio station for engaging in propaganda on behalf of Christianity. The court declared that "freedom of religion also includes the right to seek to persuade neighbors" (http://www.danistay.gov.tr/kerisim/ozet.jsp?ozet =metin&dokid=24421).

People called "Sabetayists" were made scapegoats, as on many occasions when the Turkish society faced a crisis. These people were considered the followers of Sabetay, the descendants of Ottoman Jews who had converted to Islam in the seventeenth century. Although this conversion had occurred three hundred years ago, they were still not regarded as true Muslims and were referred to as "converts" or "followers of Sabetay." Books about them such as *Efendi* and *Şebeke*, written by one-time leftists, became bestsellers. The former deputy leader of the left-of-center DSP, Rahşan Ecevit, uttered these words in connection with the work of missionaries: "I am a Muslim and I cannot bear to see Islam in retreat in my own country. In our bid to join the EU, we are in danger of losing our faith" (*Radikal*, 3 January 2005).

This situation was blatantly discriminatory and created discord among citizens. It was a result of the mindless anti-Semitism that was on the rise as a reaction to Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. There was also an element of xenophobia, however, which was becoming endemic in Turkish society.

In the meantime the sale of property to foreigners became a favorite area for the release of xenophobic sentiments. The concepts of sovereignty and property were blurred, aggravating the paranoia that found its expression in the slogan "Our homeland is being sold to foreigners." At this point the Constitutional Court handed down the most abashed decision in its history in March 2005 to annul the legislation on the sale of property to foreign nationals, reflecting the court's ambivalence. The decision was confined to article 19 of the law on the sale of property to foreigners under certain conditions. It did not actually prevent the implementation of this article but merely suspended its implementation on a temporary basis. The court's decision contained this sentence. "This annulment does not mean that no property can be sold to foreigners. It only means that the legal safeguards and limitations are not considered to be adequate" (Sabah, 14 March 2005). In fact, it would be difficult to argue that the conditions were not adequate: in addition to the condition of reciprocity, the property had to be located outside a military, strategic, or other forbidden zone, foreign juridical persons could not purchase more than 300,000 square meters without special permission from the Council of Ministers, total sales to foreigners could not exceed 0.5% of the total surface of any particular province, and so forth.

Much disinformation was spread to influence public opinion during these proceedings. It was claimed that Israelis were buying vast tracts of land in the GAP (Southeast Anatolia Project) region. Actually, no Israeli had purchased any real estate in the GAP region, according to the General Directorate of the Land Registry. This information was confirmed by the General Staff, the MİT (National Intelligence Organization), and the Ministry of Defense. Israelis were not even among the ten largest purchasers of land in Turkey. It was also claimed that approval had been given to Syrians to buy land in excess of the allowed quotas in the province of Hatay. This situation dated from 1939, however, when Hatay united with Turkey and some property owners in Syria at the time opted to preserve their Syrian citizenship. As a matter of fact, no sales of land to Syrians had taken place in Hatay since 1939.

### The Law to Combat Terrorism (TMK: Terörle Mücadele Kanunu)

Articles 216, 288, and 301 of the Penal Code that went into effect on 1 June 2005 placed serious restrictions on the freedom of expression. After this came the TMK, which represented a sharp retreat from the adjustments to EU legislation put into effect from 2002 to 2004. A very wide spectrum of acts like employing false seals, insulting the sovereignty symbols of the state, instigating someone to

commit suicide, supporting conscientious objectors, undermining the reputation of the military, encouraging the military to disobey orders, exporting historic objects, and so forth came within the scope of the TMK, enacted on 29 June 2006. The courts handling such cases had jurisdiction to try even youths over fifteen, and those found guilty of terror by these courts could not have their sentences remitted. The law restricted defendants to only one lawyer to represent them, and only one close relation would be notified. If police officers were being tried, however, the state was authorized to pay the legal fees of three defense lawyers. The law allowed officers to use their firearms if a warning to halt was not heeded.

#### D. The Rise of Ethnic Turkish Nationalism

Until the middle of 2004 Turkey had been going through its second revolution from above, in its long saga on the road to modernization. At that point Turkey started to witness an explosive growth of nationalist sentiment.

This was a time when Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf was published simultaneously by twelve publishers, and a novel on the theme of a supposed U.S.-Turkish war, Metal Firtina (Metal Storm), as well as another based on the events of Turkey's war of liberation, Çılgın Türkler (These Crazy Turks), went through hundreds of editions.

In the field of foreign relations, the incident in which a number of Turkish military personnel were detained by American soldiers in Suleymaniyah, Iraq, and had hoods placed over their heads on 4 July 2004 led to an atmosphere in which even the ultranationalist Idealists (Ülkücüler), who had traditionally followed an anti-Communist line and were therefore pro-American, turned anti-American. Early in 2006, when books on the subject of Sabetay were on the bestseller list, a film was released with the title of Kurtlar Vadisi—Irak (The Valley of Wolves—Iraq). In one scene, the film's hero remarks: "Aren't American soldiers the tools of American capitalism?" The situation was no different in the Islamist camp. On 18 May 2006 a gunman penetrated the building housing the Administrative High Court and started shooting at the judges, supposedly because of a grievance over the Islamic head scarf. The gunman's father told a journalist: "Don't become tools of imperialism. This country harbors enemies of Islam, the Quran, and the nation" (Hürriyet, 12 August 2006).

Another milestone was registered on 21 March 2005. At the Newroz celebration to mark the advent of spring, four youngsters, some of them children, trod on the Turkish flag in the city of Mersin. The General Staff described the culprits as "so-called citizens" (*Takvim*, 14 April 2005), while the Senate of the University of Ankara issued a statement containing the same expression. These

events marked the beginning of a new period. "Display the flag" campaigns were launched across the nation, and individuals were manhandled for distributing pamphlets asking for more democracy. In Trabzon the police had to intervene to stop a lynching. But the governor of Trabzon, Hüseyin Yavuzdemir, made statements in April 2005 and June 2006 in which he justified the actions of the lynch mob. On 30 August 2006 there was an attempt to lynch those who were demonstrating against the dispatch of Turkish peacekeeping forces to Lebanon. This time Istanbul's head of the Police Department, Celalettin Cerrah, displayed a similar mentality by declaring that "the reaction of our citizens is quite appropriate" (Sabah, 31 August 2006). The prosecutors failed to launch investigations against the would-be lynchers or merely charged them with offenses that called for minimum sentences.

This trend also affected public agencies. In March 2005 the Ministry of the Environment and Forests renamed certain species because it determined that "they had been deliberately misnamed in a way that might undermine the unitary character of the state" (BBC News, 8 March 2005). A type of red fox with the name Vulpes vulpes kurdistanica was renamed Vulpes vulpes, while Ovis armeniana, the Anatolian wild sheep, was renamed Ovis orientalis anatolicus, and roe deer known as Capreolus capreolus armenus became Capreolus cuprelus capreolus.

Such actions were undertaken by a coalition known as Kızıl Elma (Red Apple), consisting mainly of Kemalists, former Marxists, and an assortment of people adhering to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis view. The common thread in this coalition was hatred of all that appeared to be "different" ("the other"), hidden behind a façade of "anti-imperialism" in order to lend it a measure of respectability. The former dichotomy of Left and Right disappeared when these two tendencies merged. These groups marched under the banner of nationalism and began to exert influence all over Turkey. This phenomenon was mainly a reaction to two events.

1. It was a reaction to globalization, as was the case all over the world. This reaction manifested itself as opposition to EU reforms that started at the end of 2001. These reforms were seen as designed to make Turkey subservient to imperialism, to dismember the country, to undermine its Islamic character, or to turn it into an Islamist country. Those who held such views failed to note that some of these goals were clearly contradictory. The poll conducted by Euro-Barometer in July 2006 revealed that support for the EU in Turkey had dropped to 43% from a level of 60% in the fall of 2005.

2. Another element was the renewal of terror by the PKK, starting in early 2005. This reaction came at a time

when many EU reforms were telescoped into a short span of time. As explained earlier, the PKK had been caught between the capture of its leader Öcalan and the EU reforms. Kurds were angry to see EU reforms being blocked by the bureaucracy, however, and the PKK took advantage of this situation to renew its campaign of terror in order to be in the limelight once again. This was a typical example of nationalism begetting more nationalism.

3. Last but not least, this wave of anti-western, antinon Muslim and ultra-secularist Turkish nationalism was constantly provoked by the "Deep State", as the Ergenekon Trials would reveal starting from 2008. These trials began after concealed arms and ammunition were discovered in various parts of the country, as well as the bones of the victims of extrajudicial "operations" carried out by the Deep State. Even the gunman who raided the Administrative High Court on "religious grounds" was found to have links with the Ergenekon plotters. At the beginning of 2010, Ergenekon Trails were investigating no less than five military coup attempts that seem to have been averted between 2003 and 2008. The aim of these plots was to "save the country" by imposing the principles of Kemalism as applied in the 1930s, and also maintain the priveleges enjoyed by the military as the "guardians" of Kemalism.

### Foreign Policy during this Period

#### Overview

The global wave of fear unleashed by the 9/11 attacks and the implementation of the policy of occupation by the neo-cons, who took full advantage of the reigning fear, suddenly plunged the world into a situation that was akin to that prevailing in the 1870s.

In the 1870s the world had entered the period of imperialism, when countries achieved their economic and strategic objective through the use of force (see Box Intro-7 in the Introduction). The overrunning of countries was justified by claims that the objectives being pursued were noble, as expressed in the mantra "the white man's burden" or "mission civilisatrice." Although Britain was the hegemonic power in the 1870s and thereafter, it was balanced to a certain extent by countries like France and Germany, because the gap in military technology at the time was negligible. As explained earlier, in the age of imperialism during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had been so anachronistic and left so far behind that it was able to last for another century only by taking advantage of the balance among the major powers.

After 2003 the neo-cons took advantage of 9/11 to justify their actions. They had adapted the objectives pursued in the nineteenth century to fit the twenty-first century. The stated objective was "to spread democracy." There was a difference, however: unlike the situation prevailing in the nineteenth century, no other power could balance the U.S. because of the huge gap in military technology.

#### I. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

Turkish-U.S. relations in this period were mainly shaped by the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

#### A. The U.S. Attack on Afghanistan --

For the neo-con policy-makers, the events of 9/11 were a true blessing. The U.S. launched a massive attack on Afghanistan in order to locate and capture Bin Laden. The Taliban government was toppled and replaced by the

pliant Hamid Karzai regime. Afghanistan suffered needlessly, because Bin Laden was never captured.

Reactions in Turkey: in the course of the attack, Turkey announced that it would make its bases available to U.S. aircraft, provide logistic support, and even help train Afghan dissidents by sending special teams of experts. It would not have been possible for Turkey to deny the use of its bases and withhold logistical support when it was so dependent on the U.S. in the military, political, and economic fields. But certain individuals and institutions in Turkey provided active support for the U.S. attack. These can be divided into four separate groups. (1) Some believed that active support should be provided to the U.S. because it was bound to win and Turkey should thus enjoy the fruits of victory. (2) Others said that the Taliban, as the advocates of Sharia law, were a threat to the region and to Turkey and should be eliminated. (3) Some pointed out that, having been against terror, Ankara could not sit back and watch while an antiterror struggle was going on. (4) Finally, some were convinced that the war being waged by the U.S. was a just war because it was being fought in the name of high principles like democracy and

After the U.S. attack, Turkey provided military technical assistance to the Northern Alliance. It also provided a contingent of 290 men to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Turkey was the sole Muslim country to do so. After receiving reassurances from the U.S., it even assumed the command of this force, taking over from Britain on 20 June 2002. Furthermore, Turkey placed the base at İncirlik at the disposal of American aircraft during the operation. Turkey would also assume command of the force once more later on, send helicopters, and provide Afghanistan with economic assistance. The former minister of foreign affairs, Hikmet Çetin, would act as NATO's senior civilian representative in Kabul for thirty-two months.

In August 2003 authority over ISAF would be taken over by NATO with the approval of the UN. When the

force came under Taliban pressure in September 2006, it called for more Turkish troops in order to demonstrate that the struggle was not between Islam and the infidels.

### B. The Invasion of Iraq The Prelude

During the attack on Afghanistan, there was no opposition in Turkey to sending troops and providing other forms of backing. After all, the issue had to do with the global interests of the hegemonic power and Afghanistan was outside Turkey's area of immediate concern. But in the case of Iraq the situation was much more controversial, for obvious reasons.

Turkey's relations with Iraq had always been much more intense and multidimensional. Above all, Iraq had been under Ottoman sovereignty from 1638 until World War I. Turkey gave up Iraq de facto under article 3/2 of the Treaty of Lausanne and gave up all its claims de jure with the 1926 treaty, which did allow Turkey a share of 10% of the revenues derived from Iraq's oil for a period of twentyfive years. Until General Kassem's coup in 1958, Turkey had excellent relations with Iraq. Both countries were concerned over the Kurdish question and were members of the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955. Furthermore, nationalist circles in Turkey kept harping on the Turcoman element in the Mosul-Kirkuk region as well as the oil deposits in the area, thus keeping public interest in these issues alive. When Operation Provide Comfort 2 was launched, Turkey's interest in Iraq became focused on northern Iraq and the Kurdish issue (see Box 7-14 in Section 7).

#### The Invasion of Iraq and Its Aftermath

The U.S. strategy during the Second Gulf War was to invade Iraq through Kuwait in the south and Turkey in the north in order to converge on Baghdad from two directions and topple Saddam Hussein. The nature of the regime that would replace Saddam's dictatorship was uncertain. For an interim period, it was expected that a pro-American Iraqi general would take charge in Baghdad or an American general would be installed, based on the 1945 model of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's administration in postwar Japan. In any case the U.S. would hold sway over Iraq for "as long as necessary." Once having inserted itself into Iraq through Operation Poised Hammer, later renamed Provide Comfort, the U.S. presence would be extended over all of Iraq. In this grand plan, Turkey had been assigned a single role: to allow the U.S. to invade northern Iraq through Turkish territory.

This appeared to be the natural role for Ankara to play for a number of reasons.

1. Turkey was deeply in debt. Its domestic debt amounted to \$100 billion, while its foreign debt stood at \$140 billion; these debts could only be serviced through further borrowing. This would require the IMF's blessing, because Turkey did not meet the necessary criteria for borrowing in international markets. According to the Maastricht Criteria, the ratio of a country's public debt to its GDP was not to exceed 60%. In 2002 this ratio stood at 144% for Turkey. Ankara could only keep borrowing because the IMF was extending loans at the behest of the U.S., which saw Turkey as a close friend because of its geostrategic importance.

Turkey was also beholden to the U.S. because Washington had located Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya (perhaps through Echelon, its global eavesdropping system) in February 1999 and delivered him to Turkish agents at Nairobi airport. This event signaled the ultimate military defeat of the PKK. In addition, Turkey was eager to become a strategic partner of the U.S., ready to play the role of a key spearhead in the region.

2. Turkey was isolated, both in the region and in the international sphere. Its relations with the Arabs and with the EU had always been fraught with complications, and it continued to be burdened by the Armenian and Cypriot issues.

3. Above all, Turkey's fear of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq prevented it from opposing the U.S.

These factors were offset by other considerations, such as being a strategic medium-sized power and sharing a common border with Iraq.

On 16 June 2002 deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz and deputy secretary of state Marc Grossman, a former ambassador to Turkey, came to Ankara to engage in preliminary negotiations with a view to securing Turkey's backing. Turkey's reply was affirmative but also conditional: Iraq's territorial integrity must be preserved, the Kurds must not obtain exclusive control over Mosul and Kirkuk, any economic losses that Turkey might incur would have to be compensated, and Iraq should have a democratically chosen administration.

After several rounds of negotiations between the two countries' delegations, in December 2002 the U.S. decision was delivered to Turkey by Condoleezza Rice, who made it clear that the U.S. would enter Iraq whether or not Turkey sided with America. In January 2003 Washington requested formal permission to deploy its troops to İncirlik, Batman, and Diyarbakır and to make use of the facilities in these locations. Ankara was also given the warning that Turkey would have no part in Iraq's postwar restructuring if it failed to cooperate.

Turkey was confronted with a real dilemma. If it refused to cooperate, its relations with the hegemonic power would suffer, and it might even be subjected to sanctions. Furthermore, the AKP government had only assumed power recently and was being accused of harboring Islamist tendencies. In these circumstances, it might need to seek the legitimacy that it needed at home from abroad, which meant from the U.S. If it did cooperate, however, it would be complicit in the invasion of a fellow Muslim country that had nothing to do with international terrorism. Moreover, it would find itself stuck in the Middle Eastern quagmire and also in confrontation with the Kurds of northern Iraq. This would further complicate Ankara's relations with its own Kurdish element. The new AKP prime minister, Abdullah Gül, invited the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to Istanbul for consultations, after which they issued a joint statement.

#### The First Motion in Parliament

In the meanwhile U.S. officials were inspecting the facilities in Turkey. Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a number of trips to Turkey. Ankara prepared the first motion under this pressure and secured its passage through parliament on 6 February 2003 (with 308 votes for and 193 against). This motion would allow Turkish ports and air bases to be modernized and reequipped in order to prepare them to receive U.S. soldiers and their equipment.

Meanwhile the press reported that negotiations were going on in connection with the economic aid package that would be furnished to Turkey to compensate it for any losses arising from an invasion. Apparently, Turkey would be given a grant in the amount of \$2 billion, its debts to the U.S. arising from the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in the amount of \$4 billion would be written off, and a grant in the amount of \$6 billion would be provided for purchasing equipment under FMS. The aid package would contain loans in the amount of \$20 billion. Turkey also sought written guarantees in connection with the Kurds.

After dragging on for some time, the negotiations ended with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 27 February 2003. These negotiations had two consequences, with different effects.

1. The protracted negotiations caused the U.S. to lose much precious time. The opposition of France, Germany, and Russia to America's invasion plans gained momentum during this period, while millions of antiwar protesters throughout the world demonstrated in anti-American

rallies. It took Turkey fifteen days to conclude the negotiations on secondary issues such as how this new American presence would be covered by the Status of Forces Agreement, meaning the laws and regulations that would apply to the 1,600 American technical personnel who would come to Turkey to modernize air bases and ports. Another such item was whether the imported equipment would be subject to value-added tax or not. Meanwhile Prime Minister Gül was visiting both Middle Eastern and EU capitals in search of a consensus to prevent war and to persuade Saddam to renew cooperation with UN weapons inspections. Simultaneously, a number of other leaders visited Ankara for consultations.

2, Turkey was a loser in this process. The long negotiations on economic aid allowed Turkey to gain time and gave the peace movement a chance to gather momentum. But it gave the world the impression that Turkey was a greedy bargainer. The picture that emerged was that Turkey was seeking maximum profit by allowing its territory to be used for aggression against a neighbor. A cartoon appeared in the U.S. showing Uncle Sam stuffing money into the belt and bra of a belly dancer who represented Turkey.

From 8 February to the end of the month the press contained reports that the U.S. side was threatening Turkey with dire consequences if negotiations were not concluded expeditiously, while the Turkish position was that no troop movements through Turkey would be allowed without a deal on the economic package. According to American sources, the U.S. had issued sixteen "last warnings" to Turkey to reach a final decision. The Turkish government was being pressed on two sides: both by the U.S. and by those in Turkey who believed that the country's interests were best served by siding with the powerful. Among the prowar voices were those of some pundits and TÜSİAD, representing the big business community. In addition, some voices in the media began to clamor for the oil resources of Iraq located in Mosul. They claimed that Turkey had historical rights to this oil and that this was the proper time to renew these claims. One columnist argued that Turkey should be demanding oil rather than cash. This led Prime Minister Gül to exclaim that they were tired of this unending pressure.

There was also a peace faction that included president Ahmet Necdet Sezer. This group claimed that war should be opposed on both moral and legal grounds. It held the view that "international legitimacy" was a prerequisite, under article 92 of the Constitution, for allowing the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey or for deploying Turkish forces beyond its borders. To resort to force would be

possible under two circumstances: legitimate self-defense or a mandate from the UN Security Council, and both were absent in this case.

Those who would follow the U.S. lead advanced some of the following arguments. If Turkey refused to cooperate with the U.S., the stock market would collapse; Turkey could derive great benefits from additional exports and contracts; the invasion would bring democracy to Iraq; Saddam would be disciplined for possessing weapons of mass destruction and using them against his own people; Saddam fed terrorism, which was a threat to everyone; this was an opportunity to prove that Turkey and the U.S. were true strategic partners; with an invasion, Turkey would be in a position to prevent a Kurdish state from emerging in Iraq; the U.S. would strike even if Turkey withheld permission; Turkey would be allowing the transit of troops but would not be directly engaged in the war; and Turkey would be directly involved in the final reshaping of the Middle East.

#### The Second Motion

Eventually the time came to take up the parliamentary motion that would allow the transit of U.S. troops and military equipment. The opposition CHP was against the motion. In addition, there was quite a bit of opposition among the ranks of the AKP. One of those opposed was the Speaker, who made passionate speeches against the motion. The minister of state, Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, declared that he was against the motion and added that he had signed the motion in the cabinet in order to avoid breaking ranks with the government and that he would vote no when the motion came up on the floor of the assembly. The National Security Council, where the military leaders were influential, released a communiqué on 31 January 2003 and called for observing "international legitimacy" as required by article 92 of the Constitution. This made the government's task more difficult and placed the burden of responsibility squarely on its shoulders.

A government motion was eventually prepared that would allow 62,000 foreign troops to come to Turkey while authorizing the Turkish government to deploy forces to northern Iraq. This motion was put to a vote on 1 March. The vote was by secret ballot, and the AKP decided not to require its deputies to observe party discipline in this case. This allowed 97 AKP deputies to deviate from the party line, leading to a result of 264 for and 250 against, with 19 abstentions. The 264 votes represented less than half of the 534 votes cast, so the motion failed to be adopted.

To understand the causes that led to this result, the

following factors have to be borne in mind. The Turkish military remained aloof on the issue, the AKP's parliamentary group did not take a position, the voting was by secret ballot, the deputies were uneasy about getting Turkey directly involved in a hazardous adventure, some deputies were not comfortable with the idea of taking part in an attack on a fellow Muslim country, and some deputies with Kurdish roots did not approve of invading northern Iraq.

This was a fateful decision that angered the U.S. and had profound repercussions on Turkish internal politics. Above all, it reinforced Turkey's self-confidence. According to some polls, from 85 to 94% of the population was opposed to the venture, and the result of the vote was to align the people with their representatives.

The international media and public opinion as well as certain countries that had been taunting Turkey for providing "mercenaries" were now expressing admiration, even if only grudgingly. The newspaper Al-Quds wrote on 4 March 2003, "Turkey has refused to be bribed" (Radikal, 6 March 2003). A U.S. newspaper published a cartoon depicting Turkey as a belly dancer, knocking Uncle Sam into the air with a bump of her hip. In another cartoon, Bush was exclaiming "We want to see democracy in Iraq...but not in Turkey."

Others, however, wanted to see the motion resubmitted to the parliament, based on the following logic.

- 1. Even if Turkey denied permission to open a northern front, the U.S. would strike at Iraq anyway. This logic led to the following counterargument. Western sources had estimated that a short campaign would lead to 11% American and British casualties, while a long campaign could raise this figure to 38%. A short campaign would result in the price of oil falling to \$20 a barrel, while a long campaign might raise the price to \$100. A long campaign would also raise the cost of the operation to astronomic levels. A cautious America would never contemplate an attack without a northern front.
- 2. Turkey had disappointed the Americans and could expect Washington to make life difficult for Turkey in the economic sphere. Those who objected to this argument stressed that the IMF had two "showcase" countries: Turkey and Argentina, which happened to be bankrupt. If Turkey was allowed to go Argentina's way, this would create acute difficulties for the IMF. Turkey was a highly indebted country; hence, if it became insolvent, international creditors would also suffer. Although the U.S. was very important for Turkey, Turkey was no less important for the U.S. in the pursuit of its imperialist policies. Furthermore, despite the rejection of the motion, Washing-

ton did not appear to be too upset and was proceeding to rent storage facilities, office space, and hotels, particularly in the provinces of Şırnak and Mardin.

3. The U.S. would exclude Turkey from the conference table where the Middle East would be reshaped. Those who objected to this argument recalled how George H. W. Bush had kept Turkey out of this process after the First Gulf War even though Turgut Özal had volunteered all kinds of assistance and support. Besides, Turkey was compensated only partly at that time for its economic losses, which had been considerable. Furthermore, history was full of cases when the hegemonic power left its closest allies out of the circuit or in the cold when it had no further use for them.

4. In these circumstance, the U.S. would not oppose a Kurdish state.

Two days after the voting in parliament, an incident occurred that had important consequences. On 3 March 2003 a group of Kurds in Iraq defied Barzani's peshmerga fighters and spat on and burned a Turkish flag. In a strong reaction to this incident, the chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, declared that "we should be supporting those who are engaged in war" (Milliyet, 6 March 2003). On 6 March the U.S. Embassy began to rent land in the southeast, in addition to the office space and depots it had already rented. The embassy took steps to hire an "army" of 600 well-paid guides. Up to that time American supply columns had been confined to the port of Iskenderun. Now they were on the move toward Iraq.

The General Staff released a communiqué on 6 March stating that these movements were in conformity with the memorandum of understanding of 27 February. The undisclosed contents of the memorandum were thus revealed for the first time. This revelation led to furious arguments in Turkey over whether all of this had anything to do with the TGNA's first decision regarding the modernization of ports and air bases.

The U.S. sent Bush's special representative Zalmay Khalilzad to Ankara in March 2003 with the following message: "If you invade northern Iraq, you will incur the risk of your troops finding themselves clashing with Kurdish and U.S. forces" (Radikal, 19 March 2003). When a Turkish Special Force of 1,000 men entered Iraq a few days later to establish a safety zone along the border, the U.S. announced that it would not share its friend-or-foe codes with Turkey. Some members of this force wearing civilian clothing were apprehended and sent back to Turkey on 30 April. They were allegedly supplying arms to the local Turcoman minority.

The third motion: on 20 March 2003 the TGNA ap-

proved a third motion by a vote of 332 to 202. It is estimated that about 40 AKP deputies were among the dissenters. The motion authorized the deployment of Turkish troops to northern Iraq and allowed the use of Turkish air space by foreign air forces for a period of six months.

At dawn on the same day, Anglo-American forces began bombing Iraq and launched an invasion from bases located in Kuwait. The unexpected resistance of the Shia in the south delayed the capture of Baghdad until 10 April. After operating uninterruptedly since 1992, the U.S. brought Operation Provide Comfort to an end on 2 May, considering its mission accomplished.

With the launching of the invasion, the Kurds of northern Iraq warned Turkey not to enter Iraq, since the peshmerga fighters had been given orders to shoot if necessary. The peshmergas subsequently entered Kirkuk and set fire to the building housing the registry of land. This was a fateful step, because Turkey had drawn "red lines" with respect to Mosul and Kirkuk. Prime Minister Gül traveled to Damascus and held consultations with Syria and Iran. In response, the co-chairman of the U.S.-Turkish Friendship Group in the U.S. Congress, Robert Wexler, asked if Turkey was changing course. The U.S. ambassador in Ankara had addressed a similar question to Prime Minister Demirel in 1967 when Turkey started receiving economic credits from the USSR. Wolfowitz had even harsher words about Turkey's rejection of the motion of 1 March: "[T]he army should have reminded everyone that it was in Turkey's interest to support the U.S. Yes, we want Turkey to say: 'Yes, we made a mistake'" (Mehmet Ali Birand, Hürriyet, 7 May 2003). He added that Washington wanted a Turkey that could acknowledge its mistakes.

After this, the AKP gave the impression that it regretted the 1 March decision of the TGNA rejecting the second motion and sought to make amends. In June 2003 the government adopted a confidential decree. The validity of this decree was restricted to one year at President Sezer's request. The decree authorized the use of Turkish bases and ports to furnish Iraq with supplies for its reconstruction and also allowed the transit of foreign troops. After the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. was unable to deal with the insurgency that followed and appealed for a Turkish force of at least brigade strength to be stationed in Baghdad. Turkey had no desire to get involved in regions where pro-Saddam elements were at their strongest. Ankara also wanted a NATO umbrella to cover an operation whose mission would be confined to the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

At this stage, a small number of Turkish Special Forces personnel were detained for fifty-seven hours by

U.S. soldiers at Suleymaniyah. In this incident, which occurred on 4 July 2003, the Turkish team was alleged to be plotting to kill the governor of Kirkuk. Turkish officials found it difficult to reach their counterparts in Washington because of the holiday. A similar incident had occurred on 30 April; but this time the Turkish personnel had their heads covered with hoods by the Americans. This created outrage in Turkey. It is likely that the Turkish Special Forces personnel were supplying weapons to the defenseless Turcomans, as in the previous incident. In carrying out its action, the U.S. must have calculated that it was in its interest not to alienate the Kurds, the only group that was prepared to collaborate with America.

The question of sending troops to Iraq became a subject of heated debates in Turkey. Some of the arguments centered around whether it was necessary to wait for a UN resolution or not. Employers' associations like TÜSİAD and TOBB were in favor of sending the troops. Reports appeared in the press on 22 August that Abdullah Gül had made this statement: "Our country's strategic interests cannot be confined to Anatolia. Turkey will claim its rightful share of the oil, but within the bounds of legality" (Derya Sazak, Milliyet, 22 August 2003). On 1 September the press reported that Özkök, the chief of the General Staff, known for his caution and restraint, had made a statement that you cannot win a prize in the lottery unless you buy a lottery ticket. He added that a norisk policy was extremely dangerous. Most media pundits agreed with the general's assessment.

From the end of July 2003 to the middle of September, threatening messages began to come from the Kurdish leadership and even some of the other communities of Iraq. Talabani warned Turkey that its forces were not welcome in Iraq, even if they remained under U.S. control. Saddam's followers threatened violence, and the elders of the Sunni community declared that Turkish soldiers would become targets. The leaders in Fallujah, a Saddam stronghold, warned the Turkish forces not to come or they would meet the same fate as the Americans. The Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr declared that they would treat Turkish forces as occupiers. The foreign minister of Iraq, Hoshyar Zebari, who was a Kurd, affirmed that Turkish forces could not go through northern Iraq. Various Islamic clerics threatened to decapitate Turkish soldiers, claiming that it would be religiously legitimate to kill those in the service of the U.S. On 6 August and 7 October Turkish trucks were set on fire; on 16 August shots were fired on Turkey's Embassy in Baghdad; on 20 August the UN building was bombed and totally destroyed; and on 24 September Pakistan announced that it would not be sending troops even if a UN resolution sanctioned such a move.

Previously, on 29 July, Gül had declared that a UN resolution was not necessary to send troops and that the TGNA was empowered to make such a decision. He added that the government did not expect to run into any difficulties with a new parliamentary motion. Now Gül began to say that they would require an invitation from Iraq's Provisional Governing Council. On 24 September he ended up by stating that a UN resolution was needed.

The Americans also began to change their tune that month. Secretary of state Colin Powell announced that there was sensitivity against Turks, while the Washington Post wrote that it would be dangerous to play the Turkish card (http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/eylul/17/doi.html). Bush's approval rating fell to 51% as it became clear that no weapons of mass destruction would be found in Iraq. Kofi Annan declared in a speech that the Bush Doctrine was a challenge to peace.

The fourth motion: the TGNA held a closed session on 7 October and approved a new motion by 358 votes to 183. The motion authorized the government to send troops to Iraq, but the authorization was valid for only one year. The authorization was for sending 16,000 men to Iraq, where they would head south after crossing northern Iraq. It looked like the government wanted to appear to be complying with U.S. wishes.

Throughout October the Los Angeles Times kept writing about the disruptive effects of a possible Turkish presence in Iraq, while Mullah Krekar, the former leader of the Ansar-al-Islam, openly stated that Turkish troops would be regarded as targets. After this came the bombing of the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad. Some columnists in Turkey were warning that, if Turkish soldiers stayed home, Turkey would incur the risk of dismemberment. At a time when even Donald Rumsfeld was declaring that Turkish troops might not be coming to Iraq after all, Tayyip Erdoğan was still declaring that Ankara wanted to dispatch troops. But eventually the government announced that it would not make use of the parliamentary authorization.

During the process Turkey was trying hard to set up a security belt on the Iraqi border but failed in the face of the opposition that it encountered.

An assessment of Turkey's policies: on the issue of the invasion of Iraq the AKP policy-makers went through a number of zigzags. This was due to the desire to avoid angering the U.S. while seeking to avoid being drawn into the Iraqi quagmire. There was also the chronic anxiety regarding the Kurdish question. Domestic as well as foreign factors interacting under rather special circumstances caused these many ups and downs or recurring zigzags. Nevertheless, it was indicative of a weakness in foreign policy.

In the end, however, this ambivalence in the policy of a strategic medium-sized power like Turkey turned out to be fortunate for Ankara. It spared Turkey from getting trapped in Iraq, and its relations with its neighbor remained unharmed. Relations with the U.S. were also spared from serious damage because (as we will examine later) the Middle-East policies of the neo-cons depended on Turkish cooperation to a large extent.

#### C. Other Issues

#### Syria, Iran, and the Kurds

At this time, Washington sought to have Turkey firmly on its side on the issues of Syria and Iran. Had Turkey complied, it would have been utterly dependent on the hegemonic power at a time when it was just beginning to mend its relations with Syria. Throughout its history Turkey had been able to avoid strife with Iran. There was also the Kurdish issue. Juggling with these realities, Turkey sought to pacify the U.S. without alienating these neighbors.

In November 2005 a series of high-level visits of U.S. officials to Ankara took place, including the directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These visits were seen as part of the effort to obtain Turkey's support in the event of an operation against Iran, although Washington claimed that the U.S. had addressed no formal request to Turkey regarding such an eventuality.

To deal with Turkish foot-dragging on these issues, the U.S. used the Kurdish card. It branded the PKK in all its guises as a terrorist organization but did not allow it to be finished off. The U.S. refused to contemplate an operation against Kandil Dağı, the mountainous region in Iraq where the PKK had implanted itself. There was talk to the effect that the U.S. had allowed Osman Öcalan, the brother of the terrorist leader, to found a new political party. Washington never fully severed its links with the PKK. The U.S. was instrumental in the setting up of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq that was steadily moving toward autonomy. This allowed Washington to wield permanent pressure on Turkey.

The Black Sea and the Greater Middle East Project
The Black Sea was one of the two important elements that
the U.S. needed to spread its hegemony over Eurasia. As
the construction of oil and gas pipelines went ahead, the
area started to attract more U.S. attention. Washington began to call for changes in the Montreux Straits Convention

that would remove limitations on the U.S. military presence in the region, while curbing Russia's role. The Turkish press claimed in May 2004 that the U.S. had proposed the expansion of the İncirlik air base and requested port facilities in Trabzon and Samsun on Turkey's Black Sea coast. These requests did not go down well in Ankara (see "Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia" below).

At a meeting held at Sea Island in June 2003, the Greater Middle East Project was launched (its formal name was changed to Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative in 2004). Tayyip Erdoğan was among the few regional leaders attending this meeting. At first Turkey was included among the twenty-two target countries that made up the region. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised objections to this and took formal steps to have the definition of target country changed. The reason for this was probably the desire to present Turkey as a European and not a Middle Eastern country. Turkey also wanted to play an active rather than a passive role in the project of the hegemonic power that was quickly gaining momentum. In the new version, Turkey acquired the status of democratic partner in the initiative, along with Yemen and Italy. Turkey was a country that was democratic, Western oriented, advancing on the road to EU membership, and secular. It had succeeded in transforming Islam. For these reasons, Turkey was initially presented as a "model" for the region. When this did not receive enthusiastic support among those concerned, Turkey was relabeled a source of inspiration.

At this time, Turkey started making appeals to its regional neighbors, calling for more democracy, more cooperation with the West, and more energy in eliminating shortcomings before blaming the West for everything that went wrong. This was most probably done to preempt any new U.S. military intervention that would further destabilize the region.

Turkey was focusing on those objectives of the U.S. project that aimed to transform Eurasia through democratic civil initiatives and NGOs. Erdoğan declared that Diyarbakır would be turned into the heart of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

#### **Economic Relations and Defense Industries**

In the economic crises of 2001 the IMF left Argentina to its own devices, while Turkey received full support thanks to its strategic importance. This support reflected the U.S. interest in Turkey. During Ecevit's visit to the U.S. in January 2002, decisions were made to develop bilateral trade and economic relations. In line with these decisions, an Economic Partnership Committee was created, which

resulted in the establishment of Specialized Industrial Zones.

On 8 May 2003 Erdoğan signed a \$1.5 billion contract for the purchase of AWACS aircraft. An agreement was reached with a Turkish company to supply components for the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. U.S. firms declined to participate in the bidding to supply attack helicopters, however, a process that had been dragging on for a number of years. Turkey wanted to be the supplier of the helicopters' software, which the U.S. firms would not accept.

Toward the end of the AKP's first term in power in 2006, serious differences emerged in Turkish-U.S. relations. The U.S. became highly critical of some Turkish actions like the TGNA's rejection of the 1 March motion, the reception given to the leader of Hamas following the Palestinian election, the drift of Turkey's relations with the EU, the rising anti-Americanism sweeping the country, the description of the Fallujah operation as genocide by some AKP members, the failure of the prime minister to grant an appointment to the American ambassador over an extended period, and Turkey's desire to develop its relations with Syria and Iran. The tone of the criticism directed at the government was rising both among circles close to the U.S. in Turkey and among various think tanks in America.

#### Relations with NATO

There were two important milestones in Turkey's relations with NATO: the Prague Summit of 2002 and particularly the summit of June 2004 that took place in İstanbul, with the participation of George W. Bush. As expected, the Prague Summit was focused on 9/11; in addition, however, it included a decision to admit new members to NATO as well as a decision to set up a rapid intervention force to deal with chemical and biological threats. At the İstanbul Summit, decisions were made to expand ISAF's operations in Afghanistan, to transfer the responsibility for SFOR in Bosnia to the EU, to reinforce NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, and to strengthen ties with countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia within the framework of Partnership for Peace. The launching of a new process in the Middle East was of particular interest to Turkey. It was called the İstanbul Cooperation Initiative and would come under the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
Turkey recalled the decision adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit, calling for the strengthening of the con-

sultation mechanism between the EU and NATO members that were not part of the EU. Turkey complained that this decision was not being implemented, leaving the consultation mechanism weak.

It would not make much sense for Turkey, a nonmember of the EU, to seek membership in the Committee on Policy and Security whenever it took up the subjects of security and defense. The most strident opposition to such a formula came from France, which saw Turkey as a U.S. surrogate.

One of the causes for Turkish concern was that the Rapid Reaction Force to be established by the EU within the framework of the ESDP might be used in the event of disputes over the Aegean or Cyprus. To relieve Turkey's misgivings, the Ankara Document was signed in December 2001, following protracted negotiations. Under this arrangement, Turkey would automatically be a participant in operations in which the EU would use NATO facilities. When NATO facilities were not used, however, Turkey's participation would depend on an invitation from the EU Council.

Although Turkey signed the Ankara Document, this arrangement was not considered fully satisfactory by either the Greek or the Turkish military. That is why Turkey used its veto in the North Atlantic Council to block the arrangement made between the two organizations that would allow the EU to take advantage of NATO capabilities and planning. This prevented NATO from turning over its mission in Macedonia to the EU.

The negotiations were eventually concluded in December 2002 when a new government came to power in Turkey. The agreement between NATO and the EU was signed in March 2003. Under the arrangement known as "Berlin plus," the EU obtained the right to use NATO's planning and capabilities. The agreement provided that, in the event of a crisis, the question would first be taken up in NATO; if NATO did not want to get involved, the EU would assume responsibility. In this way, the U.S. was able to ensure that the ESDP remained dependent on NATO.

### D. The Growth of Anti-American Sentiment in Turkey

While all this was going on, anti-U.S. feelings in Turkey were on the rise. According to polls, 83% of the public perceived the U.S. as a threat. There were a number of reasons for this. As a consequence of neo-con policies, anti-U.S. sentiments, even hostility, were on the rise throughout the globe. As a result of the "hood incident" that took place in Suleymaniyah on 4 July 2003 and the resumption of PKK terror in mid-2004, the impression gained ground

in Turkey that the U.S. supported the PKK and that Washington was working toward establishing a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

In addition, people with various ideologies also harbored similar anti-American feelings. The Islamists were resentful over the U.S. actions in Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo and over Israel's actions in Ramallah. The nationalists suspected that the U.S. was seeking to impose "moderate Islam" on Turkey. The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative was also bothering broad segments of the population.

The Bush administration, however, placed the responsibility for anti-American sentiments in Turkey on the AKP.

### II. RELATIONS WITH THE EU

The EU's Progress Reports on Turkey and the related developments in EU summits can be summarized as follows.

# A. The Progress Report for 2002 and the Copenhagen Summit

The report praised Turkey for its reforms but also pointed to the serious shortcomings in compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, adding that accession talks could not begin before these shortcomings were addressed. Among the topics highlighted in this context were relations between civilians and the military, the condition of non-Muslim minorities, freedom of expression, the way the judiciary system worked, the violations of human rights, and corruption.

Elections took place in Turkey in the interval between the publishing of the report and the holding of the summit, with the AKP emerging as the winner. In the days preceding the summit Turkey expected that a date would be fixed for the commencement of accession talks, while the EU wanted to see Turkey retract its objections on the subject of the ESDP and give unconditional support to the Annan Plan, to pave the way for the membership of Cyprus.

As noted earlier, the first of these expectations was met with the Ankara Document of December 2001. Gül also promised to give unconditional support for the Annan Plan. The summit's final communiqué was then drafted, with the undertaking that accession talks would start conditionally in 2005 without further delay. The Turkish government greeted this as a victory. The elections in northern Cyprus brought Mehmet Ali Talat to power. Talat was a politician who favored a resolution of the Cyprus question.

In April 2003 the EU Commission issued the second Accession Partnership Document (APD) relating to Turkey. The chapter on Expanded Political Dialogue and Political Criteria included "border disputes" (meaning the Aegean disputes) and "Cyprus." In addition, steps to be taken by Turkey on freedom of expression, relations between civilians and the military, human rights, the situation in the southeast, and other such topics were listed.

Turkey's response to the second APD came in July 2003 with its National Program. Turkey again referred to the subjects of the Aegean and Cyprus in the introduction and not under the heading "Political Criteria." But the document's tone was highly conciliatory. At the same time, Turkey was adopting new harmonization packages.

# B. The 2003 Progress Report and Summits

Despite all these efforts, the July 2003 summit at Thessaloniki and the Brussels Summit of December 2003 failed to adopt the decision to commence accession talks with Turkey. The Progress Report issued in October 2003 praised Turkey's reforms over the past year but noted that the political criteria had still not been met and recommended that no action be taken before the end of 2004.

# C. The Annan Referendum of 2004, the Expansion of the EU, the Progress Report, and the Summit of 17 December 2004

The referendum held in Cyprus in April 2004 on the Annan Plan received a yes vote in Northern Cyprus but was rejected in the South. Nonetheless, with the coming into force of the Accession Treaty on 1 May 2004, Southern Cyprus became a member of the EU along with the nine other candidates. It did so as the Republic of Cyprus and purporting to represent the whole island.

This situation created a problem for Turkey because of the Ankara Agreement and the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. Both arrangements required Turkey to bring all countries joining the EU within the scope of the agreement.

As we shall see, Turkey would extend the scope of the agreements to cover the new members by means of a ministerial decree in which the word "Cyprus" was employed instead of "Republic of Cyprus." This was to create problems with respect to the Additional Protocol. Turkey would also be faced with the question of opening its ports and airports to South Cyprus. Worse still, the issue would also mar Turkish-EU relations after mid-2005 and create serious difficulties for Turkey.

On 6 October 2004 the EU Commission issued three separate documents: the usual Progress Report, the recommendations to the council, and, for the first time, an Impact Study.

In the Progress Report, Turkey obtained what it had been seeking. The commission recommended to the council to commence accession talks during 2005 on certain conditions. But the report's language also contained drastic changes in the usual rules for accession talks and gave a strong impression that these procedures had been devised exclusively for Turkey. In addition, it stated that certain fields such as agriculture, free movement of people, and structural policies might be subject to protective measures on a permanent basis. Starting the talks appeared to be good enough for Turkey, however, and it kept quiet about these unusual conditions. In a sense Ankara voluntarily relinquished the possibility of negotiating for improved conditions before December 2004.

The Impact Study, which was an appraisal of the likely positive and negative effects on the EU of Turkey's eventual membership, had an interesting feature. It underlined that the international management of water resources and infrastructures would be an important issue of the EU. Some nationalist circles in Turkey interpreted this to mean that Turkey should allow transboundary rivers to be opened up to international exploitation in order to make a contribution to the Middle East Peace Process.

The resolution concerning Turkey that was adopted in the European Parliament on 15 December 2004 was another cause for satisfaction in Ankara. Although the resolution recommended the commencement of accession talks, it also referred in three different places to the absolute necessity for Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide and demanded action from Turkey on issues that had nothing to do with EU criteria.

Finally, at the Brussels Summit of 16–17 December, it was decided that negotiation with Turkey would get underway on 3 October 2005.

#### The Cyprus Issue

The Cyprus issue was intensely debated in the Final Communiqué of the summit and caused much tension in Turkish-EU relations. The final communiqué contained the following paragraph on the subject: "The European Council welcomes Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States. In this light, it welcomes the declaration of Turkey that 'the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement

prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations that are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union."

The situation with respect to the EU and Cyprus can be summarized as follows. When the EU expanded with the accession of ten new members, including Cyprus, on 1 May 2004, it became incumbent on Turkey to extend the scope of the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement to cover the new members. This would be done through a protocol with the new members.

On 12 May 2004 the Turkish cabinet announced its decision to extend the scope of the agreement to the nine new members without including Cyprus in the list.

The EU informed Turkey that this was unacceptable and warned that it might prevent a decision in the approaching summit of 17 December 2004 to start accession talks. In response, Turkey issued a new decree on 2 October 2004, where the island was included but was called simply "Cyprus."

The EU then insisted that the extension be carried out by means of a protocol. In the past Turkey had signed protocols only after the 1973 expansion. The extensions after the expansions of 1981 and 1986 had been carried out through decrees. The EU insisted on a protocol because it suspected that Turkey would not employ the term "Republic of Cyprus." This was precisely why the AKP government was seeking to avoid a protocol, which was liable to be interpreted as recognizing the South (the Republic of Cyprus) and forsaking the North (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). This would lead to serious difficulties in getting parliamentary approval for such a document.

As noted earlier, at the Brussels Summit of 16–17 December 2004 Turkey committed itself to sign the appended protocol. The paragraph was signed by minister of state Beşir Atalay.

The protocol would eventually be signed by Turkey on 29 July 2005, with the list of beneficiaries that included the "Republic of Cyprus." At the same time, Turkey released a communiqué, stating that the protocol did not imply Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

In response to this, on 21 September 2005, the EU released a communiqué, stating clearly that it would not allow any discrimination against the Republic of Cyprus.

As a matter of fact, it is anomalous for a candidate country to deny recognition to a country that is already a member of the EU. Furthermore, the use of Turkish ports by Greek-Cypriot shipping would create no special economic problems. Once Ankara had taken a position, however, there was no turning back. Had the government originally used the term "Republic of Cyprus," it would not have found itself obliged to conclude an international protocol and would have managed to get by with just a decree. Now that the issue has become an international problem, with the EU insisting on a protocol, it will be necessary to involve the TGNA. This is because the 1963 Ankara Agreement will be amended with a protocol, and under article 90 of the Constitution an international document can only come into effect with the approval of the TGNA. Turkey's position will be seriously weakened if the protocol is approved without the accompanying communiqué, while approving the two documents simultaneously would meet with serious opposition from the EU. When Oli Rehn, the commissioner responsible for enlargement, visited Ankara in October 2005, he made this quite clear when he declared that actual negotiations can only commence when Turkey formally approves the protocol and that nothing should be appended to the approved document that would imply that the Republic of Cyprus would not be recognized.

### The Consequences of the Brussels Summit

This summit would have important consequences. In line with the decision of 2002 to start talks with Turkey "without delay," the summit confirmed that negotiations would commence on 3 October 2005, even though the phrase "without delay" was interpreted fairly loosely. The negotiating process would start with the screening of Turkish legislation and practices before moving on to the actual negotiations. This was the summit's most important decision. At Turkey's insistence, the final document also contained phraseology confirming that the negotiations would aim for full membership.

Turkey would be facing a tough agenda, because it had already been decided that the negotiations would be open ended, that there would be derogations that might be applied on a permanent basis, that the negotiations might not necessarily lead to full membership, and that a large country like Turkey would not be able to accede before 2014. Furthermore, the drafting of the passages dealing with Cyprus and the Aegean allowed the negotiations to be confronted with new obstacles in the future. All of this proved that Turkey was being treated differently from the other candidates. In these circumstances, the commencement of negotiations had been made conditional on Ankara's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, it seemed that the accession of Turkey would depend on the circumstances that would prevail at least ten years later.

# D. The Negotiating Framework Document

Following the summit, the EU started to prepare Turkey's Negotiating Framework Document, containing the following elements:

- For reasons related to the EU's budget, the talks would not be completed before 2014, regardless of Turkey's pace in carrying out its commitments.
- There would be four basic commitments that Turkey must carry out to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion: full compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria; resolution of outstanding border disputes by peaceful means; a settlement of the Cyprus question; and extension of the Association Agreement to all new EU members. The last two conditions related to the opening of Turkish ports and airports to Republic of Cyprus—registered vessels and aircraft, in the context of the free movement of goods, and, eventually, recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey.
- In addition, the EU's capacity for absorption (which was considered implicit in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria) would be taken into account.

After overcoming a host of hurdles, formal negotiations with Turkey began on 3 October 2005. Actually, what had begun was the screening and familiarization process. The actual negotiations started in June 2006, when the chapter on Science and Research was taken up and provisionally completed. After the beginning of the negotiations, the EU issued the Progress Report for 2005 in November, followed by the third Accession Partnership Document. The screening and familiarization process continued throughout 2005.

# III. RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND CYPRUS A. Turkish-Greek Relations

After the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkish-Greek relations followed a smooth course. Greek foreign minister Georgios Papandreou visited Ankara on 20 January 2000. In addition to the signing of four technical agreements, it was decided to set up working groups consisting of soldiers and diplomats to take up matters related to military cooperation.

This visit was followed by the visit of Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem to Athens on 4 February 2000, the first such visit in forty years. Five further technical agreements were signed in Athens.

Although the agreements that had been signed during this thaw were of a technical nature, practically all of them were of the confidence-building category designed to bring the two countries closer. The undersecretaries of the two foreign ministries held closed meetings called "exploratory contacts," where they focused on Aegean problems.

Improvements in bilateral relations appeared in a number of ways. For example, the Greek prime minister attended the wedding of his Turkish counterpart's daughter in July 2004. Greece no longer figured among the top threats to Turkish security in Turkey's National Security Document. Greece began to provide open support for Turkey's EU membership.

# в. The Cyprus Issue

# Developments Following the Helsinki Summit

The most striking effects of the Helsinki Summit were seen in Northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots discovered that they could break free from their perennial dilemma of having to choose between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. They began to react against Denktaş's efforts to ignore the new conditions. In the presidential election of 15 April 2000, Denktaş managed to get elected only in the second round and through Turkey's direct intervention. Subsequently, the Turkish Cypriots began to demand that the police force (2,000 strong) be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, as in all the other democratic countries. At the time, the force was attached to the Security Forces Command under the Prime Ministry. But in reality the Security Forces were commanded by a military officer from Turkey and therefore under the control of the Turkish Peace Force stationed on the island. The commander of the Security Forces described these efforts as "treason" and threatened those involved with punishment. The staff members of the newspaper that was reporting these issues in a critical tone were also accused of treason and were placed under detention. This action precipitated anti-Denktaş demonstrations at the very time when proximity talks under the aegis of the UN were in progress.

# A New Denktaş Initiative: Direct Intercommunal Talks

In 2001 the U.S. was changing its strategy. The epicenter of crisis had shifted to the Middle East, and one of the natural allies of the U.S. in this region was Turkey. To serve a useful purpose as a key regional country, Turkey had to be strengthened through accession to the EU and had to overcome its most pressing difficulties. Ankara's line in Cyprus grew tougher in the course of 2001, however, under the impulse of antireformist elements.

At this juncture, on 14 April, the European Commis-

sion adopted a decision that weakened the positions of Turkey and the TRNC. Through this decision, the commission exempted Malta and Cyprus from the five-year restriction on the sending of workers to Europe, secure in the knowledge that no such movement was expected from these countries anyway. But this had an influence on the Turkish Cypriots, who were suffering from the effects of the economic crisis in Turkey. They began to apply for and obtain passports of the Republic of Cyprus in large numbers. While Denktaş came under fire from Turkish business circles for his intransigence, the president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, declared that Cyprus would be in the wave of new accessions with or without a solution to the Cyprus question. He added that the EU stood ready to accept any solution that was approved by the two parties on the island.

Feeling pressed from all directions, Denktaş sought to recover the initiative with a new move. On 12 November 2001 he appealed to Clerides to engage in direct talks. This initiative drew a positive response from Clerides, who was also under pressure. The parties would now be engaging in direct talks for the first time since 1997.

Despite this apparently positive development, however, both sides were holding onto their positions. At a time when the opposition in the North was becoming louder and coming under increasing pressure, Turkey was becoming more solidly united on the issue of Cyprus, with even some elements of the "Left" joining a united front of hard-liners.

### Toward the Copenhagen Summit

On 16 January 2002 the talks between the two Cypriot leaders were resumed. This time there was a widely shared view that the parties were closer than ever to an agreement. Both parties were seeking to influence the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, which would be making critical decisions on the question of the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Clerides's objective was to guarantee the membership of Cyprus, and he was determined not to be the party that walked away from the talks on the eve of the critical summit. Denktas wanted to convey the impression that he was in the negotiating process until the Copenhagen Summit made a decision on the commencement of Turkey's accession talks.

Concurrently, the EU was striving to bring about a solution by pursuing a dual-track policy. Although it did not want to admit a divided island beset by internal problem, it was also applying pressure on the Turkish side to settle by declaring that the accession of Cyprus was definite, even without a final settlement. It was also apply-

ing pressure on the Greek Cypriots to be conciliatory by gradually moving closer to Turkish positions. The European Council called on the European Commission to set up a liaison office in Northern Cyprus, while the commission allocated a sum of 208 million euros to the North for regional aid.

Meanwhile, in the local elections of 28 June 2002, Denktaş lost control of key cities to the Republican Turkish Party. While the opposition in Cyprus was questioning the links with Turkey, it wanted a settlement in Cyprus that would not exclude the mother country from eventual membership in the EU. On the contrary, it was stressing that a settlement would clear Turkey's path toward membership. Both sides forced themselves to continue with the negotiations throughout 2002.

# The AKP's New Policy on Cyprus and the Copenhagen Summit

Having won the election of 3 November 2002, the AKP government wanted to reinforce its legitimacy through the EU's accession process. All obstacles on the path to accession would be removed one by one; but the AKP was forced to start with the taboo subject of Cyprus despite the risks, because this was the most pressing issue as the summit approached. The party's election manifesto declared that the establishment of a state administration consisting of two communities, as in Belgium, would be in accordance with the interest of both communities. This was a radical departure from the established state policy. The previous position of "no solution is the solution" was being abandoned and, instead of two states, the idea of one state with two communities was being embraced. This meant giving up the idea of a confederation and returning to the formula based on federation.

These internal disagreements were clearly visible at the Copenhagen Summit. Claiming that the EU would not set a date for the commencement of negotiations, President Sezer stayed away. Denktas also stayed away and sent his foreign minister, who declared that the Annan Plan was not acceptable as a basis for negotiations. Once again, the Turkish party had given the impression of being intransigent, while Clerides appeared to be conciliatory. The EU refused to accept this situation as final, and the Summit's Conclusions document declared that the EU was seeking a united Cyprus. The door had been kept open for the Turkish side once again.

As the deadline kept being extended, minor revisions were made in the Annan Plan to accommodate Turkish objections. The Turkish side had convinced itself that the negotiating process was going in its favor, but it had

missed a crucial opportunity. Had the Annan proposals been accepted in Copenhagen as a basis for negotiation, the Annan Plan and accession of Cyprus to the EU would have been submitted to a referendum as a single package and a no vote in the South would lay to rest the hopes of the Greek Cypriots for EU membership. But the Greek-Cypriot administration and public were never confronted with such a dilemma. Thanks to the negative stand of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, the election of 16 February 2003 resulted in the presidency of the former EOKA militant Tasos Papadopoulos, who was elected with the support of the AKEL party. There was no more need for him to be conciliatory.

The debate in Turkey grew more heated after Copenhagen, while the South breathed a sigh of relief. When the Turkish side walked away from the negotiations of 10–11 March 2003, Papadopoulos was further relieved from international pressure. On 16 April 2003 the South signed the accession agreement in Athens under the label "Republic of Cyprus."

# Developments Following the Copenhagen Summit

Being conscious of the external pressure on Turkey, Denktaş made an unexpected decision on 21 April 2003 and opened the Green Line crossing points from 9:00 AM to 12:00 PM to traffic in both directions. Defying their leadership, close to 60,000 Greek Cypriots visited the North in one week, while 23,000 Turkish Cypriots crossed into the South. This was greeted with great satisfaction in European circles. Denktaş had killed several birds with one stone. The Greek Cypriots were able to see for themselves that living conditions in the North were far from being what they had been led to believe. They were obliged to present their passports to the TRNC authorities, which they had not recognized. The message was also conveyed to international circles that, if the parties were left to themselves and without outside pressure, it would be much easier to achieve a settlement through confidence-building measures taken in a step-by-step approach. The Turkish side also appeared in a conciliatory light, bringing down the tension within the TRNC.

The objective being sought by the TRNC was perfectly clear: to reiterate the equality of the two parties and remind everyone that there also was a state in the north. If a single-state solution proved unfeasible, the world would see that the alternative was two friendly states living side-by-side in Cyprus.

The Republic of Cyprus was quick to make its countermove. On 30 April it announced its new package of



measures that would benefit the Turkish Cypriots. Starting on 10 May, they would be allowed to travel to the South in their cars. This meant that the Greek Cypriots accepted the validity of vehicle license plates granted by the TRNC. Turkish Cypriots would also be able to seek employment, they would be free to channel their export products through southern ports, and TRNC diplomas would be recognized.

Meanwhile international pressure on both sides was mounting for negotiations within the framework of the Annan Plan to get underway before May 2004. The EU was determined to make every effort to secure the accession of a Cyprus that had overcome the difficulties stemming from division. The UN also was eager to see its efforts bearing fruit and took full advantage of the EU-membership lever to achieve this end. The U.S. wanted to be able to support the accession of a Turkey that had overcome its difficulties in Cyprus, because this would demonstrate that the new international order was able to coexist peacefully with Islam.

# Assumption of Power by Mehmet Ali Talat

In the election held on 14 December 2003 in the TRNC, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP: Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) obtained nineteen seats, the National Unity Party (UBP: Ulusal Birlik Partisi) eighteen, the Democratic Party (DP: Demokrat Parti) seven, and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH: Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi) six in the fifty-seat parliament. Until then the proportion of right-to-left votes had stood at around 70% to 30%. The increase in the number of seats obtained by the CTP and the BDH, which had campaigned under the banners of resolution of the issue, peaceful coexistence, and EU membership, demonstrated the desire for change among the Turkish-Cypriot people. Now most of the voters were younger people who saw their future in EU membership. The CTP was opposed to the Denktaş-Ankara duo and (reading Ankara's new mood correctly) directed its criticism at Denktaş, while affirming its readiness to pursue policies that were in tune with Ankara.

Following the election, the government was set up by the CTP under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat and the DP under the leadership of Serdar Denktas. With the son of Rauf Denktas assuming the position of deputy premier, it was clear that even the Right was finally coming to terms with change. The result of the TRNC election also strengthened the AKP government's hand. President Denktas himself got the message and was forced to act accordingly, even if he did so grudgingly.

Upon Annan's invitation, the Cypriot talks were re-

sumed on 10 February 2004. This time Denktaş was kept under close surveillance by the undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uğur Ziyal, and the Papadopoulos tactic of forcing Denktaş to walk away from the negotiating table was successfully thwarted. In the end both Denktaş and Papadopoulos were able to agree that the Annan text as it stood would not be submitted to referenda if the parties failed to reach a compromise. In that case, the gaps in the text would be filled by the UN secretary-general himself. Everything went according to plan, and the date for holding the two separate referenda was set as 24 April.

### The 24 April Referenda

In the Turkish sector, the parties of the Left and those in favor of the EU campaigned for a yes vote, while President Denktaş and the UBP sought a no vote. The leader of the DP, Serdar Denktaş, announced that he would vote no, although he instructed his party followers to vote according to their personal inclinations. In Turkey the government gave its support to the yes voters, but the opposition parties backed the no camp, with the CHP, the Nationalist Action Party, and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) in the forefront.

In the Greek sector, DIKO (the Democrat Party), the party of Papadopoulos, waged a "no" campaign by playing on the nationalistic feelings of the Greek Cypriots. In this context, the role of the Communist AKEL party was critical; but, true to its former self, it was unable to ignore the nationalistic wave sweeping the country. Although it did not object to the essence of the Annan Plan, it questioned its feasibility and sought guarantees from the Security Council, especially in connection with the military aspects of the plan. At this point the Russian Federation came into the picture and prevented the Security Council from making a decision by threatening to use its veto. This provided a façade of respectability for the AKEL's stand.

This outcome pleased AKEL as much as it gave satisfaction to Denktaş, who exclaimed, "May God bless Russia!" (Sabah, 23 April 2004).

The results of the two referenda held in Cyprus were as follows: in the North 64.9% voted yes and 35.1% voted no, while in the South the no votes prevailed by 75.8% to 24.2%. The Greek-Cypriot vote doomed the Annan Plan.

Although these results might appear to be a victory for the supporters of the status quo, they did free the Turkish side from the onus of being the intransigent party for the first time. The Turkish side's efforts to reach a settlement were widely acknowledged. The first reaction came from the EU when its foreign ministers released 259 mil-

lion euros for assisting the TRNC to achieve economic development and break away from its economic isolation. This was followed soon afterward by a U.S. announcement that it was revising its Cyprus policy. Annan submitted a report to the Security Council in which he pleaded for "the lifting of the restrictions and obstacles that are needlessly isolating the Turkish Cypriots and preventing them from developing economically" (UN Security Council S/2004/437).

The lifting of the economic embargoes would help overcome the main obstacle confronting the Turkish Cypriots in their efforts to open up to the world and thus confirm the existence of two different sectors in the island. Although the efforts of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus within the EU were slowing the process, it would be hard for European values not to prevail over divisive tendencies over the long term. Divisive tendencies could continue only if Turkey pursued an erroneous path. In fact, both Papadopoulos and the leader of the AKEL, Dimitris Christophias, have felt it necessary to affirm that their rejection of the Annan Plan need not signify the end of the process.

# IV. RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST A. Relations with Arab States

Turkey's refusal to participate in the American operation against Iraq launched on 20 March 2003 generated much sympathy for Turkey in the Arab world. These feelings were reinforced by the visits to Syria and Iran in the days preceding the operation.

Syria, Iran, and Turkey drew closer as it became clear that a Kurdish state of one sort or another would emerge in northern Iraq following the occupation. Never before had Turkish-Syrian relations been friendlier. This relationship had its origin in the Adana Agreement of 1998 and continued after the death of Hafez Assad in 2000, when President Sezer went to Damascus to attend his funeral. The process gained momentum with the visit of Bashar Assad to Turkey on 6 January 2004. During this visit trade agreements were signed through which Syria recognized, even if only indirectly, that the province of Hatay was part of Turkey. During the drafting of the texts of the agreements, Syria did not question the wording describing the two countries' borders.

Despite the allegations that Syria was behind the murder of the former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri and strong opposition, Sezer carried out his return visit in April 2005. The policies of the U.S. and Israel to isolate Turkey from Syria failed. This policy of friendship with Syria was

crucial for a medium-sized strategic country like Turkey in need of establishing balances in the region. It probably also drew strength from the fear that Syria might confront a situation, as in Iraq, in which a power vacuum would offer the PKK a chance to become implanted there. On 22 August 2006, when the issue of sending a peacekeeping force to Lebanon was being debated in Turkey, Foreign Minister Gül visited Damascus to seek Syria's views, thus displeasing the U.S. once again.

The Arab countries were also deriving satisfaction from the AKP government's harsh criticism of Israel's policies toward the Palestinians.

In June 2004 Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, a Turkish academic, was elected secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). This was another success in Turkey's Arab policies that occurred during the AKP's tenure of power. At the OIC's conference of foreign ministers held in June 2005, the TRNC participated as the "Turkish Cypriot State." It is very probable that the U.S. policies aimed at freeing the TRNC from its isolation played a role in this outcome.

### B. Relations with Non-Arab States

#### 1. Relations with Israel

# The Souring of Relations

Throughout the 1990s Turkish-Israeli cooperation extended to military, economic, and other areas. In the new decade this cooperation began to undergo changes, and the trend became more pronounced when the AKP government assumed power.

The driving force of the close Turkish-Israeli relationship in the 1990s was Turkey's military effort to defeat the PKK. A number of factors intervened that would cool this friendship. Among these factors were Turkey's success in dealing with the PKK (even if it was only partial) and the eruption of the Second Intifada following Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. This brought the Middle East Peace Process to an abrupt end. To this must be added the different perceptions and expectations of the two countries regarding the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

In October 2000 Turkey voted for the UN resolution condemning Israel for violence against the Palestinians and for the illegal activities of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories. Turkey hardened its position as the number of Jewish settlements increased, the building of the security wall went ahead, and Arafat was besieged in his Ramallah headquarters in June 2002. Foreign minister Ismail Cem called on Israel to withdraw from the areas in the West Bank that it had reoccupied. In April 2002 Ecevit described the Israeli raid on the Janin refugee camp as

genocide. Although these harsh words led to a crisis in bilateral relations, it proved short-lived when Ecevit toned down his rhetoric out of concern about losing the support of the powerful Jewish lobby in the U.S.

The criticism directed at Israel continued after November 2002, when the AKP took over the reins of government. Ankara was shaken by the news that Israel was contributing actively to the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and that it was involved in the training of Kurdish peshmerga fighters. Erdoğan rebuked Sharon for his hard-line policies and qualified as "terrorism" the killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in April 2004 and the subsequent murder of Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Turkey also voted against Israel when the decision of the International Court of Justice of 9 July 2004 ruling the Israeli security wall to be illegal was taken up by the UN General Assembly.

Despite all this, both sides did make some efforts to improve relations. In July 2004 Israeli deputy prime minister Ehud Olmert visited Turkey in order to help develop bilateral trade and economic relations. In Ankara he declared that his country was eager to continue its strategic relations with Turkey. In August 2004 Turkey sent a delegation to Israel. In January 2005, following Arafat's death, Abdullah Gül visited Israel and Palestine, where he discussed bilateral relations, the Palestinian elections, and Iraq. He indicated Syria's readiness to engage in peace negotiations and called for their resumption. Although Israel turned down Turkey's proposal, it did welcome the Turkish efforts in this direction. Gül caused apprehension in Israel by addressing the Palestinian parliament but not the Knesset and by calling on Israel to recognize the new Palestinian government that had been formed following Arafat's death.

In the election held on 25 January 2006, Hamas emerged as the winner, with 76 seats in the Palestinian parliament of 132 seats. When Hamas formed the new government, Israel imposed an economic embargo. It was at this juncture that Khaled Mashal, one of the Hamas leaders, visited Ankara, causing renewed tension in Turkish-Israeli relations.

Nevertheless, these relations maintained their normal course in the economic, trade, and military fields. Whereas exports to Israel amounted to \$861 million in 2002, they registered an increase of more than 20%, reaching \$1.067 billion in 2003. In the next two years exports hovered around the \$1.1 billion level. In October 2003 the agreement for the sale of water from the Manavgat River to Israel was signed. The agreement was never implemented, however, and it was eventually canceled in 2006.

#### 2. Relations with Iran

The international developments after 2000 all contributed to the improvement of bilateral relations with Iran, which had followed an unsatisfactory course in the past. The following factors helped bring about this improvement.

# The Relaxation of Ideological Rivalry

Especially after the reelection of Mohammad Khatami for a second term as president, the inherent ideological conflict in Turkish-Iranian relations began to ebb. The time from 2000 to 2005 was the first period that was not marred by a crisis in bilateral relations. This was not surprising, because Khatami's main goal in foreign policy was to change Iran's image as a revisionist state bent on exporting its revolutionary regime.

The election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as successor to Khatami in 2005 led to concern in Turkey that the former ideological rivalry and the recurrent crises it generated might return to spoil relations. But this concern proved groundless. Ahmadinejad's domestic policy was similar to Khomeini's, but in foreign policy he maintained the Khatami course. Although his rhetoric toward Israel and some other countries was reminiscent of Khomeini's, no hostility was displayed toward Turkey. On the contrary, he was even more conciliatory toward Ankara than his predecessor had been.

#### The U-Turn in Iran's Policy toward the PKK

In the 1990s the most serious question in bilateral relations had been Iran's support for the PKK. In a dramatic shift a few years after the turn of the new century, the support came to an end. In fact, Iran began to cooperate militarily with Turkey in the struggle against the PKK.

It appeared that Iran's PKK policies were not indexed to Iran's internal dynamics but rather to U.S. and PKK policies. Apparently, Iran was merely reacting to the actions of the U.S. and the PKK. Until about 2000 Tehran had seen the PKK as a vehicle for reducing the effectiveness of Ankara and Baghdad in the region.

Iran also hoped to transfer the grievances of its own Kurds to Turkey and Iraq by siding with the PKK. These expectations changed with the capture of Öcalan in 1999 and the occupation of Iraq in 2003. The PKK's relations with Iran also worsened as a result of the squabbles that erupted within the organization after 1999. But, above all, it was Tehran's perception that the U.S. had begun to use the PKK as one of the tools against Iran after the occupation of Iraq, as well as the actions of the PKK confirming this perception, that brought on the final rupture. The militant antiregime Mujahedin-e Khalq group began to

leave Turkey and headed to the U.S. and Europe (where it could operate more freely) and also to bases in Iraq. This removed a major obstacle to good bilateral relations. Iran responded by repeatedly bombing the PKK base at Kandil Dağı in Iraq, which continued to be a major source of irritation for Turkey.

Similarity of Views regarding the Occupation of Iraq With the occupation, Turkey and Iran began to get concerned about the territorial integrity of Iraq and took a common stand against the possibility of a new state in northern Iraq. There was also an identity of views on the need for the occupiers to turn over the administration to Iraqis as early as possible and to evacuate the country.

But the positions of the two countries were divergent in three areas. Iran was openly opposed to Turkey sending troops to Iraq and supported the Shiite Arabs, while Turkey sought to obtain a fairer share of Iraq's resources for the Sunni Arabs and Turcomans that would be proportionate to their actual numbers. Iran was also resentful that Turkey was providing many of the supplies needed to sustain the occupation. But these were minor issues that would be easily sorted out with time.

# Iran's Nuclear Policy

Contrary to expectations, Turkish-Iranian relations were not affected by U.S. allegations about Tehran's nuclear ambitions. As U.S. pressure on Iran mounted, Tehran's efforts to improve relations with Turkey also increased.

Although Turkey's rhetoric was not that different from Iran's, Ankara made an effort to ensure that there was no confrontation with the U.S. Turkey kept repeating that, as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its annexed protocols, Iran was bound to observe the provisions that gave Iran certain rights but also imposed responsibilities. Consequently, Iran had a right to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the enrichment of uranium, but it also had to allow full supervision of its activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ankara also declared that if the IAEA and the Security Council uncovered serious lapses in Iran's nuclear program and decided to impose sanctions, Turkey would observe the sanctions. Assuming that the Security Council would make no decision that would reflect on its relations with Turkey, Tehran announced that it was satisfied with Ankara's approach to this issue.

The Natural Gas Pipeline, Transport, and Tourism
The gas pipeline linking the two countries came into operation in December 2001. Turkey's purchases of gas shifted

the balance of trade in favor of Iran. The Iranian market was protected by high customs barriers; to compensate for this, Turkish products would be given a chance to become more competitive in this market by lowering the duties on all Turkish imports to 4%.

Rail passenger services between İstanbul and Tehran were resumed. Ankara also allowed the opening of rail services between Tehran and Damascus via Turkey to enable Iranian pilgrims to visit the holy sites in greater comfort. The number of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey grew to more than half a million. Some of these visitors were coming to purchase Turkish goods for subsequent resale in their country. The obstacles and formalities hampering the transit of trucks were reduced to a minimum.

Two events marred these favorable developments. Although the Turkish firm TAV (Tepe, Akfen, Vie) had completed the construction of the Imam Khomeini Airport, the Iranian parliament denied the company the right to operate the facility, as provided in the contract. The parliament also blocked the firm Turkcell from acquiring a majority share in Iran's first private cell phone operator, even though Khatami made a special effort on behalf of the Turkish company. But these events did not stop Turkish investments in Iran. Turkish firms that wanted to take advantage of cheap energy and labor were eager to invest in Iran just as they had been doing in the Balkan countries.

# The Freezing of Contentious Issues between Azerbaijan and Iran

In the 1990s Baku and Tehran had been at odds over the status of the Caspian Sea and the issues of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijani nationalism. In the following decade these issues did not disappear, but they were allowed to drop from the active agenda. This lessened the likelihood of a confrontation between Turkey and Iran.

The last incident in the dispute between the two countries over this issue occurred in 2001, when an Azerbaijani exploration vessel searching for oil in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea was harassed by the Iranian navy. As a warning to Iran, Turkey sent a formation of F-16 aircraft on a visit to Azerbaijan.

# V. RELATIONS WITH THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

In the first decade of the new century two radical and contradictory changes occurred in Turkey's relations with the region. Turkey lost much of its interest in the area even as its importance there kept on increasing.

### Turkey's Withdrawal from the Region

In this period Turkey withdrew from a region in which it had displayed so much interest in the 1990s for a number of reasons.

Internal reasons: after Turkey was declared a candidate for membership at the EU's Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey's attention shifted toward the EU around the middle of 2001. The economic crisis of 2001 also had the effect of focusing Turkey's attention on its domestic problems. The attention of the AKP government that took over in November 2002 was firmly fixed on the EU. Moreover, the countries of the region had not found what they were speking in Turkey and began to lose interest in the relationship. This naturally affected Ankara's perception of the area. One reason why Turkey had been so interested in the region was the impression in Ankara that, with the demise of the USSR, Russia had ceased to count. When the true situation became apparent, Turkey's interest started to wane.

External reasons: with its occupation of Afghanistan in 2002, the U.S. changed its strategy and began to get more involved with the region. It acquired bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (which were subsequently lost) and obtained the right to use Kazakhstan's air space and make emergency landings there. The U.S. also made its influence felt through the various revolutions that took place, including the Orange Revolution and others. The revolutionary movement had its origin in Georgia, where American influence was preponderant, and spread from there to Ukraine. But the wave was unable to spill across the Caspian Sea. In Kyrgyzstan the opposition took to the streets and succeeded in gaining power; but in Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev held onto power by associating himself more closely with the U.S. The revolutionary governments that came to power in Georgia and Ukraine were not all that successful. But these events demonstrated that, despite everything, the U.S. was the most influential power in the region.

In addition, the EU was beginning to take an interest in the region by including the southern Caucasus within its neighborhood policy and was getting more involved in the Black Sea region. On the other side of the globe, China also began to take a closer interest in the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. There were substantial Chinese investments in Kazakhstan. As the major global actors made their influence felt to a much greater extent, the Turkish presence was receding into the background.

The changes in government in some of the region's countries also led to a cooling of relations with Turkey. One example was the new leader in Georgia, Mikheil

Saakashvili, who was putting greater stress on nationalism and religion. Among his actions was the placing of a huge cross in Batumi, just across the Turkish border. All of this made Turkey uncomfortable. Georgia felt a similar discomfort over Turkey's close ties to Eduard Shevardnadze in the period of the changeover and Ankara's coolness toward the Rose Revolution there, not to mention the contacts that were maintained with the Abkhazians. Furthermore, Georgia acted in concert with Romania and Bulgaria to draw the U.S. into the Black Sea area, leaving it out of step with both Russia and Turkey.

A similar process was underway in Kyrgyzstan, where Turkey stood by Askar Akayev until the last moment. As soon as the new regime took over, rumors began to surface about alleged irregularities and bribes relating to Turkish investments. Turkey's unconditional support of İlham Aliyev aroused anger among the public in Azerbaijan.

Another sign of this new trend was the end of the spread of Fethullah Gülen schools in the region. In fact, their numbers began to decrease. These schools started to experience difficulties in securing funding, owing to the economic crises in Central Asia as well as in Turkey. As doubts about these schools began to grow in Turkey, a similar pattern emerged in the region. Finally, when Gülen settled in the U.S., talk spread among the Russian public that his community was in the service of U.S. intelligence.

# Turkey Ascendant in the Region: Energy Pipelines

The completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and Kazakhstan's decision to join the venture were sure to give a boost to Turkey's standing in the region over the medium and long term, even if its immediate effect was slight.

In addition to the BTC, other pipelines were boosting Turkey's standing in the region. In 2006 the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline was nearing completion. Contrary to the expectations of many, the Blue Stream project (with the partnership of the Italian energy giant ENI [Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi]) was completed and began to move natural gas on the seabed of the Black Sea directly from Russia to Turkey. Projects were initiated to ship natural gas to Greece and Italy through Turkey. Multinational oil firms, as well as the Russian energy giant Lukoil, went ahead with plans to construct oil refineries in Ceyhan. As a result of the chaotic situation in Iraq and the possibility that Iran might come under an American/ Israeli attack or have an embargo imposed on it, the price of energy began to spiral upward. This enhanced the importance of the pipelines crossing Turkey. In addition, new lines were being planned to carry oil from Samsun to Ceyhan. Finally, there were plans to connect the Turkish natural gas network with the Middle East under the Mediterranean Sea. As a consequence of these developments, the Caucasus began to be perceived not as a part of Eurasia but as a part of the Euro-Atlantic region. It was natural for the importance of Turkey, as a neighbor of the region, to rise at the same time.

# VI. RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Visits by the Russian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

On 23–25 October 2000 prime minister Mikhail Kasianov paid a visit to Ankara that produced notable results. He proposed that Turkey become a strategic partner. Although the exact content of this proposal was not clear, soon afterward the littoral states of the Black Sea established the Black Sea Peace Force (Blackseafor) on 2 April 2001, with headquarters in Istanbul. Its task would be to engage in maritime search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, measures to clear mines, protection of the environment, and other tasks that the contracting parties might wish to assign. The agreement was ratified in August, and the first exercise was carried out from the naval base at Gölcük in Turkey.

The timing of foreign minister Igor Ivanov Ivanov's visit on 7-8 June 2001 was significant. Previously, the U.S. had announced its new energy policy. Turkey was blocking the European Security and Defense Policy, the public in Turkey was engrossed with the "White Energy" scandal that also involved the Blue Stream project, relations between Iran and Azerbaijan had grown tense in June, Russia had bombed Georgia for helping the Chechen insurgents, and Chechen militants in Turkey had attempted to highjack a plane, followed by a hostage-taking incident at the Swissotel in Istanbul. The agenda before the ministers included cooperation against terrorism, Turkish support against the Chechens, the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the prevention of the passage of nuclear wastes through the Straits, and cooperation in the Eurasian region. On 16 November 2001 the Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia was signed. The text laid stress on the Eurasian identity of both countries and, for the first time, went into a detailed description of various fields of cooperation.

#### Military Cooperation

Another milestone in relations was the signing of the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field and Agreement on Cooperation in Military Training on 15 January 2002. These agreements were signed

during a visit to Turkey by the Russian chief of the General Staff Anatoly Krashnin, which coincided with Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to the U.S. Under the provisions of these agreements, Russia would sell military technology to Turkey, and Turkey would manufacture Russian-designed equipment; the future Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would be jointly defended; the military academies would cooperate; and collaboration would extend into areas like the struggle against PKK and Chechen terrorists. Cooperation was also envisaged in the ongoing operation in Afghanistan.

When Romania and Bulgaria proposed the extension of the operations of NATO forces into the Black Sea region, Turkey and Russia blocked this. Turkey was worried about possible violations of the Montreux Straits Convention, while Russia was concerned about U.S. domination of the Black Sea. Both countries were in favor of preserving the existing balance in the Black Sea.

### Visits by Members of the AKP Government

Even before the momentous events of 2003 had pushed the issue of relations with Russia into the background, Erdoğan went to Moscow prior to assuming his duties as prime minister and had a meeting with President Putin on 24 December 2002. This was followed by the visit of Foreign Minister Gül to Moscow on 23–25 February 2003. The issues taken up during the talks were cooperation against terrorism, the balance-of-trade deficit, difficulties in the implementation of the Blue Stream agreement, and problems encountered in navigation through the Straits.

One of the pressing issues in the agenda was cooperation against terrorism. In general, Moscow was satisfied with Turkey's approach to the Chechen question. Mustafa Yıldırım, who had taken thirteen persons hostage at the Marmara Hotel on 4 May 2002, was condemned to a prison term of thirty-six years on 12 July 2004. Following the Beslan hostage-taking incident, however, Russian minister of defense Sergey Ivanov announced that between 1999 and 2004 there were twenty-four Turkish nationals among the terrorists killed in Chechnya.

# **Economic Relations**

For Turkey, the main concern in this field was the yawning trade gap. The volume of trade began to grow, especially after the natural gas projects came into operation. Trade, which stood at close to \$10 billon in 1997, fell by about half as a consequence of the 1998 crisis but rose to \$9 billion in 2004. Meanwhile the trade gap grew from \$1.3 billion in 1999 to \$2.7 in 2000 and then to almost \$5 billion in 2004. The almost total disappearance of the luggage trade also contributed to the growth of the gap. With

the disappearance of this trade, Turkey lost an important asset in its effort to overcome the gap. The luggage trade, which stood at \$4 billion in 2002, fell sharply when limitations were imposed on the quantity and value of goods that could be imported by travelers, starting on 1 January 2003. All items over 50 kilograms in weight and \$1,000 in value per traveler became liable to customs duties and VAT as they entered Russia.

Tourism, another element that helped compensate for the trade gap, maintained its buoyancy. The number of Russian visitors grew from 1 million in 2002 to 1.2 million in 2003 and to 1.7 million in 2004, placing the Russian tourists in second place after the Germans.

The Blue Stream project came into operation on 20 February 2003 and remained on the agenda all through the year. The "White Energy" scandal arose in large measure because Turkey had not been able to complete its domestic gas distribution network. Another item being discussed with Russia is the establishment of an oil pipeline that will bypass the Straits in order to alleviate the oil tanker traffic. The two routes being considered are the Samsun-Ceyhan line and the Black Sea—Aegean line from Kıyıköy on the Black Sea to Saros on the Aegean.

The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, at a cost of approximately \$3 billion, was begun on 25 June 2002, and the first oil reached Ceylan at the end of 2005. The line became fully operational in July 2006.

Putin was due to visit Turkey for the first time on 2 and 3 September 2004, but this had to be postponed to 5–6 December because of the hostage-taking at Beslan. The timing of this visit was seen as support for Turkey at a time when the European Summit was scheduled to decide on 17 December about beginning accession talks with Turkey. Following the visit, Gasprom and Botaş signed a framework agreement on energy cooperation.

In January and May 2005 Prime Minister Erdoğan made official visits to Moscow, followed by the Sochi summit in July. At this summit, it was decided to raise the volume of bilateral trade from \$11 billion to \$25 billion in three years.

Person-to-person contact between the two countries, which consisted mostly of the sex trade in the 1990s, acquired a completely different dimension, with mixed Turkish-Russian marriages reaching 80,000.

Bilateral relations developed positively during this period. This was in some measure due to the good relations that had been established with the USSR in its last decade of existence. The agreements signed with Russia during Putin's presidency demonstrated that more positive developments can be expected in the future.

#### VII. RELATIONS WITH BALKAN NEIGHBORS

Starting in 2000, the basic parameters in the Balkans underwent radical changes.

### Stability and Borders

The old, warring generation gradually disappeared from the scene, and a certain measure of stability was established. Aside from the brief and (by Balkan standards) relatively bloodless Albanian uprising in Macedonia, peace and stability were gradually restored throughout the region. With the secession of Macedonia from Serbia, the process of disintegration of the former Yugoslav Federation was completed, with Kosovo remaining as the most contentious place. The negotiations over the final status of this territory under UN administration were going on in Vienna. (Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 2008.)

#### The U.S. and the EU

The U.S. approach to the Balkan region underwent drastic changes in the new millennium. For the Bush administration, the Middle East and Central Asia had strategic priority, and the U.S. allowed the EU to assume responsibility in the Balkans, declaring that this was done in the name of cooperation. In line with this policy, the U.S. forces in the region were rapidly reduced. Whereas 20,000 American troops were stationed in Bosnia in 1996, their members had dwindled to about 5,000 troops spread out in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia by 2006.

When the EU assumed the political and economic responsibility for the region, it designated Greece (the sole EU member in the Balkans) as its representative and spokesperson in the region. Following a shift in its Balkan policy in 1996, Greece mended its relations first with Albania and then with Macedonia as it built up its economic presence in the region. Greece took over the responsibility for distributing and disbursing EU funds among the Balkan countries and assumed the task of preparing them for EU membership based on its own experience. In this framework, the EU's Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 opened up the perspective of eventual EU memberships for these countries. A bank was set up, with its headquarters located in Thessaloniki. Having achieved internal peace, Bulgaria and Romania were awaiting full membership in 2007, and all the Balkan countries found it in their strategic interest to pursue policies of friendship toward Greece.

In preparation for membership, the EU signed Stability and Partnership Agreements first with Macedonia and then with Albania and Croatia. The signing of a similar agreement with Serbia was postponed until Belgrade agreed to cooperate in the handing over of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic to the War Crimes Tribunal.

These developments made accession to the EU the main concern of the Balkan states and pushed Turkey into a marginalized position in the region. Other developments contributed to Turkey's marginalization in the Balkans: the economic crisis of 2001 that severely jolted the Turkish economy, Turkey's own concerns about accession to the EU, and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the region, which left Ankara without its main source of support.

### VIII. HUMAN RIGHTS

In 1998 the ECHR reached a decision on the Titina Loizidou case relating to her property rights in Northern Cyprus, which went against Turkey. By agreeing to pay compensation in December 2003, Ankara was able to overcome this contentious issue. Ankara also agreed to reach a friendly settlement over the property of the Assumption priests.

During this period Turkey made very significant progress in the field of human rights legislation.

Turkey's progress was in three different categories. As explained earlier (see "Politics" above), the first category consisted of the comprehensive constitutional amendments introduced in October 2001 and the eight EU harmonization packages. The second category included the Turkish Civil Code of 22 November 2001, the Turkish Penal Code of 26 September 2004, and the Penal Procedural Code of 4 December 2004. These changes made significant improvements in Turkey's legislation. The third category was Turkey's accession to the principal human rights conventions, through which Turkey engaged itself to comply with international commitments. Among these were the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (adhered to on 16 September 2002), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adhered to on 13 September 2003), and the Thirteenth Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights, completely banning the death penalty (adhered to on 20 February 2006).

With these arrangements, Turkey's legislative short-comings in the areas of democracy, human rights, the establishment of the rule of law, and, above all, the abolition of the death penalty were rectified to a very large extent. The interpretation and implementation of the new legislation by the administration and judiciary left much to be desired, however, and many of the old problems persisted.

The main reason for this was the judiciary's unwillingness or inability to adapt itself to the new legislation, because its mentality made it difficult to abandon old practices and conform to new rules. Therefore this period has been a time of transition in complying with human rights norms.

# IX. THE ISSUE OF THE TURKISH STRAITS The Transit Regime

Positive Developments at the IMO (International Maritime Organization): Turkey had met with criticism at the IMO for its regulation of 1994 and 1998 governing navigation through the Turkish Straits. Starting in 1999, developments at the IMO took a more positive course for Turkey.

In May 1999 the decision was made to delete this question from the IMO's agenda on the condition that Turkey would establish a Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) system in the Straits and adopt the other necessary technical measures. This reversal on the IMO's part was not unrelated to the policies of the U.S. with reference to energy transport routes and particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. In fact, President Clinton was a witness at the adoption of the Istanbul Declaration regarding the BTC in November 1999, signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

The coming into operation of the VTS system in the Straits: parallel to these developments at the IMO, Turkey invited tenders for the Maritime Traffic and Information System in the Turkish Straits, and the actual building got underway in 2001. The system (consisting of thirteen radar towers) came into operation on 30 December 2003. This system enabled all ships to be monitored electronically twenty-four hours a day and advised captains on navigation conditions. From 2003 to 2005 there were some cases of ships breaking down, but not a single maritime accident in the Straits.

Changes in legislation: the transit regime that came into operation in 1998 was maintained until 2006. To cope with the increasing number of ships and their changing characteristics, however, certain changes to the 1998 regulation were introduced in October 2002. One of these changes was the requirement imposed on ships of over 200 meters laden with dangerous cargos to transit the Straits in daytime unless there were overriding reasons to do otherwise. In addition, it became mandatory for vessels over 500 gross tons and those carrying dangerous cargos to be in possession of internationally valid insurance policies and international environmental safety certificates.

The Straits and international energy transportation routes: during this period the outcome of the BTC pipeline issue was decided. The saga began in 1994 with the signing of an agreement in Baku, followed in 1998 by the signing of a memorandum of understanding by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The three national parliaments ratified the agreement in 2000, and actual construction began in 2002. The first shipment of oil arrived at Ceyhan at the end of 2005. Thus, in addition to the relief created by the new VTS system in the Straits, the congested waterway would henceforth be relieved of the tankers that had been transporting oil from Azerbaijan.

Early in 2004 a new threat to the Straits began to loom. As a result of the increased global demand for petroleum and the negative developments in the Middle East, there was talk of a fivefold increase in the flow of Kazakh and Russian oil through the Straits by 2010. This led to the consideration of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline project after 2004. At first, it was rumored that Russia and the oil companies were not much in favor of the project; but the Turkish government clarified the position after consultations with interested parties. In May 2006 the decree granting the responsibility to undertake the preparations for the project to an energy company was approved by the government. When realized, this project will turn Ceyhan into a world-class oil terminal and relieve the Straits of the flow of Kazakh and Russian oil, with all the threats that such flows imply for the waterway.

Conclusions: Turkey was successful in demonstrating the threats that excessive tanker traffic posed to the Straits. This helped Ankara in furthering its policy of routing energy pipelines through Turkish territory. The threat to the Straits is real, and Ankara used this threat with skill to achieve its goal of obtaining approval for its other projects. As a result, Ankara achieved its dual objective of carrying out its energy projects while also developing a new regime and technical infrastructure to ensure safety of navigation through the Straits.

# The Effect of 9/11 on the Turkish Straits

In 2005 and 2006 the U.S. pursued a policy of enhancing its presence in the Black Sea. Inevitability, this policy placed the provisions of the Montreux Straits Convention on the international agenda.

1. After 9/11 the U.S. intensified its struggle against terrorism and, in this context, initiated Operation Active Endeavor in the eastern Mediterranean region. This enabled the U.S. to monitor maritime traffic in the Mediterranean. The U.S. sought a similar arrangement in the Black Sea region, with its network of energy transportation routes. In this connection, it concluded a treaty with Romania in December 2005 that provided for the establishment of an American naval base at Constanta.

- 2. The freedom of movement of the U.S. (as a non-littoral state of the Black Sea) in this area, however, was severely constrained by the terms of the Montreux Convention: in peacetime, nonlittoral states cannot maintain warships in the Black Sea in excess of a total of 30,000 tons (in specific situations, this ceiling can go up to 45,000 tons). Furthermore, their stay in the Black Sea cannot exceed twenty-one days.
- 3. Even if Turkey and Russia did not look upon the U.S. presence with much sympathy, the U.S. policy in this respect, if seriously pursued, would lead to a reinterpretation of the provisions of the Montreux Convention in a way that would dilute these limitations in order to conform to changing circumstances. Worse still, such a situation might even lead to arguments to revise the Montreux Convention (as occurred in the 1990s). This possibility would keep Turkish policy-makers preoccupied for some time to come.

# X. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE PERIOD FROM 2001 TO 2006

#### **Domestic Politics**

With the events of 11 September 2001, the world entered a period of intensified fear and nationalism. This led to a serious erosion of freedom everywhere. Paradoxically, this was a period when Turkey was becoming much freer, thanks to the modernizing reforms being carried out to meet EU standards.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the general atmosphere gripping the world was also spreading to Turkey, where the Sèvres syndrome and the coming into power of an "Islamist" party made an already heavy atmosphere even more difficult. The slightest provocation was enough to bring lynch mobs out into the streets in city centers. For the first time in its history, Turkey was attempting to become a country of laws. Instead, it started heading toward becoming a "lynch state."

#### Foreign Policy

At this time, Turkey's foreign policy also began to take shape under the shadow of 9/11 and the U.S. effort to impose its hegemony on the Middle East by force of arms.

Even as Turkey struggled to adapt itself to the new conditions prevailing after the end of the Cold War, it had to make an additional effort to adjust to the changed conditions once again. Under normal conditions, it would be expected that the U.S. would easily succeed in giving direction to Ankara's foreign policy, at least in the short term. This was because one of the characteristic features of a strategic middle-sized power is that it feels it must al-

ways be on the agenda of the hegemonic power. Turkey needed the U.S. to be on its side for two important reasons. Turkey felt compelled to cooperate with the IMF (always under the strong influence of Washington) to shore up its economy, ever vulnerable because of widespread corruption and permanently threatened with recurring crises. Another reason for depending on Washington's backing was that Turkey had not been able to solve its foreign policy problems at a national level because of an unduly nationalistic approach to these issues. Notable among these unresolved issues were the Kurdish, Armenian, and Cypriot questions.

These expectations of continued U.S. influence over Ankara did not come to pass, however, because of the neo-con–inspired policies in the Middle East, which had two contradictory effects on Turkey.

- 1. The anxiety-producing effect: it should not be forgotten that a strategic middle-sized power only breathes free when balance is prevailing. At this time, there was no trace of balance in the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey's border regions were in danger of being submerged in chaos both during the Gulf War of 1991 and during the attack on Iraq in 2003. Under these circumstances, Turkey could follow two courses.
- a. Turkey could comply with U.S. wishes. In this case, Turkey would become a "pivotal" state that was dependent on the U.S. In practice, this would drag Turkey into the Middle East quagmire and antagonize neighbors whose populations were predominantly Muslim. Turkey had gone through this experience during the Menderes period, from 1950 to 1960. It would also lead to a loss of the relative autonomy that Turkey had built up in the 1960s and 1970s.

b. Turkey could distance itself from the U.S. In practice, this would be a difficult option. As a strategic middle-sized power, Turkey could not afford to be dropped from the agenda of the hegemon. That is why Ankara agreed to send troops to Afghanistan in October 2001 and to Lebanon on 5 September 2006, without, however, getting caught up in the quagmire. The first decision was easy for the government; in the case of the second decision, however, it had to overcome the opposition of NGOs that had become more vocal and more experienced after the rejection of the government motion of 1 March 2003. But the government appeared more determined in this case, and the opposition of NGOs was overcome.

2. The opportunity-creating effect: the neo-con policies would not be able to dominate a region like the Middle East by relying exclusively on Israel. This offered numerous opportunities for Turkey.

For a strategic middle-sized power to breathe, a bal-

ance is as essential as oxygen. It is effective to the extent that there is a regional and global balance. These powers are particularly adept at establishing their relative autonomy, which is inherent in all countries. To achieve this, they sometimes have to produce their own oxygen (see Box Intro-6 in the Introduction).

If the U.S. had continued to pursue the policies of the Clinton administration, Turkey might have come under greater U.S. influence. But the neo-cons embarked on an imperialism that eliminated all semblance of balance. This policy made it essential for Washington to rely on Turkey in addition to Israel. This, in turn, led to much American pressure on Turkey but at the same time expanded Turkey's room for maneuver. In a Middle East where the existing balance had been upset, Turkey found the oxygen it required by moving closer to Syria and Iran during the crises in Iraq and Lebanon. On the issues of energy routes and the access of the U.S. Navy to the Black Sea, Turkey moved closer to Russia. Especially on the issue of revising the Montreux Convention (which represented balance for Turkey), Ankara established a kind of alliance with Russia. Turkey was almost pushed into following this course because of the neo-cons, who operated under the banner "those who are not with us are against us."

Turkey undertook the Blue Stream project with Russia in 1998, when Clinton was president and Turkish-U.S. relations were excellent. The objective that was being sought with this project was not balance. The real objective was to meet the growing demand for energy in Turkey, with the more sinister aims of profit and corruption lurking in the background. The Blue Stream project eventually turned into a rival of the East-West energy corridor that the U.S. had been backing so energetically. Blue Stream was used by Russia to frustrate American efforts to isolate it in the field of energy. Due to the need for balance/oxygen of a strategic medium-sized power both in its region and in the wider Black Sea area, a project that had been conceived to attain other objectives acquired a completely different purpose as well.

The effect of the Kurdish question: against the background of these developments, the Kurdish question continued, as always, to rob Turkish foreign policy of its rationality. Turkish policy vis-à-vis Iraq (especially northern Iraq) was always regarded in Turkey as being in the realm of domestic rather than foreign policy, because this policy was indexed directly and exclusively to Turkey's Kurdish question. Due to "Sèvres paranoia," Ankara had never been able to turn its own Kurds into "voluntary citizens." Instead they remained a collection of "compulsory citizens" and could therefore not be trusted. This automatically led to a policy of total opposition to any semblance

of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Ankara began to draw "red lines" in a neighboring country that were beyond its capacity to enforce. Inevitably, this resulted in loss of prestige. For these reasons, Turkey's ability to formulate rational policies in the Middle East and particularly in northern Iraq remained constricted.

#### The AKP's Policies

In many ways, the AKP government that assumed power in November 2002 resembled Özal's Motherland Party administration. It by-passed the traditional institutions of the state and relied on Turkish citizens as advisors that had lived and worked in the U.S. Its foreign policy catered to the inclinations of the American Jewish lobby. It sought contacts with key individuals within the U.S. administration and maintained close links with think tanks that were close to the neo-cons. At the same time, the new government sought to expand its freedom of maneuver by tackling ossified questions such as Cyprus and the Kurds in order to minimize their influence on the direction of Turkey's foreign policy.

But the AKP had drawn the necessary lessons from the experience of the Welfare Party and Virtue Party. In addition, NGOs had developed significantly in recent years. As a result, the AKP did not follow in the Motherland Party's tracks. It made a special effort not to find itself at odds with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the army. Where it really differed from the Motherland Party, however, was in its ideology. The AKP was not bound to the ideology of the nation-state, with its strong attachment to the concept of assimilation—something that was out of step with modern practices. The AKP was not nationalis-

tic. Thus, instead of focusing on the concepts of "Turkishness," it preferred the concept of "belonging to Turkey." Before it came under the influence of the wave of Turkish nationalism that swept the country after 2004, the AKP was quite close to modern ideas that found their expression within the context of the EU's Copenhagen Criteria. In other words, the AKP, which was the latest manifestation of the current that was a reaction to Kemalism, also adopted the practices of modernization that had been launched by Kemalism.

Obviously, the AKP, representing the fast-rising conservative "Anatolian capital," was never anti-West, as alleged by certain quarters in the latter part of 2006. On the contrary, it made a real effort to appease the U.S. over the 1 March government motion. This was clearly seen when the decision was made to send Turkish peacekeeping forces to Lebanon.

The report "Transatlantic Tendencies 2006" (issued by the joint American-German-Italian pollsters in September 2006) noted that those who looked upon the U.S. with sympathy in Turkey had fallen from 28% in 2004 to 20%. During the same interval, those who looked upon Iran with sympathy had risen from 34% to 43%. These changes had nothing to do with a reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy from West to East. The rapprochement with Syria, Iran, and Russia might in a way be related to the conservative Islamic tendencies of the AKP but in reality was the instinctive move of a strategic middle-sized power to establish a balance of power in the region.

Baskin Oran

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